SEB Complaint - Cross - and - Moncla - 20221104 FINAL
SEB Complaint - Cross - and - Moncla - 20221104 FINAL
SEB Complaint - Cross - and - Moncla - 20221104 FINAL
Moncla
4805 Spring Park Circle 824 Lake Grove Drive
Suwanee, GA 30024 Little Elm, TX 75068
678-925-6983 469-588-7778
Email: [email protected] Email:[email protected]
November 4, 2022
We are forced to re-submit this complaint as a final effort to urge the State Election Board
(the “Board”) to address the issues we have previously raised, and to refute the unsupported
assertions of an anonymous “technician” in response to our original complaint (Exhibit A,
hereinafter referred to as the “Initial Submission”). The Initial Submission sets forth the
background in greater detail, but we have been communicating with Chairman Duffey since early
September to forestall the occurrence of machine anomalies that is certain to call into question the
legitimacy of the upcoming election.
Below is a highlight summary, including the facts as we see them and an overview of the
sur-rebuttal to the Response contained in this letter:
2. Mr. Cross may have “jumped the gun” by submitting this evidence, but it
was so compelling and needed either explanation or an investigation.
Chairman Duffey had asked for “facts” and “data”, and Mr. Cross
believed the identified errors were too great to wait for a more formal
submission.
1
Many counties have already destroyed or overwritten their SLOG files. We believe this practice is illegal and a
felony. See fn. 5, infra.
2
The EAC report states that those ballots were effectively hidden (in the “provisional” folder) from both the
ballot scanner and the protective counter, thereby removing the ballot from the count and hiding it from all
reconciliations. Exhibit 13, page 4 in the Initial Submission. Pro V&V came to the same conclusion.
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November 4, 2022
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4. In response to Mr. Cross’s first note with the data, Chairman Duffey had
the STC review the data. The Response (prepared by the STC) was both
inaccurate and misleading. We summarize it and the information set forth
in this letter with the following:
C. All of the STC’s assertions are proven false by the facts, our analysis,
reports by the EAC, Dominion, and the three (3) Declarations of
subject matter experts we include as exhibits to this sur-rebuttal.
E. The relief Complainants seek is only that which is lawful, logical, and
necessary to mitigate the effects the identified deficiencies may have
on the election results -- the enforcement of the existing rules
promulgated and codified by the SEB governing Advance Voting
reconciliation and ballot scanner poll closing procedure.
Technical Response:
Despite the arrogant and irrelevant statement in the Response that the SLOG files were
“designed for technicians,” we have been using technical consultants as well -- each of them were
flabbergasted by the flippant response we received. See their reports, attached. They are named
– and not hiding their credentials. The anonymous nature of the Response leaves open what the
STC knows about the State’s election processes, the Dominion machines, or the initial complaint.
Suffice it to say that the experts we have consulted do not believe that the Response was
responsive -- in the least. Of course, none of us are perfect, but when we see anomalies, we try to
correct them as we can – or investigate to learn the truth. But we fear the ridiculous response of
this particular consultant will be used to justify dismissal of the instant complaint without
investigation, rule, or remedy, as with so many other complaints that go unanswered.
Thus, we have included the statements from each of our experts and they have agreed to
go on-the-record with their names and assessments, unlike the STC. They have each prepared a
response, and their statements are attached as Exhibits C, D and E. We have summarized below
our collective response to the four numbered paragraphs in the Response authored by the STC and
the final paragraph of unknown provenance. Each item of the response is discussed below the
restatement from the Response.
Before we begin, it is worth noting that even the first paragraph of the response to Mr.
Cross misstates the question presented.
Mr. Cross: I had your September 27, 2022, complaint and the data attached with it
reviewed by an outside testing company to evaluate if the data you provided supports the
same undervote problem that was discovered in Williamson County, Tennessee. The
following was reported to me:”
Chairman Duffey says he has had the Initial Submission reviewed in connection with the
“same undervote problem“ in Williamson County, Tennessee. We don’t know what instructions
were given to the STC, but this is not an “undervote problem.” An “undervote” suggests that the
voter made no selection for one or more contests on an otherwise voted ballot, as opposed to the
Williamson County anomaly which essentially removed the entire ballot from the tabulator count.
As stated in the Initial Submission, these anomalies are consistent with the Williamson
County anomaly that caused the County to fire Dominion Voting Machines (same error and
uncounted ballots). But there is no way to positively identify that which we’ve documented in
Georgia is of the same cause, because the exact cause of the Williamson anomaly remains
undetermined.
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November 4, 2022
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Nevertheless, the same serious deficiencies have been positively identified in Georgia, no
matter the cause, and will continue to threaten the election system without the immediate
intervention of the Board. As for the remaining paragraphs, the first response reads as follows:
1. The SLOG (system log) file in the scanner is designed for technicians and
includes the entire life of the unit. It is not election-specific and includes
everything that happens with the unit over its life.
First, the STC must know that the claim that the system log “is not election specific” is
blatantly incorrect. Dominion’s Georgia User Guide states:
“Memory Cards - Memory cards are also known as CF or Compact Flash cards. The
memory cards are used to hold the election definition files, audio ballots, scanned ballot
images, and results files for a single election.” (Emphasis added)
The SLOG file is designed to log the details of all events and activities of the scanner
during one election and is stored on two compact flash cards. There are other parts of the
technology, like the protective counter 3, that include “everything that happens with the unit over
its life” but that is not the case with the ICP SLOG files.
SLOG files are written alongside result files. For ImageCast Precinct (ICP) tabulators this
is on the media that was built for the election and is inserted into the tabulator. For
ImageCast Central (ICC) tabulators, this is the network location specific to the election
where the results are saved. In either case, the SLOG file would be new every single
election and would not be “for the life of the tabulator”.
In fact, when importing results into Dominion’s software “Results Tallying and Reporting”
(“RTR”), one of the options is to import the SLOG files for that given election. These are
stored with the election results because they are tied with an individual election.
2. The reports in the log files for signature mismatch and other categories that you
cited are expected for scanners that have been used in 4-5 elections. The types of “errors”
reported in the SLOGs include a range of events from someone feeding a ballot into a
3
The Protective Counter maintains a count of every ballot scanned on a tabulator during the life of the tabulator,
akin to vehicle’s odometer; the Williamson anomaly somehow caused the protective counter not to increment.
4
A true and correct copy of the Declaration of Douglas Logan is included in this submission as “Exhibit C”.
5
What’s more, Georgia’s practice is to “recycle” the memory cards. This entails formatting and reprogramming
the memory cards. We believe this practice is illegal and a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-73 and 52
U.S.C. § 20701, although this is not the subject of this submission. By wiping clean and recycling memory cards,
the record of the prior election is destroyed. Millions of ballot images from across the state were deleted in
violation of the laws requiring that they be preserved. The State Election Board could consider a rule to make
clear what it considers election related documents.
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November 4, 2022
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scanner crooked to someone feeding in a blank ballot during testing of the equipment
before the election.
This is again a straw man comment intended to deflect any investigation of the errors. As
noted above, the reports referenced in the SLOG files are only for whichever election the log
details. For example, the SLOG file for the Coffee County May 24th Primary states:
The STC literally claims that such errors “are expected for scanners that have been used in 4-5
elections”. The rationale seems to be that there is an expected and rapid degradation of the
scanner’s accuracy through the course of normal use in just 4-5 elections. This is obvious nonsense
and insulting to anyone who is familiar with these machines. We can also prove it wrong through
County data which documents approximately the same error rates for the 2020 primary (the first
Georgia election held on these machines).
Expected or otherwise, the ballot error reversals far exceed the corresponding tolerance as
defined by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC). Our analysis of the ICP tabulator SLOG
files include those from 13 random counties encompassing 104,821 ballots cast. Out of those, 23.7
percent initiated errors and the ballots were reversed (returned to voter) at a rate of 18.6 percent.
According to Dominion’s own SLOG files for the 13 counties we analyzed, 18,601 ballots were
reversed and returned due to error. According to the Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”)
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 6 (VVSG):
The misfeed rate according to the EAC “must not exceed 1/500” ballots, Georgia is
averaging nearly one (1) out of five (5) – or nearly 100 times the acceptable error rate.
Systems expert and bona fide election systems “technician” Clay Parikh (formerly of Pro V&V) 7
reviewed our findings as submitted to the Board as well as the STC’s analysis. Mr. Parikh states:
6
See the EAC’s Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) here:
https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/TestingCertification
7
Mr. Parikh tested voting systems for EAC certification for 9 years at two (2) Voting System Testing Laboratories
(“VSTL”), the last of which was Pro V&V, who tested Georgia’s current system for EAC certification. See his
statement at “Exhibit D”.
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November 4, 2022
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These findings are also consistent with those of Russel Ramsland and Allied Services
Operations Group (“ASOG”) found in Antrim County, Michigan immediately following the 2020
General Election. ASOG discovered and documented an error/ballot reversal rate of some 67%.
Not only was Mr. Ramsland and ASOG correct in regard to this aspect of their findings, we have
recently confirmed that the same condition persists to this day in parts of Michigan. It also must
be said that ASOG’s findings were erroneously dismissed simply because of a report by a
previously respected, and once thought credible, J. Alex Halderman, who regarded the same as
“benign”. Complainant, the EAC, and logic, disagree 8.
The STC does not dispute that the errors are occurring, nor does he or she dispute the error
rate. The STC’s explanation for ballots that are initially rejected, then accepted by the scanner is
because the ballot was initially inserted the “wrong way”. This is patently wrong. The error code
does not indicate that the ballot is being misread or that the QR code is being misread. Rather, it
is being used to state that the QR Code does not match certain data from within the QR code’s
validation and verification algorithm (checksum/signature).
The STC’s explanation draws parallels between the operation of a vending machine and a
voting machine. The “worn dollar bill” analogy ignores the fact that the EAC standards require
that the ICP scanners read the ballots from any of the four (4) possible orientations. Therefore, to
accept the explanation of the STC is to also accept the deficiency of scanners across the state.
What’s more, at issue is not worn ballots but pristine QR code ballots freshly printed moments
before being scanned.
Merely being able to scan the same ballot twice with two different results is in-and-of-itself
evidence of failure.
We apologize if this is taken the wrong way, but the third paragraph in the Response can
only be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to mislead by obfuscation:
3. The “reversed” ballots are ballots rejected by the scanner so the voter has
an opportunity to re-insert the ballot. That the SLOG shows, after 15-20 seconds,
acceptance of the ballot supports that a ballot was rejected because of the way it
was inserted to be scanned and then rescanned (see, for example, Bacon County
(page 2 of PDF) that has an accepted ballot 19 seconds after a reversal, Randolph
County (page 56 of PDF) with accepted ballot 17 seconds after reversal). Put
another way, the “errors” you reference are not errors but indications that the
scanners are functioning as designed. It’s the scanner reporting back to the
technician what is happening with it so it can be properly maintained over its
8 This is the same J. Alex Halderman who has recently exploited a vulnerability in Dominion’s system and has
literally created a Do It Yourself (“DIY”) website showing others how to do the same. He is then claiming certain
election records should not be provided in their native format to investigators such as myself for fear that the
vulnerability he exploited and publicized could theoretically used to identify a voter’s candidate selections (K.M.).
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November 4, 2022
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usable life.
Ballots are reversed due to one of several possible error conditions and each specific error
is recorded with each instance on the system log. While it may be “reporting back to the
technician”, the reason is such that the technician can diagnose and address whatever deficiency is
causing the error.
The STC’s professional opinion is analogous to that of a person whose car check-engine
light has remained on for months and who never seeks service. The Board should take this vehicle
– our election machinery – to a qualified mechanic who could access the system log and determine
the root cause of the check-engine light.
Further, the excessive ballot reversals are either being caused by genuine errors (defect) or
other condition (anomaly), but the remedy is the same for both.
The STC dismisses the cause for the ballot being reversed the first time because the ballot
is accepted on its second, or subsequent scan. The logic being whatever problem that caused the
ballot to be reversed initially has been corrected. While it seems to make sense, that is not the
case. Ballots are reversed due to several possible conditions, and each is specifically identified
and recorded along with each ballot reversal on the system log. If there is a problem with the way
a ballot is fed into the scanner and the ballot cannot be read, the entry into the SLOG will look like
this:
May 24/2022 17:10:53 ScanVote Warning + error, crop top image (top edge) average=103 length=82 height=2406
May 24/2022 17:10:53 ScanVote Warning + error, crop top image (top edge) average=103 length=82 height=2406
May 24/2022 17:10:53 ScanVote Warning - bottom side start marker (top left corner), RectangleFind rcTop=52228
rcBottom=52228 rcLeft=52229
May 24/2022 17:10:53 ScanVote Warning + Ballot format or id is unrecognizable.
May 24/2022 17:10:55 ScanVote Ballot has been reversed.
May 24/2022 17:11:08 ScanVote Ballot 194 processed successfully.
The SLOG shows the ballot scanner measuring the ballot and is expecting a certain length
and width that it isn’t seeing. It knows immediately that something is wrong and logs the problem.
It then proceeds to look for specific reference points on the ballot, “bottom side start marker” and
others which it cannot find, and logs that it cannot find them. The scanner then logs that it doesn’t
recognize the ballot and kicks it out. The ballot is then scanned 13 seconds later and “…processed
successfully.”. This is precisely what the STC is describing and in this instance is exactly what
happened. However, while it does happen, it is rare, and is not the condition we’re describing.
The ballot detailed on the SLOG above was never read because the scanner could not find the
reference points on the ballot. The following is another example:
May 24/2022 16:00:41 ScanVote Total number of ballots = 400.
May 24/2022 16:01:13 Security Error QR code Signature mismatch.
May 24/2022 16:01:13 ScanVote Warning + Ballot format or id is unrecognizable.
May 24/2022 16:01:15 ScanVote Ballot has been reversed.
May 24/2022 16:01:31 ScanVote Ballot 125 processed successfully.
May 24/2022 16:01:31 ScanVote Total number of ballots = 401.
This SLOG excerpt starts and ends with a ballot successfully processed to “bookend” the
activity in-between. The second line shows “Security Error”, then “QR code Signature mismatch”.
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November 4, 2022
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Note that there are no warnings about unexpected ballot length or unfound reference points
because the ballot was not misfed, skewed, etc. The QR code was scanned but doesn’t match its
“signature” 9. Which is why it is troubling to see the same ballot being scanned successfully only
16 seconds after it could not be authenticated. This error is not caused by the ballot being fed
incorrectly or other mechanical shortcoming.
There is no issue here with the ballot measurement or reference points as no issues are
raised until the scanner “…could not find QR code on ballot.”. This same error caused ballots to
be reversed 5,952 times (out of 104,821 ballots scanned) and were successfully accepted moments
later. 10 Still, the fact that some of the ballots may be successfully scanned does not prove that –
as found in other places – this error indicates something is happening that causes ballots to go
missing.
The seemingly common refrain is that these errors are largely attributed to human error, or
how voters are feeding the ballots into the scanner; however, the Image Cast Central (“ICC”) is
also producing wide-ranging errors at inexplicable rates for both QR code and hand marked
ballots, even though the ballots are machine-fed.
Another point that complainants raised in the Initial Submission is that the ICC is also
producing the QR code signature mismatch error and rejecting the ballot, then subsequently
accepting the same ballot. This fact is damning. Again, a QR code cannot be misread, and yet it
is being rejected by an ICC for no explicable reason (human-error removed). The ICC consists of
a batch-fed, commercial-grade Canon scanner that’s connected to a Dell workstation, running
Dominion software. Without human error, the same result is repeating itself using different
equipment, and the only common variable that remains is the Dominion software.
To that end, the independent work of the highly experienced and respected systems expert,
Jeffrey Lenberg, further supports our findings. At our request, Mr. Lenberg provided a Declaration
9 The signature is a unique string of numbers and letters used to “check” or validate data. Before the computer
creates the QR code, the data is run through an algorithm which produces a unique code. For the sake of
explanation, say the algorithm takes the 3rd, 8th, 19th, and 36th digit of the data, adds the values together, takes the
sum and multiplies it by ½ the value of the 3rd digit. Let’s say that number is 186.25. The QR code is then created
containing the encoded signature (186.25). When the QR code is scanned, the same calculations are performed
and must match.
10
The third-party QR code software used by Dominion incorporates the Reed–Solomon polynomial algorithm with
Level M error correction. In simple terms- the QR code has the robust ability to sustain "damage" and continue
to function even when up to 15% of the image is obscured, defaced, smudged, or removed. It literally and
dependably rebuilds itself -mathematically.
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November 4, 2022
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The machines are capable of reversing ballots on the first attempt for no discernible reason
and then accepting the same ballot on the second or in some cases even the third attempt.
They reversed ballots at a 10 to 15 percent rate. Properly designed, tested, and certified
voting machines should not behave in this fashion. I assess that this behavior by itself is
sufficient cause to decertify the voting machines.
Mr. Lenberg also observed that the error rates are higher for ballots with votes for
Republican candidates than ballots with votes for Democrat candidates:
The reversals were not due to a bad ballot since the ballots were created by election officials
on an official BMD. A limited number of ballots were created and run many times over. The
reversals would occur on different ballots each time the batch was rerun indicating that it
was independent of the actual ballots.
Mr. Lenberg’s testing yielded results which are consistent with our findings state-wide, but
more importantly it substantiates the same biased “irregularities” identified previously in Coffee
County. Misty Hampton and Cathy Latham witnessed the reversal of ballots with votes for a
specific candidate or party over the course of several elections 13.
The fourth paragraph in the Response uses the straw man of “human error.” If it were
human error, why does the same anomaly occur when the human error is corrected?
4. That the Williamson County, Tennessee situation involved some of the same
reports in log files does not support the idea that the same problem exists in
Georgia. In the Williamson County matter, an employee used an outdated election
file in a newer version of the Dominion equipment. The resulting misconfiguration
of the database led to system errors, which caused ballots to be coded provisional
when they were not. It was a configuration error with a different version of the
software than is used in Georgia and thus generally the same reported error in a
system log file is not an indication the same behavior is happening in our state,
because these incidents are logged for the benefit of maintenance staff, not for the
functioning of the election equipment.
This long conclusory paragraph misstates the actual facts on the ground in Williamson
11
See the Declaration of Jeffery Lenberg attached hereto as “Exhibit E”
12
Logan and Lenberg’s role in the testing of Coffee County’s election systems was strictly a “hands-off” exercise
which relied upon the authority of the Election Supervisor, Misty Hampton, who reported to the Board of Elections
and who controlled the machines.
13 See the Affidavit of Cathy Latham (attached hereto as “Exhibit F”) in which she describes the ballot scanner’s
reversal of predominately Republican voted ballots.
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November 4, 2022
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County. The STC blames error on a whole host of failings identified but accounted for in the
Williamson County report: configuration error, incompatible software versions, outdated election
file, misconfiguration of the database, and of course, the ever-present negligent employee.
This concerns us because it indicates to us that the STC has not actually read the EAC’s
report on the Williamson incident investigation. Had he or she done so, he or she would have
learned that the exact cause was inconclusive, that even when any possible error was corrected,
the same errors occurred, that they have been known to occur disproportionately (see the affidavit
of Cathy Latham attached as Exhibit G), that Dominion acknowledged the presence of “erroneous
code” in their software, and that Williamson County terminated their contract with Dominion.
Then there’s also the Engineering Change Order (“ECO”) – Dominion submitted the ECO
to the EAC seeking approval for a revised software version to “fix” the problem. As a legal matter,
our lawyers advise us that correction of an error should not be used as evidence in a tort case. Fair
enough. But we are in the real world and Dominion didn’t “fix” the problem, rather their software
revision only addressed a symptom. Why would Dominion attempt to fix what the STC claims
wasn’t broken?
The fact is that Dominion doesn’t know the cause of the problem, and if they don’t know
precisely what caused the anomaly, they have no basis for asserting that such is limited to
Democracy Suite 5.5B, and 5.5C.
There is a final paragraph in Chairman Duffey’s response that appears to be written by the
STC:
The SLOG files alone do not indicate an improperly functioning scanner based on
the way Georgia scanners are built to function. We would also need to see recap
sheets indicating that there is a mismatch in the number of ballots scanned and the
number of votes counted if the situation was similar to Tennessee.
In a separate email Chairman Duffey claims that the QR code Signature mismatch error is
not necessarily indicative of the Williamson anomaly.
While we cannot say without further investigation whether this error code is definitively
the source of the errors and miscounts in Georgia, in the ECO referenced above, Pro V&V used
the absence of the error code as evidence that their software revision had fixed the anomaly:
"The audit logs were reviewed to check the error message for any Ballot
Misreads encountered. The error message “QR Code Signature Mismatch” was
never encountered during testing."
Also, the same ECO quotes the assessment by Dominion Voting Machines that supports
the need for further investigation:
"Not all ICX BMD ballots that are interpreted as provisional will trigger the identified
behavior."
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November 4, 2022
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We do not fully understand this comment by Dominion, since there should be NO ballots
that are ever interpreted as "provisional" by a scanner.
DELTA REFERENCE
Dekalb County 2022 Primary 2,810 Ballots See page “Exhibit A-7”
Floyd County 2020 General 2,700 Ballots See page “Exhibit A-8”
Gwinnett County 2020 General 2,642 Ballots See page “Exhibit A-8”
These differences represent ballots in the scanners that were never counted. In every
instance where a hand recount was done after this anomaly was observed, the scanner counts
did not match the physical ballots counted.
Despite this “best-evidence” already before the Board, the STC or SEB has requested that
we provide “recap sheets.” The “recap sheets” for all of these – if they exist – would be available
to any investigator. Further, the requirement that recap sheets be maintained is not being enforced.
Finally, a “recap sheet” for one machine will not identify its lack of congruence with another
machine’s count. A recap sheet shows only one count – a recap sheet is generally only going to
show opening number and the closing number of one particular part of the voting process.
For Advance Voting, this is particularly a problem in early voting, where voting check-ins
are facilitated using laptops connected to E-net (Secretary of State’s database)- not poll pads. Yet
there is no Recap sheet for laptop check-ins. (See the correspondence of Cobb County Elections
Director Jeanine Eveler affirming the fact that check-ins have, since 2020, not been documented) 14.
How can one verify the ballot counts of the machines without check-in recap sheets? Since
Georgia’s purchase of the Dominion Machines in 2019, the voter check-in list is provided to the
county by the Secretary of State “…a few days before certification”. 15
But the disparity that could be shown may be great. Exhibit H documents the differences
between the pollpad count and the scanner count, and the touchscreen count. This could be created
because of the efforts of four veteran Early Voting poll managers who did record their numbers
despite not having a corresponding recap sheet. 16 All four showed the same irregularity- the ballot
scanners fell far short.
This same “Williamson County” problem also was documented in the November 2020
14
See the recent memo from Cobb County Election Director, Jeanine Eveler, affirming the fact that early voting check-ins
have not been tracked, attached hereto as “Exhibit G”.
15
Fulton County BRE Meeting Nov 2020 (rumble.com)
16
See Recap charts attached hereto as “Exhibit H”.
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November 4, 2022
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Coffee County Board of Elections meeting minutes (previously provided) where the Supervisor of Elections
described the same inability of the machines to produce a consistent result:
“Mrs. Martin also stated that “all counties do not have the same check points that I have in
place.” Ms. Thomas-Clark asked “if you have a ballot and you ran it twenty times, the system
would count it 20 times.” Mrs. Martin replied “yes”. Mrs. Martin said that during advance
voting the number on the scanner never matched the number of ballots voted.”
This is not just two years old – a request for investigation was first raised after the May
2020 primary by Coffee County official but has never been investigated
This issue has been reported in every election since. After the January 2021 Senate runoff,
the anomaly was recreated and observed under controlled conditions by systems expert Jeffery
Lenberg. We have painstakingly documented and repeatedly asked for a meaningful investigation
by the Secretary of State or the Board. The same errors that we call the “Williamson County
problem” are found in every Georgia county we have looked at this year, except for two (Coffee
and Gilmer).
We believe a thorough investigation is required – that was the purpose of the Initial
Submission and we welcome an independent investigation by the Board. The comments from the
STC seem only to have delayed the investigation. We stand ready to assist and answer questions
from a forensic examiner and would welcome the opportunity to provide insight into the design of
any further testing.
But now that we have run out of time to investigate, there is a larger problem – even if the
Board determines now that the error rate is as the SLOG files suggest, there is no permanent
remedy if the machines are currently operating at the error rates being suggested to us—which are
consistent with the error rates reported in the 2020 election. But there is possible relief.
Combined with what we’ve learned from the Williamson incident, our findings, and the
work of Logan and Lenberg, when viewed together strongly suggests a situation of grave concern.
Several individuals in different capacities have witnessed the biased reversal of ballots.
Independent benchmark testing recreated the scenario under controlled conditions and yielded the
same overwhelmingly biased result -- Republican-voted ballots were reversed at ratio of 7:1 over
Democrat-voted ballot reversals (emphasis is not party affiliation but detailed as a factual matter
and to establish that a clear bias exists). Because the distribution of ballot reversals is not random
suggests intentional influence is at play.
In essence, ballots are being reversed for error conditions that do not exist. This testing
and testimony show that the ballot reversals are not random. Significant numbers of paper ballots
were scanned but not counted and consistent with the Williamson anomaly and remain otherwise
unexplained.
You asked for facts. We have given you facts. For whatever reason, your STC
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November 4, 2022
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mischaracterized our presentation as matters that could be easily explained. 17 We believe that the
documents and reports provided are sufficient to establish that “Georgia scanners” are
malfunctioning in masse if analyzed by an independent examiner. No matter if caused by defect,
malware or malfeasance, the results remain, and persist. This alone is sufficient cause to
immediately suspend use of the Dominion voting systems in Georgia.
Therefore, we seek the following Emergency Relief necessary to mitigate the likelihood
that the conditions defined herein will affect and materially alter the outcome of the pending
midterm elections, followed by General Relief.
EMERGENCY RELIEF
1. Promulgate emergency rule requiring compliance with the poll closing procedures
for the ballot scanners used for Advance Voting as prescribed by Ga. Comp. R. &
Regs. 183-1-14-02. Specifically, we are hearing reports that memory card are being
removed from scanners in violation of paragraph (9), that daily recap sheets are not
being kept and matched to the number of voters as required by paragraph (13), and
personnel are not counting the ballots as required by paragraph (14).
3. Any other emergency relief the Board deems necessary to ensure true and correct election
results.
GENERAL RELIEF
We hope that this complaint will receive more serious treatment by the Board and its
technical consultants. If we are correct, then there is no way that these machines should be used
in any capacity in elections in any state – including Georgia. We refer you to the twelve reports
prepared by technical examiners in Texas, whose reviewed the Dominion Voting Machines for
Secretary of State of Texas and advised against their adoption. See, for example, some of the
reports at https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/laws/oct2019-dominion.shtml. After the initial
rejection of the machines as not suitable, Dominion was given an opportunity to correct and
resubmit the machines. In one report, the examiner, Mr. Tom Watson noted, “It is disappointing
that the problems documented in the previous examination’s report were not read, or not taken
seriously.”
17
We are disappointed that the issues we identified were not taken seriously by the technical advisors. We
respectfully request that you retain an independent technical advisor to review the concerns we have raised.
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
EXHIBIT A
(submitted without all exhibits in original submission)
Exhibit A-1
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit A-2
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit A-3
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit A-4
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit A-5
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit A-6
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit A-7
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit A-8
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit A-9
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit A-10
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit A-11
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit A-12
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit A-13
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit A-14
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit A-15
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
EXHIBIT B
From: William Duffey<[email protected]>
Date: On Tue, Oct 11, 2022 at 7:16 PM
Subject: Fwd: Your September 27, 2022, Complaint
To: David Cross <[email protected]>
CC:
Mr. Cross: I had your September 27, 2022, complaint and the data attached with it reviewed by an
outside testing company to evaluate if the data you provided supports the same undervote problem that
was discovered in Williamson County, Tennessee. The following was reported to me:
1. The SLOG (system log) file in the scanner is designed for technicians and includes the entire life of the
unit. It is not election-specific and includes everything that happens with the unit over its life.
2. The reports in the log files for signature mismatch and other categories that you cited are expected for
scanners that have been used in 4-5 elections. The types of “errors” reported in the SLOGs include a
range of events from someone feeding a ballot into a scanner crooked to someone feeding in a blank
ballot during testing of the equipment before the election.
3. The “reversed” ballots are ballots rejected by the scanner so the voter has an opportunity to re-insert
the ballot. That the SLOG shows, after 15-20 seconds, acceptance of the ballot supports that a ballot was
rejected because of the way it was inserted to be scanned and then rescanned (see, for example, Bacon
County (page 2 of PDF) that has an accepted ballot 19 seconds after a reversal, Randolph County (page
56 of PDF) with accepted ballot 17 seconds after reversal). Put another way, the “errors” you reference
are not errors but indications that the scanners are functioning as designed. It’s the scanner reporting
back to the technician what is happening with it so it can be properly maintained over its usable life[.]
4. That the Williamson County, Tennessee situation involved some of the same reports in log files does
not support the idea that the same problem exists in Georgia. In the Williamson County matter, an
employee used an outdated election file in a newer version of the Dominion equipment. The resulting
misconfiguration of the database led to system errors, which caused ballots to be coded provisional
when they were not. It was a configuration error with a different version of the software than is used in
Georgia and thus generally the same reported error in a system log file is not an indication the same
behavior is happening in our state, because these incidents are logged for the benefit of maintenance
staff, not for the functioning of the election equipment.
The SLOG files alone do not indicate an improperly functioning scanner based on the way Georgia
scanners are built to function. We would also need to see recap sheets indicating that there is a
mismatch in the number of ballots scanned and the number of votes counted if the situation was similar
to Tennessee.
Exhibit B-1
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
EXHIBIT C
See file included in this submission as
“20221021 - FINAL Declaration of Douglas Logan
Executed with Exhibits.pdf”
Exhibit C-1
EXHIBIT D
Mr. Moncla,
Per your request I have read and reviewed the complaint you filed “VERIFIED NOTICE
AND DEMAND FOR EMERGENCY REVIEW” dated October 11, 2022. I also reviewed the
email response you received from the Chair of the State Election Board, Mr. William S. Duffy Jr.
dated October 18th, 2022.
I will provide my honest technical and professional opinion on both your complaint and
the response from the state representative. I will briefly provide some of my education,
experience, and certifications to help validate I have the credentials and expertise to make sound
observations on this matter. I have a Bachelor of Science in Computer Science and Master of
Science in Cyber Security. I have done Root Cause Analysis (RCA) and investigations (both
incident response and forensic) for Government agencies, Department of Defense agencies and
my employers (Lockheed Martin, BAE, etc.). I have the following certifications: CISSP, CEH
and CHFI. Additionally, I have nine years of experience testing electronic voting systems within
several VSTLs.
First your complaint in my professional opinion contained enough technical and
supporting evidence to warrant a review of the Dominion Democracy Suite 5.5A election
system. The error rates and numbers that you cite do not comply with VVSG standards. The
standards I referenced are VVSG 1.0 volumes 1 and 2. However, I can state with pretty good
certainty that your findings do not comply with any version of the VVSG.
The response email states, “Based on the technical review we had done of your letter, this
is expected behavior—in other words, if a scanner cannot read a ballot, the proper behavior is to
reverse the ballot back to the voter, who then can re-feed it into the scanner.” While this is the
expected behavior, the multiple locations and number of times that you cite this happening, no
matter what the error code given, is a failure of the VVSG standard. As I stated to you in an
earlier conversation after reviewing the summary of error findings, even if you exclude the
ballots accepted during a second run, there is still a 5% error rate. The status of the second run is
irrelevant as the initial run must meet a .05% by VVSG standard. I must disagree with their
statement "As a result, we do not see that the rate of “rejected-then-accepted” evidences a
scanner malfunction." It is a malfunction and is considered a VVSG failure whether 5% or 20%.
At the very minimum the EAC should suspend the use of this particular version of the voting
system until an investigation is completed. This is according to the guidance I have read
published by the EAC.
The reply also states, "As the EAC referenced in its report, the mere presence of the “QR
code signature mismatch” in the log files did not necessarily indicate the anomaly related to
programming that in occurred in Tennessee(page 3 of the EAC report). The mere presence of
that message, especially when it is followed by the successful reading of a ballot, indicates the
expected behavior of the scanner and not an error in its operation." As they list page 3 of the
EAC report, I assume they are referring to paragraph 4 on page 3 of Exhibit A. Therefore, I re-
Page 1 of 2
EXHIBIT D
read Exhibit A. I had also previously read the “United States Election Assistance Commission
Report of Investigation Dominion Voting Systems D-Suite 5.5-B Williamson County, Tennessee
March 31, 2022”. So, I have now reviewed that EAC report several times. I will hold my
professional opinion and comments on the overall report as they are not relevant to this
complaint.
The report states the ballots were rejected when that error code was logged. The report
also states, "Subsequent resetting of the ICP scanners and additional tabulation demonstrated that
each instance of the anomaly coincided with the previously mentioned audit log entries, though
not every instance of those audit log entries resulted in the anomaly." This means there were still
failures but not all ballots ran resulted in producing the anomaly. Analyzing this paragraph and
saying the EAC stated “the mere presence of … followed by the successful reading” indicates
expected behavior is not technically accurate interpretation.
The fifth paragraph which continues to page 4 of the report admits that successfully
scanned ballots that ran after the anomaly still weren’t counted when the poll close reports were
created. Report paragraph inserted here for reference “Further analysis of the anomaly behavior
showed that the scanners correctly tabulated all ballots until the anomaly was triggered.
Following the anomaly, ballots successfully scanned and tabulated by the ICP were not reflected
in the close poll reports on the affected ICP scanners.”
Based on my technical analysis of your complaint and the states response It is my
professional opinion that the electronic voting systems you reference in your complaint should
have a detailed technical review or incident response type investigation. I am more than willing
to discuss my comments and observations on this matter with you or any state representative.
Please let me know if you need or would like a physically signed copy.
Respectfully submitted,
/S/
_______________________
Clay Parikh
CEH, CHFI, CISSP
Page 2 of 2
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
EXHIBIT E
Exhibit E – Page 1
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit E-2
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit E-3
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit E-4
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit E-5
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit E-6
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit E-7
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit E-8
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit E-9
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit E-10
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit E-11
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
Exhibit E-12
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
EXHIBIT F
I, Cathy A. Latham, declare the following pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746
teacher with the State of Georgia as a virtual teacher. The subjects that I teach
Education and full majors in History, and English. I also have a Master's in
until June 2021, I serve as the Rural County Chair responsible for oversight
18
https://douglasnow.com/index.php/community/item/6456-coffee-high-s-cathy-latham-
selected-
2019-georgia-economics-teacher-of-the-year
Exhibit F-1
and assistance to county party activities in 129 rural counties in Georgia. I
also served until June 2021 as the Chairwoman for the Coffee County
served as the First Vice Chair of the 12th Congressional District Republican
Committee.
the General Election Cycle of 2016 and when I became the Chair of Coffee
County in 2017.
of the election process itself concerning several federal, state, and local races,
with and continue to speak with various county election officials before,
our members and the public, answering important questions, and verifying the
Exhibit F-2
7. During the Senate run-off elections in January 2021, I served as a
Republican observer and Voter Review Panelist during the counting of the
Precinct Optical Scanners (ICP) failed to read advance voting ballots and was
sealed by the
tech determined that it was probably the failure of one of the memory cards.
The decision was made to run these ballots on Election Day when absentee
ballots would be scanned, which would be after the polls closed. It was
estimated that there were 6,000 ballots that would need to be scanned in
addition to the absentee ballots and the UOCAVA ballots (Uniformed and
Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act Ballots) and any provisional ballots.
All these ballots would be scanned on the one ImageCast Central Scanner
Everyone else either was in the lobby looking in through the windows into the
Exhibit F-3
scanning room or were in the other room opening the absentee ballots.
10. As everyone settled in for a long night in a very small room with a
As she put in the first batch, the machine began scanning and then jammed on
11. This continued, batch after batch, time after time. Dominion tech,
County after scanner issue problems in the June 2020 Primary and November
recommended to Ms. Hampton that she needed to take a cloth and wipe down
the scanner. At times he advised and instructed her to blow canned air at the
eye of the scanner to help remove paper debris. This didn’t help.
12. One thing that was noticed by Ms. Hampton, Mrs. Thomas-Clark,
and me was that every ballot that had a QR Code Failure was a ballot for all
looked over at me and said, “This isn’t right.” I agreed with her.
13. Several tries, wipes, and blows of air were used and smaller and
smaller batches were being put through the machine. Eventually we were
running 5-10 ballots at a time, trying to get through the stacks. The hours
Exhibit F-4
were stretching into a possibility of going into the next day. We only had
approximately 5,800 ballots but it was taking forever since there was at least
one ballot per small batch that would be rejected as a QR CODE FAILURE.
Chairman, lost his temper and told Mr. Challandes to get his boss on the
phone immediately. Mr. Challandes got his boss, Scott Tucker of Dominion,
on his phone, Mr. Chaney asked for the phone to be put on speaker, and he
proceeded to tell the Scott Tucker that Mr. Challandes had about 30 minutes
to fix the scanner so that it would take the ballots, or he (Mr. Chaney) was
calling all news agencies and inviting them into the board office and have
them film and witness what was going on with the scanners and the ballots.
Mr. Tucker then asked if this was a threat and Mr. Chaney responded that no,
it was a promise. Mr. Challandes then took the phone off speaker and
Scott Tucker. Mr. Challandes came back in about 30 minutes later and was
smiling saying that he knew that this was going to work, and we’d soon be
finished.
15. Mr. Challandes then stood next to the scanner but did not touch the
scanner at any point during this time. In his hand, he held his cell phone,
which was a smart phone. While standing next to the scanner, he instructed
Exhibit F-5
Ms. Hampton to wipe the machine down one more time. She balked at doing
it as she had been doing this same procedure all night long, without resolution.
Mr. Challandes started grinning and said that this time it would work and
there would be no more problems. Ms. Hampton one more time wiped the
machine down and then inserted another batch of ballots. Mr. Challandes kept
insisting this was going to work and he was bouncing on his toes, getting
excited. Ms. Hampton was getting mad and told him to settle down and he
continued to say that this was going to work. I even chimed in and asked him
16. Ms. Hampton ran that batch (a large batch that Mr. Challandes
insisted on running) and the last 5 batches, and sure enough, all ballots
processed.
17. After Mr. Challandes left the room and we were finishing the wrap
up and getting final numbers for the press, Mr. Chaney asked, “Did we all just
witness what I think we witnessed?” I looked at him and said, “Is there
anyway that something was downloaded to that scanner from his phone or
from the Internet? There is no way that wiping the machine with a cloth
happened because that was too coincidental to have not been a download or
technical fix to the machine. Mrs. Thomas-Clark looked at me and said again,
Exhibit F-6
“This isn’t right.” The scanner that all night long had rejected Republican
ballot after ballot with QR Code Failure was allegedly fixed with a phone call
Exhibit F-7
Cross-Moncla Response
November 4, 2022
EXHIBIT G
From: Eveler, Janine <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, Oct 9, 2022 at 4:28 PM
Subject: Advance Voting equipment pilot
To: Jacquelyn Bettadapur <[email protected]>, Salleigh Grubbs
<[email protected]>
Cc: Hamilton, Erica <[email protected]>
Chairwomen,
I would like to notify you of a pilot that Cobb County will be participating in during
Advance Voting. Our previous procedure was to enter the voter’s paper application
directly into eNet and then use the Poll Pad to encode a generic card with the voter’s
precinct & district combination. In this pilot, we will be using the Poll Pad exclusively to
pull up the voter’s record, similar to Election Day, and marking the voter record as voted
on the Poll Pad. We will not update voter’s data in eNet while the voter is in the advance
voting poll, but will do that in the “back-of-the house” after the voter leaves. This is
expected to greatly increase the speed at which we process voters.
The Poll Pad will sit on an attached printer that will print a certificate showing the voter
has voted. The certificate will be given to “back-of-the-house” workers to enter into
eNet. To make sure that the voter can only vote once, the new Poll Pad equipment will
be connected via a dedicated cellular network to a central application, so that each Poll
Pad will sync its data to the others. In the past, we have told you that the Poll Pad
numbers do not matter during advance voting, because they were just used as generic
encoders. Now, the numbers on the Poll Pad will be tracked on reconciliation sheets
and should exactly match the ballots printed and cast. Attached is a copy of the
Reconciliation form we have drafted for the pilot, some photos of the unit on its printer
base and a sample of the certificate it will print. Your poll watchers will be able to view
the numbers on the reconciliation form daily to verify they match.
Janine Eveler
Director,
Cobb County Elections & Registration
770-528-2312
770-528-2519 Fax
678-315-0439 Cell
www.CobbElections.org
Register...then Vote!
Exhibit G – Page 1