This case involves a petition seeking reversal of a Court of Appeals decision affirming an ejectment case. Specifically, petitioner Tony Caudal refused to vacate an apartment after private respondent Dionisio Cu, who had purchased the property, notified petitioner of the lease termination. The Metropolitan Trial Court initially dismissed Cu's complaint, but the Regional Trial Court reversed and ruled in Cu's favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirms, finding that Cu's intended use of part of the property as a maid's quarters and storage comes within the definition of "residential purposes" under the law. The Court also notes Cu's need for his own residence.
This case involves a petition seeking reversal of a Court of Appeals decision affirming an ejectment case. Specifically, petitioner Tony Caudal refused to vacate an apartment after private respondent Dionisio Cu, who had purchased the property, notified petitioner of the lease termination. The Metropolitan Trial Court initially dismissed Cu's complaint, but the Regional Trial Court reversed and ruled in Cu's favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirms, finding that Cu's intended use of part of the property as a maid's quarters and storage comes within the definition of "residential purposes" under the law. The Court also notes Cu's need for his own residence.
This case involves a petition seeking reversal of a Court of Appeals decision affirming an ejectment case. Specifically, petitioner Tony Caudal refused to vacate an apartment after private respondent Dionisio Cu, who had purchased the property, notified petitioner of the lease termination. The Metropolitan Trial Court initially dismissed Cu's complaint, but the Regional Trial Court reversed and ruled in Cu's favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirms, finding that Cu's intended use of part of the property as a maid's quarters and storage comes within the definition of "residential purposes" under the law. The Court also notes Cu's need for his own residence.
This case involves a petition seeking reversal of a Court of Appeals decision affirming an ejectment case. Specifically, petitioner Tony Caudal refused to vacate an apartment after private respondent Dionisio Cu, who had purchased the property, notified petitioner of the lease termination. The Metropolitan Trial Court initially dismissed Cu's complaint, but the Regional Trial Court reversed and ruled in Cu's favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirms, finding that Cu's intended use of part of the property as a maid's quarters and storage comes within the definition of "residential purposes" under the law. The Court also notes Cu's need for his own residence.
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Caudal v.
Court of Appeals
FERNAN, C.J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision in CA G.R. No. 09457 entitled "Tony Caudal v. Hon. Remegio E. Zari," dated 29 January 1988 1 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 98, Quezon City and its resolution dated 18 May 1988 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Private respondent Dionisio Cu, his wife and five (5) children rented first an apartment at No. 269-A D. Tuason, Quezon City but later transferred to No. 38 Silencio St., Santol, Quezon City because the owner of the former apartment needed it for his personal use On 2 July 1984, Cu notified petitioner who was then occupying one of the units therein, of the termination of the lease contract by giving him until October 1984 within which to vacate the premises.3
petitioner refused to comply
Cu to bring the matter to the office of the Barangay Captain who issued a certification to file a complaint. 4 Dionisio Cu filed an ejectment case docketed as Civil Case No. 0047612, against petitioner herein Tony Caudal before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 35 defendant alleged that he had a verbal contract with the owner Julieta B. Esguerra on the subject premises at the monthly rate of P150.00 since July 1967; that Mrs. Esguerra failed to claim the rental for November 1984 causing the defendant to deposit the same in a bank; that as the subject parcel of land had an area of 1,000 sq. m. more or less he proposed that the 600 sq. m. fronting the 6 door apartment be used for the construction of plaintiffs dwelling.6 Metropolitan Trial Court on 26 March 1986 dismissED the complaint of the plaintiff plaintiff Dionisio Cu appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which docketed it as Civil Case No. 47639.8 RTC of Quezon City reversed the decision of the inferior court. 9 Its decision in favor of Cu was based mainly on the latter's right to possess the said property after Cu had bought the 6 door apartment from vendor Esguerra. From said decision RTC-Quezon City . Petitioner argued that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it ruled in favor of Cu despite the latter's intention of merely using (1) door as stock room, office, quarter for maids and drivers.10 In support of his argument, petitioner cited Sec 5 (c) B.P. 877 Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.11 Petitioner moved to reconsider but the appellate court in its resolution dated 18 May 1988 denied the motion. 12
ISSUE: DO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN INTERPRETING SEC. 5 (c) BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 25 AND 877, IN RELATION TO SEC. 2(6) (Sic), BATAS PAMBANSA 877,
RULING:
We affirm. Cu may eject petitioner from the premises. The subsequent conversion of the subject area into a maid/driver's quarters and stockroom comes within the purview of Sec. 5(c) as a legitimate need for residential purposes.
As an intrinsic aid in fully appreciating the term "residential unit," we must refer to the Rental Law Batas Pambansa 877. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the whole statute. Clauses and phrases of the statutes should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. 14 Said law in defining the term "residential unit. the law does not strictly confine the meaning of the word "residence" mainly for habitation purposes as restrictedly interpreted by petitioner. In a way, the definition admits a measure of liberality, albeit limited, since a residence may also be the site of a home industry, or a retail store or be used for business purposes so long as it is principally used for dwelling purposes
Thus, if an abode can be used for limited business purposes, we see no reason why it cannot be used as an abode for persons rendering services usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment of a home and who personally minister to the personal comfort and convenience of the members of the household.
We need not belabor(Meaning:TO ATTACK VERBALLY OR TO EXPLAIN OR INSIST
ON EXCESSIVELY) the fact that Cu himself was in dire need of a place to stay since he too was just renting an apartment at 38 Silencio St., Santol, Quezon City and had to transfer in view of the imminent expiration of his lease on 16 March 1986. 25 Indeed, there was a need to find a place he could call his own.
the law could not have intended to prevent bona fide sales from owners/lessors who wish to dispose of their property to third persons in need of their own residence. This would be an absurd interpretation contrary to the basic philosophy underlying the right to property. To give preferential right to a tenant over and above a new owner's need for the premises for his use and that of his family as propounded in the Tan Tok Lee Case 26 is arbitrary and unreasonable.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29 January 1988 is hereby affirmed.
