The United States and the

Question of the Greco-Turkish

War, 1919-1922
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SAMUEL J. RAPHALIDES

I
In the post World War II era, the strain in the trilateral relation
between the United States, Greece and Turkey is one of the most
disquieting and vexatious elements to emerge from American
foreign policy. The so-called southeastern flank of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is currently beset with
tensions that threaten to impede its contributory role in NATO's
overall defense strategy for southeastern Europe (if th~y have not
already done so). In this political drama, the principal antagonists,
Greece and Turkey, have a number of outstanding differences
which on occasion have brought them to the precipice of war ..
As a result, the United States has intervened as the protagonist
and consequently has become the recipient of the enmity of these
two NATO allies for not recognizing their 'special' claims or
interests. As in the characteristic classical Greek drama, the chorus
of NATO partners offer a common chant: they are united in
proclaiming that the current state of affairs seems to portend
failure to the concerted effort to defend Western Europe.
Although this vexatious problem developed during the post
World War II period, it is best understood when approached
through an historical paradigm in which the many forces that
helped create the tension can be mined from the field of historical
events. To be sure, the current dilemma in the trilateral relation
of the United States, Greece and Turkey was not created by any
one variable; it is, instead, the result of complex and interactive
171
 forces of history that can be observed in the American experience,
and in the bilateral relation between the two antagonists, within
a framework of European events in which the United States played
a significant role. Participation in World War I and the post war
settlements by the United States reflect this role. Then, too, the
participation of the United States in the Second World War and its
assumptive post bellum leadership role of the West strengthen the
historical linkage, because Greece and Turkey become dependent
on the United States and have not resolved their outstanding
bilateral differences. In this context, historic claims and interests
were constantly subsumed under Cold War priorities - that is, the
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greater struggle taking place between East and West. As a result,

as new differences emerged from the accumulation of unresolved
claims and unrecognized 'special' interests, American policies often
exacerbated the tension between the antagonists.
Within the American historical context of this trilateral relation,
the Greco-Turkish war of 1919-22 is but one link in a relational
pattern that had its genesis in the Greek war of independence from
the Ottoman Empire (1821-9). Conceptually its significance as a
subject of inquiry in American foreign policy rests with two
noteworthy factors. First, it occurred at that moment in American
history when the forces of internationalism paradoxically generated
isolationism. Therefore it underscores a chapter in American foreign
policy in which the Harding Administration attempted to reconcile
nonentanglement in Europe's affairs with the pragmatic require-
ments demanded of a dominant power. Second, it focuses needed
attention on the trilateral relation of the United States, Greece and
Turkey in the pre-World War II period - a period that has
received insufficient attention. It is the description of the situation
in the Near East to which we now briefly give our attention.

II
On 30 October 1918 Turkey accepted the armistice of Mudros,
which removed the Ottoman Empire from the war. However, the
Turks did not sign a peace treaty until 10 August 1920, at Sevres.
The considerable delay in a settlement of the Eastern Question,
after the Mudros armistice, had several causes. First, the allied
concern with Germany consumed most of the attention in 1919.
Second, considerable attention was devoted to the division of the
172
 Austrian Empire, especially the Balkan territorial frontiers. And,
lastly, delay occurred because of the widely held idea by the allies
that the United States was considering accepting mandates under
the newly created League of Nations for the proposed Armenian
state and Constantinople.!
Although President Wilson refused to commit any American
forces to the occupation of Turkey, he agreed to both an American
mandate for Armenia and possibly Constantinople, if the United
States Senate consented.2 However, given the nature of American
public opinion against entanglement in European matters, as
evidenced by the Senate's rejection of the treaty of Versailles, the
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prospect for a mandatory role was not very good. In June 1920
Congress formally refused the proposal for an American mandate.
The congressional rejoinder was straightforward and compelling,
and officially signaled a United States withdrawal from all political
responsibilities in the Near East. 3
The general complexity of the situation in Asia Minor and the
area of the Straits, along with the traditional rivalries which
divided the allies, most notably the conflict between Great Britain
and France,4 caused many problems through misperception and
miscalculation among the actors. For example, it created the illusion
that time and circumstances would allow its imposition upon the
Turks regardless of the provisions of the settlement wi~h Turkey.

I. The United States officially sought information on what a mandatory role

would entail. Major General Jaces G. Harbord, Chief of the President's Mission
to the Near East, was assigned the responsibility 'to investigate and report on
political, military, geographical, administrative, economic, and other considerations
involved in possible American interests and responsibilities in that region'. Papers
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, II (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934), pp. 826-8. (Hereafter cited as Foreign
Relations.) See New York Times (22 February 1920), IV, p. 1.
2. Foreign Relations, 1919, Paris Peace Conference, III, p. 788. A similar refusal
to commit American forces was expressed by President Harding before the Lausanne
conference opened in 1922. The administration was strictly committed to 'protection
of legitimate American rights and interests, without participation in political or
territorial settlements, and of using the influence and good offices of the United
States wherever possible toward a beneficent and last peace in the Near East'.
New York Times (18 November 1922), p. 2.
3. M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (New York, 1966), p. 362.
4. Italy and Greece also clashed. In a letter to the New York Times a Greek
spokesman, Clean this Zonaras, the former Civil Governor of Myriophyto, Thrace,
lamented that without historic rights in Asia Minor Italian rule 'in occupied Greek
territories is as tyrannical as was the Turkish despotism'. (I June 1919), III, p. 2.

173
 The Eastern Question was further complicated by (a) the collapse
of the Russian Empire and the additional problem of the
proliferation of successor states in the region; (b) questions
concerning self-determination, recognition and boundaries - the
demographics of the region frequently aggravated attempts to draw
frontiers based according to ethnicity and the concept of self-
determination advanced by President Wilson was seized by the
Greeks as one rationalization of their claims in Asia Minor;5
(c) the question of whether the Turks would be allowed to retain
territory anywhere in Europe, including Constantinople; (d) the
internationalization of the Straits and the difficulty of determining
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how that was to be organized; and (e) the question as to whether

or not Greece would assume sovereignty of Smyrna and its
immediate surroundings.6 These were important issues posing
serious problems to which there were no simple solutions.
Mutual suspicions over territorial arrangements of mandates and
spheres of interest also impeded cooperation. In one instance, in
July 1919, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, accused the
French and Italians of trying to gain the upper hand in Turkey,
especially in business ventures.7 The effect of these suspicions
seriously compromised the allied capacity to impose a settlement
on Turkey. In addition, on 14 May 1919 the rivalries precipitated
the Greco-Turkish conflict by inviting the landing of Greek forces
at Smyrna under the pretense of protecting the Greek and Christian
population. 8
For example, in April 1919, Italian forces landed in Adalia in
ail attempt to assert Italy's claim to a separate sphere of interest
in southern Asia Minor. In response to Italy's unilateral action,
the British, French and American governments authorized the
Greek landing and provided the requisite naval coverage.9 There
5. 'Of all the powers, Greece was the only one who could advance the additional
claim that in the regions she coveted there was a large population which was
Greek Orthodox and within that population a large proportion which spoke the
Greek language, living in communities that had their own schools and a Greek
way of life. Moreover, Greece was contiguous to the regions in which she hoped
to expand'. See D. Dakin, The Unification of Greece 1770-1923 (New York, 1972),
p.222.
6. M. S. Anderson, Ibid., pp. 362-3.
7. Ibid., p. 363.
8. The Greek claims for the landing were almost entirely false. See Charles T.
Thompson, The Peace Conference Day by Day (New York, 1920), pp. 373-4.
9. The American naval force included the battleship U.S.S. Arizona and five
destroyers.

174
 is some question over who proposed the Greek landing. It has been
suggested that it came from President Wilson, 1 0 who apparently
made a unilateral decision to commit American naval forces in the
landing. Whatever the source of origin, the effect was clear: the
historic enmity between Turk and Greek was intensified. The notion
of Greek occupation of Turkish territory galvanized Turkish
sentiment not only against the Greeks, but against their European
supporters. 11 The nationalist Turks thereafter rejected the measures
imposed by the allies in the 1920 treaty of Sevres. Ironically,
the United States was spared culpability in the Greek venture.
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10. According to Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, when Italian troops seized

the port of Adalia, 'President Wilson attacked the move so vigorously that Premier
Orlando for a time withdrew from the conference. President Wilson now announced
his support of the long-debated claim of Greece to the possession of Smyrna, Aidin
and the coast. Apparently, President Wilson's theory in proposing this move was
that the nearest friendly troops were the Greek divisions in Macedonia, and that
prompt action was necessary to protect the Christians of the Smyrna district ...
Lloyd George cordially approved President Wilson's proposal, Clemenceau offered
no objections, and the occupation was ordered and quickly accomplished'. [My
underline.] See I Was Sent To Athens (New York, 1929), pp. 23-4. On the other
hand, Joseph C. Grew, an American delegate to the Lausanne Conference (1922-3),
writes that 'in May 1919, Great Britain and France, in order to forestall Italian
imperialistic enterprises in Anatolia, encouraged Greece to land troops at Smyrna'.
See Turbulent Era. A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, I (Boston, 1952), p. 477.
John A. DeNovo writes: 'Wilson was drawn into another intra-Allied controversy
when Italian ambitions in Anatolia frightened Lloyd George and Clemenceau ...
Lloyd George did not intend to stand idly by while the Italians ousted Britain's Greek
ally from Smyrna. He proposed on 6 May that the Greeks be permitted to land two
or three divisions at Symrna and won the approval of Wilson and Clemenceau
for this fateful operation to be designated an Allied force under Greek command'.
[My underline.] See American Interests and Politics in the Middle East 1900-1939
(Minneapolis, 1963), p. 117.
II. M. S. Anderson writes: 'Occupation by the deposed Greeks, by the rayah
whom they have so often defeated in the past, was an unbearable insult: anger
mixed with fear began to unite the population of Anatolia against these new
invaders and their backers in western Europe'. Anderson also cites a British
representative in Constantinople who described the hostility between Greeks and
Turks on 17 August 1919 as 'animosity which has to be seen to be believed, which
is as unreasoning as it is rabid, and which is gradually becoming pretty nearly
unquenchable'. The Eastern Question 1717-1923 (New York, 1966), pp. 364ff.
British Department Foreign Policy. 1st Series, IV, p. 880. See also the account by
former Consul-General of the United States in the Near East, George Horton.
He testified that 'to the Turk, the Hellene is not only a "dog of an unbeliever",
but he is a former slave'. The Blight of Asia (New York, 1926), p. 74. Riza
Bur Bey, the second ranking Turkish delegate to the Lausanne Conference
(November 1922-July 1923), claimed that the United States and the allies did not
understand the gravity of the situation in Asia Minor. He states: 'It has been shown
that Greeks and Turks cannot live side by side, and the only solution is for the
Greeks to go'. New York Times (18 December 1922), p. I.

175
 Among the Turks, the more helpless the Ottoman government
in Constantinople appeared, the more attractive the nationalist
cause. In July 1919, the nationalist movement formally organized
at Erzerum and quickly spread to the city of Sivas where in
September its Congress adopted a declaration, which demanded
allied recognition of the integrity of Turkish territory in accordance
with the terms of the Mudros armistice. On 11 September 1919
the allies were informed by the nationalists that the government
in Constantinople no longer represented Turkey. That declaration
and the transcendent impotence of the Ottoman government in
Constantinople signalled nationalist intransigence and instigated
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armed resistance to the Greek occupation of Smyrna. In March

of 1920 the nationalists moved their government from Sivas to
Ankara. There Mustapha Kemal was elected President of the Grand
National Assembly's executive committee. A National Pact was
proclaimed and, among other claims, reasserted the declaration of
territorial integrity issued at Sivas.
On 10 August 1920, at Sevres, the allies imposed their settle-
ment upon the largely impotent government in Constantinople.12
Those provisions favorable to Greece - the isles of the Aegean
Sea, eastern Thrace and the region of Smyrna - the nationalists
considered a despoliation of Turkey proper at the hands of their
most dangerous enemy not only in historic terms but, also, because
Greece served as the surrogate of Great Britain and its Turcophobic
Prime Minister, Lloyd George.13
In response, Prime Minister Venizelos of Greece proposed to
the allies that Greek forces be used against the nationalist
resistance. Without any formal response, the Greeks assumed the

12. The terms of the treaty were worked on in a London conference in February
and March of 1920, and finalized at San Remo in April. On 10 October 1921,
Admiral Mark L. Bristol, high commissioner of the United States in Constantinople
between 1919 and 1927, informed Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes that
'It is now quite clear that the Treaty of Sevres, if it is retained at all by the Allies,
will be modified in important particulars. Presumably, there will be further
negotiations among the allies to accomplish this ... we cannot rely upon the Allies
to protect our interests in the Near East'. Bristol to Hughes, 10 October 1921,
Department of State 711.67/21. Cited in J. A. DeNovo, Ibid., p. 131.
13. According to H. N. Howard, 'the Greek aggression at Smyrna did more than
any other factor to precipitate the nationalist movement in Turkey, but the British
action at Constantinople [16 March 1920, which preserved the sultan on his throne]
added the finishing touches'. See The Partition of Turkey, Howard Fertig edition
(New York, 1966), p. 257.

176
 offen~ive and by the end of 1920 occupied considerable territory,
including the historic Turkish capital, Bursa. Thereafter, the military
and diplomatic situation for the Greeks steadily worsened. Because
of domestic political problems Italy was compelled to evacuate its
forces from Asia Minor. Whatever Anglo-French 'cooperation'
existed in Anatolia formally ended when France concluded a treaty
with the government in Ankara on 20 October 1920. In 1921, the
Greek forces strategically overextended their positions as they
threatened the new capital at Angora. But they failed in their
attempt to capture the city. In August 1922, the nationalists' forces
scored an impressive victory at the front. The Greek lines broke
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and on 9 September the Turkish nationalists entered the city of

Smyrna. The military venture for Greece in Asia Minor ended with
the signing of the armistice at Mudania on 11 October 1922.
The political settlement was addressed at the Lausanne Conference,
which met from November 1922 to July 1923. As one student of
Turkish affairs so aptly observes, 'Turkey had succeeded in
completely altering her international position ... In western Europe
the Angora government had succeeded in winning both Italy and
France from any solidarity they may have had with England. They
had settled accounts with their neighbors. With these new factors
involved, there can be little wonder at the Greek debacle in
September 1922'.14

III
The American experience in World War I provides a base point
for the analysis, since the war moved the United States from
complacent unconcern with Europe's troubles through economic
and ideological involvement to military participation. The United
States entered the First World War with a sense of duty rather
than enthusiasm. Although some Americans viewed participation
as an adventure, and something of a crusade, most considered the
experience as an interference with normal routine. Virtually every
sector of society felt the strains of government regulation or control.
Even some sectors that benefited from government policy viewed the
war time restrictions as harmful to the nation's sense of well-being.
In short, the average American's reaction to internationalism can
be described as a disillusionment and it sparked what Warren G.

14. Ibid., p. 264.

177
 Harding popularized as a return to 'normalcy'. In his first annual
message to the nation, he declared: 'It is not my purpose to bring
to you a program of world restoration. In the main such a program
must be worked out by the nations more directly concerned'. 15
The public clamoured for demobilization, an end to government
restrictions - a return to 'normalcy'. The government responded
by releasing 652,000 men from the army before the end of 1918.
By the end of June 1919, it had disbanded over 2.6 million men
and by October 3.2 million. Altogether over four million men were
returned to civilian life. With all deliberate speed war time contracts
also were liquidated and price controls and priorities were ended.
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The return to 'normalcy' was an abstraction meaning different

things to different people, but its popularity was unmistakingly
concrete.
Also affecting the turn from internationalism was the post war
depression. True it was comparatively short-lived, but its effects
were enduring. The problems of industry and agriculture and the
demands of veterans were among the economic matters which
concerned the American people in the early 1920s and indeed
through the decade. American attention in the problems of Europe
began to shift rapidly with the onset of the economic depression
of 1920. To many the domestic problems seemed far more pressing
than any international question.
At the end of the First World War, the United States was
catapulted into a position of power, for which it was unprepared,
and found adjustment to its new role difficult. Most AmericaQs of
that period displayed a perennial insularity nurtured by the ideology
of the doctrine of the two spheres. (Not even a global war divested
them of this insularity.) President Wilson, who, at war's end,
envisioned a new world order, presented the nation with the proposal
for a League of Nations and a treaty of peace. Opposed by his
implacable foe, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts,
chairman of the important Committee on Foreign Relations, the
packaged proposal provided an important political issue because of
its internationalism. To the Republican leadership there were cogent
reasons to avoid supporting internationalism. The midterm election
of 1918 confirmed a political trend underway since 1912 when a
Republican majority returned to both Houses of Congress.
15. F. L. Israel, ed., The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents 1790-1966,
III (New York, 1967), p. 2616.

178
 The bitter struggle and rejection of the League averted an inter-
national entanglement and the election of 1920 confirmed the
decision. To the incoming Harding Administration, the events
appeared to be a mandate to eschew unnecessary involvement in
Europe's affairs. The Atlantic Ocean continued to serve as a physical
and psychological barrier; it was, so to speak, the demarcation line
for the new and separate sphere. Under the circumstances the
Harding Administration was constrained in administering a world
role. But despite the overall American inclination toward
isolationism, the administration succeeded in avoiding outright
policies of parochialism.
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For the United States, the question of the Greco-Turkish war

of 1919-22 was an issue that the government faced in tandem with
two broader Near East considerations: the Eastern Question and
the resumption of Ottoman-American relations. In the broader
Eastern Question the major allied European powers, and by
association the United States, concerned themselves in the post war
settlement with the Ottoman Empire and the dismemberment of its
imperial territories. The nature of international diplomacy, politics
and the military machinations that characterized that task also
affected Ottoman-American relations and, therefore, the question
of the Greco-Turkish war for the United States.
Coming at a time when Americans concluded that they could
not solve Europe's problems if Europeans themselves would not
do so, the United States pursued an independent course in inter-
national matters, in the interwar years, a course often described as
isolationism.16 Yet this term may be misleading, since the United
States moved vigorously and unabashedly in Latin America where
competing European interests were squeezed out by aggressive
American entrepreneurs who had the active encouragement of the
government. On the other hand, where the United States faced
vigorous competition, as in the Near East, it continued to proclaim
the Open Door policy and political noninvolvement.

16. There is substantial and continued controversy over the term 'isolationism'
as a description of American policy of the period. For example, among many
others, W. A. Williams discredits the notion of isolationism in 'The Legend of
Isolationism in the 1920's, Science and Society (1954), pp. 1-20; and Joan Hoff Wilson
asserts that the term 'independent internationalism' is more descriptive of the
character of American policy for the period. See American Business and Foreign
Policy, 1920-1933 (Boston, 1973), p. x.

179
 The thesis advanced here is that United States policy was largely
governed by the ideology of the doctrine of the two spheres.
Coeval with the founding of the American republic, the doctrine
of the two spheres was a logical development that defined, as a
general principle of international policy, the separation of the old
world from the new. Historically, it rationalized the nation's
independent position and nonentanglement in European affairs.
In essence, it served to augment America's perception of its place
as a republic in a hostile world. In the early twentieth century,
for example, it rationalized the American status of associated power,
in contrast to an allied power in World War I; it rationalized
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the rejection of the Armenian mandate; it rationalized non-

entanglement in the Greco-Turkish war; it rationalized United
States observer status at the Lausanne Conference of 1922-3;
and it rationalized a separate Turco-American treaty.
Thus according to this perspective even American participation
in the First World War may be viewed as a temporary aberration
from the doctrine, as witnessed by the immediate postwar period,
in which a majority of Americans hoped to avoid European
entanglements and concentrate on domestic matters. American
policy in the Near East settlements and in the question of the
Greek- Turkish war was subordinated to this ideological self-
constraint. In essence, President Harding's popularized 'return to
normalcy' was a call for a return to the hemispheric security
most Americans understood and evidently supported. Conceptually,
it was a more concrete assertion of the doctrine of the two spljeres.
Although the doctrine of the two spheres was the overriding
consideration affecting United States policy, it did not go
unchallenged by individuals and groups that sought to place the
United States among the great powers. Those who sought something
beyond a moral or symbolic role for the United States in the
international environment found no incompatibility between
America's traditional idealism and great power status. Those who
rejected that role asserted the historic separation of the two spheres
and the independent conduct of America's foreign affairs. More
often than not, however, American foreign policy was a curious
blend of traditional idealism and pragmatism.
There is no evidence to suggest that during the Greek-Turkish
war the United States, as a matter of policy, prioritized its relation
with either state. Indeed, it placed both Greece and Turkey within
180
 the old sphere of Europe and, therefore, separated them from the
strategic and political interests of the United States. I 7 Their bilateral
relations, after Greece obtained its independence, were characteristic
of Balkan politics and European politics. In principle, relations
with each state were governed largely by American economic and
humanitarian interests. Turkey attracted the interests of the
American business community because of its great economic
potential. Religious and educational groups were also attracted by
the potentialities offered them in Turkey's heterogeneous
population. Comparatively, the Ottoman Empire was the focus of
most of America's economic and humanitarian interests in the
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Near East.
Yet of the two states it was Greece that occupied a special
place in the American mind because of its historic contributions
to western civilization and its Christianity. But neither the special
regard for classical Greek civilization, Greek Christianity, nor the
preponderant economic and humanitarian interest in Turkey was
sufficient to overcome America's adherance to the doctrine of the
two spheres. To be sure, events in the Near East along with the
Greco-Turkish conflict tested the American resolve in nonentangle-
ment. However, without American strategic and political interests
in the conflict or region, the nature of the trilateral relation was
relegated to the separate sphere status. A significant contrast with
the post World War II era had indeed emerged. .

IV
Warren G. Harding assumed the office of President in January
1920. His selection of Charles Evans Hughes as Secretary of State
was publicly announced on 19 February 1921. For both men their
political relationship worked smoothly largely because the President
abdicated foreign policy matters in favor of Hughes and he, in turn,
often compensated for some of Harding's presidential shortcomings.

17. It is interesting to note that when the United States tilted toward one state,
strain developed in the bilateral relation with the other. For example, two such
instances occurred over the Cyprus problem which seriously affected the trilateral
reiation. In 1964 the Johnson Administration tilted in favor of Greece, provoking
an immediate coolness in Turco-American relations. In 1974, the Nixon Administra-
tion tilted in favor of Turkey, provoking a similar response in Greco-American
relations.

181
 In the Harding Administration Hughes displayed patience and
pragmatism in policYmaking, and enjoyed considerable freedom in
diplomacy receiving little presidential instruction. Hughes set the
tenor of his stewardship at the State Department when he declared
that 'foreign policies are not built upon abstractions; they are the
result of practical conceptions of national interest arising from some
immediate exigency or standing out vividly in historical perspec-
tive'}S Except for the Washington Conference of 1922, Hughes
generally confined his activities to a fairly restricted area.
As far as the new administration's policy was concerned, the
Eastern Question and Greco-Turkish war were beyond the pale of
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any American strategic and political interest. Yet that policy grew
increasingly difficult to follow because of the confluence of American
economic and humanitarian stakes in the region and the principle
of noninvolvement. American oil companies were interested in Near
East oil. Religious and humanitarian groups were interested in the
Greek and Armenian issues, and in the continued American
educational presence in Turkey. The issues were linked to political
responsibilities that the new administration was unwilling to accept
and even sought to avoid at the Lausanne Peace Conference.
Because of the conjugation, the conference presented a dilemma to
the administration. It presented a dilemma not because it sought
to involve the United States directly in European political negotia-
tions, for that would have violated the doctrine of the two spheres,
but because the administration sought to protect American interests
within the constraints imposed by the doctrine. .
. The public's perception of the Greco-Turkish war was a variable
the Harding Administration quickly confronted, since American
sentiment historically favoured the Greeks while American
economic and humanitarian interests were largely centered in
Turkey. For example, as early as 1914, the Ottoman ambassador
to the United States, Ahmed Rustem, criticized United States policy
which prohibited the sale of war vessels to Turkey while American-
built war vessels were sold to Greece. He was equally critical of
the negative image of Turkey projected by the American press.
'Turkey has been the object of systematic attacks on the part of
the press of the United States', he declared, and 'these attacks,
18. Quoted in J. Vinson, 'Charles Evans Hughes', in N. A. Graebner, ed.,
An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century
(New York, 1961), p. 132.

182
 conceived very frequently in the most outrageous language, spare
her in none of her feelings. Her religion, her nationality, her
customs, her past, her present are reviled. This attitude of the
press has poisoned public opinion in the United States in regard to
the Turkish people to such an extent that a member of that race
is seldom thought or spoken of in this country otherwise than as
the "unspeakable" and when Turkey, defeated and bleeding as the
result of the Balkan War, was in need of a kind word, mockery
and insult of the most cruel nature were poured upon her by
almost every American paper'. 19
American sentiment for the Greeks was rationalized as much in
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support of the legacy of 'Greek civilization'20 as for the general

ignorance most Americans displayed of the Turk and his Islamic
faith. Historically, Greco-Turkish conflicts were perceived in rather
simple terms: as the cross against the crescent. Indeed, one
editorial boasted of the 'great opportunity' the Greeks had to
attain national unity and proclaimed that for 'the first time in
eight or nine centuries the world will see a Hellas really new and
truly great'. 21
On 7 March 1920 a resolution was introduced in the Senate by
Henry Cabot Lodge. This resolution of the Paris Peace Conference
was designed to put on record that the Senate favored awarding
Greece not only the twelve islands of the Aegean and the Greek
portion of the western coast of Asia Minor, but also -Northern
Epirus. It was adopted by the Senate on 17 May 1920.22
Recognition of the outpouring of American sentiment was cabled
to the American-Hellenic Society's 1919 annual fete by Prime
Minister Venizelos of Greece who lauded America's support of the
19. Cited in H. Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (New York, 1919),
pp. 117-120.
20. The American infatuation with Greece and 'Greek civilization' is as old as
the republic and can be attributed to several factors: historically the intellectual
link which educated Americans shared with classical Greece; the element of Greek
Christianity which conspicuously defined all Greek conflict with the Turk on
religious grounds; and American Philhellenism. See S. J. Raphalides, United States
Policy Toward the Greek War of Independence, Ph.D. dissertation (Graduate
Faculty, New School for Social Research, 1974).
21. New York Times (26 April 1920), p. 12. See also Senate Resolution 364
congratulating the peoples of Greece upon the reintegration of their ancient
territories. Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 2nd session, SR 364, 59, pt. 9.,
p.7713.
22. Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 2nd session, SR 333,59, pt. 5, p. 4210.
New York Times (7 March 1920), p. 2. (17 May 1920), p. 1.

183
 'enslaved Greeks' (of Asia Minor and Thrace). And, in charac-
teristically diplomatic language, Venizelos played upon educated
America's regard for classical Greece - the American card - b)
intoning the idea that in return for America's support 'ancient
Greece can indeed be proud of her greatest daughter'. 23
The apogee of American sentiment on behalf of the Greeks was
reached with the burning of Smyrna on 11 September 1922, and
the revelation of atrocities committed by the Turks against the
largely Greek and Christian population in Asia Minor, especially
after the retreat of the Greek forces. 24
However, while the news media and the Philhellene religious
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groups stressed Turkish atrocities, the State Department assumed

a more balanced assessment of the conflict in _Asia Minor: 'The
Christian world has been filled with horror at the atrocities
committed in Anatolia, especially in connection with the burning of
Smyrna', observed Secretary of State Hughes, 'while nothing can
excuse in the slightest degree or palliate the acts of barbaric cruelty
of the Turks, no just appraisement can be made of the situation
which fails to take account of the incursion of the Greek army into
Anatolia, of the war there waged, and of the terrible incidents of
the retreat of that army, in the burning of towns, and general
devastation and cruelties. Anatolia in war has been the scene of
savagery' .25

23. New York Times (7 June 1919), p. 6.

24. There exists a plethora of eyewitness accounts (as well as hearsay) about the
burning of Smyrna, the looting and atrocities committed against the Greek and
Christian population, and the 'violation' of American property and institutions.
See George Horton, op. cit., pp. 126-54 and pp. 275-92. One interesting interchange
on the subject reportedly tool place between James Cannon, Jr., a southern
Methodist Episcopal bishop and Secretary of State Hughes: 'I endeavored to impress
Secretary Hughes with the urgency of the need for prompt, definite, and effective
action owing to the critical conditions existing, especially in Asiatic Turkey, where
the Turks were ruthlessly slaughtering Greeks and Armenians, combatants and
noncombatants, children and old people. Secretary Hughes read the resolution
[of a memorial of his church] and called my attention to what he considered to
be the extreme language used, asking what was-meant by the words "whatever steps
may be necessary". I replied that it meant exactly what it said. "But", said
Secretary Hughes, "that could mean war". I replied, "Certainly it could, if the
Turks thought the United States government was not in earnest in commanding
that they cease committing atrocities; but if war is necessary, the resolutions clearly
contemplate war".' J. Cannon, Jr., Bishop Cannon's Own Story: Life As I Have
Seen It, edited by R. L. Watson, (Durham, Duke University Press, 1955), p. 226.
25. Foreign Relations, 1922, II, pp. 947-8.

184
 The Harding Administration received numerous importunings
from groups which advocated that the government take whatever
steps were necessary to prevent the carnage in Smyrna and Asia
Minor.26 On 4 October 1922a White House spokesman complained
that the government was unfairly criticized for its aloofness.27
The President and his cabinet met on 10 October and discussed the
situation in Asia Minor.28 Despite the importunings, the adminis-
tration reaffirmed the noninvolvement policy of the United States.
'It is not consistent with American policy', noted Harding, 'to call
our armed forces to minister to all the troubled spots of the world'. 29
Senator Lodge, an avowed Philhellene, typified the ambivalence
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over the question when he suggested that if the President referred

the issue to Congress 'there would be a declaration of war' which,
he was confident, the people of the United States did not want.
'Our duty', concluded Lodge, 'is to stand behind the President.
I believe the United States can render the best service by acting
with entire independence'. 30
In response to the interest group sentiment over the question
the State Department decided to send a delegation of observers
to the Lausanne Conference in order to state the American position
and to protect its interests.31 With only observer status, the United
States joined the principal allied powers, Great Britain, France and
26. New York Times (l October 1922), p. 1. Bishop James Cannon, Jr., a
representative of American church and relief organizations, made no secret of his
Turcophobic views. He sent the following cable to Secretary of State Hughes: 'You
will recall that the American church bodies urged the State Department in July
(1922] to take whatever steps were necessary to protect the Eastern Christians. A
prompt, definite American demand, supported if necessary by the American naval
units present, would probably have prevented, certainly greatly minimized the
Smyrna fires and massacres'. For an account of Cannon's efforts behind the cause
of American intervention in Turkey see V. Dabney, Dry Messiah: The Life of
Bishop Cannon (New York, 1949). A similar problem confronted the administration
over United States participation in a proposed inquiry into the atrocities committed
against Armenians. Harding notified Hughes: 'Frankly, I very much hesitate to
hold aloof from a participation which makes such a strong appeal to a very large
portion of our American citizenship'. Foreign Relations, 1922, II, p. 922.
27. New York Times (4 October 1922), p. 1.
28. New York Times (II October 1922), p. 3.
29. Foreign Relations, 1922, II, p. 922.
30. New York Times (12 October 1922), p. 3.
31. The delegation was headed by Richard Washburn Child, Anibassador to
Italy, Admiral Mark L. Bristol, American High Commissioner to Turkey, Joseph
C. Grew, Copley Amory, F. Lammot Berlin, Harry G. Dwight, Lewis G. Heck,
and Julian Gillespie. Foreign Relations, II, p. 899. See also J. C. Grew, Turbulent
Era, I (Boston, 1952), p. 484.

185
 Italy, and the other participant states, Greece, Turkey, Romania
Yugoslavia and Japan at Lausanne.
The administration's decision to send a delegation of observer
to the conference was prophylactic. Except for humanitarian aid
that is, several destroyers which were dispatched to Constantinople
in September 1922, to assist in evacuating Greek refugees primaril:
women and children, the administration was not prepared to alte
its policy. Therefore, the United States resisted the clamour fron
missionary and private Near East relief groups that urged it t<
assume a greater responsibility in the region. This response
provoked controversy. In the political discourse, its detractor:
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saw little efficacy in observer status. The activists advocated ar

active role for the United States with full participation in the
deliberations as the only means to ensure the protection of Americar
interests in Asia Minor and the Near East.
Former Ambassador to Greece Henry Morgenthau was a leadin~
spokesman for the activist faction. He believed the United Statel
should exercise greater 'influence in European councils'. That couIe
be achieved with a 'radical change in our national psychology',
and a 'change of policy in Washington'. 'I do believe that unlesl
we intervene by sending more than a mere observer to the::
Lausanne conference', Morgenthau prophesied, 'another World
War is imminent'. 32There was strong support also among religiom
and humanitarian groups.33 For example, Everett P. Wheeler oj
the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missiom
enthusiastically endorsed Morgenthau's prescription.34 Commer-
cial interests too supported full participation of the United States
in concluding any new economic arrangements at Lausanne. This

32. New York Times (12 November 1922), IX, p. 6.

33. The trustees of the New York based Church Peace Union petitioned
Secretary of State Hughes to send authorized representatives to the Lausanne
Conference with power to assume for the United States its full share of responsibility
in cooperation with other nations 'for the just solution of the Near East problems'.
New York Times (16 December 1922), p. 2. Similar sentiments were expressed
by the Rev. Malcolm McLeod of the Collegiate Church of St. Nicholas in New
York, and Bishop William Manning of the Cathedral of St. John the Divine.
New York Times (13 November 1922), p. 2.
34. 'If the [Harding] Administration were to do what I am urging, I am convinced
that the whole country would arise to support it and the Turks would yield to our
superior force. It would prevent war, as Mr. Morgenthau showed ... .'. New York
Times (16 November 1922), p. 18.

186
 was especially true of the American oil consortium's interest in
Near East oil.35
On the other hand, the New York Times supported the
administration's decision to send 'official observers' to the
conference. 'While not as comprehensive in its scope as was the
invitation', the Times editorialized, 'it is nevertheless broad enough
to cover all the matters in which the voice of America ought to
be heard'.36 Senator Lodge also supported the administration's
decision. He described observer status as 'helpfulness but not
entanglement'.37 When Senator William E. Borah of Idaho
addressed the Press Club of Chicago, he boldly declared: 'Tell
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England and France you shall find no sympathy or succor in this

quarter of the globe'.38
Thus, for the administration, the policy dilemma was reduced
to the question: How can the American humanitarian and economic
stake in the Near East be protected without assuming correlative
political or military responsibilities? In formulating the State
Department's policy, Hughes believed it was 'neither natural nor
desirable' for the United States to participate in the peace conference
or become involved in 'policies and aims' that the United States
did not share with the European powers. On the other hand, he
considered it critical that the United States government 'be
constantly in command of adequate information for the protection
of American interests'. 39
Those interests which concerned the United States directly
Hughes listed as (1) capitulations; (2) protection of American
educational, philanthropic and religious institutions; (3) protection
of American commercial interests; (4) claims and damages;
(5) protection of minorities; (6) freedom of the Straits; (7) inter-
national financial control; and (8) archeological research.40 The
delegation faced its greatest task when it advocated those issues
concerned with specific rights of American citizens -I guarantees
for educational and religious institutions, and capitulations - and
35. See J. A. DeNovo, op. cit., pp. 167-209.
36. (20 November 1922), p. 16. As the deliberations proceeded at Lausanne,
the editorial policy was modified and called for a stronger voice on the part of the
United States.
37. New York Times (31 October 1922), p. 1.
38. New York Times (I October 1922), p. 2.
39. Foreign Relations, 1922, II, pp. 887-8.
40. Ibid.

187
 those strongly identified with American idealism: the fundamental
principles of justice and human rights - notably the protection
of Greek and other minorities in Turkey.41
Unlike the European powers, the administration's strategy was
free from a shared perception of threat. It sought to maintain the
integrity of the American position 'as an independent power'
unconcerned in its deliberations with the rivalries of other nations,
and to forfeit no point of advantage, to ensure that there be 'no
influence lost, no injurious commitments made'. When it was
diplomatically suitable, the United States would conclude a separate
accord with Turkey.42 Approximately one month after the
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Europeans concluded the Lausanne agreement, a Turco-American

treaty of amity and commerce was signed on 6 August 1923.
The accord authorized by the State Department required nearly
three months of bilateral negotiations. However, for reasons beyond
the scope of this paper, the resumption of diplomatic relations
under the treaty were not immediately realized.

V
Since the United States had achieved its desiderata through the
Greco-Turkish war and the conference of Lausanne, which ended
the conflict, we turn our attention briefly to the unidimensional
purpose of American policy. 'Policy is purposeful behavior', writes
a former director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-
Military Affairs, 'something specific is to be achieved by Il!aking
certain maneuvers and sacrifices' .43 This raises several questions,
of course, that are pertinent in concluding the thesis of the paper:
What was the purposeful behavior of the United States in the
question of the Greco-Turkish war? What specifically was achieved
by that behavior? What maneuvers did the United States engage
in or sacrifices did it endure in order to achieve the gains?
First, the United States purposely avoided involvement in the
Greco-Turkish war because it did not define any American strategic
or political interest in the conflict that justified involvement.

41. J. A. DeNovo, op. cit., p. 140.

42. Foreign Relations, 1922, II, p. 888.
43. L. H. Gelb, 'Muskie and Brzezinski: The Struggle Over Foreign Policy', in
New York Times Magazine, 6 (20 July 1980), p. 35.

188
 Second, the United States reaffirmed the doctrine of the two
spheres as a general principle of international policy. And, in a
period of time, when the forces of internationalism paradoxically
generated isolationism, the Harding Administration pursued a
relatively pragmatic Near East policy under the watchful eye of
Congress.
Third, the government ideologically subordinated the question
of the Greco-Turkish war to the old sphere of Europe. The
administration's consistent disclamation of any strategic or political
interest in the region coalesced domestic support for its policy.
It publicized and balanced its concerns in the conflict with the
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broader problems of the region. It extended support to American

economic interests by championing the principle of the Open Door.
It expressed American idealism by extending sympathy and
humanitarian assistance to the Greeks and other minorities in the
Ottoman Empire. Finally, it provided diplomatic influence in their
behalf. These maneuvers assuaged interest group pressures.
In one sense, the United States did sacrifice playing the greater
role in shaping the future world. Perhaps we may postulate that
it. also sacrificed a correlative role in shaping a trilateral relation
with Greece and Turkey devoid of dependent statuses. However,
given the historical setting of the interwar period, the United States
responded to the question of the Greco-Turkish war in a fashion
compatible with its domestic priorities and its ideological perspective
of its place in the world.
Fairleigh Dickinson University,
New Jersey

189