USArmy SpecialForcesIO
USArmy SpecialForcesIO
USArmy SpecialForcesIO
Special Forces
Guide to Information Operations
March 2013
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only
to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange
Program or by other means. This determination was made on 30 March 2012. Other requests for this document
must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School,
ATTN: AOJK-CDI-SF, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.
FOREIGN DISCLOSURE RESTRICTION (FD 6): This publication has been reviewed by the product developers
in coordination with the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School foreign
disclosure authority. This product is releasable to students from foreign countries on a case-by-case basis only.
Special Forces
Guide to Information Operations
Contents
Page
PREFACE ............................................................................................................. vi
Chapter 1 FUNDAMENTALS.............................................................................................. 1-1
Information Operations ....................................................................................... 1-2
The Information Environment ............................................................................. 1-3
Information Superiority ....................................................................................... 1-4
Information Operations Capabilities ................................................................... 1-5
Considerations.................................................................................................... 1-5
Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 1-5
Chapter 2 INFORMATION OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES AND TACTICS ..................... 2-1
Operations Security ............................................................................................ 2-2
Military Deception ............................................................................................... 2-5
Military Information Support Operations ........................................................... 2-11
Electronic Warfare ............................................................................................ 2-15
Computer Network Operations ......................................................................... 2-16
Combat Camera ............................................................................................... 2-17
Local Populace and Key-Leader Engagements ............................................... 2-19
Countering Adversary Information Activities .................................................... 2-26
Rewards Programs ........................................................................................... 2-29
Civil-Military Operations ................................................................................... 2-30
Public Affairs ..................................................................................................... 2-31
Defense Support to Public Diplomacy .............................................................. 2-31
Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to
protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange
Program or by other means. This determination was made on 30 March 2012. Other requests for this document
must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School,
ATTN: AOJK-CDI-SF, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610.
Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.
Foreign Disclosure Restriction (FD 6): This publication has been reviewed by the product developers in
coordination with the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School foreign disclosure
authority. This product is releasable to students from foreign countries on a case-by-case basis only.
i
Contents
Figures
Figure 1-1. Information operations capabilities ...................................................................... 1-2
Figure 1-2. Information environment ...................................................................................... 1-3
Figure 2-1. Information operations employment .................................................................... 2-1
Figure 2-2. Summary of the five-step operations security process ........................................ 2-3
Figure 2-3. Useful format for determining risk to critical information...................................... 2-4
Figure 2-4. Useful format for planning operations security tasks ........................................... 2-5
Figure 2-5. Military deception usage ...................................................................................... 2-5
Figure 2-6. Example of a military deception work sheet ........................................................ 2-9
Figure 2-7. Five-step computer network operations planning process ................................ 2-17
Figure 2-8. Example message (paired to themes) ............................................................... 2-22
Figure 2-9. Example message development matrix ............................................................. 2-22
Figure 2-10. Example of a face-to-face engagement work sheet ........................................ 2-25
Figure 2-11. Mutual support within information operations capabilities ............................... 2-32
Figure 2-12. Potential conflicts within information operations capabilities ........................... 2-36
Figure 2-13. Support roles of information operations, civil-military operations, public
affairs, defense support to public diplomacy, and combat camera ............... 2-39
Figure 3-1. Information operations staff estimate................................................................... 3-3
Figure 3-2. Example graphic information operations estimate ............................................... 3-4
Figure 3-3. Sample information operations asset list ............................................................. 3-5
Figure 3-4. Example of information content and flow organization ........................................ 3-6
Figure 3-5. Mission analysis work sheet ................................................................................ 3-7
Figure 3-6. Information advantage work sheet ....................................................................... 3-9
Figure 3-7. Examples of information superiority..................................................................... 3-9
Figure 3-8. Effects for information operations ...................................................................... 3-11
Figure 3-9. Tasks for information operations capabilities .................................................... 3-13
Figure 3-10. Example of an information operations planning work sheet ............................ 3-14
Figure 3-11. Example information operations concept of support sketch ............................ 3-15
Figure 3-12. Format for a five-paragraph information operations annex (Army orders
format) ........................................................................................................... 3-16
Figure 3-13. Example of a format for a matrix information operations annex (Army
orders format) ................................................................................................ 3-17
Figure 3-14. Example 1 of an information operations execution matrix ............................... 3-18
Figure 3-15. Example 2 of an information operations execution matrix ............................... 3-19
Figure 4-1. Sources of data collection .................................................................................... 4-3
Figure 4-2. Example of an assessment graphic ..................................................................... 4-3
Figure 4-3. Battle drill format for insurgent-related violence .................................................. 4-6
Figure 4-4. Abbreviated staff battle drill.................................................................................. 4-7
Figure 5-1. Visualization of the information environment ....................................................... 5-4
Figure 5-2. Example combined information overlay ............................................................... 5-6
Figure 5-3. Example center-of-gravity analysis and the use of the CARVER process
to rank and plot critical vulnerabilities in the information environment ........... 5-7
Figure A-1. Information operations working group duties and responsibilities ...................... A-2
Figure A-2. Sample intelligence update format...................................................................... A-4
Figure A-3. Sample assessment update format .................................................................... A-4
Figure A-4. Sample operations update format ....................................................................... A-5
Figure A-5. Sample operations calendar ............................................................................... A-6
Figure A-6. Information operations planning aid .................................................................... A-6
Figure A-7. Relationship between intelligence preparation of the operational
environment and information operations ........................................................ A-7
Figure A-8. Sample center-of-gravity analysis ....................................................................... A-7
Figure A-9. Sample combined information overlay ................................................................ A-9
Figure A-10. Mission-to-task products ................................................................................... A-9
Figure A-11. Sample information operations mission and tasks (tactical level) .................. A-10
Figure A-12. Sample course-of-action sketch ..................................................................... A-10
Figure A-13. Mission analysis and information operations .................................................. A-11
Figure A-14. Example of a mission-analysis work sheet ..................................................... A-12
Figure A-15. Example of an information operations asset/capability matrix ........................ A-13
Figure A-16. Example of a fact and assumption analysis .................................................... A-14
Figure A-17. Example of a commander’s critical information requirement and
essential elements of information for information operations ....................... A-15
Figure A-18. Information environment ................................................................................. A-15
Figure A-19. Information environment variances by level of war......................................... A-16
Figure A-20. Sample information environment effects matrix.............................................. A-17
Figure A-21. Combined information operations overlay template ....................................... A-18
Figure A-22. Example of a combined information operation ............................................... A-19
Figure A-23. Relationship between center-of-gravity analysis and the planning
process ......................................................................................................... A-20
Figure A-24. Decisionmaking template ................................................................................ A-20
Figure A-25. Information infrastructure template ................................................................. A-21
Figure A-26. Information tactics template ............................................................................ A-21
Figure A-27. Information situation template ......................................................................... A-22
Figure A-28. Example of an information operations estimate format .................................. A-23
Figure A-29. Graphic information operations estimate ........................................................ A-24
Figure A-30. Example of an execution matrix ...................................................................... A-25
Figure B-1. Deception planning process overview ................................................................ B-1
Figure B-2. Deception estimate format .................................................................................. B-2
Figure C-1. Operations security and the planning process ................................................... C-1
Figure C-2. Example of a counterintelligence template ......................................................... C-2
Figure D-1. Media analysis process ...................................................................................... D-2
Figure D-2. Media theme assessment diagram ..................................................................... D-3
PURPOSE
This TC serves as a guide to describe the fundamentals of how to incorporate IO at the tactical and operational
level. Appendixes A through F offer tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) Special Forces (SF) Soldiers can
use to analyze and plan information operations. This TC implements Army and joint IO doctrine established in
FM 3-13, Inform and Influence Activities, and Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations.
This TC reinforces the definition of IO used by Army forces: IO employs the core capabilities of electronic
warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), Military Information Support operations (MISO), military
deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related
capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems and to influence decisionmaking. This TC
is specifically targeted for SF; however, it is also useful to Army special operations forces (ARSOF) and the
Army in understanding how SF employs IO.
SCOPE
TC 18-6 significantly affects the conduct of full-spectrum operations as an SF-common skill set that applies to
offensive as well as defensive operations. This TC links to a broad variety of doctrine to provide a rudimentary
understanding of IO.
APPLICABILITY
This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United
States, and the United States Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated.
ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION
The proponent of this manual is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
(USAJFKSWCS). Reviewers and users of this manual should submit comments and recommended changes on
Department of the Army Form (DA Form) 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to
Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-CDI-SF,
3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610.
IO should be viewed as an element of combat power, focused when and where it best
supports the operation. As with other elements of combat power, there is no universal
formula for the application of IO. Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and
support available-time available, and civil considerations are the major determinants.
Operation VALHALLA
Operation VALHALLA was a typical SF-type mission. The Jaish al-Mahdi death
squad was tracked down because of the especially brutal murders of a number of
civilians and Iraqi troops. On 26 March 2006, a battalion from the 10th Special
Forces Group (Airborne) (SFG[A]), as part of the Combined Joint Special Operations
Task Force—Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP), along with the Iraqi special forces
unit it was training, engaged the Jaish al-Mahdi at their compound. The mission was
successful with no friendly casualties. There were approximately 17 Jaish al-Mahdi
members killed, a weapons cache found and destroyed, a badly abused hostage
found and rescued, and approximately 16 Jaish al-Mahdi members detained. A
combat-camera element, along with some SF Soldiers wearing helmet cameras,
recorded the entire operation.
By the time the SF and Iraqi forces returned to their compound, roughly an hour after
leaving the site of the firefight, someone had moved the Jaish al-Mahdi bodies. The
guns of the Jaish al-Mahdi fighters were taken, and their bodies were put back inside
the compound so it appeared as if the Jaish al-Mahdi members were killed while
engaging in prayer. Someone then photographed the bodies in these new poses,
and loaded the images onto the web, along with a press release explaining that
American Soldiers had entered a mosque and killed men peacefully at prayer. This
was done in under an hour. Both the American and Arab media picked up the story
almost immediately. The United States (U.S.) did not release a statement until 70
hours after the operation. During the resulting investigation, which took close to a
month, the SF Soldiers, who had soundly and justly defeated their adversary, were
made combat ineffective by a cell-phone camera.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
1-1. The possession and use of information can provide a marked advantage to one military force over
another. SF units expend significant time and resources to collect, process, and internally transfer
information for the purpose of mission command. Without adequate and accurate information, an SF unit is
unlikely to successfully accomplish its mission or meet its objectives.
1-2. Stated in the simplest way, IO is the use of information to gain an advantage over an opponent. Such
an advantage, known as information superiority, is achieved by a series of actions by military and other
forces to impact both enemy forces and the operational area. To gain the advantage over the adversary, an
SF unit should use any available capability at its disposal, whether doctrinal or not, to achieve information
superiority at specific times and places in the operation. Figure 1-1 describes the five core capabilities, five
supporting capabilities, and three related capabilities of IO. IO forces can affect data, information, and
knowledge in three basic ways by—
Taking specific psychological, electronic, or physical actions that add, modify, or remove
information from the environment of various individuals or groups of decisionmakers.
Taking actions to affect the infrastructure that collects, communicates, processes, and stores
information in support of targeted decisionmakers.
Influencing the way people receive, process, interpret, and use data, information, and knowledge.
1-3. Thinking about IO within the terms of this doctrinal construct may do injustice to IO’s true
capabilities. Field experience shows that IO is less about doctrinal capabilities than it is about
understanding that every military action has the potential to positively and negatively affect populations
within the operational environment. In the end, everything an SF unit or detachment does or does not do
can affect the information environment, and any asset that affects information content and flow is a
possible contributor to (or detractor from) achieving the mission or the commander’s objective. For this
reason, IO should include any methods and means that can affect information content and flow, and target
perceptions and behaviors in the operating area.
1-6. When taken together, the information environment’s three dimensions explain how the creation and
flow of information causes real-world effects by converting real-world (physical) situations into human
perceptions that form the basis of individual and organizational behavior. Unfortunately, although the
effects of information are observable, the cause—information content and flow—is largely invisible.
However, analysis of the information environment’s dimensions can explain the disposition of the
information environment in any specific operational area and its impact on SF operations. Broad
considerations include the following:
The information environment is not uniform. Physical features of the operational area (for
example, terrain, information infrastructure, population demographics, and so on) determine the
topography of an information environment and the cognitive aspects of the people and
organizations present in the area (for example, their collective values, beliefs, and perceptions).
The interactions of these factors form distinct subinformation environments, or areas in which
the information environment’s characteristics are notably different from those of adjacent areas.
Analysis of a specific operational area can identify subinformation environments and their effect
on SF operations. SF units must anticipate having to employ IO differently within each
subinformation environment.
Information content and flow are variable. The relevance or importance of information changes
according to the needs of the various population groups and organizations. For example, people
located in an area devastated by a natural disaster desire information concerning humanitarian
assistance, whereas the populace in an insurgent-infested area is primarily interested in
information related to security. The task for SF units is to determine what information in the
operational area is important to the mission and then to identify and track its primary themes and
flow, just as SF units observe and monitor the presence of enemy forces.
The information environment’s character changes by the level of war and mission. The
information environment becomes less tangible and more conceptual as operations move from
the tactical to the strategic. At the tactical level, information flow is primarily by short-range
communications systems and observable means, such as graffiti and banners. What people see of
their physical surroundings is critical to their situational awareness, perceptions, and behavior.
On the other end of the spectrum—the strategic level—the information environment is impacted
less by physical features and more by abstract ideas, ideologies, and philosophies. Information
flow is not terrain-dependent, extending well over the horizon by long-range and mass-
communications systems. Finally, the assigned mission (for example, combat, peacekeeping,
humanitarian assistance, and so on) is a critical determinant of an SF unit’s relationship to its
information environment because it establishes the relative importance of the information
environment’s specific characteristics to the conduct of operations. For example, in conventional
combat, the physical information infrastructure in the operational area is often a dominant
characteristic because of its potential use by the enemy. In counterinsurgency missions, populace
support (a cognitive aspect of the information environment) is a critical characteristic because of its
importance to enemy and friendly operations.
1-7. To impact the information environment, an SF unit must identify subinformation environments and
information nodes in its operating area. Subinformation environments are areas in which the information
environment’s characteristics and effects are notably different from those of adjacent areas. Information
nodes are places, persons, or infrastructure that shape information content and flow by creating or
transmitting information into the surrounding area. It is important to note that information nodes can
change from day to day so what worked one day may not necessarily work the next.
1-8. Operations in the information environment are asymmetrical and not benign, often favoring one side
over another. Opposing forces use the information environment just as they use the physical environments
of air, land, and sea to place their enemy at a disadvantage and to achieve their objectives. Furthermore,
U.S. adversaries do not use the information environment in the same way or have the same means as U.S.
forces. Understanding this, an SF unit must identify how its adversary views and uses the information
environment. This is a challenge, because even though two opposing forces occupy the same operational
environment, they will not have the same capabilities in the information environment. It is important to
avoid mirror imaging U.S. concept of IO upon the adversary and mismatching U.S. capabilities and
vulnerabilities to those of the adversary. Chapter 5 provides additional information.
INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
1-9. Information superiority is the purpose of IO. It is also the reason why a commander allocates
resources to IO. Information superiority should not be treated as a doctrinal catch-phrase. Just as each
mission’s end state is different, so is information superiority. For example, during combat operations,
information superiority can be gaining surprise over the enemy or preventing the enemy from employing
its reserve forces. During counterinsurgency operations, information superiority can be gaining populace
support for friendly operations or preventing enemy freedom of flow. In each case, information superiority
is defined specifically for the mission in terms of what advantage is sought for the friendly force.
1-10. To achieve information superiority, an SF unit uses information to actively attack the adversary and
to shape the information environment to the force’s own advantage. This duality of operations—attacking
the adversary and shaping the information environment—is analogous to “fires and maneuvers,” where
fires equate to attacking the adversary’s ability to use information, and maneuvers are actions to seize and
retain information nodes to gain a positional advantage in the information environment. To be effective, an
information operation balances lethal and nonlethal activities to attack the adversary with those that shape
the information environment. Through a combination of both, an SF unit seeks information superiority
over its opponent.
1-11. An SF unit will rarely achieve absolute and universal information superiority. The actions of
opposing forces, as well as the information content and flow in the operational area, are not static.
Therefore, information superiority is a localized and transitory condition over the adversary. SF units seek
information superiority at certain times and places, usually at or before the decisive point of the operation.
Chapter 3 provides additional information.
CONSIDERATIONS
1-14. Subject-matter experts for core IO capabilities are typically positioned at the special operations task
force (SOTF) level and higher when deployed; however, it is essential that commanders at detachment
levels understand the core capabilities of IO and how to effectively utilize them to achieve information
superiority and accomplish the assigned missions. SOTF staffs can include an IO planner, EW planner,
Military Information Support (MIS) planner, a MIS detachment commander, a CA planner, and a
COMCAM and PA representative. At the joint special operations task force (JSOTF) level, the staff
mirrors the battalion with the addition of a special technical operations planner and the group public affairs
officer (PAO), along with retaining the conduits to leverage the higher headquarters (HQ) assets and
interagency capabilities. The subject-matter experts at the SOTF and JSOTF can provide training and
recommendations to the Special Forces operational detachments A (SFODAs) and Special Forces
operational detachments B (SFODBs) on how best to utilize information capabilities, and provide
assistance in coordination and deconfliction for IO capabilities in support of their concept of operations.
CONCLUSION
1-15. IO is the use of information as a military capability. Many of the principles and concepts that guide
the conduct of other military operations also guide the employment of IO. One way for SF commanders
and staffs to integrate IO into operations is to consider IO in terms of the factors of mission, enemy, terrain
and weather, troops and support available-time available, and civil considerations:
Mission. The role of IO in the unit mission is to achieve information superiority. As such, it is
important to identify exactly what advantage over the enemy IO is expected to achieve.
Enemy. Gaining an advantage over the adversary in the information environment starts with
pairing friendly capabilities and vulnerabilities in the information environment against those of
the adversary. An information operation that defeats the adversary’s capabilities and turns the
information environment to the friendly force’s favor will achieve information superiority.
Terrain and weather. Terrain and weather interact with the information environment to affect
information content and flow as well as the employment of IO capabilities. SF units must adjust
the employment of IO to the terrain and weather.
Troops and support available. Rarely does an SF unit have all the assets needed to conduct an
information operation. Commanders and staffs can fill the gap by thinking beyond doctrine for
other ways and means to affect information content and flow.
Time available. Regardless of echelon, IO requires long lead times compared to other operations.
Typically, IO must be planned one phase or event in advance of fire and maneuver.
Civil considerations. When civil considerations are important to the unit mission, IO capabilities
can be applied to influence the populace, if doing so will achieve an advantage over the adversary.
The use of assets and means for the purposes of IO require judgment in application.
Some capabilities—notably MISO, EW, and CNO—are disciplines that require
specialized training and skill sets. Employment of these capabilities requires
specialized technical expertise to properly plan and execute. Other capabilities
already reside within a command or unit and require only planning and coordination
to employ them as part of IO. Figure 2-1 outlines some of the more commonly
employed IO capabilities.
Capability Employment
Local populace and key-leader Gain support for friendly-force operations and HN government
engagements activities.
Countering adversary information Neutralize hostile propaganda or mitigate its effects.
Rewards program Influence adversary leaders’ perceptions.
OPERATIONS SECURITY
2-1. OPSEC is a universal IO capability. It is not just an “in-garrison” competency and needs to be
operational at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. OPSEC should be included in all plans, operations,
and activities. The goal of OPSEC, in conjunction with unit security programs, is to achieve essential
secrecy. Essential secrecy is concerned with the content and flow of critical information. Military forces
seek critical information about their opponents to fulfill their own information needs. To do this they
attempt to collect accurate, timely, and relevant information, process the information, and disseminate it for
use in planning and directing operations. Conversely, if a military force is to prevent its adversary from
gaining useful information, then it must prevent the flow of critical information from friendly to adversary
forces. At its core¸ OPSEC is an approach to conducting operations. To have a good OPSEC program, it is
imperative that the unit identify this critical information, understand the OPSEC indicators and
vulnerabilities, and practice essential secrecy. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, defines essential secrecy as the condition achieved by the denial of critical information
to adversaries. Essential secrecy depends on the combination of two approaches to protection—security
programs to protect classified information, and OPSEC to deny adversaries critical information (which is
often unclassified).
2-2. Each command and operation has a tremendous amount of information, both classified and
unclassified, that must be protected. However, denying all information about a friendly operation or
activity is seldom cost-effective or realistic. Central to this idea is the concept of essential secrecy. By
achieving essential secrecy, military forces protect their intentions, capabilities, and activities to retain
initiative and the element of surprise for operations. As a condition, essential secrecy is not static—it must
first be developed and then maintained as the situation and mission evolve. Essential secrecy cannot be
achieved in all places and at all times; therefore, the protection of information must be focused and
prioritized to counter specific threats.
2-3. Essential secrecy and the protection of critical information is not the exclusive responsibility of
OPSEC. It is the result of mutually supportive OPSEC and security programs. The purpose of OPSEC is to
prevent, or at least limit, the flow of sensitive, unclassified information to adversary forces. The actual
content of the information, whether classified or unclassified, is the responsibility of information security
program controls and procedures. OPSEC denies critical, friendly information to the adversary by
eliminating or reducing to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary
exploitation. Because OPSEC is not the sole contributor to essential secrecy, an IO objective can integrate
other capabilities—such as MILDEC, physical security, information security, and CI—that are not related
to OPSEC.
2-4. OPSEC is a process of identifying and protecting critical information and actions that could benefit
the adversary. A good OPSEC operation starves the adversary’s intelligence system by denying it the
information it seeks. Without information on friendly organization, disposition, and intent, the adversary
leader’s decisionmaking is degraded.
2-5. The basis for OPSEC’s contribution to an operation is the commander’s key tasks for IO. This means
that, for OPSEC to be part of an information operation, at least one essential IO task should address the
protection or defense of friendly information.
2-6. Although the purpose of OPSEC is a constant, its focus may change by echelon. At the tactical level,
OPSEC prevents the adversary’s detection and identification of friendly activities and operations to prevent
the targeting of critical assets and countering of current activities and operations. Operational-level OPSEC
prevents the disclosure of intentions, capabilities, and future operations (that is, courses of action [COAs])
to avoid the compromise of planning and operations. Tactical-level OPSEC addresses specific measures to
defeat the adversary’s collection capabilities; whereas, at the operational level, OPSEC addresses broad
guidance or general measures for the entire force and new measures to counter the adversary’s intelligence
capabilities.
2-7. As a way to systematically identify, analyze, and protect critical information relevant to the mission,
OPSEC is integrated into the military decisionmaking process. Figure 2-2, pages 2-3 and 2-4, depicts a
summary of the five-step OPSEC process.
Note. The five-step process is used at the JSOTF where the assets to form an OPSEC working
group exist. At the tactical level, the type of information contained in the OPSEC work sheet
(Figure 2-3, page 2-4) and the OPSEC tasks (Figure 2-4, page 2-5) needs to be considered when
developing a concept of operations.
1. Identify Critical Information. Determine what information needs protection by identifying the information
required by the adversary to prevent friendly-force mission success (list of critical information or essential
elements of friendly information [EEFI]). Adversaries can derive critical information from the aggregation
of indicators resulting from the observation or detection of friendly-force activity. Friendly actions generate
indicators (detectable actions and open-source information) that can be collected and developed into
critical information (facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities). An adversary can plan and
execute its own operations by using critical information. To identify critical information—
Identify what information is critical to the friendly mission. Sources of critical information include
higher HQ plans and operations orders, commander’s guidance, and current unit-critical information
lists. Focus on friendly-force intentions (time and place of units and operations), capabilities, and
vulnerabilities (strength, technologies, and tactics).
Keep in mind that critical information is different for every operation. Do not use a “cookie-cutter”
approach. Continually develop or refine critical-information lists.
Use an OPSEC working group to take advantage of subject-matter experts (for example, aviation,
communications, and computer systems).
Identify the length of time each element of critical information must be protected (not all information
needs protection for the duration of the operation).
Write critical information in the form of a statement (do not write critical information in the form of a
question). Generic examples include current and future locations of unit elements; intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and limitations; and unit movement methods and
routes.
List the elements of critical information (for example, time and route of helicopter flight) in the order of
priority and keep to a manageable number (perhaps five).
2. Analyze Threat. Identify the threat to the critical information by determining the adversary’s information
needs and collection capabilities:
Information needs are items of information the adversary requires. Do not bother trying to protect
information that the adversary already has.
Collection capabilities include human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery
intelligence, and open-source intelligence (OSINT). An estimated 90 percent of the adversary’s
information needs are met from OSINT.
Example threat analysis: Adversary knows: personnel and equipment move by helicopter; adversary
needs: departure times and routes of flight; adversary collection method: visual observation by spotters.
3. Analyze Vulnerabilities. Identify each element of critical information and its vulnerability to adversary
intelligence collection. These are known as OPSEC vulnerabilities and are the result of detectable
indicators of the critical information. OPSEC indicators become OPSEC vulnerabilities if they can be
observed, analyzed, and acted upon by the adversary. To determine OPSEC vulnerabilities:
Identify OPSEC indicators. Determine what detectable actions and OSINT can be interpreted or
pieced together by the adversary to derive the unit’s critical information.
Compare OPSEC indicators to adversary collection capabilities. Determine which indicators can be
observed, analyzed, and acted upon by the adversary.
Example OPSEC vulnerabilities: Direction of flight, helicopters taking off, loading of troops and equipment,
and assembly of troops and equipment.
4. Assess Risks. The goal is to reduce risk to an acceptable level based on the commander’s guidance.
Conduct a risk assessment for each vulnerability to determine which really need protection. Focus on the
vulnerabilities that produce the most risk to mission success and, therefore, are an unacceptable risk, and
then select one or more OPSEC measure for each vulnerability:
There are three types of OPSEC measures:
Action controls that change unit procedures, activities, and actions (randomized routine activities,
avoid repetitive tactics and procedures).
Countermeasures that disrupt enemy information gathering and targeting (jamming [EW],
physical attack, and camouflage, cover, and concealment).
Counteranalysis that deceives the enemy by providing false indicators (decoys, deception in
support of OPSEC).
Decide which OPSEC measures to implement. Check that OPSEC measures do not create new
vulnerabilities. Balance OPSEC measures with operational effectiveness (risk versus unit resources).
Developing OPSEC measures is a balance between cost and resources in terms of time, personnel,
assets, and interference with operations.
Example OPSEC vulnerabilities and mitigating measures: direction of flight (fly in false direction, change
direction en route), helicopters taking off (vary flight times, conduct false missions), loading of troops and
equipment (load just prior to takeoff), assembly of troops and equipment (assemble troops and equipment
under cover).
5. Apply OPSEC Measures. Tasks turn OPSEC measures into specified actions. Because OPSEC
measures do not follow any doctrinal format, it is necessary to convert them to tasks that the executing
units and elements can understand. Develop tasks that support the command’s key IO tasks, as well as
protect and control the specific indicators associated with key operational tasks:
Rewrite approved OPSEC measures as tasks. A useful format is task, purpose, and method. In
general, for OPSEC, a task is an action that controls or protects observable activities, purpose can be
critical information requiring protection, and method is the OPSEC means or methods used to
execute the task.
Example OPSEC task that supports combat operations: task—jam enemy ground surveillance radars,
purpose—conceal flow of combat elements from electronic collection, method—screen jamming.
Example OPSEC task to support stability operations: task—deny civilian populace access to base-camp
overwatch sites, purpose—prevent line-of-sight observation of security activities, method—unit patrols,
local police.
Assign responsibility and coordinate OPSEC tasks with units and staff, to include the intelligence
directorate of a joint staff (J-2)/assistant chief of staff, intelligence staff section (G-2)/intelligence staff
officer (S-2), and CI for monitoring, and then include OPSEC tasks in the operation plan or operation
order.
Adversary Residua
EEFI Vulnerability Indicators Collection Risk Level OPSEC Measure l Risk Assess
Standing
Operating
Procedures
or Current
Adversary Vulnerable OPSEC Additional OPSEC
EEFI Collection Indicators Measures Measures OPSEC Tasks
2-8. During operations, the current operation staff should monitor and adjust the elements of critical
information based on the adversary’s reaction to the implemented OPSEC tasks and for inadvertent
disclosure by friendly forces. Tools useful to planning and implementing an OPSEC plan are the OPSEC
working group, OPSEC standing operating procedures (SOPs), and OPSEC work sheets.
2-9. The OPSEC working group is a group of subject-matter experts that determines critical information,
identifies OPSEC vulnerabilities, coordinates and synchronizes OPSEC measures and tasks, and assesses
the effectiveness of OPSEC tasks. Typical membership includes an intelligence analyst to assist with threat
analysis, CI personnel to analyze vulnerabilities, a force protection officer, communications and aviation
representatives, and subordinate unit liaison officers. The OPSEC working group should conduct periodic
assessments of command critical information, threat collection capabilities, OPSEC vulnerabilities, and
OPSEC measures.
2-10. An OPSEC SOP is critical to ingraining OPSEC into unit operations. The SOP should be short and
direct and should include standing critical information or EEFI, standing OPSEC measures, composition
and responsibilities of the OPSEC working group, and OPSEC assessment procedures.
MILITARY DECEPTION
2-11. JP 1-02 defines MILDEC as actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision
makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to
take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.
2-12. MILDEC is more of a process or way of thinking than a capability with tangible assets and
resources. It may be executed using a unit’s own troops and equipment. An effective deception does not
have to be elaborate or complex; however, any time deception is part of an operation, it is the main effort
for the information operation and should be included in the defined operational advantage (information
superiority) provided for the mission.
2-13. MILDEC is a method, not a result. MILDEC is not conducted merely to deceive an adversary.
Deception is used only to support the mission. Figure 2-5 shows ways to employ MILDEC.
2-14. MILDEC actively targets adversary leaders and decisionmakers in support of specific battles and
engagements. It creates an exploitable advantage by misleading or confusing the adversary’s
decisionmaker. Distorting, concealing, or falsifying indicators of friendly intentions, capabilities, or
dispositions that the adversary will see and collect can mislead or confuse the adversary. MILDEC is
conducted at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical—and must be carefully coordinated to
deconflict operations between the HQ and subordinate units.
2-15. Deception in support of OPSEC is conducted to reinforce unit OPSEC and is planned using the
OPSEC plan as the basis for the deception. A deception in support of OPSEC uses false information about
friendly forces’ intentions, capabilities, or vulnerabilities to shape the adversary’s perceptions. It targets the
adversary’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance abilities to distract the adversary’s intelligence
collection away from, or provide cover for, unit operations. A deception in support of OPSEC is a
relatively easy form of deception to use and is very appropriate for use at battalion-level and below. To be
successful, a balance must be achieved between OPSEC and MILDEC requirements.
2-16. Camouflage, concealment, and decoys are normally individual or unit responsibilities and governed
by SOP. These actions may be taken for their own ends. They can also play a role in a larger MILDEC or
deception in support of OPSEC operations where camouflage, concealment, and decoys comprise just a
few of many elements that mislead the adversary’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance abilities.
Merely hiding forces may not be adequate, as the adversary may need to “see” these forces elsewhere. In
such cases, cover and concealment can hide the presence of friendly forces, but decoy placement should be
coordinated as part of the deception in support of OPSEC.
2-17. The uncertainties of combat make decisionmakers susceptible to deception. The basic mechanism for
any deception is either to increase or decrease the level of uncertainty (commonly referred to as ambiguity) in
the mind of the deception target. Both MILDEC and deception in support of OPSEC present false
information to the adversary’s decisionmaker to manipulate their uncertainty. Deception may be used in the
following ways:
Ambiguity-decreasing deception. This type of deception presents false information that shapes
the adversary decisionmaker’s thinking so he makes and executes a specific decision that can be
exploited by friendly forces. This deception reduces uncertainty and normally confirms the
adversary decisionmaker’s preconceived beliefs so the decisionmaker becomes very certain
about his COA. By making the wrong decision, which is the deception objective, the adversary
could misemploy forces and provide friendly forces an operational advantage. For example,
ambiguity-decreasing deceptions can present supporting elements of information concerning a
specific adversary’s COA. These deceptions are complex to plan and execute, but the potential
rewards are often worth the increased effort and resources.
Ambiguity-increasing deception. This deception presents false information aimed to confuse the
adversary decisionmaker, thereby increasing the decisionmaker’s uncertainty. This confusion can
produce different results. Ambiguity-increasing deceptions can challenge the enemy’s
preconceived beliefs, draw enemy attention from one set of activities to another, create the
illusion of strength where weakness exists, create the illusion of weakness where strength exists,
and accustom the adversary to particular patterns of activity that are exploitable at a later time.
For example, it can cause the target to delay a decision until it is too late to prevent friendly-
mission success. It can place the target in a dilemma for which there is no acceptable solution. It
may even prevent the target from taking any action at all. Deceptions in support of OPSEC are
typically executed as this type of deception.
2-18. Before planning a deception, it is first necessary to determine if there is a deception opportunity. A
deception may be a feasible option if it is appropriate to the mission and if there is a possibility of success
against the adversary. The following questions should be considered when planning deception:
Is the adversary susceptible to deception? Planners should use the J-2/G-2/S-2 adversary COA
as a basis to develop information about the adversary’s system and decisionmaking process.
Planners should determine how the deception target acquires and acts on information, what
knowledge the target has of the situation and how the target views the friendly force. If
necessary, planners should make assumptions. To do this, they should try to place themselves in
the position of the adversary without mirror imaging.
Does the friendly mission lend itself to deception? Some missions are better suited to deception
than others. Planners should not feel compelled to work deception into every operation.
Generally, when a unit has the initiative and can exercise some control over the mission area of
operations (AO), then deception is possible.
Do constraints prevent the use of deception? Other than the constraints imposed by authorities
and political considerations, the most important consideration is time. Execution of the mission
must allow enough time for the adversary to see the deceptive activities, reconstruct the activities
into the deception story, form the desired perceptions, and issue the orders that will cause the
adversary force to act in a manner consistent with the deception objective.
Are friendly assets available? To successfully deceive the adversary, MILDEC requires assets.
However, very few assets are specifically designed and designated for deception purposes. This
means that existing assets have to dedicate support to the deception. This is sometimes difficult,
especially when assets are limited. Therefore, the unit may have to be creative to find assets and
to use them efficiently.
Note. JSOTF will support strategic MILDEC plans and plan operational MILDEC. At the SOTF
and below, units will use tactical MILDEC. Appendix B provides additional information and a
tactical deception aid format.
2-19. As with other operations, deception planning follows the military decisionmaking process. Planning
a deception does not have to be difficult, but there are certain steps that must be taken to ensure the
deception is properly constructed. The steps are as follows:
Determine the deception goal. The deception goal is the desired contribution of the deception to
friendly-mission success. In other words, what advantage does the deception provide for friendly
forces (for example, provide target opportunities for friendly forces)?
Determine the deception objective. The deception objective is the purpose of the deception
operation expressed in terms of what the adversary is to do or not to do at the critical time and
location. In simpler terms, it is the action or inaction that friendly forces want the adversary to
take (for example, cause insurgent forces to move into the open).
Identify the deception target. The target is the adversary decisionmaker with the authority to
make the decision that will achieve the deception objective (for example, the insurgent group
commander).
Identify desired perceptions. These are what the deception target must believe to make the
decision that will achieve the deception objective. Based on the deception objective and target,
the planner must determine the nature of the desired perceptions—will they increase or decrease
the target’s uncertainty (ambiguity increasing or decreasing)? Desired perceptions eventually
translate to resource requirements; therefore, the number of perceptions should be kept to an
absolute minimum to conserve the assets needed for the deception (for example, U.S. forces are
going to attack from the south).
Develop the deception story. The deception story is a plausible, but false, view of the situation
which leads the deception target to act in a manner that accomplishes the deception objective. To
be plausible, the story must be integrated into the overall COA. The story is built and stated
exactly as the planner wants the target to reconstruct it. To develop the deception story, the
planner thinks about how the target sees the situation and then writes the story like the deception
target’s own intelligence estimate. The story is always written from the target’s perspective—
what does the target expect to see and think and what will he do (for example, indications are
that U.S. forces are massing to the south in preparation for an attack)?
Identify the deception means. These are the methods, resources, and techniques that the unit will
use to create required observables (things the adversary decisionmaker needs to see to deduce the
desired perceptions) and act out the deception story. The planner must determine for each desired
perception what means—physical, technical, and administrative—can be used. Physical means
are observable physical activities of forces, systems, and individuals that present visual
indicators. Technical means include radio broadcasts, radar emissions, and electromagnetic
deception. Administrative means are used to convey oral, pictorial, documentary, or other
material evidence to the deception target.
Develop deception events. These are the activities conducted by the deception means at a specific
time and location to convey the deception story to the target. To convey the deception story, the
deceptive activities must be observed by the adversary. To determine this, planners pair up the
available deception means with the capabilities of the adversary’s intelligence collection system.
If the adversary intelligence system can “see” the deceptive event, then it can collect the
information it needs to piece together the deception story. Deception events must be translated
into tasks to subordinate units if the deception operation is to be executed (for example,
loudspeaker simulating vehicle traffic, SFODA present in area).
Develop OPSEC measures. Without OPSEC to deny critical information to the adversary, the
deceptive activities may not convince the adversary to believe the deception story. In order for
the deception to be successful, the unit must adhere to a strict need-to-know policy.
Develop assessment requirements. Collecting feedback is a difficult challenge. However, to
judge the effectiveness of the deception, it is necessary to have indications of how the target is
responding to the deception. Ideally, there will be indicators of whether the target is receiving the
deception story as planned, and if the target is acting in accordance with the deception objective
(for example, insurgents move from building to highway).
Develop a termination plan. A deception operation does not just end on its own. Part of the
operation is a termination plan that establishes when organized deception activities cease, and
how deception means, techniques, and events will be protected. This is important, because there
is no logic in executing a deception after the objectives have been met. Additionally, the
adversary should not know what deception means, techniques, and events were used. Otherwise,
the next deception operation may not have the desired effect due to the adversary gaining
insights into friendly TTP.
2-20. In time-constrained deception operations, the “see–think–do” methodology can be used as an
abbreviated planning process. The planner uses this process by identifying what he wants the target to do
(for example, the deception objective), then determines what the target must think (for example, required
perceptions), and then establishes what the target must see (for example, deception events).
2-21. Deception operations cannot proceed without approval or coordination. Two authorities can direct a
deception operation: a higher HQ and the unit commander. In both cases, the command’s deception plan
must be coordinated with the higher HQ. To ensure coordination, deception plans are normally approved
two levels above the employing unit HQ. It is imperative that a deception be thoroughly coordinated to
prevent information fratricide; that is, employing deception in a way that causes effects in the information
environment that impede the conduct of friendly operations or adversely affect friendly forces.
2-22. The military deception work sheet (Figure 2-6, pages 2-9 through 2-11) is a tool that can be used to
capture the key elements of the deception plan. Elements of planning information are listed on the work
sheet in the order they are developed using the deception methodology.
Unit Mission: (Concise restatement of the mission. Deception Constraints: (Identify constraints on the
Identifies the operational goal(s) of the command to which command from higher to lower as they affect the
the deception must contribute.) deception plan.)
Establish a bridgehead across the Knewt Canal to rapidly All liaison activities with members of friendly foreign
advance forces deep into Towie territory and occupy key governments and Allies that concern this operation will
terrain on Sangria Ridge. not be conducted with prior approval by the Atari Chief
of Staff of the military.
War stocks, particularly ammunition, will be stored,
handled, transported, and issued with exercise
ammunition. The perception that Atari is conducting
Exercise SACRED HEART must be maintained.
Wartime SOPs, wartime communications, and wartime
modes of operation will not be implemented until two
hours prior to commencement of the actual attack
operation.
Commander’s Guidance for Disposition/Deception Goal: (Describe the desired effects or the end state a
commander wishes to achieve [commander’s intent for the deception operation].)
Intent: We will mask the plans for our attack and build-up of our military strike forces by massing supporting logistic
elements, the forward deployment of our assault engineers and air defense umbrella, and our increased
communications under the guise of Exercise SACRED HEART (the annual Atari command post and maneuver
exercise). Exercise SACRED HEART provides the overall cover to conceal our actual intentions.
End State: Numerically and qualitatively superior combat, combat support, and combat service support elements of
the Atari 1st Army will be fully deployed on the south bank of Knewt Canal to execute canal crossing operations,
drive deeply into Towie territory, and occupy key terrain on Sangria Ridge.
Atari Commander’s Goal Statement: Use MILDEC to achieve operational surprise during Atari canal crossing
operations; and enable Atari freedom of maneuver during our drive to the Sangria Ridge.
Deception Objective: (Describe the desired action or inaction on the part of the adversary at the critical time and
location.)
Cause the Towie front commander to delay mobilization and commitment of the Towie strategic reserve in response
to operations. (Note: If a delay in mobilization and commitment of the strategic reserve is achieved, this delay then
contributes to/supports the Atari commander’s goal statement of achieving surprise.)
Deception Target: (Identify adversary decisionmakers responsible for the actions(s) or inaction(s) specified in the
deception objectives.)
The Towie front commander has sole authority to mobilize and commit the Towie strategic reserve—he is the single
and only decisionmaker that can make this decision.
Desired Perceptions: (Describe what the deception target must believe for it to make the decision that will achieve
the deception objective.)
The Towie front commander must believe:
- The Atari military is not preparing for immediate combat operations against the Towie forces or nation.
- The Atari military is conducting Exercise SACRED HEART to improve wartime fighting efficiency, mission
command, and logistics; hence, the buildup of its military forces.
- Towie intelligence should detect visible signs of impending combat operations, but Atari forces would be preparing
for an exercise and training in the open.
Deception Story: (Outline a scenario of friendly actions Deception Means: (Describe how the plan will be
or capabilities that will be portrayed to cause the implemented and how it supports the unit’s overall
deception target to adopt the desired perception.) mission.)
Atari military forces are conducting Exercise SACRED Atari forces can employ the following MILDEC means to
HEART. The purpose of Exercise SACRED HEART is to get the target to take the action desired: physical,
improve the fighting efficiency, mission command, and technical, and administrative. These means can be
logistics of the Atari Army via the exercise’s numerous employed independently or in collaboration depending
training and maneuver phases. on the situation.
(continued)
for the operation in question as well as specified execution authorities in the form of an
execution order, operation order, or theater security cooperation plan.
A MISO theme is an overarching subject, topic, or idea. It often comes from policymakers who
establish the parameters for conducting MISO by delineating the themes to stress and avoid.
Target audiences are groups of people that can effect achievement of the commander’s mission
and toward which actions are directed. Planning for MISO requires a thorough analysis of each
group’s attitude, behavior, susceptibility, and sources of information to determine which themes,
messages, and means will effectively influence the group to exhibit the desired behavior.
MISO objectives are general statements of measurable response that reflect the desired behavioral
change of foreign target audiences and best support the accomplishment of the supported
commander’s mission. Generally, the MISO objective is written at the geographic combatant
commander level and is part of the geographic combatant commander’s overall campaign plan.
Supporting MISO objectives are the specific behavioral responses desired from the target audience
to accomplish a given MISO objective. Supporting MISO objectives are unique for each MISO
objective, and each MISO objective always has two or more supporting MISO objectives.
MISO series consist of all the MISO products and actions designed to accomplish one behavioral
change by a single target audience.
Distribution is the movement of completed MISO products from the production source to the
point of dissemination.
Dissemination is the delivery of MISO products directly to the target audience. Planners must
keep in mind that each target audience varies greatly in their access to a particular medium,
whether it is radio, television (TV), newspapers, posters, and so on. Additionally, the ability of
target audiences to understand the message varies because of language, cultural, or other barriers.
Note. An essential element of effectively planning for MISO is integration into the targeting
process. This allows MIS forces the opportunity to get the rest of the staff to understand the
importance of its nonlethal targets and the psychological effects of planned operations on target
audiences.
2-26. Tactical-level MISO are typically conducted by MIS forces (directly attached at the SFODA level)
through close-range means, such as face-to-face meetings, loudspeaker broadcasts, or by pinpoint
distribution of products, such as leaflets to a particular village.
2-27. Strategic-level MISO focuses on conveying select information to international regional foreign
audiences. Operational-level MISO focuses on a theater of operations, whereas tactical-level MISO focuses
on conveying select information inside a tactical unit’s AO. Because MISO are planned and executed at all
levels, it is important that they be mutually supporting or complementary of other United States
Government (USG) information activities, as well as other information capabilities (for example, PA and
OPSEC). Generally, tactical-level MIS units will use this higher-level guidance as the basis for their own
information activities.
Note. The proximity to the target audience does not determine the level of support (tactical,
operational, or strategic). Mission analysis and, ultimately, the MISO objective determine the
level of support. Likewise, the impact of a MISO effort at the tactical level can have operational
or strategic implications.
2-28. Generally, a joint MISO task force assigned to the higher joint command provides direct guidance to
all MIS forces in-theater to coordinate MISO at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Depending on
the mission, either a company- or detachment-sized MIS element will typically support the JSOTF or a
SOTF. Task organization is tailored in accordance with the mission, available resources, and priority of effort.
2-29. The primary mission of a MIS company supporting a JSOTF is to conduct operations that influence
behavioral responses and advise the commander of those responses and their impact on the operation. The
MIS company typically supports a variety of tactical-level special operations forces missions, monitors the
psychological state of target audiences in the operating environment, and analyzes adversary information
activities. It can develop, produce, and disseminate tactical-level products within the guidance assigned by
the approval authority. The company consists of a company HQ section with a span-of-control of three to
five detachments. Development and production of MISO products are typically conducted at the company
level.
2-30. A MIS detachment attached to the SOTF is comprised of a HQ section and three to six teams
comprised of three to five Soldiers. The MIS detachment provides direction and oversight of the teams.
The MIS detachment does product-dissemination planning by determining dissemination priorities and
tracking the dissemination of products within the AO. (FM 3-53, Military Information Support Operations,
and FM 3-05.301, Psychological Operations Process, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, provide a
complete description of the responsibilities and duties of the respective MIS elements.) The team is a three-
to five-man element led by an E-7; the team is generally task-organized down to the SFODA. The E-7 also
serves as the MIS planner and advisor to the SFODA/SFODB commander and is responsible for the
integration and employment of the team. The MIS team is the link between the SF commander and local
target audiences in a given AO. This linkage is possible through face-to-face communication and
rapport-building with local nationals. Whether conducting loudspeaker operations in support of combat
operations or collecting information, on target audiences and the operational environment, the MIS team is
a tactical asset that can significantly influence overall operations. Because of its integrated nature, the team
is most effective when maintained as a cohesive element. After-action reviews suggest the division of a
team decreases its capability.
2-31. A tactical MIS team can perform the following functions during combat operations:
Reduce the adversary’s will to fight. MIS Soldiers can use loudspeakers and leaflets to instill and
exploit the fear of death or defeat in the adversary; undermine the adversary’s confidence in their
leadership; decrease their morale and combat efficiency; and encourage surrender, defection, or
desertion.
Support deception activities through employment of loudspeaker assets and other means.
Minimize civilian interference with military operations.
Monitor and assist in efforts to counter propaganda in the AO.
Plan, develop, and monitor a key-leader engagement strategy for supported commanders to
ensure this critical influence tool is appropriately aimed at achieving the commander’s
objectives.
2-32. During stability and support operations, in addition to discouraging civilian interference and
assisting in efforts to counter propaganda, MISO can support the following:
Humanitarian assistance. MIS units support humanitarian assistance operations by providing
information on program benefits, shelter locations, food and water points, and medical-care
locations. MIS units also publicize humanitarian assistance operations to build support for the
United States and HN governments.
Peacekeeping. MISO help gain acceptance for U.S. or allied forces in the AO, thereby gaining
support and compliance with U.S. and allied policies and directives, and increasing support for
HN governments or military and police forces.
Noncombatant evacuation operations. MIS units support these operations by reducing
interference from friendly, neutral, and hostile target audiences and by informing evacuees.
Demining operations. MISO educate the target audience on the dangers of mines, how to
recognize mines, and what to do when a mine is encountered. MIS units encourage target
audiences to report locations of mines and unexploded ordnance.
Foreign internal defense. MISO help build and maintain support for the HN government and its
forces while decreasing support for insurgents.
2-33. In the execution of the MISO series, the team leader coordinates the dissemination of all products
through the higher MIS detachment and the maneuver unit. Products normally comprised of standard
visual products, such as posters, handbills, and novelty items; audio products, such as loudspeaker
broadcasts, radio messages, and compact discs; and audiovisual products, such as video compact discs or
digital videodiscs. In dissemination, the team follows the guidelines set forth in the series dissemination
work sheet, which gives specific instructions for required dissemination to the appropriate target audiences.
As part of its support to MISO development, the team provides details on possible dissemination sites and
optimal dissemination times.
2-34. Whatever dissemination means are used, the MISO messages communicated to the target audiences
are guided by themes. A theme is a subject, topic, or idea used as a planning tool to develop a MISO series.
For MISO, a theme is developed through target audience analysis based on approved MISO objectives and
formulated to affect the attitudes or behaviors of the target audience. As such, themes are broad, somewhat
static, and not communicated to the target audience. At the tactical level, MISO themes should be the basis
for all communication with the adversary, local populace, and any other target audiences. The two types of
themes are the themes to be stressed and the themes to be avoided. The list of themes to stress and avoid
can be found in the higher HQ MIS annex. The following are examples of themes:
Themes to stress. Only local people can resolve problems, coalition forces do not favor any
group or faction, and displaced persons should return to their homes. Themes to be stressed vary
according to the target audience:
Enemy forces. Themes include inevitability of defeat, hardship and privation, and absence
from loved ones.
Local population. Themes to stress include security and stability, reconstruction and
economic prosperity, tribal and cultural, nationality and history (for example, Iraq is a
multi-ethnic, tribal-sect-dominated state), insurgents are criminals and miscreants.
Foreign governments. Themes to stress include commitment and resolve, international
security, and cooperation.
Third-party organizations. Themes to stress include security, stability, and solidarity with
military forces.
Themes to avoid. Themes to avoid include religious issues, cultural comparisons, women’s roles
in local society, themes that appear to favor one faction or group over another, and themes that
degrade local ethnic, cultural, or religious values.
2-35. A message is a communication of the theme, whether visually, audibly, or in written form. Messages
are communicated to the target audiences to influence their attitudes and behavior. As such, messages are
specific, constantly evolving with the situation, and tailored to specific target audiences. Messages may
take either of the following forms:
Spoken. Messages can be spoken communication delivered in TV and radio broadcasts, talking
points delivered during face-to-face communication or loudspeaker broadcasts.
Written. Written messages can be delivered by leaflets, handbills, or posters.
In any case, a message is a single thought to be conveyed from U.S. forces to the enemy or other target
audience (such as the local populace).
2-36. Because of the number of messages and themes available to the commander for his information
activities, it is imperative that the IO staff coordinate and synchronize all messages (for example, MIS
planner, PAO, CA planner) emanating from the commander. This deconfliction should ensure that
messages from different elements are not contradicting one another and that the correct message is
communicated to the correct target audience at the right time and place.
2-37. MISO are not the only IO capability that produces themes and communicates messages to the
adversary or populace. PA produces and uses PA themes and messages to communicate with the media and
inform the populace. MILDEC may communicate deceptive messages to the adversary. Therefore, MISO,
PA, and MILDEC must coordinate and synchronize themes and messages so that the correct message is
communicated to the correct target audience at the right time and place to avoid information fratricide.
2-38. By using MISO, the commander brings to bear a force-multiplier that uses its capabilities to degrade
the enemy’s will to fight, reduce civilian interference, minimize collateral damage, and maximize the local
population’s support for operations. MIS forces do this by using assets at their disposal to reach local and
over-the-horizon targets with different visual, audio, and audiovisual products. Proper employment of
MISO means fewer casualties (friendly, enemy, and civilian), fewer U.S. troops required to accomplish the
mission, shorter operations, and less damage to infrastructure. Success in these areas results in faster
reconsolidation of combat elements, less required rebuilding of infrastructure, and ultimately, quicker
return of a nation to self-sufficiency.
2-39. When employing MISO, there are three primary limitations to consider. First, only personnel school
trained in MISO and designated by their Service as MIS officers or Soldiers should develop MISO series
(although any friendly-force element can disseminate products and conduct face-to-face engagements).
Second, there are legal and political factors that may restrict the use of MISO. MISO must follow U.S. and
international laws, especially when used without a declaration of war. The third constraint is time. MISO
planning must begin early in the operation and continue throughout if it is going to effectively influence
the target audience in time to support the operation. FM 3-53 and FM 3-05.301 provide further details on
MISO planning and TTP.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
2-40. EW plays a major role in attacking and exploiting the adversary’s ability to use information, while
defending the U.S. ability to process information. By definition, EW is any military action involving the
use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the EMS or to attack the enemy. It consists of three
divisions: electronic attack (EA), electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. EA is the use of
electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or
equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. EA is
considered a form of fires. Electronic warfare support involves actions taken to search for, intercept,
identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for
the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, and planning. Electronic protection involves passive
and active means taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or
enemy employment of EW. Of EW’s three major components, EA has the most direct role in support of
IO, especially at the tactical level. At the tactical level, EA is primarily used to attack adversaries by
jamming the electromagnetic frequencies used by the adversary (degrading or disrupting information flow)
or using the EMS to deceive the adversary (affecting the information content available to decisionmakers).
2-41. The objective of EA planning and execution is to ensure use of the EMS for friendly forces while
preventing the adversary’s effective use of the spectrum. Electromagnetic jamming denies the adversary
the use of its receivers by overwhelming them with high-powered signals on the same frequency as the
receiver. Procedurally, this is accomplished through spectrum management and deconfliction. Spectrum
management controls frequencies that all friendly emitters use to prevent interference and fratricide.
Deconfliction is the process used to avoid conflicts in frequency usage. It is also used during mission
execution to resolve interference problems.
2-42. To meet the technical requirements of EA, an EW officer is often needed to effectively plan,
coordinate, monitor, and assess friendly and adversary force activity in the EMS. However, depending
upon the unit, an EW officer may not be authorized. If the unit does not have an EW officer, EA
responsibilities will usually fall to the IO planners. In such a case, IO planners should research the EW
assets available to the command from higher HQ and establish contact with representatives from the units
that possess the assets.
2-43. Synchronization of EW tasks is imperative. Up to a certain point in the operation, friendly forces
may want adversary decisionmakers to communicate, so they do not want to tip off the adversary by
jamming too early in the operation. Additionally, lack of frequency deconfliction can result in information
fratricide among friendly forces.
2-44. Basic planning considerations for EA include the following:
Enemy vulnerabilities. The J-2/G-2/S-2 should have an electronic order of battle and other
intelligence products that identify how the enemy uses the EMS—which systems are critical to
adversary operations, what those systems are used for, and what frequencies those systems use.
This information helps determine specific electromagnetic vulnerabilities that may be exploited.
Friendly capabilities. Tactical units have limited organic EA assets. Most EA assets are assigned
at higher echelons. It is important to know specific capabilities organically available to the unit,
as well as those assets that are available through higher HQ.
EA deconfliction. Frequency-spectrum management ensures effective use of the EMS, preventing
interference with military and civilian frequencies.
Rules of engagement. EA usually has rules of engagement that must be followed to avoid
violating international treaties that control the use of the EMS. In peacetime, EA is generally
used only to protect friendly forces. In wartime or conflict, there are restrictions concerning the
impact of EA on civilian emergency services.
Note. At the SFODA/SFODB level, leaders must coordinate with the SOTF IO planner for an
effect in the EMS. The IO planner will coordinate with the EW officer to identify the means to
achieve the effect. It is imperative that EA be coordinated and deconflicted with higher and
adjacent elements. The frequency range on the EMS or the cell tower that needs to be jammed
for an operation may be the primary means of communications or intelligence collection for
friendly forces.
Note. Other than CND, which is executed by the J-6/G-6/S-6, CNO is not conducted at the
JSOTF. If a need for CNO arises, the IO planner at the JSOTF will request support through
appropriate channels. It requires a long lead time for the approval process.
2-46. Although CNO has a unique request process involving the joint operations planning process and
classified supplemental processes, successful CNO planning relies on a five-step process (Figure 2-7,
page 2-17) that should be integrated into the unit’s planning process.
1. Identify CNO contributions to the information operation and determine targets. IO planners should
refrain from identifying specific tasks to CNO and should focus on the desired effect for CNO in support of
the information operation. This can be achieved by reviewing the previously determined IO objectives and
identifying which objectives can be supported by CNO in terms of the effect included in the objective.
Once the objectives to be supported are identified, IO planners coordinate with J-2/G-2/S-2 to identify
potential targets for CNO. Related planning factors for a typical computer network attack include the—
Quality of available intelligence.
Reliability of access to the targeted network.
Level of risk determined through a collateral-effects estimate.
Timely availability of a required capability.
IO planners should include CNO-related activities when developing measures of effectiveness (MOEs)
associated with the IO objectives and identify collection methods for MOEs associated with CNO.
2. Determine time available. During this step, IO planners determine if there is time available to employ
CNO in support of the information operation. Considerations include approval timelines, required timing
and execution of other IO capabilities in regard to shaping the information environment, and whether
delayed or disapproved CNO integration will substantially affect specific IO capability efforts or IO’s overall
contribution to the mission.
3. Obtain approval. Although CNO is an operational-level planning function, units at the tactical level should
not hesitate to request CNO support if they identify an appropriate use. The request for CNO is a request
for national-level assets. The CNO approval process has unique complexities. CNO-related authorities
are retained at high echelons, and IO planners should plan accordingly. When completing CNO requests,
IO planners should clearly show the necessity for CNO and its impact on mission accomplishment. IO
planners at the tactical level should contact operational-level IO planners to submit CNO requests.
Operational-level planners should handle the somewhat-formal approval process. One significant factor
pertaining to approval is the fact that computer network exploitation has two distinct subelements. The
first is that of an intelligence function (collection) and the second is that of an operations activity
(enabling). This distinction is important because CNO, by doctrinal definition, does not include the
intelligence subelement of computer network exploitation. However, under Title 10, United States Code,
CNO can conduct similar activities as long as they are not for the purposes of intelligence collection. The
intelligence community, operating under Title 50, United States Code, can conduct both subelements of
computer network exploitation. Therefore, to ensure all activities are legal, coordination between these
communities is usually required prior to approval.
4. Execute CNO tasks. Execution of CNO should be monitored by the unit to ensure synchronization with
other IO capabilities as well as unit maneuver elements. IO planners should identify collected
CNO-associated MOEs and make recommendations to the commander concerning variations to the plan.
5. Conduct after-action review. Upon completion of the operation, IO planners should determine if CNO
tasks supported the IO objectives, as planned. IO planners should identify additional CNO tasks that may
have increased friendly-force advantage. IO planners also review the request for CNO and determine
what information would have expedited the request. They determine if all MOEs were able to be collected.
If not, they determine what changes should be made for future operations? Finally, IO planners determine
how the unit will handle unexpected CNO-related adversary responses in the future.
COMBAT CAMERA
2-47. JP 1-02 defines COMCAM as the acquisition and utilization of still and motion imagery in support
of operational and planning requirements across the range of military operations and during joint
exercises.
Due to the IO planning for the operation, COMCAM accompanied the assault force
and provided crucial footage proving that no damage was caused to the facility and
personnel were treated with respect. The footage was reviewed and released by
higher HQ to refute the accusations.
2-48. COMCAM documents military operations with both video and still photography. When the mission
dictates, it is used to—
Gather intelligence. COMCAM provides imagery of potential targets or target areas and supports
battle-damage assessments.
Support planning efforts. COMCAM validates assumptions by providing accurate images of a
situation.
Provide imagery to PA and other IO capabilities. COMCAM provides graphics, photography,
video products, and print media to enhance the effectiveness of PA press releases and MISO
products.
Document interrogations and autopsies. COMCAM provides evidence of proper techniques and
procedures.
Support landing zone studies. COMCAM imagery can help determine the diameter of the area
and the terrain’s grade.
Provide historical documentation. COMCAM provides evidence of events for future use (for
example, Red Cross investigations) and preserves the accuracy of historically significant events.
2-49. COMCAM captures a photographic record of military operations but, more importantly, it allows
commanders to provide visual proof of operations for MISO and PA and to counter adversary IO for
enemy, adversary, and neutral information activities. Once the COMCAM team’s captured imagery or
video is released by the supported commander, the imagery is digitally transmitted to the noncommissioned
officer in charge of the JSOTF. Prior to sending the product to the joint combat camera center (JCCC), the
imagery is reviewed to obtain the commander’s release approval. Once approved, the image is sent to the
JCCC, where it may be used by any Department of Defense entity that has access to the imagery database.
For example, MIS elements may use these pictures to develop products, whereas PA will use these pictures
during press conferences and media-engagement activities. At the tactical level, units can use these images
to make immediate impact on the populace within the operating area by producing visual products
highlighting local events, good or bad, to achieve the goals set by the unit commander. The complete cycle
from image acquisition to receipt by the JCCC must occur within 24 hours for the collection imagery to
remain a viable decisionmaking tool for national-level leaders.
2-50. The method of documentation depends on the purpose of the mission, the environment in which the
documentation occurs, and the support available to the Soldiers documenting the event. There are three
different COMCAM documentation methods:
Still photography. Still photography involves producing, processing, and reproducing still-
picture films, prints, and transparencies. These images can be captured using film or digital
cameras or can be taken from motion picture or video photography. COMCAM teams use digital
still-video cameras to capture and transmit images electronically. Some cameras also have night-
vision devices that permit them to be used during darkness or other limited-light conditions.
Motion media. Motion media is documentation of activities or operations as they occur. Motion
media technology can be used in daytime, nighttime, and limited-visibility operations. The film,
which captures positive and negative images, must be edited before IO or other staff elements
can effectively use it.
Multimedia presentations. Multimedia products can be used for a variety of purposes, from
meeting training requirements to serving as a means to transmit public information. They allow
commanders to review the operations and training of their forces, and introduce new and
improved operational techniques and developments to subordinates.
2-51. COMCAM imagery must be reviewed by appropriate staff members of the supported command prior
to release. The supported commander is the release authority for all collected COMCAM images before
they are transmitted out of theater. Composition of the review board should be tailored based on the
specific unit design. A typical review board includes the following individuals:
J-2/G-2/S-2 representative (for identification of possible intelligence and exposure of classified
information).
OPSEC officer (for identification of possible disclosure of unit critical information [EEFI]).
Judge Advocate General (for identification of possible or perceived violations of the laws of land
warfare).
Operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3)/assistant chief of staff, operations staff section
(G-3)/operations staff officer (S-3) representative (for identification of exposed TTP or any
content that is not desirable for release).
PAO (for public-release consideration).
2-52. To maximize COMCAM support, leaders should—
Employ COMCAM as an operational asset assigned to the J-3/G-3/S-3. A COMCAM
representative is identified within the J-3/G-3/S-3 to plan for the employment of COMCAM.
Plan to employ COMCAM during the initial phases of an operation to ensure comprehensive
mission documentation.
Provide COMCAM with full mission access (as is reasonably and tactically feasible) during each
phase of the operation.
Ensure COMCAM coverage availability before, during, and after operations.
Ensure tasks to COMCAM personnel include clearly defined requirements and priorities. Include
a purpose for each task to take advantage of COMCAM personnel initiative.
Ensure COMCAM imagery is reviewed by PAO prior to release outside of the organization.
Ensure COMCAM personnel provide imagery to the JCCC for immediate distribution to support
strategic and operational objectives.
Note. COMCAM can provide images for MISO, MILDEC, PA, and CMO. It can be used for
battle damage MOEs. It can also serve as a record.
engagements, but every Soldier has the potential to conduct some form of engagement with the local
populace and leaders, and most importantly, to communicate a message through their actions.
2-54. Military leaders who prepare, listen well, and communicate effectively are more likely to gain the
cooperation and trust of the local populace. Commanders must also understand that influencing a given
populace will most certainly require committing assets to help meet the people’s needs—talk will only go
so far. People associate actions with messages. SFODA actions on the objective must support the
command’s themes and messages. Messages with few or no supporting actions generally are given little
credibility.
2-55. The attached MIS element is the most capable, by purpose, training, and organization, to develop,
plan, monitor, and assess a commander’s key-leader engagement strategy. As key-leader engagement is
targeted to influence an action or nonaction, it falls to the MIS element to develop the appropriate
messages to be disseminated to the appropriate target audience at the right time as part of the commander’s
larger influence efforts. By using attached MISO personnel to manage the KLE program, a commander
ensures a broader, more effective influence effort in his AO.
TYPES OF ENGAGEMENTS
2-56. In interacting with the local population, there are well-planned and coordinated meetings and chance
encounters, as described below:
Planned face-to-face meetings. These meetings are daily or weekly key tactical-leadership
activities that occur with local leaders and populace. Planned face-to-face engagements are well
thought out and resourced. They are an important facet of the mission during counterinsurgency.
Face-to-face meetings are often the result of the targeting process and support specific effects
tied to accomplishing the desired end state.
Key-leader engagements. These meetings are at all levels between military leaders, HN
government, and tribal or village leaders to achieve or support a specific desired effect. To match
the appropriate military leader with the leader being engaged requires careful planning.
Chance encounters and contacts. Chance encounters typically occur with the local populace
during patrols and other mission activities by MIS teams, Civil Affairs teams, and SFODAs. All
personnel with access to the local populace and leadership should be briefed on how to conduct
face-to-face engagements, be aware of current matters of interest to the local populace, and be
knowledgeable of the command’s themes and messages.
TYPES OF MESSAGES
2-59. Messages may be either negative or positive. Negative messages are used to attack the target
audience or to convey the likelihood of negative consequences if the target audience does not engage in the
desired behavior (for example, if you do not surrender, you will be killed). Positive messaging offers
specific or implied benefits if the target audience engages in a certain behavior (for example, cooperation
with coalition forces will result in the construction of a health clinic).
Note. By doctrine, there are no IO themes and messages. MISO and PA have themes and
messages. If needed, in coordination with MISO and PA representatives, the IO staff may have
to develop command themes and messages.
MESSAGE DEVELOPMENT
2-60. When developing messages, it is important that message content addresses target-audience
vulnerabilities (or perhaps an interest or motivation). Target-audience vulnerabilities are determined by
considering the following four factors:
Motives. Look for factors that drive target-audience behavior. Primary motives include basic life
needs such as shelter, security, and food. Secondary motives evolve from social interaction
within the family, clan, or tribe, or from membership in political and religious organizations.
Demographics. Look for target-audience characteristics, such as gender, ethnicity, religion, and age.
Planners must determine which characteristics can be exploited to affect target-audience behavior.
Psychographics. Look for the target audience’s cognitive characteristics relevant to the world
around them, both near and far. These can be values, beliefs, attitudes, and ideology that trigger
emotional responses.
Symbols. Symbols are a sophisticated mix of graphics, video, audio, or audiovisual objects that
reference architecture, religious symbols, historical events, and symbols with cultural or
contextual significance to the target audience.
2-61. Once vulnerabilities are identified, messages are crafted that communicate the approved themes to
the target audience and address its vulnerabilities. Crafting messages is an art that requires time and
thought. Figure 2-8, page 2-22, provides a sample message. A few guidelines to follow include—
Limit each message to one thought.
Keep each message succinct. Complex messages pose challenges for senders, translators, and
receivers. Limit each message to one sentence and minimize internal sentence punctuation.
Keep messages to a manageable number. Rule of thumb is no more than five messages per theme
or target audience.
Tailor messages for the means and method of delivery and the target audience.
Convey a story (the theme) by arranging the messages from first to last. The sum of the messages
should then tell the story (or theme).
Place the bottom line up front and summarize at the end. The first message should contain the
most important thought. The last message should restate the first message.
Consider developing “escape” messages that leaders and Soldiers can use to deflect
conversations away from the themes to avoid.
Themes Messages
It is inevitable that the insurgents will be While your leaders sleep safe in their warm beds, you
defeated. are left to suffer in the cold and wind.
Your mothers will mourn the deaths of their sons, and
your children will be orphans when you meet the bloody
death that awaits you.
Lay down your weapons and return home to the families
who need you.
The Army is honorable and capable. The Army is the guardian of the people.
The Soldiers fight like bold lions for the freedom of the
nation.
The enemy comes with foreigners in the night to murder
and rob their fellow tribesmen.
Help the Army defeat its enemies and provide
information about terrorists, weapons, people, and
activities.
The insurgents are responsible for civilian The United States and its allies do everything possible to
deaths. avoid civilian deaths.
The insurgents hide among the populace.
It is well known that the terrorists place women and
children in harm’s way when it suits their purposes.
People in Security from Halt violent Violence does not Violence does
Village X. villagers in Town Y. demonstrations. solve any not improve your
problems. situation.
Further violence
will lead to the
withdrawal of
coalition aid and
support.
Note. After identifying a meeting, leaders should determine an appropriate location for the
meeting. If hosting the event, leaders ensure the area is presentable and cleared of any
operational information. They ensure the location is quiet and away from disturbances such as
phones or radios.
Identify target-audience characteristics. Gather as much information about the local leader as
possible (for example, proper name and title, approximate age, family members, ethnicity,
language spoken, and relationships to other leaders, friendly forces, third-party organizations,
and the adversary). One way to obtain this information and prepare for a meeting is to consult
personnel who have met with the person before. It is important to continually refine and update
background information based on experience with the individual. Characteristics of the local
leader that are good to know include—
Language spoken. Identifying the leader’s language may be difficult if multiple languages
and dialects are spoken in the operational area, all of which could require different
interpreters.
Education/literacy level. Level of education may determine which form of the language the
local leader speaks. Many languages have a colloquial version and a more formal textbook
version (often referred to as high or formal). Knowing the individual’s level of literacy may
impact on decisions to leave written products during the meeting.
Customs and etiquette. Identifying unique customs and proper etiquette prevents awkward
moments during the meeting.
Attitudes. Understanding the local leader’s attitudes toward military forces and toward
other organizations and groups in the AO helps to avoid a tense discussion. Plan a strategy
to overcome the leader’s negative perceptions.
Key advisors. Knowing the local leader’s key advisors facilitates follow-on discussions and
may bridge gaps that cannot be resolved with the target directly. Advisors are also helpful
in gauging the leader’s perceptions of U.S. forces and of the results of the meeting.
Identify target-audience concerns. Every individual engaged has some key concerns that may be
raised during the meeting. Being prepared to address these concerns will greatly facilitate
communication. Some of the local leader’s concerns may include—
Local conditions. Religious, public health, crime, and economic issues in the key leader’s
AO may impact the dialogue during the engagement.
Needs. The local leader will probably discuss the needs of his followers. Needs can be the
basic requirements of food, water, and shelter, or they can be more complex—political
power-sharing, contact between the populace and U.S. forces, or getting help with
reconstruction or security matters. Anticipating the leader’s concerns allows the U.S. leader
to plan resources that can enhance cooperation.
Religious, political, and economic viewpoints. Conditions in the operating area may shape
religious, political, and economic viewpoints, but viewpoints vary depending on the
individual. Knowing the local leader’s viewpoints makes it easier to address or avoid
sensitive topics that may detract from the meeting. This does not mean that these topics
should be avoided, but in general it is best to avoid sensitive topics until one is more
familiar with the target audience.
Review previous meetings. Notes, comments, and debriefings from previous meetings with the
key leader may indentify previous agreements made with the local leader and reoccurring topics that
are likely to be raised at the meeting. For example, if during previous meetings with a city mayor,
the mayor asked for more money at each meeting, chances are that he will ask for money again.
Identify end state. Typically, the engagement’s end state is the action (or, at times, the inaction)
friendly forces want the target to take. For example, the unit may want a leader to actively
support Army recruiting or a religious leader to stop encouraging violence.
Develop messages. Develop tailored messages that support the engagement’s end state and
address the key leader’s vulnerabilities. When possible, use already approved messages. Review
MISO themes to stress and avoid.
War-game responses and reactions. Develop appropriate counteractions to the key leader’s most
likely responses and possible demands.
Develop meeting exit strategy. Have an exit strategy so the meeting can end tactfully.
2-65. Leaders can use a face-to-face engagement work sheet (Figure 2-10, page 2-25) to plan critical
aspects of key-leader engagements. When kept current, the work sheets are a useful planning tool for
future engagements with the same target. Commanders and leaders should also rely heavily on assigned or
appropriate themes and messages for reinforcement during the engagement. MIS forces habitually do target
audience analyses on various individuals, groups, and factions within their assigned AO and are skilled at
planning operations to influence.
Treat all members of the target audience with courtesy and respect.
Avoid making or implying promises that cannot be kept.
Avoid elevating his position or embellishing his authority. Although he certainly may have to
check with higher authorities before making promises or decisions, using it as an excuse too
often may decrease the target audience’s respect for him as a leader.
Use open-ended questions to facilitate discussion. Yes or no answers tend to be incomplete and
inaccurate.
Be aware of the body language from all parties. He ensures that the body language does not
negate the message.
Recap what has been said, as the meeting closes, and clarify expected actions by both parties.
Target: Date-Time Group: Location:
Intended target is John Smith. 210900DEC11 FOB Bragg, Building 2, Room 123
Characteristics:
Records from previous meetings indicate John Smith is a stern tribal leader. Research shows him to be supportive of
U.S. interests, but he has been known to support operations against U.S. forces when it benefits him personally. A
number of Smith’s acquaintances verify this information. Meeting will be limited to one hour.
Environment and Concerns: Previous Meetings:
Meeting at FOB Bragg is a friendly environment. Our Previous meetings have been cordial and show Smith
goal is to provide assurance to Smith that the United appears to support U.S. interests. Smith has indicated a
States will support him upon his return to the tribal desire to partner with U.S. forces in the tribal region.
region.
Desired End State: Themes/Messages:
Reconfirm to Smith that the United States will continue The message Smith must receive is that the United
to support his tribe by providing a detachment to States will continue to provide support for training and
support training against insurgency. combat operations. Posters and pamphlets clarifying this
support will be provided to Smith upon his departure.
Anticipated Reaction/Issues: Response:
Smith’s reaction should be positive provided he is Previous meetings indicate that Smith is a hard
affirmed of continued U.S. support for his tribe. As an negotiator, and will initially request more than the United
issue, it is anticipated that Smith will request monetary States is prepared to offer. Negotiators must remain
compensation for the families of wounded and killed steadfast in limiting promised support to that which is
tribal members. deemed appropriate.
Meeting Strategy: Exit Strategy:
Meeting rehearsal is scheduled for 200900DEC11. The Time limit for the meeting is set at 1 hour. The code word
team leader and team sergeant will negotiate on behalf DISCONTENT will be used to end the meeting.
of the United States. Participants should be firm, but
respectful. Negotiation will occur with Smith only.
Samples of products will be provided. Promises of
support must remain in keeping with commander’s
guidance.
Attendees:
Scheduled attendees include John Smith, his aide (Michael Jones), the team leader, team sergeant, and intelligence
sergeant. The intelligence sergeant will maintain a list of additional attendees, including approximate age, home
town, contact information, profession, and demeanor.
Notes:
Team will conduct after-action review immediately following the meeting to compare notes and ensure an accurate
understanding. Final report will be submitted to Colonel Jackson not later than 220900DEC11.
Follow-up Actions: Next Meeting:
Meeting notes and after-action report will be provided to all detachments in Next meeting is scheduled for
the area. Any required coordination with higher will occur within 10 days of 200900JAN12.
the conclusion of the meeting.
information. Successful operations to counter adversary information require the use of all IO and other
capabilities.
2-75. All elements of IO can and will support the operations to counter adversary information plans, but
the focal point for such operations should remain with PA forces. Adversary information is used to
describe information and activities used by an adversary or enemy, in peacetime and wartime, to
undermine the legitimacy of operations and the credibility of the force. Previously the term propaganda
was used to describe all forms of adversary information. The evolution of media forms and capabilities has
made the term propaganda too limiting in describing how information is used by adversary states and
nonstate actors to gain an advantage in the global information environment. To better clarify the use and
application of adversary information this manual divides adversary information into the following four
categories:
Information for effect. Information for effect involves the use, publication, or broadcast of factual
information to negatively affect perceptions and/or damage credibility and capability of the
targeted group. Examples of uses of information for effect involve the premature announcement
of collateral damage caused by friendly forces, reporting or images of the results of insurgent
attacks on friendly forces, or release of captured sensitive, or classified information.
Propaganda. Any form of adversary communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature,
designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to
benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly (JP 1-02).
Misinformation. Incorrect information from any source that is released for unknown reasons or to
solicit a response or interest from a nonpolitical or nonmilitary target (FM 3-13).
Disinformation. Information disseminated primarily by intelligence organizations or other covert
agencies designed to distort information or deceive or influence U.S. decisionmaker, U.S. forces,
coalition allies, key actors, or individuals via indirect or unconventional means (FM 3-13).
2-76. For the purposes of IO, adversary information justifies actions and bolsters legitimacy of an
adversary. By communicating with the populace and, at times, friendly forces, the adversary offers a
window into its philosophy, goals, objectives, and operations. Therefore, adversary information may
provide a useful insight into how to defeat the adversary. Some of the more commonly used techniques
include the following:
Name-calling. This describes the use of a name or word to connect a person to something
negative (for example, Muslim extremists describing or terming Westerners as Crusaders).
Glittering generalities. This describes the twisting of the meaning of a word that has great
symbolic value (for example, terming terrorist attacks as a jihad).
Euphemisms. This describes the use of a milder word to make a situation seem less threatening
(for example, “revenue enhancement” to describe a tax hike).
Transfer. This describes the use of symbols to associate an agenda with a respected institution
(for example, placing official letterhead on a piece of disinformation).
Testimonial. Testimonials add credibility to a position (for example, using celebrities to testify
on political issues).
Bandwagon. This describes a technique which plays on the desire of people to fit in (for
example, 7 of 10 workers prefer candidate X).
Fear. This describes the manipulating of people’s fears to elicit a behavior (for example, without
jihad, the crusaders will invade your homes).
2-77. To effectively counter adversary information, it is necessary to understand the environment in which
the adversary information exists. One way to establish the context of adversary information is to determine
the interrelationship between information indigenous to the operational area and the culture and history of
the people. This information is often available in the MISO studies and appendixes to the command’s
operation plan. Furthermore, it is also necessary to identify adversary information from other forms of
information in the operating environment. Adversary information is often subtle and nuanced, and may be
mixed in with misinformation and disinformation. To separate propaganda, it is necessary to identify
adversary capabilities to develop and spread propaganda, as well as the receptiveness of the target audience
to the adversary’s lines of persuasion. This is typically a MISO task, conducted using the source-content-
audience-media-effects analysis technique for individual pieces or instances of opponent propaganda and
series analysis to determine the operational impact. Source-content-audience-media-effects analysis
requires thorough analysis and resources normally found with the MIS elements at the JSOTF level. IO
planners can facilitate this analysis by assisting intelligence and MIS personnel in the collection of
suspected propaganda. A simple description of source-content-audience-media-effects is as follows:
Source. Identify the originator or sponsor of the propaganda.
Content. Identify the line(s) of persuasion used (the message and the source’s desired effect).
Audience. Identify the audiences targeted by the source and actually reached by the propaganda.
This step is critical to countering adversary IO planning.
Media. Identify the medium used and why that particular medium was selected by the source.
Effects. Determine the impact of the opponent’s propaganda on the target audience. Try to
determine whether the propaganda has caused attitudinal or behavioral change.
2-78. A possible staff solution to the problem of countering adversary information activities is to form a
working group of personnel from the IO, MISO, PA, and intelligence staffs who can fuse propaganda
analysis and media analysis with the current intelligence estimate. In general, the working group seeks to
determine how the adversary affects the content and flow of information in the operating environment, how
propaganda impacts the various target audiences, and what audience needs are being targeted by the
propaganda.
2-79. Countering adversary information activities does not commence upon discovery of adversary
propaganda. Effective operations to counter adversary information activities proactively seek to mitigate
propaganda’s effects before their onset.
2-80. Countering adversary information activities is a long-term operation. To mitigate or nullify the
effects of adversary propaganda, countermeasures must anticipate the adversary’s response. Success of this
effort rests with the ability to correctly direct the capabilities at affecting specific information to the target
audience. An effective operation to counter adversary information efforts selects the appropriate
capabilities and determines how these capabilities can be employed to match or overmatch the effects of
opponent propaganda. Common techniques to counter adversary information include the following:
Forestalling. Forestalling counters possible lines of persuasion prior to the release of propaganda.
Conditioning. Conditioning preemptively shapes target audience vulnerabilities prior to exposure
to propaganda.
Restrictive measures. Restrictive measures deny the intended target audience access to the
propaganda.
Direct refutation. Direct refutation rebuts the propaganda point-for-point.
Indirect refutation. Indirect refutation questions the validity of some aspect of the opponent’s
argument.
Diversion. Diversion diverts attention by presenting more important or relevant themes to the
target audience.
Imitative deception. Imitative deception alters the propaganda to degrade its impact.
Silence. Silence offers no response to the propaganda.
Minimization. Minimization acknowledges selected elements of the propaganda while
downplaying the importance of the content.
2-81. It is unlikely that any one set of countermeasures will apply a complete solution. The effects of
opponent propaganda and friendly countermeasures will likely develop in a nonlinear fashion; hence, a
constant process of analysis and application is necessary. It is unlikely that any one set of countermeasures
will apply a complete solution. The effects of opponent propaganda and friendly countermeasures will
likely develop in a nonlinear fashion; hence, a constant process of analysis and application is necessary. To
do this, IO planners must monitor any effects produced by the countermeasures, changes to the operating
and information environments, and adversary responses to the countermeasures. Then, if applicable, IO
planners reengage the target audiences with new countermeasures. Although there is no doctrinal
methodology for countering propaganda, the following steps can be used:
Analyze target audiences. Understand the environment, the operational area, the inhabitants, the
culture, and the adversary.
Analyze propaganda. Establish a collection plan to identify and collect adversary propaganda.
Use the source-content-audience-media-effects process to analyze.
Analyze media affecting the environment. Identify media in AO and then determine its bias and
use by adversary for propaganda purposes.
Apply countering adversary information measures. Compare the propaganda analysis to the
various capabilities and countering adversary information techniques and then apply appropriate
countermeasures.
Monitor. Evaluate the effects of the countering adversary information measures.
REWARDS PROGRAMS
2-82. The Department of Defense Rewards Program pays rewards to persons for providing USG personnel
with information or nonlethal assistance that is beneficial to—
An operation or activity of the Armed Forces or of allied forces participating in a combined
operation with allied forces conducted outside of the United States against international
terrorism.
Force protection of the Armed Forces or allied forces participating in a combined operation with
U.S. Armed Forces.
2-83. There are two types of Department of Defense rewards:
Preapproved rewards allow a geographic combatant commander to nominate individuals or items
to be placed on the Secretary of Defense preapproved rewards list for rewards in amounts that
are in excess of the authority delegated to combatant commanders.
Regular rewards paid to individuals providing the information after the target has been
prosecuted and a monetary value established.
2-84. The Department of Defense Rewards Program can be used for information leading to the killing or
capture of high-value individuals, the recovery of weapons caches, or information of impending attack on
U.S. forces. Rewards can be paid in monetary funds or barter items. It cannot be used for weapons buyback
programs, running an intelligence program, paying intelligence-source salaries, deceased persons (for
example, an assassination program), or paying for illegal drugs (for example, a poppy, heroin, or cocaine
buying program).
2-85. Rewards programs can be a potent asset to IO used to shape the information environment and
provide a conduit to pass messages to the populace and the adversary. Examples of how rewards can be
used for the purposes of IO include the following:
Key-leader engagement. Rewards can be used as a means to establish working relationships and
build influence with key leaders who have influence in their communities. Rewards can be used
to bolster a key leader’s position in their community.
Influence local population. Rewards can be used to convince the local populace they can help
control the local security situation. They can receive cash rewards for turning in weapon caches
and insurgents that cause insecurity in their communities.
Message insurgent leaders and fighters. Rewards can be used to send messages that affect
adversary perceptions and decisionmaking. Placing a preapproved reward on a mid-level
insurgent leader and then saturating his operating area with wanted posters and handbills may
curtail his ability to move and conduct operations.
Rewards as part of deception. Deceptive information about rewards can be used to conceal
friendly TTP. Messages can be disseminated that insurgents are being captured because they are
being turned in for rewards and not by friendly collection assets. The success of the reward
program can be highlighted through MISO products, key-leader engagements, and the “rumor-
mill.”
Rewards as a divisive tool. As rewards are paid to individuals concurrent with the kill or capture
of high-value individuals, friction can be created within an enemy network as members consider
who may be leaking information, intentionally or unintentionally, that places the network at risk.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS
2-86. CMO establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and
nongovernmental civil organizations, and the local populace. CMO contribute to shaping the operational
area by focusing on civil aspects of the mission, their impact on military operations, and the impact of
military operations on the civilian populace. A supportive civilian population can provide resources and
information that facilitate friendly operations. As is the case with PA, CMO rely heavily on credibility with
local leaders and the populace. CA forces are the designated forces and units organized, trained, and
equipped to support the commander in planning and conducting CMO.
2-87. CA forces are structured to support JSOTF operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels
while maintaining regional focus. The concept of CA support to the JSOTF is that a CA battalion (minus)
with two CA companies supports the JSOTF. The CA battalion CA planning team is collocated with the
JSOTF HQ to assist in CMO planning within the joint special operations area. A CA company HQ will be
collocated with each SOTF and is capable of providing a civil-military operations center (CMOC) outside of
each SOTF. A CA team is designated to support each SF advance operational base, as directed. The remaining
CA teams are designated as a surge capability for the SOTF commander.
2-88. The CMOC is a standing capability formed by all CA units. The CMOC serves as the primary
coordination interface for the U.S. armed forces and indigenous populations and institutions, humanitarian
organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational military
forces, and other civilian agencies of the USG. The CMOC facilitates continuous coordination among the
key participants with regard to CMO and CAO from local levels to international levels within a given
operational area, and develops, manages, and analyzes the civil inputs to the common operational picture. The
CMOC center is the operations and support element of the CA unit as well as a mechanism for the
coordination of CMO.
2-89. CA teams are typically four-Soldier elements consisting of a team leader, team sergeant, engineer,
and medic. Besides planning, coordinating, and supporting civil reconstruction projects, CA teams can
conduct medical civilian action programs, veterinary civilian action programs, and humanitarian assistance
missions to provide quick-impact contributions to local populace quality of life. A CA teams’ performance
in a given area can affect the public perception in the local area. MISO can support these with radio
broadcasts and other means to advertise the events and later exploit their success. PA can also exploit the
success of these missions through press releases. It may be useful to attach COMCAM to a CA team to
document civil contributions or to provide photographs for intelligence analysis. If COMCAM assets are
not available, any available Soldier with knowledge of the command’s intent for the photographs may take
pictures.
2-90. If friendly-force military operations create collateral damage and casualties among the populace, CA
teams may conduct consequence management to mitigate the negative impact of such operations on the
populace through payments or other types of reimbursement. The unit’s CA officer may be a conduit to a
provincial reconstruction team or other similar entities that have developed relationships with local leaders.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
2-91. PA units provide timely and accurate information so that both U.S. and international audiences may
assess and understand the facts concerning military operations. PA units have the following
responsibilities:
Internal. PA provides command information to inform the force and counter effects of adversary
propaganda and misinformation.
External. PA provides information regarding military operations to external agencies,
governments, media, and populaces.
2-92. Although PA personnel strive to be separate from IO, there is no denying the impact of timely,
relevant PA press releases on a given audience. This impact can be multiplied substantially and used to
support command objectives when PA personnel are included in IO planning and able to prepare
consequence-management activities by preparing press releases beforehand.
2-93. Adversary forces may review PA release information to cue intelligence and provide battle damage
assessments. Additionally, PA may be an information conduit to adversary decisionmakers. Extreme care
should be taken when employing PA, as successful and effective public relations depends on credibility,
and credibility relies on truthful reporting. PA can support IO by—
Getting ahead of enemy propaganda with the truth.
Countering adversary misinformation and disinformation by publishing accurate information.
Ensuring media awareness of the implications of premature release of certain information.
Playing a key role in establishing ground rules for embedded reporters.
2-94. MISO and PA are separate capabilities that support the commander’s objectives. Coordination must
be conducted between both. For IO planners, it is important to understand that rural populations generally
do not have access to PA release material. Further, PA is wholly dependent on local, regional, and
international media to carry their messages. These rural and isolated groups are best informed through MIS
assets, which do have organic production and dissemination capabilities. IO planners can facilitate this by
ensuring PA releases and articles are sent to MISO planners for dissemination to the local populace. PA
planners should review and deconflict messaging with MISO planners to ensure that tactical, operational,
and strategic messages are mutually supporting or, at the very least, not contradictory.
Note. The best way to influence the populace through themes and messages is to use the most
influential people in the area—the key communicators. Local leaders, FID partner forces, and
religious leaders are just some examples of the types of personnel who can spread the message
amongst the populace. Whoever is viewed as the most influential, trustworthy source (key is
credibility of the messenger) should be the individual serving as a conduit to the target audience.
2-96. The focus of defense support to the public diplomacy is to understand, engage, influence, and inform
critical foreign audiences through words and actions to foster understanding of U.S. policy and advance
U.S. interests. The decisions and actions executed by the SFODA on the ground can have a profound effect
on U.S. public diplomacy efforts.
2-97. Figure 2-11, pages 2-32 through 2-35, and Figure 2-12, pages 2-36 through 2-38, provide an overview
of IO capabilities. Figure 2-13, pages 2-39 and 2-40, outlines the support roles of IO, CMO, and PA.
EW Supports By (continued):
Degrading adversary’s ability to see, report, and process information.
MISO Isolating target audience from information and herding that target
audience onto MISO broadcast frequencies.
Physical Destruction Providing target acquisition through EW support.
Using electronic protection to safeguard communications used in
Physical Security
protecting facilities.
IA Using electronic protection to protect equipment.
CI None.
CNA Supplementing CNA with EA.
Using electronic protection to protect personnel, facilities, and
CND
equipment.
Physical Security Supports By:
OPSEC Protecting operation plans and operation orders.
MILDEC Restricting access by level of security and number of personnel.
Protecting inventory of sensitive products to prevent premature
MISO
dissemination of messages.
Safeguarding availability of information systems to use in physical
Physical Destruction
destruction.
EW Safeguarding equipment used in electronic warfare.
IA Safeguarding information systems by implementing security procedures.
Safeguarding personnel, and preventing unauthorized access to
CI
equipment, installation, materiel, and documents.
Safeguarding information systems from sabotage, espionage, damage,
CNA
or theft.
CND Determining applicable risk and threat levels.
IA Supports By:
OPSEC Ensuring information system confidentiality.
MILDEC Providing information system assets for conducting MILDEC operations.
MISO Ensuring availability of information systems for MISO.
Ensuring information systems are available for physical destruction
Physical Destruction
tasks.
EW Ensuring EW assets are available.
CI Supports By (continued):
Physical Destruction None.
Providing electronic countermeasures.
EW Conducting countersignal operations to allow broadcast of MISO
messages.
Physical Security Countering foreign human-intelligence operations.
IA Should be no conflict.
CI Should be no conflict.
IO Supported By:
Influencing informing populace of civil-military activities and support.
Neutralizing misinformation and hostile propaganda directed against civil
CMO
authorities.
Controlling electromagnetic spectrum for legitimate purposes.
Countering adversary information and protecting from
misinformation/rumor.
PA
Developing EEFI to preclude inadvertent public disclosure.
Synchronizing MISO and OPSEC with PA strategy.
Ensuring accuracy of information.
Maintaining relevance of information.
Timeliness of information.
DSPD
Usability of information.
Completeness of information.
Security of information.
Coordinating guidance to COMCAM teams with commander's
COMCAM information/objectives.
Assisting in expeditious transmission of critical COMCAM images.
CMO Supported By:
Providing information to support friendly knowledge of information
environment.
Synchronizing communications media and assets and messages with
other information capabilities.
IO Coordinating C2 target sets with targeting cell.
Establishing and maintaining liaison or dialogue with indigenous
personnel and nongovernmental organization.
Supporting MISO with feedback on MISO themes.
Providing news and information to the local people.
Providing information on CMOC activities to support PA strategy.
Synchronizing communications, media, and message.
PA
Identifying, coordinating, and integrating media, public information, and
HN support.
Providing information to inform interagency elements on local information
environment.
Synchronizing communications media and messages with other IO
DSPD capabilities.
Establishing and maintaining liaison or dialogue with indigenous
personnel and nongovernmental organizations.
Supporting DSPD with feedback on strategic communications themes.
Using COMCAM capabilities to record priority civic action projects.
COMCAM
Synchronizing imagery assignments with COMCAM team leader.
PA Supported By:
Coordinating with IO planners to ensure a consistent message and
maintain OPSEC.
Supporting counter adversary information.
IO
Providing assessment of effects of media coverage to OPSEC planners.
Providing assessment of essential nonmedia coverage of deceptions
story.
PA Supported By (continued):
Providing accurate, timely, and balanced information for the public.
CMO Coordinating with civil affairs specialist to verify facts and validity of
information.
Coordinating with interagency planners to ensure a consistent message.
DSPD
Proving assessment of media coverage.
Managing release of key images through PA channels.
COMCAM Coordinating for COCAM coverage and access to key events and
operation.
DSPD Supported By:
Providing a link to interagency for coordination and guidance on strategic
IO
communications themes and activities.
Providing a link to interagency for coordination and guidance on strategic
CMO
communications themes and activities.
Providing a link to interagency for coordination and guidance on strategic
PA
communications themes and activities.
Providing a link to interagency for coordination and guidance on strategic
COMCAM
communications themes and activities.
COMCAM Supported By:
IO Providing responsive imagery coverage of events in the operational area.
CMO Providing responsive imagery coverage of events in the operational area.
PA Providing responsive imagery coverage of events in the operational area.
DSPD Providing responsive imagery coverage of events in the operational area.
Successful IO Plan
The primary role of the IO planner is to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict while
ensuring the appropriate capabilities are employed based on the desired effect. An
example of this is an information operation that took place in the Basra Province of
Iraq in 2009.
The mission was to conduct an information operation with and through the HN forces
to bolster popular support for a partner unit and decrease the influence of extremist
groups in the province to set conditions for a safe and secure environment.
The concept was broken down into three phases and focused on four information
capabilities: PSYOP, PA, COMCAM, and CMO. The first phase was education and
training; the focus of this phase was to provide the partner unit with training on how
to interact properly with the populace and the media. The PSYOP teams took the
lead during this phase by providing information team training based on various
approved courses. This was also an assessment phase for the PAO and the CA
officer on the partner unit’s media relations and CMO capabilities. In addition to
conducting assessments, the PAO, in cooperation with COMCAM, published
numerous press releases highlighting the successes of the partner unit’s direct action
missions. The second phase was planned engagements; the focus of this phase was
to assist the partnered unit with providing the locals with much-needed supplies and
materials. The CA planner took the lead during this phase by working with the
SFODA to determine the best areas to deliver goods and in which areas the SFODA
wanted to increase their influence. (continued)
The PAO and COMCAM supported this phase by highlighting the engagements via
press releases and photos. They also utilized a broadcaster to gather video footage
of the successful engagements. Based on the relationships developed during phase
two, the SFODA transitioned to phase three—planned operations. The SFODA used
the information gathered during the planned engagements to assist with targeting
efforts, and focused on decreasing the influence of the insurgent groups in the
region.
By incorporating multiple capabilities of IO into a focused, coordinated effort, the plan
achieved the desired effects to bolster popular support for a partner unit and
decrease the influence of extremist groups in the province.
3-7. Typically, essential tasks for IO number between three and five. More than five essential tasks
present the risk of overtaking subordinate elements or having an information operation that is too complex
to execute.
3-8. One useful technique for validating an essential task is to ask the following question: “If the unit
accomplishes all other tasks marginally and does this one well, will it accomplish the mission?” If the
answer is “no,” then the task is not essential. If more than five essential tasks are identified, planners should
question the validity of each essential task or the nature of the requirements levied on the unit by higher HQ.
3-10. IO planners face a challenge in expressing IO capabilities to the commander and staff. A simple list
of IO capabilities (that is, three ground-based jammers, nine MIS teams, two COMCAM teams, and so on)
does not help the commander visualize the command’s capabilities in the information environment. In
developing its staff estimate. IO planners should consider the following basic questions:
What can the command do using organic assets?
What can supporting assets from the higher HQ do?
What can not be done?
3-11. One possible solution to this problem is to organize IO capabilities by elements, asset, and means in
terms of their contributions to friendly-force operations in the information environment. Figure 3-3 shows
a sample asset list.
Supported
Element Assets Means Essential Tasks Effect Targets
for IO
MIS 4 x MIS Loudspeaker Degrade Degrade Insurgent
detachment teams operations adversary Influence cell
Handbills morale Local
Inform
and posters Influence local populace
Radio and populace to not Key leaders
TV interfere with
broadcasts friendly
operations
Face-to-face
Key-leader
engagement
SF SF teams Direct action Disrupt Disrupt Insurgent
detachment Face-to-face adversary C2 Destroy leaders
Build legitimacy Degrade Insurgent
of HN security cells
forces Influence
Local
populace
EA 2 x EA-6B Jammer Disrupt Disrupt Insurgent
adversary C2 Degrade leaders
Degrade Isolate Insurgent
adversary cells
morale Influence
1. Facts. Statements of known data concerning the situation, including adversary and friendly
disposition, available troops, unit strengths, and material readiness that will directly affect the
mission.
2. Assumptions. Suppositions on the current or future situation assumed to be true in the absence of
facts and which will typically describe future eventualities on which success of the operation depends.
3. Tasks.
a. Specified. Tasks specifically assigned to the command by higher HQ (extracted from
paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the higher HQ base order, annexes, and overlays).
b. Implied. Tasks that must be performed to accomplish specified tasks of the overall mission
(developed from an analysis of specified tasks).
c. Essential. Tasks that must be executed to accomplish the mission (derived from analyzing
specified and implied tasks lists: essential tasks are included in the mission statement).
4. Constraints. Restrictions placed on the command by higher HQ that dictate an action or inaction,
thus restricting the command’s freedom of action (extracted from higher HQ guidance, concept of
operations, coordinating instructions, and annexes—especially IO, rules of engagement, themes to
avoid, CMO, and PA).
5. Available Assets. Organic and supporting troops and equipment available for the operations
(derived from higher HQ order, current tasks organization, and unit status reports).
6. Risk Assessment. Hazards that may be encountered during the mission because of the presence of
the adversary or hazardous condition in the AO (developed from staff experience and SOPs).
7. CCIRs. Information the commander needs to make critical decisions, especially to determine or
validate COAs.
a. PIR. Information the commander must know about the adversary (derived from known gaps in
information required to accomplish the operations).
b. FFIRs. Information the commander must know about the friendly force (developed form
knowledge of the friendly force and mission).
8. EEFI. Critical aspects of the friendly operation that—if known by the adversary—will compromise,
lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and, therefore, must be protected from detection
(derived from higher HQ order and developed by using the OPSEC process).
Distinguishable. Each COA should be supported with a unique information operation, although
the differences may be subtle. These differences include the use of different IO capabilities,
changes to the allocation of the capabilities, or changes in the time or sequence of IO tasks.
Complete. The COA should provide information superiority and address friendly-force actions in
the case of undesirable results.
3-20. Successful IO give subordinates maximum latitude for initiative and postures the unit for follow-on
missions. Likewise, with a little foresight, IO planners can use one information operation to jump-start
another. Occasionally, a tactical-level information operation may just be the perfect catalyst for an
operational-level information operation (and so on).
Slow decisionmaking
Adversary Force Misemployment of forces
Reduce morale
Information Environment Change populace support Change populace behavior
3-27. Once identified, information superiority becomes the purpose of the information operation, and as
COAs are developed, they must be nested to the unit’s main operation. To do this, IO planners determine
the operational advantage (that is, information superiority) that will be sought in the information
environment and ensure its purpose supports the purpose of the mission statement.
each assigned mission or COA based on what the command’s assets and resources can do to achieve the IO
objectives. To build an IO concept of support, the IO planner develops the—
Purpose of the information operation (information superiority).
IO objectives or essential information operations tasks (EIOTs) that will create the effects in the
information environment to achieve information superiority.
Tasks to subordinate units and staff elements that assign specific actions that will achieve the IO
objectives’ desired effects.
Target nominations. Certain IO tasks may result in the identification and nomination of targets.
Request for support from higher HQ.
Assessment plan to measure progress.
objective is to deny (effect) insurgent (target) ability to exploit negative effects of friendly-force
operations (action) to prevent support to adversary efforts (purpose).
3-34. Because it is impossible to anticipate all possible effects, terms other than those presented in this TC
may be used to describe the desired effects for IO. Effects terms should describe a condition—not a task.
Definitions may vary for the same effect based on the physical and cognitive nature of the effect and the
target of the specific effect.
3-35. As IO objectives are developed, IO planners should consider the indications of success (MOEs) and
how the indications will be collected. If adequate indications and collection means cannot be identified, the
objective may have to be refined to produce measurable and detectable results. If an objective’s MOE is
focused on behavior or beliefs, planners must consider physical actions that are a result of the desired
behavior, or belief, as an indicator.
(tasks) of the various IO capabilities. One difference is that EIOTs include the methods or means that will
be used to perform the EIOT. A possible format for an EIOT uses task, purpose, method, effect:
Task (for example, jam adversary’s C2 communications).
Purpose (for example, prevent coordinated efforts against friendly forces).
Method (for example, EW EA-6B).
Effect (for example, disrupt).
General plan for IO lists the IO objectives, tasks to be executed, capabilities that will execute,
associated MOEs for the objectives, and collection methods that will be used for assessment.
Priority of support designates which subordinate unit or element has the priority of IO assets and
capabilities. Restrictions on the employment of IO lists prohibited and directed actions that affect
the employment of IO.
General scheme for IO uses doctrinal concepts and terms to explain how the IO objectives will
be achieved, who will perform them (that is, the tasked units), and the sequencing of key tasks; it
relates the key tasks to the achievement of information superiority.
Counter – Diminish adversary information to Broadcast – Transmit and make public by means of
correctly portray friendly intent and actions. radio or TV. Typically MISO forces conduct tasks to
Demonstrate – Show or reveal. MILDEC typically broadcast.
conducts tasks to demonstrate. Demonstrate – Show or reveal. MILDEC typically
Deter – Prevent action through the existence of a conducts tasks to demonstrate.
credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. MISO Disseminate – Spread or disperse. MISO and CMO
forces typically conduct tasks to deter. typically conduct tasks to disseminate.
Disseminate – Spread or disperse. MISO and CMO Engage – Initiate contact to open dialogue with or
typically conduct tasks to disseminate. communicate a message to a target. MISO and CMO
Jam – Interfere with or prevent the clear reception of typically conduct tasks to engage; however, any
signals by electronic means. EW typically conducts friendly-force asset with access to the target has
tasks to jam. potential to conduct face-to-face engagements.
Persuade – Induce to believe something or Inform – Provide information or educate a specific
convince. MISO forces typically conduct tasks to target audience. MISO, PA, and CMO typically conduct
persuade. tasks to engage; however, any friendly-force asset with
access to the target has potential to inform through
Prevent – Keep from happening or avert. OPSEC face-to-face engagements.
typically conduct tasks to prevent.
Persuade – Induce to believe something or convince.
MISO forces typically conduct tasks to persuade.
Publicize – Bring to the attention of the public. PA
typically conducts tasks to publicize.
Detect – Discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an intrusion into information systems. IA, CI,
and EW typically conduct tasks to detect.
Protect – Guard against espionage or capture of sensitive equipment or information. OPSEC, IA, CNO,
physical security, EW, and CI typically conduct tasks to protect.
Respond – React quickly and appropriately to an adversary attack or intrusion in the information environment.
All IO capabilities have potential to respond, depending on the specific incident.
Restore – Bring information systems or conditions in the information environment back to their original state.
IA typically conducts tasks to restore.
COA: Conduct raid at Objective LIMA to remove insurgents and return control of the area and populace to the
existing government.
IO Objective: Disrupt communications by jamming insurgent communications. This will prevent coordinated
efforts against friendly forces.
OPSEC Tasks:
Protection of the essential elements of friendly
information is imperative to ensure success of
electronic warfare plan.
PA Tasks:
None
3-44. The IO annex (Army orders format) or appendix (joint orders format) describes the complete IO
mission and how IO will gain information superiority in support of the scheme of the maneuver. This
approach places a lesser emphasis on individual IO assets and capabilities and greater emphasis on the
aggregate IO effects needed to achieve information superiority. The IO staff must be careful to not let the
requirement to develop and explain IO capabilities contribution to the operation overwhelm the primary
purposes of the IO annex, which are to—
Provide operational details on the information operation.
Focus element and unit tasks on achieving specific effects in the information environment.
Provide the information needed to assess the information operation.
3-45. There are two basic formats for an IO annex: a five-paragraph (Figure 3-12, pages 3-16 and 3-17)
and a matrix annex. The five-paragraph annex is used when sufficient planning time is available. The matrix
annex is used when time is limited or when directed by the J-3/G-3/S-3 or unit SOP.
1. SITUATION.
a. AO. Describe the information environment’s subenvironments. Identify significant characteristics (for
example, terrain, weather, populace, civilian information infrastructure, civilian population, and third-
party organizations). State the aggregate impact on adversary and friendly operations. Identify
aspects of the information environment, to include key information nodes that favor adversary and
friendly operations.
b. Adversary Operations in the Information Environment. Describe how, when, where, and why
adversary forces will operate in the information environment. Describe likely objectives and activities
and how information capabilities will be employed. Identify adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities in
the information environment in terms of information collection, protection, and projection.
c. Friendly Capabilities and Vulnerabilities in the Information Environment. Identify friendly-force
capabilities to shape the information environment and attack adversary forces with information.
d. Civil Considerations. Identify key people, groups, and organizations that operate in the information
environment and will affect friendly and adversary forces’ operations. Describe likely objectives and
activities in the information environment.
e. Attachments and Detachments. List organic and supporting assets that are available to execute the
information operation.
2. MISSION. State the unit mission.
3. EXECUTION.
a. Concept of Support. Describe how IO will be conducted and who will perform it from beginning to
end, to include adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities to be attacked and friendly critical
vulnerabilities to be protected. Define information superiority (that is, the operational advantage
derived from operating in the information environment) and explain how and when IO will achieve it.
Include IO effects (that is, objectives or EIOTs), sequencing of key tasks, and IO capacities priorities
by phase.
b. Assessment. Describe the assessment plan for the information operation.
c. Tasks to Subordinate Units. List subordinate units and assigned IO tasks.
d. Coordinating Instructions. List IO instructions common to two or more units. State any rules of
engagement applicable to IO capability. List constraints not contained in the concept of support.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Identify requirements for support pertaining to IO as a whole. Identify service
support to individual IO elements in their respective appendixes or annexes.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Significant command and signal information related to IO not covered in the
base order. Include arrangements needed to exchange information among IO capabilities.
3-46. Typically, at the tactical level, the information operation can be adequately described on a matrix
order format (Figure 3-13). When combined with a copy of the IO concept of support sketch, most IO
capabilities can understand and execute accordingly. There is no specific format for an execution matrix.
Figures 3-14 and 3-15, pages 3-18 and 3-19, are two examples.
Concept of Support:
Prevent preemption of the air assault and minimize civil interference in and around the objective by
destroying, degrading, disrupting, and exploiting adversary mission command and fire support systems;
deceiving adversary decisionmakers; destroying, degrading, disrupting, and deceiving enemy information
systems; denying adversary decisionmakers information about XXI Corps intentions and capabilities;
protecting mission command and information systems.
IO Objectives/Tasks: Assessment:
Prevent compromise of the operation; protect XXI Corps
mission command; disrupt 109th Division air defense and
targeting systems during critical periods of the operation;
minimize civilian interference.
Coordinating Instructions:
XXI Corps: Contact counterparts to coordinate and synchronize efforts to identify suspected SPF locations.
Service Support:
No change.
Appendixes:
Appendix 1 (OPSEC), Appendix 3 (EW), Appendix 4 (IO Execution Matrix).
HN Forces Take lead in all Take lead in all Take lead in all Take lead in all
lethal actions on the lethal actions on the lethal actions on the lethal actions on
objective. objective. objective. the objective.
Other N/A N/A N/A N/A
Time on Target
Tasked Unit IO
or Location Remarks
or System Task
Time of Effect
CONSIDERATIONS
3-47. IO planning can be initiated at the SFODA typically by the attached MIS element as the only
information capability at that echelon, and finalized at the SOTF. Typically, an SFODA will not have
access to all of the IO capabilities. When developing a concept of operations, planners must consider and
include the applicable capabilities in Figure 3-14, page 3-18. The SOTF IO planner will coordinate for
assets and synchronize and deconflict the effects. It is important for the SFODBs and SFODAs to
understand the JSOTF/SOTF IO plans to ensure the higher HQ intent is nested within their plans.
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
3-48. When planning, the SFODAs should consider what actions to take if the operation does not go as
planned. In the event that an operation does go awry, it is important to understand the information
environment, to include the influential leaders that SFODAs and their FID partnered units should engage to
assist in getting the appropriate information and messages to the populace. Also, it is important to note
what media outlets are available to assist with getting ahead of the news cycle. Key consideration is that
the first voice is the loudest. If the SFODA or the HN provides the facts of an operation or event in a
timely manner, the adversary will be forced into defense and will have to react and counter the information
as they fight to influence the population.
This chapter focuses on the key staff tasks IO planners must accomplish during
execution of an information operation. Once execution begins, IO planners monitor
the adversary and friendly situations, track IO task accomplishment, determine the
accomplishment of the IO objectives and tasks, and detect and track any unintended
consequences. Three staff tasks critical to execution include the following:
Monitor. Planners must maintain situational awareness and monitor the progress
of operations to determine if the operation is going according to plan.
Evaluate. Planners analyze the progress of the information operation, the status
of the adversary, and the effects in the information environment to determine if
there are variances from the plan and the significance of the variances.
Adjust. Planners estimate the effectiveness of task execution and the
effectiveness of IO on the adversary, the local populace, and friendly operations.
If an unexpected incident occurs, IO planners—in coordination with current
operations staff—coordinate with subordinate units and staff elements to
develop an appropriate task for that incident.
MONITORING
4-1. The key to monitoring is the collection of information critical to execution of the information
operation. The first step is determining what information is needed to evaluate and adjust the information
operation. Two sources for deriving the information are the CCIR and the J-2/G-2/S-2 decision support
template. From these sources, IO planners can determine their own information requirements; notably,
intelligence requirements and FFIRs that will help guide the information collection effort.
4-2. Next, IO planners monitor both the command’s overall operation and the IO tasks and activities as
spelled out in the operation order, IO appendixes, annexes, and execution matrices. Then, operations
reports and intelligence summaries are reviewed for IO-relevant information and paired against the IO
objectives to evaluate progress of the information operation. If necessary, requests for information are
submitted and tracked for clarification or additional information.
EVALUATING
4-3. The purpose of the assessment is to judge success or progress of the information operation. Progress
is determined by analyzing relevant information and intelligence from unit operations and intelligence
reports. The information is then applied against current IO objectives to determine whether the desired
effects are being achieved. However the assessment is conducted, planners should consider the following
principles:
The assessment should lead to recommendations to the commander to continue, end, or change
the operation.
The assessment must detect situation changes quickly enough for commanders to respond
effectively.
A balanced assessment considers changes in both the friendly and adversary forces’ information
environment.
The assessment of an information operation should focus on collective rather than individual
tasks and targets, because changes in the information environment or adversary force usually are
not the result of any single task or target.
4-4. Assessing IO can appear complex and difficult, but it need not be burdensome if IO planners use a
simple methodology to assess the information operation. In principle, assessing an operation consists of
evaluating the operations against measures of performance (MOPs) and MOEs.
Note. IO planners must be careful not to over assess by becoming bogged down in formal
assessment procedures for numerous tasks and effects, or to overwhelm subordinate units or
staff elements with requirements for numerous reports, questions, and information requirements.
4-5. MOPs measure friendly actions in terms of task accomplishment and performance. IO cannot
generate effects if the planned tasks are not successfully executed. As such, assessment should account for
task execution. Because task completion affects execution as well as assessment, it is important that the IO
capability representatives and subordinate units report accomplishment of their respective tasks. MOPs are
not measures of success—they gauge task completion and do not measure effect success or failure.
4-6. MOEs are used to measure the results achieved in the overall mission and execution of IO
objectives. More practically, MOEs determine if a desired condition or outcome is in place (that is, effect),
even if not directly caused by planned military action. Because IO objectives are written to articulate a
specific condition or state in the operational environment, most MOEs are crafted and used to measure the
effects generated by those tasks collectively executed to achieve each IO objective.
4-7. An assessment plan is normally developed as part of the planning process. For complex or long-term
operations, it may be necessary to form an assessment working group to produce the information required
to assess the information operation. Attendees to the working group may include representatives from the
J-2/G-2/S-2; J-3/G-3/S-3; plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5); assistant chief of staff, plans staff section
(G-5); MISO; EW; CA; and PA. During combat operations, the combat assessment board may supplant the
assessment working group.
Note. One of the critical factors in a successful relief-in-place or transfer of authority between
IO planners is the passing on of all historical IO data and ongoing assessment plans.
4-8. There is no standardized or doctrinal assessment process. In the absence of a doctrinal process, IO
planners must develop their own methodology to guide assessment. Based on field experience, the
following process is a logical approach to assessing an information operation:
Develop assessment criteria. The first step in the assessment process is to develop the assessment
criteria. This involves developing the items that support the MOE, indicators, and MOPs. One or
more MOE is normally developed for each IO objective. Each MOE should clearly articulate the
desired condition (effect) or end state that supports the associated IO objective. For example, for
an IO objective to “reduce popular support for insurgents,” an MOE could be “level of popular
support to insurgents.” Next, indicators are developed for each MOE. Multiple MOEs should be
developed and used to determine if the IO objective is being achieved. Indicators for the MOE
“increased reporting of insurgent activities” could include increased tips-line reporting, increased
tips to patrols, and increased walk-in tips. MOPs assess task accomplishment. Example MOPs
include the number of face-to-face interviews conducted, the number of handbills disseminated,
and the number of radio broadcasts (all observable and measurable activities).
Define the measures. Once MOEs, indicators, and MOPs are developed, IO planners establish a
foundation for comparison and analysis (also known as benchmarking). Benchmarking
determines the current state of MOEs and supporting indicators.
Collect and analyze data. The next step is to identify sources of data needed to assess the MOEs,
indicators, and MOPs. Data collection requirements should be kept as simple as possible. When
possible, standard operations and intelligence reports are used as the means to collect the data.
Figure 4-1 shows some data collection sources.
Provide recommendations. Assessment should yield changes to execution (based on MOPs),
changes to desired effects (based on MOEs), and changes to resource allocation.
Recommendations based on the assessment should provide the commander with the bottom line,
a recommended way ahead, and any issues requiring the commander’s involvement.
Internal Situation reports, intelligence summaries, current operations data, and other command reports.
Organic HUMINT, CA, MISO, and PAO reports; significant acts database; subordinate unit assessments.
External Other government agencies, international organizations, polling and populace surveys, media
analysis, OSINT.
4-9. As the data is collected, it should be analyzed against the established indicators to establish the
benchmarks. Follow-on data collection periods and assessments establish changes to the indicators and
MOEs. The sum of indicators then provides the assessment for each MOE. Figure 4-2 shows an example of
an assessment graphic.
ADJUSTING
4-10. The ways that IO planners can adjust the information operation in response to events in the
information environment are battle drills, the IO working group, and crisis-action teams. In a best-case
scenario, IO planning accounts for all possibilities and sets conditions for further operations. The
information environment is never static, and planning for consequence management through battle drills
and rehearsed crisis-action teams is critical to staying ahead of the adversary’s information cycle. By the
same token, proactive planning of synchronized IO efforts helps preclude reactive IO responses
for example, facilitating more timely and better prepared MISO and PA products and preplanned key-
leader engagements.
BATTLE DRILLS
4-11. Staff battle drills are planning aids designed to speed response to crisis situations that occur during
the conduct of a mission. For IO, quick responses to the adversary’s actions and events in the operational
area are necessary to beat the adversary in the information environment and ultimately achieve information
superiority.
4-12. Battle drills are developed during the planning process; however, they are not complete and final
COAs. Rather, battle drills are predeveloped concepts that anticipate crises. Once a crisis occurs, the battle
drill (that is, the COA) can be quickly adjusted to address the realities of the situation at hand.
4-13. A military operation can be thought of as a series of events, planned and unplanned, that force both
friendly and enemy forces to react to a changing situation. Some of these events, referred to as critical
events, are keys to mission success of friendly or enemy forces. Critical events—
Can create both intended and unintended effects and may be brought on by friendly, adversary,
or third-party actions.
Can be either negative or positive. The staff can develop drills that react to either type. For
negative critical events, a battle drill should mitigate the impact of the event on the populace and
friendly forces. For positive critical events, a battle drill should exploit the event to maximize the
impact on the populace and adversary forces.
Can be triggers or cues for the staff to initiate a battle drill.
4-14. An IO battle drill is a generic concept of support that addresses a friendly-force IO response to a
critical event that may occur during execution of the operation. There is no established format for battle
drills, though it should be recognizable to the staff and mirror existing products. Development of battle
drills does not follow an established guide, but rather, they are developed to suit specific missions and
potential branches and sequels of missions. Each battle drill should—
Identify critical events.
Define information superiority.
Develop IO concept of support.
Determine tasks and targets.
The information contained in a battle drill is not a final and complete plan, but rather a concept that must
be refined to the realities of the situation at hand. Depending on the battle drill, productions of approved
MISO products (such as radio scripts or other products) may be appropriate.
Note. Where the tasks are performed is determined once the battle drill is put into action.
Priority of support. Planners designate which subordinate unit or element has priority use of IO
capabilities.
Constraints on IO. Planners list prohibited and directed actions that are expected to affect the
information operation, paying particular attention to information content and flow (for example,
no jamming in urban areas).
Note. The formal battle drills are developed and coordinated at the SOTF level. The SOTF IO
planner will use the 7-day mission tracker to ensure they are ready to provide support upon start
of mission.
SITUATION: Insurgent forces attack friendly forces, a friendly third-party organization, or an opposing faction
(for example, a bombing, shooting, or mortar attack).
ASSUMPTIONS: The insurgent attack does not cause significant friendly causalities.
LIKELY FRIENDY ACTION: A response force is deployed to secure the site, and find and destroy the
insurgent force. Security operations are conducted in and around the area of attack. If necessary, force
protection measures are increased.
IO CONCEPT: The purpose of this IO is to gain populace support for counterinsurgency activities and identify
hidden insurgent cells for targeting. IO capabilities provide direct support to the response force. MIS teams
disseminate print products to the populace near the attack site. Unit leaders, MIS teams, and CA teams engage
local leaders to gain support for friendly operations. PAO issues a press release to explain the command’s
position and counter misinformation concerning the situation. Restrictions: MISO products must conform to
and support approved programs. MOE: Increased reporting of insurgent activity by populace.
4-21. The frequency of IOWG meetings depends on the situation and echelon. The working group may
gather daily, weekly, or monthly depending on the situation, echelon, and time available. The formality of
the IOWG also varies by echelon. For purposes of organization and focus, even the simplest IOWG should
have an agenda. The composition of the IOWG is tailored to the agenda. Representatives from every staff
need not attend every IOWG. Participants are selected because they either represent a critical element or
capability or because they have expertise that is critical to the information operation. Typical attendees
include the following:
IO planners.
MIS representatives.
EW representatives.
OPSEC representatives.
COMCAM representatives.
CA representatives.
PA representatives.
MILDEC representative.
Representatives from the J-2/G-2/S-2.
Representatives from the J-3/G-3/S-3, effects cell.
Special technical operation planners.
Fire support officer.
Others, as required.
Note. Appendix A, pages A-1 through A-6, provides detailed information on IOWG.
CRISIS-ACTION TEAM
4-22. For significant operational matters, a crisis-action team may be activated. The crisis-action team
consists of key members of the staff, to include the IO officer. When activated, the crisis-action team plans
and rehearses the command’s reaction to the event, and then issues a fragmentary order. To be a viable
participant, IO planners should develop response options to support the crisis-action team planning
process. When possible, IO planners use battle drills as the basis for adjustments to the information
operation and tasks to the IO capabilities.
REPORTING
4-23. Significant events and friendly- and adversary-force activity in the information environment should
be routinely reported to the J-2/G-2/S-2, J-3/G-3/S-3, and, as appropriate, the higher HQ’ IO staff. The
guiding principles for reports are to—
Keep the report as simple and as short as possible.
Include only that information which feeds a planning, assessment, or reporting requirement.
4-24. At the JSOTF, it may be useful to develop an IO intelligence summary or IO operation summary.
Depending on the mission and tempo of the operation, these reports may be daily, weekly, or monthly
products. The IO situation report is an event-driven report that provides basic information on significant
activity in the information environment as it occurs.
Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, and integration
of information and knowledge about adversaries and their networks obtained through
observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. IO planning and execution rely
on the existing intelligence capabilities of the command to provide support. IO
significantly increase the demand for intelligence and require detailed analysis of the
information environment and the adversary’s use of the information environment.
Intelligence support to IO is continuous and requires long lead times. The intelligence
necessary to affect the perceptions and decisionmaking of adversaries or other
audiences often requires that specific sources and methods be positioned and
employed to collect the information and conduct the analyses needed for the
information operation. The challenge is to get the right information and intelligence
at the right time.
environment, and terrain for all operations. IPOE builds an extensive database
of potential areas where units may be required to operate. The database is
analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and
terrain on operations and then presents the analysis in a graphic form. IPOE is a
continuing process. In joint doctrine, IPOE is referred to as joint intelligence
preparation of the operational environment.
Although there is no single set of characteristics useful for analyzing every information environment, some
broad characteristics that can serve as starting points are terrain (weather), populace, civilian information
infrastructure, civilian population, and third-party organizations. Figure 5-1 provides a broad list of
characteristics of the information environment.
Significant
Elements of the Characteristic Information Requirements
Characteristic
Terrain Those aspects of terrain and geography How does terrain (and weather conditions)
that impact information content and canalize and compartmentalize information
flow. content and flow?
How does terrain (and weather conditions)
impact information flow?
Civilian Key information system links and nodes What are the key information systems
Information (information conducts) in the operating (telephone, microwave, Internet, and so
Infrastructure area. on)?
What information content is passed on each
information system?
Who (friendly forces, enemy, civilians, other
organizations) uses each information
system?
Who manages and controls the information
systems?
Media Radio, TV, print, and Internet, to include What media sources are available (for
audiences. adversary and friendly use) in the AO?
What information content is reported by
each media source?
Who is each media’s audience?
What is the context or bias of the media
outlets?
Civilian Demographics, such as distribution, How does the populace communicate?
Population language, religion, ethnicity, and What information content does the populace
education. need or want?
Cultural factors, such as societal What are the populace’s biases?
structures, ideologies, perceptions,
and beliefs. What is the populace’s social organization?
What are the populace’s cultural
characteristics?
Third-Party Interagency, nongovernmental Who are the interagency, nongovernmental
Organizations organizations, private volunteer organizations, private volunteer
organizations, and international organizations, and international
organizations that can be competing organizations in the AO?
influences in the information What are their purpose, goals, and
environment. objectives?
What information do these organizations
project?
5-11. Planners analyze each of the previously identified significant characteristics using the three-
dimensional model to determine specific impacts on operations in the information environment (that is,
Step 2 of IPOE). To accomplish this task, each characteristic is considered within the framework of the
three following dimensions:
Physical. Units focus on what information systems in the operational area collect, process, and
disseminate information. Identification should include the tangible aspects of each significant
characteristic, such as technical information systems and networks (for example, radio towers,
fiber-optic networks, and telephone networks) and nontechnical (human) information network
nodes and links (such as persons with influence, key leaders, and face-to-face communications
networks). Additionally, analysis should show where those information systems and networks
are located in the physical environment.
Cognitive. Units focus on the values, beliefs, and perceptions of key individuals and
organizations in the operational area that make decisions, as well as how those decisions are
formulated. This analysis should show how this human mental programming affects the value of
specific information to those key individuals and organizations in the operational environment.
Information. Units focus on how information flows and the content of that information. Flow
describes the exchange of information in terms of conduits, form, and speed. Content includes
the major subjects or topics circulating in the AO.
5-15. The CIO is a guide, not a rigid template. It typically depicts mission-significant aspects of the
information environment, subinformation environments, key information nodes, and information flow in
the operating area. The information included in the graphic should be presented in a concise manner.
Whatever final form the CIO takes, it must present an operationally-relevant overview of the information
environment. Every CIO will be unique because every information environment is different.
of its organization, capabilities, and mission. As such, they form the basis of the adversary’s capabilities
(and vulnerabilities) in the information environment. Collect, protect, and project are defined as:
Collect. To plan and execute operations, the adversary must collect accurate and timely
information.
Protect. To be successful, the adversary must protect its critical information from collection and
maintain its means of communication.
Project. To further its goals and objectives, the adversary must project the information into the
information environment to influence the perceptions of its target audiences.
5-18. Depending on the adversary, the means used can be as simple as direct human observation and open
sources (collect); couriers and intimidation (protect); and night letters, other printed materials, and graffiti
(project). Ideally, analysis of how the adversary operates in the information environment is based on
modeling, or templating.
Figure 5-3. Example center-of-gravity analysis and the use of the CARVER process
to rank and plot critical vulnerabilities in the information environment
5-20. The COG analysis of the adversary should be conducted by the J-2/G-2/S-2. If not, IO planners and
operational detachments in the field can use a COG analysis to analyze the adversary in the information
environment by—
Identifying potential threat COGs. Visualize the threat as a system of functional components.
Based upon how the threat organizes, fights, makes decisions, and its physical and psychological
strengths and weaknesses, select the threat’s primary source of moral or physical strength, power,
and resistance. Depending on the level (strategic, operational, and tactical), COGs may be
tangible entities or intangible concepts. To test the validity of the COG, the question that needs to
be asked is: “Will the destruction, neutralization, or substantial weakening of the COG result in
changing the threat’s COA or denying its objectives?” When possible, the J-2/G-2/S-2 identifies
the COG. If these assets are unavailable, then an independent information environment may need
to identify the COG. Typically this is the adversary’s information position, which is a way of
describing the quality of information an organization possesses and its ability to use that
information.
Identifying critical capabilities. Each COG is analyzed to determine what primary abilities
(functions) the threat possesses in the context of the operational area and friendly mission that
can prevent friendly forces from accomplishing the mission. Critical capabilities are not tangible
objects; rather, they are threat functions. To test the validity of a critical capability, the questions
that need to be asked are: “Is the identified critical capability a primary ability in context with the
given missions of both threat and friendly forces? Is the identified critical capability directly
related to the COG?” A critical capability is a means that is a crucial enabler for a COG to
function and, as such, is essential to the accomplishment of the adversary’s specified or assumed
objectives.
Note. The adversary’s critical capabilities are the functions in the information environment—
collect, protect, and project.
Identifying critical requirements for each critical capability. Each critical capability is analyzed
to determine what conditions, resources, or means enable threat functions or mission. To test
validity of a critical requirement, the questions that need to be asked are: “Will exploitation of
the critical vulnerability disable the associated critical requirement? Does the friendly force have
the resources to affect the identified critical vulnerability?”
Note. Critical requirements usually are tangible elements such as communications means, nodes,
or key communicators.
Identifying critical vulnerabilities for each critical requirement. Each critical capability is
analyzed to determine which critical requirements (or components thereof) are vulnerable to
neutralization, interdiction, or attack. As the hierarchy of critical requirements and critical
vulnerabilities are developed, interrelationships and overlapping between the factors are sought
to identify critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities that support more than one critical
capability. When selecting critical vulnerabilities, a critical-vulnerability analysis is conducted to
pair critical vulnerabilities against friendly capabilities.
CONSIDERATIONS
5-25. Intelligence that may be considered less-than-credible or insignificant to a traditional intelligence
analyst can be key to an IO planner. Some examples include the following:
Perceptions. Planners use the target audience’s existing perceptions to their advantage.
Knowledge and understanding of existing perceptions of the population, insurgent groups, and
HN government and forces can provide IO opportunities to exploit to achieve desired effects or
counter the adversary’s exploitation. Gaps in understanding perceptions can be answered using
MIS teams, CA teams, and during the conduct of key-leader engagements. Examples of
perceptions to exploit or counter include—
An insurgent group that believes a mole exists within their organization (exploit).
The populace believes that insurgents are forcing U.S. forces out of bases (counter).
Rumors. Planners use rumors as a method to achieve an effect. IO planners look for various
fissures in organizations to exploit and shape perceptions. Examples are—
Mistrust or jealousy among individuals.
Greed or desire for power.
This appendix provides multiple planning aids for Soldiers conducting IO missions.
It outlines the duties and responsibilities of the IOWG and provides Soldiers with
numerous mission analysis tools.
COMPOSITION
A-2. The composition of the IOWG is tailored to the agenda. Representatives from every staff section
need not attend each and every IOWG. Participants are selected because they either represent a critical
element or capability, or have expertise that is critical to the IO. Core participants are staff members and
subject-matter experts who regularly attend the IOWG due to their role in IO. Core participants include the
following:
IO personnel.
MIS representatives.
EW representatives.
OPSEC representatives.
COCAM representatives.
CA representatives.
PA representatives.
MILDEC representatives.
Representatives from the J-2/G-2/S-2.
Representatives from the J-3/G-3/S-3, effects cell.
Special technical operation planners.
Fire support officer.
Others, as required.
A-3. There are other staff members who may not attend the IOWG on a regular basis, but whose role is no
less important. They include the following:
COMCAM officer in charge.
G-6/S-6 representative.
Cultural advisor.
Chaplain.
Political advisor.
Subordinate-unit IO officers.
Staff Judge Advocate representative.
Liaison officers.
PREPARATION
A-5. Preparation is critical to a successful IOWG. A successful working group requires a collective effort
from the IO section. For example, someone sets and prepares the agenda, another person notifies
participants and ensures each is prepared to provide meaningful input to the working group, and another
person prepares the IOWG presentation. Preparation tasks for the IWOG include the following:
Set agenda.
Notify participants:
Verify time and place of IOWG.
Identify additional participants.
Review status of due-outs and contact those participants with due-outs.
Coordinate with participants who have formal input.
Publish a read-ahead packet:
If possible, provide IOWG materials to participants prior to the meeting.
Ensure participants provide input to IOWG presentation prior to the meeting.
Assign a recorder to take minutes for the working group.
A-6. There are certain basics of meeting management that—if applied to the IOWG—can increase its
effectiveness. Some basic suggestions include the following:
Meet at established times and places.
Keep meetings short—1 hour is a good rule of thumb.
Have an agenda and follow it.
Tailor working group membership to those people who are truly needed.
Encourage participation by members; working groups are not one-way conversations.
Complete detailed work and coordinate actions before the IOWG. Discuss actions and issues that
are relevant to the working group.
Identify and work critical issues. Identify and work side issues after the working group.
Follow through on actions and due-outs. Record and track the results of the working group and
publish minutes.
Insist on timely delivery of due-outs and products.
Invite subordinate and higher-command representatives.
Give feedback to working-group members.
AGENDA
A-7. IOWG agendas vary by mission, situation, and echelon. A typical IOWG agenda includes the
following:
Roll call.
Due-outs from previous IOWG.
Intelligence update.
Assessment update.
Operations update.
Discussion and issues.
Review of due-outs.
Conclusion.
A-8. Some IOWGs are organized along the lines of a targeting meeting, whereas others are similar to an
operations meeting. Regardless of what agenda the IOWG takes, the purpose remains the same—to
synchronize IO’s contributing capabilities.
Intelligence Update
A-10. The purpose of the intelligence update is to answer current G-7 intelligence requirements. As such, it
focuses on the information environment, the adversary’s actions in the information environment, and the
impact of those actions on friendly operations. Intelligence updates for IO should not be a regurgitation of
other conventional intelligence updates. One way to structure the intelligence update is to capture
significant events in the information environment and organize them by the G-7’s intelligence
requirements. Figure A-2, page A-4, provides a sample intelligence update format.
Assessment Update
A-11. The purpose of the assessment update is to assess the impact and effectiveness of current IO. Its
focus is on analyzing and presenting information and intelligence from unit operations and intelligence
reports, as well as input from the IOWG members. Figure A-3, page A-4, provides a sample of how the
assessment update can be depicted. Each operational area has a pie chart that represents the status of the
current IO objectives (in this example there are five IO objectives).
OPERATIONS UPDATE
A-12. The purpose of the operations update is to synchronize the IO objectives with element/capability
tasks and targets for current and future (mid-range) IO. The focus is on gaining or maintaining information
superiority. One way to structure the operations update is to use graphics that show time, location, and
purpose for key IO tasks for each major operation. Figure A-4 provides a sample format.
Review of Due-Outs
A-14. The purpose of reviewing due-outs is to ensure the working group participants understand and
acknowledge their due-outs and responsibilities for the next meeting. Prior to final questions and
comments, the G-7/S-7 reviews new due-outs identified during the working group as well as any open due-
outs from the previous working groups. Each due-out should identify the issue or question requiring
resolution, and the person or element responsible for answering the due-out.
Conclusion
A-15. The G-7/S-7 briefly discusses what the meeting accomplished and what working-group objectives were
met. If necessary, side conversations, meetings, and other subworking groups are identified and scheduled.
A-17. The purpose of performing a COG analysis (Figure A-8, page A-7) is to determine and evaluate the
adversary’s critical vulnerabilities for exploitation. Because this tool is used to evaluate the adversary, the
appropriate time to perform this analysis is during Step 3 (evaluate the threat) of IPOE.
A-18. In testing the validity of the COG analysis, leaders should apply the following questions:
Will destruction, neutralization, or substantial weakening of the COG result in changing the
threat’s COA or denying its objective?
Does the friendly force have the resources and capability to accomplish destruction or
neutralization of the threat COG? If the answer is no, then the threat’s identified critical factors
must be reviewed for other critical vulnerabilities, or planners must reassess how to attack the
previously identified critical vulnerabilities with additional resources.
Intelligence Preparation
of the Operational Environment Information Operations
Steps Focus Analysis Product
Define the operational Define the information environment. Combined information overlay—
environment. significant characteristics of the
Describe the operational Describe the information information environment and
environment’s effects. environment’s effects. effects on operations.
Evaluate the threat. Evaluate the threats’ information Threat COG analysis—critical
system. vulnerabilities.
Threat templates—who makes
decisions; what nodes, links,
and systems the threat uses;
how information assets are
employed.
Determine threat COAs. Determine threat actions in the Information situation template—
information environment. when, where, and why the threat
will seek to gain information
superiority.
A-19. Figure A-9, page A-9, is a sample combined information overlay. Figure A-10, page A-9, depicts a
sample IO mission-to-task product chart. Figure A-11, page A-10, depicts a sample IO mission and tasks
(tactical level). Figure A-12, page A-10, depicts a sample COA sketch.
A-20. In addition to doctrinal effects, IO have a number of nondoctrinal effects, to include the following:
Destroy. This renders a target so damaged that it cannot function as intended nor be restored to a
usable condition without being rebuilt.
Degrade. This reduces the effectiveness or efficiency of adversary information systems, assets,
or functions.
Disrupt. This temporarily interrupts the flow of information.
Deceive. This misleads or manipulates adversary understanding of friendly forces’ activities,
capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions.
Influence. This affects an adversary or others perceptions, attitudes, and behavior to support
friendly-force objectives.
Preserve (nondoctrinal). This maintains the effectiveness or efficiency of friendly-force
information systems, assets, or functions (related to doctrinal effect protect).
Deny. This hinders or prevents an adversary and others from gaining access to, collecting, or
using information concerning friendly forces.
A-21. Possible IO tasks include the following:
Control.
Counter.
Counter-reconnaissance.
Defeat.
Delay.
Demonstrate.
Destroy.
Deter.
Engage.
Fix.
Inform.
Interdict.
Isolate.
Jam.
Neutralize.
Persuade.
Prevent.
Protect.
Secure.
Suppress.
IO Mission: On order, the friendly force disrupts the enemy ground and air defense forces’ C2, influences
civilian populace perceptions, and protects Corps’ critical information in the AO to facilitate destruction of 1st
Operational Strategic Command forces.
IO Objectives:
Disrupt the enemy force’s air defense C2 to prevent coordinated engagement of the friendly force’s
deep attacks.
Disrupt operational reserve command posts and communication networks to delay employment of
reinforcing or counterattack forces.
Influence civilian populace in occupied areas to minimize interference with the friendly force’s operations.
Deny detection and identification of the friendly force’s main and tactical command posts to prevent
targeting by the enemy force’s artillery fires.
Figure A-11. Sample information operations mission and tasks (tactical level)
Determine Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Input information requirements for IO.
Reconnaissance Plan
Update Timeline Input lead time for IO tasks.
Write Restated Mission Write IO mission statement (if used).
7. Deliver Mission-Analysis
Briefing Input to mission-analysis briefing.
A-23. Figure A-14, page A-12, provides a sample mission-analysis work sheet. The mission-analysis work
sheet—
Provides a tool to conduct mission analysis.
Focuses on the minimum information needed for a plan.
Follows the sequence of the mission-analysis briefing format, not the steps of mission analysis.
A-24. Identify specified and implied tasks to IO; not tasks to the capabilities. Tasks to the capabilities may
be a constraint because they allocate resources away from the IO. Specified tasks are tasks specifically
assigned to a unit by its higher HQ. Implied tasks are tasks that must be performed to accomplish a
specified task or the mission, but are not stated in the higher HQ order.
A-25. IO tasks ignore staff coordination, administrative, and SOP tasks (for example, conducting a weekly
IOWG, or submitting daily reports). Leaders organize identified specified and implied tasks to improve
clarity. Tasks may be divided into two categories—
Tasks to shape the information environment and to engage enemy forces.
Tasks associated with information flow and information content.
A-26. Essential tasks are specified or implied tasks that must be executed to accomplish the mission.
Leaders select three to five essential tasks, which are approved by the commander during the mission-
analysis briefing.
1. Facts: Situation remains that the enemy will continue to use improvised explosive devices, small-unit
attacks, and ambushes to attempt to gain strength for its cause. Friendly forces will continue to find and
engage the enemy to eliminate improvised explosive devices. Current strength remains at 90 percent.
Troops in the area of operations remain on the offensive and material readiness remains at 90 percent.
2. Assumptions: Attacks will continue to increase as the weather continues to improve, allowing for more
insurgents and better leadership. This has been the pattern over the last several years and by all
indications will continue.
3. Tasks:
a. Specified: Detachments within the area of operations will continue to hunt for suspected insurgents
and find, fix, capture, or eliminate as situation dictates. Additionally, detachments will continue to provide
support to coalition forces and provide humanitarian support to the host nation.
b. Implied: Continue offensive operations against insurgents. Continue to provide operational support to
coalition forces and provide humanitarian support and security for the host nation.
c. Essential: Provide for security and protect essential elements of friendly information. Provide training
support to host-nation and coalition forces and conduct offensive operations to deter and eliminate
insurgent activities in concert with collation partners.
4. Constraints: Close air support is authorized in rural areas. The use of close air support in urban areas
must be approved by regional commander. Cultural support team will interrogate women and children
only and detachments will provide security, as applicable.
5. Available Assets: All organic detachment equipment will be used, to include combat controllers,
interpreters, Civil Affairs teams, Military Information Support teams, provincial reconstruction teams, and
coalition support. Current rules of engagement remain in effect. Avoid using themes that will denigrate
host-nation forces, such as cultural and religious themes. All releases to the media must first be
approved by the public affairs office.
6. Risk Assessment: Improvised explosive devices will remain a constant threat. Weather conditions will
hamper aviation and air support.
7. CCIR: In order to maintain the offensive, the commander needs to know current situational status and
personnel status for both U.S. and coalition forces.
a. PIR: Commander needs a clear and concise understanding of the enemy strengths and
weaknesses; the disposition of forces and key leaders.
b. FFIR: Commanders need a clear and concise understanding of coalition and friendly forces within
the area of operations—specifically, which units are available to support detachments if needed, to
include other ongoing operations within the detachment area of operations.
8. EEFI: Protection of intelligence requirements. Mission of higher and friendly forces within the area of
operations, infiltration and exfiltration routes, unit strength, and communications must be protected.
Organic Assets
Supporting Assets
DETERMINE CONSTRAINTS
A-28. Constraints are restrictions on the use and employment of IO. The two types of constraints are
prohibited actions (cannot do) and directed actions (must do; that is, resources and assets are required to do
something). Constraints affect the use of IO capabilities and may be found in base orders, annexes, and
appendixes. Constraints may be organized by affect on information content and flow (Figure 3-4,
page 3-6).
MISSION-ANALYSIS BRIEFING
A-34. The IO portion of the briefing is included either in the G-3 and G-2 planners’ presentations or, when
appropriate, developed as separate slides. IO input typically includes the following:
Mission. Commander’s intent for IO of HQ two levels up and own commander’s IO guidance.
IPOE. CIO and enemy COAs in the information environment.
Facts and assumptions. Critical facts and assumptions for IO.
Tasks. Specified, implied, and essential tasks for IO.
Constraints. Restrictions on the use and employment of IO.
Forces available. Organic and supporting IO-capable assets and their capabilities and limitations.
Risk assessment. Risks in the information environment.
CCIR. Input to PIR, FFIR, and EEFI.
Timeline. Input to the time allocation plan for accomplishment of IO essential tasks.
Restated mission. IO mission statement (if used).
Decisionmaking Template
A-45. The decisionmaking template identifies who makes decisions. Its purpose is to identify key leaders,
organizational structures, linkages and interrelationships, key decisionmakers, and decisionmaking
characteristics. Figure A-24, page A-20, provides a sample decisionmaking template.
Figure A-23. Relationship between center-of-gravity analysis and the planning process
MISSION
A-52. The IO mission describes the operational advantage that IO achieves in support to the unit’s mission.
Enemy Forces
A-55. The enemy forces paragraph describes how, when, where, and why the enemy force operates in the
information environment. It identifies enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities in the information
environment in terms of information—collection, protection, projection.
Friendly Forces
A-56. The friendly forces paragraph describes friendly-force capabilities to operate in the information
environment. It identifies friendly vulnerabilities to enemy and third-party actions in the information
environment.
Assumptions
A-57. The assumptions paragraph lists the assumptions essential for planning, execution, and assessment of
the information operation. It is organized by—
Information environment (information content and flow).
Adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities in the information environment.
Friendly capabilities and vulnerabilities in the information environment.
DESIRED PERCEPTIONS
B-1. Desired perceptions are those thoughts the target audience must process to believe the planned
deception story. The formation of the target audience’s perceptions is largely based on the means and
events used to portray the deception story.
MEANS
B-2. Considerations for selecting deception means include the following:
What collection systems or mechanisms does the target audience use?
How much credibility does the target audience place on information from each conduit?
What kind of information can be conveyed through each of the means?
When is each means available to transmit information?
What filters affect information as it moves through the means?
How long will it take the information to reach the target audience?
EVENTS
B-3. The deception story is portrayed to the target audience through deception events conducted by friendly
forces. These are pieces of a puzzle that the target audience assembles over time. The puzzle itself is the
deception story, the pieces are the deceptive events seen by the target audience via the means. Events must be
observed and accepted as reality by the target audience. The two types of deception events include—
Those necessary for the formation of desired perceptions (required events).
The supporting events that complement or reinforce the desired perceptions.
ASSESSMENT PLAN
B-4. The two primary forms of feedback in deception operations are—
Indicator feedback. This feedback is information that indicates whether and how the deception
story is reaching the deception target audience. This feedback is useful for the timing and
sequencing of executions. (It answers the question: “Is the target audience receiving the
deception story as planned?”)
Perception feedback. This feedback is information that shows whether the target audience is
forming the desired perceptions and is acting (or is likely to act) in accordance with the
deception objective. (It answers the question: “Is the target audience acting in accordance with
the deception objective?”)
B-5. At the tactical level, the pace of operations and limited number of collection assets may reduce the
practicality and utility of feedback. For this reason, at the lowest levels of command, tactical deception
operations must not depend on feedback for successful execution.
DECEPTION TECHNIQUES
B-6. Tactical deceptions often contain one or more of the following techniques:
Feint. A feint is a limited operation to deceive the enemy of the location or time of the decisive
operation. Forces seek direct fire contact with the enemy but avoid decisive engagement. Feints
usually occur before or during the main operation. Multiple feints may be needed to portray the
deception story. The objective of a feint is to cause the enemy to misemploy forces.
Demonstration. Demonstrations are shows of force to deceive the enemy as to the location or
time of the decisive operation. They are similar to feints, except no contact is made with the
enemy. The objective is to delude the enemy into an unfavorable COA. Demonstrations are
useful when time and distance factors make the lack of contact realistic.
Ruse. A ruse is a deliberate exposure of false information to enemy collection means.
Display. A static display of an activity, force, or equipment is intended to deceive enemy
observation. Displays project the appearance of objects that do not exist or appear to be
something else. Observables include the use of heat, smoke, electronic emissions, false tracks,
and fake command posts.
DECEPTION TACTICS
B-7. The two types of deception tactics are ambiguity-increasing deception and ambiguity-reducing
deception. The following paragraphs discussed these tactics.
AMBIGUITY-INCREASING DECEPTION
B-8. Ambiguity-increasing deception increases decisionmaker uncertainty about key information needed
to make decisions. It can be used to delay a specific decision or reduce the quality of a decision.
Ambiguity-increasing deception—
Presents conflicting elements of information.
Overloads enemy intelligence-collection and analytical capabilities.
Confuses enemy expectations about friendly-force size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment,
intent, or mission.
AMBIGUITY-DECREASING DECEPTION
B-9. Ambiguity-decreasing deception provides the decisionmaker with the illusion of reduced uncertainty
and risk. It can be used to elicit specific behavior that can be exploited by friendly forces and to provide
cover for friendly actions. Ambiguity-decreasing deception—
Reinforces the enemy’s preconceived beliefs.
Draws enemy attention from one set of activities to another.
Creates the illusion of strength where weakness exists.
Creates the illusion of weakness where strength exists.
Accustoms the enemy to particular patterns of activity that are exploitable later.
C-2. EEFI focus on friendly-force intentions (time and place of units and operations), capabilities, and
vulnerabilities (strength, technologies, and tactics). EEFI are different for every operation. Leaders must
avoid the “cookie-cutter” approach and should continually develop new EEFI or refine old EEFI. The
OPSEC working group can be used to take advantage of subject-matter experts (for example, aviation and
communications). Leaders identify the length of time each EEFI must be protected (not all information
needs protection for the duration of the operation). EEFI are prioritized and kept to a manageable number
(perhaps five).
ANALYZE VULNERABILITIES
C-4. Leaders identify each EEFI’s vulnerability to enemy intelligence collection (that is, OPSEC
vulnerability). The OPSEC vulnerability is a result of the OPSEC indicator and enemy collection
capabilities. OPSEC vulnerabilities are detectable indicators of EEFI. OPSEC indicators become OPSEC
vulnerabilities if they can be observed, analyzed, and acted upon by the enemy. To determine OPSEC
vulnerabilities, leaders—
Identify OPSEC indicators. Leaders determine what detectable actions and OSINT can be
interpreted or pieced together by the enemy to derive EEFI.
Compare OPSEC indicators to enemy collection capabilities. Leaders determine which
indicators can be observed, analyzed, and acted upon by the enemy.
ASSESS RISK
C-5. Leaders develop measures to protect OPSEC vulnerabilities by conducting risk assessments for each
vulnerability and then selecting one or more OPSEC measure for each vulnerability. There are three types
of OPSEC measures:
Action controls. The controls change unit procedures, activities, and actions (for example,
randomized routine activities, avoiding repetitive TTP).
Media analysis is a quick and useful technique for evaluating the impact of media
coverage on military operations.
Note. Home (domestic) media is a primary consideration for the PA staff, but it is not a
consideration for military IO.
D-2. The media analysis presented in this aid is a tool that staffs can use to understand and assess the
impact of media reporting on friendly and enemy activities in the AO. This type of media analysis helps
the staff—
Maintain situational awareness on media reporting.
Evaluate the impact of media reporting on the mission.
Identify adversary information.
Provide data for assessment.
D-3. Other staff elements may also conduct media analysis to support their functional area:
The PAO conducts a media content analysis to assess news coverage.
The intelligence staff may collect and analyze media reporting as part of OSINT.
MIS forces prepare extensive media assessments and analyses of commercial and government
media within their AO, as they seek to leverage more indigenous and credible local media outlets
to use for dissemination.
D-4. The IO staff must be prepared to analyze the media, to monitor changes in the information
environment, and to counter adversary misinformation and propaganda.
DATA COLLECTION
D-5. Planners systematically monitor media coverage of the command, its mission, and the AO from
the sources identified above. Useful sources of media reports and stories include the following:
PAO media operations center. This center provides translations of foreign press coverage in
addition to monitoring major English-language media outlets.
OSINT media-monitoring sources (contracted by the Department of Defense).
United States Government open-source center.
Internet.
D-6. Data collection must be continuous and consistent—usually on a daily basis. Several factors can
affect collection of data reports. Items that need to be considered include the following:
English-language media sources are readily available and may skew the collection effort away
from local media.
Translation of local and regional media may cause a lag time of a day or more.
A database should be created, populated, and maintained to establish a baseline upon which
comparisons can be made (for example, media reporting for one month versus another month).
D-7. Other than the PAO’s media content analysis, there is no established doctrinal method for
analyzing the media. The media analysis process identified in Figure D-1 has been field-tested. It can be
modified to fit command and staff needs.
Maintain (+) United Kingdom supports troop expansion British Broadcasting Corporation
international News and Cable News Network
support for
mission (–) U.S. missile strikes kill civilians British Broadcasting Corporation
News and Associated Press
Reduce popular (+) Tribal elders turn in Taliban to Afghan Local Armed Forces radio and TV
support for police
insurgents
(–) Taliban propaganda about U.S. missile Dawn (Pakistani newspaper)
strikes
REPORT FINDINGS
D-11. There is no standard method on how to report media findings. The key is to portray media
coverage in an easily understood format that can be quickly scanned to see what themes are important.
Planners should use color coding to clearly display the impact of each theme: green is positive, red is
negative, and blue is neutral. Symbols (for example, +/–, letters, or numbers) should be added so the
analysis can be understood if printed in black and white. Planners must resist the temptation to fill the
boxes with headlines rather than themes. Media themes that reflect enemy propaganda should be added,
along with an assessment of operational impacts. Planners display a trend analysis to put the current
media reporting into a broader context. Figure D-3 provides one technique of reporting findings.
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
D-12. Military operations can trigger either positive or negative coverage by the media. This coverage
may be a situation that must be mitigated to prevent or reduce the impact on the unit mission, or
exploited as an opportunity to further the command's objectives. Such a situation is called “media
bounce.”
D-13. Media bounce refers to the staying power of a story over time. The bounce is usually short,
particularly if another newsworthy event occurs. Monitoring media bounce avoids reacting to an event
that loses media’s attention and may renew negative reporting, thereby aggravating the situation. A
consequence-management tracker (Figures D-4 and D-5, page D-5) is a simple decisionmaking aid that
tracks subsequent media reporting of an event (bounce) to determine whether subsequent command
action is required.
This appendix provides a guide for tactical face-to-face engagements by troops at the
detachment, company, battalion, and group level when meeting target audiences.
Leaders must always remember they are representing their unit, the command, and,
for all intents and purposes, the United States and its allies. Regardless of rank or
position, actions taken when in contact with the populace can shape the battlefield to
defeat an enemy seeking local sanctuary to conduct attacks on the forces and allies of
the United States.
Leaders must remember that the translator is their voice and their representative to
the community. The translator will be seen as a representative of the command, of the
Army, and of the United States. As such, leaders must monitor and keep all aspects of
their behavior professional and ethical regardless of their nationality or ethnicity.
GENERAL GUIDELINES
F-1. Leaders should insist translators—
Speak in first person.
Remain nearby when the leader is speaking.
Carry a notepad and take notes, as needed.
Project clearly and mirror the vocal stress and overall tone of the leader.
F-2. Good leaders know their translators. The lives of Soldiers may be in the translator’s hands, so it is
critical to know the translator’s strengths and weaknesses. Translators should be treated as part of the unit.
The better the translator is integrated into the unit, the better the translator’s performance.
F-3. Translators should be used for translation duties only. Using them for other activities may violate
their contract. An example of misemployment is using a translator to run errands in town. However,
sending the translator to town to coordinate a meeting for U.S. officials is allowed.
F-4. The translator is the leader’s voice and, as such, may be subject to physical harm because of the
messages delivered. Translators should be offered physical protection. If the translator is allowed to carry a
weapon, the unit must ensure that he can handle it in a safe manner. Range familiarization/qualification (as
well as knowledge of movement techniques and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear equipment)
is highly recommended.
F-5. Translators should be allowed rest periods to collect their thoughts and catch their breath. Meal
meetings are especially challenging for a translator. Leaders should ensure the translator is allowed to eat
during or after the meeting.
F-6. Translators should be dressed like the troops they are supporting so they can be readily identified as
a friendly in a combat situation to preclude fratricide. Uniform accessories (such as wet weather gear, body
armor, and glint tape) that are common on Soldiers’ uniforms should be made available to the translator.
F-8. Leaders must rehearse conversations, particularly when dealing with complex, new, or sensitive
issues. A rehearsal will help define words the translator may not know and ensure the translator
understands the overall message to be conveyed. Leaders provide feedback to the translator and make
corrections as needed. Leaders must keep in mind that if the translator performs poorly, it affects the target
audience’s perception of the unit.
IA information assurance
IO information operations
IOWG information operations working group
IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment
J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff
J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff
J-6 command, control, communications, and computer systems directorate of a
joint staff
JCCC joint combat camera center
JP joint publication
JSOTF joint special operations task force
MASINT measurement and signature intelligence
MILDEC military deception
MIS Military Information Support
MISO Military Information Support operations
MNF multinational force-Iraq
MOE measure of effectiveness
MOP measure of performance
OPSEC operations security
OSINT open-source intelligence
PA public affairs
PAO public affairs officer
PIR priority intelligence requirement
S-2 intelligence staff officer
S-3 operations staff officer
S-6 command, control, communications, and computer systems staff officer
S-7 information operations staff officer
SF Special Forces
SFG(A) Special Forces group (Airborne)
SFODA Special Forces operational detachment A
SFODB Special Forces operational detachment B
SIGINT signals intelligence
SOP standing operating procedures
SOTF special operations task force
TC training circular
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
TV television
U.S. United States
USAJFKSWCS United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
SECTION II – TERMS
information environment
The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on
information. (JP 1-02)
information operations
The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert
with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decisionmaking of adversaries
and potential adversaries while protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)
information superiority
The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an
uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.
(JP 1-02)
SOURCES USED
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 10 October 2011.
ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012.
FM 3-05.301, Psychological Operations Process, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,
30 August 2007.
FM 3-13, Inform and Influence Activities, 25 January 2013.
FM 3-53, Military Information Support Operations, 4 January 2013.
ARMY FORMS
DA Forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate web site (www.apd.army.mil).
DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms).
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010.
JP 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006.
RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1307001
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Not to be distributed;
electronic media only.
PIN: 102842-000