Polish-Swedish Relations During Ii WW

DREAM
ISTS
ERS
TUN
& OPPOR
POLISH–SWEDISH RELATIONS DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Paweł
Jaworski
DREAM
ISTS
ERS
TUN
& OPPOR
POLISH–SWEDISH RELATIONS DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Paweł
Jaworski
Södertörns högskola
Author: Paweł Jaworski (ORCID: 0000-0001-5256-1238)
Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)

This publication is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License
First published 2009 by Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Poland

Original title: Marzyciele i oportuniści. Stosunki polsko-szwedzkie w latach 1939–1945
Translation: Katarzyna Hussar

The translation of this volume was financed by
the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education.
Narodowy Program Rozwoju Humanistyki, Project: 31H 13 0148 82
Södertörns högskola
(Södertörn University)
Library
SE-141 89 Huddinge
www.sh.se/publications
Cover: Jonathan Robson (Illustration by Paweł Jaworski)

Graphic form: Per Lindblom & Jonathan Robson
Printed by Elanders, Stockholm 2019
Södertörn Academic Studies 73

ISSN 1650-433X
ISBN 978-91-88663-35-1 (print)
ISBN 978-91-88663-36-8 (digital)
Contents
Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................... 7
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 11
PART 1
In the Circle of Politics and Propaganda ........................................................................ 21
1. On the Eve of War.......................................................................................................... 23
2. Aggression of Germany and the Soviet Union Against Poland from
the Swedish Perspective ................................................................................................ 35
First reactions ................................................................................................................. 35
Reports from the front .................................................................................................. 44
The picture of total war ................................................................................................ 51
The attack from the East............................................................................................... 56
The final phase of the campaign.................................................................................. 65
The fate of Swedish diplomats in Warsaw ................................................................. 71
Representation of Polish interests by Sweden in Germany ..................................... 74
3. In the Face of Consequences of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact ............................... 93
Following the defeat of Poland .................................................................................... 93
During the Winter War .............................................................................................. 107
4. Consolidation of German Hegemony in Europe – Polish Strategy
of Maintaining Relations and Swedish Dodging .................................................... 121
A freeze in relations following Hitler’s invasion of Scandinavia .......................... 121
Operation Barbarossa and the apparent improvement
in Polish–Swedish relations ....................................................................................... 144
Polish and Swedish federalist concepts for post-war Europe ............................... 166
Overcoming stagnation in bilateral relations following
Hitler’s defeat in Moscow........................................................................................... 177
5. Revival of Bilateral Relations Following the Battle of Stalingrad .......................... 191
Polish diplomatic activity in the period of the Wehrmacht’s failures ................. 191
Swedish public opinion on the situation in occupied Poland and
Polish–Soviet relations ............................................................................................... 197
Swedish discussion on Katyń ..................................................................................... 216
6. Sweden’s Return to Strict Neutrality and the Normalisation of
Relations with the Polish Government .................................................................... 231
The visit by the Minister of Industry, Trade and Shipping
Jan Kwapiński to Stockholm ...................................................................................... 231
Change in the policy of the Swedish government .................................................. 242
Sweden’s position on the Polish matter (January–July 1944) ............................... 246
Swedish reactions to the birth of the Lublin Committee ....................................... 268
Activity of the Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP) in Sweden .................................... 272
7. The Double Game of Swedish Diplomacy ................................................................ 287
The rising in Warsaw from a Swedish perspective ................................................. 287
The propagandist campaign for the recognition of Poland’s right
to sovereignty and territorial integrity ..................................................................... 302
Diplomatic chess .......................................................................................................... 315
Around Yalta ................................................................................................................ 325
Sweden’s break-up of diplomatic relations with
the Polish government in exile .................................................................................. 355
PART 2
Economic Issues .............................................................................................................. 361
8. Swedish Presence in Occupied Poland ..................................................................... 363
9. Plans of Polish–Swedish Post-War Economic Cooperation ................................. 391
10. The Mission of Brynolf Eng ..................................................................................... 439
PART 3
Humanitarian Mission of Sweden ................................................................................. 447
11. The Fate of Polish Refugee ........................................................................................ 449
12. Swedish Humanitarian Aid for Poland ................................................................... 473
Humanitarian activity 1939–44 ............................................................................ 473
The plans for providing post-war humanitarian aid ........................................... 491
The mission of Sven Hellqvist in the General Government ................................ 498
Swedish transports of humanitarian aid to the
Lublin Committee Poland ..................................................................................... 503
Final negotiations regarding humpanitarian aid in the post-war period ........... 508
13. The Problems of Polish Soldiers Interned in Sweden ........................................... 513
Submarine crews .......................................................................................................... 513
Aviators ......................................................................................................................... 540
Soldiers of the 1940 Norwegian Campaign ............................................................. 546
Conclusion........................................................................................................................ 547
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 553
Index .................................................................................................................................. 571
Abbreviations
AAN Archiwum Akt Nowych

(Central Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw)
AK Armia Krajowa
(Polish Home Army)
AMSZ Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw
Zagranicznych
(Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland)
ARAB Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek
(Swedish Labour Movement’s Archive and Library)
AA Auswärtiges Amt
(Federal Foreign Office of the German Empire)
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
ČTK Československá tísková kancelář
(Czech News Agency)
FO British Foreign Office
FRA Försvarets Radioanstalt
(Swedish National Defence Radio Establishment)
IAfÅ Internationella Arbetslag för Återuppbyggnad
(International team for reconstruction)
KA Krigsarkivet
(Military Archive in Stockholm)
KBN Komitet Badań Naukowych
(State Committee for Scientific Research in Poland)
KMW Kierownictwo Marynarki Wojennej
(Polish Navy leadership)
KRN Krajowa Rada Narodowa
(State National Council or Homeland National
Council in German-occupied Poland)
LO Landsorganisationen
(Swedish Trade Union Confederation)
MUST Militära underrättelse- och säkerhetstjänsten
7
DREAMERS AND OPPORTUNISTS
(Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service)

NA National Archives (London)
NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
(National Socialist German Workers’ Party or Nazi
Party)
PAT Polska Agencja Telegraficzna
(Polish Telegraphic Agency)
PCK Polski Czerwony Krzyż
(Polish Red Cross)
PKWN Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego
(Polish Committee of National Liberation or the
Lublin Committee)
PPS Polska Partia Socjalistyczna
(Polish Socialist Party)
PRL Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa
(Polish People’s Republic)
PRM Prezydium Rady Ministrów
(Prime Minister of Poland)
RA Riksarkivet
(National Archives of Sweden)
RAF Royal Air Force
RGO Rada Główna Opiekuńcza
(Central Welfare Council, Kraków)
RP Rzeczpospolita Polska
(Second Polish Republic)
SAE Sveriges Allmänna Exportförening
(Swedish Export Association)
SAP Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti
(Swedish Social Democratic Party)
SIH Svenska kommittén för internationell
hjälpverksamhet
(Swedish Committee for International Assistance)
SIS Statens Informationsstyrelse
(Sweden’s Board of Information)
8
ABBREVIATIONS
SISU Studentförbundet för internationellt

samhällstudium och uppbyggnadsarbete
(Student Union for International Society Study and
Construction)
SKP Sveriges kommunistiska parti
(Communist Party of Sweden)
SPP Studium Polski Podziemnej
(Polish Underground Movement Study Trust)
SRK Svenska Röda Korset
(Swedish Red Cross)
SSU Sveriges socialdemokratiska ungdomsförbund
(Swedish Social Democratic Youth League)
TASS Tielegrafnoje Agientstwo Sovietskogo Sojuza
(Russian News Agency)
TRJN Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej
(Provisional Government of National Unity)
TT Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå
(TT News Agency/Swedish Telegraphic Agency)
UD Utrikesdepartementet
(Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration
ZPP Związek Patriotów Polskich
(Union of Polish Patriots)
ZPPwSz Związek Patriotów Polskich w Szwecji
(Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden)
ZPPwZSRR Związek Patriotów Polskich w ZSRR
(Union of Polish Patriots in the Soviet Union)
ZŻP Związek Żydów Polskich
(Union of Polish Jews)
9
10
Introduction
Having restored its independence in 1918, Poland did not prioritize Scan-
dinavia in its foreign policy. The Swedes were also wary of their new partner
on the international arena. Both sides lacked motivation to set up a closer
political or economic cooperation. There was some revival in the mid-1920s,
when Polish coal appeared on the Swedish market, but only the Polish
minister Józef Beck attempted to develop the mutual relations. Their founda-
tion became economic relations and cooperation under the League of
Nations. Common commercial interests and efforts to uphold peace in
Europe were the cornerstones of good Polish–Swedish relations in the 1930s.1
The Swedish Envoy to Warsaw, Eric von Post, on summing 1934, emphasized
‘the interest of the Polish side with Sweden was striking and certain plans of
economic and cultural cooperation were starting to crystallize. It may be said
that the development of Swedish–Polish relations is currently by no means a
significant issue in Poland.’2 The subsequent Swedish Envoy to Warsaw, Erik
Boheman, commented on the breakthrough in Polish foreign policy involv-
ing the balancing of Poland’s two powerful neighbours and avoiding multi-
lateral commitments, as well as its wait-and-see attitude towards interna-
tional developments. He continued to submit his positive assessments of
former and current Polish policy to his headquarters. He stated: ‘Over the
long period of time that passed from the conclusion of the war, numerous
circumstances have allowed us to distinguish Poland among the countries
—
1
For more information on Polish–Swedish relations in the interwar period see i.e.: J.
Szymański, Stosunki gospodarcze Polski ze Szwecją w latach 1919–1939, Gdańsk 1978; idem,
Polsko-skandynawska współpraca w zakresie żeglugi w okresie międzywojennym (1919–
1939), Gdańsk 1988; idem, ‘Problemy polityki Polski wobec Skandynawii w okresie
międzywojennym (1919–1939)’, Zapiski Historyczne 1993, iss. 1; idem, ‘Z genezy stosunków
Polski ze Szwecją w latach 1919–1925’, Zeszyty Naukowe Wydziału Humanistycznego UG,
Studia Scandinavica 1978, iss. 1; idem, ‘Wybrane aspekty kwestii rozbrojenia w stosunkach
polsko-skandynawskich w okresie międzywojennym’, Acta Universitatis Lodziensis, Folia
Historica 1991, iss. 42; briefly in: Historia dyplomacji polskiej, vol. 4: 1918–1939, ed. P.
Łossowski, Warszawa 1995; mostly based on printed sources: P. Jaworski, Polska niepodległa
wobec Skandynawii 1918–1939, Wrocław 2001; A. Staniszewski, Po dwóch stronach Bałtyku.
Polityczno-gospodarcze stosunki polsko-szwedzkie w latach 1918–1932, Toruń 2013; P.
Jaworski, ‘Polish experiences with Scandinavian activity in the League of Nations’, Scandi-
navian Journal of History, 2015, Vol. 40, No. 5.
2
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 482, quarterly report for the period 1 October20
December, 1934 by E. von Post, Warsaw, 21 XII 1934.
11
whose foreign policy stance is marked by the desire to preserve and reinforce
its territory and maintain the political status quo established by the peace
treaties.’3 Therefore, he was not surprised by Poland’s alliance with France,
which supported Polish territorial claims at a conference in Paris and later
joined an anti-German alliance. He did not consider this consensus to be
purely opportunistic, but the result of cultural and historical tradition. At the
same time, he highlighted that the decision-makers of the Second Polish
Republic (Rzeczpospolita Polska) were acting solely in the interests of the
Polish state.4
Although the atmosphere for developing bilateral relations was favour-
able, their activation required overcoming barriers both in Stockholm and
Warsaw. Michał Sokolnicki, who served as Polish envoy to Copenhagen
1931–36, on judging the situation from the perspective of his subsequent resi-
dent mission in neutral Turkey, stated that economic cooperation schemes
could create a chance for Poland to develop its foreign relations, also with
Scandinavia. He also noted the following: ‘I have observed that efforts in this
direction were obstructed by […] bureaucratic obtuseness in Warsaw, poli-
tical strife, squabbles and discrepancies between offices, excessively detailed
regulations instead of programmes and inability to see the wood for the
trees.’5 At the same time the Swedes’ attachment to neutrality, reaching back
to the close of the Napoleonic era, required them to show restraint even when
it came to discussing the subject of cooperation with Poland.
It is worth mentioning the friendly connection established at the time
between the head of Swedish diplomacy, Rickard Sandler, and Józef Beck.
Equally good relations were maintained between the Polish Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Envoy Boheman. Beck showed his trust to the Swedish
representative in Poland, for instance by secretly briefing him on the content
of talks with Anthony Eden during his visit to Warsaw.6 It was not a coin-
cidence that Beck made Boheman, Secretary-General at the Swedish Ministry
—
3
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 483, letter by Swedish Envoy to Warsaw E.
Boheman to UD, Warsaw, 4 III 1935.
4
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 483, letter by Swedish Envoy to Warsaw to UD,
Warsaw, 16 IX 1936. In his memoirs, apart from a critical picture of Polish internal relations
in the interwar period, Boheman also evaluated Polish foreign policy. His conclusion was
that had Sweden found itself in a similar situation to Poland, ‘it would have most probably
acted in a similar way’, and ‘Poland could have not been rescued by any other policy.’ See E.
Boheman, På vakt. Från attaché till sändebud. Minnesanteckningar, Stockholm 1963, pp.
208, 212, 221.
5
M. Sokolnicki, Dziennik ankarski 1939–1943, London 1965, p. 50.
6
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 483, letter by Swedish Envoy to Warsaw E.
Boheman to UD, Warsaw, 5 IV 1935.
12
INTRODUCTION
of Foreign Affairs from 1938, a guardian of his ‘Final Report’ manuscript,

which he wrote following his internment in Romania during the Second
World War. The manuscript was handed to the Swede by Beck’s widow close
to the end of the war.
It may be said that the interwar period was also when the distrust of the
Swedes towards Poland was overcome, and most importantly of anti-Polish
stereotypes promoted by German propaganda. At the same time fragile eco-
nomic links and personal contacts paved the way for more intensive bilateral
international relations. The final months of peace and the subsequent years
of war put both countries under severe pressure.
Sweden, in the face of political tensions across Europe, hid behind the
policy of neutrality, drawing from experiences gathered during the First
World War. Poland, however, became the main target of aggression and was
forced to find powerful allies.
Polish–Swedish relations during the Second World War are yet to be
covered by a synthetic study. Although, the subject is examined on numerous
occasions in academic literature. The most valuable and available resources
are monographs by Andrzej Nils Uggla and Józef Lewandowski. Uggla, a
Polish philologist and literary scholar at the University of Uppsala, presented
the problems of Polish refugees in Sweden.7 He also briefly discussed the
question of the presence of Polish literature in Swedish publishing and the
question of Poland-related themes in the Swedish press.8 Lewandowski in
turn was a historian who became known in the 1960s for his papers devoted
to the Piłsudskiite movement. Following his move to Sweden he established
a cooperation with Uppsala University where he began his investigation of
the arresting of a group of Swedes in Warsaw (1942), who cooperated with
—
7
A. N. Uggla, Polacy w Szwecji w latach II wojny światowej, Gdańsk 1997; the Swedish edi-
tion: idem, I nordlig hamn. Polacker i Sverige under andra världskriget, Uppsala 1997.
8
A. N. Uggla, Den svenska Polenbilden och polsk prosa i Sverige 1939–1960: två studier i
reception, Uppsala 1986. Uggla is also the author of several papers devoted to subjects men-
tioned in this book (see: Bibliography). Yet, his primary research focus was literary studies.
He authored, among others, the polonica bibliography, discussed below.
13
the Polish resistance movement.9 The same subject discussed by Swedish his-
torian Staffan Thorsell.10 The Swedish researchers were also interested in
former Polish prisoners from German concentration camps who reached
Sweden in the last weeks of the war as a result of the “white buses” action.11
The question of Polish–Swedish relations was mentioned in the periphery
of source literature, mostly as side threads of larger works. The fate of Polish
seamen interned in Sweden, however was thoroughly examined,12 as was the
Poles’ chances of escaping from the occupied territories across the Baltic Sea
on Swedish ships.13 Based on Polish sources attempts have been made to des-
cribe the activities of Polish intelligence in Scandinavia and the activity of the
communication headquarters in Stockholm, which provided contact between
London and the Polish resistance movement.14 Polish issues were mentioned
—
9
Initially, the results of his preliminary research were published: J. Lewandowski, Swedish
Contribution to the Polish Resistance Movement during World War Two, 1939–1942, Uppsala
1977; and later the amended and supplemented version: Węzeł stockholmski. Szwedzkie
koneksje polskiego podziemia IX 1939–VII 1942, Uppsala 1999; the Swedish edition: Knut-
punkt Stockholm: den polska motståndsrörelsens svenska förbindelser från september 1939 till
juli 1942, Stockholm 2006. Apart from this, he also translated and compiled an excerpt from
the diary of the Swedish diplomat Sven Grafström, and later, in cooperation with A. N.
Uggla, prepared an extended Polish edition of J. Lewandowski, ‘Polski dziennik Svena
Grafstróma’, Zeszyty Historyczne 1982, iss. 60, pp. 158–207; S. Grafström, Polskie stronice.
Dziennik od 5 lipca 1938 do 6 grudnia 1939 roku, selected, translated and compiled by J.
Lewandowski, A. N. Uggla, Warszawa 1996. See also: J. Szymański, ‘Polska–Szwecja. W
cieniu wydarzeń europejskich XIX i XX wieku’ [in:] Szwecja–Polska. Lata rywalizacji i
przyjaźni. Polen och Sverige: År av rivalitet och vänskap, ed. J. Niklasson-Młynarska,
Stockholm 1999, pp. 50–67; idem, ‘Skandynawia–Polska 1918–1945–1989’ [in:] U progu
niepodległości 1918–1989, ed. R. Wapiński, Gdańsk 1999, pp. 194–214.
10
S. Thorsell, Warszawasvenskarna: De som lät världen veta, Stockholm 2014.
11
W. Bogatic, Exilens dilemma. Att stanna eller att återvända – beslut i Sverige av polska
kvinnor som överlevde KZ-lägret Ravensbrück och räddades till Sverige 1945–1947, Växjö
2011; L. Olsson, På tröskeln till folkhemmet. Baltiska flyktingar och polska koncentra-
tionslägerfångar som reservarbetskraft i skånskt jordbruk kring slutet av andra världskriget,
Lund 1995.
12
This issue has been discussed in both Polish and Swedish historiography. See chapter 13,
“Submarine crews”, footnote 1.
13
B. Chrzanowski, ‘Organizacja sieci przerzutów drogą morską z Polski do Szwecji w latach
okupacji hitlerowskiej (1939–1945)’, Zeszyty Muzeum (Stutthof) 1984, iss. 5; B.
Chrzanowski, A. Gąsiorowski, K. Steyer, Polska Podziemna na Pomorzu w latach 1939–1945,
Gdańsk 2005.
14
A. Pepłoński, Wywiad Polskich Sił Zbrojnych na Zachodzie 1939–1945, Warszawa 1995; L.
Gondek, Na tropach tajemnic III Rzeszy, Warszawa 1987; L. Kliszewicz, ‘Baza w Sztok-
holmie’, Zeszyty Historyczne 1981, iss. 58, pp. 44–174; idem, ‘Baza w Sztokholmie’, Warsaw–
London 2000; A. Pepłoński, ‘Skandynawia i republiki bałtyckie’ [in:] Polsko-brytyjska
współpraca wywiadowcza podczas II wojny światowej, vol. 1: Ustalenia Polsko-Brytyjskiej
Komisji Historycznej, eds. T. Dubicki, D. Nałęcz, T. Stirling, Warszawa 2004, pp. 342–349;
G. Bennett, ‘Skandynawia i republiki bałtyckie’ [in:] Polsko-brytyjska…, pp. 337–341. See
also: B. Chrzanowski, ‘Ekspozytura Północ Oddziału II Sztabu Naczelnego Wodza na terenie
14
INTRODUCTION
several times in the book by Klas Åmark that concluded discussions in the
recent years about the Swedish policy during the Second World War.15
Nevertheless, we lack a study with the diplomatic and political relations as
its point of departure, where particular attention is paid to propaganda car-
ried out by Poles in Sweden.16 The primary research objective of this book is
to answer the three following questions: 1. Where and when, despite the un-
favourable circumstances, did the authorities of Poland and Sweden develop
their common interests and how were they manifested? 2. Did the both sides
feel co-responsible for the Baltic Sea region? 3. What was the attitude of the
Swedes towards the ‘Polish matter’ (a complex of all issues connected with
Poland during the War) and how was Swedish policy evaluated by the Poles?
This study is divided into three parts presenting the covered research
problems in chronological order. The first and most extensive part examines
the changes in political relations between Poland and Sweden as well as the
evolution of the attitude of the Swedish society towards the Polish matter based
on diplomatic sources and newspaper content published during the Second
World War. There will be a detailed discussion of the visit to Stockholm in 1943
by Jan Kwapiński, Minister of Industry, Trade and Shipping for the Polish
government in exile. From the Polish perspective this visit was considered a
breakthrough in bilateral relations. Important in this context is the reaction of
—
Szwecji’ [in:] Polski wywiad wojskowy 1918–1945, eds. P. Kołakowski, A. Pepłoński, Toruń
2006, pp. 480–493. It is worth to become familiar with the extensive paper: T. Potworowski,
‘The Polish Legation’s undiplomatic activities, Stockholm September 1939–July 1942’, Acta
Sueco-Polonica 2001–2002, iss. 10–11, pp. 5–93. Sweden is mentioned in a paper devoted to
the activity of the Continental Action, which used the members of Polish emigrant
community for anti-German activity in Scandinavia, see: E. Kruszewski, Akcja Kon-
tynentalna w Skandynawii 1940–1945, Copenhagen 1993.
15
K. Åmark, Att bo granne med ondskan. Sveriges förhållande till nazismen, Nazityskland och
Förintelsen, Stockholm 2011; 2nd edition: Stockholm 2016.
16
Only the final period of the war was of greater interest to historians, where attempts were
made to reconstruct the process of establishing relations between the Swedish government
and the Polish PKWN government, which later became the Provisional Government of the
National Unity. This subject is directly addressed in the book from the field of political
science, see: J. Dorniak, Stosunki polsko-szwedzkie w latach 1944–1974, Słupsk 1978. The
author based his work exclusively on published academic papers and Polish daily news-
papers; this can constitute a starting point to further archival study. An academic paper was
published in Sweden on economic negotiations between the so-called Lublin Committee
Poland and Sweden during the final stage of the war (based on Swedish sources), see: S.-O.
Olsson, ‘Swedish-Polish Trade Negotiations at the End of the Second World War and Their
Results’, Scandinavian Economic History Review 1988, iss. 2. For a valuable work on this
subject, based only on Polish source material, see: A. Kłonczyński, Stosunki polsko-szwedzkie
w latach 1945–1956, Gdańsk 2007. The author opens his lecture by discussing July 1944, and
the final months of the Second World War are treated by him as a point of departure to the
essential part of the lecture.
15
the Swedes to the disclosure of the Katyń Massacre, to which here a great deal
of attention has been devoted. The key issue of 1944–45 became the two-way
policy of Sweden and its concurrent contacts with the Polish Legation in
Stockholm and the representatives of the Polish Committee of National
Liberation (PKWN), which was later transformed into the Provisional Govern-
ment and finally the Provisional Government of National Unity (TRJN).
The second part of the book presents two fundamental plots of Polish-
Swedish economic relations. Much interest has been devoted to the presence
of Swedish business enterprises in occupied Poland, and inter alia, to the role
of the Swedish Chamber of Commerce in Warsaw, which sought to continue
the activity of the Polish-Swedish Chamber of Commerce despite the unusual
conditions presented by the Second World War. Another crucial issue ad-
dressed in this book is the recovery of mutual financial claims between Polish
and Swedish partners. Negotiations on such matters (especially regarding
advance payments from the Polish for military equipment from the Bofors
company) continued throughout the war and remained unresolved. An
entirely separate issue was the re-establishing of trade following the war, ini-
tiated by negotiations as early as in 1943. Their continuation in 1944 was
conducted by Swedish representatives in Moscow and the final stage took
place in Warsaw (Brynolf Eng’s mission). The negotiations were no longer
with the representatives of the Polish government in exile but with repre-
sentatives of the Provisional Government.
The third part of the book covers the fate of Polish refugees as well as
seamen and soldiers interned in Sweden. It also focuses on the issues of hu-
manitarian aid for Poland. Insofar as the commonly known facts about the
interned Poles were only supplemented by some new and detailed findings,
the issue of humanitarian aid is presented in a broad political context based
on so-far unexamined Swedish archival resources. This extensive source base
allowed for a comprehensive presentation of the activity of the Swedish Red
Cross (SRK) in Poland, especially during 1944 and 1945, when humanitarian
actions were carried out both in the General Government (Sven Hellqvist’s
mission) and in the territory of the so-called Lublin Committee Poland.
For the study, collections of both Polish and international archives have
been examined.17 Fortunately for this investigation, the New Acts Archive
(AAN) in Warsaw now contains, aside from an incomplete collection of
documents from the Polish Legation in Stockholm, copies of documents
—
17
Since not all investigated collections were paginated, in the case some of the quoted docu-
ments’ page numbers are not mentioned in the footnotes.
16
INTRODUCTION
issued by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the war, held in the
Hoover Institution Archive (Stanford University). Another important sup-
plementation were documents from the economic departments of the Polish
government in exile. These collections helped create a complete picture of
Swedish policy, as well as expectations towards Sweden and plans to reacti-
vate Polish–Swedish relations. A separate group of archival materials consists
of documents devoted to the activity of Polish communists in Sweden (the
Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden headed by Jerzy Pański) and their
attempts to initiate official relations with the Swedish government. Motiva-
tion which accompanied the leaders of the Lublin Committee Poland on the
establishment of relations with the Swedes can be examined based on the
PKWN protocols, the documents from the Union of Polish Patriots
(ZPPwZSRR) in the Soviet Union and the collection of the Polish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government (Political Department, Polish
Embassy in Moscow).
Archival collections of ministries and military authorities, contained in
the archives of the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London proved
to be of great significance for this study. Primarily they made it possible to
put Polish–Swedish relations in a broader context. The documents of the
Ministry of Congress Work have confirmed the presence of Sweden in the
agenda for political cooperation in the post-war period (federalist concepts).
Materials from private collections, however, have revealed the secrets behind
many political and propaganda actions in Sweden. This is especially true of
the collections of socialist Adam Ciołkosz, which documents the activity of
the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), and of minister and socialist activist Jan
Kwapiński, which contains a detailed description of his visit to Stockholm.
Some documents were found at the Polish Underground Movement (1939–
45) Study Trust (Studium Polski Podziemnej) in London.
The research largely focused on materials found at Riksarkivet (National
Archives of Sweden) in Stockholm. This archive held documents produced
by Utrikesdepartementet (UD, Sweden’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs), much
of which reflected the content of the Polish documentation, but also des-
criptions of matters lacking in Polish collections.
Documents from the Foreign Office (FO) held in the National Archives in
London presented the British perspective on Polish activity in Sweden and
detailed the Swedish attitude towards Polish interests. These were a meaning-
ful complement to the Polish and Swedish sources. Results of investigations
at Krigsarkivet (KA, the Military Archives in Stockholm) and Arbetarrö-
relsens arkiv och bibliotek (ARAB, Swedish Labour Movement’s Archive and
17
Library, Stockholm) were of similar help, so too were the division of manu-
scripts at Uppsala University Library (Carolina Rediviva) and the difficult to
access archive of Militära underrättelse- och säkerhetstjänsten (MUST,
Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service).
A crucial element of the study was the analysis of newspaper commen-
taries, mostly from Swedish dailies. This represents a separate subject. The
review of a wide spectrum of newspapers, books and political brochures al-
lowed for a general evaluation of the presence of Polish affairs in the Swedish
public debate. What has been particularly helpful during the examination of
the Swedish newspapers was the polonica bibliography compiled by Andrzej
Nils Uggla18 and press reports from a private collection of the Polish Press
Attaché in Stockholm during the war, Norbert Żaba. When researching for
the Polish edition of this book, Dr Janusz Korek granted me access to the
documents, which he was in possession of. At present, these documents can
be found in the New Acts Archive in Warsaw. The character of the materials
collected during research of the Polish newspapers published in exile were
slightly different. These newspapers addressed Swedish issues very rarely.
Nevertheless, some articles have proven very helpful in becoming familiar
with Polish views on Swedish policy.
This book is a result of my long-term stays abroad and in Warsaw thanks
to scholarships from the Swedish Institute (Svenska Institutet) in Stockholm
(a two-month stay in 2001 on the invitation of Centrum för multietnisk forsk-
ning at Uppsala University and a six-month stay in 2005 at the Centre for
Baltic and East European Studies at Södertörn University, Stockholm), the
Lanckoroński Foundation (a one-month stay in London in 2001 and a two-
month stay in London in 2003). The subject has been studied under the KBN
2 H01G 004 23 project.
To conclude, I would like to thank everyone who supported me in the
process of creating this book. I am very grateful to the late Professor Józef
Lewandowski for numerous meetings and discussions and to Tomasz
Potworowski for giving me a copy of his father’s private writings and a
mention about him in a letter. I owe my sincere thanks to two Professors who
were my guardians during my visits to Sweden: Professor Andrzej Nils Uggla,
who was always ready to offer me his useful advice, support and granted me
access to his extensive collection of press cuttings, and Professor David
Gaunt. I would like to thank Dr Andrej Kotljarchuk for bibliographical data,
Ludomir Garczyński-Gąssowski from Stockholm for granting me access to
—
18
A. N. Uggla, Polen i svensk press under andra världskriget: En bibliografi, Uppsala 1986.
18
INTRODUCTION
copies of documents on the Katyń Massacre, and Philip Mallet for allowing
me to quote the unpublished memoirs of his father.
I would also like to thank the staff at all of the archives I have visited, who
made it possible for me to conduct this extensive (due to the specificity of the
subject) study efficiently, and especially Ewa Berndtsson from Riksarkivet,
Catharina Hammarström from MUST, the staff at Carolina Rediviva and of
the division of the Riksarkivet in Arninge, Captain Jerzy Milewski and
Andrzej Suchcitz from the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London,
the staff at the New Acts Archive (including the reprographics department).
I would like to thank the Head of the Section of Polish History and Contem-
porary History of the 19th and 20th Centuries at the Institute of History at
the University of Wrocław Professor Teresa Kulak for her help in all organi-
sational matters and her constant willingness to support me in my academic
research. I am grateful for all the critical input given by the reviewer of the
Polish edition of this book, Professor Wojciech Materski. The first edition of
this book was published in Polish by the Institute of National Remembrance
in Warsaw in 2009. This edition has been updated, shortened and revised.
The revision of the text would not have been possible without help of Marta
and Arthur Sehn (Stockholm), Per Nilsson (Hässleholm) and, finally, Iwona
Sakowicz (Gdańsk).
The translation was possible thanks to a grant from the Polish Ministry of
Science and Higher Education under the NPRH programme (Narodowy
Program Rozwoju Humanistyki, 0138/NPRH3/H31/82/2014). The applica-
tion for the translation of this book into English was supported by Professor
Anthony Kemp-Welch and Dr Piotr Wawrzeniuk, for which I am deeply
grateful to both. I am thankful for all the critical remarks made by the review-
ers of the new English edition Professor emeritus Klas Åmark and Professor
emeritus Kent Zetterberg both of Stockholm University.
19
20
PART 1
In the Circle of Politics and Propaganda
21
22
1. On the Eve of War
In April 1939, the Polish Envoy to Stockholm, Gustaw Potworowski.1

reported to his headquarters that the Swedish government claimed: ‘the
policy conducted by Poland contributes to the stabilization of relations in the
Baltic Sea region, which is in line with the interests of Sweden.’2 Some time
later, in July 1939, the envoy informed Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jan Szembek on the Swedish ‘great recognition, understanding and admira-
tion of our attitude.’ The speech delivered by Polish Minister for Foreign
Affairs Józef Beck on 5 May, where he categorically rejected Hitler's claims
towards Gdańsk (Danzig), met with an exceptionally positive reaction from
Stockholm. According to Potworowski, Secretary-General at the Swedish
Foreign Ministry Erik Boheman ‘exhibited a strongly pro-Polish attitude’ and
Minister Rickard Sandler was ‘very effusive towards us.’ What needs to be
highlighted, however, is that these views, which continued the good atmos-
phere of mutual relations over the past several years, in fact only illustrated
the positive personal relations between the diplomats. According to Potwo-
rowski, the attitude of the Swedish government was the following: ‘The
Swedes are afraid of war, they do not feel sufficiently safe and are afraid of
being dragged into a military conflict.’3 During the interwar period, the
policies of the Scandinavian countries were dominated by a spirit of pacifism,
self-armament and keeping away from all possible alliances. It could hardly
be expected then that in the face of Hitler’s expansion, Sweden, which had
—
1
Gustaw Potworowski (1889–1951), Polish Envoy to Stockholm 1936–42, held a diplomatic
post from 1921. In the years 1921–24, he worked in the General Commissariat of the Free
City of Danzig and 1928–35 he served as secretary of the Polish Embassy in Paris.
Potworowski participated in several delegations to the sessions of the League of Nations in
Geneva. His son Tomasz said: ‘he was famous for his interest in economic issues, his socialist
sympathies, as well as for skillful handling of relations with leftist journalists in Paris. All the
above elements combined with the highest social refinement of both of my parents only con-
firmed the appropriateness of their appointment as diplomatic representatives in a country
where the royal court coexisted with the socialist government based on a firm leftist majority’
(letter by T. Potworowski to the author, Kensington, California, 15 November 2002). From
1943 Potworowski resided in Lisbon, where he served as head of the Polish Legation until
his death.
2
Polskie dokumenty dyplomatyczne 1939 styczeń–sierpień, S. Żerko (ed.), in cooperation with
P. Długołęcki, Warsaw 2005, doc. 224, p. 373 and doc. 227, p. 381.
3
Diariusz i teki Jana Szembeka (1935–1945), vol. 4, compiled by J. Zarański, London 1972,
p. 668. Potworowski noticed that Swedish society was gradually reviving its former pro-
German sympathies.
23
not been involved in any military conflict since the Napoleonic era, would
suddenly change its policy and join forces with Poland and its Western Allies,
France and Britain, in a war with Germany. In May 1938, Swedish Prime
Minister Per Albin Hansson claimed that in the event of a pan-European
conflict, Sweden should choose ‘the right side’ and, if keeping away from
military activity proved impossible, fight against totalitarian regimes. Never-
theless, following the conference in Munich, which exposed the power-
lessness of the democratic countries of Europe, Sweden confirmed its former
political course and its will to maintain strict neutrality.4
In the spring of 1939, in the face of growing tensions in Polish–German
relations and British promises to provide Poland with support in the event of,
among other things, Hitler’s aggression, Swedish diplomats from the Berlin
mission were convinced that war would break out. Military Attaché Colonel
Curt Juhlin-Dannfelt, Attaché of Aviation Colonel Harald Enell and Naval
Attaché Commodore Anders Forshell, in a joint report prepared for Minister
of Defence Per Edvin Sköld, confirmed this opinion, backing it up with the
following arguments: ‘numerous events that have taken place over the past year
prove that German leaders are not acting rationally and responsibly.’5 In mid-
1939, the Swedish military diplomats were submitting possible outcomes of the
unfolding international situation to their headquarters, and judged the chances
of maintaining peace as rather slim and considering the result of the Polish–
German clash to be foregone. Juhlin-Dannfelt, in July 1939, suspected that if it
came to a conflict with Poland, the German army would probably conduct a
brisk offensive. He claimed that Poland’s position was critical both in the
northern and southern section. Pomerania was to be cut off right away by two
strikes, from the west and from East Prussia. Polish diplomats residing in Berlin
passed him the news that the line of defence was being prepared along the
Vistula and Narew rivers. In the south, also during the initial stage of the war,
Upper Silesia was to be annexed by the Germans owing to their unquestionable
superiority. In the circles of representatives of the Baltic States apprehensions
were growing that the outbreak of a Polish–German conflict could lead to an
agreement between Hitler and Stalin and to the division of the Baltic Sea region
and Poland into their spheres of influence.6 At the beginning of August it was
—
4
A. W. Johansson, Per Albin och kriget, Stockholm 1984, p. 22.
5
K.-R. Böhme, Tysklands expansion börjar. Österrike 1938, Tjeckoslovakien 1938–1939 [in:]
Stormvarning. Sverige inför andra världskriget, B. Hugemark (ed.), Luleå 2002, p. 54.
6
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 2, vol. 717, an overview of military preparations of
Germany in July 1939, report by Swedish Military Attaché to Berlin Colonel C. H. Juhlin-
Dannfelt, Berlin, 4 VII 1939.
24
1. ON THE EVE OF WAR
clear that the Germans were at their peak combat readiness both in the military
and economic sense. The Germans reached in to their deepest reserves and in
no time mobilized all types of military and paramilitary formations. These
discernible actions showed, according to Juhlin-Dannfelt, clear signs of pre-
parations for the so-called blitzkrieg, that is, the rapid crushing of Poland, the
weakest opponent of Germany. Taking these preparations into account, the
Swedish attaché suspected that the critical period would be at the turn of
August and September. The only thing missing was the declaration of war.7 As
Juhlin-Dahnfelt reported in the last days of August, Polish Military Attaché
Colonel Antoni Szymański did not believe Germany would attack. He
explained that the preparations were merely a bluff.8
At the outset of July, at an international congress of trade unions in
Zurich, August Lindberg, head of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation
(LO), did not support the resolution favouring the conclusion of the agree-
ment with Germany. On the other hand, Minister of Foreign Affairs Rickard
Sandler, in a speech delivered on 30 July 1939, refused the idea that Sweden
should back the initiative of pledging support to the countries of the Baltic
Sea region by the Soviet Union, France and Great Britain. Both Lindberg and
Sandler excused their decisions with the need for maintaining the policy of
strict neutrality, which allegedly did not permit participation in official
resolutions regarding international affairs. Sandler also did not approve of
the fact that the European powers, who joined forces in the name of peace by
pledging their support to smaller countries, at the same time granted them-
selves the right to interfere in these countries’ affairs.9 The Swedes considered
only the possibility of cooperation within the Nordic States, which were
equally interested in defending their neutrality.10
Apprehensively following the process of German preparations for the
aggression against Poland, both the diplomats, who were knee deep in poli-
tical problems, and the press commentators, who were divided in their sym-
pathies, predicted that the upcoming war would be a total war, much more
gruesome than the First World War, and a threat to the well-being of Euro-
pean culture. That is why some individuals considered that categorical rejec-
tion of Hitler’s claims was impossible, as it would lead to war. But others
—
7
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 2, vol. 717, an overview of military positions of
Germany at the outset of August 1939, report by Swedish Military Attaché to Berlin Colonel
C. H. Juhlin-Dannfelt, Berlin, 5 VIII 1939.
8
S. Thorsell, I hans majestäts tjänst. En berättelse från Hitlers Berlin och Stalins Moskva,
Stockholm 2009, p. 75.
9
W. M. Carlgren, Svensk utrikespolitik 1939–1945, Stockholm 1973, p. 18.
10
Ibidem, p. 16.
25
claimed that war would be a better solution than surrendering to the gradu-
ally growing pressures from the Nazis.11 It ought to be highlighted that
Hitler’s expansion more often than not was met with understanding by
Swedish journalists. Even the opinion of journalists working for social-demo-
cratic daily newspapers claimed that the right of nations to self-determina-
tion was a traditional Marxist principle and for that reason they accepted
German claims against Austria and Czechoslovakia. The influential editor of
Social-Demokraten, Rickard Lindström, was of a similar opinion, though he
did not approve of ‘detestable gangster political methods’ employed by
Hitler.12 In general, the ruling elites of Sweden adopted the position of passive
observers, which brought hope that war could be avoided.
At the meeting of the ministers of the Nordic States on 13 August 1939,
Minister Sandler highlighted that one war fathers another war, and lasting
peace may be reached only as a consequence of war, provided that the foreign
policy of Sweden would be limited only to the territory of northern Europe,
to which the war, as he said, was not a threat. He also said: ‘our greatest
concern, both at the moment and in the very near future, is that peace and
honour – and, shielded by this honour, also our proud freedom – be main-
tained in the North and for the North.’13 A joint manifestation of will to
maintain strict neutrality was the meeting of the diplomatic heads of Sweden
(Rickard Sandler), Norway (Halvdan Koht), Denmark (Peter Munch) and
Finland (Eljas Errko) in Oslo on 30–31 August 1939.14
In August 1939 the Polish–German conflict was the number one story in
all Swedish newspapers. Breaking news from Berlin and Warsaw were anxi-
ously awaited. What became a sensation was the unexpected news about the
conclusion of the agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany which,
despite being vividly commented on, did not change the course of Swedish
foreign policy. Instead, speculation emerged on the possibility of a Soviet
attack and the division of Poland between Stalin and Hitler.15 Johannes
Wickman, a famous opinion journalist for Dagens Nyheter, who specialized
—
11
K. Åmark, Makt eller moral. Svensk offentlig debatt om internationellpolitik och svensk
utrikes- och försvarspolitik 1938–1939, Stockholm 1973, pp. 59, 67, 71.
12
Ibidem, pp. 43–44.
13
ARAB, Rickard Sandlers samling, vol. 5a, speech by R. Sandler at the Nordic meeting, 13
VIII 1939.
14
W. M. Carlgren, Svensk utrikespolitik…, p. 22.
15
K. Åmark, Makt eller moral…, pp. 113–117. Erik Boheman did not give any credence to
Aleksandra Kollontai when she explained to him that the agreement between the Soviet
Union and the Germans was averting the threat of war, see: A. Kollontai, Diplomaticeskie
dnevniki 1922–1940, vol. 2, Moscow 2001, p. 447 (a conversation from 24 VIII 1939).
26
in foreign policy, suspected that the pact entailed a secret agreement to the
detriment of Poland. He claimed Hitler was no longer focusing only on
Gdańsk, but on all the territories, at the very least, which had been taken away
from Germany under the Treaty of Versailles. It was obvious to Wickman
that the situation for Poland following such a Hitler–Stalin pact would be
disastrous.16 Two public discussions, devoted to the Soviet–German agree-
ment, took place in Stockholm on 31 August and 5 September. Officials
speculated whether this was an alliance or simply a pact of non-aggression
and, if so, had the outbreak of war already been determined by this point.
Activists belonging to the Communist Party of Sweden (SKP), who parti-
cipated in both of these meetings, rejected claims that Stalin intended to
spark a pan-European conflict. They claimed instead, that the arrangement
had been concluded only because Poland did not accept the Soviets’ offer of
assistance in the event of external attack, and the arrangement with the Soviet
Union was rejected both by France and Great Britain.17
During the following days, further information came to light from various
sources on the secret agreement regarding the division of Central and Eastern
Europe,18 but faced with the prospect of an alternative arrangement between
the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France, under which Stalin demanded
extensive concessions from the Baltic States, officials in the Swedish govern-
ment could breathe a sigh of relief. They believed that the threat of Sweden
being pulled into the war was, as a result, considerably diminished. Swedish
diplomats claimed that during the British–French–Soviet negotiations, con-
ducted in Moscow, bargaining on the future of the Baltic States was on the
agenda and, perhaps, even of Poland. Swedish Military Attaché to Moscow
Carl Vilhelm Birger Vrang was informed by a German source that the French
had allegedly already decided to sacrifice the Baltic States and Finland, but
that the British disagreed. He doubted that there was such an opposition: ‘the
independence of these countries was of no significance to the Empire.’19
Prime Minister Hansson expressed the view that the Soviet–German ar-
rangement did not worsen the situation in Europe, because it had been very
difficult for many preceding months, and so the outbreak of the war was
—
16
Wickman’s articles were published 22 and 25 August 1939. See also: J. Torbacke, Dagens
Nyheter och demokratins kris 1937–1946. Genom stormar till seger, Stockholm 1972, pp. 16–
17.
17
E. Karlsson, ‘Två diskussionsmöten’, Ny Dag, 7 IX 1939.
18
W. M. Carlgren, ‘Den stora överraskningen. Regeringen och Moskvapakten’ [in:] Storm-
varning. Sverige inför andra världskriget, B. Hugemark (ed.), Luleå 2002, p. 155.
19
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 2, vol. 716, secret letter by Swedish Military Attaché
to Moscow C. V. B. Vrang to the head of intelligence, Moscow, 16 VIII 1939.
27
unavoidable.20 According to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the

agreement between Hitler and Stalin led to the calming of situation in the
Baltic Sea region, limited the number of incidents and virtually eliminated
military operations there. After the Soviet Union had started exporting
natural resources to Germany, German pressures on Sweden regarding trade
diminished. Minister Sandler, among other things, in a conversation on 29
August with Envoy Potworowski, was sceptical regarding the value of the
German–Soviet pact.21 In short, Stockholm showed great disregard towards
the pact, convinced that it was of little importance for northern Europe. It
was considered that the fate of Sweden was not dependent on the fate of
Poland. What was sought for instead of the actual threats were positive
aspects of the rapprochement between the two dictators.22 The Swedish king
Gustaf V even claimed that this agreement would actually prevent war.23 If
war were to break out, Sandler convinced Potworowski that Sweden would
be in a better situation than during the First World War when it had to battle
against economic isolation: ‘Firstly, because in such a case the transit of
resources to Russia on a massive scale will be out of the question, and
secondly because – due to the position of the Soviet Union – the isolation of
Germany may be not as severe as then.’24
Meanwhile, reassuring reports were pouring in from Poland. The Swedish
Military Attaché to Warsaw, Colonel Erik de Laval, in a conversation with
Colonel Józef Englicht, First Deputy of Division II of the General Staff, heard
that Poland had rejected all support offered by the Soviet Union and that the
pact was beneficial for the Baltic States. This was because it averted the
looming danger of the German preventive war in this region, whereas for
Stalin the status quo meant the creation of a buffer zone separating him from
Germany.25 Attaché de Laval noted that the Poles were mostly focusing on the
conflict with Germany, against which a press campaign had been launched.26
Numerous articles described, among other things, the might of the German
army. According to de Laval, it could not be denied that it was larger and
—
20
A. W. Johansson, Per Albin…, p. 60.
21
Polskie dokumenty dyplomatyczne 1939 styczeń…, doc. 497, p. 834.
22
W. M. Carlgren, ‘Den stora överraskningen. Regeringen och Moskvapakten’ [in:] Storm-
varning…, p. 151.
23
Ibidem, p. 156.
24
25
E. Norberg, ‘Det militära hotet. Försvarsattachéernas syn på krigsutbrottet 1939’ [in:]
Stormvarning…, pp. 74–75.
26
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 2, vol. 725, letter by Swedish Military Attaché to
Warsaw Colonel E. de Laval to Minister of Defence, Warsaw, 6 VII 1939.
28
better armed than its Polish counterpart, and for those reasons what was
emphasized about the Polish soldiers were the virtues of patriotism, persist-
ence and readiness to make sacrifices:
It is undeniable that so far this strategy has brought a positive response and
broad masses of the public are anticipating war with Germany peacefully and
strongly convinced that Poland would secure a military victory over Ger-
many. Whether this largely exaggerated and biased press campaign brings
only advantages may be naturally called in to question – the breakdown in the
face of the grim reality may turn out to be massive.
To name an example, de Laval presented the situation of France in 1870. In

light of the Swede’s report, Polish society was, psychologically, fully prepared
for the approaching war, ‘certain of their national strength, manifested
mostly by the army, and united in the will of armed defence of their free-
dom.’27 On the verge of the outbreak of war, however, de Laval, while discus-
sing the condition of Polish armed forces in his report from 28 August,
established that the Polish army was, in most cases, equipped with modern
weaponry. With some inconsistency he pointed out that the Poles were
second to the Germans in the air as well as artillery, but agreed with the view
that the Poles disdained death, which, as he explained, was a consequence of
their ‘Slavonic determinism’. Polish individualism could turn out to be un-
favourable when conducting efficient operation of the army. And yet: ‘Owing
to the national character and military training we may say that the standards
of the Polish army are high: the soldiers are brave, insensitive to losses and
adversities of fate, […] feature high marching skills.’ His final evaluation was
far from critical:
Although in the event of war with Germany, the Polish army would have to fight
in highly unwelcoming strategic conditions and although there exist many
arguments that allow us to suspect that the support of first-line military units
would be performed in particularly difficult conditions, this army may prove to
be a difficult opponent. For one thing, it is indeed possible that the faith in the
Poles’ military superiority over the Germans (the quality of six Germans said to
equal one Pole), encouraged by the public and by the press, may be shattered
during the initial battle, and another – also the expectations of the Germans,
—
27
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 2, vol. 725, letter by Swedish Military Attaché to
Warsaw Colonel E. de Laval to Minister of Defence, 6 VII 1939.
29
expressed, among other things, in official speeches, that Poland will be defeated
in a couple of weeks, may become a dangerous delusion.28
Following the reports of the Swedish Chargé d’affaires to Warsaw Sven

Grafström, the stance of Polish diplomacy in the frenzied days of August
1939 was also optimistic: ‘“The thesis” of the Polish government, as I have
already allowed myself to say, is a conviction that the Germans will not dare
to risk flaring up a world war and therefore the probability of war between
Poland and Germany is low.’29 At the same time, Grafström reported from
Warsaw that views were heard among the Poles that war was inevitable,
because ‘Hitler’s standing requires a quick solution on the question of
Gdańsk.’ He added that he had heard such statements from many influential
officials, ‘yet not in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.’ Besides, Grafström
confirmed de Laval’s view that Polish society had a firm belief in victory over
Germany, which was consolidated continuously by the press. According to
Grafström, naive military arguments were used such as German tanks would
prove useless when confronted by the potholed roads of Poland. Never-
theless, he would soon add that the authorities have achieved an unquestion-
able success, namely the internal national consolidation around the idea of
independence.
It was Grafström’s personal conviction on Europe being threatened by
Hitlerism that encouraged him to take unconventional steps. On the evening
of 18 August, he met with Minister Beck, intending to warn him of the im-
pending German attack which had been confirmed by various Swedish
sources. To his surprise, Beck’s views on the matter were quite different. He
claimed that Germany was putting on the line its final arguments in a battle
of nerves with Poland. According to Beck, Hitler started to hesitate when it
transpired that Poland’s position on the question of Gdańsk was unyielding.
He did not give credence to the concept of ‘the new Munich’. He was con-
vinced that if Poland entered combat its Western Allies would rush forward
to help. Beck estimated the chances of maintaining peace were 50 percent,
which was very similar to the view of Swedish Envoy to Warsaw Joen Lager-
berg. Beck confirmed the press reports on the withdrawal of the Soviet army
—
28
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 725, report by Swedish Military Attaché to
Warsaw Colonel E. de Laval, Warsaw, 28 VIII 1939.
29
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 485, letter by Swedish Chargé d’affaires to
Warsaw S. Grafström to Prime Minister P. A. Hansson, Warsaw, 15 VIII 1939.
30
from the Polish border, which was additionally reassuring.30 Meanwhile,

Swedish Envoy to Berlin Arvid Richert on 21 August reported of news from
independent sources that it could take two days for the German army to be
at full combat readiness and that the outbreak of the war was most probably
very close.31
The day after, Envoy Lagerberg informed his headquarters that the an-
nouncement regarding the German–Soviet pact of non-aggression broadcast
by German radio as early as in the evening of 21 August, came as a total
surprise to Warsaw, but the consternation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
lasted only a moment. Beck’s secretary Ludwik Łubieński continued to con-
vince Lagerberg that Poland’s position would not change and that news of
the pact with the Soviet Union was another bluff used by Hitler to apply
pressure to Great Britain and France. And, by the same token, his estimate
for maintained peace remained at 50 percent. An anonymous informer of the
Swedish Legation, however, received news that Gauleiter Albert Forster
revealed to one of his co-workers that the question of Gdańsk would be
solved between 24 and 28 August.32 Similar news was passed on to Stockholm
by Swedish Consul to Gdańsk Knud Lundberg, who had earlier discussed
these rumours, considering them likely to be true, with High Commissioner
of the League of Nations Carl Burckhard. This was because Lundberg had
heard from a high official of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs that
following the conclusion of the agreement with Stalin, the question of
Gdańsk and the Corridor could be settled within a couple of days.33
In the face of the looming war, the Polish government expected Sweden
to maintain its Poland-friendly neutrality. Initially, there even existed plans
to transport military equipment from the west across Sweden, the Baltic Sea
and Gdynia. Eventually, fearing the isolation of Pomerania, Polish staff offi-
cers chose a route across Romania.34 In addition, the Swedes were reluctant
to the idea of a Polish transit route running through Sweden. When asked
about this matter by Envoy Potworowski two days before the outbreak of the
—
30
Warsaw S. Grafström, to Minister K.G. Westman, Warsaw, 18 VIII 1939. See also: J.
Lewandowski, ‘Polska przygoda Svena Grafströma’ [in:] S. Grafström, Polskie…, pp. 7–44.
31
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 485, note by A. Croneborg, Stockholm, 21 VIII
1939.
32
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 485, letter by Swedish Envoy to Warsaw J.
Lagerberg to S. Söderblom, Warsaw, 22 VIII 1939.
33
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 485, note by A. Croneborg, Stockholm, 23 VIII
1939.
34
Diariusz…, p. 691.
31
war, Sandler ‘brushed it off by talking in general terms, making everything

conditional on the actual situation which might take place but which was
impossible to predicted. He seemed sceptical about the transit route across
the Baltic Sea, claiming that the route through Romania will be of greatest
importance.’35 Polish diplomats limited themselves to issuing a request to the
Swedish authorities on 26 August 1939 in which they asked them to represent
the interests of Polish citizens staying in Germany in the event of war.36
At the time, the Poles had no idea about the secret activity of Swedish
diplomats conducted in the guise of Birger Dahlerus’ mission. In the final
days of peace, this Swedish industrialist, believing in the friendly intentions
of Hermann Göring, took part in a German game, the purpose of which was
to present Germany as a country striving to maintain peace at any price. It is
clearly visible that the Swedes had ambitions to, if such an opportunity arose,
play the role of ‘peace-broker’.37 Though the government in Stockholm was
cautious about the mission of Dahlerus, its context highlighted the major
principle of the Swedish state of reasoning: the stabilization of the political
situation in Europe was of greater importance than the fate of Poland, which
was to pay the price for maintaining, at least for some time, peace in Europe.
Prime Minister, and leader of Swedish Social Democrats, Per Albin Hansson,
in a conversation with Dahlerus on 10 July 1939, expressed a view that war
would not be declared and that Polish–German disputes would end. Despite
this, Sandler, with whom Dahlerus met on 13 July, thought that any parti-
cipation by the Swedish government in the negotiations between Great
Britain and Germany aimed at preventing the war would be unreasonable,
—
35
36
AAN, MSZ 1918–1939, 6509, the issue-related correspondence, pp. 33–35. The issue is also
mentioned by S. Grafström, Anteckningar 1938–1944, p. 72, the record from 26 VIII 1939:
‘The Polish government, partially represented by minister Potworowski in Stockholm,
partially by Lagerberg in Sweden, requested Sweden to represent Polish interests in Germany
and Italy in the event of war’. The note from 27 August 1939: ‘In the face of the feverishly
reissued Szembek’s inquiries to Lagerberg, about whether he finally received the answer from
Stockholm, we were able, having received the coded messages from UD, to inform you today
that the government of Sweden is willing to represent Polish interests in one of these two
countries, depending on Poland’s choice. I am satisfied with the answer. A negative answer
would put us here in Poland in a very difficult situation. Luckily it turned out that Poles were
most probably the first ones to submit such request in Stockholm. Had it been done by any
of “the Axis Powers” we would be forced, as I understand, to accept their claim. Choosing
another solution would be a violation of the policy of strict neutrality, which (for how much
longer?) we are striving to maintain.’ The efforts made by Poland are also confirmed in the
journal, Diariusz, by Jan Szembek p. 698: the note about a conversation on August 26 with
Envoy Lagerberg, whom he asked to expedite the decision.
37
K. Åmark, Makt eller moral…, p. 175.
32
since such behaviour would be perceived by the world, and most certainly by
Poland, as a departure from the policy of neutrality. At the same time, he
assured the disappointed Dahlerus that he personally had nothing against
efforts to initiate peace talks, but it was nevertheless only possible for him to
make such request as a private person and on his own initiative. A secret
preliminary meeting of negotiators in Germany on 7 August, at the Sonke
Nissen Koog estate owned by Dahlerus’ German-born wife, ended with no
specific arrangements. Both sides simply promised to continue convincing
their governments as well as those of France and Italy to organize a con-
ference on a neutral ground (most probably in Sweden) aimed at solving all
the disputes. Göring gave assurances that Germany was interested in a rerun
of the Munich agreement. The Swedish authorities, in line with their an-
nouncements, did not participate in these events, but on 9 August Dahlerus
met with Hansson, who was constantly underestimating the threat of war in
Europe, in order to update him on the talks in Germany. The Prime Minister
of Sweden maintained that Dahlerus, even in a non-official capacity, was
forbidden to do anything that might compromise the interests of his home-
land. What is worth noting is that despite the ostentatious reserve of the
Swedish government towards the matter, Dahlerus remained in contact with
the Swedish Legation in Berlin and systematically prepared detailed reports
of the events he witnessed and took part in.38 At Göring’s request he came to
Berlin on 24 August. Following a meeting with the Marshal of the Third
Reich he flew to London, where Minister of Foreign Affairs Lord Halifax
assured him that the agreement was possible. Urged by Göring, he asked the
British to present a concrete offer to the German government. On 26 August,
supplied in a letter from Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and Minister
Halifax, Dahlerus visited Berlin once again. The meeting with Hitler streng-
thened his conviction that war could be avoided. Subsequent runs between
Berlin and London were a smokescreen for the predetermined German ag-
gression against Poland.39
—
38
B. Dahlerus, Sista försöket. London–Berlin sommaren 1939, Stockholm 1945, pp. 45–75, 84,
134.
39
Accompanied by Forbes, advisor to the Embassy of Great Britain, on 31 August Dahlerus
participated in a meeting in Berlin with Polish Ambassador Józef Lipski and as a ‘neutral
mediator enjoying the trust of the [British] cabinet, the [British] Embassy and the German
government’ he read out the 16 points of the German demands towards Poland. He ensured
the participants that the Germans wanted to limit themselves only to the annexation of
Danzig and the so-called Corridor. He was disappointed to meet with a reserved reaction of
Lipski, who stated that accepting these proposals would be tantamount with ‘the violation of
Poland’s sovereignty’ and: ‘their acceptance is out of question.’ Quoted after J. Karski, Great
Powers and Poland 1919–1945. From Versaille to Yalta, Lanham 2014, pp. 226–228.
33
According to Boheman, Dahlerus was ‘daring and utterly naive in his

grand political game.’40 He thought that Swedish authorities had no option
other than to make it easy for him to carry out his entire mission. At the same
time though, Boheman admitted much later on that at the outbreak of the
Second World War he was relieved that the period of uncertainty was finally
over and ‘that it was good that the process of the downfall of European
civilization was finally stopped.’ He also stated: “It was clear that this would
entail great sacrifices, but was it not worth these sacrifices?” Aware that
certain sentiments, however, would not result in any consequences for his
homeland, Boheman added: “It was perhaps easier to think that it was not
necessary at all to take sacrifices of Sweden into account.”41
—
According to Dahlerus’ account, Lipski was also to add that in the case of war riots would
take place in Germany, and the Polish army would easily capture Berlin. See: B. Dahlerus,
Sista…, p. 175. For more extensive information on the role of Dahlerus, see: H. Batowski,
Agonia pokoju i początek wojny (sierpień–wrzesień 1939), Poznań 1979. See also: J. Lipski,
Diplomat in Berlin 1933–1939. Papers and Memoirs of Jozef Lipski, Ambassador of Poland,
ed. W. Jędrzejewicz, New York–London 1968, p. 573 (correspondence with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs where Lipski considered Dahlerus’ mission to be another phase of pressures
from the Germans), pp. 595–609. Ambassador of Great Britain to Berlin Neville Henderson
did not make an explicit reference to Dahlerus in his memoirs. Without mentioning his
name, he described him as ‘a source of information close to Göring […], yet unofficial’, see:
N. Henderson, Failure of a Mission. Berlin 1937–1939, New York 1940.
40
E. Boheman, På vakt. Kabinettssekreterare under andra världskriget, Stockholm 1964, pp.
69–70. Dahlerus’ attitude was more bluntly summed up by the controversial British historian
David Irving, who describing him as ‘gentle and courteous Swedish manufacturer of
machine tools’ who was ‘stupefied and as pure as the driven snow’ and ‘by no means under-
stood the treacherous complexities of great diplomacy,’ see: D. Irving, Reichsmarshall Her-
mann Göring 1893–1946. Biography, chapter: With hope for a new Munich.
41
E. Boheman, På vakt…, p. 70.
34
2. Aggression of Germany and the Soviet Union
Against Poland from the Swedish Perspective
First reactions
According to the reports of the Swedish press, the inhabitants of Stockholm
reacted to the news of the outbreak of war with ‘quiet dejection’ (lugn be-
klämning).1 People crowded around shop windows, where the latest issues of
newspapers were displayed, and read them with interest.2 Some passers-by
were even taking souvenir photos. A frantic search for essential items began.
Suddenly the city was without sugar, whilst the authorities assured the popu-
lation that there was no reason to panic as there was plenty.3 Worse still was
the supply of petrol, where restrictions on its distribution were expected to
be introduced at any moment. In a few locations around Stockholm yellow
posters appeared announcing partial military mobilization. Nobody was
under the illusion that this would be a war between Poland and German. The
dispute over Gdańsk was compared to the Serbian–Austrian tensions at the
outset of the First World War. It was clear that a system of alliances would be
initiated and a confrontation between countries of continental Europe would
take place.4
On the first day of the conflict, 1 September 1939, King Gustaf V announ-
ced that Sweden would maintain strict neutrality (fullständig neutralitet) in
the war between Poland and Germany.5 At the same time, partial military
mobilization was ordered.6 On the same day Prime Minister Per Albin
Hansson, announced on the radio: ‘for Swedes, this means that we should
firmly and unanimously focus on one serious task: keeping our country out
—
1
‘Kö till bensin och socker. Tyst och lugnt Stockholm avstod från diskussioner’, Dagens
Nyheter, 2 IX 1939. See also H. Dahlberg, I Sverige under 2:a världskriget, Stockholm 1983,
p. 13.
2
Radio news was usually broadcast only three times a day – at 12:30, 19:00 and 22:00. See:
K. Lindal, Självcensur i stövelns skugga. Den svenska radions roll och hållning under andra
världskriget, Stockholm 1998, p. 30.
3
Thanks to rich harvests in 1938 the government was able to put aside considerable stocks
of grain, but liquid fuels were still in short supply. See: A. W. Johansson, Per Albin…, pp. 61–
62.
4
‘Krigsutbrottet’, Dagens Nyheter, 2 IX 1939.
5
Svensk utrikespolitik under andra världskriget. Statsrådstal, riksdagsdebatter och kommu-
nikéer, Stockholm 1946, p. 7.
6
35
of the war, defending and nursing our indispensable national values, as well
as trying to manage the current difficult situation in the best possible way.
The will to maintain strict neutrality, which fills and unites our nation, was
today announced by the government in agreement with the representatives
of parliament in the Commission of Foreign Affairs. Nobody should doubt
the honesty and firmness that are behind this statement. Nevertheless, I
would like to remind you strongly once more about the duties obliging all of
us and every single one of us in the face of our solemn promise to maintain
cautiousness and good tone in all we say. We value our right to freedom of
speech and it is nobody’s intention to restrict it. For this reason, we are even
more entitled to expect those who make use of this precious gift to do it with
sense of responsibility and self-discipline.’7
From Hansson’s talks with his ministers it follows that he constantly
hoped that an agreement would be reached and that Hitler’s aggression
towards Poland would not evolve into a pan-European conflict.8 The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs received news of the outbreak of war in an un-
dramatic manner. Zenon Przybyszewski-Westrup, who was of Polish des-
cent, spoke Polish and had fond memories of his childhood in Poland prior
to the First World War, arrived at work outraged and cursing the Germans.
Gunnar Hägglöf, who described Westrup’s reaction in his journal, claimed to
understand his reaction, for the Germans had invaded ‘his beloved Poland.’
He also added, showing little regard, that nothing had in fact happened that
was not expected. For Sweden, as he stated, the most important task in this
case was to sign commercial arrangements with both sides of the conflict as
quickly as possible to secure food provisions. A couple of days later Minister
Sandler came out in support of his view.9
Commentaries published in the daily newspapers were largely varied and
sympathies were mostly determined by political profile. The communist Ny
Dag drew attention to the fact that Poland too, like Germany, had a fascist
government that participated in the partition of Czechoslovakia. At the same
time Ny Dag assured its readers that anti-fascists would still side with Hitler’s
next target, Poland, and that Sweden needed to do everything possible to
—
7
Svensk utrikespolitik…, p. 8.
8
9
G. Hägglöf, Möte med Europa. Paris–London–Moskva–Genéve–Berlin 1926–1940, Stockholm
1971, pp. 190–191. In his memoirs, Westrup, son of a Polish writer Stanisław Przybyszewski
and Norwegian Dagny Juel, admitted that he was raised to be a Polish patriot. Nonetheless,
after he had moved to Sweden at the age of 10 and was adopted by his late mother’s family, his
contacts with Poland were only occasional, see: Z. P. Westrup, Jag har varit i Arkadien,
Stockholm 1975, pp. 10–15, 86–93, 131–132.
36
2. AGGRESSION OF GERMANY AND THE SOVIET UNION
help. Rumours that the Soviet Union, together with Germany, was to assume
the role of aggressor following the agreement concluded on 23 August were
denied. This option was completely ruled out, and efforts were undertaken
to prove that the Soviet Union, having earlier signed a pact of non-aggression
against Poland, ‘maintains the policy of providing peace to all countries and
nations.’ The daily added that the Communist Party of Sweden supported
neutrality. A couple days later their leader, Sven Linderot, delivered a public
speech at Folkets hus in Stockholm where he presented a more aggressive
position on the matter of the on-going war. Quoting prolifically the state-
ments of the leaders of the Third International, Dmitriy Manuilsky and
Vyacheslav Molotov, he said that the war was imperialist and came about
because Western Allies had rejected the peace-building policy of the Soviet
Union. He asked rhetorically: ‘Is it not the Soviet Union that has always tried
to issue guarantees to prevent war? All those who have not lost their temper
and clarity of mind recognize that it has been so. They recognize that the
Soviet Union has been consequently conducting its peace-building policy
and fighting in defence of collective security at all times.’10 Linderot explained
that the pact of 23 August was not a treaty of alliance or aid, but an agreement
of non-aggression. He described Poland as a link in the imperialist English–
French block conducting a war with Germany, the ambitions of which were
also imperialist. Linderot presented the position of the Communist Party of
Sweden on the politics of the Swedish government: ‘We support the govern-
ment that wants to keep Sweden away from the on-going war, but we are not
neutral when it comes to fighting against an imperialist power, we are not
neutral towards Fascism, Nazism and other anti-popular forces in the world.
Against them we must fight even more strongly.’11 On 7 September news
broke about the mobilisation of reservists in the Soviet Union.12 The next day,
Military Attaché for the Baltic States Major Karl Lindquist informed Swedish
staff about the continuing preparations of the Soviet army for a military inter-
vention in Poland.13
—
10
‘Kamp mot imperialisternas krig skydda Sveriges folk och frihet. Sven Linderots tal’, Ny
Dag, 9 IX 1939.
11
‘Kamp mot imperialisternas krig skydda Sveriges folk och frihet. Sven Linderots tal’, Ny
Dag, 11 IX 1939.
12
‘Sovjet i Polen’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 26 IX 1939.
13
Stormvarning…, p. 79.
37
Illustration 1: Germanias nya axel [‘Germania’s New Shoulder’]. The caption reads “As
long as the others don’t feel replaced, dear Stalin”. By Blix, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjö-
farts-Tidning, 9 September 1939.
On 9 September, the Berlin correspondent of Svenska Dagbladet, Bertil

Svahnström, published an article with the ominous title: ‘Berlin reckons with
a looming Russian invasion of Polish Ukraine.’ In this article he heralded a
partition of Poland with the co-participation of Lithuania and Slovakia.14 At
the same time a report in Svenska Dagbladet announced that one million
Soviet soldiers were waiting at the border with Poland.15 A commentator for
the newspaper, on analysing the foreign policies of the neutral states, claimed
that in the case of Italy and the Soviet Union this was ‘provisional neutrality.’
He predicted that Stalin’s policy could bring many surprises in the future,
and he did not rule out his collaboration in the partition of Poland.16 On
September 9, the daily newspaper Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning
—
14
B. Svahnström, ‘Berlin räknar med snar rysk inmarsch i polska Ukraina’, Svenska Dag-
bladet, 9 IX 1939.
15
‘Redan en million ryssar vid gränsen till Polen’, Svenska Dagbladet, 11 IX 1939.
16
‘Olika neutralitet’, Svenska Dagbladet, 14 IX 1939.
38
published a suggestive and original satirical drawing (Illustration 1, previous

page) presenting Stalin and Germany as allies.17 Also alarming were early
reports from the Soviet TASS news agency on the Ukrainians’ uprising
against the Poles.18
In the first days of the war there also flared up a discussion on who was to
blame for its outbreak. It manifested itself mostly in exposing the defamatory
German accusations towards Poland on its rejection of Hitler’s restrained
demands.19 The Berlin information service operated more efficiently than the
Polish Telegraphic Agency (PAT), however. German propaganda in Stock-
holm was more dynamic than that of the Allies. News of the alleged Polish
attack was spread on the radio in Gliwice and dramatic photographs were
distributed of German refugees from Poland, whose dire situation confirmed
that Hitler’s demands were legitimate.20 Pro-German newspaper Aftonbladet
justified Hitler’s attack with his intention to forestall Polish aggression.21 The
presented views of Edmund Urbański, editor of the Polish bulletin Handel i
Transport Morski (Trade and Sea Transport), explained that the Germans
were afraid of the economic dominance of Poland in the Baltic Sea region
and for this reason committed this act of aggression. Urbański claimed,
however, ‘this is nothing new because Scandinavians, and Swedes in parti-
cular, are frequent visitors to Gdynia and Gdańsk and they know that the two
cities specialize in maritime foreign trade.’22
On 3 September, after Great Britain and France had declared war on Ger-
many, Gustaf V announced another declaration of neutrality.23
In the third year of the war Prime Minister Hansson stated that the policy
of neutrality was an obvious one for the Swedish government and that
Sweden was not obliged to make any choices, as it traditionally rejected the
option of participating in alliances. He said: ‘The declaration of neutrality we
—
17
‘Germanias nya axel’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 9 IX 1939.
18
‘Hitler hotar’, Arbetaren, 14 IX 1939.
19
‘Tyska kraven offentliggjorda’, Social-Demokraten, 1 IX 1939; ‘Polen vägrade förhandla
förklarar Berlin’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 1 IX 1939.
20
See for example, ‘Allting beror på om Polen i sista stund kommer att ge vika’, Sydsvenska
Dagbladet Snällposten, 1 IX 1939.
21
Already from the first day of the war even the dailies which tried to maintain objectivity
were put to a serious test of evaluating contradictory information which was breaking from
Berlin and Warsaw. See: J. Torbacke, Dagens Nyheter och demokratins kris 1937–1946.
Genom stormar till seger, Stockholm 1972, p. 77.
22
‘Polens utrikeshandel oroade Tredje Riket’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 5 IX
1939.
23
Svensk utrikespolitik under andra världskriget. Statsrådstal, riksdagsdebatter och kom-
munikéer, Stockholm 1946, p. 9.
39
announced in September 1939 was an expression of our practical actions,

unanimous views and our nation’s will.’24
A vivid expression of his attitude towards the war was provided by Tage
Erlander, who in the 1930s was an official at the Ministry of Social Affairs
(Socialdepartementet). After the war he became a long-term Prime Minister
of Sweden. In his memoirs he contended: ‘Sweden had no enemies. Neither
did she have any friends who would be ready to spill even a drop of their
blood for our sovereignty. We were left to our own devices, which in turn left
us with little room for political manoeuvring.’25 According to Erlander,
Sweden adopted the role of terrified spectator and helpless participant.26 The
pro-German daily newspaper Stockholms-Tidningen presented the neutral
countries with the task of preventing the war from spreading outside of the
countries that were already involved and saving Western civilization from
destruction. Quite grandiloquent were Erlander’s predictions that even the
winners of the war would end up its losers and that Sweden’s role was to
provide humanitarian aid to all the victims of the catastrophe.27 The sugges-
tively titled article ‘Responsibility and duty’ in Svenska Dagbladet stated opti-
mistically that Sweden was outside of the powers’ line of fire, and therefore
only the Swedes would decide whether to stay away from the struggle. The
possibilities of coping with a war-related economic crisis were described as
satisfactory, but a certain scarcity of food and restrictions on civil rights were
assumed.28 The same newspaper also examined the policies of the Soviet
Union and Italy. It was highlighted that although the situation in the Baltic
Sea region, despite its proximity to the battlefield, was simple and obvious,
the situation in the Mediterranean Sea region was hazy.29
In early September 1939 Stockholm still believed that Sweden’s political and
economic situation was better than in 1914. Gustaf V, during a meeting with
the government, mentioned that at the outset of the First World War virtually
all countries could have been dragged into the conflict. He said he remembered
the summer of 1914 as being a continuous series of conferences with foreign
diplomats trying to convince him to participate in the war. Consequently, his
opinion was that the danger of becoming engaged in the conflict had been
—
24
P. A. Hansson, Vår neutralitetspolitik, Stockholm 1942, p. 6.
25
T. Erlander, 1901–1939, Stockholm 1972, p. 266.
26
T. Erlander, 1940–1949, Stockholm 1973, pp. 262–263.
27
‘Efter det nya krigets inledningsdag’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 2 IX 1939.
28
‘Ansvar och plikt’, Svenska Dagbladet, 2 IX 1939.
29
‘Första krigsdagen’, Svenska Dagbladet, 2 IX 1939. W. M. Carlgren, Svensk utrikespolitik…,
p. 24.
40
greater then than at that moment.30 Sweden demanded warranties from both
sides that they would respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Germany
granted Sweden such warranty on 2 September and Great Britain one week
later. Both declarations were announced in the Swedish press and turned out
to be a well-regarded basis for the arrangement of commercial relations with
the powers. As predicted by Gunnar Hägglöf, negotiations on the issue of trade
with Germany and Great Britain during the Second World War became the
most important task of the Swedish diplomacy.
The Swedish government always highlighted that its actions were in line
with the will of Swedish society, and even that there was harmony between
the position of the authorities and public opinion.31 At the same time they
insisted repeatedly that society cannot become involved in the propagandist
rivalry between the powers and must remain self-restrained in voicing their
opinions. Such an appeal was made to the Swedes by Prime Minister Hansson
in the second chamber and by Minister Sandler in the first chamber of par-
liament on 12 September 1939. In accordance with these appeals leading
Swedish daily newspapers stated with utmost certainty that Sweden had
adopted the policy of neutrality and that the Swedish nation supported its
government.32 The newspaper Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten pointed out
on 6 September that neutrality placed demands not only on the government
but also on society, including the press: ‘The press are most of all obliged to
fulfil an unconditional requirement to provide the public with objective
information. […] One cannot serve only one side and treat failure as victory
and the other way round.’ It was also added: ‘To feel sympathy or aversion
towards others is an inalienable human right which cannot be refused to
anyone. […] Nonetheless, both showing one’s feelings and discussion should
take a worthy form and should be performed with moderation and dignity.’33
The journalist Hans Eric Holger, in turn, in the Nya Dagligt Allehanda
newspaper protested the interference of the Swedish diplomacy in the con-
tent of press announcements.34 Stockholms-Tidningen had no illusions that
the neutral countries were also showing an inclination towards favouring one
side or the other and that people too had preferences. This daily nevertheless
—
30
31
P.A. Hansson, Vår neutralitetspolitik, p. 22. The Allies were counting on the support from
the neutral states. French General M. Weygand maintained that these countries were sup-
porting the Allies, though these sympathies were not ‘shown openly.’ See: M. Sokolnicki,
Dziennik ankarski 1939–1943, p. 23.
32
‘Vart neutrala Sverige och kriget’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 2 IX 1939.
33
‘Neutralitetens förpliktelser’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 6 IX 1939.
34
H. E. Holger, ‘Pressen och UD’, Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 9 IX 1939.
41
supported the position of the government: ‘Even though everyone enjoys

freedom of thought, it is to be expected from the opinion-forming circles in
a neutral country that this neutrality be manifested also in words and deeds,
and that ideas and feelings or likes and dislikes do not clash with the common
interest of the citizens expressed by the state in the proclamation of
neutrality. […] This requires not only observing the demanded caution and
moderation in the interests of one’s own country, but also showing an honest
spirit of neutrality in all information activities directed towards society.’ This
explains the suggestion that the press should collect news from both sides of
the conflict and allow readers to evaluate it themselves.35 Many daily news-
papers published both German and Polish announcements, but sometimes
commentaries attached to these mostly short news items, to a large extent,
compromised their impartiality and revealed the true attitude of their editors.
A small breakthrough in the understanding of press neutrality occurred on
17 September. A commentator for Stockholms-Tidningen readdressed the
issue of impartiality of Swedish dailies in the context of Poland’s fate: ‘It is us,
the neutral states, who are obliged to understand and evaluate the motifs and
conduct of the countries who are participating in the war as impartially as
possible. It is our duty and our privilege. But we are human beings and we
have a nationality. Let us defend ourselves against the suffering which is
inflicted by the war upon the citizens of both sides. We are also strongly
hoping that peace would not have to be gained at the cost of any of the nations
losing its liberty.’36
Stockholms-Tidningen and Aftonbladet, which were part of the press
company owned by Torsten Kreuger, brother of Ivar (the famous financier),
showed a clear sympathy towards Nazi Germany from the beginning.37 How
can one generally evaluate the Swedish dailies in terms of the objectivity of
the content of their reports from the front? In the first days of the war Envoy
of Great Britain to Stockholm Edmund Monson, in the face of Germany’s
wide-ranging propaganda offensive, had serious doubts as to whether the
British would be able to maintain their prestige in Sweden. The Swedish press
became practically cut off from the English information service which only
reached Sweden with a significant delay, whereas the broadcast from Berlin
—
35
‘Pressens neutralitet’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 9 IX 1939.
36
‘Polens fjärde delning som krigsmål’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 17 IX 1939.
37
A quite different image of Torsten Kreuger from the 1920s was recorded in the memoirs
of Alfred Wysocki, Polish Envoy to Stockholm in the years 1924–1928, who highlighted his
merits for the Polish foreign policy in Sweden. See: A. Wysocki, Na placówce dyplomatycznej
w Sztokholmie 1924–1928. Wspomnienia, edited by P. Jaworski, Toruń 2004, pp. 85–99, 127–
128, 137, 167–169.
42
was transmitted perfectly. As a result, there appeared many more German

announcements in the Swedish press than were received from the Allies.
This, in spite of the fact that from the beginning of the war both the press and
radio endeavoured to maintain a balance in their selection of news.
Difficulties in maintaining impartiality by the Swedish press were highlighted
by a commentator for Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, who blamed the
British for their lack of imagination and willingness to cooperate with jour-
nalists from other countries. The journalist noted that the Germans provided
exhaustive information on a regular basis, whereas the British excused them-
selves with war censure, preferring to remain silent.38 The attitude of the
British press service contrasted the Polish Legation, which started distri-
buting its own news bulletin based on radio reports. Drawn up by a cor-
respondent for the PAT, Jan Otmar-Berson, the so-called zielonek (from the
Polish for the colour green ‘zielony,’ which was the colour of the printing
paper used), was distributed by the legation’s chauffeur amongst individual
editorial sections of dailies and periodicals, as well as government institutions
and diplomatic missions of other countries.39
The situation was exceptional for the Swedes. The news services were
much more active; for the first time ever, the radio began broadcasting morn-
ing news. When the highest priority news items came in, regular pro-
gramming was interrupted. This occurred only once, on 17 September 1939,
when the Soviet Union invaded Poland. The Swedes were always at risk of
being reprimanded by the warring parties. For the first time in history, the
head of the Swedish Telegraphic Agency (Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå or TT),
Gustaf Reuterswärd, received a complaint from the German Consul to
Malmö, Alexander Bogs. In a telephone conversation, Bogs claimed the even-
ing radio news had expressed hostility towards Germany.40
—
38
‘Svårigheter for neutralpress’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 4 X 1939.
39
A letter by Tomasz Potworowski to the author, 15 XI 2002 r. See also: T. Potworowski,
‘Zapiski do pamiętnika: Sztokholm, wrzesień–grudzień 1939’, Acta Sueco-Polonica 2003–
2005, iss. 12–13, pp. 191–204. Report by Gustaw Potworowski from 16 October 1939, see:
Polskie dokumenty dyplomatyczne 1939 wrzesień–grudzień, W. Rojek (ed.), Warsaw 2007, p.
202, where the Envoy calls for setting up special press-news unit in Paris for the needs of
Polish propaganda in Sweden.
40
K. Lindal, Självcensur i stövelns skugga. Den svenska radions roll och hållning under
andra världskriget, Stockholm 1998, pp. 31.
43
Illustration 2: ‘Världen har intet val’ [‘The World has no choice’], The captions on the
uniforms translate to ‘Hitler’s understanding of war’ and ‘Hitler’s understanding of peace’.
By Low, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 12 September 1939.
Reports from the front

From the first day of the war the Swedish press had published regular reports
about military operations on the Polish–German front. The ambition of
many daily newspapers was to provide professional explanations of the com-
bat based on situation maps and present probable scenarios of the forth-
coming military actions.41 Dagens Nyheter offered its pages to Colonel Axel
Gyllenkrok, who on 1 September presented his analysis with the charac-
teristic title: ‘Military opportunities for Poland’,42 which had been prepared
before the German aggression took place. The Swedish officer made an ac-
curate prediction that principal German blows would be directed at the so-
called abdomen of Poland, from Lower Silesia to Kalisz and Łódź, as well as
from East Prussia to Warsaw and from Slovakia to Dęblin. He also correctly
predicted that Pomerania and Upper Silesia would be cut off quickly from
the rest of the country. According to Gyllenkrok the Germans would annex
provinces which were formerly theirs within a week. He neither excluded
guerrilla warfare at the rear of the German army nor doubted that the Allies
would be unable to provide direct support to Poland, except for the air force.
—
41
J. Torbacke, Dagens…, p. 81.
42
A. Gyllenkrok, ‘Polens chanser vid krig’, Dagens Nyheter, 1 IX 1939.
44
He maintained that the Polish–German war would be a good opportunity for

Soviet aggression. Gyllenkrok presumed too that such an attack was unlikely
during the initial stage of the war, but at the same time did not deny that the
Soviet army would await the opportunity to make use of German successes,
thereby conserving its efforts. He estimated that the Polish chances for suc-
cess were relatively slim, even if the Western Allies eventually achieved vic-
tory over Germany. Opinion journalists reacted to the news of the decision
of London and Paris to join the war with understanding. On 12 September,
Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning published a drawing (Illustration 2,
previous page) suggesting that the world had no other choice than to take up
arms against Hitler, and beat him.43
After the Western Allies had become engaged in the conflict, Swedish
opinion journalists started to wonder if the Allies could provide support to
Poland, and with clear doubt expected that a major offensive would be
launched in the West. What was considered improbable at the same time was
the conclusion of the war after the breaking of the Polish army’s resistance by
the Germans as the conflict was perceived as a fight between powers for
hegemony in Europe. Starting on 4 September, the title of a famous novel by
Erich Maria Remarque All Quiet on the Western Front was repeated continu-
ously and a rhetorical question about how long would there be peace on the
French–German border and what would happen there was asked time and
time again.44 This quiet on the western front made a ghastly and unrealistic
impression on the Swedes.45 Commentators in the Swedish press doubted that
the Western Allies had long to consider whether they wanted to do some-
thing for Poland. They also made the Swedish public aware of how impossible
it was to offer Poland immediate help. Having compared the current situa-
tion with that of the Polish army in 1920 during the war with Soviet Russia,
Colonel Sune Bergelin, a commentator for Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-
Tidning, argued that sending French staff officers to the front was unneces-
sary in that case, as Poles were well-qualified and it was impossible to trans-
port weapons and ammunition there. The heavy military equipment of the
French army would not improve the chances of overcoming the German
defence on the western front. The only way to provide help, as suggested by
Bergelin, was to launch an air raid on Germany, but at the same time he
claimed that this would not take place, because, as he put it: ‘A terrorizing air
—
43
‘Världen har intet val’, Göteborgs Handels– och Sjöfarts–Tidning, 12 IX 1939 (Illus. 2).
44
K. A. B., ‘Från västfronten intet nytt’, Dagens Nyheter, 5 IX 1939; ‘Lugnet på västfronten’,
Dagens Nyheter, 7 IX 1939.
45
T. Erlander, 1940–1949, p. 44.
45
battle, which would probably give the quickest results, is contrary to the
Western Allies’ general democratic approach towards war.’ Besides, ‘a ter-
rorizing air battle – from a moral perspective – could in fact prove to be a
double-edged sword.’ Nonetheless, according to Bergelin, the Western Allies
were obliged to take some pro-active measures on the western front for the
sake of maintaining their prestige. He also comforted the Poles by mention-
ing the case of Belgium and Serbia, which despite being conquered during
the First World War, were liberated and territorially enlarged right after its
conclusion, but at the same time he also noted that in the case of Poland the
circumstances were quite different and similarities rather small.46 A com-
mentator for Svenska Dagbladet argued that the situation on the western
front-line certainly may not be described as ‘somewhat idyllic’, the evidence
of which was to be the sinking of the passenger ship Athenia.47 By 14 Sep-
tember Göteborg Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning had published Gunnar
Cederschiöld’s article from 3 September, where he accepted the ultimatum
given to the Germans and soon afterwards the declaration of war issued by
France: ‘It is inexpressibly tragic and at the same time indescribably inspiring
to see the entire nation sacrifice all what’s most dear to them in order not to
defend themselves, their land or homes, but in order to help another nation
in a fight against lawlessness and violence, and in order to fight for the
principles which constitute the foundation of their lives. 2 September 1939 is
a meaningful date in the history of France: This date marks the death of
egoism. How long will this last? Months or years? This depends on the length
of the war.’48
The Allied forces continued their flyer drops. Social-Demokraten posited
that the British were likely expecting the revival of anti-Hitler opposition in
Germany and that they did not want to put the German nation off.49 In spite
of the fact that they were continuously describing the on-going preparations
for the offensive in the West, they also agreed that by the time it took place it
would already be too late to save Poland.50 The western front was still quiet
on the following day.51 According to Göteborg Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning
this was the calm before the storm: ‘It has already been repeated several times
that Germany would note great successes during the first 6–8 weeks of the
—
46
S. Bergelin, ‘Västmakternas understöd’, Göteborg Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 8 IX 1939.
47
‘Utan krigsförklaring’, Svenska Dagbladet, 5 IX 1939.
48
G. Cederschiöld, ‘2 augusti 1914–2 september 1939’, Göteborg Handels- och Sjöfarts-
Tidning, 14 IX 1939.
49
‘Det stora luftkrigets premiär’, Social-Demokraten, 14 IX 1939.
50
H. S., ‘Polska fälthären skingrad’, Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 19 IX 1939.
51
‘Fortsatt lugn på västfronten’, Svenska Dagbladet, 20 IX 1939.
46
war. They have started the war using all their reserves. The Western Allies
need time to mobilize their armies. When they reach full readiness, the
Germans will start to retreat.’52
German announcements confirmed Swedish public opinion that the Allies
had no interest in opening the western front and that they were incapable of
relieving Poland by attacking Germany from the air.53 French announcements
from the western front, stating that operations were progressing normally,
were considered humourous. The Swedish Attaché Juhlin-Dannfelt explained
to his superiors on the seventh day of the war that nothing was going on in the
west, because ‘the French army was prepared for a defensive battle along the
Maginot Line but had no intention of crossing it.’54
Almost nobody doubted that the Germans, using all their motorized mili-
tary force, would break through the Polish defence, which would then move
from borderline territories to the line of the Vistula and Bug rivers.
According to Colonel Bergelin it was obvious that the aggressor’s superiority
over the line of the Polish defence, which was disadvantaged and excessively
stretched out along the borders, was not only in numbers and technology but
also strategy. The commentator also stressed the significance of air forces
which were destroying ground targets and resorting to acts of terror.55 Hitler’s
former colleague Otto Strasser, who was his opponent at the time, predicted
in Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, that the Polish army was doomed
to withdraw. He maintained that it was paradoxical to expect that the quicker
the Poles withdrew to the main line of defence on the Vistula River, the
greater the chance would be of an effective counter-attack. He also claimed
that long-lasting defensive combat could thwart the chances of victory over
the Germans. The Western Allies should at least launch an air offensive
against Germany, in order to support Poland.56 Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snäll-
posten daily also underlined the fact that ‘the strategic location of the young
Polish state was difficult from the very beginning and the situation had
become even worse over the last two years.’ Additionally, the mobilization
was not carried out completely, and mild weather favoured the quick relo-
cation of motorized German army. At the same time, it was pointed out that
—
52
‘Fortsättning följer’, Göteborg Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 20 IX 1939.
53
NA, FO 419/33, letter by the Envoy of Great Britain to Stockholm, E. Monson, to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs Halifax, Stockholm, 11 IX 1939.
54
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 717, memorandum by Swedish Military Attaché
to Berlin Colonel Juhlin-Dannfelt on the reports up to 7 September, Berlin, 7 IX 1939.
55
S. Bergelin, ‘Krigsöppnandet’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 4 IX 1939.
56
O. Strasser, ‘Uppmarschen vid fronterna’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 5 IX
1939.
47
the Soviet offensive of 1920 was stopped on the outskirts of Warsaw. A

rhetorical question was asked whether ‘the “Miracle on the Vistula” can be
repeated now when Poland has such a terrifying opponent, and its allies are
unable to provide it with direct support?’57 In the eyes of the Swedish com-
mentator the high-quality of the varied weapons as well as the overwhelming
superiority in the air benefitted the Germans. Journalists for Sydsvenska
Dagbladet Snällposten excused the Poles in some way writing that during the
first week of the war it was impossible for the Poles to conduct a counter-
attack due to intense German air raids, which made it difficult to gather
reserves.58 Most of the analyses were based on experiences from the First
World War, and attempts were made to find similarities and point out the
differences between the two conflicts. On the fourth day of the war Stock-
holms-Tidningen noted that the Germans were implementing a scenario from
1914, but this time their purpose was to conduct a ‘lightning war’ in the east,
and then to attack France. On this occasion a fundamental question was
asked about whether it was possible for the Polish army to stop the Germans,
just like the French had done during the Battle of the Marne in 1914, and so,
a Polish counter-offensive was expected.59 The head of Swedish military intel-
ligence, Colonel Carlos Adlercreutz, was sceptical, though he would not
deny, as the press commentators did, that there would be ‘another battle of
the Marne’, as the Vistula and Bug rivers were considered to be a natural line
of defence.60 The military campaign would begin then, but based on reports
coming from the front at first doubts as to the feasibility of such defence were
voiced as early as 8 September. News was breaking that entire Polish divisions
were downing weapons and ammunition surprised by unusually quick mov-
ing armoured forces equipped with heavy machine guns.61 The retreat, there-
fore, looked like a chaotic escape and the first announcements of the defeat
of Poland were received. On 9 September Dagens Nyheter published news
about a catastrophe near Warsaw, namely the threat of cutting off the with-
drawing Polish armies from the main forces.62 These predictions were sup-
ported by statistics showing that many Polish soldiers were taken prisoner by
—
57
‘Den polska krigsskadeplatsen’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 6 IX 1939.
58
‘Tysk-polska fronten’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 8 IX 1939.
59
‘Vad sker i Polen?’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 7 IX 1939.
60
Stormvarning…, pp. 76, 78.
61
‘Tysk-polska fronten’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 8 IX 1939.
62
‘Katastrofen vid Warszawa’, Dagens Nyheter, 9 IX 1939.
48
the Germans.63 Other dailies reported that a siege of Warsaw had begun.64 On
9 September Colonel Sune Bergelin described the position of the Polish army
as dramatic: ‘One glance at the situation plan is enough for us to see that
catastrophe may await the Polish armed forces to the west and north-west of
the capital.’ The withdrawal was hindered seriously by continuous bom-
bardment of Polish units. What was striking for Bergelin was the complete
lack of initiative on the Polish side, as a result of which the open flanks of the
quickly charging German army were left alone.65 Quite different was the
opinion of the situation presented by Social-Demokraten. Here it was stated
that according to official announcements the Polish army was retreating, but
that this was done in complete order, while retaining high morale and a brave
attitude. It was pointed out that even though the Polish Commander-in-
Chief Marshall Edward Śmigły-Rydz had once before, in 1920, been forced
to retreat from Kiev to near Warsaw, a victory over Bolshevik Russia was
eventually secured by the Poles. Journalists predicted that the autumn would
slow down the German army and that there was a chance that the fate of the
war would change.66 Part of the Polish army in Pomerania and the province
of Poznań was cut off from the rest of the country. A commentator for Social-
Demokraten wrote: ‘The impression is nonetheless that the Poles have not
suffered a conclusive defeat but that they have been trying to limit the
number of casualties and reach the internal line of defence on the other side
of the Bug-Vistula-San rivers, where the chances for a more effecttive and
dense resistance are greater.’67
On 11 September, commentators for Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-
Tidning analysed the Soviet Union policy. The conclusion of the campaign in
Poland was all but accepted and an increasing amount of speculation
appeared on the subject of a possible intervention by Stalin: ‘Why is Russia
mobilizing its forces? Perhaps due to the situation in the Far East. […]
Perhaps Moscow actually wants to protect its interests in Europe and also
tries to prevent the incorporation of the part of Poland which belonged to
Russia until 1914 […]. This may result in another partition of Poland along
the border from 1914 or make Poland play the role of a buffer state between
Russia and Germany. In the first case the current mobilization would con-
clude with Russia entering Poland from the east and dividing its winnings
—
63
‘25 000 fångar tagna’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 8 IX 1939.
64
‘Än är Polen ej förlorat’, Svenska Dagbladet, 9 IX 1939.
65
S. Bergelin, ‘Krigssituationen i Polen’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 9 IX 1939.
66
‘Polackerna betrakta läget med optimism’, Social-Demokraten, 9 IX 1939.
67
‘Krigsläget’, Social-Demokraten, 9 IX 1939.
49
with Germany. In the second case it would be all about pressures from Russia
to stop the German march to the east. If a hypothesis that the mobilization of
Russia is caused by the situation in Poland turns out to be true, it would bring
serious consequences for the small Baltic States which in 1914 belonged to
Tsarist Russia.’68 Aftonbladet argued: ‘It would seem that the ill-fated history
of Poland will be repeated, in spite of the fact that polsk riksdag [Swedish
expression for a chaos or mess or disorder, but directly translates to Polish
Parliament] is now a matter for the past.’ But it was highlighted: ‘Overesti-
mating one’s own importance is a dangerous deficiency;’ and also stated:
‘Valour must go hand in hand with reason, insight and caution.’ It is worth
focusing on the last statement of this article, where the author suddenly
changes the subject and claims that under the German–Soviet contract
‘Russia would sooner send its soldiers than goods.’69 On 12 September the
syndicalist daily Arbetaren (The Worker) drew attention to the discussions
on the position of Stalin who ‘is dreaming of territorial expansion disguised
in a revolutionary mask.’ Arbetaren’s commentator suggested this issue be
examined from a nationalist point of view, because the aggression of Russia
against Poland would most importantly lead to the enlargement of Stalin’s
empire. The people of Poland – a half-totalitarian country – would find
themselves in a fully totalitarian country. Restricted freedom would become
lack of freedom, and the Polish nation would be jumping out of the frying
pan into the fire. The journalist in Arbetaren made optimistic predictions that
the labourers of Europe would not allow themselves to be deceived and that
they would recognize Fascism, ‘even if it dresses up in a red mask.’70 Another
opinion journalist for the same newspaper wondered why Stalin had sta-
tioned such large armed forces so close to the Polish border and whether he
was preparing for an invasion. Added to which news began to appear in the
German press of Ukrainians’ standing against Poles, which could constitute
a prelude to a revolutionary movement proclaiming the incorporation of
Poland into the Soviet Union.71
Svenska Dagbladet, in an article from 12 September entitled ‘Prior to the
conclusion’ predicted the course of events for the very near future. It was not
hard to guess the anticipated conclusion, as it was noted that Germany con-
tinued its attack and the two Polish allies did little to minimize the pressure.72
—
68
‘Osäkerhet’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 11 IX 1939.
69
‘Observatör, Hur vållades den polska tragedien?’, Aftonbladet, 11 IX 1939.
70
‘Stalin och Polen’, Arbetaren, 12 IX 1939.
71
‘Skymtas Sovjet i bakgrunden?’, Arbetaren, 12 IX 1939.
72
‘Inför avgörande’, Svenska Dagbladet, 12 IX 1939.
50
Meanwhile, Colonel Karl-Axel Bratt in his article for Dagens Nyheter awaited
news of the defence of Warsaw. He noted that keeping the capital in Polish
hands was morally significant. He also predicted that the Germans would
decrease the pace of their attack because ‘even mechanised units get tired.’
But he added that the Germans were entitled to feel tired after such ‘a fan-
tastic achievement.’73 Swedish newspapers were full of announcements
detailing the steady progress of the German army and the total collapse of the
Polish defence. Dagens Nyheter, on 14 September, though constantly high-
lighting the bravery of the Polish army, heralded its utter defeat in the on-
going great battle near Warsaw.74 One day later, Stockholms-Tidningen stated
that the resistance by the Polish army was pointless because its sacrifice
would delay the German achievements by only a week. This was still an
incommensurately short period of time as compared to the losses incurred
by the Poles, which most probably would prevent them from launching a
counter-offensive. Slowly everyone arrived at the conclusion that the Polish
army should have organized its defence along the line of the Vistula river
from the start.75 Experts on the subject pointed out the crucial role of panzer
divisions in breaking the line of the Polish defence and confirmed the opinion
of German soldiers that warfare was turning into the slaughter of Polish
infantry and that valour helped nothing in that case.76 An expert for Syd-
svenska Dagbladet Snällposten issued a reminder on 16 September about the
expected defence of the Bug-Vistula-San line. The rapid movement of the
German army and their crossing of the Bug and San rivers rendered such
deliberations pointless and the Polish army ended up surrounded. The
resistance of Poland was from then on no longer described by him as valiant
but as desperate and hopeless.77
The picture of total war

Between 12 and 15 September, Colonel Juhlin-Dannfelt together with other
military attachés travelled from Berlin to the Polish–German front. The plan-
ned German expedition to the vicinity of Częstochowa, Kielce and to the
north of Warsaw had to be limited to north of Warsaw only as roads were
blocked by Polish snipers. Consequently, the foreign observers eventually
—
73
K. A. Bratt, ‘Över de polska slag fälten’, Dagens Nyheter, 12 IX 1939.
74
K. A. Bratt, ‘Förintelse slaget kring Warszawa’, Dagens Nyheter, 14 IX 1939.
75
‘Situationen i Polen’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 15 IX 1939.
76
‘Pansardivisionernas roll’, Dagens Nyheter, 16 IX 1939.
77
‘Dubbel omfattning i andra omgången’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 16 IX 1939.
51
travelled to Pułtusk, Mława, Wyszków and several other towns and villages
located near the Polish capital. According to a Swedish officer, the quick
movement of the German army was the result of its exceptionally high level
of mechanization as well as the frequent use of the air force, which paralysed
the movement of the Polish army and, most importantly, dampened its
morale. Juhlin-Dannfelt had no doubt that the technical superiority of the
Germans that he observed characterized other sections on the front. He also
maintained that both sides had suffered immense losses in the ever con-
tinuing combat. According to the Swedish Attaché, due to the Germans’
plans to occupy the territories of Poland, they were not striving to destroy the
conquered towns and villages, and, as a matter of fact, this activity neither
slowed down the pace of military operations nor increased the losses. Only
due to the fact that ‘the Polish units were taking pleasure in putting up
resistance in locations of which many were fortified, there are voices among
the Germans that it was necessary to subject many towns and villages to
artillery shelling in order to carry out the bombardments of the Polish army.
They also claim that civilians and soldiers from defeated units often acted as
snipers, shooting at the German soldiers who were marching through the
towns. This often led to acts of retaliation, such as setting fire to individual
buildings or to entire neighbourhoods.’78 This was how the Germans were
able to justify the complete destruction of Wyszków, Mława, Pułtusk and
many other locations, which were examined by the foreign visitors. Juhlin-
Dannfelt predicted that over the forthcoming week Poland would be defeated
and entirely occupied by the Germans. Rumours spread among the circle of
attachés about the impending Soviet attack: ‘This would seal the loss of
independence for the Polish state.’
Reports by Swedish daily newspapers about ordeals endured by civilians
were to a large extent truthful, yet their coverage of the bombardments of the
Polish cities was restrained. In contrast, the newspapers had written about
the bombardment of Gdańsk by the Polish air force.79 In the first days of the
war, to quote the PAT, the press published only the official announcements
to the public from the president and political parties.80 On 4 September,
however, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning quoted the United Press
and the PAT correspondent, Edmund Allen, who stated that several hundred
—
78
Berlin Colonel Juhlin-Dannfelt, Berlin, 16 IX 1939.
79
Observatör, ‘Tyska flyget blott sparsamt med i Polen’, Aftonbladet, 2 IX 1939.
80
‘Patriotisk appell till Polens bönder’, Jönköpings-Posten, 2 IX 1939; ‘Polens president manar
till kamp mot arvfienden’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 3 IX 1939.
52
civilians had died as a consequence of the bombardments of the Polish cities

by the Germans.81 This news was confirmed by the first group of Swedish
refugees from Poland who arrived at Stockholm on 7 September. At the same
time Aftonbladet, citing the German press reports, argued that the Germans
were not engaged in bombarding churches.82 This pro-German daily admit-
ted that ‘the air battle began on 1 September with the bombardment of nu-
merous localities all over Poland.’ However, it was also added: ‘It seems that
the German fighter-bombers have attacked only military targets and bridges,
and not civilians.’83 On 11 September, the Germans announced themselves
that they were bombing Warsaw, and that in requital for civilians’ resistance
and active fights with the German army, involving shooting at German sol-
diers from windows and attacking German tanks, their actual fate was
beyond the Germans’ concern.84 Photographs of a bombarded Warsaw were
published at the same time together with the announcement of the PAT that
attacks by German panzer divisions on the capital had been repulsed.85 An
analyst for Svenska Dagbladet confirmed on 12 September that roads, bridges
and railways were under constant bombardment, as well as units of the Polish
army. His conclusion was nevertheless reassuring: ‘The air blitzkrieg, which
terrified many who thought that it would be an unexpected attack on settle-
ments and civilians, turned out to be a violent but short strike aimed only at
Polish military bases.’86 Even Aftonbladet, on 18 September, quoting the
English press, came with news about repeated air raids by German fighter-
bombers on defenceless refugees.87 The heroic picture of Warsaw subjected
to relentless German bombardments was also presented by an anonymous
opinion journalist in the syndicalist daily Arbetaren. The article, entitled
‘Warsaw, a city in fire and blood’ was concluded with the military-announce-
ment-style statement: ‘Warsaw is still defending itself.’88 The correspondent
for Dagens Nyheter, Vladimir Semitjov, submitted continuously his reports
from the Polish capital. He focused mostly on describing the misery of
civilians who would likely suffer repeated German bombardments. He also
reported that the citizens of Warsaw were persistently retaining their
—
81
‘Tyskarna intensifiera luftkriget’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 4 IX 1939; ‘27
plan bombarderade Bydgoszcz’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 4 IX 1939.
82
‘Tyskarna i Warszawa’, Aftonbladet, 7 IX 1939.
83
‘Luftkriget – en sammanfattning’, Aftonbladet, 7 IX 1939.
84
‘Repressalie-bombardemang av Warszawa?’, Svenska Dagbladet, 11 IX 1939.
85
‘Fortsatt strid i Warszawas yttre områden’, Svenska Dagbladet, 11 IX 1939.
86
‘Luftkriget i Polen’, Svenska Dagbladet, 12 IX 1939.
87
‘Polska flyktingarna beskjutas av flygare’, Aftonbladet, 18 IX 1939.
88
‘Warszawa, en stad i eld och blod’, Arbetaren, 14 IX 1939.
53
discipline and bravery.89 Contrary views were also published. A commentator

for Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning opened his report with a state-
ment that the current events differed substantially from those of the First
World War, but that, as far as he was concerned, predictions from previous
years, that the next war would be dreadful, had hitherto failed to come true:
‘Havoc-wreaking poisonous gas bombardments of civilians, destruction of
entire cities and provinces by air raids and other acts of violence connected
with the declaration of war or even prior to the so-called blitzkrieg, no such
things have happened. The fact that attacks were also targeted at unfortified
locations is undeniable, but it would be difficult to juxtapose these events
with the so-called terrorizing of civilians, who, as it in fact turns out, were
fighting beside a regular army.’90
Few precise descriptions of the consequences of the German bombard-
ment of civil targets were published in the newspapers. This changed at the
close of September, when another, larger group of Swedish refugees from
Poland reached their homeland and were encouraged by the dailies to pro-
vide an account of their war experiences in Poland. At the time it transpired
that the most important public utility buildings in Warsaw, including the
National Museum and the Polytechnic had been reduced to rubble, with
substantial number of civilian casualties. Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-
Tidning announced on 26 September that the bombardments brought a
moderate death toll of 5 thousand civilian inhabitants of Warsaw.91 On 27
September the newspaper published a heart-breaking picture of children
observing the Warsaw sky in expectation of an air strike.92 In spite of this fact
the opinion journalist for Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, Gösta Torelius,
described German pilots as energetic heroes of the sky. And in general he
claimed: ‘The people of the German aviation are one big family’.93
The ruthlessness of the German army was also addressed, though rarely,
by diplomats. During a visit to Poland, 9–12 October 1939, the assistant of
attaché Juhlin-Dannfelt, Lieutenant Göran Hedin noted that the German
—
89
W. Semitjov, ‘Gråtande kvinnoskaror kring bombernas offer’, Dagens Nyheter, 5 IX 1939.
Following his return to Sweden: ‘Många tyska agenter. Vägledande signaler’ Dagens Nyheter,
25 IX 1939.
90
‘Erfarenheter från världskriget’ Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 19 IX 1939.
91
Likewise, the news that was pouring in from the Eastern Borderlands was not describing
the atrocities performed by the Soviet soldiers but about the process of breaking up landed
estates controlled by the new authorities. See ‘Den ryska ordningen införes omedelbart i
östra Polen’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 26 IX 1939.
92
‘I väntan på bombanfall’ Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 27 IX 1939.
93
G. Torelius, ‘Luftens käcka kavaljerer’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 15 X 1939.
54
methods of conducting war were tough even following the defeat of Warsaw,
and, when it comes to civilians, were comparatively merciless.94
At the beginning of October, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten published
a three-part report by Carl Herslow concerning the fate of a Swedish colony
in Warsaw. Throughout the entire siege the Swedes had remained in the
building of the Swedish legation and their evacuation took place just before
the capitulation with the Germans’ approval – firstly to Königsberg, and from
there via Riga to Stockholm.95 Soon after the conclusion of the campaign the
newspapers also started publishing reports from Eastern Poland,96 including
the account by Semitjov, who was travelling towards the Romanian border
through Brest and Kowel.97 A series of his reports became the basis for a book
published at the close of 1939 entitled Ett land försvann. Ödesveckor i Polen
(A State Has Dissappeared. Crucial Weeks for Poland). The text was filled with
sympathy for civilians who were traumatized with bombardments. Semitjov
quoted vulnerable victims of air strikes: ‘This is not war, this is slaughter.’ He
was at that time also making ironic comments about Polish military propa-
ganda which kept trying to persuade the public that the defence proved
effective although poverty, starvation, epidemics and first signs of anarchy
were clearly evident. No less favourably he evaluated the bravery of Polish
soldiers who were doing everything they could in that hopeless situation.
Everyone was in high spirits. Refugees were also helping one another.
Semitjov was surprised by the apparent lack of theft: ‘This was a sign of Polish
solidarity, unwavering in its suffering, as long as there was something that
could be shared with others.’98 The propaganda machine orchestrated by
Goebbels was effective and the Swedes were convinced that it was the Poles
who were the repressors of a German minority. Archbishop Erling Eidem
influenced by accounts from Germany even asked the Swedish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to intervene in the case of German ministers, with Polish
—
94
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 2, vol. 717, report by Lieutenant G. Hedin, Berlin, 23
X 1939. The cruelty of Wehrmacht, its paranoid fear against ‘Polish partisans’ are described
by Jochen Böhler: ‘Auftakt zum Vernichtungskreig. Die Wehrmacht in Polen 1939’,
Frankfurt am Main 2006; ‘Deutschlands Krieg gegen Polen’, Frankfurt am Main 2009.
95
C. Herslow, ‘Septemberdagar i Warszawa’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 2 X 1939;
idem, ‘Hela våningen borta på en natt’. ‘Några intryck från septemberdagarna i Warszawa’,
Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 6 X 1939; idem, ‘Tysklands luftvapen från början över-
lägset’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 9 X 1939.
96
E. P. Andersson, ‘Ryssen kommer!’, Arbetaren, 3 X 1939, 4 X 1939.
97
W. Semitjov, ‘Alla tåg vände: ryssarna komma’, Dagens Nyheter, 5 X 1939.
98
W. Semitjov, Ett land försvann. Ödesveckor i Polen, Stockholm 1939, pp. 31, 86, 117, 134,
174.
55
citizenship, who the Poles allegedly evacuated to the East following the out-
break of the war and probably murdered. Following the conclusion of the
campaign, the emissary of the B Division of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs tasked with the duty of protecting Polish citizens in Germany, Major
Carl Petersen, confirmed that one protestant priest was dead, and another
was still missing. Archbishop Eidem expressed his gratitude for the informa-
tion on the fate of these priests ‘in former Poland.’99
The attack from the East

Active propagandist preparations for the Soviet invasion of Poland were
launched by announcements from the Russian News Agency TASS, on 13
September, about several violations of Soviet airspace by Polish aircraft. On
this basis an opinion journalist for Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning
claimed on 14 September that ‘the position of Russia in this conflict is still a
mystery.’100 One day later Aftonbladet announced the intensification of the
anti-Polish campaign, conducted by the Soviet information services, which
was described as ‘a declaration of war on the entire minority and cultural
policy of Poland.’ The Moscow newspaper Pravda criticised Poland for op-
pressing Ukrainians and Belarusians. The paper compared the policy of the
Polish authorities to the terror of the Tsarist period.101 The analysis of the
defeat presented by Ny Dag was simple: ‘If Poland had a worker-peasant
government, which would motivate all the forces of the nation to defend the
sovereignty of the country, it would have been different.’102 In the same issue
of Ny Dag a journalist criticized Poland, providing an extensive quotation
from Pravda, where it was explained that the reason of Poland’s defeat lay in
its persecution of minorities: ‘That is why it is hard to call up a united force,
filled with the will to put up resistance to the invader.’ Polish fighter-bombers
were accused of violating Soviet airspace on 12 and 13 of September.103
—
99
RA, UD avdelningar och byråarkiv 1864–1952, Andra B-avdelningen, vol. 297, letter by
Archbishop E. Eidem to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Boheman (including attach-
ment), Uppsala, 22 IX 1941; letter by C. Petersen to UD, Berlin, 17 X 1939; letter by
Archbishop E. Eidem to J. Beck-Friis, Uppsala, 21 X 1939.
100
‘Nya tyska terrängvinster i östra Polen’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 14 IX
1939; cf. ‘Ryska anklagelser: polska flygarna kränka gränsen’, Svenska Dagbladet, 14 IX 1939.
101
‘Ryssland och Polen’, Aftonbladet, 15 IX 1939.
102
G. J., ‘Fjorton dagars krig’, Ny Dag, 15 IX 1939.
103
‘Förtrycket mot de nationella minoriteterna hämnar sig’, Ny Dag, 15 IX 1939; ‘Polska
flygare kränker Sovjet-unionens gränser’, Ny Dag, 15 IX 1939.
56
On 16 September, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten broke the news about

specific territorial claims that were raised against Poland by the USSR during
the talks in Berlin with the representatives of the Third Reich.104 The cor-
respondent Sven Tillge-Rasmussen reported from London that nobody
doubted any longer that Russia was supporting the other side and that the
only question that remained unclear was ‘is Russia going to engage militarily
in order to help the Germans?’105 On 15 September, Stockholms-Tidningen
received a letter from one of its reporters in Berlin, Christer Jäderlund, who
quoted the opinions of the highest government officials in Germany stating
that the fourth partition of Poland was already a fact and that talks on the
question of the future Polish–Soviet border were finally coming to an end.106
The editors of Social-Demokraten wrote on 16 September that they had no
illusions that Stalin was in the middle of preparations to enter Poland. This
was evident not only because of the high concentration of troops near the
border but also by the propaganda campaign which attacked the minority
policy of the Polish government. Somewhat puzzling was the position of the
Western Allies, which in the light of their obligations towards Poland, should
have declared war on the Soviet Union.107 According to a commentator for
Social-Demokraten, the active side in this war was the USSR, which would
probably launch a military offensive towards the Turkish straits, and possibly
an attack in the territory of Central Asia. One of the experts writing for
Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten was also certain that the Soviet Union,
which mobilized 4 million soldiers, was only waiting for the right moment to
enter Poland.108 Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning reported news from
the BBC that an agreement between Hitler and Stalin would turn Poland into
a small buffer state.109
Speculation in the press was confirmed by the Swedish Envoy to Moscow,
Wilhelm Winther, who reported on 13 September that the Soviet authorities
had ordered wide-ranging military mobilization. About half a million men
were recruited and joined the existing army of one million soldiers.110
—
104
‘Ryssland anmäler anspråk i Polen’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 16 IX 1939.
105
S. Tillge-Rasmussen, ‘Tysk-ryska samtalen hade pågått länge’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet
Snällposten, 16 IX 1939.
106
Ch. Jäderlund, ‘Hur tyskarna tänka sig Polens fjärde delning’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 16
IX 1939.
107
‘Sovjet och Polen’, Social-Demokraten, 16 IX 1939.
108
‘Dubbel omfattning i andra omgången’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 16 IX 1939.
109
‘Stalin vill ej sända ryska armén in i Polen’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 16 IX
1939.
110
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 516, letter by Swedish Envoy to Moscow W.
Winther to Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Sandler, Moscow, 13 IX 1939.
57
According to Winther, who was carefully following the tone of the Soviet
press, by 10 September comments had already appeared on the need to secure
the borders because of the Polish–German war. At the same time, the Soviet
Deputy of People’s Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Vladimir Potemkin
gave assurances that the USSR had no plans concerning the Baltic States.
Deputy of People’s Commissioner Solomon Lozovsky, however, convinced
Winther that the Soviet authorities had no intention to interject into the
internal affairs of Poland and were not concerned with protests by Ukrainian
civilians in eastern Galicia, about whom the Soviet press wrote. As far as the
‘rumours spread by the Swedish press on Russian plans to enter Poland were
concerned – he described them as pure fantasy.’ During their talks, Winther
and the diplomats representing the Baltic States and Poland arrived at a joint
conclusion that Stalin would not risk involvement in a military conflict with
the Western Allies, which would happen in the event of Soviet aggression
against any of the European neighbours of the USSR. However, in a report to
his headquarters the Swedish envoy pointed out: ‘This certainly does not
mean that the position of the Soviet Union regarding this matter may not be
changed.’ Soviet representatives in Brussels declared that the Russian nation
was far from supporting territorial changes in Europe, and constantly des-
cribed the Germans as the worst enemy of the USSR.111 Quite different was
the message of Swedish Envoy Richert’s report from his meeting with Am-
bassador of the USSR to Berlin, Aleksander Shkwarcew, appointed to the
office on 3 September. When asked about the meaning of the Ribbentrop–
Molotov Pact, the Soviet diplomat said that the arrangement was preparing
the foundations for the future friendly relations between Germany and the
Soviet Union and for the development of their political, economic and
cultural ties. When it came to other matters he talked evasively and prac-
tically failed to take a stand on both specific commercial and credit agree-
ments and Soviet plans regarding Poland.112
All speculation ceased with news about the Soviet aggression of 17
September. All daily newspapers announced that the Soviets had crossed the
entire line of the Polish border. In this situation the resistance of the Poles
was deemed pointless.113 The Nya Dagligt Allehanda newspaper explained:
—
111
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 39, vol. 1538, letter by Swedish Envoy to Brussels G.
von Dardel to Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Sandler, Brussels, 13 IX 1939.
112
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 39, vol. 1538, letter by Swedish Envoy to Berlin A.
Richert to S. Söderblom, Berlin, 15 IX 1939.
113
‘Rysk inmarsch i Polen’, Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 17 IX 1939.
58
We know sufficiently much to understand that the crossing of the borders

took place in agreement with Germany. It is also evident that the Russians
have learned new methods to justify their invasion of Poland with a public
ordering action aimed at seeing to the “Russian interests” in Poland and pro-
tecting Belarusian and Ukrainian minorities in Eastern Poland, “otherwise the
government’s escape would create a serious threat of chaos”.
The author of the article admitted that the minority policy of the subsequent
Polish governments was not always appropriate and that the Polish state was
being weakened by the continuous ethnic conflicts. At the same time, he
asked a rhetorical question about the situation of Belarusian and Ukrainian
residents in the USSR, ‘Is it really so certain that they are enjoying free will
out there? Would the ethnic minorities residing in Poland like to swap places
with the subjects of Stalin in the red Soviet state?’114 An opinion journalist for
Svenska Dagbladet wondered about the consequences of the Soviet interven-
tion in Poland for the remaining part of Europe: ‘It seems that we are the only
ones who notice that Russia is again casting its grim shadow over Europe.’115
More extensive reports and commentaries regarding the Soviet aggression
started to appear in the press from 18 September.116 Social-Demokraten pub-
lished a statement by a leading activist and social democratic opinion jour-
nalist Zeth Höglund: ‘What gradually starts to show is the true character of
the German–Russian pact thanks to which, according to Ny Dag, Stalin has
saved European peace and forced Hitler to retreat.’ His comments on the
justification of the Soviet intervention were cutting: ‘We have found a partner
in sophistry. Stalin is actually a student of Machiavelli, not of Marx, of Hitler
– not Lenin.’ Höglund made an optimistic prediction that when it comes to
the defeated Poland the last word would be left to its Western allies, but at
the same time he noted that if the Soviet Union joined the war on the German
side the clash would be terrible.117 An opinion journalist for Sydsvenska Dag-
bladet Snällposten, having compared Stalin, just like Höglund, to Machiavelli,
made an emotional comment about the aggression of 17 September: ‘The
sphinx has now revealed his true intentions! The Russian army enters the
arena to take part in the fourth partition of Poland, which, as everything
—
114
‘Polens fjärde delning som krigsmål’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 17 IX 1939.
115
‘Rysslands skugga’, Svenska Dagbladet, 17 IX 1939.
116
‘Röda armen har anfallit Polen’, Social-Demokraten, 18 IX 1939; ‘Ryssarna attackera ort
under tysk bombraid‘, Social-Demokraten, 18 IX 1939; ‘Den ryska noten till diplomaterna‘,
Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 18 IX 1939; ‘Polen bemöter Sovjets motiv‘, Sydsvenska
Dagbladet Snällposten, 18 IX 1939; ‘Sovjet måste värna egna intressen’, Göteborgs Handels-
och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 18 IX 1939.
117
Z. Höglund, ‘Sovjet vill dela bytet’, Social-Demokraten, 18 IX 1939.
59
seems to indicate, was arranged, or at least prepared before the German army
went to battle. This came as a surprise to all those who have forgotten that
Russia also presents revisionist claims! […] Russia prefers to play the role of
jackal and snatch its prey after Polish resistance has been broken.’118
Illustration 3: ‘Hela skillnaden’ [‘The

only difference’], by Marianne, Nya
Dagligt Allehanda, 20 September 1939.
A characteristic drawing equating Stalin with Hitler was published in Nya

Dagligt Allehanda.119 Likewise, Social-Demokraten compared the National
Bolshevik Party to the Nazi Party.120 Whereas, the communist Ny Dag con-
tented itself with publishing, for several days in a row, quotations from the
official Soviet notes on the collapse of Polish resistance and overwhelming
chaos. Based on these quotations, the paper formulated serious accusations
against Poland, considering it to be a fascist country oppressing ethnic
minorities and above all a country that had, owing to the support from Great
Britain and France, robbed Soviet Russia of Belarus and Ukraine in 1920.121
The paper also stated that Winther, the Swedish Envoy to Moscow, received
an assurance from the Soviet government that the neutrality of Sweden would
—
118
‘Sfinxen röjer sig’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 18 IX 1939.
119
‘Hela skillnaden’, Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 20 IX 1939.
120
‘Kombination’, Social-Demokraten, 27 IX 1939.
121
‘Röda armen skyddar Västukraina efter polska regeringens flykt’, Ny Dag, 18 IX 1939;
‘Polska regeringens bankrutt nödvändiggör Sovjets aktion’, Ny Dag, 18 IX 1939; ‘Röda
arméns aktion’, Ny Dag, 19 IX 1939; ‘Röda arméns inmarsch’, Ny Dag, 19 IX 1939; ‘Rövar-
tåget mot Sovjetunionen för 19 år sedan’, Ny Dag, 20 IX 1939.
60
be respected, just as the neutrality of the other states of Scandinavia, the Baltic
States and Romania.122
Illustration 4: ‘Kombination’ [‘Combina-

tion’], Social-Demokraten, 27 IX 1939.
The caption reads: ‘Proposal for a new
party logo for the Nazi-Communists’.
According to the commentator for Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning,

the real situation was rather different. He thought that the involvement of the
Soviet Union in the war complicated the situation of the neutral states and
predicted that northern Europe could end up ‘under a terrible pressure of
turbulences,’ both war-related and political, in connection with the rivalry of
powers for the influences in the Baltic Sea region.123 A lead article by another
journalist published on the same day opened with the conclusion: ‘Russian
question mark has straightened up. It has turned into an exclamation mark.’
However, it is surprising to read in further passages of the article that Stalin
thwarted Hitler’s plans to seize Ukraine and that the German dictator was
forced to put a brave face on the matter. Equally surprising is the view that
the Soviet army, in full combat readiness, was protecting the Baltic States
against the German aggression. The opinion journalist of the journal which
was well-known for its anti-fascist attitude clearly disregarded the threat
—
122
‘Sovjet neutralt gentemot Sverige’, Ny Dag, 18 IX 1939. For more information on this issue,
see: ‘Den ryska noten’, Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 18 IX 1939.
123
‘Rysslands inblandning försvårar de neutrala staternas läge’, Göteborgs Handels- och
Sjöfarts-Tidning, 18 IX 1939.
61
from the Soviet Union.124 Meanwhile, a commentator of Nya Dagligt Alle-

handa stated: ‘Most probably the partners have determined the demarcation
line much earlier. It is not at all excluded that we shall now become the
witnesses of fraternization between the Russian and German soldiers, which
has already taken place in Poland during the First World War when the
Bolsheviks surrendered Russia.’125 A few days after the Soviet aggression
against Poland, Swedish diplomat Gunnar Hägglöf noted that he considered
that what had happened was horrendous because the cooperation between
two so far deadly enemies, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, was as gloo-
my as it was ominous.126
Colonel Karl-Axel Bratt, an expert for Dagens Nyheter on military affairs,
asked his readers on 18 September whether following the Soviet attack there
was any point in examining the strategic position of the Polish and German
armies. He considered the campaign to be concluded in a strategic sense. As
a matter of fact, according to his views, what happened on the front could be
only described as tragedy not strategy, and this tragedy was only extended
and speeded up by the Soviet invasion.127 On the next day he announced the
already outdated news that the Polish government was still residing in Kuty,
near the Romanian border, which was nonetheless considered by him as a
sign of Poland’s defeat. As for the Soviet invasion, he added that even without
this ‘Russian shot to the head’ the position of Poland was hopeless, but
Stalin’s intervention shortened the Poles’ fight.128 Nya Dagligt Allehanda in a
short situational review entitled ‘The Dying Poland’ stated that ‘in given
circumstances we will not have to wait long for the collapse of Warsaw.’129
Two days later the same analyst claimed that it was hard to predict how much
longer the battles in Poland would continue.130 Whereas, Stockholms-Tid-
ningen reported: ‘Perhaps it is too soon for us to announce that “everything
has been lost besides soldierly honour”,’ but it followed from the description
of the situation that the defeat of Poland was obvious.131 Svenska Dagbladet
wrote: ‘The closing act of the drama may not last long.’132 The resistance con-
tinued, but the Polish army kept fighting only in a small number of isolated
—
124
‘Mellankommandepart’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 18 IX 1939.
125
H. S., ‘Polska fälthären skingrad’, Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 19 IX 1939.
126
G. Hägglöf, Möte med…, p. 197.
127
K. A. B[ratt], ‘Den ryska invasionen’, Dagens Nyheter, 18 IX 1939.
128
K. A. B[ratt], ‘Den polska arméns dödskamp’, Dagens Nyheter, 19 IX 1939.
129
H. S., ‘Det döende Polen’, Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 18 IX 1939.
130
‘Ryska invasionen’, Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 20 IX 1939.
131
‘Polackernas kamp’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 19 IX 1939.
132
‘Slutakten’, Svenska Dagbladet, 19 IX 1939.
62
locations.’133 On 21 September Karl-Axel Bratt stated in Dagens Nyheter: ‘the

disintegration process is fully-fledged, but the Polish bravery is still erecting
its memorial.’ According to him this was due to be celebrated with at least a
minute of silence. Although, he was critical about the government and Polish
command, who had abandoned both the country and the remaining fighting
soldiers.134 For Svenska Morgonbladet, it was certain that Poland was losing
its independence: ‘The cry: the end of Poland – Finis Poloniae! which re-
sounded more than once throughout Europe, is heard once again. All neutral
countries are sad to hear this. A free nation is like a healthy part of the human
body, an enslaved nation is withering and only half-alive.’135 A commentator
for Svenska Dagbladet turned his thoughts towards the August pact between
Germany and Russia and wondered what else could have been arranged at
the time between the two dictators: ‘Could the Germans say no to the
Moscow protectorate over the Baltic States and Finland, thereby putting a
halt to the summer negotiations with the Western Allies?’136 Meanwhile, a
military expert highlighted the significance of the Soviet invasion which
thwarted the hopes for continuing the resistance against the Germans and
receiving support from the West.137 The position of the Soviet Union was
described most bluntly by the social-democratic and syndicalistic dailies.
Arbetaren claimed that:
Stalin’s intention […] was to perform the same imperialist expansion as the
one that lies at the root of the German aggression. […] This was easy to anti-
cipate. Firstly, Stalin made it possible for Hitler to carry out the invasion. Then
he weakened the Polish defence by concentrating the Russian army near the
Russian–Polish border, engaging a substantial part of Polish military forces,
thereby making it easy for Hitler to conduct his attack. Eventually, when
Poland was fighting a life-and-death battle which brought it closer to death –
not life – the noble, wonderful and brilliant Stalin chose the right moment to
plunge a dagger into Poland’s back. The remarkably talented leader of the
world proletariat spoke and acted like a regular gangster who wielded political
power. Stalin’s official intention was to “protect” Belarusians and Ukrainians.
He acted like Hitler, who placed the Czechs under his “protection” and later
—
133
‘Ryssarna rycka fram i ilmarscher’, Svenska Dagbladet, 20 IX 1939.
134
K. A. Bratt, ‘Det polska hjältemodet’, Dagens Nyheter, 21 IX 1939.
135
‘Finis Poloniæ-for denna gång’, Svenska Morgonbladet, 18 IX 1939.
136
‘Finis Poloniæ’, Svenska Dagbladet, 18 IX 1939.
137
‘Nådastöten’, Svenska Dagbladet, 18 IX 1939.
63
deported and forced hundreds of thousands of them to slavish labour in

Germany.138
In the commentaries of syndicalist journalists, Stalin was depicted as being

no different to Hitler. They also highlighted only slight differences between
the two totalitarian regimes: ‘The fascist and the Bolshevik national tota-
litarianism are in all cases twins and both these regimes are the enemies of
the socialist working class. It is only a matter of time before the workers
understand this.’139
The communist daily newspaper Ny Dag claimed that the war between
Germany and the Allies was an imperialist war and because of that it was
necessary to avoid it.140 The Soviet Union not only wanted to protect Bela-
rusian and Ukrainian people, but also bring peace to the Polish people. John
Garter (a pseudonym for Per Meurling) rejected Zeth Höglund’s earlier
claims, arguing in Ny Dag that ‘the oppression of people by the landed gentry
of Volhynia finally ended.’141 Ny Dag attacked the social-democratic press on
25 September, accusing it of being engaged in British propaganda, which
heralded the outbreak of war between democratic and fascist countries. This
vision meant an attack on the Soviet Union, but, after all:
We kept reading that people from the territories annexed by the Red Army
were welcoming their liberators. We were reading that the units of the
workers’ guard were formed, that peasants were appointed as commissioners,
that estates were divided and given away, that workers were taking control
over the factories, that landowners, manufacturers and fascist officials were
fleeing like crazy, fearing the wrath of the people, and that a red banner was
raised before the fascist terror broke out.142
According to Ny Dag, Poland broke down because its people were not willing
to defend their homeland that was controlled by the fascist government. In
particular, ethnic minorities were considered to have no interest in doing so.
It was stated: ‘In the Soviet Union there are no ethnic minorities, only free
—
138
‘Stalin avslöjar sig’, Arbetaren, 18 IX 1939.
139
Ibidem.
140
N. Holmberg, ‘Vår ställning till kriget’, Ny Dag, 18 IX 1939.
141
J. Garter, ‘Den röda armén marscherar’, Ny Dag, 22 IX 1939.
142
H. H., ‘Slå tillbaka splittrarna’, Ny Dag, 25 IX 1939.
64
people.’143 This version was consequently presented in successive publications

devoted to the defeat of Poland.144
The final phase of the campaign

As early as on 19 September the first reviews of the campaign hit the news-
papers. All analyses pointed to the same causes of the defeat of the Polish
army: the speed of the German attack, the high mobility of the Germans
owing to motorized units, the very poor strategic situation of Polish units
which were excessively stretched out along the open borders, the lack of
panzer divisions in the Polish army, the lack of support from France and
Britain, and eventually the Soviet invasion. What was the subject of most
severe criticism was that the Poles had trusted in receiving support from the
Allies, overestimated their chances of success, showed excessive optimism
and were poorly commanded. At the same time journalists highlighted that
the Polish troops were known for their bravery and dedication.145 Experts
drew attention to the breakthrough achievements of the Germans in the
sphere of warfare. They were the first to use, on an unprecedented scale,
armoured and motorized panzer divisions, supported by numerous squad-
rons of fighter-bombers. The assumption that this type of weaponry would
not perform well when confronted with the poor-quality roads of Poland
proved spurious. Gösta Torelius, who had been a war correspondent during
the time of the First World War, summed up the military campaign in Poland
with the following words:
The defeat of Poland somehow proves that in this century it is the machine
that starts to dominate over the human being. Even so, it may not be left un-
mentioned that it was not only the inferiority of the Polish military equipment
that contributed to the lightning victory of the Germans. […] One valiant
army has been defeated by an equally valiant counterpart – a better armed and
more skilfully managed machine of war.’146
—
143
‘Polska folkets väg till friheten’, Ny Dag, 27 IX 1939.
144
E. Karlsson, ‘Den polska katastrofen’, Ny Dag, 26 X 1939; J. Garter, ‘Polsk rapsodi’, Ny
Dag, 8 I 1940.
145
A. Gyllenkrok, ‘Det tyska blixtkriget och Polens fjärde delning’, Aftonbladet, 28 IX 1939;
G. Torelius, ‘Det polska blixtkriget’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 3 X 1939; ‘Erfaren-
heter från kriget i Polen’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 25 X 1939.
146
G. Torelius, ‘Det polska blixtkriget’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 4 X 1939. The
attitude that was generally dominant was admiration for the German war machine, and at
times even its glorification. See for example the evaluation of commentaries by Colonel Axel
65
The Swedish consul, Carl Herslow, who was very sympathetic towards the
Poles, sought the reasons for the Polish army’s quick defeat, which took place
despite a third of the national income having been allocated to its support for
over a decade and despite it boasting very good soldiers, in the highly dis-
advantageous strategic location of Poland, German superiority in the size and
number of panzer units and fighter-bomber squadrons, as well as in the
Soviet invasion.147 According to other journalists the Polish defence would
have been successful with immediate support from Great Britain and France.
In such a case, the Poles would not have found it difficult to hold off the
German army, of which a considerable part would have to be relocated to the
western front.148 Nonetheless, the clear majority of commentators considered
the very fact that the Polish had been expecting such support to be a mistake.
Could the Polish experiences during the campaign be of any use to the
Swedes? The commentators highlighted the crucial importance of using
modern weaponry on the battlefield and demanded the mechanization of the
Swedish army and the advancement of military aviation.149
Aftonbladet claimed that the conclusion of the campaign was the Ger-
man–Soviet victory parade in the city of Brest on 22 September. The paper
regarded the town to be a historically symbolic location and recalled that it
was there that Suvorov had defeated the Poles before the Third Partition and
where peace was reached between the Central Powers and Soviet Russia in
1918.150 A military analyst for Svenska Dagbladet claimed that from the
cultural, economic and ethnological perspectives the placement of the border
along the line of the Narev-Vistula-San rivers had been a detestable act, but
also that these particular factors were attributed little importance in Europe
at the time.151 Meanwhile, Berlin correspondents for Dagens Nyheter and
Svenska Dagbladet reported about the previously determined border that ran
along the Vistula River, as well as about the German plan to form a tiny
‘Polish buffer state.’152
—
Gyllenkrok published in the Dagens Nyheter J. Torbacke, Dagens Nyheter och demokratins
kris 1937–1946. Genom stormar till seger, Stockholm 1972, p. 82.
147
C. Herslow, ‘Tysklands luftvapen från början överlägset’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snäll-
posten, 9 X 1939.
148
‘Erfarenheter från kriget i Polen’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 25 X 1939.
149
Ibidem; S. Bergelin, ‘Krigserfarenheter’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 29 IX
1939.
150
A. Gyllenkrok, ‘Det tyska blixtkriget och Polens fjärde delning’, Aftonbladet, 28 IX 1939.
151
‘Polsk epilog’, Svenska Dagbladet, 23 IX 1939.
152
‘Provisoriska gränsen går genom Warszawa’, Svenska Dagbladet, 23 IX 1939; ‘Tysk-ryska
gränsen dras genom Warszawa‘, Dagens Nyheter, 23 IX 1939.
66
An opinion journalist for Social-Demokraten claimed that the Russian

invasion added to the tragedy of the Polish nation, though he did not make
any prejudgements about the future fate of the inhabitants of the territories
which were included in the Soviet empire: ‘They have already experienced
that living under the shadow of Soviet bayonets is not something one could
envy. One can only hope that their fate would not be equally difficult as that
of the Poles and the Jews who are staying on the territories occupied by the
Germans.’153 What was certain, however, was that these people were subjected
to severe indoctrination. Dagens Nyheter broke the news about the transports
of half a million portraits of Marx, Engels, Stalin and Lenin, 1.4 million books
and brochures in Ukrainian, 10 thousand gramophone records and Soviet
films which were shown immediately in cinemas.154
Stockholms-Tidningen speculated about the next possible move by Stalin,
who for the first time managed to push the borders of his state further to the
west: ‘It is understandable that the Baltic States and Romania are uneasy.
Russia again showed its ambition to come into possession of a year-round
port on the Baltic Sea and Moscow never accepted the incorporation of Bess-
arabia into Romania.’ Also, the idea of creating a pan-Slavic empire and to
exercise hegemony over the Balkans was reintroduced. The war, at least in
the immediate future, would progress, ‘The Germans against the Western
Allies, the USSR against […] its weaker neighbours.’155 According to a jour-
nalist for Svenska Dagbladet, the Soviet invasion made a greater impression
on international public opinion than the catastrophe which was brought to
the Polish nation. Stalin established the border with Slovakia and Hungary.
The concentration of Soviet military forces near the Estonian border
heralded the conclusion of ‘the remarkably successful Baltic status quo that
Sweden and Finland made use of for two idyllic decades.’156
Dagens Nyheter, expressing anxiety and uncertainty, commented on the
increasing military mobilization in the USSR: ‘What for? After all the Soviet
Union is completely unthreatened by Romania or the Baltic States.’
There was speculation that perhaps the cooperation with Germany would
soon come to an end. The worst scenario of the Soviet expansion in the Baltic
Sea region was obviously ignored.157 Commentators in Social-Demokraten
seemed convinced that the division of Poland had been introduced as early
—
153
‘Minoriteterna i Polen’, Social-Demokraten, 23 IX 1939.
154
‘En miljon Marxbilder till Ukraina‘, Dagens Nyheter, 24 IX 1939.
155
‘Bolsjevismens marsch västerut’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 24 IX 1939.
156
‘Sovjet flyttar västerut’, Svenska Dagbladet, 24 IX 1939.
157
‘Ryssland i förgrunden’, Dagens Nyheter, 26 IX 1939.
67
as in August 1939 and that Stalin had only pretended that the agreement with
the Western Allies was important to him.158 A question was asked whether the
Soviet–German cooperation would continue, and if so in what form.
On 22 September Attaché Juhlin-Dannfelt, referring to information ob-
tained from Colonel Mellenthin, head of the group of Swedish military attachés
to Berlin, passed the news to his headquarters that the Narev-Vistula-San river
line had been agreed between the German and Soviet authorities some time
earlier, but the final decision regarding the course of the border had not yet
been made. He also learned that at that moment the issue of the possible res-
toration of the Polish state, even in the form of a rump state, had not yet been
examined, summing up, ‘such question is not yet on the agenda.’159
On 24 September, Dagens Nyheter published an article covering foreign
and internal policy of Poland during the reign of Piłsudski. The article, illus-
trated by two photographs of Piłsudski and one of Hitler standing in one of
the Kielce churches in front of a monumental plaque commemorating
Piłsudski, sounded like the obituary of the Second Polish Republic.160
The end of September passed by with announcements concerning the
poor defence of Warsaw and expectation of surrender.161 The brutality of
German attacks in the closing phase of the fight for the capital was justified
with the intention of conducting the fastest possible occupation of the city
before the arrival of the Soviets. According to Colonel Bratt, it was impossible
to explain such conduct to the public.162 The capitulation of Warsaw was un-
animously considered by the military commentators to be the symbolic con-
clusion of the campaign, even though on 2 October the fall of the last Polish
bastion was noted in the Hel Peninsula.163
The Swedish dailies almost immediately speculated on the possible course
of the German–Soviet border. Based on the reports from the front, news
broke about the line along Białystok-Brest-Lviv.164 Rumours poured in from
Berlin that the Germans were attempting to take over oil fields near
Drohobych and that areas around Warsaw and Łódź were to be placed under
—
158
‘Omkastningen i Östeuropa’, Social-Demokraten, 28 IX 1939.
159
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 2, vol. 717, letter by the Swedish Military Attaché to
Berlin Colonel C. Juhlin-Dannfelt to the head of intelligence, Berlin, 22 IX 1939. [The ori-
ginal manuscript is erroneously dated to November]
160
H. M., ‘Marskalk Pilsudskis Polen’, Dagens Nyheter, 24 IX 1939.
161
‘Budet om kapitulation stoppade ej striderna’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 29 IX 1939; A.
Kronika, ‘Det brinnande Warszawa ett ohyggligt skådespel’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snäll-
posten, 29 IX 1939.
162
K. A. Bratt, ‘Warszawas vita flagga’, Dagens Nyheter, 28 IX 1939.
163
‘Halvön Hela kapitulerar’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 2 X 1939.
164
‘Polens fjärde delning’, Svenska Dagbladet, 20 IX 1939.
68
the joint German–Soviet protectorate.165 News that Stalin wanted to scoop up

more than the Germans expected also rolled in and that the new border was
to be similar to that of 1914.166 The latest reports from the territories being
annexed by the Soviet army revealed details about, among others things, bar-
ricades in the streets of Vilnius and the mass plundering of Polish property.
The effectiveness of the Soviet propaganda was reflected in the descriptions
of the interactions between Soviet troops and locals. This vision of the initial
phase of Soviet occupation presented by Ny Dag is not surprising: ‘Both
adults and children embraced and kissed the soldiers of the Red Army and
their officers’,167 ‘young ladies were giving them flowers’ and peasants were
crying: ‘Long live comrade Stalin!’168
Remarkable, however, were the reports – to a large extent similar, but at
the same time lacking the enthusiasm which was characteristic of the Com-
munist Party of Sweden – published in other dailies, for instance in Dagens
Nyheter: ‘After a short time the main streets of the city [Vilnius] filled with
tanks, armoured cars and military units. The infantry and cavalry arrived
after a few hours. Polish soldiers were disarmed and released. They were soon
back in the streets unarmed and without their shoulder straps and cockades.
At street corners there appeared Russian military posts and one could notice
women chatting with the soldiers and laughing. The windows of many
houses were adorned with peculiar red flags. People were cutting red and
white Polish flags in two, and displaying only the red halves.169
Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning on 27 September stated: ‘Moscow
has just become the hub of European diplomacy.’170 This was to be confirmed
by a simultaneous visit to the capital of the USSR by the Estonian Minister of
Foreign Affairs Kaarel Selter, head of the Turkish diplomacy Sükrü Sara-
djoglu and Joachim von Ribbentrop. According to Swedish observers, these
talks indicated that Stalin was planning to launch an expansion to the Baltic
Sea region and the Balkans. On the following day the same newspaper pub-
lished the opinion that ‘Hitler and his comrades are fully dependant on the
good will of Moscow’ and that it was Stalin who became the main beneficiary
of the agreement of 23 August, because the Germans had lost their hegemony
over the Baltic Sea region and their access to the deposits of oil in South-
—
165
‘Polenkonferens Tyskland-Sovjet inledd i Moskva’, Dagens Nyheter, 21 IX 1939.
166
B. Svahnström, ‘Vad blir Polens öde? Ryssarna får mer i Polen än man väntat i Berlin’,
Svenska Dagbladet, 22 IX 1939.
167
‘Rödarmisterna hälsas med leverop för sovjetmakten’, Ny Dag, 21 IX 1939.
168
‘När Väst-Ukraina led under polskt förtryck’, Ny Dag, 22 IX 1939.
169
‘Stadens fängelser öppnades, polska förråden plundrades’, Dagens Nyheter, 20 IX 1939.
170
‘Situationen’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 27 IX 1939.
69
Eastern Poland. What is more, the commentator for the paper claimed that
Germany had to reckon with the Communists’ considerable influence.171
Similar was the role of Moscow perceived by a commentator for Svenska Dag-
bladet, who noticed:
[Stalin], in striving to meet his political goals, does a great job of imitating the
methods – which were earlier adopted by Hitler – based on evoking paralysing
fear and whose violence could be compared to a clap of thunder. Unfortu-
nately, as one may expect, this strategy would be now turned against the Baltic
States. What had become impossible to realize during the coup d’état on 1
December 1924 […] may be now achieved by means of more effective
methods. […] The moment of the opening of the tragedy of all the states
bordering with the Baltic Sea becomes increasingly evident and this tragedy
may be entitled: Stalin ante portas!172
The Berlin correspondent for Svenska Dagbladet, Bertil Svahnström, wrote

the article ‘Are Russia and Germany dividing the Baltic States into pieces?’
He reported that Estonia and Latvia were to be incorporated in to the Soviet
Union, and Lithuania in to Germany.173 The Swedish journalist most pro-
bably learned of the details of the secret protocol of the arrangement of 23
August. In turn, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning predicted that
[Europe] would have to count not only on changes within the Baltic Sea
region, but also in the Balkans.174 An entry in Arbetaren lay forth the love
between Russia and Germany and concluded: ‘Stalin supports Fascism – and
this is a fact.’175 Svenska Morgonbladet’s predictions for Soviet territorial ac-
quisitions were the most far-fetched. It claimed that Stalin would annex all
the Baltic States, Bessarabia and take control of all the Turkish straits: ‘The
table cloth has already been laid, the only thing left is to serve the meal. We
can only hope that the Nordic States would not be subjected to any gruesome
secret agreements.’176 Arbetaren wrote: ‘The pact between Stalin and Hitler is
not an ordinary pact of non-aggression. It represents the striking of a bargain
between the twin regimes of two totalitarian states and sealing their friend-
ship directed against liberal-capitalist democracies.’ The journalists also la-
mented the following fact: ‘the clear majority of workers from Western
—
171
‘Idag’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 28 IX 1939.
172
‘Stalin ante portas’, Svenska Dagbladet, 28 IX 1939.
173
B. Svahnström, ‘Ryssland och Tyskland dela Baltikum?’, Svenska Dagbladet, 30 IX 1939.
174
175
‘Rysk-tysk kärlek’, Arbetaren, 3 X 1939.
176
‘Polens delning och dess följder’, Svenska Morgonbladet, 30 IX 1939.
70
Europe have no idea that the revolutionary Soviet system is nothing more
than dictatorship of the Bolsheviks.177
Meanwhile, Soviet propaganda was working well. On 27 September, in
Folkets hus in Stockholm, a public debate was held about the Soviet policy,
organized by communist and social-democratic youth organisations. The
representative of the Communists, newspaper editor Sven Landin argued
that the Soviet army had liberated Eastern Poland. He called the authorities
of the Western Allies, together with the government of Poland, the per-
petrators of war in Europe. And as for Hitler, he never mentioned his name.
These views were contested by editor Torsten Nilsson, who represented the
Social Democrats.178 But Ny Dag continued to report that ethnic conflicts in
the territories controlled by the Soviet army were solved based on the prin-
ciple of self-determination, ‘at least fifteen million people have been freed
from the burden of Fascism’ and ‘the Soviet authorities, as usual, act in the
name of peace.’ According to the editors of Ny Dag, in connection with
constant pressures from Germany and the Western Allies, the best solution
for Sweden was to conclude the peace agreement and to accept the liquida-
tion of Poland.179
The fate of Swedish diplomats in Warsaw

Swedish diplomats in Warsaw did not send much information to Sweden
about the situation in Poland during the campaign. Although, several reports
by Envoy Joen Lagerberg are known about. Initially, on the basis of these
reports the conclusion was drawn that ‘the mood is rather grim but so far
there are no signs of panic.’180 On 1 September, Lagerberg paid a visit to
Deputy Minister Jan Szembek and proposed that he would organize a system
allowing for constant telegraphic communication between Poland and other
countries via Stockholm.181 The diplomats also discussed the evacuation of
Polish diplomatic and consular employees from Germany, which on the
request of Poland was to be taken care of by Sweden. An agreement to this
—
177
‘Den bruna, svarta och röda fascismen’, Arbetaren, 3 X 1939.
178
‘Röda arméns krig i Polen debatteras’, Social-Demokraten, 28 IX 1939.
179
G. J., ‘Fred i öster’, Ny Dag, 30 IX 1939.
180
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 39, vol. 1538, note from 9 IX 1939.
181
The aforementioned telegraphic connection was indeed established on the first day of the
war. The Polish ambassador to London wrote in his journal that the Polish Embassy in
London contacted Warsaw via telephone in the morning of 1 September. See: E. Raczynski,
W sojuszniczym Londynie. Dziennik ambasadora Edwarda Raczyńskiego 1939–1945, 3rd
edition, London 1997, pp. 37–38.
71
effect was signed in the last days of August.182 The Germans requested a simi-
lar protection of German citizens in Poland from the Dutch.
In the evening of 4 September, a decision was made that the Polish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had been operating as normal, would be
quickly evacuated on the following day, 5 September, to Nałęczów and
Kazimierz on the Vistula.183 The prospect of an evacuation had been con-
ceived of several months prior to the outbreak of war and some preparations
were already in place to make it easier. The actual process, though, was largely
improvised. Most importantly, there was no contact between the individual
units of the ministry, and the diplomatic corps was isolated from the govern-
ment and Minister Beck. According to Sven Grafström’s report, when
Lagerberg was to make an independent decision whether or not to evacuate,
his feelings of confusion were obvious: ‘Having received the telegram […]
that he was to make the decision on his own, poor Lagerberg broke down and
I felt very sorry for him.’184 Eventually he proceeded with the evacuation. The
diplomatic mission in Warsaw remained under Grafström’s supervision.
As early as 6 September it was decided that, in the face of unfavourable
developments at the front, the ministry staff and foreign diplomats would be
relocated further away to Volhynia, and then to Kremenets [Polish name:
Krzemieniec], where the evacuees arrived on 8 September.185 Minister Beck,
who together with the entire government was staying in Brest, had joined them
by the night of 10 September. The following day the town was bombarded by
the Germans. Part of the diplomatic corps, fearing for their safety, demanded
they be evacuated to Romania. Lagerberg was not particularly visible. He
neither initiated further evacuations nor did he support protests by other diplo-
mats about neglecting anti-raid procedures. There is no confirmation either
that he took a stand on the eventually criticised plan of a joint protest at the
German attacks on civilian targets. Another stage of the evacuation of the
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs towards the Romanian border, to
Zalishchyky, was ordered on 14 September. Next, Beck directed the diplomatic
corps to Kosovo and the staff to Kuty. Following the arrival in Kosovo, it
transpired that the quarters were already occupied by the Ministry of Military
Affairs. Part of the corps decided to remain in Kuty, whereas a larger group,
—
182
J. Szembek, Diariusz wrzesień–grudzień 1939, compiled by B. Grzeloński, Warszawa 1989,
p. 20.
183
Historia dyplomacji polskiej, vol. 5: 1939–1945, ed. B. Grzeloński, Warszawa 1999, p. 10.
184
S. Grafström, Anteckningar 1938–1944, p. 79.
185
Z. Nagórski, Wojna w Londynie, Paris 1966, p. 19. The author reminded that in Nałęczów,
which was one of the places where the evacuees stopped on their way, Lagerberg stayed at
his mother’s house.
72
after the bombardment of Zalishchyky, crossed the border in to Romania on

15 September.186 Lagerberg was part of this group, and he stopped in Chernivtsi.
Straight after his arrival in to Bucharest, Lagerberg set off by train to Berlin.
From Grafström’s report we know that Lagerberg was shocked by the air-raids
inflicted by the Germans on the defenceless civilians.187
Lagerberg, in his letters to Staffan Söderblom, Head of Political depart-
ment of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, described how he organized
the work of the legation in the extreme conditions during the bombardments
of the city in the first days of the war. He often compared the dramatic events
he witnessed to his experiences in France from the First World War, when he
was also a passive observer. Based on these experiences Lagerberg distanced
himself from the military announcements, especially those from Germany.
Nonetheless, on 10 September he became aware of the defeat of the Polish
army and, despite the immense scale of the defeat, admired the remarkably
high level of discipline and order among the Polish soldiers. Lagerberg, whilst
cut off from reliable sources of information, noted down views he heard in
conversations with other diplomats. In the first days of the war he was in high
spirits. Over time though, as the living conditions gradually worsened during
the hasty evacuation, depression and sarcasm replaced his optimism.188
Following his departure from the capital of Poland, Grafström, together
with the greater part of the Swedish colony and diplomatic corps, reached
Berlin on 21 September, right before the German army’s final storm. The only
ones left in the Swedish legation were the staff members of the Swedish–Polish
Chamber of Commerce, Hilding Molander with his wife, the long-standing
typist, Margit Vingquist, and Per Olof Silfverskiöld from Svenska Kullager-
fabriken AB (Swedish Ball Bearing Factory AB or SKF). At first they put a lot of
effort into convincing the Poles to stop converting the building of the Swedish
mission into a hospital, and then in to dissuading the Germans from turning it
in to a military quarters. Eventually, on 2 October, they received confirmation
that the building would not be occupied by the army or by the police.189
Diplomatic accounts contained no mention of the participation of the Swedes
—
186
Historia dyplomacji polskiej, vol. 5, p. 13.
187
S. Grafström, Anteckningar 1938–1944, p. 134. See also: Z. Nagórski, Wojna…, p. 23. The
author recalled meeting Lagerberg in Chernivtsi on 17 September: ‘What struck me was a
change in his behaviour: he seemed cold and indifferent – no sign whatsoever of the kindness
he showed before. Times have changed’.
188
P. Jaworski, “Rapporter” från det svenska sändebudet i Warszawa Joen Lagerberg i septem-
ber 1939, ‘Acta Sueco-Polonica’, nr 12/13 (2003–2005), Uppsala 2006, pp. 217–234.
189
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, R 20, vol. 565, copy of report by H. Molander for the
Swedish Envoy to Berlin A. Richert, Warsaw, 2 X 1939.
73
in the warfare of September 1939. Hence the article by Anders Jobs, published
in Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten and presenting the story of a young Swede
who was surprised by the war in Gdynia, was considered a sensation. The
twenty-year-old seaman from Blekinge did not manage to flee from Poland on
1 September and, as he said: ‘The only thing I could do was to enlist, more or
less “voluntarily”, to the auxiliary units which were being mobilized.’ Having
done so, he encountered no linguistic barrier, because he found himself sur-
rounded by marines who had previously served on Swedish ships. The situa-
tion with arms and uniforms was worse. The army had an insufficient stock of
equipment and he had to manage without it. The young man witnessed the
annexation of Gdynia by German soldiers, whom he remembered rather
fondly. This could not be said of his encounters with the police and the Gesta-
po. He mentioned hearing the salvos of firing squads executing the defenders
of Gdynia.190 Unfortunately there are no further sources to confirm that this
press material was anything other than a hoax.
Representation of Polish interests by Sweden in Germany

Representation of interests of a country in a state of war by a neutral country
is common. Sweden played such role as early as in the 19th century (its first
mission involved the defence of Italian interests in Austria in the 1860s), and
during the First World War, on fifteen occasions. At the time, particularly for
this purpose, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the B Division (B-
avdelningen) with around a hundred employees.191 The appointment pro-
cedures and the powers of the welfare state were not defined precisely, but
the foundations for such activities during the Second World War were laid
by the Geneva Convention of 1929 which introduced many regulations in
this respect. In general, it had been established that the representatives of a
country-guardian were to remain officials of their homeland and carry out a
mission of good services. They were also to act as intermediaries in the trans-
mission of news, documents and financial assets, as well as to supervise the
treatment of prisoners of war.192 The mission was paid by the government, by
whom it was requested.
—
190
A. Jobs, ‘Svensktalande kompanier sattes upp i Gdynia!’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snäll-
posten, 20 IX 1939.
191
B. Åkerrén, ‘Schweden als Schutzmacht’ [in:] Schwedische und Schweizerische Neutralität
im Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. R. L. von Bindschedler, H. R. Kurz, W. M. Carlgren, S. Carlsson,
Basel 1985, pp. 112–144.
192
See: M. Flemming, Jeńcy wojenni: studium prawno-historyczne, Warszawa 2000, pp. 186–
190.
74
When the Second World War broke out, the B Division was re-established
in Stockholm. Before the war, Poland had already requested that the Swedish
government represent its interests in Germany and Italy in the event of the
outbreak of war. Talks regarding this matter were initiated relatively late – in
the last days of August. The final approval was granted to the Polish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs on 29 August 1939. Did this act have a political dimension?
Choosing Sweden was certainly dictated by hope for its friendly attitude and
consistent defence of Polish interests. What is more, a country with whom
Poland would engage in military conflict was to be banned from asking
Sweden for a similar service. Regardless, by 3 September, the Germans had
done just that, asking Sweden to represent their interests in France and their
colonies, namely one of Poland’s allies.193 Several days later the Swedes agreed
to represent Germany in Egypt and South Africa in Germany.194 A balance in
treatment by the Swedish diplomacy could be said to be evident from then
on. As the war spread to other countries, Sweden was asked on many occa-
sions to represent the interests of both sides. Requests were made in the
spring of 1941, when the Third Reich threatened the Balkans. The Swedish
government then agreed to protect the interests of Germany in Greece, the
interests of the Netherlands in Hungary and the interests of Hungary in Great
Britain (from 9 April 1941 onwards). Later on, with every subsequent act of
aggression, the number of countries asking for assistance grew. Protocols
from the sessions of the Swedish government show that Sweden was asked as
many as seventy-eight times.195 As number of European countries left un-
touched by German, Italian or Soviet aggression became smaller, so too did
the chances of finding a neutral representative. Sweden was still available to
fill this role, however. From 1941 onwards, it had already become evident
that the Swedes sometimes assumed the role of intermediaries between the
—
193
RA, Kabinettet/UD Huvudarkivet, Statsrådsprotokoll, serie A3A, vol. 106, Protokoll över
utrikesdepartementsärenden, Stockholm, 3 IX 1939.
194
Ibidem, Protokoll över utrikesdepartementsärenden, Stockholm, 6 IX 1939.
195
utrikesdepartementsärenden, Stockholm, 9 IV, 25 VI, 28 VI, 31 VII, 30 VIII, 19 IX, 10 X, 21 XI,
12 XII, 19 XII 1941 r.; vol. 112, Protokoll över utrikesdepartementsärenden, 16 I, 6 II, 27 II, 6
III, 27 III, 17 IV, 30 IV, 8 V, 22 V, 29 V, 13 XI 1942 r.; vol. 114, Protokoll över utrikesdeparte-
mentsärenden, 29 I, 19 XI, 3 XII 1943 r.; vol. 116, Protokoll över utrikesdepartementsärenden,
28 I, 4 II, 11 II, 2 VI, 30 VI, 15 VII, 12 VIII, 14 IX, 30 IX, 6 X, 17 XI, 24 XI 1944 r.; vol. 118,
Protokoll över utrikesdepartementsärenden, 19 I, 23 III, 4 V, 25 V, 8 VI, 31 VIII 1945 r. One of
Swedish authors calculated that, in total, in the period between the 19th century and 1985
Sweden defended the interests of 28 foreign countries 114 times. As he noted, Great Britain and
USA had never been included in this group, see: B. Åkerrén, ‘Schweden als Schutzmacht’ [in:]
Schwedische und Schweizerische Neutralität im Zweiten Weltkrieg, red. R.L. von Bindschedler,
H. R. Kurz, W. M. Carlgren, S. Carlsson, Basel 1985, p. 116.
75
fighting sides, for example, representing the interests of the USSR in Slovakia
(from 25 June 1941) as well as of Denmark and Finland (from 28 June 1941)
in the USSR. Similar cases include acting as representative between Finland
and Germany (from 14 September 1944), Argentina and Bulgaria, Romania
and Hungary (government decisions of 4 and 11 February and 2 June 1944),
Finland and Hungary (from 30 September 1944), Finland and Japan (from
30 September 1944), Japan and Romania (17 November 1944), Japan and
Bulgaria (24 November 1944), Japan and Denmark (25 May and 8 June 1945)
and Japan and the USSR (31 August 1945). The B Division’s activity was
extended to include continents outside of Europe. By the third year of the
war, it was insignificant whether countries had requested such representation
in advance. Towards the end of the war, the decision by the government to
represent both sides could be made during more than one session. Several
countries submitted requests after their military opponent, yet they were ac-
cepted. This proves that representation of interests in 1939 was quite different
in the following years when the opportunities for a country-guardian’s suc-
cessful actions diminished. These were virtually restricted to maintaining
contact between enemy countries through neutral Sweden.
The Poles were counting primarily on the safe evacuation of embassy and
consulate staff, as well as on securing both national and private property. The
outbreak of the war meant the liquidation of the Polish Embassy in Berlin and
the liquidation of 16 Consulates scattered across Germany. The evacuation of
Embassy staff began as late as 3 September, following the news that staff at the
German Embassy in Warsaw had left Poland. According to the agreement of
August 1939, the Swedish diplomacy took over the representation of interests
of Polish citizens in Germany. Józef Lipski entrusted the care of embassy build-
ings and all the consulates to the Swedish Legation in Berlin.
Consulate staff located in northern and central Germany were interned in
Hamburg, and staff in southern Germany were detained in Vienna. When
the news broke that the German consular corps had evacuated itself from
Poland, on 13–14 September the staff who were interned in Hamburg moved
to Denmark, and those in Vienna fled to Hungary. Jerzy Warchałowski,
Consul General to Königsberg was held in Germany for a year. His col-
leagues, Deputy Consul General to Królewiec Witold Winiarski and Consul
to Allenstein (Olsztyn) Bogdan Jałowiecki were murdered. The entire staff of
the Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in the Free City of Gdańsk
were arrested. Only after several days of physical and mental harassment,
were they freed and by 6 September had reached Kaunas.
76
Initially, the role of head of the reactivated B Division was passed on to

Johan Beck-Friis, whereas Carl Petersen was assigned to the Swedish Lega-
tion in Berlin as B Division’s representative for the protection of Polish
citizens. Regarding this activity the institution employed officials from Polish
consulates, which were in the process of liquidation.196 On 15 September the
division was moved to the building of the Consulate General of the Republic
of Poland in Berlin.
Among the interventions carried out by the Swedish diplomacy, one in
particular deserves special attention, namely the efforts of Arvid Richert in
the release of Poles interned in Królewiec and the Free City of Gdańsk. The
latter case was also involved property confiscated by the Germans. Through
the Swedish Consul to Gdańsk, those Poles in the direst financial situations
received, secretly and unofficially, three thousand German marks a month.197
Buildings that were left for use by Polish consular representatives in the
territory of Germany were either rented out or their lease agreements were
terminated. Anything that could be moved as well as archives were taken over
by the Swedish Legation in Berlin or by Swedish consulates.198
The Germans had apprehended nearly 1200 Poles in total, but within a
week only about one hundred remained under arrest. Petersen also reported
that some Polish citizens sent to regular concentration camps where German
citizens were detained for similar offences. He did not see any possibility for
Sweden to intervene in these cases.199 Towards the end of October Petersen
was permitted to inspect a prisoner-of-war camp nearby Kielce. The Swede
claimed that the day-to-day life in the camp was virtually the same as that in
military barracks, that prisoner morale was high, and that the release of pri-
soners, due to the demand for manpower in agriculture, was probably about
to happen.200 Tolerable conditions were also present in other camps that ob-
servers were granted access to by the Germans.
Beck-Friis claimed that despite Sweden’s lack of a legal basis to devote
attention to the Poles who remained in the Soviet-occupied territories, it none-
theless needed to be concerned with their fate for humanitarian reasons, as they
—
196
PISM, A 11, E/430, report by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 20 XII 1939.
197
Ibidem, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Stockholm, 22 XI 1939.
198
Ibidem.
199
C. Petersen to UD, Berlin, 14 X 1939.
200
C. Petersen to UD, Berlin, 27 X 1939.
77
were protected by no one.201 Nevertheless, the authorities in Moscow refused to

cooperate on the subject, justifying their position with procedural constraints.
Requests concerning people were directed to Soviet diplomatic missions
abroad.202 Enquiries about Polish prisoners were met with ominous silence.
Sometimes attempts to obtain information about civilian refugees through
German diplomats brought positive results. This was not the case when it came
to information about soldiers who had been taken prisoner in 1939.203
In the beginning of November, the Poles sent two letters proposing to cede
the task of protecting Polish interests in Germany and in the occupied ter-
ritories to the Swedish Legation in Bern.204 This issue was communicated by
Swedish Envoy to Bern Hans Beck-Friis in his letter from 16 November. First,
he requested more details and instructions concerning the case, which was
unusual for the Swedes and, for this reason, difficult. Normally, the com-
monly adopted regulations concerning the issue of representing the govern-
ment of one of the fighting sides were applied. In this case Germany did not
acknowledge the Polish government. The German’s reaction to the Swedish
diplomacy came possibly because of the reference to the Polish government.
According to Beck-Friis, when the mission of protecting Polish interests con-
tinued, the duty should lie with the Swedish Legation in Berlin and all in-
structions should come directly from the B Division in Stockholm. He could
not understand why the Polish side was so concerned with including the
mission in Bern in this system. Perhaps the reason was a matter of com-
munication – a better connection between France and Berlin via Bern than
via Stockholm.205 The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was planning to
develop their humanitarian activity based on the mission which was en-
trusted to the Swedish diplomacy. On 16 November 1939, Secretary-General
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Jan Ciechanowski instructed Franciszek
Maleszka, who was staying in the Swedish Legation in Berlin: ‘The Polish
government still intends to keep all the establishments of Polish consular
institutions in Germany – including those which were formally vacated – and
—
201
RA, UD avdelningar och byråarkiv 1864–1952, Andra B-avdelningen, vol. 417, letter by J.
Beck-Friis to Swedish Envoy to Moscow W. Winther Stockholm, 6 XI 1939.
202
Ibidem, letter by Swedish Envoy to Moscow W. Winther to J. Beck-Friis, Moscow, 16 XI
1939.; copy of letter by J. Beck-Friis to the Consulate General in Pretoria, Stockholm, 16 XII
1939.
203
Swedish Envoy to Moscow V. Assarsson to B. Johansson, Moscow, 5 V 1941.
204
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 39, vol. 1586, letter by Head of Political department
of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD) S. Söderblom to Swedish Envoy to Bern H.
Beck-Friis, Stockholm, 6 XI 1939.
205
Ibidem, letter by Swedish Envoy to Bern H. Beck-Friis to S. Söderblom, Bern, 16 XI 1939.
78
pay rent from consular funds deposited in German marks in the Swedish
Legation in Berlin.’ Besides, Ciechanowski informed: ‘Having confirmed oral
instructions passed to you by Consul General Sir Korsak regarding the issue
of exercising protection over the Polish citizens in Germany, the Ministry
emphasizes that it attaches great significance to continuing this protection in
the widest possible extent and expects detailed reports regarding this par-
ticular issue.206 The widest possible extent meant not only the form of future
representation but also the territory it was to include. On the same day, when
Ciechanowski sent a letter to Berlin, Envoy Potworowski sent a telegram to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he explained: ‘The Swedes have already
protested several times against accepting the duty of exercising protection
over our citizens in other countries except Germany. If we make a statement,
we will be surely risking unquestionable refusal.’207 Potworowski did not in-
tend to worsen relations with the Swedes. According to him the Swedes
treated the issue of representation and care ‘very conscientiously and they are
trying to do everything they can to defend our interests.’ At the same time,
he noted that: ‘they are facing great difficulties from the Germans, which they
do not always want or can successfully fight.’ According to Potworowski,
their opinion was that the issue of representation of interests is ‘admittedly
often a heavy duty, but still a duty of a neutral state’,208 however it should not
be treated by the Polish diplomatic circles as a signal to charge the Swedes
with additional tasks.
The plans for further development of Polish–Swedish cooperation, in
exercising protection over Polish citizens, were rendered pointless when on
20 November 1939 the German authorities submitted a note to the Swedish
representatives. In this note, they were informed that the German offices
were taking over Polish interests: ‘The Auswärtiges Amt [Foreign Office of
Germany or AA] has an honour to inform the Royal Legation of Sweden, in
connection with the note of 1 September of the current year, regarding the
issue of protection over Polish interests in the German Reich exercised by the
Government of the Kingdom of Sweden, that the reasons on the basis of
which this protection was initiated, according to the government of the
German Reich, had ceased to exist and that the duty of exercising protection
—
206
PISM, A 11, E/430, letter by Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs J. Ciechanowski to F.
Maleszka, Paris, 16 XI 1939.
207
Ibidem, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 16 XI 1939.
208
Foreign Affairs, 22 XI 1939.
79
fulfilled by the Legation of the Kingdom of Sweden should therefore no

longer be considered valid. The Auswärtiges Amt asks the Royal Legation of
Sweden to recognize the fact that the protection over the matters and items,
which have been so far exercised by the legation, is from now on ceded to the
relevant German offices.’209
An eminent Polish historian and a specialist in history of diplomacy,
Henryk Batowski, who conducted a detailed analysis of the note, highlighted
the fact that the Germans did not write openly that the Polish state ceased to
exist to avoid discussion in the area of international law.210 The Swedes could
only ask at best what development of events the Germans had in mind, but
the discussion was not initiated. Potworowski informed the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, which was already in exile in France: ‘The Swedes are clearly
shocked and claim that this is contrary to all international customs, but they
are nevertheless powerless, for it is impossible to introduce any protection
without the consent of a relevant government.’ The envoy highlighted ‘a
highly critical attitude towards the German decision’ of the Swedish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.211 Richert, on the same day, in the Division of German
Protocol under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed surprise at German
demands. Most of all, he criticized the fact that they were not announced
earlier, which put the Swedes in a somewhat embarrassing situation. He sug-
gested that the Germans agreed to the transitory period in the process of
revoking the duties of the B Division on Polish matters.212 On 22 November,
Richert was informed by the head of the Political department of the AA, Ernst
Woermann, that such a transitory period, revoking the duty of the Swedish
diplomacy in representing the interests of Poland, should end no later than 1
December. The Germans permitted, however, a possible cooperation with
Petersen after 1 December on consular issues connected with searching for
missing persons, as well as matters concerning prisoners of war and the
management of Polish property.213
—
209
RA, UD avdelningar och byråarkiv 1864–1952, Andra B-avdelningen, vol. 183, copy of
verbal note by the AA to the Swedish Legation in Berlin, Berlin, 20 XI 1939. On that very
same day Swedish Envoy A. Richert sent the letter to Stockholm, asking for specific in-
structions. See also: H. Batowski, Walka dyplomacji niemieckiej przeciw Polsce 1939–1945,
Kraków–Wrocław 1984, p. 57 (Polish translation), p. 169 (original note quoted in full).
210
H. Batowski, Walka…, pp. 57–59
211
PISM, A 11, E/430, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm, G. Potworowski, to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 XI 1939.
212
Swedish Envoy to Berlin A. Richert to J. Beck-Friis, Berlin, 20 XI 1939.
213
Ibidem, note from a telephone conversation with Counsellor of the Swedish Legation in
Berlin E. von Post, Stockholm, 23 XI 1939.
80
Following consultations on 29 November with the headquarters of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Richert submitted a letter to the AA, where he
stated that the Swedish government acknowledged the German note and
accepted the fact that it was no longer possible for it to fulfil its duties towards
the Polish government.214 This decision was also announced to the press.215 At
the same time, the demand ‘to terminate the activity of the section for the
protection of Polish citizens operating under the legation in Berlin until 1
December’ was accepted.216 In this situation Minister Zaleski considered the
issue of interest representation to be closed and asked Potworowski to clarify
the question of returning or safeguarding the private property left by the offi-
cials of Polish diplomatic missions in Germany. The inventories of this pro-
perty remained in Swedish hands.217 Both the Embassy of the Republic of
Poland in Paris and Potworowski in Stockholm demanded that the Swedes
safeguard the private property of Polish diplomatic and consular officials. A
high priority was assigned to the property of Ambassador Lipski, who had
built up a valuable collection of items and accumulated a lot of wealth.218 On
27 November, the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed
Richert that the Germans must not be granted access to any funds deposited
in Berlin by Ambassador Lipski. According to the Polish Legation in Berlin’s
archive, it was said that the archive should be moved to the seat of the Swedish
Legation and sealed. Furniture and other items, everything except private
property, were to be returned to the Germans after being catalogued. The
Swedes also took it upon themselves to take care of four Polish officials
working for the B Division, to whom the Germans did not grant permission
to leave Berlin. The search for missing persons was to be ended, even open
—
214
Ibidem, copy of verbal note by Swedish Envoy to Berlin A. Richert to Auswärtiges Amt,
Berlin, 29 XI 1939.
215
‘Polens intressen i Tyskland. Svenska regeringens bevakning av Polens intressen upphör’,
Svenska Dagbladet, 30 XI 1939.
216
PISM, A 11, E/430, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm., 25 XI 1939.
217
Ibidem, telegram by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Zaleski to Polish Envoy to Stockholm,
G. Potworowski, 21 XII 1939.
218
RA, UD avdelningar och byråarkiv 1864–1952, Ander B-avdelningen, vol. 221, ibidem,
letter by R. Gyllenram to UD, B-avdelningen, Paris, 8 I 1940 r.; ibidem, letter by J. Beck-Friis
to the Swedish Legation in Berlin, 12 I 1940; letter by J. Lagerberg to E. von Post from the
Swedish Legation in Berlin, Stockholm, 5 III 1940.
81
cases were to be concluded with relevant reports, although Potworowski per-

sisted in telling Beck-Friis that proceeding with this sort of activity without
Swedish assistance would be impossible.219
When considering the events connected with revoking the duty of repre-
senting Polish interests in Germany by the Swedish diplomacy, one needs to
highlight that Sweden, like every neutral country, continued to acknowledge
the existence of the Polish government and did not accept the official German
stance in this matter. One could agree, however with Batowski that Hitler’s
diplomats achieved success at a very low cost.220 It is worth noting that,
according to Swedish Minister of Justice Karl Gustaf Westman, the answer of
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sandler to German demands was cutting, despite
the head of the Swedish diplomacy being in favour of Berlin’s request not to
make it public.221 One should also recognise that a natural consequence of this
course of events should be termination the B Division’s operations at the
Swedish Legation in Berlin regarding Polish interests. This was not the case.
Instead, one of the major agents of this section became the former Military
Attaché to Warsaw, Colonel Erik de Laval. For obvious reasons nobody was
willing to draw too much attention to this. It is also difficult for us to estimate
the actual scale of this activity. Nevertheless, drawn from what little informa-
tion there is on the subject, a consequence was undoubtedly that Polish issues
were present.
Petersen reviewed the humanitarian action conducted in the General
Government initiated by the American Red Cross and the organisation of
American Quakers. He then proposed that due to Swedish diplomatic activity
being prevented by the Germans such duties were to be taken over by the
Swedish Red Cross.222 The issue was discussed in Stockholm at the beginning
of December, following the Soviet aggression towards Finland.
Both the management of the Swedish Red Cross and Utrikesdepartementet
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs), despite this, believed the current developments
prevented any wide-ranging humanitarian activity in Poland.223
—
219
RA, UD avdelningar och byråarkiv 1864–1952, Andra B-avdelningen, vol. 183, letter by J.
Beck-Friis to the Swedish Legation in Berlin, Stockholm, 27 XI 1939.; letter by J. Beck-Friis
to Swedish Envoy to Berlin A. Richert, Stockholm, 29 XI 1939.
220
H. Batowski, Walka dyplomacji niemieckiej przeciw Polsce 1939–1945, Kraków–
Wrocław 1984, p. 59.
221
K. G. Westman, Politiska anteckningar september 1939–mars 1943, Stockholm 1981, pp.
59–60.
222
letter by C. Petersen to the Swedish Legation in Berlin, Berlin, 29 XI 1939.
223
Ibidem, copy of letter by J. Beck-Friis to C. Petersen, Stockholm, 6 XII 1939.
82
When in December 1939 Potworowski held a meeting with Beck-Friis, he

heard that the B Division at the Swedish Legation in Berlin had officially
concluded its activity on 1 December. The process of its liquidation, though,
was still in progress and Petersen would visit Stockholm and submit a
liquidation report no earlier than 22 December. Formally, the task of exer-
cising protection over Polish citizens was ceded by the Swedes to the new
office created by the Germans and to the German Red Cross. Any property
that could not be moved was given to the Germans. Ambassador Lipski’s pri-
vate property and the large sum of money that he had left at the disposal of
the Swedish Legation were secured. According to the information obtained
from the German authorities, four Polish officials who had been working for
the Swedes for a short while intended to remain in Germany, and two of them
even expressed a willingness to work for the Germans. Richert was to inter-
vene once more in the releasing of Polish consuls. Potworowski revealed:
‘Richert, I have been told, did everything he could in this matter, intervening
several times and with all his force, but unfortunately he achieved nothing
specific, and the resistance came not as much from the Auswärtiges Amt as
from internal authorities. Giving very little hope for releasing the interned
abroad, the Germans would be rather ready to release them into occupied
Poland. Richert, however, reserved the right to return to this issue at a later
time and his intention is to continue his interventions, viewing them already
from the perspective of his personal prestige.’224
At the time the Swedish press published information about the sus-
pending of the mission’s activity and eventual liquidation of the B Division
at the Swedish Legation in Berlin on 16 December in connection with the
establishment of the General Government and civil administration in the
occupied territories.
It was only on 19 December that the Germans together with the Swedes
wrote a protocol concerning the issue of ‘handing the authority of former
Polish missions in the Third Reich over to the Foreign Office in Berlin.’ A
copy of this protocol was submitted by Petersen to Potworowski following
his arrival in Stockholm. In the document it was recorded that both movable
and immovable property had been transferred, but not confiscated. That
which could be moved was placed in a special warehouse. Cash was entrusted
to the legal counsellor of the Swedish Legation, German lawyer Dix, and it
—
224
83
was to him that one turned to on the issue of storage payments. As Pot-
worowski discovered: ‘Otherwise these movables would be in danger of being
sold at auction.’ The Swedes rescued the funds transferred by Ambassador
Lipski, concealing their existence from the Germans. Potworowski added:
‘What is more, these funds have increased by nearly 44 thousand marks
recovered from individual consulates, and following the payment of all
expenses incurred from protection over Polish interests and its termination,
they currently amount to over 200 thousand marks.’ On Petersen’s request,
the Poles were to refrain from using these funds, at least for some time, as,
according to the Swedes, ‘revealing, in any way, the existence of […] sums
allocated for Poland-related purposes, would risk them being swept up by the
German authorities, not to mention the trouble this could cause for the
Swedish Envoy to Berlin.’225 The Swedes suggested that the funds be trans-
ferred abroad or to the occupied territories, but a transfer to Warsaw was
considered impossible at that moment.226 Potworowski informed his head-
quarters: ‘when the current vigilance of the Germans and the apprehension
of the Swedes die down, I will try to get back to the issue of making use of this
sum in one way or another.’ For the time being the funds were to be used to
cover the storage costs of the Polish property, since all bank accounts
belonging to the Poles were blocked by the German authorities. Next,
Potworowski began negotiations to transfer the sum in Swedish crowns to
the Poles in Stockholm.
Petersen confirmed that the cases involving the search of missing civilians
in Germany and occupied Poland were taken over by the German Red Cross.
He also confirmed that the Polish officials who remained in Germany had done
so of their own will: Maleszka and Waligórski remained in Berlin, Berent
moved to Hamburg, and Tworowski to Katowice. The honorary consul of
Sweden to Königsberg continued his efforts to release the interned employees
of the Polish consulate.227 Potworowski intervened constantly with Envoy
Richert during each of his visits to Stockholm. Richert took a personal interest
in the issue, telling Potworowski: ‘I am not in favour of leaving the issue
unsolved on revoking the duty of Swedish protection.’ Most importantly, the
Polish envoy asked for an intervention in the case of Consul Warchałowski, in
—
225
Ibidem, report by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Stockholm, 20 I 1940.
226
AAN, HI/I/245, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry
227
of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 20 I 1940.
84
the still unclear case, for the Polish authorities, of Maleszka and other Polish
officials, as well as for sending financial aid to Lithuania for Madam Jałowiecka.
By the spring of 1940 Potworowski informed the Polish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (in exile after September 1939, by summer 1940 in France, later in
London) that the matter of the transfer of funds gathered by Ambassador
Lipski was on the right track, but the fulfilment by the Swedes of their obli-
gations regarding the protection of Polish interests he evaluated unequivocally:
‘My overall impression from the conversation with Richert, as I have already
noted many times during conversations on this subject in the local Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, is that the Swedes are helpless in dealings with the German
authorities and have no authority that would allow them to oppose effectively
their lawless orders, as a matter of fact they don’t want to fall out of favour with
the Germans by supporting our cause. Nevertheless, they would genuinely like
to help us, with their modest abilities and means, all the more so as what is at
stake is their prestige, about which they are very sensitive.’228
In May 1940 Minister Zaleski continued to ask Potworowski why War-
chałowski was still being detained by the Germans in the Pawiak (this was a
common name for the Warsaw prison on Pawia street). According to the
announcement of the AA, Warchałowski had been given to return home.229
The issue of Polish property was addressed again in 1941, when the prop-
erty was sequestrated and other items were put up for auction by the Ger-
mans. Richert directed an entreaty to the Germans to call off the sequestra-
tion. He wrote to the incumbent head of the B Division, Birger Johansson: ‘I
am deeply saddened by the fact that I failed to salvage the private property of
my former Polish colleagues, which has been confiscated today by the Ger-
man state. Unfortunately, there is no possibility to undertake another action
in this matter.’230
From the report prepared by Potworowski in October 1941 it is evident
that the issue of Swedish protection over the interests of Poland did not
conclude with the auctioning of property left in Germany by the staff of the
Polish Legation in Berlin and the consulates: ‘Following the official liquida-
tion (at the outset of December 1939) of the Swedish protection over our
—
228
Ibidem, report by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Stockholm, 26 III 1940.
229
AAN, HI/I/256, telegram by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Zaleski to Polish Envoy to
Stockholm G. Potworowski, 9 V 1940.
230
the B Division of Utrikesdepartementet to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, 8 V 1941; IPMS,
A 11, E/430, translation of letter by Swedish Envoy to Berlin, A. Richert to B. Johansson,
Berlin, 2 V 1941.
85
interests in Germany, we have managed to maintain contacts both within the

local Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as with the Swedish Legation in
Berlin in the sphere of assistance and care regarding several cases mentioned
below. This protection is unofficial and based on rules of politeness, and so
far, the Swedes have managed to respond to our demands in a courteous
manner.’231
First, through the Swedes, information about the imprisoned Polish con-
sular officials continued to be collected. It was also possible, on a regular
basis, to make use of the funds deposited by Lipski. In Stockholm Potwo-
rowski received a payment of 50 thousand crowns from these funds, calcu-
lated at the official conversion rate.232 Someone perhaps came to the conclu-
sion that leaving at least part of the money half way between neutral Sweden
and the General Government would be more beneficial than submitting it to
London. Potworowski described the allocation of the money in a very general
way: ‘These funds are used by the Swedish Legation in Berlin to cover the
expenses connected with settling our matters.’233 Part of this amount was
allocated to the purchase of some of the more precious items of the Polish
property that were auctioned off by the Germans. The Swedes on the consent
of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs bought the items at two auctions (28
May and 11 June 1941) for over 18 thousand marks. From the German
authorities they demanded, also for fundamental reasons, that the payments
for the storage of the property were returned, but they received no answer.
What is especially puzzling about this relationship is the information
about ‘settling our matters’ through the legation and by means of funds that
were deposited there. In connection with what little news there was about the
courier activity, organized partially by the Union of Armed Struggle (Związek
Walki Zbrojnej, from 1942 Armia Krajowa) in occupied Poland and partially
by the VI Division of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief in London, the
issue of point of contact in the Swedish Legation becomes more understand-
able. The group of individuals acquainted with the subject had to be limited,
but Envoy Richert knew that Potworowski had been depositing additional,
non-inventoried, large sums of dollars at the Swedish mission in Berlin.234 It
—
231
for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 10 X 1941.
232
of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 15 VII 1940.
233
of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 10 X 1941.
234
Swedish Envoy to Berlin A. Richert to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin, 8 II
86
is not a secret that in the Swedish Legation there existed the so-called Polish
fund (den polska kassan), which was used to cover the storage costs of Polish
items. In November 1941 de Laval passed on information that after the trans-
port costs of some Polish items to Sweden had been met, 7 thousand marks
were left for the auctions, announcing though that the fund would need to be
replenished.235 In July 1941 Potworowski asked Richert to submit to three
female former officials of the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Ms
Gradowska, Ms Halina Jałowiecka, Ms Winiarska) 1500 marks each from the
funds of Ambassador Lipski.236 Richert was not officially allowed to do so. He
informed Johansson that he would try to make a payment through the agency
of Carl Herslow or Hilding Molander, who directed the Swedish Chamber of
Commerce in Warsaw. It was precisely from the Polish fund that de Laval
took the money he handed in to the female officials mentioned by Potwo-
rowski.237 In 1943 about 17 thousand marks were kept in the Polish account
at the Swedish Legation in Berlin, and in 1945 there was more than 15 thou-
sand marks. Money deposited by other officials from the embassy and Polish
consulates in Germany was taken to Stockholm in two lots by Adolf von
Rosen in November 1942.238
When in the second half of 1944 the Polish government in exile gradually
started to prepare itself for a nationwide protest, the of representation of
Polish interests by Sweden was again examined. It would establish whether
Poland had suffered financial loss, and if it had, how much the Swedes should
pay to cover it. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a draft of the protest letter
was prepared, in which it was pointed out that the Swedish Legation in Berlin
had fulfilled its task in an improper way and that the Swedish government
should bear the material responsibility for its negligence. Polish lawyers
argued, firstly that: ‘The Swedish government became the Polish govern-
ment’s mandate holder for this matter and as a consequence is subject to legal
obligations which bound each mandate-holder, and as such responsibility for
exercising protection.’ And secondly they argued that: ‘The Swedish govern-
ment so far did not waive its duty towards the Polish Government to exercise
—
1941. The reference is made here to the amount of 2500 dollars, which was not included by
Carl Petersen in his financial reports from December 1939.
235
Ibidem, copy of letter by E. de Laval to B. Johansson, Berlin, 30 X 1941.
236
Ibidem, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to B. Johansson, Stockholm,
15 VII 1941.
237
RA, UD avdelningar och byråarkiv 1864–1952, Andra B-avdelningen, vol. 362, confiden-
tial letter by E. de Laval to B. Johansson, Berlin, 21 X 1941.
238
A. de Rosen to the B Division of UD (together with attachment), Berlin, 10 XI 1942.
87
protection over the Polish citizens in Germany, which is also confirmed by

the fact that it did not prepare any reports concerning the funds received for
this purpose, this also includes the losses and damage suffered as a con-
sequence of transferring the Polish property to the Germans.’239
In this draft it was highlighted that, so far, the Polish government did not
bring up this issue so as not to further complicate the situation of the Swedish
government. The draft concluded emphatically: ‘Without a doubt the Swedish
government realizes that it acted improperly by yielding to the German pres-
sure and avoiding tensions, even though this was a clear violation of inter-
national customs and it made the government a partner in a crime against
Poland. Drawing attention to this issue once again now may make it easier for
Sweden to redeem itself in the eyes of Poland, it may prove helpful in nego-
tiations with the Germans on other issues, and for this very reason the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs considers this to be a suitable moment to raise this issue. Not
mentioning our demands towards the Swedish government could be con-
sidered by the latter as silent consent of the Polish government to the accom-
plished settlement of this matter by the German government.’240
The tone of the drafted démarche was the result of opinions expressed by
the employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Legal expert Stefan
Lubomirski pointed out in his analysis: ‘The Swedish government, with a tre-
mendous amount of effort and good will, set about the task of carrying out
the accepted mandate of protection’, and ‘the submittal of the buildings of
consular offices and the property of Polish officials to the representatives of
the Swedish authorities in Germany was performed, in most of the cases, in
a satisfactory way.’ Nevertheless, on 19 December 1939 the Swedes trans-
ferred the Polish property to the Germans. Lubomirski stated: ‘When the
Swedish government came across obstacles from the Germans that made it
difficult for it to continue the maintenance of the pledged protection, it had
two options to choose from:
- to waive the mandate of protection in relation to the Polish govern-

ment and to demand the instruction as to whom this matter needed
to be ceded to;
- to state formally before the Polish and German government that the
German authorities made it impossible for Sweden, being a neutral
—
239
PISM, A 11, E/430, draft of letter to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, [November 1944].
Probably prepared by A. Lisiewicz; not accepted.
240
Ibidem.
88
country, to exercise the protection – according to the rules of inter-

national law – over the interests of the country in a state of war, and
return to the Polish government the keys to all the buildings that had
been placed under its supervision.
The Swedish government took another path, which was in fact very original.
Namely, it tried to settle this matter opportunistically.’241
What is more, Lubomirski pointed out that the Germans had violated the
protocol of property transfer by offering it all for auction. The Germans’
answer to the Swedish protests was that the Polish country did not exist,
which was clearly against the rules of international law. The lack of reaction
from the Swedes gave rise to considerable concern from Poland. Especially
that, according to Lubomirski, right after the outbreak of the war the Swedes
had exercised their protection in a way that was ‘demonstrative or even osten-
tatious according to the Germans.’ Later, the character of this protection
became private. The Swedish side had never accounted for the 200 thousand
marks that were left after Ambassador Lipski and was responsible for all the
losses incurred by Poland. Lubomirski claimed: ‘the Swedes’ case should be
still considered open, as we have not yet discharged the Swedish government
from exercising the protection and, furthermore, the settlements with the
Swedes concerning protection have not yet been taken care of.’242
The legal counsellor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Włodzimierz
Adamkiewicz, having scrutinised the issue, pointed out that the Swedes had
demonstrated a lack of caution. This was so since they managed Polish
property without consulting the Poles on the matter: ‘It is important that it
was impossible for the Swedish government to refer to any clear or even silent
consent of the Polish government for the transfer of management of Polish
property to the German government.’243
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought justification for submitting ma-
terial claims to Sweden at all costs. A more balanced analysis was given by an
anonymous member of staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jan Ciecha-
nowski is the most likely author, who, in fact, agreed that the arguments of
Lubomirski and Adamkiewicz were logical and legally well justified, but who
at the same pointed out: ‘their presumption that the Swedish government did
not inform the Polish government about the German demand to withdraw
the Swedish management of the property, commissioned by the Polish
—
241
Ibidem, a note by S. Lubomirski to Minister of Foreign Affairs T. Romer, 20 X 1944.
242
Ibidem.
243
Ibidem, a legal opinion of the counsellor W. Adamkiewicz, 28 X 1944.
89
government, and ignored the Polish interests is highly improbable.’244 The

author of the note considered such a hypothesis to be very unlikely and
suspected that the records regarding this matter had been destroyed during
the evacuation of Angers (France) in 1940.245 His proposal was to examine
whether the Swedish government had turned to the Polish authorities on this
matter in any form and what was the reaction of the Polish authorities. He
was the only one to draw attention to the political aspect of the entire issue:
‘But even if the legal status was fully explained in accordance with the
assumptions of Lubomirski and Adamkiewicz, there still remains a question
of whether the Swedish government should be called to account. For
throughout the entire war the Swedish government acted extremely [the word
was crossed out] kindly towards Poland and Poles (internment of ships,
tolerance of the refugees, assistance for the country, action of the Red Cross
etc.) [anonymous note on the margin: not always, not always – author’s note]
and its assistance is still necessary, and – in the future – also other tokens of
this kindness may be needed. Therefore, accusing the government of being
an accomplice in the violation of international law may be a very severe
accusation for the Swedes, even more so that Sweden is making consistent
efforts to gain a positive reputation in the world in this respect.246
The best method for referring to this case was to be the submission of an
aide-mémoire to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Envoy Henryk
Sokolnicki with a reminder that the Polish government would demand satis-
faction from Germany for the violation of the rules of international law. It
would also be possible for the Swedish government to raise this issue in Berlin
at that point. The beneficial consequence of the possible entry of the Allies in
to the territory of Germany would be the renewal of the Swedish mandate to
exercise protection over the buildings of former Polish consular posts to save
the archives and furnishings from damage.
Following on from that, Sokolnicki also requested the Swedish Professor
of Law, Håkan Nial, provide his evaluation. Nial confirmed that: ‘according
to the Swedish perception of international law, the confiscation of Polish
property in Germany must be considered contrary to the rules of interna-
tional law because it constitutes a discrimination of Poland based on the false
—
244
Ibidem, a note, London, 16 XI 1944.
245
The former Polish Envoy to Stockholm, G. Potworowski, confirmed that the Polish
government did not protest the statement issued by the Swedish government regarding the
German government preventing it from seeing to the Polish interests in Germany. See PISM,
A 11, E/430, note by J. Ciechanowski from 28 XI 1944 on the note from 16 XI 1944.
246
PISM, A 11, E/430, note, London, 16 XI 1944.
90
premise that Poland as a country does not exist. Regardless, the confiscation
of Polish private property in Germany must be considered illegal within a
broader concept of private property protection by the international law.’247
The value of the property was estimated by Poland to be 5.1 million francs
in gold, 2 million of which was owned by the Polish state and the remainder
by the diplomatic and consular personnel. Sokolnicki admitted that Nial’s
evaluation added nothing new to the issue, though it brought clarification
and facilitated further interventions.248 Based on this evaluation on 19 March
1945 Sokolnicki submitted a note to Utrikesdepartementet. At the same time,
Lipski sent a private letter to Eric von Post, and the counsellor of the Polish
Legation in Stockholm, Tadeusz Pilch, spoke to Grafström. Sokolnicki wrote:
‘this conversation, besides confirming the best will of the Swedish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, did not bring any particular results.’ Nevertheless, the
Poles used various ways to communicate their postulates to the Swedish
diplomats. Post asked about the actual demands of Poland. Plans to seize the
German property in the territory of Sweden were formulated, and the matter
was discussed by the Poles with the British authorities.
In response to Nial’s evaluation, counsellor Adamkiewicz highlighted the
responsibility of the Swedish government for the fate of the property that was
placed under its supervision: ‘The issue of special treatment, resulting from
the fact of assuming, at a certain point, the care by the Swedish government,
which was entirely omitted in the disquisitions of Professor Nial, should be
used as an argument to make this government prioritize [underlined in the
original text] the aforementioned demands.’249
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adam Tarnowski, asked Envoy
Sokolnicki to consider the opinion of counsellor Adamkiewicz and to settle
the matter as quickly as possible: ‘The Ministry is asking You, Sir, to take all
possible measures to obtain the decision of the government on this matter of
specific nature, in the quickest time possible. Haste is all the more so justified
that our demands were not included as part of the global demands raised in
the territory of Sweden by the Allies towards Germany.’250
—
247
PISM, A 11, E/188, Håkan Nial: Memorandum regarding the issue of Polish property
sequestrated and confiscated in Germany, Stockholm, 7 V 1945. (translated from Swedish).
248
Ibidem, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Stockholm, 19 V 1945.
249
Ibidem, opinion from legal counsellor W. Adamkiewicz regarding a memorandum by H.
Nial devoted to the issue of the Polish property sequestrated and confiscated in Germany, 4
VI 1945.
250
Ibidem, letter by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Tarnowski to Polish Envoy to Stockholm
H. Sokolnicki, London, 8 VI 1945.
91
The withdrawal of the Swedish authorities’ recognition to the Polish

government in exile on 6 July 1945 and simultaneously granting recognition
to the Provisional Government of National Unity in Warsaw shattered the
efforts of the Polish Legation to settle this matter.
92
3. In the Face of Consequences of the
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact
Following the defeat of Poland

When the military campaign in Poland ended, the fate of the Second Polish
Republic ceased to be a popular theme for current affairs news services and
commentaries of opinion journalists. There were a few voices, but these mostly
expressed indifference. The editors of Social-Demokraten conveyed their opti-
mism about the future: ‘This situation may not continue much longer. One
may not fail to appreciate the unprecedented force of Polish desire for inde-
pendence. The history of Poland reflects the indomitable spirit of freedom this
nation has. On the western front, the war has not yet started. In 1918 all of
Poland was occupied by the German army, and when the occupation con-
cluded in the West, the young Polish state ascended like a phoenix from the
ashes.’1 According to a commentator for Arbetaren, the end of the campaign in
Poland did not put an end to the problems with the Poles who, in his opinion,
constituted an ‘open wound’ for Germany and the Soviet Union.2
Initially, the Polish matter was evaluated quite differently in Göteborgs
Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, where the significance of the September Cam-
paign had been disregarded entirely. According to an anonymous opinion
journalist: ‘The events that are taking place in Poland are horrifying, and the
heroic attempt of the Polish nation to repel the aggressor deserves admira-
tion. Nonetheless, the reality is that the fate of Poland is of minor importance
for the result of the entire war, which as a matter of fact, has not yet started.
For this reason, it is of even less importance to us.’3
Relations with the Polish government in exile were not a high priority for
the Swedish diplomacy, though the rebirth of the Polish army in France was
observed with interest. The Swedish Envoy to Paris, Einar Hennings, watched
with curiosity the actions of the Polish authorities, who initiated the organi-
zational activity in France. At the same time, he commented with embar-
rassment on the severe evaluations of foreign policy conducted by Józef Beck,
who was strongly criticised for each diplomatic step and deemed responsible
—
1
‘Avgörande i Öster?’, Social-Demokraten, 15 IX 1939.
2
‘Hitler hotar’, Arbetaren, 23 IX 1939.
3
‘Erfarenheter från världskriget’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 19 IX 1939.
93
for the defeat in September 1939: ‘Over and over again voices repeat that the
so-called Polish policy of perching between the powers was such an immense
mistake that everyone could predict where, sooner or later, this would lead.
The tragedy of Poland is a result of a lack of reason and insight shown by
those who assumed the responsibility for the fate of this country.’
Nevertheless, Hennings, on summing up the discussions in Paris on the
subject of Polish foreign policy prior to the outbreak of war, stated: ‘the fact
that must raise absolute admiration is simply the energy and dedication
which here, within the Polish circles in the present critical situation, drive the
search for possibilities to serve the national cause, which, is nevertheless not
yet treated as lost.’4
Meanwhile, Envoy Torsten Undén reported from Budapest about the fate
of Marshal Śmigły-Rydz based on information obtained from the Romanian
head of diplomatic protocol, Georges Crutzesco. The Romanian expressed a
very unfavourable opinion about the Marshal. He accused him of behaving
improperly at the border, as the Marshall did not accede to the request of
Romanian authorities nor did he take off his uniform. However, much more
interesting for the Swedish diplomat were the remarks of the representative
of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Soviet Union would not
decide to declare war on Finland and Romania, but chose to reach its political
goals by adopting the Hitlerian method of terror and intimidation.5
Following the annexation of entire territory of the Second Polish Republic
by the German and Soviet armies, the Swedish authorities, first of all, at-
tempted to find out what was going on in the territory of Poland and become
familiar with the plans of the Polish government. Swedish Envoy to London
Björn Prytz in his letter from 26 September gave an account of his meeting
with Ambassador Edward Raczyński. The Polish diplomat informed him that
the Soviet authorities had launched the process of a systematic slaughter of
landowners.6
In the Swedish Legation in Berlin a memorandum was prepared on 27
September about the planned course of the German–Soviet border. It was
written there that the demarcation line, initially provisional, was to become
a border between the two countries. At that point Hitler was to ponder over
—
4
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 485, letter by Swedish Envoy to Paris E.
Hennings to the Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Sandler, Paris, 30 X 1939.
5
Ibidem, letter by Swedish Envoy to Budapest T. Unden to the head of the Political
department of UD, S. Söderblom, Budapest, 6 XI 1939.
6
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 39, vol. 1539, letter by Swedish Envoy to London B.
Prytz to the head of the Political department of UD S. Söderblom, London, 26 IX 1939.
94
3. CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIBBENTROP-MOLOTOV PACT
the future of the Polish territories which were not part of Germany in 1914.
Rumours started to spread about creating a substitute for the Polish state
which would be completely subordinate to the Germans. Richert predicted
that a peace conference could be held in such a situation, which would settle
all disputes between the powers, as well as disarmament issues, commercial
issues, colonial issues and the Jewish issue. Göring warned that since peace
had not been concluded in Europe quickly enough, the Soviet Union would
easily scoop up Estonia and Latvia, though he failed to mention that Finland
was also at risk.7
On 30 September, Envoy Potworowski informed Minister Sandler that the
Polish nation would never accept the decisions of the German–Soviet ar-
rangement of 28 September 1939 regarding the division of Poland. At the
same time he stressed the existence of a legal Polish government, whose in-
tention was to fight until victory in a just war for the liberation of its country.8
On the next day he sent another letter about the appointment of the new
president of the Second Polish Republic, Władysław Raczkiewicz, and about
the formation of a new Polish government in Paris headed by General
Władysław Sikorski.9 Two days later Staffan Söderblom replied that the
Swedish government acknowledged the note,10 whereas Minister Sandler
confirmed personally that Envoy Lagerberg remained accredited at the Polish
government.11 At the same time Potworowski managed to appoint Major
Feliks Brzeskwiński as military attaché.
At the beginning of October 1939, Hitler offered a peace deal to the
Western Allies. These negotiations were observed in Stockholm with inte-
rest.12 According to the Swedish government, reaching agreement between
the sides was beneficial. Although the authorities officially distanced them-
selves from the engineer Birger Dahlerus, whose mission was to act as inter-
mediary between the Swedish government and Hermann Göring, Stockholm
—
7
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 39, vol. 1538, memorandum of A. Richert, Berlin, 27
IX 1939.
8
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 485, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G.
Potworowski to the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Sandler, Stockholm, 30 IX 1939.
9
Ibidem, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Swedish Minister of
Foreign Affairs R. Sandler, Stockholm, 1 X 1939.
10
Ibidem, letter by the head of the Political department of UD, S. Söderblom, to Polish Envoy
to Stockholm G Potworowski, Stockholm, 3 X 1939.
11
Polskie dokumenty dyplomatyczne 1939 wrzesień–grudzień, doc. 135, telegram by Polish
Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 3 X 1939,
p. 131.
12
AAN, HI/I/245, telegram by Polish Envoy to Oslo W. Neuman to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 17 X 1939.
95
permitted the possibility of concluding peace at the expense of Poland and

adjusting to the new deal in Central Europe. Similar contacts to those of
Dahlerus had a famous Swedish traveller, Sven Hedin, who was received in
Berlin by Hitler.13 Both Swedes heard from the Führer that the Polish country
would be restored, but only with the co-participation of Germany and the
Soviet Union.14 In spite of the outbreak of the war, Dahlerus continued his
efforts to conclude the European conflict by reaching a compromise. On the
seventh day of the war he continued to convince British politicians that
Göring was ‘the only person that could save the peace’ and rebuild ‘auto-
nomous Poland.’ According to a British expert on the subject, throughout the
first three months of the war no other negotiator was held in such a high
esteem by the Nazi high command or received by them on as many occasions
as Dahlerus.15
Deliberations on the subject of the powers’ peace agreement at the expense
of Poland were taking place, until December end 1939, mostly for fear of what
would happen next in the Baltic Sea region. From the two-year perspective,
one of the Polish opinion journalists overemphasized: ‘Following the conclu-
sion of the Polish campaign, the Swedish public opinion was that this was the
end of the storm in a teacup. They intoxicated themselves with the hashish of
peace up until the attack on Norway on 9 April 1940.’16 This attitude also do-
minated among the members of the political elites, in spite of the fact that
they were aware of the brutal actions of the Germans towards the Poles.
On 16 November, Swedish Consul to Gdańsk Knud Lundberg informed
his superiors in Stockholm about the situation in the city following the entry
of the German troops on 14 September. He quoted an appeal of the local head
of the NSDAP, Albert Forster, who announced that the Germans would
finally demonstrate to the Poles who was the master. He also wrote: ‘With
brutality which may be equalled with that of the [Soviet] GPU, actions were
taken against the local population.’ The arrested were placed in confined
spaces and forced to remain in an upright position for a long time without
—
13
W. M. Carlgren, Svensk utrikespolitik 1939–1945, Stockholm 1973, p. 48, 127.
14
This is mentioned by Cz. Madajczyk, Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce, vol. 1,
Warszawa 1970, p. 86. Hitler, in the conversation that took place on 16 October in the
presence of S. Hedin was to express a willingness to create a separate Polish national entity,
because he wanted to ‘keep this mob outside his territorial limits’.
15
Detailed information on the subject based on British documents: P.W. Ludlow, ‘Scan-
dinavia between the Great Powers. Attempts at Mediation in the First Year of the Second
World War’, Historisk tidskrift 1974, iss. 1, pp. 7–9.
16
J. Townacki [sic!; T. Nowacki?], ‘Ewolucja polityczna Szwecji (1939–1942)’, Wiadomości
Polskie, 4 X 1942.
96
food or water. Mass displacements of Poles were ordered. They were forced
to leave their homes in only a couple of hours, taking only things they were
able to carry. The Poles were robbed of their cash and valuables, taken to a
railway station and loaded onto freight trains. According to Consul Lund-
berg, Gdynia was forced in to economic stagnation.17 The displacement of 36
thousand Poles was suspended by the end of October. Lundberg justified this
action as being due to insufficient manpower. This was because the German
authorities announced the obligation of work for those aged 16–65. Thanks
to this, nearly 50 thousand Poles were able to remain in Gdynia.18
Staffan Söderblom passed on the news of the displacements to the Inter-
national Red Cross and asked permission to send his representative to
personally witness the inhumane treatment of the Polish people. However,
Max Huber, the secretary general of the organisation, refused. Following this
Söderblom informed Envoy Richert that: ‘it is difficult for us for the time
being to think about any interventions for our part in this matter.’19
In turn, Military Attaché Colonel Juhlin-Dannfelt, in his notes from the
visit to occupied Poznań at the end of October 1939, wrote: ‘the feelings of
German officers towards the Poles seem to be to a large extent the same as
their feelings towards the Jews, and they even speak about them in the same
way.’20 He also took note of the curfew that was imposed on the Poles. He
noticed that the head of the Province of Posen (Poznań) was Arthur Greiser,
from whom the Poles could not expect anything good. He, first of all, drew
attention to the economic drain of Polish people, from whom almost all cash
was confiscated. Poles were prohibited from pursuing many professions: that
of doctor of medicine, lawyer etc. Clerical workers were forced to take up
manual labour. Each Polish house or apartment, confiscated by the Germans,
needed to be vacated within two hours. The Swedish officer reported that the
SS and the Gestapo launched raids on settlements, arrested the Poles they
found suspicious and executed them by firing squad without trial. What was
striking for the Swedish attaché were the overcrowded churches, where the
—
17
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 485, letter by Swedish Consul to Danzig K.
Lundberg to the head of the Political department of UD S. Söderblom, Danzig, 16 XI 1939.
18
letter by the counsellor to the Swedish Legation in Berlin, E. von Post, to the head of the
Political department of UD, S. Söderblom, Berlin, 31 X 1939.
19
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 485, letter by the head of the Political
department of UD, S. Söderblom, to Swedish Envoy to Berlin A. Richert, Stockholm, 16 XI
1939.
20
Berlin Colonel C. Juhlin-Dannfelt to the General Staff, Berlin, 31 X 1939.
97
Poles were seeking comfort in this hopeless situation. Those who remained,
suffered from the lack of food supplies and stove coal. On summing up his
report, the Swede, however, justified the actions of the Germans: ‘My strong-
est impression from this journey was that the restoration of the former good
condition of the roads and bringing order to many areas of life is taking place
in Posen thanks to German energy and diligence. At the same time, German
administration is carried out using brutal measures, as pay back for the Poles’
previous cruelties towards the Volksdeutsche.’
Juhlin-Dannfelt’s assistant, Lieutenant Göran Hedin reported that on 17
November an institution of forced labour was introduced in Poznań and acts
of terror against the Poles were taking place: ‘The harshness of conduct
towards the Polish people seems unbelievable.’21 In Kraków though food
shortages started to affect the population. All over Poland road and railway
maintenance works started, which employed many Poles. When it came to
the mood of the Poles, he claimed: ‘The attitude of the people is uncertain but
tamed.’ He also noted: ‘Hatred seems common and immense.’
Little information came from the territories that were occupied by the
Soviet Union. By the end of October, Envoy Winther reported from Moscow:
‘Just like in other formerly despotic countries, so it happens now in the Soviet
Union that the current regime refers to the manifestations of “the will of the
people”, creating the impression that this regime is founded on the majority
of the population and realizes its aspirations.’22 This was how Winther justi-
fied the need to organize a performance whose main actors would be the par-
liaments of western Ukraine and western Belarus, who were then to decide
on the matter of their own incorporation in to the USSR. The Swedish diplo-
mat was under no illusion that elections to these assemblies had anything to
do with commonly understood free elections. Following the entry of Soviet
troops, the process of power takeover by the working class and the peasants
was sparked. Landowners were chased away, and their estates were divided.
The confiscation of land, as well as the nationalisation of banks and industry
was approved by special decrees. As Winther confirmed: ‘These declarations
abounded in lyrical reflections about ideal relations within the Soviet Union
and they were concluded with cheers in honour of both the state and the
Communist Party.’
Virtually all Nordic States, Finland especially, whose relations with the
Soviet Union were tense, were interested in ending the conflict between
—
21
Ibidem, memorandum by Colonel G. Hedin, Berlin, 1 X 1939.
22
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 516, letter by Swedish Envoy to Moscow W.
Winther to Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Sandler, Moscow, 31 X 1939.
98
Germany and the Western Allies. The Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Elias Erkko, in a conversation with the Swedish Envoy to Helsinki, Stig
Sahlin, even expressed a wish that Minister Sandler on behalf of the entire
Nordic nation submit a proposal to begin mediation with the Germans.23
According to Wilhelm M. Carlgren, Sandler thought that it would not be well
received if Sweden engaged in peace mediation, considering the protection
of Polish interests in Germany. However, he did not question the idea of a
peaceful settlement based on creating ‘a smaller Polish state located between
the former German border and the new Russian border, and real autonomy
for Bohemia and Moravia.’24 A different evaluation of Sandler’s attitude was
provided by British historian Peter Ludlow, who claims that it was Sandler
who wanted Sweden to become engaged in peace mediation. He was never-
theless faced with opposition from other ministers who, not without reason,
considered every initiative of this sort – while the opinion of the British
government was that the negotiations could start right after the change of
regime in Germany – to be a token of friendship towards Hitler.25
The heads of the Nordic States held a meeting 18–19 October in Stock-
holm to discuss the current situation. This was the second such conference.
The first, attended by prime ministers and foreign ministers, took place 18–
19 September in Copenhagen, after the Soviet army had entered Poland. The
consultations were modelled on the meeting of three Scandinavian monar-
chists in Malmö, 1914. These meetings were a manifestation of Nordic unity
and their will to preserve neutrality during the on-going war. At the same
time, as Gunnar Hägglöf pointed out, they were also evidence of these coun-
tries’ helplessness and their lack of influence on the events in the Baltic Sea
region. Sweden looked on during the conquest of Poland by Hitler and Stalin,
as well as the process of imposing political-military arrangements on Estonia
(28 September), Latvia (October) and Lithuania (10 October) by the Soviet
Union. The invitation, submitted on 5 October by Moscow, for the Finnish
government to discuss specific political questions, did not bode well either.
—
23
UD Handarkiv, series 3, Rickard Sandler, vol. 2, Report by S. Sahlin do Swedish Ministry
of Foreign Policy (Conversation with Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko, 4 October 1939),
Helsinki, 4 X 1939.
24
W. M. Carlgren, Svensk utrikespolitik., Stockholm 1973, pp. 38. Cf. H. Batowski, Agonia.,
pp. 400–401.
25
P. W. Ludlow, Scandinavia…, pp 33–34. It is worth noting that the eventual peace media-
tion of the Scandinavian states was opposed by the French. See: Polskie dokumenty dyplo-
matyczne 1939 wrzesień…, p. 203, Envoy Potworowski informed the headquarters on 16 X
1939: ‘the local French Envoy announced at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that their peace
proposals were unwelcome.’
99
The initiative to hold a meeting in Stockholm came from Sandler, who ex-
pected that this would help him reinforce the Finnish position in the nego-
tiations. One hundred thousand people demonstrated in support of Finland
on 18 October at the royal castle in Stockholm, but the statements of support
for president Kallio stimulated only the Swedish public opinion and had no
influence on the development of events on the diplomatic scene.26
From early October, Minister Sandler pursued an active policy that was to
support the Finns in their diplomatic game with the Soviet Union. He
claimed that this would scare Stalin off and prevent aggression. Hansson was
not willing to take the risk, however. His motto was ‘in politics one should
never act prematurely’. The prime minister believed waiting until the end of
the Finnish–Soviet negotiations would suffice, and that the related tensions
in his government would naturally fade away.27 When it came to foreign
policy, his goal was to avoid complications. That is why, following the out-
break of the Winter War, on 30 November, Sandler was forced to resign. As
a consequence, the general reconstruction of the government took place.28
The government programme, adopted on 5 December 1939, following nego-
tiations between the four major government coalition parties, highlighted
that the policy of neutrality required the maintenance of relations with both
sides and avoiding complications, as well as vigilance of one’s own sover-
eignty. The Swedish government pledged to help Finland,29 but – to protect
its own interests – following a few weeks of negotiations, it concluded com-
mercial agreements with Great Britain (7 December 1939) and Germany (22
December 1939).30 These agreements formed the basis for trade that proved
satisfactory for Sweden until the German attack on Denmark and Norway on
9 April 1940. At the time, the Polish government in Angers hoped that orders
for missiles for the destroyers Grom and Błyskawica would be completed in
Sweden, but attempts to initiate discussions on this subject proved fruitless.31
—
26
Y. Möller, Rickard Sandler. Folkbildare. Utrikesminister, Stockholm 1990, pp. 376–377.
27
More information about the policy of Sandler towards Finland, see: A. W. Johansson, Per
Albin…, pp. 63–80.
28
Of certain importance could also be the campaign launched in the Hitlerian newspaper the
Völkischer Beobachter, which was directed against Sweden and Sandler who was perceived
as ‘an enemy of Germany’ and ‘a servant of England’. See: Y. Möller, Rickard…, p. 386.
29
ARAB, SAP arkiv, Protokoll, partistyrelsen (a microfilm) 1931–1939, vol. A2C 005, pro-
tocol from the meeting of the party leadership with the parliamentary group; attachment:
memorandum devoted to the core lines of the coalition government’s programme adopted
following the negotiations between the representatives of the four main parties, 5 XII 1939.
30
W. M. Carlgren, Svensk utrikespolitik…, pp. 29–35.
31
Polska Marynarka Wojenna 1939–1947. Wybór dokumentów, vol. 1, selected and compiled
by Z. Wojciechowski, Gdynia 1999, p. 57.
100
By 10 October 1939 the Polish government in exile adopted guidelines for

directors of foreign diplomatic missions. Here it was highlighted that the task
of Polish propaganda was to consolidate the truth about the bravery of the
Polish army and civilians during the September Campaign.32 On Swedish
ground this task was not easy. Members of the Swedish–Polish association
maintained moderation when voicing their positive opinions about Poland.
Baron Georg Stiernstedt reminded the public of Poland’s indecent acts to-
wards Czechoslovakia in 1938. He justified his statement on the subject to
Envoy Potworowski with the need to maintain a neutral attitude towards the
conflict between Poland and the other country, as ‘the sympathies of some of
the members of the association can [underlined in the original] be not on the
side of Poland.’33
It is hard to establish whether this view was determined by the mixed feel-
ings towards the foreign policy of Poland, strong influences of Germany or
the struggle for the utopia of absolute neutrality. However, generally, the
greatest competition for deliberations on the fate of Poland was the Finnish–
Soviet war, a conflict which was closer to the Swedes both geographically and
emotionally. Nevertheless, in 1939, several papers discussing the conflicts in
Poland were still being published in Sweden.
Zeth Höglund, in his foreword to a collection of articles he published with
the suggestive title Alliansen Hitler-Stalin (Hitler–Stalin Alliance), wrote:
‘Bolshevism, which in its entire history, and still in August, wanted to be per-
ceived as the leading defender of peace, the strongest opponent of all im-
perialist aspirations, a defender of the right of nations to self-determination
and a sworn enemy of Fascism, in a month took the following form:
- vanquisher of peace as an aggressor against Poland,

- oppressor of free nations (starting with Poland and Estonia),
- supporter of imperialist policy, striving to extend its power in all
possible directions (Poland, the Baltic States, the Balkans and Asia),
—
32
Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, vol. 1: październik 1939–
czerwiec 1940, scholarly editing by M. Zgórniak, compiled by W. Rojek in cooperation with
L. Neuger, Kraków 1994, p. 16.
33
A polemic on this subject: AAN, the Polish Legation in Stockholm, 65, letter by the Press
Attaché of the Polish Legation in Stockholm, A. de Pomian, to General G. Stiernstedt,
Stockholm, 28 XI 1939, pp. 4–6; ibidem, letter by General G. Stiernstedt to the Press Attaché
of the Polish Legation in Stockholm, A. de Pomian, Stockholm, 29 XI 1939, pp. 10–11.
101
- agreement and alliance with the German Nazis, executioners of the

working class and democracy.
[…] Nazism and communism became intertwined in a loving embrace. Their

offspring is called war and bondage.’34
Höglund unmasked the true character of the two totalitarianisms in order
to resist both German and Soviet propaganda and treat them as nazikom-
munistiska propaganda (translation: Nazi-Communist propaganda). The
opinion journalist predicted that this propaganda marked the beginning of
the road to enslavement for Sweden, and decided to give testimony regarding
the crime of both regimes against Europe.35
The collective work Polen fjärde delningen (Poland. The Fourth partition),
which constituted the first volume of the chronicle of the Second World War,
was laced with compassion and sympathy for the noble and brave Poles, who,
despite their greatest efforts, sacrifice and heroism were no match for the
German war machine. The opinion journalist Karl Olof Hedström prepared
the first four chapters of the book, where he presented the overview of the
history of Poland starting from the pre-partition period, through the pro-
independence activity of Józef Piłsudski and Roman Dmowski, the regaining
of independence in 1918, up until the internal situation and foreign policy of
the Second Polish Republic. The author described the achievements of Poles
with recognition and respect, including Gdynia and the Central Industrial
District, which he visited just prior to the outbreak of the war. He noted that
the September defeat resembled the events of the 18th century, when Prussia
and Russia partitioned the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. This proved
that the Polish state could develop in peace while its two neighbouring
powers were at odds. The correspondent for Stockholms-Tidningen, Gösta
Persson, described the Polish–German conflict from the perspective of the
fate of the Free City of Gdańsk majority of population was German, but
which could develop successfully under the aegis of the League of Nations
and Poland. In turn, the lieutenant of hussars, Stig Facht, examined the cam-
paign from a military point of view. He admitted that due the lack of pre-
cision and many distortions in Polish military announcements, he had to
base his analysis on the reports of the German command. A reporter for
—
34
Z. Höglund, Alliansen Hitler–Stalin, Stockholm 1939, pp. 3–4.
35
The first article was published on 23 August 1939, but Z. Höglund already in May that year
predicted that the German-Soviet alliance was quite real. See: T. Erlander, 1901–1939, pp.
262–263.
102
Dagens Nyheter, Vladimir Semitjov, reiterated his impressions, given pre-

viously as articles, of the exodus of people fleeing from the Germans during
the military campaign in Poland. In the conclusion, Hedström emphasized
that the Swedes reacted with grief to the news about the defeat of the great
nation, with whom ‘our country maintained remarkably friendly relations’,
as well as that the Polish government continued to exist, although it tem-
porarily had no control over its territory.36
Analyses of the September Campaign were also published as part of a
series entitled Kriget (The War) and in the military magazine Ny militär
tidskrift (New Military Journal). Their overall tone was favourable towards
Poland, and their assessment of the course of combat and the causes of defeat
was realistic.37
Shortly afterwards collections of diplomatic documents were published in
Sweden under the auspices of each side engaged in the war whose intention
was to present its opponent as the initiator of the conflict. The Germans
published the White Paper at the Bonniers publishing house that made them
an object of scorn in the eyes of supporters of the Western Allies: ‘This very
same publishing house was described by Goebbels as one of the worst Jewish
octopuses.’38 The British published the British War Blue Book at the Bonniers
publishing house and in the Kooperativa Förbundets Förlag publishing house.
Their reviewers highlighted that it was of great importance that readers take
their own stand in relation to the content of both publications. Only on a few
occasions did they pointed out that the diplomatic conflict had in fact already
reached its climax and the avoidance of confrontation was impossible.39
Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning informed its readers that Polish
patriots were pouring in to France to continue fighting the Germans. It was
believed possible to recruit as many as 200 thousand soldiers from Polish
expatriates in France.40 Albert Ehrensvärd, in the same daily newspaper,
stated that the new Polish government had finished with its non-democratic
past. He predicted the rebirth of not only Poland, but all other countries that
had been conquered by Hitler: ‘There is no reason to doubt in the resur-
rection of Poland and Czechoslovakia, though perhaps in a new form and
within the new borders. In the times we live in, cultured and developing
—
36
Polen fjärde delningen, Stockholm 1939, pp. 8, 102, 197–199, 209.
37
M. Cygański, ‘Publicystyka państw skandynawskich wobec agresji…’, Przegląd Zachodnio-
pomorski 1983, iss. 1–2, p. 95.
38
‘Oförsynt judetilltag’, Trots Allt!, 21 X 1939.
39
‘Dokumenten’, Östgöta Correspondenten, 24 X 1939.
40
103
nations cannot be held in captivity […]. The sooner their liberation takes
place, the quicker order and stability will be restored in Europe.’41
One year later, Jacob de Geer called for remembrance of Poland and the
Poles: ‘We are speaking about the rebuilding of Denmark, Norway, France,
but is there any one speaking about Poland? Each defeat reveals mistakes and
weaknesses. The gloomy notions of polsk riksdag, Polnische Wirtschaft as well
as of quarrelsome and incautious Poles have returned. People are saying that
they have suffered a defeat because of their customary defiance. Nevertheless,
throughout the last year the Polish nation has turned out to be the only one,
except for the British, to shed its blood in defence of its homeland. In many
aspects it should serve as an example for other nations.’42
Further, he noted that Poland did not face up to the German war machine,
but when defeat had been experienced by France, it was then France that was
pointed to as an example of a power that proved incapable of resisting the
Germans. According to de Geer, another argument for remembering Poland,
and the need for its resurrection, was that no traitor like the president of
Czechoslovakia Emil Hácha or Norwegian Vidkun Quisling operated there.
What should be noted is that the liberal daily newspaper Göteborgs Handels-
och Sjöfarts-Tidning was included in the circle of leading Swedish newspapers
that openly opposed the new German order in Europe. The editor-in-chief,
Torgny Segerstedt, had warned his readers already about Hitler’s posses-
siveness before the outbreak of war. Despite the constant threat of confisca-
tion, he continued his uncompromising attacks on the totalitarian rules of
Germany on the continent, as well as on the Swedish government, who was
trying to prevent the invasion by means of a policy of concessions. For
Segerstedt, the fight with Hitler was tantamount to the fight for freedom, law
and democracy.43
From the end of 1939, it was difficult to make reference to Polish affairs,
both due to the lack of interest and freedom of press limitations. On 20
—
41
A. Ehrensvärd, ‘Polen i landsflykt’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 22 XII 1939.
42
J. de Geer, ‘Efter tjugu års mellanakt’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 13 XII 1940.
43
See T. Nybom, Motstånd - anpassning - uppslutning. Linjer i svensk debatt om utrikespolitik
och internationell politik 1940–1943, Stockholm 1978, pp. 47–49, 70. Worthy of note is the
difference in the attitude towards the German and the Soviet totalitarianism. The opinion
journalists for Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning consequently stated that the Soviet
Union was not expansive and aggressive by nature. Also the social-democratic daily Arbetet
propagated the view that the communist dictatorship in Russia, as opposed to Fascism, was
not striving for external expansion. Segerstedt, even following Stalin’s aggression against
Finland in 1939, perceived Germany as the main threat. These views are reflected in the
commentaries on the subject of Polish–Soviet relations in 1943 and later.
104
December 1939 laws changed resulting in restrictions on civil liberties, in-

cluding freedom of speech and publication. On 20 January 1940, during a
public debate on these restrictions, the most-right leaning member of parlia-
ment, Ivar Anderson, said: ‘Swedish society must adapt to the new era.’44 In
practice this meant avoiding voicing opinions which could provoke a reac-
tion from the countries involved in the war.
From 1940 only a few articles were published that pointed out the policy
mistakes of the pre-war Polish authorities which led to the defeat in Sep-
tember 1939. It was highlighted that the government formed after the lost
campaign was composed of ‘brave and wise people, who can offer a new fu-
ture to the Polish nation.’45 Following the defeat of France in July 1940, Polish
military efforts in autumn 1939 began to be assessed differently: ‘France had
to defend itself against the attack of 80 million Germans and 40 million
Italians while being supported by well-prepared fortifications, natural bar-
riers and Great Britain. Poland was defeated by 80 million Germans and 170
million Russians while not being supported by any fortifications what-
soever.’46 German successes on the western front made the Swedish press
revise their opinion of Polish army’s weakness in 1939. Opinions were even
voiced that the Poles had done a better job than their powerful allies.47
In 1940, the brochure How it Happened! From Versailles Until Today was
published, in which an anonymous author explained the genesis and course of
the Polish–German conflict in the interwar period. The author mostly focused
on the situation of the German minority in Poland and the Polish minority in
—
44
A. W. Johansson, Per Albin., pp. 99–103. Also during this debate a renowned historian and
opinion journalist, Herbert Tingsten, drew attention to the absurdity of the situation: ‘The
only ones who may not be criticised are the governments of the countries who are attacking
our government’. The influence of restriction on freedom of speech in Sweden during the
war on the general presence of Polish theme was described by A. N. Uggla, Den svenska
Polenbilden…
45
Tasp., ‘Politisk tvekamp i armén vållade Polens katastrof’, Dagens Nyheter, 11 I 1940.
46
‘Orsakerna till Polens nederlag’, Arbetaren, 25 VII 1940.
47
See the quotation from the Social-Demokraten daily reprinted in the Polish newspapers
published in the USA: A. K. Kunert, Rzeczpospolita Walcząca. Styczeń–grudzień 1940. Kalen-
darium, Warszawa 1997, p. 306. Paradoxically, these opinions were more likely to be made
public by the closely observed and systematically criticised by the Germans – due to, accord-
ing to Berlin, excessive virulence – Swedish press rather than by an allied broadcasting
station. Minister of Information and Documentation S. Stroński addressed this issue during
the government session on 8 January 1941: ‘At times we had problems with the BBC in rela-
tion to the preoccupation of the British with avoiding putting the French off. This was the
reason for the BBC’s unwillingness to repeat the opinion of the Swedish press, who con-
sidered our army better than that of the French’. See: Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Ministrów
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, vol. 2: czerwiec 1940 – czerwiec 1941, scholarly editing by M.
Zgórniak, compiled by W. Rojek in cooperation with A. Suchcitz, Kraków 1995, p. 259.
105
Germany, and polemicized with the propaganda of Goebbels and described the
position of the German minority as much better.48 In turn, lawyer Stanisław
Adamek, who came to Sweden with refugees from Poland and started to
cooperate with the Trots Allt! magazine, argued that Poland needed peace more
than any other country in Europe, that it did not want war and that it was not
prepared for it. Adamek also exposed the brutal conduct of the Germans
towards civilians during the campaign and later on.49 It is worth noting that
Trots Allt!, which was published by Ture Nerman, was famed from its con-
ception for its crusade against totalitarianism and defeatism, which spread
increasingly among Swedish society following Hitler’s victories.50
As well as some favourable studies in the Swedish publishing market, there
appeared an anti-Polish work devoted to the defeat of the Second Polish
Republic. Torun Hedlund-Nyström (a Secretary of the Editorial Board for
the journal Sverige-Tyskland), in the beginning of her book Polens fjärde del-
ning. Dess förhistoria och fullbordan (The Fourth Partition of Poland. Its
Genesis and Execution) presented the argument that the Polish nation, like
no other of similar size, was never able to maintain a strong national culture,
and the epithets polsk riksdag and Polnische Wirtschaft, therefore, were the
result. Absurd decisions concerning the location of borders, approved by the
Treaty of Versailles, as well as Polish chauvinism, fuelled by the activity of
ultra nationalist associations, were responsible for the Poland–Germany con-
flict, which centred on Gdańsk.51 Hedlund-Nyström did not explicitly blame
any of the sides, but remarked that the Germans were neither the exclusive
nor the main perpetrators and that part of the responsibility rested on the
shoulders of Great Britain. On a map depicting the concentration of armies
of both sides before 1 September 1939, the author drew arrows that allegedly
showed the planned attacks of the Polish armies. She did not deny the bravery
of Polish soldiers, but quoting General Edmund Ironside she accused the
higher command of a lack of sufficient organisational skills.
—
48
Justus, Hur det skedde! Från Versailles till i dag, Stockholm 1940.
49
ESWU [Stanisław Adamek], Folkens frihetskamp. Det nya världkriget, Stockholm 1940, pp.
14, 16, 21–22, 82.
50
For more information about the circles centred around the Trots Allt!, see: L. Drangel, Den
kämpande demokratin. En studie i antinazistisk opinionsrörelse 1935–1945, Stockholm 1976,
pp. 34–73.
51
T. Hedlund-Nyström, Polens fjärde delning. Dess förhistoria och fullbordan, Malmö 1940,
pp. 11, 95, 109, 135,
139, 159.
106
During the Winter War

In the face of growing tensions in Finnish–Soviet relations, which by Stalin’s
order, on 30 November 1939, evolved into the so-called Winter War, the
Finnish issue became the number one story both in the press and during the
sessions of the Swedish government. Insofar as during the September Cam-
paign opinions as to the genesis of the war were divided. The Swedish public
opinion clearly condemned the Soviet aggression, using such blunt terms as
cynicism, brutality and aversion to describe the overt injustice inflicted upon
a peaceful nation. The attack on Finland was received almost like an attack
on Sweden itself. Supporters of an active military engagement by Sweden in
defence of Finland repeated the slogan ‘Finlands sak är vår’ (Finland’s busi-
ness is ours). People also started to wonder how Hitler and Stalin actually
divided up Europe and in which of the two spheres of influence Sweden
found itself.52 The Polish matter was pushed into the background, and there-
fore appeared only in the margins of political debate.53
In connection with the growing interest in the Soviet expansion – follow-
ing the aggression against Finland and later annexations in the territories of
the Baltic States – publications describing the situation in the Polish Eastern
Borderlands began to be put out. In the preface to the brochure Rysslands nya
imperialism: de små nationernas drama i diktaturstaten (The New Russian
Imperialism. The Tragedy of Small Nations in a Dictatorial Country) by Paul
Olberg (a former activist of the Mensheviks, editor of Social-Demokraten,
and Swedish citizen) a well-known social-democratic activist Zeth Höglund
argued that Stalin’s aggressions were a continuation of Russian imperialism,
the only difference being that the Bolshevik imperialism used methods which
were far more clever, sophisticated, and brutal, under the veil of social
liberation. Olberg concluded that the Soviet policy conducted in the Polish
territories led to the spread of disorganisation and anarchy, lawlessness and
poverty. These views of opinion journalists who moved in social democratic
circles were echoed by the Swedish journalist Letta Rudnicka-Jaroszynska in
Mitt möte med Röda armén (My Meeting with the Soviet Army) published in
1943, where she described her life under Soviet occupation. The reign of the
Bolsheviks in Poland was, according to her, tantamount to the reign of terror
—
52
J. Torbacke, Dagens Nyheter och demokratins kris 1937–1946. Genom stormar till seger,
Stockholm 1972, pp. 103–104.
53
When in the beginning of December 1939 S. Grafström returned to Berlin from occupied
Warsaw, he found that the only matter that was discussed in the Swedish Legation was the
Finnish–Soviet war. Same was the case in the capital of Sweden. See: S. Grafström, Anteck-
ningar 1938–1944, p. 200, 203.
107
and lawlessness, propaganda brainwashing, poverty and hunger, deporta-

tions and atheisation of social life.54
According to Envoy Potworowski, over the following several months the
Swedish press became increasingly neutral, and, to escape exposure to any
charges, hard-hitting commentaries were avoided. News from the General
Government, introduced by the Germans in the occupied territories of
Poland, was mostly neglected.55 In spite of this, Potworowski, based on his
experience from working in Stockholm for several years, stressed that the
press was showing a lot of good will by periodically reporting on the activity
of the Polish government in exile, the development of Polish Armed Forces
in the West or about the tragic situation in the territories occupied by the
Germans and the Soviets.56 Moreover, attacks on Poland in the press were
rare or pointless. This was also how Potworowski evaluated screenings of
Blitzkrieg, which portrayed the 1939 campaign in Poland. According to the
Polish envoy, the film was weak, and therefore harmless. Most reviewers of
the film agreed with his opinion.57 This was one of the reasons why, in March
1941, the Polish diplomat asserted that the attitude of the Swedish press on
—
54
L. Rudnicka-Jaroszynska, Mitt mote med Röda armén, Malmö 1943, pp. 55–56, 62, 86, 101–
102, 109–110, 113, 181.
55
During the initial months of the war, the British propaganda services in Sweden were
concentrating particularly on the dissemination of descriptions of brutal actions of the
German occupying forces in Poland. See: Ch. Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia, Oxford–
New York 1986, p. 49.
56
See: discussion on these articles in the Polish newspapers in London: ‘W Szwecji o Polsce.
Nie ma Quislingów wśród Polaków’, Dziennik Polski, 26 XI 1940; ‘Szwed o rujnującej
gospodarce niemieckiej w Polsce’, Dziennik Polski, 15 I 1941; Tak jest w Warszawie,
‘Dziennik Polski’, 18 VII 1941; ‘Szwedzki dziennikarz, który był w Polsce’, Dziennik Polski,
1 XI 1941; ‘Szwecja nie tai prawdy o Polsce’, Dziennik Polski, 19 XI 1941; ‘W Szwecji o Armii
Polskiej’, Dziennik Żołnierza, 3 VI 1942; ‘Szwedzi o cierpieniach Polski’, Dziennik Polski, 27
VIII 1942; ‘Prasa szwedzka o nas’, Dziennik Polski, 17 XI 1942; ‘Co widział obserwator
szwedzki w Polsce? Smutne życie w zburzonej Warszawie’, Dziennik Polski, 16 I 1943;
‘Dziennik szwedzki o życiu w Warszawie’, Wieści Polskie, 12 III 1943; ‘Dziennik szwedzki o
życiu w Warszawie’, Orzeł Biały, 4 IV 1943. It is worth noting that the Polish press in London
quoted Swedish articles about Poland very rarely, as it perceived them as a valuable inter-
mediary in the process of acquiring information on the situation in the occupied territories
and it was not reasonable to attract the German attention to these sources.
57
This most probably refers to the documentary film by F. Hippler Feldzug in Polen
(Campaign in Poland), screened in Germany from 6 February 1940. Or possibly another
documentary film devoted to the same subject – H. Bertram’s Feuertaufe (Baptism of Fire),
which was presented for the first time in Oslo on 5 April 1940 and one day later in Berlin.
See: A. K. Kunert, Rzeczpospolita Walcząca. Styczeń–grudzień 1940, p. 156. Polish news-
papers published in London highlighted that the film did not arouse much enthusiasm in
Stockholm, see: ‘Film, który się nie podoba Szwedom’, Dziennik Polski, 5 V 1941. British
press attaché Peter Tennant mentions Swedish screenings of the film Feuertaufe, see: P.
Tennant, Vid sidan av kriget. Diplomat i Sverige 1939–1945, Stockholm 1989, p. 115.
108
the Polish matter was ‘more than appropriate, as it was friendly and full of
understanding and sympathy for our situation.’58 Throughout the entire war
the Svio-Polonica annual was published by the Polish–Swedish Academic
Association of the Stockholm University College (Svensk-polska studiesäll-
skapet vid Stockholms högskola). Those who deserve the most credit for safe-
guarding Polish–Swedish academic relations during the war were the Polish
language teachers at the higher education institutions in Stockholm, Uppsala
and Lund – Zbigniew Folejewski, Jerzy Trypućko and Zygmunt Łakociński.
In 1942 Otto Sjögren, the author of a university handbook in geography,
devoted a chapter to Poland. Based on pre-war sightseeing descriptions, he
presented a picture of Warsaw before the bombings – a city, not enchanting
at first sight, but which improved on closer inspection, and Gdynia – the best
Polish interwar investment. The author predicted that ‘history may once
more allow us to see Poland reborn.’60
Gunnar Lundberg, in 1940, published his evaluation of the foreign and
domestic policy of the Second Polish Republic. He described Poland as a
country with a meaningful Russian minority and quite severe social oppres-
sion. In his view, its victorious opponents were worse still. The Soviet Union,
in exchange for its will of cooperation with the Third Reich, received a pay-
ment in the form of half of Poland and the Baltic States.61
A negative picture of Poland and the Poles re-emerged in contemporary
Swedish diary literature. In his memoirs, published 1942–43, Swedish diplomat
Einar af Wirsén, and official of the Swedish Legation in Warsaw in 1921,
emphasized the capital city’s dirt, 18th-century mentality of Polish politicians,
their ignorance, recklessness, quarrelsomeness and ruthlessness.62 Other books
of this genre were also published. In 1942 Det har inte stått i tidningen. En
svensk utlandsjournalists minnen från två krigsår (This Was Not in the News-
paper. A Swedish Foreign Correspondent’s Memoirs of Two Years of War) was
published. It was written by Gunnar Müllern, a Berlin correspondent for
Aftonbladet, who travelled to the General Government twice – at the beginning
of 1940 and again in mid-1941. Müllern recalled the ‘bloody Sunday’ in
Bydgoszcz as an example of repression used by the Poles on the Germans.
—
58
AAN, HI/I/199, press report by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski for the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 12 III 1941.
60
O. Sjögren, Geografisk läsebok, vol. 2: Europa utom Norden, Stockholm 1942, pp. 765–777.
61
G. Lundberg, Missnöjets missionärer. En vidräkning med de kommunistiska sabotörerna,
Stockholm 1940, p. 6.
62
E. af Wirsén, Minnen från krig och fred, Stockholm 1942; idem, Från Balkan till Berlin,
Stockholm 1943. See: B. Skarżyński, Motywy polskie w piśmiennictwie szwedzkim w czasie
wojny (ciąg dalszy), ‘Nowa Polska’ 1946, iss. 1, pp. 62–64.
109
When addressing the German policy during the occupation, he did not en-
counter any anomalies, describing it instead as ‘iron discipline.’ Polish people
complained about increase in prices, but – according to Müllern – the Germans
made sure that factory employees and their families were offered cheap meals
by field kitchens. The German Governor Hans Frank also assured him that he
was planning to rebuild Poland. An indicator of situation in the Kraków Ghetto
was the availability of coffee and other goods, although at inflated prices. In
general, the views of Müllern were infused with anti-Semitism. His account
does not mention acts of terror and massacres committed by the Germans.
Instead it focuses on the filth and stench, for which he blamed the Jews.63
Memories of Poland can be found in Hakkorsets tidevarv (The Era of the
Swastika), a book published only in 1944 by a Berlin correspondent for
Svenska Dagbladet and Stockholms-Tidningen, Bertil Svahnström. This pub-
lication covers Svahnström’s work in Germany. It contains few Polish
threads, but Svahnström describes the damage incurred by Poland in Sep-
tember 1939. The visit to occupied Warsaw was a particularly meaningful
experience for him: ‘It was shocking to see the first city that was reduced to
rubble during the Second World War. Over the first five years of the war we
gradually became less sensitive […], but what we saw during these memor-
able days of September have been our most striking experience.’64 Although
at the outset of the war his attitude was pro-German, he expressed disbelief
at the Soviet bestiality presented to the foreign press correspondents by the
Germans in the Lviv prisons occupied in the summer of 1941. He also men-
tions the process of Germanisation and the misery of Poles from Poznań
province, which had been incorporated in the Third Reich.
The decline in the public interest in Sweden as to the fate of the Second
Polish Republic harmonized with the passivity of the Swedish government,
which was at the beginning of 1939 and 1940 preoccupied with issues that
were marginal in the sphere of Polish–Swedish relations. On 19 January 1940,
for instance, Swedish authorities examined the case of a butler at the Swedish
Legation in Warsaw, Józef Szymański, who died during the bombing of the
city on 24 September 1939 when he was at working in the building of the
legation. The minister’s request was that the Swedes cover all the costs of his
—
63
G. Müllern, Det har inte stått i tidningen. En svensk utlandsjournalists minnen från två
krigsår, Stockholm 1942, pp. 52–57, 179–184.
64
PISM, A 21, 8/26, the study devoted to the book by B. Svahnström entitled Hakkorsets
tidenarv (The Era of Swastika).
110
funeral, 663.14 crowns, from the additional expenses fund.65 In the Swedish
diplomatic correspondence it is difficult to find the echoes of Polish efforts
to launch protests against the harsh occupational policy in Poland.66 Sweden
behaved the same as other neutral countries, which for fear of reprisals from
Berlin and Moscow ‘had to pretend that the Polish matter did not exist.’67
At the outset of November 1939, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
ordered Potworowski to enquire in to proposing the novel Sól ziemi (The Salt
of the Land) by Józef Wittlin for the Nobel Prize in Literature.68 There was
speculation that Wittlin had a chance of winning, which would be of great
significance, in terms of propaganda, for the Polish matter. The Winter War,
however, diverted attention away from the subject of Poland even in this
instance. The prize was awarded to the Finnish writer Frans Eemil Sillanpää.
Joen Lagerberg was not delegated to London to continue the mission as
Swedish envoy at the Polish government. The Nordic States also agreed not to
delegate their diplomatic representatives to Paris. Administrative changes
introduced by the Germans and Soviets were accepted, and further develop-
ments were anticipated. In January 1940 Lagerberg, who had remained in
Stockholm and been given little to do, was made director of the B Division,
charged with the protection of interests for countries at war. Lagerberg reas-
sured Potworowski that his accreditation to the Polish government was intact,
maintaining that was the reason Lagerberg had been assigned a task in his
homeland and not delegated abroad.69 As well as the Swedish wait-and-see atti-
tude, there are several examples of closer relations between Polish and Swedish
diplomats at various posts. According to Polish Ambassador to Ankara Michał
Sokolnicki, to give one example, the attitude of Swedish Envoy Einar Modig
towards Poland was friendly. In 1942, after Envoy Potworowski had been
expelled from Sweden, Modig visited Sokolnicki to explain this decision citing
—
65
RA, Kabinettet/UD Huvudarkivet, Statsrådsprotokoll, series A3A, vol. 107, ‘Protokoll över
Utrikesdepartementets ärende’, Stockholm, 19 I 1940.
66
The Polish government kept calling for such protests to the neutral states, especially to the
USA and Vatican, referring to speeches delivered by Americans in reaction to the Soviet
Union’s pressures on Finland. See: Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej, vol. 1, p. 88 (the statement of the Undersecretary of State at the Presidency of the
Council of Ministers during the sessions of the Government on 23 November 1939).
67
Report by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Z. Graliński at a December meeting of the
League of Nations, 9 I 1940 [in:] Sprawa polska w czasie drugiej wojny światowej na arenie
międzynarodowej. Zbiór dokumentów, ed. S. Stanisławska, Warszawa 1965, p. 132.
68
AAN, HI/I/245, telegram by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Zaleski to the Swedish Legation
in Stockholm, 2 XI 1939.
69
of Foreign Affairs, 11 I 1940.
111
pressures from Germany.70 In turn, the presiding attaché to Bern, Stanisław

Edward Nahlik, mentioned many years later that he had close relations with
Swedish Envoy Zenon Przybyszewski-Westrup.71 Incidental meetings with the
Swedes were also acknowledged by ambassador Raczyński (though he omitted
meeting with Prytz on September, 26, 1939).72 From the second half of 1941,
Swedish envoy to Moscow Vilhelm Assarsson discussed the situation and
policy of the Soviet Union with the Polish ambassador professor Stanisław Kot.
From the beginning of 1942 the Polish diplomat was fearful of Stalin’s attitude
to the Polish issues. He predicted that the Soviet Union would adopt an
imperialist policy similar to that of tsarist Russia.73
Mutual relations between diplomats mostly involved contacts between the
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the staff of the Polish Legation in
Stockholm. Yet, the Swedes were very cautious and situations determined
precisely the limits of their mission. In March 1940 they demanded that the
Polish Legation stop their radio station broadcasts. Potworowski explained
that using operating a radio station was in line with international legislation
and customs, but he did not manage to convince his interlocutor and the
Poles eventually had to capitulate.74 Envoy Potworowski drew the attention
of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the inappropriate content of arti-
cles published by the official press bulletin of the Ministry of Information and
Communications Głos Polski (The Voice of Poland), which ‘systematically
attacks Sweden in connection with the Finnish matter by means of offensive
expressions and arguments.’ Potworowski maintained that this was poli-
tically harmful and could make the operation of the Polish diplomatic mis-
sion in Stockholm even more difficult. For the Germans it provided an
opportunity to launch anti-Polish propaganda.75
Polish diplomatic circles attributed even greater significance to relations
with Sweden. Jan Ciechanowski, the newly appointed Secretary of State at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Angers, the right hand of Zaleski, proposed
that the operation of the ministry in exile be organized along the traditional
—
70
M. Sokolnicki, Dziennik ankarski 1939–1943, pp. 420–421; idem, Ankarski dziennik 1943–
1946, London 1974, pp. 265, 293. These social meetings have been recorded in the book.
71
S. E. Nahlik, Przesiane przez pamięć, vol. 2, Kraków 2002, p. 277.
72
E. Raczyński, W sojuszniczym…, p. 152.
73
V. Assarsson, I skuggan av Stalin, Stockholm 1963, pp. 104–105.
74
of Foreign Affairs, 13 III 1940.
75
Ibidem, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign
112
divisions: allied, hostile and neutral states.76 The new division was not intro-
duced, but Minister Zaleski, during the session of the National Council on 28
March 1940, highlighted that even though priority would be given to the
relations with France and Great Britain, actions in other directions should
entertained. He discussed separately the relations with the neutral states,
mentioning firstly the Holy See and the USA. He regretted the fact that many
states with which the Polish government maintained diplomatic relations
decided not to delegate their representatives to France because of pressures
from Germany. In fact, he did not mention Sweden, but it could be included
in the group of countries, to which Zaleski thanked for ‘not refusing to grant
temporary asylum to numerous Polish refugees and who helped them to
survive these difficult times.’ Gratitude was extended both to the authorities
and to associations and private persons.77 Minister of Labour and Social
Welfare Jan Stańczyk distinguished Sweden among the countries who took
part in the humanitarian action for occupied Poland. He stated that around
20 thousand Swedish crowns together with clothes were donated by Sweden.78
Despite these facts, the outbreak of the Winter War was equivalent to the
opening of a new chapter in Polish–Swedish relations. In December 1939,
when the fighting on the Finnish–Soviet front was already in progress, Bohe-
man admitted, during a conversation with counsellor of the British Legation
William Montagu-Pollock, that the Swedish government was groping in the
dark, as it was unfamiliar with the exact intentions of either the Germans or
the Soviets. According to Envoy Richert, the Germans were to attack Sweden
instantly if Sweden supported Finland against the Soviet Union. At the same
time, Göring encouraged them to help the Finns. According to the Briton’s
view, Swedish military circles and public opinion were in favour of launching
a specific aid operation for Finland, whereas the government considered such
support to be suicide.79 The Swedes were convinced that what needed to be
prevented was the merging of two European military conflicts where the
Germans and the Soviet Union would join forces against Great Britain and
France. That is why Stockholm firmly opposed the plans of launching an
intervention of the Western Allies in Scandinavia.
—
76
S. Zabiełło, Na posterunku we Francji, Warszawa 1967, p. 58.
77
E. Duraczyński, R. Turkowski, O Polsce na uchodźstwie. Rada Narodowa Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej 1939–1945, Warszawa 1997, pp. 38, 256–262.
78
RA, UD avdelningar och byråarkiv 1864–1952, Andra B-avdelningen, vol. 417, bulletin of
the agency Pol-Radio, no. 132, Stockholm, 2 IV 1940.
79
NA, FO, 371/23709, memorandum by W. Montagu-Pollock, 19 XII 1939.
113
The decision to grant military support to Finland was made by the Allies
on 19 December 1939. They hoped that this would also solve the issue of
suspending deliveries of Swedish iron ore to Germany.80 On 27 December,
the Swedish government was acquainted with the plan to transit the English
and French armies from Norway, through Sweden, to Finland. The main
advocate of this plan was the incumbent First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston
Churchill.81 Several days later, the Swedes submitted their reply, where they
refused to participate in the operation. They explained that this would lead
to a countermove by the Germans and Soviet Union, and that it was in the
Allies’ interest that Sweden maintained its neutrality.82 The fear of the
Germans also prevented the Swedes from launching their individual cam-
paign in Finland, because Hansson was convinced that Hitler would interpret
such an engagement as consent for an intervention by the Allies.83 The pro-
posal to grant special warranties of security by London were accepted by the
Swedes with reserve. They pointed to the example of Poland, where British
warranties were of no use. Sweden did not support the resolution on exclud-
ing the Soviet Union from the League of Nations, abstaining from voting
together with Denmark and Norway.84 The Swedish delegation left the session
room during voting.85 On 4 January 1940, the Swedes expressed their willing-
ness to facilitate the action of the Allies, but not so as to be accused of vio-
lating the principles of neutrality.
At the same time, the Finns initiated talks about possible support from the
West through the port in Petsamo. A specific proposal was introduced that
the operation be performed with the backing of Polish Navy vessels in the
event that the British wanted to avoid fighting with the Soviets. General
Sikorski maintained that this benefit the Polish matter, but disapproved of
the French and the British barring Polish officers from participating in the
—
80
A. Suchcitz, ‘Polska a wojna fińsko-sowiecka 1939–1940’, Niepodległość 1988, pp. 167–168.
81
See: W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 1: The Gathering Storm, London 1985,
pp. 490–493; P. R. Osborne, Operation Pike: Britain Versus the Soviet Union, 1939 –1941,
Westport, CT, USA, 2000.
82
A. W. Johansson, Per Albin och kriget, Stockholm 1984, p. 115. Before the Allies officially
turned to Stockholm in the matter of transit of their army, Hansson, at a meeting of the
leadership of the social-democratic party, explained that the Swedish government needed to
think carefully before accepting any support from the Western Allies, as it was necessary for
considering the fate of their smaller allies.
83
Ibidem, p. 122.
84
J. Nevakivi, The appeal that was never made. The Allies, Scandinavia and the Finnish winter
war 1939–1940, London 1976, p. 60.
85
B. Piotrowski, Wojna radziecko-fińska (zimowa) 1939–1940. Legendy, niedomówienia,
realia, Poznań 1997, pp. 103–104; J. Szymański, Skandynawia–Polska…, pp. 204–205.
114
staff discussions. Meanwhile, the Allies’ plans included the landing in

Northern Finland of an alpine rifle brigade, two battalions of foreign legions,
four (or two) Polish battalions and one British brigade – in total approxi-
mately 17 thousand troops.86
The Polish government proposed that the first troops to be transported
through Stockholm to Finland would be those of the Polish divisions, in-
terned in the Baltic States and in the Balkans (Polish pilots, soldiers of the
Border Protection Corps (Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza) and other units),
reinforced by French troops. The Poles expected Sweden to transfer military
equipment, the purchase of which was being negotiated between the Allies
and Stockholm.87 The armament company Bofors, which prior to the war
supplied equipment and licenses, had obligations towards Poland. The talks
were to be held in Helsinki and Stockholm and Lieutenant Colonel Tadeusz
Rudnicki was to participate in them. Sikorski hoped that Rudnicki would
convince the Swedes to take Polish volunteers in, and even to equip them
with arms and military attire. He considered a more probable scenario would
be the setting up of aviation divisions in Sweden, and relocating the Border
Protection Corps to the Åland.88
According to Marshal Carl Gustaf von Mannerheim, the plan failed due to
opposition from Sweden, but Polish documentation reveals Finland was also
reluctant towards the negotiations between the Polish and Finnish govern-
ments in Helsinki.89 Nevertheless, Lieutenant Colonel Rudnicki, who talked to
the Finns with authorisation from the Polish government, agreed with General
Rudolf Walden that the main obstacle to bringing the Poles from Latvia to
Finland was the refusal of the Swedish government to their transit.90
The new Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Christian Günther, on 9
January 1940, assured the German Envoy, Prince Victor of Wied, that
Sweden would not provide military support to Finland, at the behest of the
League of Nations, as this would be against the policy of neutrality. He added
—
86
J. Nevakivi, The appeal…, pp. 50, 65, 70–73, 87–89, 105.
87
Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, vol. 1, p. 133.
88
AAN, HI/I/246, telegram by Prime Minister and the Commander-in-Chief General W.
Sikorski do Lieutenant Colonel T. Rudnicki, 4 II 1940.
89
We may certainly speak of ambiguous attitude of the Finns towards the plans of their
support from the Allies, because they did not regulate their political-diplomatic relations
with Poland following the September Campaign and avoided direct negotiations at high
level. The question also arises of whether the plan to transfer circa 10 thousand Polish troops
and officers from the Baltic States to the Finnish front was at all feasible. See: A. Suchcitz,
Polska., p. 177; K. Tarka, ‘Z Litwy do Finlandii? Polacy w wojnie sowiecko-fińskiej’, Zeszyty
Historyczne 1996, iss. 115, p. 222.
90
J. Nevakivi, The appeal…, pp. 179–183.
115
that he would oppose every attempt of setting up an Ally military base in his
country, and even the attempt to transfer the British or French forces through
its territory.91 In turn, towards the end of February, in a conversation with a
Member of the British House of Commons, Harold Macmillan, Minister
Günther highlighted that his government’s principal aim was to prevent
Sweden from engaging in a worldwide military conflict. That is why he con-
sidered a swift conclusion to the Finnish–Soviet peace agreement to be the
best solution.92
At the outset of February 1940, Secretary General Boheman met with
Gustaw Potworowski. During their conversation he repeated arguments pre-
sented by the Swedish diplomats to the representatives of the powers. He stated
that Sweden would not join the war, as victory would be impossible in the clash
with the Germans, and Great Britain would not be able to help. He argued: ‘In
such situation no country would desire to spread the war to its own territory.
The war with us would not be easy for the Germans either, and is without doubt
undesirable, but they would not hesitate to start it, if we gave them even the
smallest reason to do so. That is why we must be very careful not to fall into the
trap.’93 According to Potworowski, Boheman’s statement reflected the mood of
the majority of the political elite and the Swedish public. The Swedes were,
however, in favour of the idea of offering military support to Finland, which
was fighting with the Soviet Union, for, as claimed the deputy minister: ‘Each
Swede understands today that the military defeat of Finland would pose a direct
threat to the borders of Sweden.’94 On the other hand he appealed: ‘under no
circumstances may we grant this support, directly or indirectly, for this would
involve Sweden in “the great war.”’ The challenge of reconciling the attitude of
neutrality towards the powers with the increase in support for Finland was
difficult.95 The Swedes endeavoured to bring an end to the Winter War by
—
91
W. Wilhelmus, ‘Det tyska anfallet mot Skandinavien’ [in:] Urladdning. 1940 – blixtkrigens
år, ed. B. Hugemark, Luleå 2002, pp. 64–65. On the Swedish-German talks on the subject of
the fate of Finland in the autumn of 1939, see: S. Dębski, Między Berlinem a Moskwą.
Stosunki niemiecko-sowieckie 1939–1941, Warszawa 2003, pp. 271–273.
92
H. Macmillan, The Blast of War 1939–1945, London 1967, pp. 47–48.
93
PISM, A 12, 3/2, vol. 2, letter by Envoy G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Stockholm, 8 II 1940, p. 528.
94
Ibidem.
95
Ibidem. At around the same time S. Grafström, on commenting in the daily on the current
policy of Sweden, stated perversely: ‘Neutrality is indeed an art of balancing on a rope, but
when one is balancing and dancing at the same time, one risks falling off.’ See: S. Grafström,
Anteckningar 1938–1944, p. 208–209. See: A. W. Johansson, ‘I skuggan av operation Bar-
barosa. Attityder och stämningar 1940/1941’ [in:] I orkanens öga. 1941 – osäker neutralitet,
ed. B. Hugemark, Luleå 2002, pp. 84–85.
116
means of an amicable settlement. They attempted to prevent, where feasible,

preparations for the British–French military intervention with the co-par-
ticipation of Poland, as well as work out a peaceful solution for Finland and the
Soviet Union.96 Sweden, for which peace was vitally important, put pressure on
the Finns to achieve this, and Stalin considered such a mediator to be ideal.
Subsequent pressure from the Allies regarding the transit resulted in the peace
negotiations evolving into a race, in which Sweden, due to its promise of
support, had to save Finland from military collapse and at the same time
convince it to accept the conditions of peace as soon as possible, prior to the
intervention of the Western Allies.97
Sweden’s engagement on the side of the Allies was therefore limited. It is
accepted that the Swedes secretly conveyed all their information about the
Soviet army to the military and naval attaché of Great Britain. This example
served British Envoy Victor Mallet as an explanation of the characteristic
features of the Swedish style of action. Officially, the Swedes forwarded
worthless information in writing. Conversely, in unofficial conversations,
they were extremely helpful and willing to answer all questions, provided
they related to the Soviets. Simultaneously, they were very cautious in their
comments about Germany.98 Mallet even put a special emphasis on the fact
that officials of Utrikesdepartementet were disciplined and extremely cau-
tious when talking with foreigners and – in contrast – officials of the Foreign
Office were much more indiscreet.99 The Swedes in their conversations with
Mallet pointed out that a total defeat of Germany was not in their interest, as
it would shatter the political balance in the Baltic Sea region.100 The relations
between Sweden and Germany were not good, especially in the initial months
of the war, when the dissatisfaction with unfavourable press articles pub-
—
96
W. M. Carlgren, Svensk utrikespolitik…, p. 81. The Swedes clearly communicated to British
Envoy V. Mallet that they would never agree to the transit of Allied forces, as this would
result in termination of deliveries of iron ore to Germany, which would be never accepted
by Hitler and make him launch an invasion of Sweden. See: E. Boheman, På vakt. Kabinetts-
sekreterare…, pp. 103–104.
97
A. W. Johansson, Per Albin…, pp. 131–132.
98
E. Boheman, På vakt. Kabinettssekreterare…, p. 8. The author explains that in the initial
years of the war it was never certain whether a sudden German attack would not make the
archives of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs end up in the hands of the Gestapo, just
like it happened in the case of the countries that had been conquered by Hitler. That is why
not all issues of foreign policy were documented.
99
NA, FO, 371/29684, letter by British Envoy to Stockholm V. Mallet to L. Collier, 8 III 1940.
100
117
lished in the Swedish liberal and leftist daily newspapers was expressed open-
ly in Berlin. Also, Minister Sandler was not particularly liked in Berlin.101 His
successor, Christian Günther, was better regarded by the Germans, who des-
cribed him as the man with whom one may talk openly even about the most
sensitive of subjects. As a professional diplomat, the Swedish Envoy to Oslo,
and with no association with any political party (according to Carlgren he
joined a social democratic party following his appointment as minister102),
Günther was to make pragmatic decisions, bordering on cynicism.
At the outset of March 1940, Envoy Potworowski sent his first press report
to Angers, in which he discussed the second half of February.103 His general
observation that the Polish affairs were pushed into the background due to
the outbreak of the Winter War is not at all surprising. Nevertheless, Pot-
worowski highlighted that the Swedish dailies were publishing – though only
occasionally – more important news about Poland thanks to the foreign press
correspondents for Swedish dailies and a correspondent for the Polish
Telegraphic Agency (PAT), Jan Otmar-Berson. It was thanks to Otmar-
Berson that the bulletin Pol-Radio (the aforementioned zielonek) was sub-
mitted every second day to leading opinion journalists and other individuals
connected with Swedish media. It also served the British, who published their
own bulletin Nyheter från Storbritannien (News from Great Britain). The
envoy admitted that the news provided by the Polish Legation was much less
popularized by the Swedish media than others, because of the general ten-
dency to avoid irritating German diplomacy.104 It was at that moment that the
Swedish government gained an essential tool of press control in the shape of
statutory authorisations, which allowed for a substantial (though not formal)
censorship of newspapers. According to Potworowski, the propaganda acti-
vity pursued by the legation was not pointless. For, as envoy explained:
‘propaganda, by means of regularly submitted bulletins, sinks into the minds
of people and shapes real views, which is reflected both in private conver-
sations and articles either specially devoted to Polish matters or addressing
—
101
Grafström noted in his journal on 21 December 1939 that Sandler’s resignation from his
position was perceived by Sweden as a concession towards Germany. See: S. Grafström,
Anteckningar 1938–1944, p. 204.
102
W. M. Carlgren, Svensk utrikespolitik…, pp. 75, 127.
103
PISM, A 10, 5/11, a press report for the period of 15–29 February 1940 by Polish Envoy
to Stockholm G. Potworowski, Stockholm, 6 III 1940.
104
Even S. Grafström, who was famous for his anti-Nazi views, agreed with the timid state-
ment of Swedish Envoy to Berlin A. Richert in December 1939: ‘Sweden is currently too
small and not sufficiently armed to have the luxury to view the current developments from
an outdated perspective of seeking justice – just like the press, who does it in the name of
humanitarian ideas’. See: S. Grafström, Anteckningar 1938–1944, p. 200.
118
the subjects from the area of European relations and the policy of the
countries engaged in the war.’105
Nevertheless, Swedish society was much more intent on switching the eco-
nomy and living conditions to military mode, and the government was pre-
occupied with clever manoeuvring within the diplomatic labyrinth created by
the continually expanding European conflict. The Winter War left the Swedish
government unscathed. Prime Minister Hansson, in his speech on 9 February
at his party’s parliamentary club, explained: ‘The government, like no one else,
wants to help Finland, and although we all sympathize strongly with Finland,
we most importantly have to think about Sweden.’106 When on 12 March 1940
a Finnish–Soviet truce was signed, relief was felt in Stockholm.107
—
105
PISM, A 10, 5/11, a press report for the period of 15–29 February 1940. Polish Envoy to
Stockholm G. Potworowski, Stockholm, 6 III 1940.
106
A. W. Johansson, Per Albin…, p. 127. H. Batowski, Rok 1940…, p. 249, positively evaluated
the activity of Swedish diplomacy during the Winter War, as ‘it showed much artistry in
avoiding extremes in both directions’.
107
Churchill Archives Centre, Sir Victor Mallet, Memoir, p. 69, reminds that from 1941 on-
wards the Swedes, while highlighting their behaviour during the Finnish-Soviet war, claimed
that it was actually thanks to them that Great Britain did not end up in a state of war with its
later ally. In turn A. Kollontai, Diplomaticeskie…, pp. 482–489, 505–506, 512–517, provides
details of the Swedish intermediation (in particular of Minister Günther) in the Finnish-
Soviet talks.
119
120
4. CONSOLIDATION OF GERMAN HEGEMONY
4. Consolidation of German Hegemony in Europe

– Polish Strategy of Maintaining Relations
and Swedish Dodging
A freeze in relations following

Hitler’s invasion of Scandinavia
From 9 April, following attacks on Denmark and Norway by Germany,
Sweden found itself close to military operations on the front. It quickly tran-
spired that Hitler did not have his sights on Sweden, but would demand poli-
tical and economic concessions. When Halvdan Koht, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Norway, asked if the Swedish government would agree to King
Haakon VII paying a short visit to Stockholm with his son and their entou-
rage, he was told that the Swedes could not provide the Norwegians with any
guarantees that personal freedoms would be respected in Sweden. Minister
Günther invoked the conduct of the Romanians, who several months earlier
had interned Polish authorities under pressure from Germany.1 The Swedes
sought to prove that they would do everything to preserve their neutrality,
steering clear of engagement in the war and avoiding being accused of not
adhering to the principles of neutrality.2 Nevertheless, in practice they were
increasingly succumbing to the influence of victorious Germany.3
—
1
2
In Stockholm there were fears that the conflict would spread further and that Germany
would enter the territory of Sweden. Henryk Batowski pointed out that certain role in
holding off eventual plans of launching an attack on Sweden was played by the Soviet
diplomacy. On 13 April 1940 Molotov informed German Envoy to Moscow Schulenburg
that the neutrality of Sweden should be respected. See: H. Batowski, Rok 1940…, pp. 81–190.
3
W. M. Carlgren, Svensk utrikespolitik…, pp. 162–163. See T. Nybom, Motstånd…, p. 34.
The dilemmas of ordinary Swedish citizens following the German aggression against
Denmark and Norway are mentioned by A. Bogusławski, Pod Gwiazdą Polarną. Polacy w
Finlandii 1939–1941, Warsaw–Paris 1997, pp. 10–11: ‘You see – they said [Swedish volun-
teers who wanted to defend Norway] – what is the trouble: as a member of Scandinavian
union we should stand in defence of Norway, as a neutral country – we should not do so. As
a brother country we should at least send volunteers, as a neutral country – which is ad-
ditionally surrounded by the German armies – we should refrain from doing this as this
would make us risk being accused of not adhering to the rules of neutrality. And, con-
sequently, become attacked just like other countries. We could not give them any pretext for
such attack’.
121
At the time, communication between Stockholm and London was all but
broken. Correspondence between Stockholm and France was occasional.
Attaché Brzeskwiński reported on 24 May 1940 that frequent talks with
Latvia and Sweden about purchasing Polish aircraft – which following the
September Campaign ended up in Latvia – were not concluded successfully.
Brzeskwiński assessment was: ‘both the first ones and the second ones are
tied up: the former by the Soviets, and the latter – by the Germans.’ It was
obvious to him that this was due to the fear of the totalitarian neighbours and
that the refusal was grounded politically, not factually.4 An expert in Swedish
foreign policy during the Second World War, Wilhelm M. Carlgren, con-
firmed the opinion of the Polish attaché: ‘A small peripheral European
country, in the last week of May 1940, on considering its own policy, could
not disregard the magnificent German victories in the West and prospects
for German victory overall.5 The Swedes started to balance between the policy
of neutrality and policy of opportunistic adaptation to the German hegemony
in the region. The Swedish government eventually agreed to the German
claims, repeated during the campaign in Norway, concerning the transit of
wounded Wehrmacht (German army) soldiers from Narvik through Sweden
and of medical personnel together with dressings and medicines in the op-
posite direction. Following the defeat of France, Swedish authorities made
further concessions. At the outset of July, in a public speech delivered in the
city of Ludvika, Prime Minister Hansson argued that Sweden ‘takes in to ac-
count the development of events in line with which seven European countries
are entirely or partially occupied, and France has called a truce.’6 In addition,
the neutrality of Sweden was scrutinized as a result of the Swedish govern-
ment’s consent to establish a minefield in the Øresund strait, which com-
plemented the blockade introduced by the Germans.7 The agreement on the
transit of the German army, concluded on 8 July 1940, became a symbol of
humiliating submissiveness of Sweden during the Second World War.8 Every
day a train passed through Sweden, carrying German troops from Germany
to Trelleborg and further to the border with Norway, and once a week – from
Trelleborg to Narvik and back. German dominance was virtually accepted.
—
4
PISM, Lot, A V, 1/43, letter by Polish Military Attaché to Stockholm Major F. Brzeskwiński
to the Polish Ministry of Military Affairs, Stockholm, 24 V 1940.
5
6
7
8
122
The press even suggested that the best solution for Europe would be to con-
clude a compromise peace, and appeals were made in this matter to Great
Britain.9
The concessions also involved the conclusion of annual commercial ar-
rangements, which guaranteed that the Germans would receive deliveries of
raw materials (iron ore, timber) and machines in exchange for coal and coke.
Another consequence of the opportunistic attitude towards Germany were
further restrictions on freedom of speech, introduced to bring down the criti-
cism pointed at the Hitlerian regime. Control over the press was exercised by
the Statens Informationsstyrelse (SIS, translation: Sweden’s Board of Informa-
tion), established on 1 February 1940.10 Interventions concerned mostly anti-
German opinions. Politicians of the coalition government concluded that the
only alternative to the concessions was suicidal confrontation with the Ger-
mans.11 That is why the Swedish government chose the strategy of adaptation
to the international situation that emerged as a consequence of German
conquests. The tightening of policy towards the press was considered by
Minister Günther to be one of the instruments of foreign policy. Confiscation
of newspaper issues or introducing a ban on distribution of individual titles
was to prove to the foreign states that the Swedish government reacted to
their diplomatic protests.12 At the same time the programme of accelerated
armament was launched.13 Sympathies of the Swedish public were divided, as
were those of the members of the highest government and diplomatic circles.
It was commonly known that the attitude of Gustaf V and Commander-in-
—
9
T. Höjer, Svenska Dagbladet och det andra världskriget september 1939–maj 1945,
Stockholm 1969, pp. 26–27; Today it is estimated that the total number of 2.1 million Ger-
man troops passed through Sweden during the three-year period of the war. See: Dahlberg,
I Sverige…, p. 294.
10
G. Andolf, De grå lapparna. Regeringen och pressen under andra världskriget [in:] Nya
fronter? 1943 – spänd väntan, ed. B. Hugemark, Stockholm 1994, pp. 304–349.
11
K. Molin, Försvaret, folkhemmet och demokratin. Socialdemokratisk riksdagspolitik 1939–
1945, Stockholm 1974, p. 256. E. Boheman, På vakt. Kabinettssekreterare…, pp. 13–16. The
author argues that concessions to Germany were unavoidable because of military weakness
of Sweden.
12
K. Zetterberg, 1942 – ‘Storkriget vänder, Sveriges utsatta läge bestar’ [in:] Vindkantring.
1942 – politisk kursändring, ed. B. Hugemark, Luleå 2002, p. 87; H. Dahlberg, I Sverige…, p.
226. Official letters on green paper contained orders as to what information was to be pub-
lished, and letters on grey paper – what news should not be distributed. About the realities
of functioning of Swedish press from the British point of view, see: P. Tennant, Vid sidan…,
pp. 78–84.
13
K. Zetterberg, ‘Neutralitet till varje pris? Till frågan om den svenska säkerhetspolitiken
1940–42 och eftergifterna till Tyskland’ [in:] I orkanens…, pp. 17–20, 23.
123
Chief General Olof Thörnell was pro-German,14 and that of social democrats
and liberals – pro-Ally. Still, all jointly supported one line of politics of neu-
trality and preparations to eventual aggression.15
In July 1940, Potworowski judged that the Swedes were faced with actual
German hegemony and the necessity to use their support in case of further
Soviet expansion on Finland and Scandinavia. In the circle of government
the sense of almost complete military and economic dependence on Ger-
many started to dominate and that is why the Polish envoy expected ‘that
Sweden would continue to gradually slide under the German influence.’16
One week later, in his subsequent report that he delivered by chance, he
summarized events from preceding weeks.17 In his opinion, the majority of
government members, together with Prime Minister and the minister of
foreign affairs, supported the Allies but wanted to avoid any accusations of
abandoning neutrality in order to save Sweden from engagement in the war.
Yet, under increasing pressure from Germany, Sweden embarked on a road
of – as Potworowski put it – gradual and small concessions. From the point
of view of the Polish envoy, restrictions on the freedom of press were most
important, as they greatly reduced the opportunities to promote the Polish
matter at a public forum.
The Polish envoy maintained that in April and May of 1940, the Swedes
had been determined to defend their homeland. According to him, a royal
address of 23 June, where King Gustaf V called for drawing conclusions from
the termination of military operations in Norway and introducing changes
in policy towards Germany, was a breakthrough moment. The statement was
—
14
See: L. Björkman, Sverige inför Operation Barbarossa. Svensk neutralitetspolitik 1940–1941,
Stockholm 1971, p. 177; K. Zetterberg, ‘Storkriget går mot sitt slut – Sveriges läge förbättras’
[in:] Vårstormar. 1944 – krigsslutet skönjes, ed. B. Huldt, K.-R. Böhme, Stockholm 1995, p.
31; W. Agrell, Fred och fruktan. Sveriges säkerhetspolitiska historia 1918–2000, Lund 2000, p.
68.
15
K. Zetterberg, 1942 – ‘Storkriget vänder, Sveriges utsatta läge bestar’ [in:] Vindkantring…,
p. 99.
16
of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 15 VII 1940.
17
PISM, A 12, 3/2, part 2, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 22 VII 1940, p. 533. During the evacuation of the
Polish government of Angers, communication with its members was strongly hindered, for
instance the Polish Embassy in Ancara had no contact with the headquarters of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs from 22 June to 5 July 1940 (see: M. Sokolnicki, Dziennik ankarski 1939–
1943, London p. 113). The mission in Stockholm was in an even worse position, when one
considers the effects of the conquest of Denmark and Norway by Germany and the political
offensive of Stalin in the Baltic States.
124
mostly interpreted as consent of the German transit to Norway. It was also

perceived as a general sign of the Swedish authorities’ capitulation.18
Boheman informed Potworowski that the Germans expressed their expec-
tations resolutely, though without threat. For Swedish public opinion, it
meant the acceptance of German hegemony in Europe. Fear of the Soviet
Union was of immense significance. The Swedes hoped that the Germans
would act as a solid counterweight for the Soviet pressure on Finland.
Cooperation in the economy was developed both with Germany and the
Soviet Union. At the same time relations with Great Britain were deteriora-
ting. Loss of prestige by the British proved crucial here, but also the sense of
resentment due to the ineffectiveness of the Allies’ during the spring cam-
paign as well as the detaining of two destroyers – whilst on their way to
Sweden from their point of purchase in Italy – on the coast of Scotland. The
warships were released eventually, but the issue left a bad after-taste in Stock-
holm. In his report Potworowski underlined that the growing dependence of
Sweden on Germany, did not in any way signify its intention to yield to
Hitler. The envoy quoted the Swedish right-wing daily Svenska Dagbladet:
‘The Swedish nation would not pay for its life by losing its freedom.’19 None-
theless, following the defeat of the Allies in France, the Swedish policy of
maintaining balance in the relations between Great Britain and Germany
became outmoded. Potworowski aptly considered the arrangement of 8 July,
concerning the transit of military equipment and German troops on military
leave, to be an adjustment to reality in a situation when there were not
enough premises to repulse the German pressure.20
In spite of such a radical change in the international situation Potworow-
ski maintained that the attitude of the Swedes towards Poland in mid-1940
was positive. Even the growth of respect and recognition for its uncompro-
mising political stance was visible. This tendency however was not reflected
in the newspapers, which became the target of the ever-growing control of
SIS. The envoy emphasized in his report though that anti-Polish incidents
occurred rarely and were inspired by the Germans. While considering the
general trend that was prevalent in the press commentaries devoted to the
current policy, Polish affairs were virtually left unmentioned. Almost nothing
was written about Poland. The envoy highlighted, however, that the attitude
of the Swedish authorities to the Polish Legation was impeccable: ‘On settling
—
18
See: K. Åmark, Att bo granne med ondskan…, pp. 101–105.
19
PISM, A 12, 3/2, part 2, letter by Polish Envoy G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Stockholm, 22 VII 1940, p. 536.
20
125
various matters of the local mission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs always
shows a lot of good will and understanding for our position, as well as caution
resulting both from a fear of falling in to disfavour with the Germans and
possibly, too, with the Soviets, and from the currently prevalent general sus-
picion towards foreigners.’21
Potworowski was aware of the German pressures regarding the issue of
liquidation of the Polish Legation. At that time, the Swedes were forced to
close their diplomatic missions in Oslo, Hague and Brussels. The envoy also
discovered that the Germans considered the possible accreditation of a new
Swedish envoy at the Polish government as proof of a hostile attitude. The
treatment of interned Polish seamen (submariners had reached the Swedish
coast in September 1939) was described by Potworowski as correct, though
the Swedes towed away the Polish submarines to Lake Mälaren as a precau-
tion. This all but prevented the seamen from escaping, but the decision was
not evaluated by the envoy as negative: ‘The crews enjoy much freedom of
action and there are no signs of misconduct in the attitude of military
authorities towards them, perhaps except for some minor incidents, which
are as a matter of fact settled directly by interventions of our naval attaché.’22
The attack of the German diplomacy concerned the Polish consulate in
Malmö. German consul to this city on 19 July 1940 informed the Auswärtiges
Amt and the German Legation in Stockholm that the Polish diplomatic mis-
sion, which had been closed for some time, had resumed its propaganda
activity. The Envoy of the Third Reich to Stockholm, Wied, filed a protest
with Utrikesdepartementet, but never received an answer.23
On 30 July 1940, during the session of the Polish Political Committee of
Ministers (then already in London), principal theses of foreign policy were
adopted. Sweden was named in paragraph 6, together with other neutral
countries conquered by the Third Reich: Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway
and Denmark. It was stated that the growing economic influence of these
countries would be an important condition for balance in Europe, which may
—
21
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 22 VII 1940, p. 537. Cf. information on the German
pressures regarding censorship: W. M. Carlgren, Svensk utrikespolitik, p. 216. The scale of
restriction on freedom of speech is reflected by an incident that took place in one of
Stockholm’s higher education institutions when a rector reprimanded his employee –
Bolesław Skarżyński who was a Pole – for mentioning during his lecture the fate of Polish
professors who were sent by the Germans to a concentration camp, because politics and
propaganda were unacceptable. See: A. N. Uggla, I nordlig hamn., pp. 144–145.
22
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 22 VII 1940, p. 538–539.
23
H. Batowski, Walka., pp. 108–109.
126
support Polish political strategy. That is why ‘Poland will strive to develop as
intimate political relations as possible with the governments of these count-
ries.’24 In the case of Sweden, such an aim, at least at that moment, was un-
realistic. This, not only due to the pressure exerted by Berlin, but also to the
political offensive of the Soviet Union in the Baltic States. News was also
coming in from London on the will of the British to conclude peace with
Hitler.25 Göring persisted to push the opinion on to Dahlerus that Gustaf V
should be the mediator in a peace deal with Great Britain. The reaction to the
idea of mediation met with the understanding of Stockholm, since a relaxa-
tion of tensions with the West would impede Soviet aspirations in the Baltic
Sea region. Both Hitler and King George VI eventually rejected the idea of
peace talks, condemning Poland to the position of a satellite state of Germany
with borders determined by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.26
The most prevalent political interpretation published in the Swedish press
was that this was a conflict between the powers, similar to the First World
War, and one Sweden should steer clear of. Slogans of the British propaganda
about the clash between democracy and totalitarianism were rejected. The
Germans were absolved from their policy of expansion, for the origin of the
conflict was thought to lie in the Treaty of Versailles. The church circles ac-
centuated a collective blame for the outbreak of the war. Opinions on Ger-
many were positive, as a consequence of the fear of communism and due to
a lack of knowledge about Hitler’s plans. The difference between the Third
Reich and the German state, with which Sweden had previously maintained
long-term close and friendly relations, was not always realized. The editor of
the daily Arbetet and, at the same time, Allan Vougt, one of the leading mem-
bers of the Social Democratic Party (and Minister of Defence 1945–51), ex-
pressed a view on 27 July 1940 that despite the prospect of Germany’s victory
potentially being a cause for concern, nobody had the right to doubt the
honesty of German aspirations for shaping a better Europe.27 Not long after,
the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) called for the lifting of a boy-
cott of German commodities, which had been declared following the aggres-
sion against Denmark and Norway.28
—
24
Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945, vol. 6: Uzupełnienia, ed. T. Pełczyński,
Wrocław 1991, doc. 1614, p. 70.
25
W. M. Carlgren, Svensk utrikespolitik…, pp. 186, 193.
26
Ibidem, pp. 196–198. Gustaf V’s diplomatic démarches are mentioned by W. S. Churchill,
The Second World War, vol. 2: Their finest hour, London 1985, pp. 229–232.
27
A. Vougt, Ur svensk synvinkel. Inlägg i den utrikespolitiska debatten, Malmö 1943, p. 98.
28
G. Richardson, Beundran och fruktan. Sverige inför Tyskland 1940–1942, Stockholm 1996,
pp. 201.
127
During a public address delivered in March 1941, Swedish Minister of

Defence Per Edvin Sköld stated that the victory of neither side was in the
interests of Sweden. He highlighted: ‘Victory and defeat deepen the hatred
and lead to new conflicts and wars.’ The Swedish Minister also argued: ‘Great
nations cannot be exterminated and their areas of settlement cannot be
changed. Reaching a partial agreement without the humiliation of either side
is, therefore, in our interests.’ That is why the best solution would be a com-
promise between the fighting sides, and ‘nothing weighs in favour of Sweden
benefitting as a result of engagement in this conflict.’29 Such views were domi-
nant within Swedish political circles. Gunnar Hägglöf recorded in August
1940 that in parliament there could be noted ‘a tendency to present a critical
evaluation of both of the blocs of powers and describe them as being equal to
one another.’ The actions towards the government and the king of Norway
during the campaign of 1940 were certainly a manifestation of this particular
way of thinking.30
It is not surprising that in such an atmosphere the supporters of a close
cooperation with Nazi Germany proposed extreme scenarios of development
of mutual relations with Poland and excluded the possibility of their continu-
ation. In the autumn of 1940, Erik Arrhén, a historian and right-wing mem-
ber of parliament, visited Germany and occupied territories twice, and fol-
lowing that prepared extensive reports for Swedish intelligence. Based on
racist theories he described with disgust the ‘filth, pathology and degradation’
of the Polish proletariat. His views concerning the Jews were similar. He
claimed that the Star of David attached to their clothes may be treated as an
emblem of a future Jewish state, provided that the Germans carried out their
plan to gather all the Jews in one territory, for instance in Madagascar. In the
reports Arrhén presented his vision of a new European deal based on the
power of Hitler, and in line with which Poland was to disappear from the
map of the continent once and for all.31 The attitude of the Swedish govern-
ment was not as extreme, but the adaptation to the situation created by the
conquests of Hitler was, naturally, connected with a gradual weakening of
diplomatic activity in the area of relations with the Polish government.
—
29
AAN, HI/I/10, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 12 V 1941.
30
G. Richardson, Beundran…, pp. 197–199, 205, 212, 216–217.
31
Ibidem, pp. 104–113. Arrhén published his impressions from a visit in Poland in Nya Dag-
ligt Allehanda. He mostly emphasized the low level of material culture. See: ‘Szwed o
rujnującej gospodarce niemieckiej w Polsce’, Dziennik Polski, 15 I 1941.
128
On 13 September 1940, the Swedes officially dismissed their military

attaché Colonel Carl Axel Torén, who had been accredited at the Polish
government from 1937. According to Envoy Potworowski: ‘this dismissal
needs to be considered as resulting from the normal course of Colonel
Torén’s service and of no political significance whatsoever.’ He nonetheless
highlighted that the form of the dismissal aroused much doubt, as it initially
took the form of a private letter from Colonel Torén to Military Attaché
Major Brzeskwiński, which was sent by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to Potworowski. However, the Polish government in London received
no direct information about it. That is why Envoy Potworowski intervened
with Envoy Lagerberg, who was accredited at the Polish government.
Langberg, in turn, promised to take care of the matter, but it was not returned
to. Potworowski considered his reservations insufficient, and did not want to
provoke further discussion about the matter, which he thought trivial.32 In
April 1941 Lagerberg was appointed as Swedish envoy to Madrid. The
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated at the time that his accreditation
at the Polish government would be still valid, but it was hard to agree that in
such a situation this type of mission could be carried out.33
In the autumn of 1940 the Germans officially announced that they would
make a declaration to the governments of the neutral states that ‘further
recognition of Polish legations would be considered acts of hostility towards
the Reich.’ Potworowski anxiously followed developments, since both
Minister Günther and Secretary-General Boheman informed him that ‘al-
though relations with Germany are not strained, they are nonetheless dis-
satisfied with the stance of Sweden, which does not understand the necessity
to adapt to their demands and submit to “the new deal” in Europe.’34 As early
as 6 November he sent a reassuring letter to his headquarters of the Polish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he stated that as far as he knew the
Germans had not submitted any démarches to the Swedish authorities
regarding the liquidation of the Polish legation. The Swedes in turn reassured
him as follows: ‘If, after all, they [Germans] demanded the liquidation, the
Swedes intend to refuse it, relying upon courtesy.’ Taking into consideration
the information from a source in the Swedish legation in Berlin, Potworowski
—
32
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 16 X 1940.
33
PISM A 12, E/430, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 22 I 1941, p. 22.
34
PISM, A 12, 53/37J, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 27 X 1940, p. 10.
129
excluded Sweden from the circle of states to whom this demand was to be
directed as the Germans were interested only in the states which were ‘not
engaged in the war and friendly’, such as Spain.35
Diplomats from the Polish Legation in Stockholm were very understanding
when evaluating the stance of Swedish government in 1940.36 Following the
Norway campaign relations with Germany became more relaxed, but as
claimed the Polish envoy: ‘Nonetheless, traditional distrust towards Russia,
mysteriousness of the Soviet policy, and especially its constant pressures on
Finland and the simultaneous sense of Sweden’s powerlessness against Ger-
many, resulted in a defeatist attitude of Swedish public opinion, who was ready
to passively accept the German “care” for fear of an invasion from the East.’37
According to Attaché Brzeskwiński, in October 1940 it was difficult to talk
about maintaining ‘strict neutrality’, but the issue was nonetheless ambiguous.
For one thing, the Germans accused the Swedes of an unwillingness to accept
the changes which had taken place in Europe following Hitler’s and Stalin’s
conquests. They had expected Sweden to become part of great Germany, even
though such a proposition to join the alliance of the Axis Powers was never
made.38 For another, the highest-ranking commanders of the Swedish army –
—
35
Ibidem, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Stockholm, 6 XI 1940, p. 12.
36
What is distinctive against this background is the critical evaluation of the Swedish foreign
policy that was performed in the Polish newspapers in exile, where up until 1943 the Swedes
were continuously called on to join the Allies. See: ‘Neutralni’, Polska Walcząca, 29 XI 1939
(‘Not “neutrality”, but only the fall of Hitler can save the independence of European
countries’); ‘Pół tuzina neutralnych’, Dziennik Żołnierza, 30 VI 1941 (‘Sweden serves
Germany not only with its territory but also industry and natural resources […] All this falls
within the scope of the so-called “neutrality”’); ‘Neutralność z wyłomami’, Dziennik
Żołnierza, 17 IX 1941 (‘In fact, Sweden – seemingly neutral and independent – is now totally
dependent on the Third Reich’); Z. Racięski, ‘Neutralni’, Orzeł Biały, 22 XI 1942 (‘Nobody
has the right today, when we have been going through the most tragic but also the most
significant period of our history, to satisfy oneself with the role of observer. In such situation,
when each nerve and each muscle, each heart and each mind may be of precious value in the
joint effort of the entire nation, nobody is permitted to escape into a safe retreat, and – taking
advantage of others’ engagement in the fight for the common good, focus even more effec-
tively on their private interests’).
37
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 19 II 1941. Potworowski, already in December 1939, following
the dismissal of minister Sandler, announced that Sweden would be ‘more submissive’ and
‘more pliable’ towards Germany. See: Polskie dokumenty dyplomatyczne 1939 wrzesień., doc.
399, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Stockholm, 7 X 1939, doc. 430, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Pot-
worowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 14 XII 1939.
38
W. M. Carlgren, Svensk utrikespolitik…, pp. 219–220.
130
General Olof Thörnell and Admiral Marc Giron – paid courtesy visits to Ger-
many. Thörnell accepted a German military decoration. The Swedes agreed to
grant the German army access to the new communication route via Karlskrona
to Norway. Rumours spread that a secret agreement was reached between
Swedish and German military commanders on military cooperation against
the USSR.39 Nonetheless, at the same time Attaché Brzeskwiński drew attention
to the issue of the Swedish–Soviet economic arrangement that concluded on 7
September, in which a special credit was to be granted to the Soviets. Sweden
was to deliver railway equipment, machines, steel and ball bearings worth 100
million Swedish crowns (compared with exports in 1938 totalling 12 million
crowns). In exchange the Soviet Union was to send oil, iron ore, grain, furs etc.
Despite the apparent submissiveness of Stockholm, the leading politician
of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) Adam Ciołkosz (then in exile in London),
evaluated the policy of Swedish Social Democrats with optimism. He in-
formed the PPS leadership in occupied Warsaw: ‘The [socialist] Movement
is strong in Sweden: it obtained absolute majority in parliamentary elections,
but it is trying to maintain neutrality, and its liking of Poland.’ Such an eva-
luation was intended to cheer up comrades back in Poland, but the positive
picture mostly came as a result of reports by the PPS representative in Stock-
holm, Maurycy Karniol, who preserved good relations with SAP leaders,
especially the head of the party’s information office – Gunnar Lundberg.40 To
promote the activity of the PPS abroad, Karniol, from his first days of his exile
in Stockholm (March 1940), prepared and distributed a modest press bulletin
in English, the factual basis of which was the socialist journal Robotnik Polski
we Francji [Polish Worker in France], published in Paris. The bulletin was
sent to the editorial boards of social democratic newspapers and to the
information office of the Social Democratic party.
Karniol’s circle of Swedish acquaintances expanded gradually. Lundberg
put him in touch with other leading Social Democrats in Sweden including
Member of Parliament and chief editor of Ny Tid, Rickard Lindström, and
editor of Arbetet, Allan Vougt. Those who Karniol became acquainted with
arranged appointments for him with other activists from various organisations
connected with the Social Democrats. He developed good relations both with
—
39
PISM, A XII, 4/175, report by Polish Military Attaché to Stockholm Major F. Brzeskwiński
from October 1940, Stockholm, 3 XI 1940.
40
‘My tu żyjemy jak w obozie warownym’. Listy PPS-WRN Warszawa–Londyn 1940–1945,
London 1992, p. 15. On the activity of Karniol in Sweden in during of the Second World
War and soon after its conclusion, see: P. Jaworski, ‘Maurycy Karniol – przedstawiciel
Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej w Szwecji w latach 1940–1946’ [in:] Od Napoleona do Stalina.
Studia z dziejów XIX i XX wieku, ed. T. Kulak, Toruń 2007, pp. 182–214.
131
August Lindberg, the chair of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO),
and Ragnar Casparsson, head of LO’s press department. Equally, good rela-
tions were established by the PPS with Adolf Stenbom, editor of Metall-
arbetaren and Karniol’s relationship with Albin Lind, a trade union’s activist,
was a precious one. Karniol also met Paul Olberg, who remembered his pre-
war connections with Poland – visits and personal meetings with socialists
Mieczysław Niedziałkowski and Kazimierz Czapiński. In turn, it was thanks to
Olberg that Karniol met the distinguished social democratic activist Zeth
Höglund.41 He developed contacts with Finnish social democratic activists
Alexei Altonen and Eero Vuori, as well as with Norwegian socialist Martin
Tranmæl. Thanks to Karniol’s activities the Robotnik Polski w Wielkiej Brytanii
[Polish Worker in Great Britain] received his interviews with various indi-
viduals from Scandinavian political life, and started publishing articles about
the PPS and Polish affairs in the Swedish local press.42
Karniol, encouraged by Lundberg, then concentrated his efforts on parti-
cipating as an observer in the 16th congress of the Social Democratic Party at
the beginning of June 1940. Lundberg promised that the question of Poland
would be addressed. Nevertheless, Torsten Nilsson, who was responsible for
organising the congress, reacted to the matter with reserve. It was Nilsson
who informed Karniol of the party’s resolution, in line with which only repre-
sentatives of social democratic parties from the Nordic States were invited to
the congress. However, a possible resolution regarding Poland was to be
accepted by the government, making the situation even more complicated.43
The efforts to obtain the consent from Gustav Möller, Minister of Social
Affairs, ended in a fiasco. No official commentaries about Poland were is-
sued, which related to the successes of the German army on the western front.
However, thanks to the grant of 200 crowns from Envoy Potworowski,
Karniol was able to prepare the distribution – particularly with the SAP’s
—
41
PISM, col. 133, vol. 160, letter by M. Karniol to A. Ciołkosz, Stockholm, 5 IV 1940.
42
Karniol made favourable comments about the internal and foreign policy of Sweden, high-
lighting especially the positive role of Swedish social democrats. All of the following articles
were published in the Robotnik Polski w Wielkiej Brytanii: ‘Szwecja jest socjalistyczna’, 29 IX
1940; ‘W Szwecji o Polsce’, 29 IX 1940; ‘Szwecja w czasie wojny’, 1 XII 1940; ‘Sprawy polskie
w Szwecji’. ‘Hołd towarzyszy szwedzkich pamięci Hermana Liebermana’, 1 XII 1941;
‘Pogotowie obronne Szwecji’, 1 IV 1942; ‘Socjaliści u władzy w Szwecji’, 1 VI 1942;
‘Działalność PPS na kraje skandynawskie’, 1 VI 1943; ‘Współpraca socjalistów polskich i
szwedzkich’, 1 VII 1943; ‘Szwecja w czasie wojny’, 15 IX 1943; ‘Szwedzka młodzież
socjalistyczna’, 1 X 1943; ‘Jak Szwecja troszczy się o swych żołnierzy’, 1 XI 1943; ‘Coraz mniej
strajków w Szwecji’, 15 XII 1943. See also the article: ‘Pozdrowienia z Szwecji’, Przedświt, 1
V 1941.
43
132
congress in mind – of the brochure Hälsning från Polska socialdemokratiska

partiet (PPS) till Svenska Socialdemokratiska Partiets kongress 1940 (Greet-
ings from the Polish Social Democratic Party to the Congress of the Swedish
Social Democratic Party 1940), which contained the party’s resolutions,
speeches from Herman Lieberman and from the representative of the PPS at
the Polish government in exile – Minister of Labour and Social Welfare Jan
Stańczyk – from 1 May 1940, as well as a passage about Poland from the book
Rysslands nya imperialism (New Russian Imperialism) by P. Olberg, and a
selection of articles about Poland from Swedish newspapers and comments
about Poland made by Swedish, Finnish and Norwegian social democrats.
When in August 1940 the 9th congress of the Swedish social democratic
youth was opened, Karniol prepared another brochure Socialismen kommer
att uppbygga det nya Polen (Socialism Will Rebuild New Poland) and sent a
letter with his regards. He soon received a polite answer with thanks.44 The
propagandist success of the brochures inspired Karniol to continue this
method of popularising the PPS activity. In 1941 he published another
brochure Polska Socialistiska Partiets (PPS) andel i uppbyggandet av den
polska staten (Participation of the Polish Socialist Party in the Building of
Polish State).
In the last weeks of 1940, the heads of the Swedish diplomacy were over-
whelmed with pessimism. Erik Boheman gave Great Britain only a 20 percent
chance of winning the war. Grafström, who was Chief of the Press Office at
the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time, made some unfavourable
comments in his diaries about his superior’s statements. He wrote that he was
disappointed with him because of his opportunistic attitude, which may
signify a severe depression within the pro-Ally circles.45 Defeatism was fuelled
by German propaganda supported by part of the Swedish academic circle,
—
44
ARAB, SAP arkiv, Brevsamling, E1, vol. 19, copy of letter to M. Karniol, 2 XII 1940. On
the occasion of the social democratic youth congress the leadership of the PPS party sent
another telegram with their regards, where they reminded the misery of the Polish nation
and the activity of its underground resistance movement. Karniol, in his letters to the Robot-
nik Polski w Wielkiej Brytanii highlighted: ‘This telegram received a great applause of the
delegates’. See: M. K[arniol], ‘W Szwecji o Polsce’, Robotnik Polski w Wielkiej Brytanii, 29 IX
1940, p. 9.
45
S. Grafström, Anteckningar 1938–1944, pp. 281, 290. The stance of Boheman was evaluated
quite differently by the British Envoy Mallet. He claimed that as a person with an anti-Nazi
attitude, in the moments of war which were worst for the British, he maintained good rela-
tions with the Allied diplomats, to whom he also paid private visits (Churchill Archives
Centre, V. Mallet, Memoir, pp. 93–94).
133
Lund University in particular.46 Karl Olivecrona, a professor of law there,

published the brochure England eller Tyskland? (England or Germany?), in
which he argued in support of Germany in its efforts to establish hegemony
over Europe. The argument for the support was Germany’s traditional close
cultural and political relations with Sweden, and since German was the first
foreign language taught in Swedish schools. Academic literature collections
at Swedish universities included mostly German works. Germany was also
the most frequent destination for study trips by Swedish students. Close con-
tacts between the two countries were also evident in religion, and especially
organisational ties between the Protestant church in Germany and Sweden.
The merits of the Germans were highlighted in the brochure Tysk väsen och
svensk lösen (The Essence of German Character and the Motto of Swedish
Character) by a specialist in literature, Fredrik Böök, who argued that ‘no
other nation has contributed more to European culture.’ These comments
echoed those made about the Germans by the traveller Sven Hedin, men-
tioned previously, who glorified the policy of Hitler.47 These views surely
influenced Swedish society, though, according to Potworowski, grandees
from the circle of Swedish intelligentsia and economic spheres, who officially
supported the new Hitlerian deal, were incidental.48 However, it is undeniable
that the disillusionment with the Germans was sparked only by the reports
about their occupational policy in Norway and Denmark. Terror and eco-
nomic depletion resulted in the Swedes starting to negate the idea of joining
the new European deal orchestrated by Hitler.
A small dose of moderate optimism was brought about by a partial raising
of the economic blockade. At the end of November, the Swedes were granted
permission from Great Britain for four merchant ships to travel from and to
the harbour in Gothenburg, Sweden, for a month (mainly from South
America). The Germans accepted this alternative on 7 February 1941. Over
the next two months, and then from summer until the end of 1942 the Swedes
were in touch with territories outside those controlled by the Germans. It was
about more than just the goods, mostly from South America, that were
delivered along this route. Göteborgstrafiken or lejdtrafiken, that is Gothen-
burg’s transport or transport with the so-called safe conduct pass, gained a
great psychological meaning. Swedish society was felt they were less isolated
—
46
See more, S. Oredsson, Lunds universitet under andra världskriget. Motsättningar, debatter
och hjälpinsatser, Lund, 1996.
47
G. Richardson, Beundran…, pp. 222–227.
48
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 19 II 1941.
134
from the world and less dependent on Germany.49 In spite of this fact, the
decline in living standards bit hard. The limitations on obtaining fuel and
food rationing were considered minor by the head of the Polish diplomatic
mission and he did not qualify them as signs of poverty or even privation.50
Nevertheless, opinions on the future were pessimistic as the prospect of vic-
tory of any side would be catastrophic. Within the highest circles of Swedish
military command, just like those of politics, by 1941, it was maintained that
‘neither the defeat of England nor of Germany is in the interest of Sweden,
because the first would entail Nazi hegemony, and the second communi-
zation of Europe.’51
Potworowski quoted the counsellor of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Östen Undén, who, in one of his speeches, highlighted: ‘we do not
want to be an object of egoistical policy of other countries and we shall stick
to our national ideas.’ Per Edvin Sköld, Minister of Defence and a socialist,
admitted: ‘Our purpose is to buy time that would allow us to decide on our
own what is acceptable for us and what needs to be rejected. […] On the other
hand, we may not make exaggerated evaluations of what is going on and not
confuse submissiveness with natural adaptation to foreign countries […]. All
great powers have their supporters in our country, and these supporters easily
confuse the notion of Sweden’s interests with their personal sympathies. It is
nonsense to imagine that any country could place the interests of Sweden
before its own. We are living in times when we, the Swedes, have to place our
interests above everything else. That is why resolute and honest neutrality is
at present the only basis of the policy of Sweden.’52
At the turn of 1940 Sweden decided to maintain its neutrality at all costs
and extended its defensive capabilities further. The rise in armament expen-
ditures was possible thanks to an increase in taxes and internal loans. The
Swedish National Home Guard (Hemvärnet) was established and could be
joined by men who were not subject to military service (17–20-year olds and
45). Brzeskwiński informed the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs about the large number of candidates for the Home Guard. Many
applications were declined as a result. The effective mobilization of Swedish
—
49
E. Boheman, På vakt. Kabinettssekreterare…, pp. 138–139.
50
51
AAN, HI/I/10, copy of telegram by Military Attaché to Stockholm Major F. Brzeskwiński
sent by the head of the II Division of the Staff of Commander-in-Chief Colonel L. Mitkiewicz
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, London, 7 II 1941.
52
135
society was motivated by the government’s growing propaganda activity pro-

moting the country’s defence. From mid-1939 until mid-1942 army expen-
ditures totalled 5 billion crowns. The Swedish ground forces and navy were
extended by 50 percent and the air force by 100 percent. The number of
soldiers, depending on the risk of invasion, fluctuated between 160 thousand
and around 260 thousand. Until the end of 1943, the Swedish navy consisted
of 7 battleships, 2 cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 small destroyers for coastal
defence, 21 torpedo boats, 26 submarines, 44 patrol cutters, 2 minelayers and
42 minesweepers. When war broke out Sweden had 57 bombers and 33 fight-
er planes. Despite the capacity of the air force being doubled, it was still the
weakest link of Swedish defence. Modern aircraft were introduced only when
the war was coming to an end, when SAAB equipped the Swedish air force
with B17 and B18 bombers and J21 and J22 fighter planes.53
This gradual change was also evident in the tone of the press commen-
taries. German journalists taking part in a visit to Sweden, on the invitation
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed their ‘disappointment and
dissatisfaction’, at strong attachment of local public opinion to “the conserva-
tive democratic attitude” and the extent “of the English propaganda”.’ Karl
Megerle from the Berliner Börsenzeitung had already previously described the
Swedes as ‘a retired nation.’ Following the visit, he promised Grafström that
he would write that the Swedes were ‘a nation on a holiday leave’, as they were
continuously reluctant to join Hitler in his efforts to introduce a new Euro-
pean order.54
In early 1941, the Swedish Telegraphic Agency (TT) re-established co-
operation with the PAT. It started to receive broadcasts from the Polagence
information service, which was an exception among the agencies of the
occupied countries.55 According to Potworowski, despite the Swedes suc-
cumbing to German pressure in many cases, this did not have much impact
on their attitude towards the Poles. Potworowski stated in his report from
February 1941: ‘The attitude of local official bodies towards the legation and
our matters was always very correct and, as a matter of fact, virtually never
gave ground to any serious objections. Rumours and commotion which
—
53
K. Zetterberg, 1942 – Storkriget vänder, Sveriges utsatta läge består [in:] Vindkantring…,
pp. 118–121, 126.
54
In his reply, Grafström stated that if in this case the word ‘leave’ meant a leave from war,
what Sweden considered normal was the state of peace, maintained from 150 years. S.
Grafström, Anteckningar 1938–1944, pp. 305–307.
55
136
spread here in the autumn about the fate of the occupied countries’ diplo-
matic missions – which was, anyway, never officially confirmed – have died
away of late. The interned submarine crews, thanks to the compassionate and
comprehensive cooperation of local military personnel, are now staying
together with our naval attaché in conditions which are, without a doubt,
much better than in any other neutral country. Civil refugees (about 300
people) are in most cases free to move and choose their place of settlement,
and are all granted decent support thanks to the attention of social welfare
institutions (Polish Aid Committee, Jewish community), whereas the Polish
Committee is subsidised by Swedish social and governmental institutions. In
the second half of the past year quite irritating became the close police sur-
veillance caused by general suspicion towards foreigners and numerous
espionage-related issues, whereas the local bodies, which were first and fore-
most trying to defend themselves against the German “fifth column”, “in
order to maintain balance” were forced to closely follow all signs of pro-Ally
information activity.’56
It was evident that the Swedes, by tracking foreign agents, attempted to
affect both sides of the conflict. When a Nazi organisation was discovered in
Gothenburg, and its members arrested, similar punitive measures were taken
against Polish citizens accused of espionage, a sentence of several months in
prison. In March 1941, Boheman informed Potworowski that, according to
police reports several employees of the Polish Legation, headed by Wacław
Gilewicz and Tadeusz Rudnicki, were conducting intelligence activities. He
did not want to request officially their expulsion from Sweden so instead he
made a discreet appeal, suggesting that consideration be given to the difficult
situation of the Swedish government, which was systematically pressurized
in the matter of the liquidation of the Polish diplomatic mission. Boheman,
as usual, stressed that he would carry on resisting the pressure, but made it
clear that the distinctively undiplomatic activity of the legation was to the
detriment of both Poles and Swedes.57 Potworowski was satisfied with this
form of unmasking Polish espionage. Moreover, he informed the head-
quarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ‘The efforts of the German pro-
paganda, the aim of which is to disparage everything that is Polish in the eyes
of local public, are mostly unsuccessful here’, and ‘occasionally published
articles of this sort are received coldly and with disbelief.’ What is significant
—
56
57
of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 14 III 1941.
137
is that the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs always supported Polish inter-
ventions regarding the anti-Polish press articles. At the same time, op-
portunities to publish pro-Polish articles were restricted: ‘every message con-
cerning our matters needs to be stripped from all anti-German accents.’ As a
result, the press continued to be all but silent about Polish affairs.
From the beginning of 1941 there was further proof that the Swedes were
changing their attitude towards the Allies. There were also attempts to
balance the opinion regarding the two warring sides. According to Pot-
worowski, the volume of New Year wishes was relatively large, and the
Swedish–Polish Association, the activity of which had been suspended effec-
tively in autumn 1939, resumed operation. On 28 April 1941, the Stockholm
section of the Social Democratic Party organized the commemoration of
Mieczysław Niedziałkowski, who was murdered by the Germans. During the
event, speeches were delivered by Senator Georg Branting, Editor-in-Chief
Social-Demokraten Rickard Lindström and Maurycy Karniol. The attendees
included Envoy Potworowski, the representative of the Czechoslovak
emigration government and former Envoy of the Czechoslovak Republic to
Stockholm, Vladimír Kučera, as well as almost 150 Polish, Czech and Swedish
guests. Potworowski requested the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs not to make information about the celebrations public due to the
possibility of German protests.58 The envoy was realistic and knew that
everything was dependent on the situation on the front: ‘These are only the
first harbingers, and knowing the slow and lumbering thinking of the Swedes,
I am convinced that as far as the war continuing in the direction that is
favourable for us, our situation here will slowly but constantly improve, and
the working conditions, those involving informational-propaganda tasks in
particular, will become gradually easier.’59
In March 1941 the Swedes said no to the increase of German transits to
Norway and ordered a partial mobilization of the army in the southern part
of their country.60 By mid-March the Swedish government promptly doubled
—
58
AAN, HI/I/57, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 30 IV 1941; RA-Arninge, Sapo arkiv, P 201 Polish Legation, löp
no. 8, copy of invitation to the memorial service following the death of M. Niedziałkowski.
The London Dziennik Polski daily published only the information about articles that were
found in the Swedish newspapers on the subject of martyr’s death of Maciej Rataj – the
former speaker of the parliament of Poland – and Mieczysław Niedziałkowski: ‘Prasa
szwedzka o Rataju i Niedziałkowskim’, Dziennik Polski, 13 II 1941.
59
60
AAN, HI/I/10, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 20 III 1941.
138
150 thousand troops by calling on reservists. According to Envoy Potworow-

ski, these orders were undoubtedly ‘a riposte to the German pressures con-
cerning the transit of armies, and especially military equipment, to Norway.’61
Potworowski sensed that there was tension in German–Swedish relations,
which was built on Sweden meeting Hitler’s demands to permit the transit of
armed German troops, which would be a breach of their present agreement.
The worsening of German–Soviet relations became of particular interest
to the Swedes. If there were to be a military conflict, Finland, it was predicted,
would be dragged into the war by Germany for fear of Soviet aggression.
From September 1940 Swedish–Finnish discussions took place regarding a
common political union between the two countries. For Sweden this would
be a good way to prevent Finland from being infiltrated by the Germans and
to dissuade the Finns from supporting Hitler’s plans for launching an attack
on the Soviet Union.62 When the idea was abandoned, Hansson and Günther
agreed that passivity was the best strategy and that the situation also called
for a wait-and-see attitude.63 Despite the official deterioration in the mutual
attitude towards the unilateral relations64 Boheman held regular meetings
with Potworowski and consulted with him on a number of various political
questions. In May of 1941 Boheman discussed Finland’s plans with the Polish
envoy. Boheman was convinced that the Finns were not willing to go to war,
but that the maintenance of neutrality was not only a matter for Finland, it
could easily become the subject of the policy of the powers.65 What Pot-
worowski considered to be reliable evidence of Sweden’s strategy were the
words of Minister Günther, who in a speech delivered on the radio on 3 May
1941, confirmed that the purpose of Sweden’s foreign policy was ‘to preserve
its independence, internal and external freedom and keep away from the war
between the powers.’ The Swedes were therefore willing to provide support
to its neighbour to the east, but only to the extent that would not involve itself
in the war.66 Troops totalling 250 thousand were maintained throughout
March, and new military investments were constantly undertaken, for
instance, the building of fortifications along the border with Norway.
—
61
62
63
Ibidem, pp. 241, 249.
64
It was so described by H. Batowski, Z dziejów dyplomacji polskiej na obczyźnie (wrzesień
1939 – lipiec 1941), Kraków 1984, pp. 222–223.
65
66
Ibidem.
139
However, King Gustaf V had no doubt that if the Swedish army came face-
to-face with German aggression it would last two weeks at the most.67
According to Attaché Brzeskwiński, the feelings of Swedish society were
growing increasingly negative towards the Germans, tradition hostility
remained towards the Soviet Union, and towards Poland and other occupied
countries – they were favourable out of courtesy.68 Envoy Potworowski con-
firmed: ‘Fear against the Germans or rather the feeling of tremulous un-
awareness of their plans for the near future is the dominant feature of these
feelings.’ He also added that the anti-German mood was growing in all sec-
tions of society.69 According to Potworowski, these were not the few sup-
porters of Germany who posed a real threat to Sweden but rather the op-
portunists who were susceptible to the Nazi propaganda.70 He claimed the
Swedes would react to the victory of Great Britain with joy, yet, the threat
from Germany was indeed real and close. As early as 1941 they feared that
the setbacks of the closing phase of the war could force their country to
participate in the beating of Germany.71
The Swedes were consequently directing the policy of avoiding war as
much as possible by yielding to the side with the advantage. In the second
half of April, a Polish source in Helsinki broke the news that the Swedes were
about to yield to German pressures and agree to the transit of the Nazi armies
to Finland. The Germans had such plans, and their actions brought moderate
success, as both General Thörnell and Minister Günther were unwilling to do
anything that would cause annoyance in Berlin.72 The same source also an-
nounced that the Germans were planning to declare war on the Soviet Union,
but because of the on-going campaign in the Balkans they postponed the date
of their attack by two or three months.73
In the context of the possible German aggression against the Soviet Union,
pursuing the policy of balance was growing increasingly difficult for Sweden,
although Boheman, whom Potworowski considered intelligent, sober, devoid
—
67
68
AAN, HI/I/10, letter by the head of the II Division the Staff of Commander-in-Chief
Lieutenant-Colonel I. Banach to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs A. Zaleski, London, 6 V
1941.
69
AAN, HI/I/10, classified letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 12 V 1941.
70
Ibidem.
71
72
L. Björkman, Sverige…, pp. 195, 328.
73
IPMS, A 12, 3/3, copy of the note for General K. Sosnkowski, 21 IV 1941.
140
of filo-German attitude and well informed, argued during the conversation

with the envoy that in spite of many political and economic reasons, the
German–Soviet war would not happen.74 Potworowski became familiar with
the views of the Soviet diplomatic representative Aleksandra Kollontai, who
frequently made unfavourable comments about the Germans. Nonetheless,
the Polish envoy underestimated her statements, as he thought that Kollontai
was ‘both shrewd and insincere, and that she is perfect at both manoeuvring
in the local difficult conditions and in relation to the competent authorities
in Moscow.’75 This picture was disrupted by news that was coming in from
Moscow about the fear of the war and plans to evacuate the diplomatic corps
in the face of the looming German attack.76 Based on the information ob-
tained from ‘one of the colleagues who […] came back from Moscow’, Press
Attaché Wiesław Patek informed the Ministry of Foreign affairs: ‘The
members of the diplomatic corps in Moscow currently estimate the chance
of war breaking out between Germany and the Soviet Union to be 50 percent,
with a tendency similar to one announced by the English press following
ambassador Cripps’ arrival in London, that is, that the conflict would once
again fall into imbalance.’77 Patek reported some other rumours from Mos-
cow. Most of all he highlighted: ‘Stalin’s attitude is evaluated as being very
inclined to make concessions to Germany. The limit of these concessions is
incredibly hard to determine, the German claims towards Ukraine and
Caucasian oil are being announced in Moscow – currently based on press
articles, and earlier on other sources.’ The reports of the Poles who managed
to escape Lithuania and enter Sweden confirmed that the Soviets were pre-
paring for war by the rebuilding of airports and fortifications and the
increasing food stocks. The clear tension in German–Soviet relations had no
influence, according to Patek, on the mood in Sweden, which did not predict
becoming engaged in the military conflict.78 In reality, these preparations
triggered great anxiety within the Swedish authorities.79 It was obvious that
—
74
75
76
Ibidem.
77
AAN, HI/I/10, copy of the report by Press Attaché of the Polish Legation in Stockholm W.
Patek for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 19 VI 1941.
78
Ibidem.
79
PISM, A 12, 53/37J, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 17 VI 1941, p. 25.
141
German pressures on Sweden were again gaining on force, especially in con-

nection with the transit of troops to the Finnish front.
Meanwhile, Boheman, whose attitude was pessimistic from autumn 1940,
in conversation with Potworowski in mid-May, stated that a long war would
take place between Germany and the USA, leading Europe into ruin. Pot-
worowski had difficulties in obtaining a binding opinion about the attitude
of the Swedish politicians towards the situation of Poland, but it is worth
mentioning his conversation with Minister Günther at the beginning of June
1941. The head of the Swedish diplomacy expressed a fuzzy conviction that
the Germans would abandon the policy of extermination, as the methods
they were using were ‘so very much against their own interests, that they
simply could not last long and one needs to hope that there would take place
changes for the better’, and, besides, ‘90 percent of them [Germans] would
prefer to live peacefully.’ According to the Swedish minister, Poland had to
be treated as an exception saying: ‘Hitler decided that the territory of Poland
would be populated by the Germans.’ And in general he claimed: ‘People
want to live in freedom and peace – and so do the Germans.’80
The most important issue for Sweden was to keep foreign trade as
developed as possible. Envoy Henryk Sokolnicki, when considering the mat-
ter from an almost three-year perspective commented: ‘Maintenance of an
independent trade policy was possible in Sweden thanks to slick juggling
between concessions of not only an economic but also a political nature. This
brought such a result that the policy of Swedish concessions in relation to
Germany was more flexible than the policy of Switzerland, which mostly
applied trade-related concessions, thereby leading to the considerable econo-
mic dependence of Switzerland on Germany.’81
What was most important for the Poles, however, was the issue of possible
attempts to liquidate their diplomatic mission. On 12 May 1941, the AA once
again instructed the German Legation in Stockholm to force the Swedes to
close down the Polish Legation and the Polish consulate in Malmö.82 As a
result, on 23 May, the German Envoy to Stockholm submitted a memoran-
dum to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he protested against
the employment of an increasing number of staff at the Polish Legation in
—
80
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 5 VI 1941.
81
AAN, HI/I/51, report by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of
82
H. Batowski, Walka…, p. 187, entire document quoted here.
142
Stockholm, the re-launching the Polish consulate in Malmö and the spread-
ing Polish propaganda in Sweden. The Swedes responded on 31 May with a
memorandum, where they argued that none of the accusations were just.
They stated that they were convinced for some time that the number of staff
should not be increased and that they were not only keeping their eye on the
matter but had even dismissed several staff members for misconduct. The
Polish consulate in Malmö could not be ‘re-launched’ either as it had only
moved to a smaller office but never closed. At the time, the Swedish authori-
ties did not agree to establish new consulates. They also rejected the claim
concerning showing excessive tolerance for the Polish propaganda. It was
explained that as a consequence of appeals from the Swedish authorities,
these actions by the Poles were virtually eliminated. Swedish police were in
complete control of the operation and, in cases when the principles of diplo-
matic activity were violated, intervened immediately demanding the dis-
missal of disgraced officials. There was a common belief that the Poles were
dealing exclusively with humanitarian aid and taking care of a relatively large
group of refugees from their own country, who arrived to Sweden following
the outbreak of the war mostly from territories occupied by the Soviet Union.
This is why the Swedes disagreed with the opinion that relations with the
Poles had intensified. Quite the opposite, these relations were to a large extent
limited, or even broken.83
Yet, on 31 May, Boheman summoned Potworowski to his office and
informed him of the German demand that the Polish mission, which they
considered to be the centre of intelligence, be liquidated. The Secretary-
General pointed out that the Swedes refused to do so. The Germans were told
that it was necessary to postpone the examination of this case until the con-
clusion of the war. Boheman assured Potworowski that the Swedish govern-
ment would not reverse its decision, but, nonetheless, a moment later he
added diplomatically: ‘unless there were exceptional and unforeseeable cir-
cumstances.’84 He also asked the Poles not to give the Germans even the
smallest pretext to make similar demands in the future and ‘not to make it
difficult for Boheman to maintain a fundamental viewpoint of the Swedish
government.’ He also advised that the legation should refrain from assuming
patronage over the press bulletin Pol-Radio, which seemed quite strange,
because the mission never flaunted its relations with this source. In general,
however, Potworowski’s impressions of the conversation with Boheman were
—
83
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 12, vol. 890, P. M., Stockholm, 31 V 1941.
84
143
positive. Polish envoy regarded Boheman’s attitude towards the entire issue
as friendly.85
Potworowski thought that ‘it is better to voluntarily and temporarily limit
or even suspend some tasks’, than to risk the closing down of the mission. In
connection with this he proposed the dismissal of all Polish officials who
compromised themselves in the eyes of the authorities, and ban them from
pursuing their activities until they left Sweden and introduce a temporary ban
on the arrival of intelligence agents. Potworowski cared most about the
moving of the branch of the II Division of the Polish intelligence to the head-
quarters of the British Legation, which would benefit from the protection of
Envoy Victor Mallet. The officers of the VI Division of the Staff of Com-
mander-in-Chief, who were responsible for contact with occupied Poland,
were still to operate in the Polish Legation. The envoy highlighted: ‘the foun-
dations of this work are already present […] and they are intact’ and ‘in the
current conditions Sweden is virtually the only channel of communication
with the country.’ The letters contain several warnings from the envoy
against excessively rash, ill-considered, hasty actions, which could thwart the
end result.86 At the end of May, he informed the headquarters of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs that he was able to launch a radio station in the legation,
but the attempts to bring operators from London could risk it being un-
covered, and the consequences of such exposure would be disastrous for the
envoy. That is why he advised that London send people with passports other
than Polish or to continue using a Norwegian transmitter.87 What highlighted
the importance of the fate of the Polish diplomatic mission in Stockholm
were special greetings sent by the President of Poland in exile, Władysław
Raczkiewicz, to King Gustaf V on the National Day of Sweden, 6 June 1941.
Operation Barbarossa and the apparent

improvement in Polish–Swedish relations
Polish–Swedish diplomatic contacts were revived following the German ag-
gression against the USSR. It was Poland who took the initiative. Potworow-
ski met with Boheman to relay to him General Sikorski’s statement on
—
85
Ibidem.
86
Ibidem.
87
PISM, A 9, E/14, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry of
144
Poland’s attitude towards the German–Soviet conflict.88 Boheman empha-

sized ‘the understanding for the complex situation of Poland.’ He understood
that taking any position was an extremely sensitive issue, and described it
neatly in French as sagesse même meaning ‘pure wisdom’. He also knew that
the Germans needed to retain their leading position, especially in their oc-
cupation of the entire territory of Poland. He denied that the Germans had
resumed applying pressure regarding the liquidation of the Polish Legation.89
The Swedes decided that none of the representatives of the occupied coun-
tries could be added to the mission’s staff. From that moment on, it was only
possible to exchange serving diplomats.90 According to the telegram from
Brzeskwiński, the signing of the Polish–Soviet arrangement generated much
interest in the press, as well as in political and diplomatic circles in Sweden,
and generally – just like in the case of Boheman – met with an understanding
for the position of the Polish government.91 The Swedes, Potworowski
claimed, were very much aware that a conflict between two enemies of Poland
put the country in a favourable situation, although, according to Boheman,
the position became complicated at the time.92 London feared that the anti-
Soviet oriented public opinion in Sweden would deteriorate further with the
restoration of normal Polish–Soviet relations. According to Potworowski,
these fears were not realised because of the Swede’s realism and certain paral-
lels between Sweden and Poland, of which the most important was the at-
titude towards Russia and Germany. Any agreement between these two
powers would constitute a threat to the independence of both Sweden and
Poland.93 Swedish press recounted the talks between the Poles and the Soviets
—
88
The content of General Sikorski’s speech from 23 June 1941 to his country, see: Protokoły
posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, vol. 3: czerwiec 1941 – grudzień 1941,
scholarly editing by M. Zgórniak, compiled by W. Rojek in cooperation with. A. Suchcitz,
Kraków 1996, pp. 5–13. Sikorski highlighted that the outbreak of the German-Soviet war was
beneficial for the Polish matter, as it would considerably weaken Germany and make the
agreement of the Polish government with the Soviet Union much easier.
89
PISM, A 12, 53/37J, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 30 VI 1941, p. 27. Notes by Polish envoy to Stockholm
G. Potworowski 1939–1942, entry from 27 VI 1941.
90
NA, FO, 371/37082, letter by the Legation of Great Britain in Stockholm to the Northern
Department of the FO, Stockholm, 17 X 1943, p. 249.
91
AAN, HI/I/10, letter by the head of the II Division of the Staff of Commander-in-Chief
Colonel L. Mitkiewicz to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, London, 14 VIII 1941.
92
PISM, A 11, 49/sow/1c, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 10 VII 1941.
93
This was at least the attitude of the members of Polish government and diplomatic circles.
See: memorandum submitted to A. Eden by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Zaleski from 8
July 1941. It was stated there that the fall of the Soviet government as a result of the war with
Germany would bring ‘a great relief to both indirect and direct neighbours of Russia, from
145
in London precisely and objectively, in most of the cases, but without com-
ment.94 As we know, the negotiations were concluded with the signing of the
Sikorski–Mayski Agreement (Mayski was the Soviet ambassador to London)
on 30 July 1941. Diplomatic relations were resumed, Polish citizens were to
be freed from prisons and Soviet labour camps, and the Polish army was to
be formed in the USSR. However, the issue of the Polish–Soviet border was
left unmentioned.
Meanwhile, the Germans used the aggression against the Soviet Union to
make Sweden more dependent on Germany. According to the commercial
counsellor at the Polish legation, Tadeusz Pilch, the Swedes were dependent
on coal supplies, which was their Achilles heel. The Germans wanted to take
over railway track construction materials, lathes and various installations –
all intended for the Soviet market – in exchange for an increase in coal sup-
plies. In connection with this, Pilch, at the outset of July 1941 reported: ‘So
far, based on a vast number of premises, it may be concluded that everything
here is done with the intention of pleasing the Germans.’95 The orientation of
most of the newspapers which provided reports from the front was pro-
German, and as Pilch put it: ‘they were merely a megaphone for the German
propaganda.’ That is why he was pessimistic about the chances of maintain-
ing the operation of the Polish diplomatic mission. In the first days following
the aggression against the USSR, Germany forced Sweden to consent to the
transit of the 163th Infantry Division, ‘Engelbrecht’, from Norway to Finland.
In an official statement, Prime Minister Hansson admitted that the decision
was met with public opposition, which was evident, for example, in press
articles that accused the government of self-limitation of sovereignty.
Nevertheless, the government announced that the decision was taken with
Nordic solidarity in mind and the need to support Finland, which was under
threat from the USSR. The concession to Germany was, then, in line with the
strategic objective of the Swedish government, that is, resisting being dragged
in to war. That explains why most of the press comments were still in favour
—
Sweden and Hungary to Turkey and Iran’. Documents on Polish-Soviet relations 1939–1945,
vol. I: 1939–April 1943, London–Melbourne–Toronto 1961, p. 124.
94
The members of the Swedish diplomatic circles maintained that the Soviet-German con-
flict would contribute to restoring the balance of power in the Baltic Sea region, upset in
favour of the Soviet Union following the annexation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and
that at the same time it would weaken Germany. For more information, see: L. Björkman,
Sverige…, pp. 314–320, 430–431.
95
AAN, HI/I/10, excerpts from letter by the counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm,
T. Pilch, Stockholm, 30 VI 1941.
146
of the government.96 Minister Günther, following the parliamentary resolu-

tion on this matter, passed on the news to Great Britain, the USA and the
USSR. He also agreed to take care of Soviet citizens in Germany. For the
Germans it was important that the Allies condemned Sweden for its flexible
approach towards neutrality. Given the situation, Hitler hoped that the
Swedish government would establish a closer cooperation with Germany.
The Swedes, however, despite their submissiveness, pointed out that this was
only a one time concession97 and volunteers were less willing to enlist in into
the Finnish army as during the Winter War.98 So as not to worsen relations
with the Germans any further, a compromise was proposed – maritime trans-
port across Swedish waters with a Swedish escort.99 Military claims were ac-
cepted, but the political fallout from this decision was rejected, which was
highlighted by Günther when Sweden was denied entry in to the Tripartite
Pact.100 Instead of ending relations with the Soviet Union, Sweden concluded
a new commercial agreement with the USSR on 4 November.
In July 1941, Envoy Potworowski met with the head of the Political
department of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Staffan Söderblom,
to settle a number of matters. He asked Söderblom about Swedish views on
the situation on the eastern front. Swedish experts had no doubt that the
German army, by defeating elite Soviet units, had achieved immense military
success. Nevertheless, Söderblom expressed the following view: ‘even if the
Germans achieved the ultimate military victory, they will eventually face
tremendous organisational problems, and it is impossible to predict how this
entire party ends.’101 Consequently, the military engagement of Germany in
the USSR was perceived by the Swedes as a chance for diminishing German
pressures on Scandinavia. For Potworowski this was only an official expres-
sion of optimism by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Söderblom
was known for his servile attitude towards Germany.
—
96
PISM, A 9, VI 21/1, report by head of the II Division of the Staff of Commander-in-Chief
Lieutenant-Colonel T. Tokarz for the Minister of Internal Affairs, S. Kot, 13 VIII 1941.
97
For more information see: L. Björkman, Sverige…, p. 374.
98
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 10 VII 1941.
99
L. Björkman, Sverige…, pp. 148–149.
100
A. W. Johansson, Per Albin…, pp. 270, 273. The decision of the Swedish government
regarding the transit of the 163th Infantry Division ‘Engelbrecht’ seems to be somewhat
paradoxical for the author, and this is because Sweden simultaneously lost and regained the
status of a neutral state.
101
147
To develop a specific strategy towards Polish affairs, the Swedes moni-

tored the relations of other neutral countries with representatives of the
Polish government in exile. The Swedish Envoy to Bern, Zenon Przy-
byszewski-Westrup, on 11 July 1941 recounted the course of a funeral mass
in commemoration of the death of the eminent Polish politician and pianist
Ignacy Paderewski. He recounted that the mass was attended by repre-
sentatives of the Swiss authorities, neutral states and Western Allies, which
presented an opportunity to learn of their opinion on the Polish matter.102
Westrup learned that the Germans had never directed the Swiss government
to close down the Polish Legation, but instead made numerous cutting
remarks on this issue. They expressed their astonishment that the representa-
tives of the Baltic States were removed from the list of diplomats by the Swiss,
and that the Poles, who according to the Germans were not more privileged,
were treated as they had been prior to the September Campaign. Moreover,
according to Westrup, the Poles caused many problems for the Swiss
authorities. Firstly, they denied for a long time that the legation possessed a
radio station, despite its discovery by local technicians. Secondly, the Polish
consul general to Geneva made it easy for interned Polish soldiers to flee
abroad, and the new Polish representative used the title of envoy, arriving in
Bern with accreditation letters in hand, whilst only having been granted the
title of chargé d’affaires by Switzerland.103
Several days later the Germans once again attempted to pressurize the
Swedes regarding the matter of liquidation of the Polish Legation. The coun-
sellor of the German Legation in Stockholm, Carl von Below, met with Söder-
blom on 15 July to inform him that the Polish Legation acted as an interface
between ‘the so-called Polish government’ in London and ‘former Poland.’
According to German intelligence, this activity was directed by ‘a certain major
R.’ What is more, the Germans accused the Swedes of allowing the new official
to join the Polish mission, which clashed with the declaration contained in the
memorandum of 31 May. In connection with this, von Below expressed his
hope that the Swedish government would gradually complete the liquidation
of the Polish Legation.104 The Swedes did not yield even on that occasion, and
—
102
Mourning ceremonies in Sweden were much more modest. They took place within the
Polish community in Malmö. See: ‘O Paderewskim w Turcji i w Szwecji’, Dziennik Polski, 14
VII 1941; A. N. Uggla, Polacy na południu Szwecji, Stockholm 1993, p. 26.
103
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 12, vol. 890, letter by Swedish Envoy to Bern Z.
Westrup-Przybyszewski to the head of the Political department of the Swedish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs S. Söderblom, Bern, 11 VII 1941.
104
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 12, vol. 890, memorandum by the head of the Political
department of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, S. Söderblom, Stockholm, 17 VII 1941.
148
the position of the mission was reinforced by the ostentatious support of the
Soviet diplomats. Thanks to the services of the British Chargé d’affaires,
Montagu-Pollock, on 6 August Potworowski met with the Soviet Envoy to
Stockholm, Aleksandra Kollontai.105 Later on, this meeting bore fruit through a
series of subsequent visits. Potworowski, in his reports to the headquarters of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recapped that up until 17 September 1939
Kollontai had sympathised with Poland and shown distrust towards Germany.
He also quoted her views, which were in line with his, on the Swedes’ sus-
ceptibility to pressures from Germany. Like Potworowski and the envoys of
Great Britain (Mallet) and the USA (Johnson), Kollontai showed moderation
in her views as well as consideration for the Swedish policy of concessions,
which was for the most part divergent from the conclusions drawn in London,
Washington and Moscow.106
Nevertheless, the Poles were under no illusion. In August 1941, Attaché
Brzeskwiński stated that renewed pressures on Sweden from Germany
should be expected.107 Envoy Potworowski followed attentively articles in the
Swedish newspapers. His intention was to track the current mood. A text he
considered particularly important was published on 12 August by Dagens
Nyheter. Potworowski claimed: ‘it gives an objective and mostly accurate, al-
though […] cautious picture of currents that are penetrating Swedish society
and of changes taking place as events unfold.’108 It was stated there that during
the Winter War Sweden had managed to provide considerable support to
Finland. By April 1940 the threat from Germany was considered too great for
Sweden to deal with alone. Consequently, any initiative of further engage-
ment in support for Denmark and Norway was abandoned. An opinion
journalist from a liberal daily emphasized: ‘What was especially striking was
the unfolding of events in Norway and what happened there still feeling like
a festering wound.’ When Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa, Finland
chose to join the alliance with the Germans, and Norway, an ally of Great
Britain, allied with the Soviet Union. In Sweden, where ‘the instinctive dis-
gust of Soviet governing methods’ had always reigned, the British–Soviet
—
105
IPMS, A 11, 49/sow/1c, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 22 VIII 1941.
106
K. Zetterberg, ‘Neutralitet till varje pris? Tillfrågan om den svenska säkerhetspolitiken
1940–42 och eftergifterna till Tyskland’ [in:] I orkanens…, p. 28; idem, ‘1942 – Storkriget
vänder, Sveriges utsätta läge består’ [in:] Vindkantring…, p. 134.
107
AAN, HI/I/10, letter by the head of the II Division of the Staff of Commander-in-Chief
Colonel L. Mitkiewicz to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, London, 14 VIII 1941.
108
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 21 VIII 1941.
149
agreement was hard for some to understand. The same opinion journalist
warned: ‘They are forgetting that the priority of the great powers taking part
in the war is the strategic situation and not ideologies.’ This was the justi-
fication for Sweden’s foreign policy: ‘One needs to keep an eye not on the
changing moods, but on the permanent interests of Sweden. […] it is also in
the interest of Sweden not to take the side of any of the opponents, simultane-
ously preserving its independence and honour. […] A casual and relaxed
attitude at the moment of the conclusion of the war is what we, the Swedes,
are expecting and striving for.’109
One attempt to counteract foreign propaganda was a public address by
Prime Minister Hansson on 17 August 1941 in Östersund, and a protest rally
organized in the Auditorium Hall in Stockholm on 21 August, where two
thousand people gathered who were connected with the Social Democratic
Party. The speech delivered by Hansson a retrospective and an assertion of
the party’s programme. It was a sign of a will to reduce concessions to
Germany, but without a doubt it also justified the flexibility of the Swedish
policy towards the claims of Hitler. Hansson stated emphatically: ‘The policy
of Sweden follows the Swedish [underlined in the original text] course, and
the Swedish nation rejects all possible attempts that could be made in order
for it to abandon this course. Our position has been made by us not as a result
of some accidental decision, but solely on the understanding of the true
interests of our country. […] Neutrality is a difficult policy. When war had
broken out, and we were proclaiming our neutrality, our assumption was that
it would be possible for us to maintain good relations with all powers. Our
aim was to adhere to this policy. Both sides assured us that our neutrality
would be respected […]. However, soon even we felt the effects of the war.
[…] The policy of neutrality of Sweden could neither be conducted exactly as
we intended nor according to our expectations.’110
The staff of the Polish Legation recognized the true intentions behind this
rally: ‘In practice, the purpose was naturally to protest the German propa-
ganda, which roamed Sweden with impunity while restricting freedom of
speech and writing when it comes to the facts or commentaries which Ger-
mans considered unpleasant.’111 During the rally the floor was taken by
Minister of Defence Per Edvin Sköld, representative of the liberals Sam
Larsson and representative of the right wing Folke Kyling. Larsson stated that
—
109
‘Svenska stämningar och intressen’, Dagens Nyheter, 12 VIII 1941.
110
Foreign Affairs (together with attachments), Stockholm, 29 VIII 1941.
111
Ibidem.
150
Sweden should not, as the defeatists were advising, take the side of the
stronger opponent, but note that the war was not over. He also added: ‘They
keep saying that democracy is doomed to failure. But what does the system
of countries, who abolished democracy, look like? In these countries there is
no place for civil liberties, no freedom to gather, no freedom of speech, reli-
gion or even of thought. We are asking now, is it worth living when every-
thing that is dear to us, is to be taken away from us?’112
Characteristic is the difference in the attitude towards the situation of
Polish diplomats who resided permanently in Stockholm and reacted with
understanding to the opportunistic attitude towards Germany and of observ-
ers to whom Sweden was a new and unknown territory. It is hard to see the
influence of their critical views on the Polish expatriate community in Great
Britain, but worth noting that various divergent views on the Swedish policy
towards Germany were reaching London.
In April 1941, in connection with the plans to activate the Swedish mes-
senger route, Professor Olgierd Górka, the historian, publicist and political
activist visited Stockholm. During the war Górka worked for the Polish
government in exile as an expert on national and ethnic issues. In a report to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs he presented his impressions, stating that he
found himself in the territory of free and unhindered German propaganda,
where around 700 people were dedicated to the German Legation. According
to Górka, despite the Swedes’ fundamental pro-democratic attitude, they
lacked widespread faith in a British victory. The German propaganda offen-
sive was much more effective than the actions of the British. In connection
with this Professor Górka witnessed ‘the picture of unsteadiness of opinion
and, from day to day, the succumbing to the influence of current news.’
According to Górka, the Swedish nation had divided sympathies, although
the pro-German inclinations were balanced only with the reluctance of the
democrats towards totalitarianism. Górka predicted that if a German–Soviet
conflict broke out the Swedes would show their absolute support to the
Germans in the face of pervasive animosity towards the Soviets. According
to the Polish analyst, the British propaganda had no chance of success,
because the Swedes anticipated pressures from the Germans. And as far as
the Polish matter was concerned: ‘there were sympathies, yet strictly platonic,
and therefore with no trace of courage that would allow anti-German mani-
festations.’ It was possible from time to time for the Poles to smuggle in their
views, whereas the Germans were unfettered. Berson, the correspondent for
—
112
Ibidem.
151
The Polish Telegraphic Agency (PAT), even asked London not to disclose the
source of information that was published by the Polish press in Great Britain,
unless it was him, as this could cause difficulties with the Swedes.113
In turn, in mid-August, an anonymous employee, most probably Norbert
Żaba, of the Polish Ministry of Information and Documentation from
Helsinki, who was ‘currently staying in Stockholm’ submitted his first im-
pressions: ‘Based on my observations of other missions, I must say that con-
trary to some opinions German influences are growing here at an alarming
rate [underlined in the original] and against continuously internal appear-
ances this country can no more be considered entirely neutral from a political
point of view. […] In some areas (police) collaboration with the Germans has
already taken place.’114
One may suspect that the Swedish pro-Ally circles, which intended to
counteract the one-sided picture of their own country that was transmitted
abroad, accentuated the will to maintain balance between the sides of the
conflict even more. Such example was certainly the 12th Swedish Trade
Union Confederation (LO) Congress held on 7 September 1941. Opened by
Prime Minister Hansson, the congress was attended by delegates from Great
Britain (represented by George Gibson), Finland (Eero Vuori), Denmark
(Laurits Hansen) and Norway (Martin Tranmæl, living in exile in Sweden).
During the sessions a telegram from a representative of the Polish Socialist
—
113
PISM, A 9, VI 7/1, letter by O. Górka to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 19 IV
1941. It needs to be noted that, for an observer who witnessed military actions, occupation
or even everyday life in an ally country involved in the war, arrival in Sweden always meant
a relocation to a somewhat unreal world. Jan Nowak-Jeziorański (after the war the head of
the Radio Free Europe Polish Section in Munich) found himself in Sweden in April 1943 as
a courier of the Polish Home Army: ‘If it was not for the radio, press and rationing of some
imported articles, the residents of the town of Slite [on Gotland] would not be aware there
was a war raging in the world. […] I am already tired of the lovely Stockholm, the true Venice
of the north, with its famous Skansen museum, cinemas screening long-unseen Western
films, elegant cafés and restaurants. In comparison to exhausted and impoverished occupied
Europe, the capital of Sweden was a true oasis of peace, well-being and safety’ (J. Nowak,
Kurier z Warszawy, Kraków 1989, pp. 110, 124). Even a correspondent of one of the Swiss
weeklies was surprised by the visit in Sweden: ‘I enter an impeccably clean, airport coffee
shop dressed with flowers. Here, one may have as much milk as one only wants, and strong
coffee […] To my surprise a completely full sugar-bowl is placed right in front of me! The
waiter has no idea, how unusual this is to me. Food looks appetizing, fresh and colourfully
cheerful. It would be great to be able to stay here longer.’ The correspondence was reprinted
in a Polish daily published in Hungary: ‘Samolotem do Stockholmu’, Wieści Polskie, 15 X
1943 and in ‘Dziennik Armii Polskiej na Wschodzie’, 23 XI 1943. See also: J. Ray[kowski],
‘List ze Szwecji’, Wieści Polskie, 11 IX 1942.
114
AAN, HI/I/10, note by Minister of Information and Documentation S. Stroński, London,
28 VIII 1941.
152
Party, Maurycy Karniol, was read out: ‘On behalf of the working people of
Poland, I am greeting your congress. The Polish nation is in bondage. It is
being exploited by an alien force. The Polish nation is suffering from hunger
and cold. It is forced to work like slaves. But the Polish people have not
broken down, they keep fighting and believe in the victory a of new, better,
democratic world.’ In addition to the everyday heroism of Poles living under
occupation, Karniol accentuated the presence of socialists in the Polish
government in exile and then concluded courteously: ‘You, the Swedish
labourers, now remain the only free, democratic, class-divided worker’s
movement in Europe. That is why we are following your efforts and your
work with sympathy. We wish you victory, we hope that your mighty Swedish
trade unions will continue to develop, and that your democracy will survive
in your beautiful country.’115 The telegram was received with enthusiastic ap-
plause. Moreover, the participants of the congress adopted a declaration con-
demning the Germans for murdering two activists of the Norwegian workers’
movement – Viggo Hansteen and Rolf Wickstrøm. Following the interven-
tion of the authorities, information about this protest was submitted to the
press in a much-softened version.116
A misunderstanding in the Polish–Swedish diplomatic relations became
an issue for the bulletin Pol-Radio. In the beginning of September 1941, the
head of the Political department of Utrikesdepartementet, Staffan Söderblom,
summoned Potworowski and informed him about the German interven-
tions. He implied that the best solution would be to suspend publication of
the journal. In spite of the bulletin being sent anonymously, its connections
with the Polish Legation were, according to the Swede, well known. Pot-
worowski claimed that ‘widespread censorship’ meant the bulletin was the
only source of information about Polish affairs. Initially, Söderblom sought
a compromise, for example, announcing that the author of the bulletin was a
Swedish citizen.117 However, after preparing another issue, Söderblom’s assis-
tant, Ragnar Kumlin, requested that distribution be suspended. He argued
that: ‘the Germans are perhaps attaching too much importance to this issue,
and as far as the Polish affairs are concerned, its distribution cannot possibly
be of key importance.’ Having distributed yet another issue, having witnessed
—
115
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 18 IX 1941.
116
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 3 XI 1941.
117
AAN, the Polish Legation in Stockholm, 62, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G.
Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 5 II 1941. p. 8.
153
further German protests and having seen that the Swedes’ negative position
remained, by November Potworowski had decided to halt publication.
Instead, texts devoted to Polish affairs were published in British periodicals
and distributed all over Sweden in various languages.118 In December 1941,
Potworowski informed the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
London that Sweden had become prone to peaceful propaganda, ‘publishing
various notes, articles, etc. concerning the activity of our Government and
our army, propagating certain political concepts etc.’ The envoy wanted to
make use of the situation,119 but he never returned to the idea of publishing
the bulletin.
Polish diplomats did their best to make their presence felt within the circle
of Stockholm diplomatic corps. On 18 September 1941, Envoy Potworowski
shared his condolences during visits to the Swedish minister of defence and
the commander of the Swedish navy in response to the sinking of three
Swedish destroyers, caused by an explosion the day before. Attaché
Brzeskwiński paid a condolence visit to the head of the cabinet of the naval
minister of defence.120
On 18 September 1941, Envoy Potworowski also met with Minister
Günther to notify him about Polish–Soviet relations and the change in posi-
tion of the Polish minister of foreign affairs (Minister August Zaleski, whose
attitude to the Polish–Soviet agreement was critical, was replaced by the
Polish ambassador to London Edward Raczyński). Envoy Potworowski pre-
sented the Swedish minister with the notes that had been exchanged between
the Polish and Soviet governments, and the text of the arrangement of 30 July
—
118
Affairs, Stockholm, 20 XI 1941. pp. 9–10.
119
Affairs, Stockholm, 12 XII 1941. pp. 11–12.
120
PISM, A 11, E 25, letter by Director of the State Protocol of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
A. Jażdżewski to Head of the Polish Navy Command (KMW) Rear-Admiral J. Świrski, 9 X
1941. Grafström mentions in his diary that in December 1941 he informed the police about
a conversation he heard in the Stockholm Opera House between Schreiber from the German
Legation and Captain Olof Carl Arboren. According to Grafström, the interlocutors dis-
cussed possible options of performing a sabotage in Sweden and they considered the
procedure of filling oilers with sand to be the best one. Arboren was also to promise to submit
to the German information on the head of the Swedish intelligence, Colonel Carlos
Adlercreutz, and his entire team. Special attention of Grafström was drawn to the mention
of the Swedish officer that the attack on the Swedish navy base in September 1941 was
definitely performed by the Poles. Grafström filed a report on the conversation with the
police, as a result of which Arboren was subjected to surveillance. See S. Grafström, Anteck-
ningar 1938–1944, pp. 377–379. For the police report in this matter, see: RA-Arninge, SÄPO
arkiv, P 201, memorandum by G. Persson, Sztokholm, 18 XII 1941.
154
(so-called Sikorski–Mayski agreement), and discussed it point by point.

According to Minister Günther, the German–Soviet war was the so-called ray
of light for Poland, but he made the value of the concluded arrangement
conditional on the result of the war with the Germans. He believed that the
Germans had overestimated their chances and if they were unable to con-
clude the campaign within six weeks and move on to a winter campaign,
predicting the result of the war would be impossible. Günther pointed out:
‘We are observing the course of events with astonishment, since it is incom-
prehensible to us what the Germans’ reasons were for starting the war with
the Soviets’. In his letter to the headquarters of the Polish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Potworowski explained that the views of the minister were charac-
teristic of the political elite of Sweden and a reflection of changes over several
months when the attitude towards Germany became more critical. This was
even more so worth highlighting because it concerned the interlocutor who
was ‘cautious in words, very “neutrally” oriented in his policy and who was
generally accused of, in my view not rightly so, pro-German sympathies.’121
Günther’s counsellor, Östen Unden, in a conversation with an anonymous
source of the Polish Legation, confirmed that Sweden had decided to engage
in the war if there came an ultimatum from Germany. Nevertheless, he did
not believe that Hitler take such a decision because, as he said, the Germans
‘are too clever to commit such a blunder in relation to the Swedes.’ What he
anticipated was a gradual increase in pressure from Berlin.122 According to
Carlgren, a post-war researcher of Swedish foreign policy, Hitler had no
reason to attack Sweden because it granted all his wishes. Swedish–German
relations remained stable following Hitler’s aggression on the USSR. Sweden,
however, did not live up to everyone’s expectations. On matters of lesser
importance, the Swedes took every opportunity not to, or at best partially,
carry out what was being asked of them. The transit of German troops, how-
ever, progressed without disruption, German ships used Swedish shipping
routes with the protection of the Swedish navy and German courier aircraft
passed through Swedish airspace. Regular trade also took place, and as a
result Germany had a supply of strategic resources and products, mainly iron
ore and ball bearings.123 Only Allied success could improve Sweden’s situation
in relation to Germany. This ‘strategy of balance’ was easier at the turn of
—
121
PISM, A 11, 49/sow/1c, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 19 IX 1941.
122
PISM, col. 183/55, letter by N. Żaba to the Ministry of Information and Documentation,
28 IX 1941.
123
155
1941 and 1942 than in the Autumn of 1941. Yet, at the beginning of 1942 the
gravest reports since the outbreak of war were heard, as it was understood
that Germans were preparing to attack Sweden.124
Nevertheless, the Swedes maintained good relations with the Germans by
remaining cautious in their diplomatic contacts with the Polish side.
Following the conclusion of the mission of Naval Attaché Commander
Tadeusz Morgenstern on 24 September 1941, Potworowski tried to convince
Boheman to appoint a successor. The Swedish government rejected the possi-
bility in line with the rule on not permitting personnel changes in diplomatic
missions of occupied countries in Stockholm. Potworowski explained an
expert on naval affairs was necessary due to the Polish submarines detained
in Sweden. He proposed a compromise involving the appointment of a naval
officer in the legation who would act as an appraiser, which was eventually
approved by Minister Günther.125 Commander Eugeniusz Pławski, a former
commander of the Piorun destroyer, was brought to Stockholm and ap-
pointed in December 1941.
In the autumn of 1941 a parliamentary debate was held on the foreign
policy of Sweden. On 27 October, the government conducted a closed in-
formation session of both houses, and two days later a public debate ensued.126
Perhaps the most critical view, in relation to the position of the government,
which defended a flexible policy of neutrality, was that of Fredrik Ström, who
remarked on Sweden’s support of Finland, its permitting of the transit of the
German forces to the eastern front, and its nonchalance towards the situation
of Norway. Eventually, all speakers agreed as to the correctness of the policy.
They only expressed the need to oppose the far-fetched demands of foreign
powers, as doing anything else would risk Swedish sovereignty. According to
Potworowski, ‘the vast majority of society favoured victory of the democratic
countries’, but at the same time ‘they are not brave enough to take up arms
and stand beside any of the opponents.’ This resulted in the flexible policy of
the government to avoid engagement in the war.127 Minister Günther speech
in the parliament is an example of skilful manoeuvring between the expec-
tations of putting a stop to German claims and joining Hitler’s vision of New
Europe. He stated emphatically that Sweden ‘categorically rejects anything
—
124
Ibidem, pp. 338–341, 346–347, 365, 393. E. Boheman, På vakt. Kabinettssekreterare…, p.
294.
125
126
127
Ibidem.
156
that could mean participation in a military or economic action, as well as in

any other action pursued by any of the fighting sides against its opponent.’128
The speech was very well received by the German press as some fragments
did not rule out that Sweden would be willing to adapt to the situation created
by the development of military operations.129 The speech was also a pleasant
surprise for one of the pro-Ally members of the parliamentary commission
for foreign affairs, as it addressed the issue of the enslavement of Denmark
and Norway.130 Envoy Potworowski drew attention to the practical side of the
policy, ‘Such a guideline – in the current geopolitical situation of Sweden – is
impossible to follow without concessions to Germany, on which Sweden is
dependent politically, economically and militarily to a much greater extent
than it is Great Britain and America.’131
In November 1941, in a conversation with Envoy Potworowski, Boheman
stressed that the Germans were displeased with Sweden. He was, therefore,
ready for further offences to be committed by the neighbour to the south.
Fundamental for Potworowski at the time were his good relations with the
Swedish authorities.132 As usual, Boheman reassured Potworowski that the
issue of the possible liquidation of the Polish Legation was not the subject of
the German–Swedish talks.133 He was most interested in hearing from the Poles
about the situation on the Eastern front. He feared stagnation or the break-up
of the Soviet Union, because he predicted that in such situation the Germans
would ‘get rid of the snag in the shape of a democratic and independent
Sweden.’134 However, he was hoping that the Germans would not attack
Sweden, because – as the Swedish correspondent in Berlin convinced attaché
Norbert Żaba, who came from Helsinki and became officially appointed in the
British Legation – ‘they are aware that the Swedes are ready to resist.’135
—
128
AAN, HI/I/10, report by N. Żaba entitled ‘Szwecja w cieniu swastyki’, attachment to letter
by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Stockholm, 3 XI 1941.
129
130
131
Ibidem.
132
NA, FO, 371/29704, confidential letter by A. Baliński to F.K. Roberts, 7 XI 1941.
133
134
Ibidem.
135
AAN, HI/I/10, report by Press Attaché N. Żaba to the Minister of Information and
Documentation, S. Stroński, Stockholm, 8 XI 1941.
157
Potworowski was appeased continuously by Boheman and did not predict

any surprises from the Swedish policy. Similar was the tone of the reports of
Attaché Brzeskwiński. Based on the analysis of the discussion in parliament,
Brzeskwiński summarized the fundamental assumptions of this policy, ‘a
constant aim to stay out of the conflict, an armed defence of this position if
need be and a willingness to maintain good relations with other countries
[…] [especially Denmark and Norway], and eventually, if possible, showing
economic support to Finland […]. In the field – the continuation of con-
structive preparation of armed forces to defend the political stance of the
government.’136
Towards the end of 1941, whilst struggling to defy German pressure, the
Swedes did not intend to support the Allies, mostly owing to their fear of the
Soviet Union. Yet, they wished the Finns military success and a beneficial
border arrangement.137 According to the Polish envoy, Sweden was to reach
an agreement with the government in Helsinki to, on its behalf, prevent Great
Britain from declaring war on Finland. In exchange, the Finnish government
was to prevent German aggression against Sweden.138 As noted by the London
correspondent for Svenska Dagbladet, Knud Bolander, following a visit to
Sweden, it was beyond any doubt that the mood of Swedish society was more
pro-Ally oriented than expected. The journalist was convinced that public
opinion, despite strong sympathies for the Finns, supported the British. The
only exceptions were young doctors and engineers educated in Germany.139
In December 1941, Envoy Potworowski informed the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs that attacks by the German and Italian press ‘are currently affecting
the Swedish public to a much smaller degree than a few months ago.’ He also
noted ‘The stiffening of the Swedes’ attitude towards the threats and demands
of the Germans […] is constantly gaining strength.140 During his talks with
the Swedes, Potworowski heard with increasing frequency that ‘the Germans
cannot possibly win this war.’ This mostly related to the representatives of
economic spheres travelling to Germany and Poland. These changes also had
an impact on the attitude towards the Polish circles focused around the Polish
—
136
PISM, A V, 31/11, report by Polish Military Attaché to Stockholm Major F. Brzeskwiński
for October 1941, 5 XI 1941.
137
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 5 XII 1941.
138
Ibidem.
139
NA, FO, 371/29666, note by O. Lancaster from a conversation with K. Bolander, a London
correspondent for Svenska Dagbladet, 17 XII 1941.
140
158
Legation in Stockholm. In connection with this, the envoy wrote to the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘On the legation’s horizon (for instance on Polish
Independence Day, 11 November, during the session of the Polish–Swedish
Chamber of Commerce or the so far modest resumption of activity by the
Swedish–Polish Association etc.) persons have started to appear who often
hold serious offices and who, so far, preferred not to display the interest they
had in Poland from September 1939.141
As usual, the officials of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs were cau-
tious in voicing their opinions, but even they admitted that the breakdown of
the military offensive along the Eastern front undermined the position of the
Third Reich. For Sweden this meant the consolidation of its position. On 27
November, during the session of the Swedish Association of Military Defence,
Minister Günther justified the consolidation of the system of national defence
as to ‘maintain the freedom of conducting the policy of neutrality without
making concessions to any of the fighting sides which would be either humi-
liating for the country or put its independence in jeopardy.’ The actions of the
Swedish politicians were to be governed by national egoism.142 Even the
Swedish press was taken aback by the tone of the minister’s statement, which
was, as for him, ‘determined and marked with patriotic temperament.’143
Attaché Brzeskwiński confirmed Envoy Potworowski’s views. At the
outset of December 1941, he conveyed to the headquarters of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in Poland, ‘the position of Sweden in relation to German
pressure seems to be reinforced.’ The Swedish government yielded to the
Germans only on matters of secondary importance, whereas on fundamental
issues it continued to resist. This meant the Germans were not granted a loan
of 100 thousand crowns or permission to transport two divisions, and the
Swedish twice announced information about the Polish army and General
Sikorski’s journey to the USSR, which as Brzeskwiński stated, ‘would have
been out of the question several months earlier.’144
In the run up to Christmas, following the Japanese attacks in the Pacific
Ocean and Southeast Asia, the belief that the war would continue a lot longer
became widespread across Sweden. Losses in the American and British navies
weakened the Allies and fortified the position of Germany in Europe. In
—
141
Ibidem.
142
AAN, HI/I/10, ‘Reakcja prasy osi na mowy Günthera’, attachment to classified letter by
Envoy G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 5 XII 1941.
143
Ibidem.
144
PISM, A V, 31/11, report by Polish Military Attaché to Stockholm Major F. Brzeskwiński
from November 1941, Stockholm, 5 XII 1941.
159
December 1941, rumours proliferated within the diplomatic circles in Stock-

holm that the Germans had initiated peace talks with Stalin. Such were the
first reactions to the news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. According
to Norbert Żaba, the rumour was the sign of ‘somewhat concern and con-
fusion that temporarily broke out in Swedish political circles in connection
with Japanese aggression and success in the first days of the war. Tension
intensified here even yesterday due to Hitler’s criticism of Sweden.’145 On the
whole though, Swedish opinion was in no doubt that Japan’s attack was ‘an
act of desperation […] in the face of the tremendous resources of America.’
Stockholm reckoned with becoming more isolated from the Western world,
while considering not only the conflict in Asia, but also the declaration of war
on Finland by Great Britain on 6 December, 1941. That is why the reserved
attitude of Poland was very well received.146
In his report for December 1941, Naval Attaché Commander Eugeniusz
Pławski underlined that the USA entering the war, the failures of the Germans
on the eastern front together with successes of the British in Northern Africa
‘are a powerful driver for the further hardening of the Swedes’ political
backbone in relation to the Germans.’ German military exercises over the Baltic
Sea, which could have indicated the possibility of German attack on Sweden
raised concern. The Swedes were convinced, however, that they could rally
against the 18 German divisions concentrated in Northern Europe.147
Did the military situation in Europe and Asia influence on the attitude
towards Polish affairs? Attaché Pławski wrote: ‘The attitude of the press
seems to be increasingly bold and independent. There are pronouncements
about the Polish army and the visit of the Commander-in-Chief in Moscow.’
Besides this, the Polish pilots who had been interned after an emergency
landing in November 1941 were released and awaited evacuation to Great
Britain. Attaché Pławski relayed: ‘The Swedes are perfectly aware that the
crew is Polish.’ What was also addressed was the possible release of some of
the interned seamen. Envoy Potworowski discussed this matter with Ragnar
Kumlin, the vice head of the Political department of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Attaché Pławski also announced with a degree of happiness that he
visited the internment camps unhindered, whereas other attachés (from
—
145
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, letter by Press Attaché N. Żaba to the Ministry of
Information and documentation, Stockholm, 12 XII 1941.
146
PISM, A 12, 53/37J, copy of telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski [?]
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Stockholm, 19 XII 1941, p. 26.
147
PISM, MAR, A V 9/2, report by Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm Captain E. Pławski to
the deputy of the head of the Polish Navy Commander T. Morgenstern, 7 I 1942.
160
Norway and the USSR) faced obstacles on the same occasion. He highlighted:
‘on the contrary, I am encountering good will on the part of the military
authorities on this issue,’ and summed up, ‘even these small facts prove that
a certain amount of relaxation took place in the attitude of the Swedish
authorities towards us. Indeed, not long ago a Polish citizen who travelled
from Gdańsk to Sweden without a ticket was handed over to the Germans,
but this was an isolated incident which occurred most probably as a result of
pressure from the Germans, as just before Christmas the Swedish authorities
did not send back four Polish refugees to the Germans but delivered them to
the Polish legation. Lately, there has also been no pressure on the activities of
some of our divisions (Branch O. II, O. VI Of the Staff etc.), or the obser-
vation of the attaché’s office.’148
The change in attitude could also have been caused by the course of the visit
of General Sikorski in Moscow (December 1941). In his report from the visit
to the Soviet Union, the Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief highlighted
the importance of Stalin’s declaration about the Soviet Union refraining from
engagement in the internal affairs of other countries – which was received
joyfully by the Swedish Envoy to Moscow Vilhelm Assarsson as well as diplo-
mats from other states that ‘are living under the threat of Soviet imperialism.’149
This thought was developed by Sikorski in his letter to British Minister of
Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden from 10 March 1942. He warned him against
the Soviet possessiveness, which was ignored, according to the Polish Prime
Minister, by Great Britain and the USA. Sikorski acted as a defender of not only
the interests of Poland but also the interests of all neutral states.150
Maurycy Karniol, in his report to the leadership of the PPS in London,
quoted the newspaper Stockholms Extrablad, where on discussing the article
from the British Weekly Review it was highlighted: ‘Currently […] under the
impact of recent events – correct views on the key significance of Poland for
the conclusion of the peace issue seems to penetrate into the minds of inter-
national management circles.’151 However, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-
Tidning, on 27 December 1941, published the complete and full of pathos
correspondence of Ilya Ehrenburg about the Polish army that was being
formed in the USSR. The author of the letters focused on overcoming
—
148
Ibidem.
149
Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, vol. 4: grudzień 1941 –
sierpień 1942, scholarly editing M. Zgórniak, compiled by W. Rojek in cooperation with L.
Neuger, Kraków 1998, p. 93 See a relevant passage of letter by Sikorski to Churchill from 17
December 1941: Documents…, vol. 1, p. 256.
150
Ibidem, p. 175.
151
PISM, A 9, III 4/14, report by M. Karniol ‘Szwedzka prasa o Polsce’, Stockholm, 22 I 1942.
161
national antagonisms between the Poles, Ukrainians and Jews within the
units, and he also planned to target Polish–Russian antagonisms, as ‘the Poles
were speaking of Russian generals with much admiration.’152
At the outset of 1942, Potworowski informed the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs: ‘from the moment of our conclusion of an arrangement with the
Soviet Union, Madam Kollontai emphasizes most insistently and manifests
her friendly feelings and good relations with myself and with the rest of the
members of the Legation.’ This attitude was characteristic of all the personnel
of the Soviet Legation. Potworowski feared the representative of Moscow
would treat good relations with the Poles instrumentally. He stated: ‘This
strategy is perfectly understandable in the current environment, where, de-
pendent on the usually negative and at least full of reserve attitude of the
Swedes towards Soviet Russia, manifesting friendly relations with us in parti-
cular is an ideal propagandist factor as well as promotion of Soviet policy.’153
At the same time this was a good occasion for strengthening Russia’s position
in relation to the Swedes. The Polish envoy recounted that as early as autumn
1941 Kollontai had invited him and his wife to dinner, and following a return
visit, he was again asked on 6 January 1942 to another dinner, with Minister
Günther in attendance.
During a conversation with the head of Swedish diplomacy, Potworowski
was asked about General Sikorski’s journey to the USA and the news from
Warsaw. Günther revealed that he was receiving information about the
situation in occupied Poland through Consul Carl Herslow.154 Other Swedish
businessmen were also informing their diplomats on the German policy in the
General Government. It is in this circle where one ought to seek the sources of
information that were arriving in Stockholm, both directly or through the
Swedish Legation in Berlin. In May 1941, Eric von Post reported from the
Berlin mission that he had obtained information about the situation in the
General Government from a reliable source. He stressed that: ‘over the last
fourteen days an increase in the prices of various essential items has taken place
in the market. […] People cannot afford to buy food. Many are starving. […]
People are becoming apathetic because of the difficulties in buying goods.
—
152
I. Ehrenburg, ‘Polska armén i Ryssland sättes snart in i striden. Målet som hägrar är –
Warszawa’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 27 XII 1941.
153
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 8 I 1942.
154
Herslow’s visit to UD headquarters in December 1941 is mentioned by S. Grafström,
Anteckningar 1938–1944, p. 380: ‘He informed that the situation of the people in Poland is
terrible, that they are on the verge of starvation, all this topped by disease and atrocities of
the occupants.’
162
Often, instead of going to work, they are staying at home because they are too
tired, hungry and indifferent to do their job.’ According to von Post, the
behaviour of German soldiers was flawless, which cannot be said about the SS
and SA.155 Envoy Richert, on supplementing the information from von Post,
added in June that the prices in the free market of Warsaw increased further
still, bringing tragic social consequences. Richert also stated: ‘One may say that
the capital is suffering from famine and there are cases of people collapsing in
the street, because they are suffering from emaciation. It is estimated that 60 to
100 people die of starvation every day in the ghetto.’156 In his opinion, the lack
of food in the General Government was a consequence of the concentration of
the German army near the border with the Soviet Union.157
Richert clearly closed his mind to the fact that the occupied territories of
Poland were the subject of an intentional policy of economic disorganization,
and that terror, murders and robbery were occurring on a daily basis. The
news from the General Government was covered up. One of the most
extreme examples was the treatment of the report by the Swedish consul to
Szczecin, Karl Yngve Vendel, who in August 1942 obtained information from
the German officers not only about everyday life under occupation but also
about the mass murder of the Jews.158 On summing up the question of provi-
sions, he stated that ‘people will have to die from starvation.’ He mentioned
the questions of illegal trade and inflated prices. Primarily, however, he
described the German intention to slaughter all the Jews: ‘The ones who are
most under threat by extermination are the Jews over 50 years of age and
children below 10 years of age. The rest have been left alive in order to fill the
place of the missing manpower; they will be liquidated when they are no
longer needed. Their property is being confiscated, it mostly falls into the
hands of the SS men. In towns, the Jewish population is gathered in one place
after being officially informed that they would be “deloused”. As they enter
the building, they are told to take off their clothes, which are sent to the
“centre for yarn materials”; whereas delousing means gassing, after which all
the bodies are buried in the previously prepared mass graves.’ In the Swedish
Legation in Berlin all similar news was consistently taken too lightly due to a
—
155
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 485, letter by E. von Post to S. Söderblom,
Berlin, 26 V 1941.
156
Ibidem, letter by Swedish Envoy to Berlin A. Richert to S. Söderblom, Berlin, 10 VI 1941.
157
Also S. Grafström was rather regularly meeting Sigge Häggberg and Sven Norrman, who
were visiting Warsaw on a steady basis. See: S. Grafström, Anteckningar 1938–1944, s. 296,
382, 366, 409–410.
158
A commentary on the document: J. Lewandowski, ‘Raport Vendla. Próba mikro- i makro-
analizy’, Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego 1992, iss. 4, pp. 33–46.
163
commonly held belief that they were unbelievable. Many Swedish diplomats,
including Richert and Söderblom for the most part at the headquarters, were
convinced that Sweden should refrain from any action that might worsen
relations with the Germans. They judged the overcoming of the information
blockade, imposed on the occupied territories by the Germans, to be risky.
During a conversation on 8 January 1942, Potworowski did not conceal the
fact that he was in contact with several Swedes who were travelling to the
General Government and who, despite difficult conditions, were trying to sur-
vive and sustain local Swedish companies. Günther mentioned the streng-
thening pre-war Polish–Swedish relations, and expressed his hope for future
developments, adding, ‘Nobody knows what the course of events will be, but
one thing is clear, and this is that when the war ends, everything would change
diametrically in comparison with the current situation, which, what is more,
cannot even serve as a foundation for the future development of relations.’159
Perhaps this unclearly formulated statement already expressed a vision of
Soviet dominance over East-Central Europe. At the same time the Swedish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was forced to analyse forecasts for the future,
when on 3 February 1942 Boheman asked Potworowski about Soviet claims
on the Polish Eastern Borderlands.160 This was, however, interpreted by
Potworowski as the sign of the Swedes’ continuous conviction that the threat
from Germany was more dangerous than that from the Soviet Union.
Primarily they believed that the latest developments on the front, both in
Russia and the area of the Japanese offensive in Asia and the Pacific, indicated
the conclusion of the war was long in the future. Everyone hoped that an
attack on Sweden would not bring any benefits to the Germans, although the
policy of the Third Reich was followed with apprehension: ‘They are, none-
theless, prepared here for all surprises which could result from an “irrational”
character of Hitlerian policy, for which even reasons of an emotional nature
may come into play, for instance a desire to eliminate one of the last countries
in Europe that refuses to be subject to “the new European order” for the sake
of the very order itself.’161
Nevertheless, Potworowski accepted the words of Minister of Social
Affairs Gustav Möller, who said that a German assault on Sweden would lead
them in to battle. To raise morale and the will to oppose the Germans, the
—
159
AAN, HI/I/19, attachment to the letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 8 I 1942.
160
Notes by Polish envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski 1939–1942, entry from 3 II 1942.
161
164
Swedish authorities permitted dissemination, to a limited extent, of informa-

tion about the German terror in Norway.
In January 1942, following talks with the commanding officer of the army,
the chief of staff, the director of the cabinet of the minister of defence and the
head of the intelligence, Attaché Brzeskwiński relayed the views of the highest
military circles in Sweden about the situation in Europe to the headquarters
of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These insights are interesting, dis-
tinctive and worth close attention. ‘It is in the interest of the Swedish reason
of state that Great Britain and its allies claimed victory, however it is not in
the interest of Sweden and most probably of the entire civilized world that
Germany was defeated by the USSR, as this would mean Bolshevik hegemony
all over Europe, and at least in countries that neighbour the USSR, among
which is Sweden. From the Swedish point of view, an ideal conclusion to the
war would be a situation where both sides (the USSR and Germany) are left
as weak as possible. According to Swedish perception, evil is not Russia or
Germany, but evil which needs to be annihilated is a) Bolshevism and b)
Nazism. If both these regimes manage to secure a complete victory over each
other, Europe would find itself on the brink of catastrophe – very serious in
the first case, and less serious in the second. […] The Germans proposed
Sweden to take part in “a pan-European battle” against communism. This is
out of question considering the Swedish policy, because in such case it would
place itself automatically on the side of the block fighting against Great
Britain and its allies, to which the Swedish government cannot agree. The
possible all-out victory of the USSR would threaten the political and eco-
nomic independence of its neighbours (Finland, Sweden, Romania and
Hungary), and if Poland regains independence thanks to this particular
victory, it won’t be for long. That is why, according to the Swedes, victory for
the USSR is not in the interest of Poland. All these conditions put Sweden in
an extremely delicate situation, which in the future could drag the country
into the turmoil of war.’162
The views of the Swedish interlocutors of Brzeskwiński were convergent
with the Polish analyses of the development of the situation in Europe and
with expectations that the situation from the closing months of the First
World War – the defeat of Russia in the battle with the Germans and the
defeat of the Germans on the western front – would be repeated. Neverthe-
less, neither Sweden nor Poland had much influence on what was happening.
—
162
Ibidem, extract of the report by Polish Military Attaché to Stockholm Major F.
Brzeskwiński for January 1942.
165
The former acted only as a passive observer, the latter was at war, but despite
its efforts it did not play a decisive role in the struggle nor did it have much
impact on strategic and political decisions of the powers.
In mid-February 1942 the Polish Staff of the Commander-in-Chief
informed Brzeskwiński about German preparations to attack Sweden. The
reports on this matter were sent to London from occupied Poland, where
detailed maps of Sweden were printed for the units of the Wehrmacht. The
Attaché immediately communicated this fact to the Swedish military authori-
ties and Envoy Potworowski met with Boheman on 19 February to discuss it.
The Swede, however, undervalued the news. On many occasions previous, it
seemed the Germans were preparing to launch an attack, yet the real purpose
was usually to warn the British of a possible attack on Scandinavia. Anyway,
Boheman assured Potworowski that in the event of attack, Sweden would
take up arms and ‘expressed his gratitude for the passing on of valuable
information to the Swedish staff by our military attaché.’163 For Sweden the
so-called February crisis was a breakthrough in relations with the Germans;
from then on relations eased somewhat.164 Nobody ruled out that Hitler could
decide to launch an attack but the danger was said to be much smaller and
dependent on the action of the Allies in Norway. A disinformation campaign
took place until July 1944, the purpose of which was to convince the Germans
that a second front would be opened in Scandinavia and not in France.
Polish and Swedish federalist concepts for post-war Europe

In line with the instructions of the minister of foreign affairs from 17 March
1942, on 27 March Envoy Potworowski attended a meeting with Minister
Günther and acquainted him with the current state of Polish–Soviet rela-
tions. The head of Swedish diplomacy was clearly interested with the General
Sikorski’s eastern policy. Potworowski assured him that Poland, following
the conclusion the arrangement of 30 July 1941, had not abandoned the plan
to guarantee independence and safety for itself and its northern and southern
neighbours. Any tensions in bilateral relations were the fault of Stalin, who
was eager to make the USA and Great Britain recognize borders agreed before
—
163
AAN, HI/I/19, a PS to letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 20 II 1942. The author of the monograph devoted to the
February crisis does not make a single mention about the Polish sources of information. This
is however done by E. Boheman in his memoirs. See: Å. Uhlin, Februari-krisen 1942. Svensk
säkerhetspolitik och militärplanering 1941–1942, Stockholm 1972; E. Boheman, På vakt.
Kabinettssekreterare…, p. 294.
164
166
22 June 1941. Potworowski explained to Günther, ‘the Polish government

claims that all allies should grant the Soviet Union as much help as possible,
especially in the shape of materials, and that, after all, all concessions which
have been made to the Soviet territorial claims would have a weakening
impact on the military effort by undermining the occupied nations’ fate in
the rightness of the common cause and in the basis which, in line with the
content of the Atlantic Charter, is to serve as a foundation of the victory. […]
While considering the overcoming of German possessiveness to be the first
and most important aim of the war, we cannot at the same time give our
consent to the Soviet possessiveness, driven both by Russian imperialism and
revolutionary doctrine.’165
Potworowski wanted to draw his interlocutor’s attention to the fact that
Poland and Sweden shared common interests. In connection with this, he
highlighted that the position of the Polish government was in conformity
with the interests of other countries with whom Poland wanted to ‘develop
close cooperation in order to create a powerful block of countries which
would be able not only to oppose German greediness, but also Russian aspira-
tions to achieve hegemony over Central Europe.’ According to the Polish
envoy, the Baltic and Scandinavian States were part of a group of countries,
to which ‘the German problem and the Russian problem constitute the key
conditions of their independence and national integrity.’ Potworowski felt
that the conversation was promising and prepared ground for continuing the
discussion in the future. Günther listened to the envoy with a clear interest
and understanding, but saw no reason for alarm even if the territorial inte-
grity of Poland was not yet established. Potworowski was too optimistic
about Günther’s position perhaps. While asking questions about various
details, Günther would only confirm his views regarding certain issues and
wanted to become acquainted with the Polish government’s tactics towards
the Soviet Union.166 Three days later, having agreed the course of the visit with
the director of the diplomatic protocol, Potworowski submitted a courtesy
note to King Gustaf V with president Raczkiewicz’s message of congratu-
lations on the occasion of the monarch’s return to good health.167
At the outset of May, Potworowski spoke with Boheman, repeating what
he had earlier passed on to Minister Günther. The Secretary-General of
—
165
166
Ibidem.
167
PISM, A 11, E/25, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Civil
Chancellery of Polish President W. Raczkiewicz, Stockholm, 15 IV 1942.
167
Foreign Affairs was not surprised by the attempts by Stalin to settle the issue
of the Polish border based on the situation from 1941 adding, ‘this issue is
very interesting for Sweden due to its location in relation to Russia and
especially because of the situation on the Baltic Sea coast.’ Both diplomats
also mentioned the German problem. Boheman feared that following the
defeat of Hitler, the hatred of the beaten nations would make it difficult to
establish peace. He also became interested in the fate of the Polish middle
class. In February 1942 Potworowski informed the headquarters of the Polish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs with resignation, ‘The idea of Baltic–Scandi-
navian federation was not addressed by the local Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in any way’, and that Boheman ‘sees no possibility of its execution.’168
Potworowski returned to the subject and the need to create a map of post-
war Europe. He acquainted his interlocutor with the idea of Polish–Czecho-
slovak federation, and his desire for Poland to play a central role in a strong
and large block of countries between Germany and Russia. He also referred
to the concept of the Nordic federation, which had been discussed recently
in the Swedish press. According to Potworowski, Boheman picked up this
subject and supported the idea of a common defensive policy for the Nordic
States. Moreover, he pointed out that by maintaining its neutral position
(which Boheman described as almost impossible) Sweden ‘would play a
wonderful international role of being nearly the only country in Europe with
an intact political and social organisation.’169 Potworowski’s argument was an
expression of his strategy of convincing the Swedish authorities that, as was
the case in Poland, the most pressing problem for the international policy of
Sweden is the attitude towards Germany and the Soviet Union.170
At the same time a public debate had sparked in Sweden regarding the
future of Scandinavia. The debate was triggered by Nordensförenta stater
(The United States of the North), a brochure published in 1942 by Karl
Petander, an activist of the folk universities (adult education institutions) and
famous for his harsh criticism of the Nazi philosophy, Colonel Willi Kleen
and Anders Örne, a social democratic politician who was also head of the
Swedish postal service management board.171 The authors underlined the
—
168
of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 6 II 1942.
169
170
171
AAN, HI/I/19, attachment no. 1 (Nordic project of united states) to letter by Polish Envoy
to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 10 VIII 1942,
Stockholm, 17 VI 1942.
168
need for creating a common Nordic defence staff and common military units.
They supported the idea of forming one government for conducting integral
foreign and parliamentary policy. They also proposed that a Nordic national
association should be established, which would be free from the powers’
influence and tied by strong economic bonds and a military alliance. They
even suggested that the royal seat of Drottningholm should become the
capital of the future union. The project was in line with the British concept
of building a federation of countries in post-war Europe. Envoy Potworowski
followed these discussions closely. He stressed their significance also from
the Polish point of view, ‘Political guidelines for the Nordic States’ block,
founded on the basis of a common defence of freedom and independence for
its members, would be therefore undoubtedly be in keeping with, or at least
parallel to the purposes of a federation of Central European countries with
Poland at its centre. This block, located between Russia to the east and
Germany to the south, would naturally extend the Central European federa-
tion to the north, and its role in the north would be that of a barrier to the
German expansion and a barrier separating Germany from Russia.172
Potworowski admitted that Sweden would be of crucial importance in
such a Nordic association, for which it was not prepared, and that the dis-
cussion on the presidency of the association ‘would be academic.’ According
to the Polish envoy in Sweden, there were ‘many people who are thinking of
the bigger picture, who understand the role which may and should be played
by Sweden in post-war Europe, foremost for the sake of the consolidation
and unification of the Nordic States.’ Among such people he mentioned
Sandler, the former minister of foreign affairs, and ‘a group of young and
intelligent officials who had a strong interest in these matters.’ In fact,
Potworowski admitted that “reliable” authorities were very cautious in their
enunciations stressing that, ‘setting out our position on this subject in the
present moment would be premature and unrealistic due to the inability to
foresee the shape of post-war relations.’ Potworowski discussed this subject
several times with Boheman. He always heard reserved remarks regarding the
idea of future cooperation between the Nordic States, which were charac-
teristic of the broadly-understood government circles, ‘By describing the
ideas of the authors of the aforementioned […] brochure about a close union
between the Nordic States as “dreams”, he was bringing to my attention dif-
—
172
Affairs, Stockholm, 10 VIII 1942.
169
ficulties in realizing closer cooperation and also pointed out that arrange-
ments to this cooperation were even less advanced on the side of the remain-
ing Nordic States than in Sweden.’
Besides, Boheman argued that the policy of neutrality did not collapse in
April 1940. He claimed that the reason for Norway’s defeat was not due to
this particular policy, but to negligence in the organisation of the country’s
defence and the betrayal by many high-ranking military men. In connection
with this, the Swedes were convinced that ‘the best policy for the Nordic
States is one of defence without alliances.’ Boheman excluded the alliance
between Sweden and any of the powers as too dangerous, although he assured
Potworowski that this did not mean isolation from the Western Allies.
Potworowski was aware that the Swedes were reluctant to develop closer rela-
tions between the countries, and, despite everything, he did not expect them
to change their position. He informed the headquarters: ‘In my conversations
on similar subjects I always try to emphasize the interest with and the under-
standing of the concept of Nordic rapprochement, and point to parallel poli-
tical interests as well as to the lack of opposing interests between the united
North, Poland and the block of countries, whose centre Poland would
become; I’m naturally doing this with caution, which is necessary due to the
Swedes’ suspicion connected with the possibility of being dragged into the
conflicts between the powers in Central Europe; a suspicion I have witnessed
from the moment of my arrival in Sweden, and it has naturally grown con-
siderably from the moment of the outbreak of war.’173
Potworowski summed up in the report he had prepared previously, ‘much
work still needs to be done to let this idea [of integration] dim the remarkably
deeply rooted particularistic spirit of the Scandinavian nations.’174 This was
first indicated by a Norwegian protest. The government periodical Norsk
Tidend, published in London, was heavily critical of the concept of a Nordic
federation. An alliance with Great Britain and the USA, however, garnered
support. Also characteristic were the commentaries of the Swedish press,
which, despite the views expressed, agreed that the matter was closed for the
time being. The arguments progressed along familiar lines, ‘Nobody knows
how Europe will be organized after the war and who would introduce this
new deal.’175 According to Potworowski: ‘The discussion […] contributed to
—
173
Ibidem.
174
AAN, HI/I/19, attachment no. 1 (Nordic project of united states) to letter by Polish Envoy
to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 10 VIII 1942,
175
Ibidem.
170
the explanation of the view present in Scandinavia, which by no means deter-

mines the issues of defensive post-war Nordic cooperation, leaving it in sus-
pension at the present moment, and making its form dependent on the shape
of the post-war relations.’ The initiative of the talks on the post-war federa-
tion in Central Europe was of a unilateral character. The Swedes were becom-
ing acquainted with the Polish position, but approached the plans with
reserve. The press commented rarely on the situation, and what was both
most striking and crude were the statements found in pro-Nazi-oriented
newspapers. In June 1942, the author of an article in Dagsposten contemp-
tuously described the plan of establishing Polish-Czechoslovak federation.
He wrote about the member countries’ very low level of development, that
the relations in Central Europe could be determined only by the Germans,
who would lead the Slavs. Moreover, the opinion journalist argued that
Sweden was geographically isolated and that no social democratic dreams
about a European federation would change this situation.176
Nevertheless, the idea of an association of Nordic States was supported by
leading Swedish politicians. In an article published in the social democratic
Ny Tid daily, on 31st of December 1942, former Swedish minister of foreign
affairs, Rickard Sandler, called for the establishment of a Nordic federation
after the war.177 In March 1943, the concept of a Scandinavian defence union
was introduced by Minister Sköld. In the same year, on the initiative of Prime
Minister Hansson, the Committee of Foreign Affairs of Sweden’s Social
Democratic Workers’ Party prepared a memorandum regarding the issue of
a future Nordic federation, which was to be a point of departure for interna-
tional cooperation. Nevertheless, the Swedish press was dominated by nega-
tive views about the plan to establish a Nordic federation. One may even risk
saying that the purpose of the initiators was to polemicize with the Nor-
wegian plan to establish a so-called Atlantic policy, namely, connecting the
political fate of post-war Norway with that of the Anglo-Saxon countries.178
Östen Undén, a leading social democratic party activist, diplomat and lawyer,
took the floor in a discussion about the draft of the federation. He warned
against the consequences of establishing associations of this sort without
approval from the powers. The lack of such consent could, according to him,
—
176
J. Hultström, ‘Östeuropeiska problem’, Dagsposten, 5 VI 1942.
177
‘Enade vi stå, söndrade vi fala’, Ny Tid, 31 XII 1942. See Y. Möller, Rickard Sandler…, pp.
442–443.
178
On the Norwegian–British polemics on the subject of post war future of Scandinavia, see
W. M. Carlgren, ‘Norsk-brittisk-svenska meningsutbyten 1942 om Norden efter kriget’ [in:]
Vindkantring…, pp. 305–320. The author of the article proves that in Sweden there was not
much support for the federalist concept.
171
lead to isolation and failure in regional cooperation. That is why Undén

proposed a close Nordic cooperation, based on common labour market and
customs union, but placed within a larger union modelled after the League of
Nations, despite the imperfections of this organisation, which were known
from the interwar period.179 These concepts had been developed for the most
part in social democratic circles, which were founded on traditional coopera-
tion between related parties from the Nordic States.180 It is beyond any doubt
that the federalist concepts within the Nordic region were developed without
connection to similar concepts related with Central Europe. The conversa-
tions of Potworowski and Boheman only confirm this. Studies advanced by
the Polish government apparently ignored these circumstances,181 much like
the deliberations of opinion journalists. Ignacy Matuszewski, a famous
opinion journalist for a pre-war Polish pro-government-oriented newspaper,
convinced the readers of a newspaper for Polish expatriates in the USA that
Poland’s fate determined the fate of the Baltic and Scandinavian States, and
therefore Poland’s freedom and independence determined the future of the
entire Baltic region.182 This view was not popular in Northern Europe.
In November 1942, the Command of the Polish Navy submitted a letter
to the Commander-in-Chief where it was opined that the real threat was the
establishment of hegemony of the Soviet Union over the region. This could
be counteracted by, among other things, cooperation with countries that
were against such dominance. Commander Karol Korytowski counted main-
ly on support from the USA and Great Britain, but saw a potential ally in
Sweden. He stated, ‘The dominance of the Soviets over the Baltic Sea is
neither in the interest of Sweden nor of Poland. Poland especially should be
wary. And, bearing this in mind, we later need to establish contact with
Sweden.’183 This aspect was reflected in an article by Julian Ginsbert, a famous
maritime journalist, in the Polska na morzach monthly in London. Ginsbert
—
179
Y. Möller, Östen Unden. En biografi, Stockholm 1986, pp. 219–222.
180
On Swedish discussions on the subject of integration of Scandinavia during the Second
World War, see: B. Piotrowski, Tradycje jedności Skandynawii. Od mitu wikińskiego do idei
nordyckiej, Poznań 2006, pp. 175–185.
181
At this point it is worth to cite the words of the Polish Ambassador to London E. Raczyński,
otherwise a devoted supporter of a Polish-Czechoslovak federation, who years later recalled:
‘Poles always fantasized: while being in exile, they developed visions of alliances, for instance
with Scandinavian countries, and these countries were not even aware that we made them do
what we wanted’. See: E. Berberyusz, Anders spieszony, London 1992, p. 75.
182
I. Matuszewski, Wybór pism. Kulisy historii Polski (1941–1946), Rzeszów 1991, pp. 75–76,
269.
183
Polska Marynarka Wojenna, pp. 40–41.
172
explained that the Baltic Sea was a northern supplementation of the Medi-
terranean Sea and what was happening there was as important for European
peace as what was happening behind the Pillars of Hercules. He suggested
that Great Britain, Sweden and Poland cultivate a cooperation to stabilize the
situation in the Baltic Sea region. In Ginsbert’s view, these waters could
neither be controlled by a country as weak as Denmark nor by an inter-
national institution. He proposed extending the territory of Denmark and
returning to the concept of John III Sobieski, who, many centuries earlier,
considered marking out a Polish–Danish border to the west of Szczecin.
Ginsbert argued that the Soviet Union should not feel threatened, but pur-
posefully did not mention either the Åland Islands or access to the Gulf of
Finland. The Swedish Legation reacted to the text with confusion, and then
described it as a curiosity. In response to the Swedes’ démarche regarding this
matter, the Polish Embassy in London stated that the article was not inspired
by the Polish authorities but merely the private views of its author.184
Nevertheless, the article was generally in line with the content of studies
devoted to Polish war aims connected with the Baltic Sea region. In Sep-
tember 1942 Jan Starzewski, a former Polish Envoy to Copenhagen, prepared
the monograph Rękojmie wolności Bałtyku (Ogólne uwagi w sprawie
przyszłego uregulowania zagadnienia bałtyckiego) [Warranties of Freedom
—
184
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 485, letter by the Swedish Legation in London
to R. Kumlin, London, 18 XI 1943. On the need for cooperation between Poland, the Baltic
States and Scandinavian States see the writings of a former Polish ambassador in Paris,
Juliusz Łukasiewicz: J. Łukasiewicz, ‘O sprawach bałtyckich’, Wiadomości Polskie, 15 III
1942. He reminded the achievements of J. Beck’s foreign policy. These achievements were
treated by him as a point of departure to establishing future relations. Nevertheless, Sweden
(Scandinavia) was rarely mentioned in Polish press commentaries devoted to the idea of the
federation. There are several examples of important publications where this region of Europe
was not mentioned: T. Piszczkowski, ‘Federacja… ale jaka?’, Myśl Polska, 20 I 1942; Junius,
‘Europa Środkowa – ośrodkiem pokoju’, Myśl Polska, 20 V 1942; T. Piszczkowski, ‘Polska a
Europa Środkowa’, Myśl Polska, 1 VII 1942; H. Strasburger, ‘Bałtyk a bezpieczeństwo
Europy’, Nowa Polska 1942, iss. 7; A. Pragier, ‘Rejon środkowo-europejski’, Nowa Polska
1942, iss. 8; J. Stańczyk, ‘Federacja krajów środkowo-wschodniej Europy – podstawą
trwałego pokoju i dobrobytu w Europie i świecie’, Nowa Polska 1943, iss. 3; N. V. Tilea, ‘Stany
Zjednoczone Europy Środkowej’, Nowa Polska 1943, p. 4; Arp, ‘Bałtyk czy Dunaj’, Orzeł
Biały, 15 VIII 1943; P. Janecki, ‘Strefa środkowa’, Myśl Polska", 1 XII 1943; A. Pragier,
‘Federacja środkowo-wschodnia. Sprawy polityczne’, Wiadomości Polskie, 6 II 1944. A
similar lack of interest could be observed in Sweden. An isolated (and pointless) view was
presented by Tadeusz Nowacki, who noted in November 1944: ‘In Sweden we may observe
an increasing understanding of growing chances for the formation of potential community
of political fate with the countries of Central Europe in the nearest future, and primarily with
Poland. This is a trend in political evolution, which may be also taken up by other Scandi-
navian countries following their liberation from the German occupation.’ T. Norwid[-
Nowacki], ‘Ewolucja polityczna Szwecji’, Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, 25 XI 1944.
173
for the Baltic Sea (General Remarks Regarding the Future Settlement of the
Baltic Sea Issue)]. A crucial postulate appeared here, which according to the
author was the condition of Poland’s recognition following the conclusion of
the war – the capacity to establish a federation as the only measure that would
guarantee the survival of smaller countries. Starzewski stated, ‘The ability to
create federal countries would be a test of political maturity for the nations
populating the Baltic Sea region, particularly as this issue is a matter of their
existence or non-existence.’185
The envoy noted that due to geographical conditions it was possible to
distinguish two groups of countries – Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia
would form a southern federation and Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark
a northern federation. Cooperation between these two federations, including
military cooperation, seemed natural. The members of the government circles
were aware of the awkwardness of plans of this sort for the current policy.
When Starzewski wanted to deliver a lecture as part of the so-called Allied
Circle186 and present his reflections, both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the Ministry of Congress Work consulted with each other regarding amend-
ments to the content of the lecture, so as not to cause rifts in relations with
other countries. Starzewski was to refrain from mentioning several countries
in a specific context. He could not associate Norway with the concept of
federation as ‘the Norwegians are against, as we know, the Nordic federation.’
So as not to irritate the Soviets, under no circumstance should he mention that
the future federation was to include Estonia and Latvia. Neither could he call
for the return of the northern bank of the Kiel Canal to Denmark, ‘because
Denmark may be against it.’187 Sweden was not even mentioned.
Sweden’s role started to be gradually reduced by both experts in the field
of economy and military affairs. In February 1943, Andrzej Cienciała pre-
sented the issue of future maritime policy of East-Central Europe in a confi-
dential study. He rejected the option of a closer cooperation with Sweden
claiming, ‘Cooperation with Scandinavian countries is not desirable for us
since the economic potential of Scandinavian countries is not enough to
allow them to employ their own navy in its entirety. They would therefore
exploit the economic potential of East-Central Europe, giving no equivalent
—
185
PISM, col. 30/V/2, Jan Starzewski, Rękojmie wolności Bałtyku (Ogólne uwagi w sprawie
przyszłego uregulowania zagadnienia bałtyckiego), p. 34.
186
PISM, PRM-K-63, letter by A. Romer to the Ministry of Congress Work, London, 9 IX
1942, iss. 423.
187
Ibidem, letter by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Congress Work,
London, 22 IX 1942, iss. 441.
174
in return. […] Locating the Swedish navy on long-distance routes leading

from our ports would be particularly dangerous.’188
Barely comprehensible was the study’s explanation of the fear of the
Swedish navy, more so that Scandinavian countries were named alongside
Great Britain, the USA and the Netherlands, as the countries of origin of the
ship owners, with whom Poland was to cooperate on the handling of foreign
trade by mapping out their route to the eastern coast of South America.
In the autumn of 1943, the Commandof the Polish Navy submitted Com-
mander Karol Korytowski’s confidential memorandum Assurance of Free-
dom for the Baltic Sea Following the War to the Command of the Polish
Armed Forces. This was a summary devoted to the issue and repeated the
theses of the author’s previous papers, which were entirely approved by Rear-
Admiral Jerzy Świrski, commander of the Polish Navy.189 Sweden was not
included in the list of Polish alliances. As Korytowski stressed, ‘Its small
population and geographical location, away from the centre of Europe,
doubtless does not predestine it to this role.’ The views of the Command of
the Polish Navy were pompous: ‘Poland, owing to its geographical location,
demonstrably positive marine conditions regarding both organisation and
our vessels’ sea operation during the war, could be a factor in counterbalanc-
ing the Russian hegemony.’
This issue was perceived slightly differently by the Staff of the Commander-
in-Chief, since it emphasized the need to improve the security of Poland ‘with-
in the union of countries of East-Central Europe, within the economic com-
munity including Scandinavian countries and Turkey’, and also in close co-
operation with Great Britain.190 According to the author of the study, Poland
had to ensure that it maritime links with Sweden would be maintained in the
event of war. This lay at the foundation of a basic demand: ‘Control over the
southern part of the Baltic Sea together with Great Britain and Scandinavian
countries is therefore a marine demand of Poland.’ What was mostly empha-
sized was the necessity to cooperate with Sweden and Norway on exercising
—
188
PISM, B 3124, A. Cienciała, Zarys przyszłej polityki morskiej Europy Środkowo-
Wschodniej, London, February 1943, p. 40.
189
PISM, B 1127, letter by the head of the Polish Navy Command (KMW), Rear-Admiral J.
Świrski, to the head of the Administration of Armed Forces, General M. Norwid-
Neugebauer, London, 24 IX 1943.
190
PISM, A 21, 2/16, postulates of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief regarding naval war
aims, attachment to letter by the head of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, General S.
Kopański, from 17 XI 1943.
175
control over the Danish straits – Skagerrak and Kattegat. However, the estab-
lishment of military bases for aircraft protecting sea lines across the Baltic Sea
required cooperation with Sweden and the Baltic States.
On 21 December 1943 the government eventually adopted a document
entitled A Draft of Points Regarding the Naval War Aims of Poland.191 The
Ministry of Congress Work, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of
Industry, Trade and Shipping jointly endorsed the draft, the priority of which
was to ensure a free use of marine routes from Poland to Sweden and to the
North Sea as well as creating a Gdynia–Gdańsk port complex. Germany was
to be practically eliminated, both politically and economically from the Baltic
Sea area. The importance of the strategic–political situation in the Baltic Sea
area for all of Europe was recognized, and the presence of Great Britain in the
Baltic Sea region was acknowledged as indispensable for the freedom of
marine transport and the security of Western Europe. An opinion was also
expressed that the Baltic Sea region was not of great significance for Soviet
interests, and Denmark would not be able to control the Baltic Sea straits on
its own.192 To assist with this task, it was necessary to extend Polish access to
the Baltic Sea by the annexation of East Prussia, Gdańsk and the Baltic Sea
coast as far as Szczecin. Another demand was that the Baltic States should be
granted independence, Germany should be deprived of the Kiel Canal and
the islands in the North Sea, any Soviet military bases should be moved far
away from Polish ports, and British military forces should be allowed into the
Baltic Sea area. A strong navy was to become an instrument of Polish Baltic
Sea policy. It was believed that in connection with the ambitions of the Soviet
Union, it was necessary to introduce a division of spheres of influence in the
Baltic Sea area, and in the case of Poland the foundation for this division was
to be an alliance with Great Britain and Sweden.193 That is why it was crucial
to encourage construction of numerous naval bases on the Polish coast and
to increase the number and improve the quality of Polish warships.
Discussions between the ministries continued until October 1944 when the
Polish government adopted the plan Points Regarding the Naval War Aims
—
191
J. K. Sawicki, ‘Polskie cele wojny w dziedzinie morskiej w koncepcjach rządu RP w Londynie
(1940–1944)’ [in:] Polityka morska państwa w 40-leciu PRL, Gdańsk 1986, pp. 19–21.
192
W. Wrzesiński, ‘Polska a problem bałtycki. Ze studiów nad stanowiskiem polskim wobec
Bałtyku w okresie drugiej wojny światowej’, Przegląd Zachodni 1990, iss. 5–6, pp. 108–109.
193
B. Zalewski, Polska morska myśl wojskowa 1918–1989, Toruń 2001, pp. 211–212.
176
of Poland.194 Consultations with Swedish authorities, about the principal pro-

visions laid out in the plan, were never conducted.
Overcoming stagnation in bilateral relations

following Hitler’s defeat in Moscow
By mid-1942 the belief that the Allies would be victorious became increas-
ingly widespread across Sweden. This converged with a growing interest in
the Polish matter, which, as claimed Envoy Potworowski in his report, even
received a semi-official sanction. It was possible for the Polish Legation to
develop its propagandist activity and make the Swedes aware of the realities
of the German occupation, the military effort of the Polish Armed Forces in
the West and the politics of the Polish government in exile. On 17 April, the
Swedish–Polish Academic Association organized an annual meeting during
which Carl Palmstierna delivered a speech devoted to the Polish–Swedish ties
in the 18th century. Of particularly solemn character was the commemora-
tion of the 3rd May National Holiday, which was modelled after a pre-war
habit of organising celebrations for around 300 people. A group of several
dozen Swedish guests included Sven Grafström, a unique event as Grafström
admitted in his diary, because the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs offi-
cials preferred not to show their support in public for occupied countries.195
A large Swedish audience also gathered at a concert of the Polish and English
pianists Roman Maciejewski and Martin Penny, organized under the aegis of
the Polish and British, in the Stockholm Concert Hall on 8 May 1942. Around
700 people attended an exhibition of artwork created by refugees and
interned seamen held in the Polish club Ognisko on 5 June 1942. On sum-
ming up the achievements of the legation in the field of propagandist activity,
Potworowski drew attention to the need of exercising special caution and
adapting to the general political situation in the context of current pro-
crastination tactics of the Swedes.196 What he probably had in mind were,
among others, the events that had taken place three months earlier, when
—
194
Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, vol. 7: maj 1944– listopad
1944, scholarly editing M. Zgórniak, compiled by W. Rojek in cooperation with A. Suchcitz,
Kraków 2006, pp. 525–536.
195
Grafström’s sympathy for Poland is unquestionable. Most probably for this reason a cor-
respondent of the Polish Telegraphic Agency (PAT), Jan Berson, considered him to be the
best candidate for Swedish envoy to Warsaw following the conclusion of the war. See: S.
Grafström, Anteckningar 1938–1944, p. 414.
196
177
several Swedish newspapers published witness testimonies detailing torture

by the Germans in Norwegian prisons. In connection with this, Minister of
Justice Westman, issued a directive on 11 March 1942 regarding the simul-
taneous confiscation of these journals, which caused an outcry. In April 1942,
a major parliamentary debate took place, during which the government was
accused of abandoning the principle of freedom of reporting information
from Norway.197 Westman, as usual, referred to a paragraph of the constitu-
tion that allowed the confiscation, without a court order, of newspapers pub-
lishing materials that could cause a conflict with another country. All activity
directed against the German policy towards the occupied territories had been
prosecuted for a long time, but less interest was shown for reports about
Soviet atrocities and attacks by pro-German dailies on Great Britain and the
USA. Accusers in this debate were former ministers of foreign affairs Sandler
and Undén (also Günther’s counsellor), who both blamed Westman for his
officiousness and acting as editor-in-chief for Swedish newspapers. However,
the government coalition emerged unscathed from the debate. Nevertheless,
in his report to London Potworowski highlighted ‘the very fact of addressing
questions and freely expressing opinions by leading politicians criticising the
system which represses both freedom of the press and humanitarian impulses
of healthy sections of the nation, proves that there is a reaction to the news
about the German atrocities inflicted upon the occupied countries every time
these news items reach wider audience.’198 The representatives of the Swedish
government preferred to take the precaution of not irritating the Germans.
On 9 April 1942, therefore, they did not attend a solemn mass in com-
memoration of the Norwegians who fought for the freedom of their home-
land, which was observed in Stockholm.
No wonder then that the ban on the publication of reports about the atro-
cities that were taking place in other occupied countries, including Poland,
was persistently maintained. In the beginning of 1942, the Black Book of the
Government of Poland by the Polish Ministry of Information and Documen-
tation, published by Ture Nerman’s Trots Allt!, was confiscated as well as one
of the issues of the communist Ny Dag magazine, in which it had been com-
mented on.199 Readers of the Black Book, which was an abridged booklet ver-
sion of the English edition, could learn about the deportations, the ruthless
—
197
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 8 IV 1942.
198
Ibidem.
199
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 16 II 1942.
178
economic exploitation and extermination of the Poles. The authors of the

Swedish edition highlighted that the German repressions, which were known
to the Swedes thanks to Norway, were much greater in Poland. At the end of
the booklet, it was noted that the Swedes could not do much to help the
victims. In fact, they could only think over the information they received and
take their personal stand on what was going on in Poland. In the conclusion
there stood the following: ‘Poland’s fate was never unimportant for human-
kind, and it never will be, and the heroism of the Polish nation touches us
all.’200 According to research of Klas Åmark, the Black Book was confiscated
after only a few weeks of distribution. One week after it had been published,
the German legation in Stockholm protested ‘the attack on the German na-
tion, army and police’. It took some time before the booklet was banned.201
The Polish Legation, undaunted by this failure, intensified its propa-
gandist activity. In the autumn of 1942, Norbert Żaba expressed the follow-
ing: ‘The German difficulties on the front bring positive results in Sweden as
far as our interests are concerned.’202 Whereas, on 6 November he reported
that pro-Ally moods had been gaining strength over the past several weeks.203
In connection with this, another attempt was made to spread the news about
German terror in occupied Poland. In November 1942 the book Polens mar-
tyrium (translation: The Martyrdom of Poland), appeared under the imprint
of Trots Allt!.204 The prospect of confiscation was taken into account (the book
was soon forbidden as an example of propaganda of cruelty (grymhetspropa-
ganda)),205 as it was decided that the publication would be mostly available in
pre-sale. Materials for the book were selected by Consul Alf de Pomian-
Hajdukiewicz from the official Black Book of the Government of Poland and
supplemented by Norbert Żaba with news taken from the German press.
What was presented were the events which took place in the Polish territories
under German control between 1939 and June 1941. The intention of the
authors was not simply to issue complaints or accusations, but to give a testi-
mony of Polish resistance. Although the tragic fate of Poland was generally
recognised, the purpose was to present a detailed picture of German policy
in relation to the Poles: bombings of defenceless civilians, mass executions,
—
200
En polsk svart bok om den tyska „nyordningen" i Polen, Stockholm 1942, p. 14.
201
K. Åmark, Att bo granne med ondskan…, p. 241–242.
202
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, letter by N. Żaba to M. Thugutt (Ministry of Internal
Affairs), 16 X 1942.
203
Ibidem, letter by N. Żaba to M. Thugutt (Ministry of Internal Affairs), Stockholm, 6 XI 1942.
204
Polens martyrium. Forhållanden under tyska ockupationen belysta av Polska informa-
tionsministeriet, Stockholm 1942.
205
K. Åmark, Att bo granne med ondskan…, p. 243.
179
and the torture of arrested patriots. At the end of the book, which contained
photographs from execution sites, the publishers argued that the facts
presented were not fragments of an overheated imagination. Quite the oppo-
site, they were ‘only partially exposing the hell, into which Poland was trans-
formed by the German invaders.’ According to Żaba, ‘the content of the book
has made a deep impression on Sweden.’ Whereas based on his own obser-
vations he stated, ‘The grim content of the book is nevertheless so hard to
bear for the Swedes, who did not suffer the atrocities of war, that many of
them are unable to finish reading it.’206 According to diplomatic reports of the
Polish Legation almost an entire edition, 2983 copies, was sold out quickly in
pre-sale, before the police managed to react. Only 19 copies of the book were
confiscated. Żaba wrote with satisfaction, ‘The police may now step in. It’s all
over.’207 The case was similar with the second edition of the book, which
appeared in February 1943. Two thousand copies were sold, of which only 2
were confiscated by police.208 In his report to London, Żaba emphasized that
many daily newspapers had reviewed the publication. Moreover, in May 1943
Erland Björklid protested the confiscations of 10 November 1942 and 3
March 1943, in an open letter on behalf of the editorial board of Trots Allt!,
and demanded the Swedish government repeal the ban on the book’s
distribution. However, this intervention had no effect.209 The book was never
available in libraries and as a result probably reached only a small circle of
readers. In mid-1942 British Envoy Mallet, in his report to London,
highlighted that the Swedes, although accepting of various forms of cultural
propaganda, continued to avoid reporting news about the brutal conduct of
the occupants in newspapers and on film.210 This trend continued for a long
time. According to news published in Trots Allt! in September 1943 the third
edition of Polens martyrium was also confiscated.211 The fiasco of another
attempt at the legal distribution of information about the terrors of oc-
cupation proved that the Swedes continued to believe that controlling
publications was necessary, at least as far as this particular thematic scope was
—
206
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, letter by N. Żaba to the Ministry of Information and
Documentation, Stockholm, 8 XI 1943.
207
Ibidem, letter by N. Żaba to M. Thugutt (Ministry of Internal Affairs), Stockholm, 6 XI 1942.
208
Ibidem, copy of letter by N. Żaba to the Ministry of Information and Documentation,
Stockholm, 8 VI 1943. See: L. Drangel, Den kampande., pp. 109–110.
209
‘Tysk massgravsgreuel fri. Varför beslag på Polens martyrium?’, Trots Allt!, 7 V 1943.
210
NA, FO, 371/33055, telegram of Envoy of Great Britain to Stockholm V. Mallet to FO, 5
VII 1942.
211
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, copy of report by N. Żaba to the Ministry of Information
and Documentation, Stockholm, 15 XI 1943.
180
concerned. The distribution of the book started to go on without obstacles as

late as 1944. Until that time, as Åmark underlined, the Swedish authorities
actively tried to stop important accounts of the German terror in Poland,
including information about Holocaust.212
A different fate awaited Det kämpande Polen (translation: Fighting
Poland), a book published in 1942, which was an anthology of articles, studies
and excerpts from Polish books prepared by Norbert Żaba and Margit
Hansson. The publication, crowned with the Swedish translation of the poem
by Władysław Broniewski ‘Co mi tam troski’ (‘I Leave My Worries Behind’)
was to present the Polish struggle with the Germans from September 1939,
through the campaign on the western front and the underground resistance
in the occupied country. The Polish version of the poem was included in the
volume Bagnet na broń (Fix Bayonettes), published in 1943. The book also
presented the works of Polish authors, including poet Kazimierz Wierzyński,
writer Maria Kuncewiczowa, reporter Ksawery Pruszyński. Despite hu-
morous stories, the readers could also acquaint themselves with descriptions
of heroic events. The publication immediately aroused the interest of Swedish
press and garnered very good reviews. In his write-up published in Upsala
Nya Tidning on 18 November 1942, Gunnar Gunnarsson stressed that the
publication ‘in terms of its value may be compared to that of a diary and
thanks to its restrained reserved style and interesting content may earn a
great popularity’ and that it proved that Poland ‘has grown up to the status
of a military power, where both minors and adults, labourers and elites are
united in one soldierly comradeship, all sharing one aspiration: striving for
freedom and saving the centuries-old Christian and humanist world view.’213
Some reviews announced that the Poles were struggling not only with the
aggressor but also with internal problems, which could lead to a fight for the
change of the social system. The communist Ny Dag also published an
extremely favourable assessment, emphasizing Polish heroism, and added, ‘if
it was not for the naive politics of the Polish upper classes towards the Soviet
Union […], the Polish soldier would surely leave much more severe marks
on the skin of the German fist, other than those he was allowed to inflict upon
it thanks to his own bravery.’214 The discussion of the book in the syndicalist
Arbetaren daily contains a note that Poland was fighting not only with a
foreign invasion, but also with a class of owners, who ‘always lived off the
—
212
K. Åmark, Att bo granne med ondskan…, p. 244, 274.
213
G. Gunnarsson, ‘Det kämpande Polen’, Upsala Nya Tidning, 18 XI 1942.
214
S. Olsson, ‘Hos kämpande polacker’, Ny Dag, 2 I 1943.
181
sweat and blood of the people.’215 However, in general the reviewers high-
lighted that the book abandoned the image of Poland as a country, which was
only suffering. This time, Poland was also presented as a fighter for freedom
and independence.216
Another example of a propagandist campaign was the exhibition of art by
Polish and Norwegian refugees shown in Stockholm in November 1942,
where sixteen Poles and eighteen Norwegians supported by art historian and
painter Wacław Reybekiel, who was associated with the Royal Swedish
Academy of Arts in Stockholm, presented as many as 169 artworks of their
own making.217
In a letter to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 12 June Potworow-
ski highlighted that, ‘the local moods are dominated by even more general and
consolidating conviction that the Axis Powers would not manage to win the
war and that its conclusion in Europe is a question of relatively short time.’218
News of the impending end of the Third Reich was mostly popularized by the
Swedes who had just returned from Germany. This only made the Polish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs suspect that the rumours could have come from the
Germans themselves. Whereas the Swedes interpreted this propagandist move
as a method to raise anti-Soviet moods and to demonstrate the threat that
would be posed on Sweden in the event of a sudden Soviet victory. According
to Potworowski, this propaganda had missed its target because, ‘the only things
gaining in strength was the pro-Ally mood and self-confidence founded on the
belief that it would be increasingly difficult for the weakened Germany to risk
an attack on the already well prepared, both militarily and morally, Sweden.’
Rumours broke out again about the distinct German–Soviet peace, but
Potworowski, following the talks with his Swedish sources, did not take them
seriously, as they were not confirmed.
—
215
V. B., ‘Det kämpande Polen’, Arbetaren, 30 I 1943.
216
Other reviews: M. H., ‘Polens kamp’, Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 13 XII 1942; A. von Arbin,
‘Det kämpande Polen’, Östgöta Correspondenten, 12 XII 1942; Viator, ‘Slöjan lyftes’, Arbetet,
18 XII 1942; A. Rods, ‘Polen kämpar vidare‘, Stockholms-Tidningen, 28 XII 1942; R. I., ‘Hur
Polens lidande folk ser på kriget’, Morgon-Tidningen, 16 I 1943; Jc., ‘Martyrfolken’, Göteborgs
Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 9 XII 1942; W. S[emitjo]v, ‘Det väpnade Polen’, Dagens Ny-
heter, 14 XII 1942.
217
The pieces included paintings, sculptures, dolls, a model guitar made of matches, a minia-
ture of the church of Mariefred, a model submarine ORP Orzeł. See: ‘Malarze polscy w
Szwecji’, Wiadomości Polskie, 28 II 1943. For more information see: J. Raykowski, ‘Polsko-
norweska wystawa prac uchodźców w Sztokholmie’, Wieści Polskie, 16 XII 1942. The exhibi-
tion was organized with co-participation of painter and pedagogue Tadeusz Potworowski,
whose work was presented in July 1941 at the Gripsholm Castle.
218
182
The turning point of the war was close but according to Żaba, London was
not preparing itself for it. The Attaché thought that the Polish government
circle did not appreciate the role of the neutral states or the systematic pro-
pagandist activity on their territory. In his reports he formulated the follow-
ing arguments: ‘Our government in London needs to devote growing atten-
tion to the neutral countries when it comes to the future situation of Poland
and the matter of borders etc. These matters are already starting to make an
impact on the press. It should not be forgotten that many momentary “allies”
from the circle of opinion journalists would be our enemies tomorrow. I am
referring here to the people who desire a strong and democratic Germany
and a powerful Russia, or even that both these things should occur in tandem
with greater Czechoslovakia. For there also exist people who do desire this.
And all these people will want to harm us.’219
Żaba thought that it would be enough to organize regular meetings for the
press to convince its representatives to support the Polish cause.220 A similar
method was used in London, where minister Stroński threw a breakfast for
Swedish journalists, including local correspondents. Among the guests were
head of the SIS Sven Tunberg, social democratic politician and opinion jour-
nalist Ivan Pauli, correspondent for Svenska Dagbladet Knud Bolander and
correspondent for Dagens Nyheter Daniel Viklund. The extraordinary rank
of the meeting was confirmed by the presence of General Sikorski, ministers
Mikołajczyk and Raczyński as well as many officials from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Information and Documentation. It is not
known whether these talks bore fruit in any specific agreement. Even the
Polish offices, which were very interested in the Polish matter, received only
a laconic and typically diplomatic information that the atmosphere was very
warm.221
Żaba asked that the propagandist materials of the government should be
sent immediately and regularly to Stockholm and that the Swedish journalists
in London were inspired. He argued, ‘I would like to point out that the
neutrals will play a more significant role at the peace congress than it was
initially expected and this is particularly because the influential American
—
219
Affairs), Stockholm, 15 XII 1942.
220
Ibidem.
221
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, telegram by N. Żaba, 14 VIII 1943.
183
circles, and even, allegedly, their English counterparts are willing to consider
the views of those neutral ones “not blinded by hatred”.’222
Nevertheless, in mid-1943 Żaba complained continuously about delays
caused by the Ministry of Information and Documentation, which sent
materials to the Swedish press much too slowly. He explained the needs of
the diplomatic mission in Stockholm in a dramatic tone: ‘It would be inap-
propriate for me to reprimand the Ministry of Information for the fact that
the department of propaganda has been operating very slowly or at times not
at all. Despite having received the telegram from the legation, sent three
weeks ago, we have not yet received the résumé and photography of [a new
Prime Minister] Mikołajczyk. […] Whereas yesterday we received, after over
a month, a bundle of photographs from the funeral of General Sikorski. Some
cretins in the photographs’ shipping department and our department of
propaganda believe that Poland is the axis of the world, around [which]
everything revolves, and they are forgetting that the entire world, at this very
moment, is being shaken to its foundations, that dramatic events are taking
place every day, obscuring the view of things that happened three days before.
Two-week-old photographs may still be published in periodicals, but for
God’s sake, not six-week-old.’223
The Ministry of Internal Affairs in London agreed with the opinion of Żaba,
much to his satisfaction in the context of the development of propaganda in
the neutral states that was being brushed off by the Polish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs: ‘‘Popularizing the news all over the world by means of the neutrals and
referring to “the objective”, neutral opinion is well used and an old propaganda
trick.’ According to Żaba, however, Polish diplomatic mission in Sweden was
by now completely neglected by the government in exile.’224
Swedish politicians and diplomats constantly mentioned the caution ex-
pressed in most cases relating to the attitude to Polish activity in Sweden.
German pressures could pose an immediate threat to the operation of the
Polish Legation in Stockholm. Following the crisis in the spring of 1941
another crisis took place in July 1942 when the Germans arrested seven
Swedish employees of the Polish Match Monopoly and the L. M. Ericsson
telephone company, who were visiting Warsaw for business purposes. Those
—
222
Ibidem, letter by N. Żaba to M. Thugutt (Ministry of Internal Affairs), Stockholm, 9 IV
1943.
223
Ibidem, copy of note by N. Żaba for J. Kwapiński [no date].
224
AAN, HI/I/191, letter by Minister of Information and Documentation S. Stroński to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 IX 1942.
184
arrested were accused of cooperation with the Polish resistance movement.225

The Gestapo also arrested several dozen Poles. However, Sven Norrman and
Gösta Gustafsson, two leading couriers of the underground movement, as
well as Harald Axell evaded capture as they were visiting Sweden at the time.
Most of the mail of the Government Delegation for Poland and the Polish
Home Army was passed on to London through Norrman and Gustafsson.
Norrman, head of ASEA’s daughter company (Polish Electrical Association),
smuggled all ‘Home Situational Dispatches’ that were produced until the mo-
ment of the arrests. Gustafsson, working in the same company, transported
the greater part of the Home Army Headquarters’ dispatches. Staff members
of the Swedish Legation in Berlin were also known to be engaged in courier
activity for the Swedish industrialists. Envoy Richert had no knowledge of
any of this. In the correspondence with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there
is an abundance of information about transfers of funds and letters from
Envoy Potworowski, containing delivery location guidelines. Evidence points
to funds being sent most often to Berlin through the diplomatic channel so
as not to attract the attention of the intelligence services in Stockholm. Next,
Colonel de Laval handed the letters to the couriers. In the summer of 1941
Staffan Söderblom prepared a manual to put an end to this activity, to which
de Laval willingly gave consent, afraid that continuation could lead to dire
consequences for him personally if the Germans were to learn of it.
Nevertheless, Svante Hellstedt from the B Division maintained that the ban
on transferring private letters could not include financial support for the
Poles living in severe poverty, adding that the issue had already been exa-
mined. He also assessed the potential risk that could arise from the inter-
mediation prior to the launch of the entire action, advocating that the parcels
be transferred as long as the head of the mission considered further activity
in this area impossible. De Laval explained that Richert was all but unaware
of the issue and the Swedish authorities knew nothing about it officially. De
Laval was the only person responsible for the execution of a consequence
agreement between Lagerberg and Potworowski, which was concluded in
1940. He was afraid that the Poles would be indiscreet and draw the attention
of the German authorities. An example he gave was a conversation with
engineer Berglind, who was aware that the cash he had taken from the
—
225
Relatively quickly, on 4 August the London periodical Dziennik Polski informed about the
arrests. The author of the note ‘Szwedzi aresztowani w Warszawie. Niemcy usuwają
świadków zbrodni’ [‘Swedes arrested in Warsaw. Germans are getting rid of the witnesses of
the crime’] aptly stated that the Germans were using every opportunity to remove from
Poland all the observers from neutral countries.
185
legation was intended for the Polish underground organisation in Warsaw

and not for philanthropic purposes. At least for a moment, Berglind’s care-
lessness prevented further postage as Birger Johansson, the current head of
the B Division, supported de Laval’s view. On 15 September 1941, Potwo-
rowski learned that the dispatch had stopped.226 Nevertheless, the confidential
courier activity continued.
Based on the news communicated to Potworowski in the Swedish Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, it was assumed that the arrests were intended to break
the last ties between the General Government and the neutral states.227
Minister Günther did not wait for the German intervention in Stockholm.
On 13 August Günther summoned Potworowski, telling him that he had
irrefutable evidence that the Polish Legation maintained contact with secret
organisations under German occupation and used the intermediation of
Swedish citizens to send money and post. The evidence was coded telegrams
deciphered by Swedish cryptologists. The Polish envoy failed to keep his
promise from the spring of 1941, when Sweden expelled Captain Gilewicz for
espionage, that the diplomatic mission would keep away from illegal activity.
That is why the Swedish government decided to consider Potworowski a
persona non grata. They also asked the Polish government to appoint a
chargé d’affaires who would become the new head of the mission. In a
telegram to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Potworowski noted that
the above fact did not mean breaking relations or closing down the Polish
Legation. The Swedes also demanded that the Polish diplomat leave Sweden
immediately.228 Potworowski acted honourably, admitting that he knew about
the activity of his staff. When asked about the cipher texts, he did not reveal
that the name ‘Adam’ contained therein was the name of the Swedish
couriers’ contact Mieczysław Thugutt. He explained that the name referred
to one of the organisational units of the mission.
On 18 August a meeting took place in Copenhagen between an officer of
Swedish intelligence and the representative of the Abwehr concerning the
arrested Swedes. Against the expectations of the Swedes the representative of
—
226
RA, avdelningar och byråarkiv 1864–1952, Andra B-avdelningen, vol. 417, letter by E. de
Laval to S. Hellstedt, Berlin, 22 VIII 1941; copy of letter by S. Hellstedt to E. de Laval,
Stockholm, 26 VIII 1941; letter by E. de Laval to S. Hellstedt, Berlin, 29 VIII 1941; letter by
B. Johansson to E. de Laval, Stockholm, 12 IX 1941; letter by E. de Laval to B. Johansson,
Berlin, 15 IX 1941.
227
of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 3 VIII 1942.
228
186
the Abwehr did not raise the issue of closing down the Polish Legation. He
nevertheless expected that the Swedish authorities would take action in order
to break up the Polish spy organisation and prevent the Poles from main-
taining contact with the General Government. The Germans demanded
access to the materials of investigation on this matter, yet did not intend to
harass of companies the detainees worked for. Instead, they demanded that
people cooperating with the Polish resistance movement be no longer sent to
the occupied territories (at that point one name was mentioned – Sven Norr-
man).229 On 10 September a meeting took place in the Swedish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, during which the demands of the Germans regarding the
detention of Swedish the citizens were discussed. Boheman proposed that the
Germans be granted access to the documentation on various matters from
1940–41. According to him, the choice to expel Envoy Potworowski was the
right one. A decision was made during the discussion that the deciphered
telegrams, which incriminated the Polish diplomatic mission, would not be
revealed to the Germans. In case the Germans were dissatisfied with the
information, they were given an opportunity to see materials concerning nine
Polish citizens arrested in Stockholm during the Gestapo operation against
the Swedes in Berlin and Warsaw. Further talks were to be conducted
between the heads of intelligence of both countries.230
The Poles never managed to re-establish the connection via Stockholm. In
December 1942 Rowecki sent the following telegram to London: ‘There is no
contact with Anna [base in Stockholm]. From the moment of launching the
arrests of the Swedes in Warsaw, Anna is only in the phase of designing con-
nectivity with us.’231 According to the British sources, General Sikorski was
furious about the entire matter, and the career of the minister of internal
affairs, Mikołajczyk, who was responsible for communication with Poland,
was hanging by a thread due to a criminal negligence.232 Envoy Potworowski
predicted that the exposure of Mieczysław Thugutt was only a matter of time,
so he asked London to remove him from the mission. The Swedes however
—
229
MUST arkiv, Försvarsstaben, Säkerhetsavdelningen, F VIII e, Underrättelsetjänst och
sabotage, Polsk underrättelsetjänst, vol. 27, copy of a note: A conversation on 18 August in
Copenhagen with a representative of the Abwehr, concerning Swedish citizens arrested in
Poland for espionage, pp. 408–409.
230
MUST arkiv, Försvarsstaben, Säkerhetsavdelningen, F VIII e, Underrättelsetjänst och
sabotage, Polsk underrättelsetjänst, vol. 26, copy of the protocol of a meeting at UD, 10 IX
1942 at 16:00, pp. 99–100.
231
Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945, vol. 2: Czerwiec 1941 – kwiecień 1943, edited
by T. Pełczyński, Wrocław 1990, doc. 359 (General Rowecki’s report no. 169], 3 XII 1942),
p. 373.
232
NA, HS, 4/135, letter by P.A. Wilkinson to E.O. Coote, 20 VIII 1942.
187
proved to be quicker.233 On 31 August and 1 September 1942 they arrested

eight Polish citizens, including Thugutt, who was about to fly back to
London. Several days later the captives were released, but only two were given
permission to stay in Sweden, these were Maurycy Karniol, who, as a delegate
of the Polish Socialist Party, had good connections with the SAP, and
Przemysław Kowalewski, who represented the Polish Red Cross. This was
how the Swedish authorities showed the Germans that they were responding
to illegal activity on their territory and to the transfer of money and post
between Great Britain and the General Government.234 Potworowski was
clearly disgusted with the decision of Swedish authorities. It transpired that
the Swedes were willing to tolerate the undiplomatic activity of the legation
until it posed a real threat to their relations with the Germans. The Polish
envoy understood the motivation behind the actions of the Swedish diplo-
macy, but at the same time stated, ‘the way I was faced with the issue was
extremely brutal, and I never expected this to happen following my six-year
stay here and best possible relations with the Swedish authorities that I always
maintained.’ Potworowski resented suffering personal consequences. This
was highlighted by counsellor Pilch, who was appointed temporary head of
the mission, in a conversation with Ragnar Kumlin. The envoy was con-
sidered ‘a man of balance, familiar with the current situation of Sweden, and
a man who on numerous occasions, to mutual satisfaction, settled more than
one difficult problem.’235 Günther declared acceptance of a successor, but at a
lower rank. Several months later Henryk Sokolnicki became the new repre-
sentative of Poland. On a personal basis Sokolnicki enjoyed a title of special
envoy and minister plenipotentiary, but officially acted as chargé d’affaires
—
233
PISM, A 9, III 4/14, telegram no. 98 by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski,
Stockholm, copy from 19 VIII 1942.
234
The case of Thugutt was described by Lief Björkman in his book about the Swedish secret
police actions against foreign intelligence activity. L. Björkman, Säkerhetstjänstens egen be-
rättelse om spionjakten krigsåren 1939–1942. Så gick det till när säkerhetstjänsten skapades,
Stockholm 2007, pp. 148–150.
235
AAN, HI/I/100, letters by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 13 VIII, 21 VIII 1942; report by counsellor to the Polish Legation
in Stockholm T. Pilch from his conversation with vice head of the Political department of
the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs R. Kumlin from 18 VIII 1942, Stockholm. Never-
theless, in a conversation with President W. Raczkiewicz which took place on 27 August
1942 in London, Potworowski stressed: ‘In general the attitude of the Swedes towards Poland
is very warm, and their conviction that the Germans would lose the war is almost wide-
spread’. See Dzienniki czynności Prezydenta RP Władysława Raczkiewicza 1939–1947, vol. 1,
compiled by J. Piotrowski, Wrocław 2004, p. 590.
188
en pied.236 To appease the Germans, he was accredited by the Swedish govern-

ment and not King Gustaf V, which was the tradition. On 23 January 1943,
Sokolnicki, submitted letters of credence to Minister Günther, and on 4
February he visited Grafström. Sokolnicki was surprised that no conditions
were specified for the operation of the legation. He maintained that this was
‘undoubtedly a result of a change in the general political situation and of
favourable moods that were currently felt as far as the attitude towards us of
both the local Ministry of Foreign Affairs and various Swedish circles is con-
cerned.’
Minister of Foreign Affairs Edward Raczyński, on 10 October 1942, sent
information to all the diplomatic missions to resolve any doubts of Polish
diplomats as to the reasons for Potworowski’s dismissal and its consequen-
ces: ‘In the face of inaccurate commentaries in the press I would like to let it
be known that Envoy Potworowski has been moved to the headquarters of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a result of German pressure on Stockholm
following the arrest of the Swedish industrialists. The Polish Legation in
Stockholm shall continue operating.’237
He was wrong about the German pressure, however, as in the end there
was none. The Swedes removed Potworowski as part of a preventive measure
and as part of the argument against the liquidation of the legation. Never-
theless, the matter quickly ceased to be important for the Germans. What
happened to the arrested Swedes? Two of the accused were cleared of charges
(but kept in prison), one was sentenced to life imprisonment, and four
received capital punishment. On 16 August 1943, Hitler commuted their
death sentences to imprisonment. The Germans were striving expressly to
maintain good relations with Stockholm and at the end of 1944 released all
the prisoners.238
—
236
H. Batowski, Walka…, p. 142. Henryk Sokolnicki (1891–1981) started his diplomatic career
as a secretary of the Polish Legation in Brussels (1919–21), then he spent three years (until 1924)
in Christiania (now Oslo) in the rank of chargé d’affaires. Following his return to Warsaw, he
worked in the Political-Economic Department under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the
years 1934–36 he was counsellor at the Polish Embassy in Moscow. In the years 1936–41 he
was Polish Envoy to Helsinki. In the years 1941–42 he was counsellor to the Polish Embassy in
Kuybyshev. Following the war he remained in exile in Sweden and Finland.
237
AAN, HI/I/63, telegram of Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Raczyński to diplomatic mis-
sions, 10 X 1942.
238
The so-called Swedish case has already been described in detail. Most of all see: J.
Lewandowski, Swedish…; the most recent works: idem, Knutpunkt Stockholm…; L. Kliszewicz,
Placówki wojskowej łączności kraju z centralą w Londynie podczas II wojny światowej, vol. 5:
Baza w Sztokholmie, Warsaw–London 2000; P. Jaworski, ‘Brev kring det ockuperade
Warszawa’ (1942), Acta Sueco-Polonica 2003–2005, iss. 12–13, pp. 287–293; S. Thorsell, Wars-
zawasvenskarna. De som lät världen veta, Stockholm 2014; about a lot of the Swedes after
189
Counsellor Pilch informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in December of

1942 that the Swedes considered that the result of the war would be detri-
mental for Germany and were increasingly open in expressing their liking for
the Poles. He also noted, ‘The anti-Nazi orientation of the Swedish press is
increasingly visible and the way various events are presented is now much
less like the traditional restraint we were used to until quite recently.’ Despite
this, the circles of government fragrantly emphasized their neutral position.
Pilch argued that apprehension about Soviet successes, however, and the
possibly crucial role of Stalin in the introduction of the new European deal
was discernible. The staff of the Polish Legation informed the Swedes about
the situation in the Soviet Union. The Swedes continued asking questions
about General Sikorski’s journey to the USA.239
During a reception organized by Maurycy Karniol at the outset of
November, counsellor Pilch held a longer conversation with Minister of
Social Affairs Möller. According to Pilch, the Swedish minister talked to him
‘openly, without a doubt.’ Möller confirmed that the Germans had refrained
from making claims about Sweden for a long time, but he did not dismiss
that pressure could increase in the future ‘in the name of defending what the
Germans called Die Festung Europa [Fortress Europe].’ Möller considered
military resistance in the occupied countries to be premature and he did not
believe in the possibility of softening the German terror, which could have
been interpreted as the sign of weakness when the hatred of the conquered
nations towards the Germans reached its climax.240 The Swedish minister
assured him that the Swedish army was developed extensively and its
equipment was modern. Its weakness was the officer corps, which was lacking
intelligence and professional skills. Möller was aware that the on-going war
transformed the role of diplomatic missions, becoming the basis for the
operation of intelligence services. He also shared his opinion as a head of the
Swedish counter-intelligence that ‘the Allied intelligence is much less careful
while performing its operations in the territory of Sweden than its German
counterpart’,241 which clearly suggested that the Swedish authorities were well
acquainted with the activity of Polish intelligence.
—
imprisonment: G. Engblom, Himmlers fred. Tyska fredstrevare genom Sverige under andra
världskriget, Lund 2008, pp. 11–18.
239
AAN, HI/I/19, letter by chargé d’affaires of the Polish Legation in Stockholm T. Pilch to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 14 XII 1942.
240
Ibidem, letter by chargé d’affaires of the Polish Legation in Stockholm T. Pilch to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 10 XI 1942.
241
Ibidem.
190
5. REVIVAL OF BILATERAL RELATIONS
5. Revival of Bilateral Relations Following

the Battle of Stalingrad
Polish diplomatic activity in the period

of the Wehrmacht’s failures
Signs of a breakthrough in the relations with the Allies were visible by mid-
1942. At the time the British started to push Sweden to abandon the politics
of concessions to Germany. In March 1942 the analysts of the Foreign Office
advised that applying political and economic pressure was an adequate solu-
tion. They pointed out that ‘in this war there is no such thing as a neutral
country; there are only the countries who are fighting and those who are not,
and the latter change their course depending on the force of wind coming
from their fighting counterparts.’1 The Germans on the other hand aban-
doned their tough policy towards Sweden and from the outset of 1943
replaced their claims with postulates and their threats with persuasive argu-
ments of discussion.2 There was no doubt that the Germans would lose the
war. Only the date and the circumstances were unknown. The unfolding of
events in Europe dictated the change in course of Swedish foreign policy.
Sweden became a country that supported the Allies, yet one that avoided
participating in the war.
In January 1943 counsellor Pilch directed a question to the Swedish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Swedish political objectives for the end of
the war. The response came that the Swedish government had yet to tackle
this problem since it assumed that everything would be decided by the Great
Powers. An occasion to raise this issue was the memorandum of Norwegian
socialists on war objectives, which was passed on to the representatives of
Swedish social democrats. For Pilch, it was important that a declaration was
made on this matter. Opinion was drawn up on the subject of the document,
issued by the Norwegians, due to its specific content. The document defined
the treatment of both victorious and defeated countries, the reintroduction
of borders from 1938, the need to develop cooperation between the powers
of the anti-Fascist coalition following the war, the possibilities of creating
regional connections and the necessity to commence cooperation with the
—
1
2
191
Soviet Union. Pilch’s anonymous interlocutor avoided giving an explicit

answer. He suggested that Sweden become subordinate to the winners.
Nevertheless, on commenting on the vision of introducing regional connec-
tions, he considered cooperation between the Nordic States to be improb-
able.3 The key to understanding later actions of the Swedish government, in
foreign policy, may be an opinion shared by Höjer, a leading journalist for
Svenska Dagbladet, in the presence of American journalists visiting Sweden
in spring 1943. He stated that the Swedes were extremely afraid of the Soviet
Union, but counting on its expansion bypassing Scandinavia.4
In October 1943 Kumlin wrote a memorandum, where he analysed the un-
folding of events in the Nordic region in the face of Germany’s defeat in
Europe. He highlighted that the Soviet Union’s position regarding this matter
needed to be taken into account, because Stalin was without doubt interested
in the events on the other side of his north-western borders. Kumlin expressed
his hope that the maintenance of neutrality by the Nordic States should
correspond with the interests of Moscow, but did not exclude the division of
the region into spheres of influence, whereas to Sweden he attributed the role
of neutral territory.5
The views of the Swedes are contained in the records of talks with diplo-
mats from other countries. British Envoy Mallet shared a dinner with
Minister Günther on 4 January 1943, during which he discussed the situation
in the context of recent military successes of the Soviet Union. Günther was
convinced that the Germans would not win the war. The way the head of the
Swedish diplomacy spoke about the situation made Mallet formulate an
opinion that described his attitude as pro-German as unjust. This was indi-
cated by the Swede saying, ‘If the Germans somehow managed to win the
war, this would naturally mean our end.’ It is worth noting Mallet’s conclu-
sion following his conversation with Günther. He claimed that the Swedes
hoped that the Soviet Union would be weakened to the extent that it would
be impossible for it to enjoy military preponderance in Eastern Europe.6
When at the outset of 1944 Mallet prepared an annual review of events that
took place in Sweden, he repeated the same thought: ‘It is commonly, though
reluctantly, admitted that following the defeat of Germany the Soviet Union
—
3
AAN, HI/I/130, letter by Chargé d’affaires of the Polish Legation in Stockholm T. Pilch to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (together with attachment), Stockholm, 22 I 1943.
4
T. Höjer, Svenska…, p. 53.
5
R. Kumlin, ‘Småstatsdiplomati i stormaktskrig. Promemorior från krigsåren’, Historisk
tidskrift 1977, iss. 4, pp. 447–448.
6
NA, FO, 371/37077, report by British Envoy to Stockholm V. Mallet to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs A. Eden, 5 I 1943.
192
would annex the Baltic States, part of Poland and Bessarabia. A slight trend
of protesting this possibility is noticeable at least in the official circles, al-
though the majority of the Swedes would prefer this never came true.’7
A sense of ease in everyday life was evident following the turning point in
the war. The fashion was typically English ladies’ suits and hairstyles.8 The
Stockholm National Museum organized an exhibition of modern American
architecture ‘Amerika bygger’ (America Builds).9 It was probably no coinci-
dence that in 1944 the Nobel Prize in six categories was awarded to an
American. The Nobel Prize in literature went to a Danish writer, Johannes V.
Jensen, however, which was in line with the policy of Nordic solidarity and
the arrangement of relations between the Nordic neighbours in the post-war
period. At the outset of 1943 there was a breakthrough in the way events in
Europe were communicated to the public. News from the occupied countries
was increasingly published in the press, more often announced on the radio,
and mostly related to Norway, Finland and Denmark.
The Poles recognised the first signs of the return to strict neutrality for the
Swedes. Grafström again appeared at a reception held in the Polish Legation
on 31 October 1942. On 15 January 1943 he held a meeting with Press
Attaché Norbert Żaba and Chargé d’affaires Tadeusz Pilch, who told him of
the mass murders of the Jews.10 The next visit in the legation was by
Grafström on 18 June. Together with Head of Political department of UD
Söderblom, high-ranking officers of the Swedish army and navy as well as
representatives of the diplomatic corps, Grafström then attended a mournful
mass at the St Eugene Catholic Church in Stockholm on 15 July 1943 follow-
ing the Gibraltar B-24 crash in which general Sikorski died.11 Minister
Günther limited himself, sending only a letter of condolence to Envoy
Sokolnicki.12
—
7
NA, FO, 371/43 501, report by British Envoy to Stockholm V. Mallet to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs A. Eden, 11 II 1944, pp. 26–27.
8
H. Dahlberg, I Sverige…, p. 47.
9
Ibidem, p. 184.
10
S. Grafström, Anteckningar 1938–1944, pp. 435, 465.
11
PISM, col. 1/3, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 23 VII 1943 (photographs from the ceremony were attached to
the letter).
12
PISM, col. 1/3, copy of letter by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden Ch. Günther to
Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki, Stockholm, 6 VII 1943 r. The death of General W.
Sikorski roused a considerable interest of the Swedish press. It published articles, where it
was stressed that the tragedy complicated both the internal relations within the Polish poli-
tical circles in London and the position of the Polish government on the international arena.
See: K. Andersson, ‘Sikorskis död ökar Polens svårigheter’, Morgon-Tidningen, 6 VII 1943;
Griggs, ‘Sikorskis död upprullar många delikata problem’, Svenska Dagbladet, 6 VII 1943;
193
Good moods did not mean the end of close surveillance. When Henryk
Sokolnicki arrived in Stockholm in January 1943, the Swedish Security
Service (Säkerhetspolisen or SÄPO) pointed out that the wife of the new
representative of Poland was Finnish and anti-Swedish. In one of the reports
the point was raised that her father, a former shipbuilding businessman,
several years earlier had participated in an anti-Swedish campaign in
Finland.13 The opinions of the security services, however, held no particular
sway over the quality of the mutual diplomatic contacts. Sokolnicki declared
in his memoirs that he maintained very good relations both with Prime
Minister Hansson, with whom he shared regular night-long bridge sessions,
as well as Minister Günther.14
On 14 October 1943, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs forwarded a
note of consent for the appointment of Commander Marian Wolbek as
Polish naval attaché. Wolbek had already replaced Commander Eugeniusz
Pławski in the post of expert on naval affairs in February. The Ministry also
granted permission for the nomination of Norbert Żaba to the post of deputy
press attaché.15 Expanding the number of the legation’s staff was unprece-
dented by diplomatic missions of other occupied countries, because previ-
ously dismissed officials had been replaced by new ones. According to Żaba:
‘The positive decision of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs reflects the
changes that have taken place in Swedish Foreign Policy and is also evidence
of the positive attitude towards Polish affairs.’16 The elimination of the Polish
propagandist activity became less persistent, and the activity itself focused on
reporting the news of life under occupation and presented principal assump-
tions of Polish foreign policy.
In January 1944 the new head of the bureau of the Polish intelligence
service, Colonel Witold Szymaniak, arrived in Stockholm. In his memoirs he
emphasized that the Swedes were very easy going. They gave their permission
to establishing radio communication between the Polish Legation and
London. They offered help in the preparations for the escape of Poles from
labour camps in Norway and the transfer of Polish captives imprisoned by
—
‘Svårt att hitta efterträdare till general Sikorski’, Morgon-Tidningen, 7 VII 1943; M. Karniol,
‘Wladyslaw Sikorski – soldat och politiker’, Morgon-Tidningen, 15 VII 1943.
13
RA-Arninge, SÄPO arkiv, P 201 Polish Legation, löp 9, memorandum by N. Fahlander,
Stockholm, 19 XI 1942 r, k. 740.
14
H. Sokolnicki, In the service…, p. 291.
15
NA, FO, 371/37082, letter by the Legation of Great Britain in Stockholm to the Northern
Department of the FO, 17 X 1943, p. 249.
16
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, copy of letter by N. Żaba to the Ministry of Information
and Documentation, Stockholm, 23 X 1943.
194
the Finnish army as Soviet soldiers called to the Soviet army as Soviet citizens
and became prisoners-of-war in the Soviet–Finnish front.17
Making use of the favourable situation, Sokolnicki raised the issue of ele-
vating his rank formally to that of envoy. This case was examined for the first
time by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May 1943 when the Swedes
sent their diplomatic representative to act as envoy to the Norwegian govern-
ment in exile. Potworowski, who at the time served in the headquarters of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, believed that the best option for the Poles would
be a wait-and-see attitude. The former envoy to Stockholm was convinced
that rapprochement between Sweden and the Allies, particularly Poland,
would be in its interest, as following the war it would risk isolation. The
beginning of talks about the participation of Sweden in the rebuilding of
Poland was the earliest evidence of this.18 Envoy Sokolnicki shared a similar
opinion to Potworowski, his predecessor in the Swedish post. He explained
in his report to London that ‘the case is still in its infancy.’19
When at the close of 1943 Sokolnicki raised the question of envoy’s rank,
he referred to the Norwegian and Dutch envoys who were considered rightful
envoys. Nevertheless, Minister of Foreign Affairs Tadeusz Romer advised
that this had not occurred during the complicated Polish–Soviet crisis.20 The
conversation between counsellor Pilch and Ragnar Kumlin was crucial.
Although Kumlin did not say anything specific, he nonetheless pointed out
that envoy nominations in relation to other countries set a beneficial prece-
dent for Poland.21 Sokolnicki and Kumlin’s next conversation was entirely
different as the Swede explained that his government considered the situation
in Eastern Europe as still taking shape and, moreover, persisted in asking
questions about Poles supporting the communist movement, namely gen.
Zygmunt Berling (the commander-in-chief of the Polish Army in the Soviet
Union) and activist Wanda Wasilewska. Sokolnicki was sure he would fail to
attain specific commitments from the Swedish government about the future.
Nevertheless, he refused to accept the unequal treatment of individual repre-
sentatives of the occupied countries, this time to the detriment of Poland,
—
17
PISM, B 3035, report by Colonel W. Szymaniak entitled ‘Polskie sprawy przed 30 laty w
Szwecji’ (Polish affairs in Sweden 30 years ago), Stockholm, June 1974.
18
AAN, HI/I/30, note by G. Potworowski, n.d, n.p. [May–June 1943].
19
Affairs, Stockholm, 5 VI 1943.
20
AAN, HI/I/323, telegram by Minister of Foreign Affairs T. Romer to Polish Envoy to
Stockholm H. Sokolnicki, 18 I 1944.
21
AAN, HI/I/30, letter by counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm T. Pilch to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 17 XII 1943.
195
which in his view was considered a second-rate country. The Swedes it would
seem were afraid of the anti-Soviet overtone of such a decision.22 Sokolnicki’s
views, based on the earlier reports, confirmed that Prime Minister Hansson
and his ministers were opportunists, carefully weighing each word.
According to Sokolnicki, even Boheman, despite showing sympathy, did not
turn out to be a time tested friend, and as an opportunist he ‘occupied himself
with navigating across the still dangerous Swedish waters.’ He also con-
sidered Minister Günther to be a particularly pliant and cautious person.23
In a conversation with Boheman on 13 April 1944, Sokolnicki raised the
issue of delegating a Swedish envoy of the Polish government in exile to
London. While speaking to Minister Günther in an earlier conversation, he
referred to the candidacy of Gunnar Hägglöf, who oversaw economic nego-
tiations with Great Britain and the USA in London, and who, allegedly, was
to represent Sweden in the governments of the occupied countries.24
Sokolnicki convinced Boheman that common economic interests should be
a starting point for broader cooperation and developing one’s own concept
of the development of this part of Europe based on the idea of the Atlantic
Charter. It is enough to recap an ironic remark from Boheman regarding the
name of the charter indicating the area of its application as well as the formal
summary of the discussion that he would present to his government.25
Sweden was engaged in challenging truce negotiations between Finland and
the Soviet Union, and therefore avoided actions that could unsettle Stalin.26
Sweden preferred not to expose itself to the pressure from the powers on the
issue of joining the war against the Germans. Kumlin assured Pilch that
attacks by the press on the Polish government were not in the interest of
Sweden.27 Despite hearing promises on this matter, efforts by the authorities
to hush down critique of Poles in the Swedish dailies were barely noticeable,
leaving them free to repeat accusations of the Soviet propaganda.
—
22
AAN, HI/I/80, letters by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs T. Romer, Stockholm, 30 XII 1943, 25 II 1944.
23
AAN, HI/I/206, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs T. Romer, Stockholm, 28 III 1943.
24
PISM, A 9, VI 21/1, note by N. Żaba, Stockholm, 11 XII 1943.
25
AAN, HI/I/80, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of Foreign
26
27
196
Swedish public opinion on the situation in occupied Poland

and Polish–Soviet relations
A slow retreat from the cooperation with the Germans and rapprochement
with the Allies brought about the gradual breakdown of the wall of silence
about Polish affairs.28 Previously, the Swedes had been pragmatic when
justifying their actions in this area. There were doubts as regards informing
the public about the crimes or protesting without guaranteed results.29
Andrzej Nils Uggla suggests there were additional circumstances: isolation
from reality and an unwillingness to admit that all ethical norms were being
violated with each and every subsequent act of German aggression. That is
why commentators, independent of recommendations expressed by the
authorities, did not believe the reports about mass murders and occupational
terror in Poland.30
Individual accounts from occupied Poland were published increasingly
often. They were not treated by officials controlling publications as uncom-
promisingly as books, because they presented the news on the realities of life
under occupation in a moderated form. On presenting a description of slavish
labour performed by Poles and Jews, Svenska Dagbladet, on 19 January 1942,
reported: ‘They [the Jews] do not receive sick pay, have the option to take a
—
28
For many months either no publications appeared about Poland or they presented the
country in a negative light. One of such examples was the book written by Boguslav
Kuczynski (original spelling) Panik i Polen (Panic in Poland), translated from German in
1941. It told a fictional story of a group of Polish refugees who were heading from Warsaw
to the Romanian border. Opinion journalist Eric Arrhén, who was famous for his pro-Nazi
sympathies discussed the book underlining its positive aspects and especially the fact that it
showed how ‘a primitive nation yields to its opponent whose methods of warfare and tech-
nical skills are very advanced’. See: E. Arrhén, ‘Det polska sorgespelet i närbild’, Svenska
Dagbladet, 30 III 1941. Duchess Virgilia Sapieha in her memoirs published towards the end
of 1941 entitled Mitt liv i Polen (My Life in Poland) showed no signs of sympathy for the
homeland of her husband. See Grafström’s opinion in vol. 1 of his diary (p. 376). He con-
sidered the harsh assessment of achievements of Poles and Poland following the interwar
period to be highly unjust. In 1944 a Germany-inspired book was published by Adolf
Vysocki Ett polskt livsöde (The Polish Fate), which presented the situation of Poles under the
Soviet occupation.
29
During one of the closed-door debates a discussion took place on the subject of possible
necessity for the Swedish government to react to the acts of unlawfulness inflicted by the
Germans upon the occupied countries. Prime Minister Hansson argued that the protests,
unless they had influence on the change of the situation, were completely pointless.
Nevertheless, in a reply, liberal politician Bertil Ohlin presented his support for the protests
and called for warning the German side against the consequences of the repressive policy
conducted in Norway for the Swedish-German relations. It needs to be highlighted that
polemics took place in December 1943. See: Protokoll…, p. 247.
30
A. N. Uggla, Den svenska Polenbilden…, pp. 30–31.
197
leave of absence or receive pay for working on public holidays. A Jewish

labourer is paid only for the work he does. […] Unemployment benefit is
limited to the mandatory minimum. […] Pensions make up part of general
insurance.’31 The following day, special penalties for the Poles were mentioned,
which involved sending them to strict camps. On 21 January 1942, an opinion
journalist for Social-Demokraten wrote that the ghettos were being isolated to
protect the country from an epidemic of typhus.32
What may be considered to be a reliable assessment of the state of awareness
of the Swedish public, when it comes to the occupational policy of Germany, is
Envoy Potworowski’s opinion of June 1942: ‘The current atmosphere prevents
us from directly and more thoroughly informing the Swedish public about the
relations present in Poland under German occupation, which are nevertheless
quite well known thanks to the Swedish correspondents in London and Berlin.
The competent authorities, however, which moreover possess their own
information, are well aware, which I managed to confirm several times, of the
current relations present in Poland.’33
The society was unaware of the murderous practices taking place in Polish
territories, and suggestion from the Swedish politicians that they not sur-
render to foreign propaganda was certainly understood as a distancing from
the facts announced by the Allies. However, even the official declarations of
the German authorities were enough to imagine the occupational terror on
an unprecedented scale. The communist German newspaper Die Welt, which
was published in Stockholm, referring to this stated, ‘These declarations
reveal only the hint of the mystery behind what happened in Poland, but over
two years of occupation the occupants announced […] how the Poles were
executed, how villages were razed to the ground as if hit by an earthquake,
how Polish property was annexed, how joint responsibility was introduced
and how the mass relocations of Polish citizens of western provinces were
ordered.’ The authors of the article estimated that from the beginning of the
occupation the Germans executed as many as 82 thousand Poles, which they
considered to be a gruesome figure. The purpose the German policy was
obvious, namely the gradual eradication of both the Poles and the Jews.34
They also claimed that the battle with German propaganda was connected
—
31
PISM, A 9, III 4/14, study by M. Karniol ‘Szwedzka prasa o Polsce’ (Swedish press on
Poland), Stockholm, 22 I 1942.
32
Ibidem.
33
AAN, HI/I/63, by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign
34
PISM, A 9, III 4/14, study of M. Karniol ‘Szwedzki organ komunistyczny o Polsce’ (Swedish
communist periodical on Poland), 22 I 1942 r.
198
with popularization of slogans from the Soviet propaganda at the time,

writing, ‘Large masses of class-conscious Polish labourers and revolutionary-
oriented small peasantry have long had a great appreciation for the neigh-
bouring socialist countries, and these masses trust in the strength of the Red
Army and strongly believe in the victory of freedom.’35
The Polish Legation had much to do in the area of propaganda such as
delivery of documentation and completed texts to the editorial sections of
newspapers and organising lectures by Swedish public figures. The generous-
ly illustrated exhibition They burnt our villages down that included photo-
graphs, statistical schemes and information boards about the situation in the
occupied countries was very popular. It was organized by the Swedish social
democratic youth and exhibited over a three-week period in Stockholm.36
On 14 September 1942 Sydsvenska Dagbladet broke the news about special
controlling and penal orders for Polish farmers. The intention was to force
the farmers to supply grain quotas determined by the German authorities. A
correspondent for a Berlin newspaper revealed that only 20 percent of the
grain was not subject to quota demands. One day later Arbetaren reported on
the dreadful health conditions affecting Polish society and an epidemic of
typhus. At times the news was of murder of the Poles committed under guise
of the joint-responsibility rule. Based on a telegram from London, Afton-
tidningen reported that 150 Poles were hung along the railway line near
Kraków as part punishment for the derailment of a train.37 In October 1942
Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning published the article ‘Extermination
of the Jews’ written by Hugo Valentin, in response to articles on this topic in
British newspapers a month before.38 Arbetaren then published an article
based on Valentin’s report and information from the Polish Legation on 23
October 1942, recounting the extermination of 700 thousand Jews in total.39
On 19 December 1942, however, Arbetaren reported on the occupation of
Poland based on materials from the Polish Legation, following a debate in the
House of Commons, entitled ‘One Million Jews Have Been Killed.’ In the
—
35
Ibidem.
36
37
AAN, HI/I/97, press report by Chargé d’affaires T. Pilch to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
38
H. Valentin, ‘Utrotningskriget mot Judarna’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 13
X 1942. The authors of a book on Swedish attitude to Holocaust underlined the meaning of
the publication: I. Svanberg & M. Tydén, Sverige och Förintelsen. Debatt och dokument om
Europas judar 1933–1945, Stockholm 2005, pp. 242–246.
39
Ibidem.
199
commentary it was declared that remaining indifferent to such crime would

be impossible, as one would have to bear the burden of the tragedy. Therefore
‘it is our duty to speak of it, and staying silent is tantamount to participating
in the crime.’40 Over time the descriptions of German crimes appeared more
and more frequently, but it was not until 1944 that Mia Leche Löfgren, one
of the organizers of humanitarian aid campaign for occupied Poland,
admitted with sorrow: ‘it has been silent for too long about this country,
which was the first country to experience war, which received the least help
of all the countries in need, and whose martyrdom is greater than the
misfortunes of all other nations.’41 Poland became the centre of attention
when journalists could write openly about the occupied countries. Poland
was presented as one of the victims and at the same time a stand was taken
towards the German attempts to include Sweden in the system of the new
European deal.42
On 15 January 1943, Svenska Dagbladet published an excerpt from a
speech of Minister Mikołajczyk about the relations within the Lublin district
(Lubelszczyzna), the omnipresent terror and the Polish peasants’ attempt to
put up resistance against the enemy.43 Similar notes were published by Arbe-
taren and Aftontidningen.44 A speech by Clement Atlee, leader of the Labour
Party, highlighting the German terror in Poland was also published. On 13
February, a telegram from the Reuters Agency describing the shooting of
seventy people in Warsaw was given priority the newspapers. According to
Żaba, this information was the first in a long time about Poland and it was
even displayed even on advertisement posters in the street.45 On 2 February,
Ny Tid published an account of a Swede in Warsaw, who described everyday
life, including the high prices as well as German attempts at Germanisation,
the most conspicuous examples of which were the German street names.46 At
the outset of February 1943 Arbetaren printed photographs from the Warsaw
ghetto that were submitted by Maurycy Karniol.47 On 12 April the Nerikes
—
40
‘En miljon judar dödade’, Arbetaren, 19 XII 1942.
41
M. Leche, ‘För Polen’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 26 VI 1944.
42
‘Ny ordningen i praktiken’, Arbetaren, 17 II 1943.
43
‘Polska böndernas självförsvar’, Svenska Dagbladet, 15 I 1943.
44
‘Polacker bränna hellre byar än de överlämnas’, Aftontidningen, 16 I 1943; ‘Bönderna
brände nedfjorton byar. Motståndet hårdnar i Polen’, Arbetaren, 18 I 1943.
45
and Documentation, Stockholm, 6 III 1943.
46
‘500 kronor för en middag i Warszawa’, Ny Tid, 2 II 1943.
47
‘Från Polen’, Arbetaren, 8 II 1943 (the photographs present the ghetto wall and Jewish
children cleaning the street; instead of a commentary a quotation from General W. Sikorski’s
speech is provided about the German murders of Polish Jews); ‘Judeförföljerserna i Polen’,
200
Allehanda circulated an article on the extermination of Polish Jews. At the

same time, it was pointed out that only a miracle could save the few who still
remained alive.48 On 2 March 1943, Arbetaren published what was, according
to Żaba, one of the best articles by a Jewish refugee from the General Govern-
ment about occupied Poland, which had been published in Stockholm up
until that point. The author mentioned neither Poland nor Germany to avoid
interference by the inspectors of publications. Readers, nevertheless, guessed
the inference to occupied Poland. The terror of everyday life under the rule
of Germany was presented in the article in a literary form. The title character,
described as ‘indifferently neutral’, had a dream in which his own country
was at risk of occupation. ‘It seemed like the scales have fallen from his eyes,
and from this night on he was no longer indifferent towards injustice, op-
pression and barbarity.’49 It is worth noting that the reports about manhunts
in the centre of Warsaw, execution of hostages and razing entire villages to
the ground were treated like sensational news events by the Swedes. Nya
Dagligt Allehanda promoted its 8 March 1943 issue containing an article on
this subject using garish leaflets.50
It is not known when Karniol started to produce and distribute (most
probably at irregular intervals) the press bulletin Från de ockuperade om-
rådena (From the Occupied Territories) that was directed mainly at editorial
teams of dailies and periodicals. In September 1943, the 79th issue of this
bulletin reached socialist Adam Ciołkosz.51 Later, Karniol changed its title to
Polska Nyheter (Polish News). Every quarter, nearly 30 issues were sent out
to all workers’ newspapers in Sweden, to socialist members of parliament and
senators, to trade unions as well as to international correspondents.
Over time an increasing amount of information about the Polish resist-
ance movement poured in. What is more, the minister of information issued
an order regarding the distribution of reports about the armed efforts of the
Polish underground. Żaba held a meeting with the famous Swedish opinion
journalist Gunnar Thorstenson Pihl to hand him documentation for an
—
Arbetaren, 9 II 1943 (the photographs present Jews wearing armbands and a sign warning of
typhus placed at the entrance to the ghetto).
48
‘Polens judar troligen räddningslöst förlorade’, Nerikes Allehanda, 12 IV 1943. In the
autumn the press informed that only 300 thousand Jews had been left alive in Poland. See:
49
J. S-a., ‘Den likgiltigt neutrale’, Arbetaren, 2 III 1943.
50
51
PISM, col. 133, vol. 295, Bulletin Från de ockuperade områdena, iss. 79, received on 27 IX
1943.
201
article in Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten.52 Żaba described the article that

was published as perfect. Its author focused on brutal German repressions,
Germanisation, displacements, manhunts, transportation of workers to the
Reich, as well as development of the Polish underground press and gradual
preparations for the rising.53
German propaganda made efforts to convince the Swedes that the occu-
pied nations were not suffering under German rule. On 18 January 1943,
Dagsposten published an interview with Swedish engineer, Jörgen N. Guld-
brandsen, who returned from Lida, Baranowicze and Nowogródek, where he
had worked. From his observations during his travels there emerged a picture
of economic development and satisfied locals.54 On the whole, he praised the
Germans for food rationing, which allegedly allowed for the holding of con-
siderable stocks of basic provisions.
In 1943 the motif of Polish resistance fighter became the subject of literary
interpretation. In the novel Attentat i Paris (Attack in Paris) Marika Stiernstedt
created a character of a Pole, a painter and officer named Szczyt, who
symbolized Polish bravery and the battle against the Germans from September
1939.55 Another example promoting Poland in Sweden was the novel Spelet
kring en drottning (translation: Intrigue Around a Queen) by Py Sörmann,
which was published in 1943. The novel told the story of the Queen of Sweden,
Catherine Jagiellon, who brought Polish culture to Sweden centuries ago.56
The Swedish journals also became interested in the development of Polish–-
Soviet relations, which were in turn followed closely by political–diplomatic
circles. In private conversations, Polish diplomats were advised to adopt a
compromised attitude.57 Żaba claimed that as far as this matter was concerned,
the Polish propagandist activity in Sweden was conducted with extreme
—
52
[G.] Th-son [Pihl], ‘Polska motståndrörelsen har blivit en hemlig armé, Sydsvenska Dag-
bladet Snällposten, 23 XI 1943.
53
54
‘Puck, Svensk ingenjör i Östland: Halvsvältande befolkning får äntligen äta sig mätt.
Beundransvärt återuppbyggnadsarbete i de besatta områdena’, Dagsposten, 18 I 1943.
55
See: B. Skarżyński, ‘Motywy polskie w piśmiennictwie szwedzkim w czasie wojny’, Nowa
Polska, 1945, iss. 3, pp. 185–188.
56
B. Skarżyński, ‘Motywy polskie w piśmiennictwie szwedzkim w czasie wojny’ (continuation),
Nowa Polska 1946, iss. 1, pp. 62–64: ‘The book contains numerous passages where Poland and
the Poles are presented as a country of the civilized West in contrast to the primordial life in
Scandinavia and where the royal family of Jagiellons is presented as particularly standing out
from the Swedish House of Vasa, showing almost parvenu features.’
57
AAN, HI/I/30, letter by Chargé d’affaires of the Polish Legation in Stockholm T. Pilch to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 25 I 1943.
202
caution. For him, the extremely aggressive Polish opinion journalists posed a
greater threat than the disapproving Swedish commentators. He also noted:
Apart from a few small exceptions the discussion is reported in a way which –
as far as I am concerned – is convenient for us. What becomes evident is the
deviousness of Moscow, which is only to our advantage. Nevertheless, our
society needs to be controlled as far as this matter is concerned, including reac-
tionary military men, everywhere, even in Stockholm, together with the dis-
gruntled as well as with those opinion journalists who are too candid. They are
more harmful than the foreign journalists, […] since I am afraid that people
who are suffering from the anti-Soviet complex will campaign against the Rus-
sians, and this will only put wind in the sails of most diverse factors.58
Żaba claimed that making threats with communism as penance was unneces-
sary as this fear was deeply rooted already in the minds of the Swedes. Besides,
this position harmonized with Goebbels’ propaganda, which the Swedes were
very critical, especially until they realized Germany would lose. Żaba defined
another problem that came to light saying, ‘some circles of trade unionists,
socialists and radical-liberal intelligentsia believe that Russia has legitimate
ethnographic claims towards our eastern territories. At the same time, we are
denied our right to East Prussia, because, according to them, this is against
the Atlantic Charter.’ A portion of the radical circles surrendered to the
charm of the Soviets. Nonetheless, the social-democratic leadership ‘fears
Moscow as if it was the devil.’ In connection with this, Żaba was convinced
that the Swedish government would insist the press stifle ‘everything which
could provoke the Soviets (eastern borders of Poland), and, on the other
hand, for fear of Bolshevism it strives to save Germany so that a strong
democratic Reich is created, which would become a counterweight for the
Soviets.’ Karniol complained to Żaba that in the face of such an attitude of
the colleagues from the Swedish social-democratic party, he had great diffi-
culty in gaining acceptance for the position of the Polish government. Żaba
strove to intensify high level contacts between the PPS and the SAP, to pro-
mote the Polish point of view more effectively. In his report to London, he
—
58
Affairs), Stockholm, 26 II 1943.
203
proposed that an eminent Polish socialist politician should visit Stockholm

and deliver a speech to win over the Swedish government circles.59
Illustration 5: ‘Stygg gosse’ [‘Naughty boy’] meaning Poland as represented by the boy in the
sailor uniform (Aftontidningen, 3 March 1943).
Deputy director of the Political department of the Swedish Ministry of

Foreign Affairs Ragnar Kumlin revealed to counsellor Pilch on 25 February,
that the discussion in the press on the Polish–Soviet conflict is needless,
—
59
Ibidem.
204
because Swedish opinion, as far as Polish–Soviet relations were concerned,

was usually in favour of Poland.60 However, an argument came to light in the
press discussion that the territories of eastern Poland were mostly inhabited
by non-Polish people, who were treated poorly by the Polish government in
the pre-war period. The Poles were also blamed for selling the bear’s skin
before the hunt, when they put forward a claim for taking over East Prussia.
Besides which, the Polish opposition press in London was considered chau-
vinist and imperialist.
The commentaries of Swedish press appeared following the deterioration
of relations between Sikorski’s government and Moscow. This was in con-
nection with Minister Edward Raczyński radio speech that laid out Polish
war aims. The Minister stated that the Polish government fought to restore
the free, sovereign Polish state with the pre-war course of eastern borders and
the favourable course of western borders. The speech caused a sensation in
Sweden and reflected badly on Poland. The first news about the Polish–Soviet
conflict, announced on 22 February 1943 in the Swedish press, was submitted
by London correspondents and presented the British point of view, which
was hostile towards Poland. Much of what was criticised were Polish ter-
ritorial aspirations, in particular the proposal to establish a new border with
Germany. The conservative, pro-Ally newspaper Nya Dagligt Allehanda
presented a review of opinions from the Polish press and the Moscow news-
paper Pravda. It considered the ambitions of the Polish government to estab-
lish post-war deal in Europe as excessive. Polish dailies published in London
were accused of promoting fantasies in discussions about peace and re-
arranging the map of Europe from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.’61 The
opinion journalist of the social-democratic afternoon newspaper Aftontid-
ningen expressed his concern with the relations among the Allies. He sup-
ported the British view that ‘nothing should hinder the cooperation between
Great Britain, the Soviets and the USA, which determines not only the mili-
tary victory, but also the issue of winning peace.’ On the question of future
relations in East-Central Europe, he took an ambiguous stand. He questioned
the rightness of maintaining the current Polish–Soviet border. Yet, he did not
believe that Stalin would be content with territorial acquisitions and refrain
from taking over control of Poland: ‘Russia has the right to demand security
of its borders. Nevertheless, its neighbours also have the right to demand that
their borders be respected. It is all right that Russia does not desire conquests,
—
60
Ibidem.
61
B. H., ‘Tilltagande irritation Sovjet-Polen’, Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 22 II 1943.
205
but its only intention is to provide security to those territories that belong to
it. This may nonetheless be bought for the price of freedom of the countries
that lie close to it. Strategic borders are justified when they may be aligned
with national borders, but when they are introduced at will, they defeat their
own purpose and undermine security rather than increasing it. Evidence of
the best possible security that may be provided for both large and small
countries is the satisfaction of its surrounding neighbours.’62
In the end however, as Żaba wrote in his letter to Thugutt: ‘a view became
widespread here that we have made territorial claims not only towards
Germany, but even towards Russia, and that these claims are to be the fruit
of Polish imperialism and conceited romanticism, as they write.’63 In March
1943, Envoy Sokolnicki assured the headquarters that the Swedish press had
taken a pro-Polish stand in the conflict with the USSR, in spite of the fact that
Swedish correspondents in London yielded to the Soviet propaganda and as
a consequence relayed that ‘the Poles are demanding Ukraine as far as Kiev’,
accusing the Poles of imperialism and a lack of tolerance for national minori-
ties.64 Much more dangerous, according to Żaba, were the so-called good
Germans (the German expatriate community), whose access to the Swedish
press was, in his view, much easier than that of the Soviet agents. This positive
attitude towards Germany in the moment of its defeat was predicted much
earlier by Gustaw Potworowski. In February 1942, he communicated this to
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Our attitude towards Germany is so clear and understandable, and arguments
we may use are so strong that political justification of our points presents no
doubt whatsoever. What needs to be considered in the future, nonetheless, is
that the point about “the good Germans” would nowhere else in the world
cause as strong of a reaction as in Sweden, where the mentality of the entire
society always is to defend the weak, the defeated and therefore the alleged
“disadvantaged” party. This is to a large extent the reason of the negative at-
titude of the Swedes towards the Treaty of Versailles, and therefore counter-
acting this type of attitude would be here a difficult task during the future
negotiations.65
—
62
‘Gränsstaternas ställning’, Aftontidningen, 28 II 1943.
63
Affairs), Stockholm, 13 III 1943.
64
PISM, A 12, 53/38Z, copy of telegram by Envoy H. Sokolnicki [?] to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs [no information about the date of sending], London, 5 III 1943 r. [the date of issuing
a copy in London].
65
206
As time went by the motto of kind treatment of Germans after the war gained
on importance.66
The majority of provincial newspapers claimed that Poland sparked the
argument with the Soviet Union and was responsible for the worsening of
relations between the Allies.67 Characteristic was the statement that both the
Poles and the Soviets were mocking at the Atlantic Charter, as the Poles
aimed to enlarge their territory at the expense of Germany, and Russia aimed
to do the same, but at the expense of Poland. The Soviet claims, based on
ethnographic grounds, were not always described as imperialist, and the
border determined by the Peace of Riga was considered unfair in this res-
pect.68 Poland, with its Jagiellonian tradition, was considered to be unrealistic
when compared to the strong Soviet Union.69
Influenced by the Germans, the dailies opposed the idea of depriving the
Reich of East Prussia,70 and announced with satisfaction that Great Britain ‘in
spite of the warranties it granted to Poland at a certain time in the past,
wanted to leave it to the mercy of the Bolsheviks.’71 The most pro-Polish arti-
cle was by Knut Hagberg that was published in Nya Dagligt Allehanda.
Hagberg argued that if Poland lost independence, Sweden’s existence would
—
66
PISM, A 21, 8/26, letter by L. Plater-Ankarhall to the Ministry of Congress Work,
Stockholm, 12 V 1944. The activity of German emigration in Sweden is proven by a note in
the memoirs of the then employee of the German Section of the Ministry of Congress Work,
Józef Winiewicz, see: J. Winiewicz, Co pamiętam z długiej drogi życia, Poznań 1985, p. 308:
‘The closer we are to the conclusion of the war, the sharper is the opposition of the rest of
the German expatriates against any concessions to Poland. The London Sozialistische
Mitteilungen among others published the results of a survey conducted among the Germans
in Sweden. Most of the answers were unfavourable to us. One of the arguments mentioned
was that Germany should not be weakened, and even that the issue of “the corridor” should
be settled in favour of Germany. Should the Poland’s access to the sea be cut off in these
conditions?’ More information about the battle between Polish diplomacy and the German
propaganda in the years 1939–1945, see: Historia dyplomacji…, vol. 5, chpt. IX by T. Dubicki
and A. Suchcitz. Polish newspapers made efforts to expose the attempts to establish contact
with the Allies by the false German opponents of Hitler. They pointed out that this was
Führer’s trick. See: ‘»Dobrzy Niemcy« grasują w Szwecji. Baron von Cramm – tenisista
gestapo’, Dziennik Żołnierza, 19 XI 1943; ‘Tajemnicza wizyta księcia Bismarcka w Szwecji’,
Dziennik Żołnierza, 23 XI 1943; ‘Sztokholm – barometr wojny’, Dziennik Żołnierza APW, 10
XII 1943.
67
and Documentation, Stockholm, 2 IV 1943.
68
E. B., ‘Polens affärer’, Karlshamns Allehanda, 1 III 1943; ‘Moskvasplaner och polackerna’,
Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 3 III 1943.
69
and Documentation, Stockholm, 2 IV 1943.
70
‘Illusioner’, Aftonbladet, 27 II 1943.
71
‘England ger Ryssland halva Polen’, Folkets Dagblad, 27 II 1943.
207
be in jeopardy.72 In turn, on 6 March, Aftontidningen published (after Soviet

Pravda) an opinion that Ukrainians wanted to be part of the Soviet Union
following many difficult years of suffering under Polish anti-minority policy
and being discriminated against by the authorities.73
According to Żaba, the most harmful opinion journalist was the Hun-
garian Stefan Szende, who had communist sympathies and had resided in
Stockholm since the pre-war period. Szende explained to Karniol that the
territorial ambitions of the Soviet Union needed to be satisfied to prevent it
from taking control of Europe. In response to articles written by Szende in
Aftonbladet,74 Karniol, on 5 April, published his polemics in that very same
daily.75 He argued that the government of General Sikorski was widely sup-
ported in Poland, remained in contact with it, and that for these reasons it
would be hard to deprive it of the mandate. He also attempted to demonstrate
that the Eastern Borderlands’ affiliation with Poland was a question of inter-
national justice and that ethnic minorities would be granted all liberties in
post-war Poland.
The current critics of Swedish submissiveness towards Germany, with
Torgny Segerstedt and Ture Nerman at their centre, did not give credence to
Stalin’s plans of expansion. They considered him first and foremost Europe’s
saviour. Following 22 June 1941, a noticeable feature of their commentaries
was tolerance for communism and in 1944 even acceptance of communists
becoming the members of the Swedish government. Such an attitude was also
adopted by the leading opinion journalist for Dagens Nyheter Johannes
Wickman, chair of the influential association Kämpande demokrati (Fighting
Democracy) Karin Schulz and writer Marika Stiernstedt, who was famous for
her sympathies towards Poland and Polish roots.76 The criticism of Stalin’s
dictatorship seemed psychologically unacceptable. The Soviet Union was
perceived as having suffered the greatest human and material losses in the
fight with Nazi Germany. People deluded themselves by thinking that follow-
ing the war democracy would be established in the Soviet Union. Not without
significance were the growing communist influences in Sweden, as the
German–Soviet front moved westwards, intensified by the worsening eco-
nomic situation of the civilian population.77 What hit the Swedes hardest was
—
72
K. Hagberg, ‘Sverige och Polen’, Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 28 II 1943.
73
‘Polackerna i minoritet i omstridda Östpolen’, Aftontidningen, 6 III 1943.
74
S. Szende, ‘Allierade statsmän om Europas framtid’, Aftontidningen, 11 XII 1942; idem,
‘Polackerna i minoritet i omstridda Östpolen’, Aftontidningen, 6 III 1943.
75
‘Polen och dess framtida gränser’, Aftontidningen, 5 IV 1943.
76
L. Drangel, Den kämpande…, pp. 117, 161.
77
208
the lack of fuel and food. From 1942 onwards virtually all goods were
rationed and many were unavailable. Maintenance costs increased by 40
percent whilst wages dropped by 10–12 percent. In order to calm radical
feelings, the social democratic party presented, prior to the upcoming par-
liament elections in 1944, a new social and economic programme (the so-
called 27 points), which would ensure the improvement of the civilian popu-
lation’s living conditions after the war by means of full employment, the fair
division of gross national income and the democratization of economic life.78
The communists were successful in the elections and also gained stronger
influence within the trade unions, especially within the union of metal-
workers. In the spring of 1945, though, the popularity of the communists
started to fall. On 5 February 1945, they announced a strike by the metal-
working industry and began demanding higher wages. The Swedish Trade
Union Confederation (LO), dominated by social democrats, did not support
the strike. LO was satisfied with the higher wages proposed by the govern-
ment. The protest did not bring the communists the intended propagandist
result, since the agreement they concluded with the government on 6 July
1945 was the same as the agreement concluded with LO six months earlier.
Difficulties in the industry, caused by prolonging the opposition, further
undermined their authority.79
Żaba noticed that in terms of attitude it was possible to distinguish four
groups of commentaries devoted to Polish matters published in the Swedish
press at the outset of 1943: the reports from London, which were critical of
Poland, then (between 28 February and 1 March) the articles in provincial
newspapers which were mostly in support of Poland’s position, later the tele-
grams from Great Britain and the USA without any commentaries, and
finally, between 6 and 10 March, the favourable statements of dailies from
Stockolm. Nevertheless, Żaba summed up:
The ones who have spoken were the opinion journalists who were reluctant to
accept our position on eastern affairs for both fundamental and ideological
reasons, such as an aversion to our pre-war political system, Polish nationalism,
the attitude of the Poles towards minorities, social inequality, contesting the
right of Poland to retain the land inhabited by the non-Polish population or
yielding to the suggestion of the Soviet power etc. Eventually, not without a
certain influence, was the, on this occasion, accidentally anti-Polish attitude of
—
78
For more information see: S. Hadenius, B. Molin, H. Wieslader, Sverige efter 1900. En
modernpolitisk historia, Stockholm 1988, pp. 170–172; H. Dahlberg, I Sverige…, pp. 120–121.
79
H. Dahlberg, I Sverige…, pp. 143–144.
209
as many as three sources of propaganda: Soviet agents, Nazi agents and German
expatriates, that is of the elements favouring “the good Germans”.80
It was only in mid-March that the Swedish press began to publish commen-
taries that were favourable towards Poland, which was associated by Żaba
with the interventions of the Polish legation both in the Press department of
the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and directly in the editorial sections
of the principal dailies. The Polish diplomatic mission was forced to deal with
a relatively delicate issue. Żaba explained: ‘Our inspirational action is ham-
pered to the extent that we may not oppose the Soviets as actively as we would
like to, because this would only consolidate the erroneous opinion of the pro-
Ally circles of Stockholm that Poland is responsible for inflaming the rela-
tions, all the more so that the Soviet legation […] behaved quite properly in
this matter.’81
Some understanding towards the Polish government, however, was shown
by the Swedish government circles, conservatives and trade union leadership.
Whereas the pro-Ally liberal circles supported the watchwords of Soviet
propaganda, which was noticeable in Dagens Nyheter, Trots Allt! and Göteborgs
Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning. Karniol, during his talks with social democrats,
learned that they were against Polish postulates regarding the course of the
borders, not only in the east but also the west. The idea to incorporate East
Prussia in to Poland was openly described by them as a manifestation of
imperialism. They could not understand the reasons for Polish persistence and
explained that losing part of one’s territory was not a tragedy. They highlighted
that Sweden had also been great in the past, but that those days were over, and
this ‘did not harm its internal happiness.’ They accepted the desire of Poland
to retain Lviv within its territory, as this area had never been part of Russia,
though they were less inclined to accept the arguments of Poland to do so in
the Vilnius Region.82 The pre-war borders of Germany were defended by many
circles. The opinion journalists of Dagens Nyheter, headed by Wickman, were
convinced that the errors of the Treaty of Versailles should not be repeated by
building foundations for the new German revanchism.83 One of the journalists
—
80
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, copy of N. Żaba’s report to the Ministry of Information
81
Ibidem.
82
Ibidem.
83
Norbert Żaba sent his protests to the editorial section of the Dagens Nyheter several times in
connection with Wickman’s articles devoted to Poland. According to the Polish attaché, the
Swedish opinion journalist was lacking comprehension of the politics of the Polish government
210
for Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning stated bluntly, ‘the Polish matter
has been hindering the peaceful development of Europe for 400 hundred years
now.’ He considered Poland’s claims towards the course of the borders both in
the east and west to be preposterous arguing that, ‘It is not due to its territorial
size but due to social justice and uniformity that Poland may fulfil its historical
mission to the benefit of both the Polish nation and the world.’84 In turn, a
commentator of Gefle Dagblad presented the border issue in terms of the so-
called realpolitik. He wrote candidly, ‘Futile are the Polish hopes that the
victorious Soviet Russia would be inclined to renounce things it has won with
the help of Germany.’85
The new Polish minister of information and documentation, Professor
Stanisław Kot, presented the manual of ‘counteracting the Soviet propaganda
directed against Poland’ during the government session of 31 March 1943.86
The document called for the emphasizing of the fact that the elections con-
ducted by the Soviet authorities in the occupied territories in 1939 were
unlawful, highlighting that the relative majority of the population of the na-
tionally mixed eastern territories was Polish, proving that the Soviet Union
was fulfilling a policy of national identity deprivation. Informing the public
about plans for internal reforms, especially agricultural, in Poland following
the war was considered appropriate. These arguments appeared earlier in
numerous propagandist publications produced on the initiative of the Polish
Legation in Stockholm.87
The Polish Legation carried out a propagandist campaign the intention of
which was to convince Swedish readers of the arguments broadcasted by the
Polish government in exile. The young Swedish opinion journalist and Polo-
nophile John Walterson, who cooperated with the legation, published ‘The
Future of Poland’ in Reformatorn, a magazine by prohibitionist organisa-
tions. He argued, ‘The discussion about Poland’s future is an important mat-
ter to all of us’ because ‘it considers principally the right and chance of small
—
in exile. Part of the newspaper’s managers believed that the only way to rescue Finland would
be concessions to Stalin in other spheres. See J. Torbacke, Dagens…, pp. 339, 344.
84
L. S., ‘Vis pacem - eller den polska frågan’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 6 V 1943.
85
I. M. S., ‘Konflikten Polen-Sovjet’, Gefle Dagblad, 8 III 1943.
86
For the full text of the manual, see: Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej, vol. 5: wrzesień 1942 – lipiec 1943, scholarly editing by M. Zgórniak, compiled by
W. Rojek in cooperation with A. Suchcitz, Kraków 2001, pp. 328–343.
87
It is worth to emphasize that the actions undertaken by the Polish diplomatic mission were
noticed and appreciated by the Press Attaché of Great Britain, Peter Tennant. He was one of
the few diplomats in Stockholm who actually took note of the Polish activity in Sweden. In
his memoirs he mentioned N. Żaba: ‘this courageous Pole, who was full of wit, battled with
words with utter chivalry, characteristic for his nation.’ See P. Tennant, Vid sidan…, p. 75.
211
nations’ existence as independent nations.’88 Walterson made a positive state-

ment about the Polish government’s plans to establish a federation, and ap-
pealed to the Western Allies for economic support that would be necessary
to rebuild Poland and redevelop it economically. On 20 February, he pub-
lished an article about Poland in the periodical Svensk underbefälstidning,
which was intended for non-commissioned officers in the Swedish army.89
The text indicated that the Poles were striving to achieve peace, but were
facing hostile Soviet policy. On 12 March, Walterson published another
article about Polish war objectives in the Nu periodical with intellectual am-
bitions. He aimed to convince the reader both of the idea of a federation and
of the Polish arguments regarding returning the eastern border to where it
was at the beginning of the war.90
To counter this, Karniol, Żaba and Pomian began to visit and conduct
frank conversations with chief editors of Swedish newspapers. During Żaba’s
meeting with the editor of the conservative Svenska Dagbladet newspaper,
Otto Järte, who favoured Poland, it emerged that Järte was convinced that the
Poles were to blame for the current conflict with the Soviet Union. He also
criticised the pre-war policy of Poland in relation to its national minorities.91
His position was in fact decisive for the political orientation of the daily, as it
was he who prepared the majority of its editorials.92
The news that received broad coverage in those days in the entire Swedish
press was the shooting of two socialist activists in the Soviet Union who were
members of the Bund, Henryk Ehrlich and Victor Alter. This event was
commented on in the context of Polish–Soviet relations; it also gained a
strong response from the social democratic periodicals. According to Żaba,
‘this issue has to a large extent contributed to putting an end to some illusions
that continued to exist within various circles as far as the attitude of Moscow
towards socialism is concerned.’93 The author of the Poles-inspired article
—
88
J. Walterson, ‘Polens framtid’, Reformatom, 14 II 1943.
89
J. Walterson, ‘Polen och Ryssland’, Svensk underbefälstidning, 20 II 1943.
90
J. W[alterson], ‘De polska krigsmålen. Hur polackerna tänker sig sin framtid’, Nu, 12 III
1943. The publication of Walterson (‘an outstanding opinion journalist, a great friend of
Poland’) drew the attention of the Polish press in London already in January 1941: ‘W
Szwecji o wielkości Polski’, Dziennik Polski, 22 I 1941; and soon after: ‘W Szwecji o jedności
i przyszłości Polski’, Dziennik Polski, 10 XII 1941.
91
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, N. Żaba’s letter to the Ministry of Information and Docu-
mentation, Stockholm, 9 XI 1943.
92
T. Höjer, Svenska…, p. 9.
93
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, copy of N. Żaba’s letter to the Ministry of Information
and Documentation, Stockholm, 3 IV 1943. See ‘W Swecji [sic!] o rozstrzelaniu Ehrlicha i
Altera’, Robotnik Polski w Wielkiej Brytanii, 1 V 1943.
212
published in Arbetaren remembered the deportations of civilians from the

Eastern Borderlands deep into the Soviet Union and wondered what the sub-
versive activity of the two activists was that had led to their execution,
Already the very fact that one does not share the views with those who hold
the power is considered a sign of subversiveness. Sharing one’s thoughts with
other people is considered high treason, which may be punished in no other
way than by execution. The Polish Jews most probably had a different under-
standing of socialism than the Bolsheviks, and in Russia this is already enough
to end up strung from the gallows.
It was reiterated that it was Stalin who had made it easier for Hitler to start the
war by concluding the pact of non-aggression in August 1939. ‘This agreement
somehow opened the door to war. It saved Hitler from battling on two fronts
and made it possible for the Germans to eliminate Poland by means of a
lightning attack in a joint effort with Russia and to rush at the Western Allies
soon thereafter with all the military power.’94 Equally strong words appeared in
Arbetet, ‘An atrocious illustration of ruthlessness which accompanies law
enforcement in Russia, to treat the Poles in the Russian fashion, is the news that
both of the Jewish worker leaders, Ehrlich and Alter, were executed. […] While
the occupied country is the place of martyrdom for the Polish nation, and
especially for the Jewish nation, the Russians, by means of several rifle bullets,
gave their answer to the trust these two men offered Russia when they were
seeking refuge there from their unrelenting enemy.’95
The fate of the two Polish socialists most probably ruined the image of the
Soviet Union as a country in the process of democratization, but in general it
had no impact on the evaluation of the Polish–Soviet relations. The majority
of Swedish opinion journalists proposed that the government in London
follow the policy of concessions and repeat the declarations of Stalin in which
he desired a strong and sovereign Poland. Similar was the behaviour of the
members of the diplomatic circles. Only Grafström did not hesitate to reas-
sure Żaba that the Swedish government supported Poland and that the press
campaign in opposition to Poland, against the background of its dispute with
the Soviet Union, harmed all small countries as well as the right of nations to
self-determination. Nevertheless, it was hard to expect that his personal inter-
vention in the editorial sections of Swedish periodicals would have the poten-
tial to change the commentaries. In general, Swedish opinion journalists
—
94
‘Kriget i all sin härlighet’, Arbetaren, 6 III 1943.
95
A. V[ou]gt, ‘Ehrlich och Alter’, Arbetet, 6 III 1943.
213
considered East-Central Europe to be an area of complex and insoluble inter-

national disputes and left the decision about its future to the powers. In
contrast, predictions for the unfolding of events in this area were at times
merciless for the Poles. One of the commentaries published in Nya Dagligt
Allehanda remarked,
The speculation that the United States of America would risk a row with its
two allies because of Poland – even though Polish demands were never more
justified – seem to be, at least from the Swedish point of view, short-sighted,
especially if the Poles’ hopes are founded on the meeting of Sikorski with the
bishop of New York [Francis] Spellman and the protests of American workers
against the execution of two Polish worker leaders by the Russians.96
Pro-German Stockholms-Tidningen claimed that the reason for Stalin’s

actions was Moscow’s desire for expansion in the west and the re-establish-
ment of borders from the tsarist period.97 In the face of these efforts, Poland
ended up in a very unfavourable position, as in the event of the German
victory it could not count on anything more than becoming a German vassal.
In the event of Soviet victory, the Polish government would be forced to
accept the loss of half of its territory and the transformation of Poland into a
Soviet republic. Both the opinion journalists for Stockholms-Tidningen and
Aftonbladet staunchly defended the position that the mistake of humiliating
Germany, as the Allies had following the First World War, should not be
repeated. And, Sweden should support only such peace plans that ensured
the existence of a militarily strong and anti-communist Germany.98 The
Polish government was criticised for its pre-war cooperation with Germany
on the partition of Czechoslovakia. Anti-Polish stereotypes were weaponised,
the undemocratic governance and internal disputes were criticised, and
eventually the issue of unwise behaviour in relation to the so-called Katyń
issue was brought up: ‘Polish blood is, as it would seem, slightly too hot. This
hot blood often makes Poles act before they think, which leads to unpleasant
complications.’99
—
96
‘Polen och Sovjet’, Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 1 IV 1943.
97
‘Randstaternas dystra framtidsutsikter’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 1 V 1943.
98
T. Nybom, Motstånd…, pp. 344–346.
99
Similar comment was published in the article ‘Självmords politik’, Göteborgs Posten, 28 IV
1943 and in the editorial ‘Konflikten om Polen’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 30 IV
1943 (‘The uncontrolled Polish nationalism was always more characteristic for its tem-
perament rather than for its political prudence’).
214
From Göteborgs Tidningen readers learned that following the First World
War, the Polish borders had been drawn to Poland’s benefit owing to the
support of France, and that Poland had no such ally at present.100
There were numerous unfavourable commentaries about Poland but there
also appeared alternative views. An opinion journalist for Kalmar Läns Tidning,
quoting Ny Tid, criticized harshly the opportunism of the Swedish press:
Unfortunately, some Swedes who once openly condemned the German
superpower policy are today more submissive towards the superpower policy
of a different tinge. They are ready to consider any kind of “new deal” and
they trade boldly in independence and territory of other countries. They
better stop being so submissive when Swedish independence is at stake.101
According to an opinion journalist from Kalmar, the Swedes should have

reacted to all signs of violence from all sides, as the future of all small coun-
tries whose fate was dependent on the will of the powers was at stake.
The most matter-of-fact articles were published by the intellectual peri-
odical Svensk Tidskrift. Its cooperating journalist Stanisław Adamek criti-
cised the politics of the British government, which complimented Moscow
and failed to examine objectively the territorial and minority-related prob-
lems of Central Europe. In May 1943, Adamek convinced Swedish readers
that only the communist government would accept the Polish–Soviet border
along the Curzon Line (in a shape established by Ribbentrop–Molotov pact
in 1939).102 It is worth remembering that the Curzon line was the demarcation
line proposed during the Polish–Soviet war in 1920 by the British Foreign
Secretary Georg Curzon to serve as a basis for the future border agreement.
Consequently, Adamek also defended the Polish government in London
against Soviet accusations of reactionism and representing exclusively the
interests of landowners.103
Generally, it was possible to discern a characteristic line of thinking in the
press articles discussing Polish–Soviet relations. Firstly, that the martyrdom
of the Polish nation aroused the pity and compassion of neutral observers
was beyond doubt. And, secondly, that the Polish government was criticised
—
100
‘Polska tvister’, Göteborgs Tidningen, 1 V 1943.
101
‘Småstaternas rätt’, Kalmar Läns Tidning, 28 IV 1943.
102
Curzon line is a term from the time of Polish–Soviet war of 1920. The British foreign
minister earl Curzon proposed Bug river as a border between Poland and Soviet Russia, but
the war was continued. The final shape of the border much east of “Curzon line” was con-
firmed by Polish-Soviet peace treaty in Riga in 1921.
103
Dagens frågor: ‘Det polska gränsproblemet’, Svensk Tidskrift, 24 V 1943; Dagens frågor:
S. Warta [S. Adamek], ‘Ryssland-Polen’, Svensk Tidskrift, 18 XII 1943.
215
for not being composed of wisest politicians. This was the tone of the article
in Mellersta Skåne:
Even if we feel compassion for the Polish nation, due to the fact that it never
encountered peace and always had to bear the pressure of its neighbours, who
desired conquests and were tearing the unfortunate country apart bit by bit to
eventually put an end to its independence, we nonetheless cannot free our-
selves from thinking that the Poles themselves are to a large extent to blame
for their own misery.104
Swedish discussion on Katyń

News regarding Polish–Soviet relations were submitted directly to the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs from its diplomatic mission in Moscow, which was
directed by Envoy Vilhelm Assarson. He noted in his memoirs meetings with
Polish ambassador Kot who was in the beginning of 1942 already fearful for
the future of Polish–Soviet relations and ‘felt deeply disgusted by all difficul-
ties he experienced from the Russian side’.106 Tadeusz Romer, Kot’s successor
in the post of the ambassador, tried to assure the Soviet authorities of the will
to clear up all misunderstandings in mutual relations. However, as Assarsson
noticed, the Soviet side was not open to such discussions.107
In March 1943 Assarsson’s subordinate, Sverker Åström, wrote in a report
from Kuybyshev that a certain consistency in Stalin’s policy towards Poland
could be detected. The Swedish diplomat repeated that after the Soviet Union
had annexed half of Poland in September 1939, its Bolshevisation took place
immediately. He also noted: ‘At the time, the Polish political, economic and
intellectual elite was exiled to the east and interned in labour camps and
prisons. A vast number of these people died while imprisoned in Russia or
was reported missing’108 Although, as he highlighted, following the conclu-
sion of Sikorski–Mayski Agreement, 30 July 1941, bilateral relations were
normalized. As early as June 1942, the Soviet authorities accused representa-
tives of the Polish authorities in the USSR of espionage and began to dismiss
members of the Polish administration and soldiers. According to Åström, it
seemed as if the Soviet government was planning to set up Polish divisions
—
104
I. S., ‘Polsk politik’, Mellersta Skåne, 29 IV 1943.
106
V. Assarsson, I skuggan av Stalin, Stockholm 1963, pp. 107.
107
Ibidem, p. 133.
108
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 485, report by S. Åström to Minister of Foreign
Affairs Ch. Günther, Kuybyshev, 10 III 1943.
216
under Russian command. The Swedish diplomat saw the genesis of the con-
flict in the dispute about the border, which in 1943 seemed exclusively
theoretical, but to which ‘a far-reaching political symptomatic significance
was attributed’, and the fact that the Western Allies postponed the opening
of a second front in Europe depreciated Poland’s position considerably, and
Stalin increasingly often implied that he would like to get his way. Which is
why, according to the Swede, the outset of 1943 brought a political attack in
the shape of the decision of the Soviet authorities to grant USSR citizenship
to all Poles residing in the territories which had been annexed after 17
September 1939. Åström explained that the talks of Polish ambassador
Tadeusz Romer with Stalin brought no positive results and that they were
conducted at a time when, in the Soviet press, there appeared commentaries
accusing the Polish government in exile of being unrepresentative of Polish
society. At the same time the Polish communists in Moscow started to pub-
lish the Wolna Polska (Free Poland) periodical. In this situation Åström
described Polish–Soviet relations as tense, and chances of reaching com-
promise as slim.109 According to the Swedish diplomat, there were clear signs
of a nearing turning point in the Polish–Soviet relations. The German revela-
tion of mass graves discovered near Smolensk near Katyń proved to be this
turning point.
Sweden was not directly involved in the Katyń issue. The diplomats
treated it with considerable suspicion.110 When the Germans began to set up
an international commission of experts to examine the Katyń graves, they
proposed a Swedish doctor of medicine, Erik Karlmark, join it. However,
following a consultation with Prime Minister Hansson, Karlmark communi-
cated to the Germans that he was unable to make such decision without being
authorized by the Swedish government. This issue was discussed on 27 April
by Söderblom and Dankwort from the German Legation. The Swede ex-
—
109
Ibidem.
110
In 2003, upon the request of the Polish Congress in Sweden, the copies of documents
connected with the Katyń issue – so far held in Swedish archives Riksarkivet and Krigsarkivet
– were moved by the Swedish government to the Archives of Polish Emigration (Polska Emi-
gratinsarkivet i Sverige). This collection was then passed on to the Institute of National
Remembrance in Warsaw in the presence of Ambassador of Sweden Mats Staffansson.
Contrary to press reports these were not specially declassified documents but diplomatic
reports or private writings which had been available to researchers for many years.
217
plained that the application was sent to Geneva and that Sweden’s engage-
ment on this matter would be limited to the activities of the International Red
Cross.111 Thus, he considered this matter to be closed.
On the following day Swedish Envoy to London Björn Prytz forwarded a
message he obtained from a credible source to UD. The message disclosed
that the British and the Americans who mediated in the Polish–Soviet dispute
were trying to persuade Stalin to satisfy himself with the Polish government’s
withdrawal of the motion for the examination of the Katyń issue by the
International Red Cross. They encouraged Moscow to retract its request to
reshuffle the Polish cabinet, as this would alarm the Soviet Union’s neigh-
bours and support German war propaganda, which called for a fight with the
Red Army to the last soldier.112
At the outset of May, Envoy Assarsson sent his report to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, which was a continuation of previous correspondence by
Åström, discussing the circumstances of the break-up of the Polish–Soviet
relations by the Soviets on 25 April 1943.113 According to Assarsson, the pro-
gress of these relations needed to arouse interest for two reasons. Firstly, it
related to the attitude of the Soviet authorities towards the Polish government
and towards the Poles residing in the territory of the USSR. Secondly, a
question was posed whether this break-up could be considered symptomatic
for Soviet authorities and their aspirations towards the neighbouring smaller
countries in the post-war period. According to the Swede, the Poles seemed
shocked at the turn of events and expected relations would be established
quickly. Assarsson was pessimistic:
Although it is indeed noticeable that at this point the Russians are not yet
closing the door on a possible reconciliation, it nevertheless seems obvious that
in order to make it possible for Stalin to re-establish relations with the Polish
government in London and acknowledge its authority over the Poles residing
in Russia, it [this government] needs to be subjected to thorough reconstruc-
tion, and what also needs to undergo drastic changes is Polish policy, especially
as far as the issue of the border is concerned.
From a wider perspective, the Swedish diplomat pointed out that the decision
to break off relations with the Poles had been made despite doubts which
—
111
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 485, letter by head of the Political department
of UD S. Söderblom to Swedish Envoy to Berlin A. Richert, Stockholm, 28 IV 1943.
112
Ibidem, telegram from Swedish Envoy to London B. Prytz to UD, London, 28 IV 1943.
113
Ibidem, report by Swedish Envoy to Moscow V. Assarsson to Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ch. Günther, Kuybyshew, 2 V 1943.
218
appeared because of the Allies. This was most probably a further confirma-
tion of the intentions, often declared by the Soviets, using all possible
measures to secure a solid border to the west following the war, meaning a
return the boundary of 1940 as a minimum. According to Assarsson, Stalin’s
behaviour was to be interpreted as a clear signal that after the war the Soviet
Union would not tolerate hostile governments in its neighbouring countries.
The Swede predicted that:
[Stalin’s] intention is to become surrounded by formally independent coun-
tries, which would cooperate with the Soviet Union and never oppose such
policy. Whether this purpose may require complete incorporation and,
wouldn’t it in fact turn out to be a temporary stage leading to this incorpora-
tion, it is currently too early to judge.114
The Swedish diplomacy viewed and examined the Katyń issue and its diplo-
matic repercussions in a broader European context, and not only in the con-
text of Polish–Soviet relations. The Swedes were most interested in the con-
sequences of the discord between the Polish government and Russia.
Assarsson’s commentary was certainly read in Stockholm not only as a pro-
phecy for Poland, the Baltic States and the Balkans, but also for Finland,
which continued to participate in the war on the side of Germany. From
Assarsson’s correspondence, it follows that the Swedes shared the opinion of
the Allies about the Polish government policy, which according to them was
‘unwise and unrealistic both towards the border issue as well as towards the
mass murder issue [Katyń]’, as it was in line with the Goebbels’ propaganda.
Assarsson conveyed from the diplomatic circles of Moscow the disbelief that
Stalin would form a puppet government in Poland. At the same time nobody
imagined that the Soviet dictator would allow Sikorski to return to Warsaw
as head of the government either.115 Turbulence around Katyń was meticu-
lously analysed in Stockholm, which was reflected in the newspapers.116
First announcements, followed by articles, broke on 16 and 17 April, al-
luding to the killing of 10 thousand Polish officers. The news came not only
from the German information services; the Swedish dailies were also awaiting
the reports from their correspondents in London. From the note by Daniel
—
114
Ibidem.
115
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 485, telegram of Swedish Envoy to Moscow V.
Assarsson to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, 3 V 1943.
116
See the review of press announcements on the subject of the Katyń Massacre: A. N. Uggla,
‘Den svenska bilden av Katyńmorden. Från uppdagande till historisk tillrättaläggelse’, Multi-
ethnica 2003, iss. 29, pp. 18–23; idem, ‘Szwedzkie spojrzenie na zbrodnię w Katyniu’, Relacje
2004, iss. 5, p. 22.
219
Viklund for Dagens Nyheter, based on an announcement by the Polish

government, it followed that despite the Poles had distancing themselves
from the German propaganda, they actually confirmed the accusations ad-
dressed to the Soviet authorities by revealing information about Polish cap-
tives reported missing in 1940.117
Almost all the dailies published the news about the simultaneous submis-
sion to Geneva of a German and Polish request to examine the issue of the
mass graves in Katyń,118 but only pro-Nazi and communist commentators
considered this news to be a propagandist success.119 Svenska Dagbladet pub-
lished reports by the Finnish author Örnulf Tigerstedt.120 He stated empha-
tically: ‘one thing cannot be denied: that the Bolsheviks executed prisoners of
war.’ He added, ‘in this case we may not speak of a crime of passion, as it was
neither committed because of a momentary surge of vengeance nor by an
undisciplined pack.’ Christer Jäderlund wrote ironically in Stockholms-Tid-
ningen, ‘the Polish appeal to the International Red Cross is welcomed with
contentment by Berlin.’121 Even more blunt was the communist Ny Dag,
where the slogans of the Soviet propaganda were repeated in the article
‘Organized cooperation between Sikorski and Hitler exposed’, which affirm-
ed ‘The statement of the London government proves that pro-Hitlerian ele-
ments have a decisive impact on the Polish government and they are employ-
ing new measures in order to worsen the relations between the Soviet Union
and Poland.’122
An anti-German position was taken by the magazine Nu, where Westin
Silverstolpe published a series of articles about Katyń, starting from issue 26
on 30 April. He argued that what raised doubts was the 10 thousand victims
—
117
D. Viklund, ‘Polens regering vill ha utredning om massgraven’, Dagens Nyheter, 17 IV
1943; as well as: Griggs, ‘Röda korset bör undersöka vid Smolensk. Tyska uppgifter om mass-
gravar oroapolackerna’, Svenska Dagbladet, 17 IV 1943; ‘Polen beggar Röda korsunder-
sökning av påstådda ryssmord på krigsfångar’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 17 IV 1943.
118
‘Polsk och tysk hänvändelse till Röda korset’, Svenska Dagbladet, 18 IV 1943; ‘Röda korset
dryftar Katyń’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 20 IV 1943; ‘Internationella Röda korset behandlar
den polska anmälan’, Social-Demokraten, 20 IV 1943.
119
Head of the department of propaganda of the Third Reich Joseph Goebbels was dis-
appointed with the reactions of the Swedish press. In his private writings he noted down on
18 April 1943 that ‘The Swedish dailies were defending themselves from publishing the
reports of their Berlin correspondents’, which was, according to him, a proof for the fact that
it was hard to call Sweden a neutral country. See J. Goebbels, Tagebücher 1924–1945, ed. R.
G. von Reuth, vol. 5: 1943–1945, München-Zürich 2000, p. 1924.
120
Ö. ‘Tigerstedt, I dödsskogen vid Kotyn [sic!]’, Svenska Dagbladet, 28 IV 1943.
121
Ch. ‘Jäderlund, Berlin välkomnar Polens appel till Int[ernationella] Röda Korset’,
Stockholms-Tidningen, 18 IV 1943.
122
‘Organiserat samarbete mellan Sikorski och Hitler avslöjas’, Ny Dag, 20 IV 1943.
220
(in contrast to the Polish government announcing the search for 8 300 of-
ficers) and the good condition of the uniforms found in the graves. Apart
from this, the opinion journalist noted that the Germans in their propa-
gandist campaign emphasized anti-Semitic threads, spreading news that four
executioners of the Poles had been of Jewish origin, ‘It may be unquestionably
concluded that these four people are an invention. It is known that the
German propaganda, whenever it sees any possibility to sanction its anti-
Jewish stunts, completely loses its scruples.123
In another article, Silverstolpe derided the individuals who examined the
bodies of those murdered, questioning their qualifications and the methods
used for establishing the date of the massacre. He even suggested that
Germany started to withdraw its accusations as it was impossible to prove
that the crime was not its own. He remarked ironically:
One indeed does not know what one should think about the Katyń issue.
Following a careful analysis, all that has been so far presented as the so-called
irrefutable evidence turned out to be totally insufficient. However, no new
evidence has been submitted so far in this case. The German press has been
silent about Katyń from the second week of May.124
Several weeks later, another article was published in response to the protest
by Finnish historian Eirik Hornborg against two earlier texts supporting the
Soviet position. Silverstolpe consistently defended his views. He gave exam-
ples of other fraud orchestrated by German propaganda and manipulation
scenarios used by the Nazis.125
A different tone was adopted by the Nazi Dagsposten, referring to the testi-
mony of the Finns who had visited Katyń. An interview was conducted with
Professor Herman Gummerus, a representative of Finnish public opinion,
which was deeply moved by the news from Katyń, highlighted that he could
not understand the Swedish mentality of concealing information about what
had happened. He could not understand those Swedes who tried to place
blinkers over the eyes of the public. This, however, made it possible to present
the Bolsheviks in a new light. Meanwhile, according to Gummerus, a view
that Bolshevism had evolved somewhat, was an example of wishful thinking,
—
123
G. W[estin] S[ilverstolpe], ‘Massgravarna vid Katyń. Lag där 12000 polska officerare?’,
Nu, 30 IV 1943.
124
G. W[estin] S[ilverstolpe], ‘Mera om massgravarna vid Katyń. Vad de medicinska expert-
erna sade’, Nu, 2 VII 1943.
125
G. Westin Silverstolpe, ‘Gravarna vid Katyń än en gång. Inre och yttre sanningskriterier’, Nu,
30 VII 1943.
221
contrary to all experiences in Europe: ‘The mass murder in Smolensk is not

any kind of propaganda, this is a true and tragic reality.’126
However, Aftonbladet explained, ‘From the Soviet-Russian point of view,
and marked with, which is alien to us, an Asian world view, the execution of
the Polish officers has most probably turned out to be a necessary security
measure. […] It would be easy to find the reasons for this act, but this does
not lessen its cruelty.’127
Pro-Ally Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning initially demanded
cautiously in the title of an article published on 19 April that Russia needed
to explain what had happened to the prisoners of war. Later in the text,
another part of the Polish announcement from London was mentioned for
balance: ‘accusations towards others are not a defence of Germany.’128
Nevertheless, only one day later the Polish government was openly attacked
in the editorial. It was accused of stupidity and boorishness towards the
Soviet Union, fighting for sovereignty of not only Poland but also other
countries conquered by Hitler:
It is understandable that the Germans are testing various methods. Their peace
surveys have brought no positive results. A very clumsy attempt to break up the
allied camp curiously has generated a response from the Poles. They have risen
to the bait in the form of the mass grave of 10 thousand people resembling
Polish officers. The Poles are generally charming individualists. They are hot
blooded and bold. […] A squabble with the Russians was the most ill-fated thing
they could engage in. The sovereignty of Poland is totally dependent on the
victory of the Russian army. Europe, in its entirety, becomes indebted to Russia
for being rescued from the bondage which was placed upon it by Hitlerism.
Poland would have no prospect of regaining independence if the Russians did
not crush the backbone of the German military power. Russia did not do this
out of non-reciprocated love for Europe. The Russians themselves do not say
this, they are extreme realists, and neither do the others. Nonetheless, the facts
remain unchanged. Now the conflict between the Poles and the Russians is
devoid of the dimension that the German propaganda intends it to have. In
reality it does not influence the course of events. […] The Swedish government
continues to make it easier for the Germans to fight against the nations who are
—
126
‘De polska massgravarna i Smolensk ha i Finlandgjort oerhört intryck’, Dagsposten, 19 IV
1943.
127
‘Gravarna vid Smolensk’, Aftonbladet, 19 IV 1943.
128
‘Ryssland måste förklara var dess krigsfångar blivit av’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-
Tidning, 19 IV 1943.
222
battling for democracy, freedom of nations and individuals, as well as for the
rules of law.’129
Attaché Brzeskwiński ascertained that the meaning of these publications was

unflattering for Poland:
What we need to state is that the Swedish press’ position towards us in the
conflict with the USSR was in most part negative. The tactics of the Polish
Government was criticised, and the fact of its turning to Geneva was evaluated
as an inappropriate action. The rumours on the possibility of the Polish
government’s resignation were endorsed and the Polish press in England was
accused of contributing to the unleashing of the conflict and therefore being
responsible for it. The Swedish correspondents from Berlin emphasized that
the official German authorities were satisfied with the conflict.130
The Swedes did not evaluate the entire issue against the backdrop of the con-
flict, but in terms of the functioning of an anti-Fascist coalition focused on
defeating Hitler. Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, famous for its pro-
Ally orientation and acting as a defender of democracy in Europe, criticised
the Poles. This diminished the meaning of the earlier published article by de
Geer, who demanded that the problem be solved quickly and that the second
front be established in Europe. According to him, this would help to both
temper the arrogant tone of the Soviets and successfully regulate the issue of
the borders.
According to Norbert Żaba, towards the end of April 1943 ‘there took
place a major turn in the way the Polish–Soviet issue was commented on’ to
the benefit of Poland. According to the Polish attaché, this change occurred
under the influence of brutal and deceitful Soviet accusations, which ‘have
made an unpleasant impact here and partially opened even the eyes of the
circles, which due to their anti-German orientation, surrendered too easily to
wishful thinking as far as the policy of the Soviet Union is concerned.’131
Voices supporting the Polish government could be heard. Favourable
articles were published by Arbetaren. On 24 and 27 April, Stalin was accused
of imperialist policy, terror and deportations of civilians. In the 28 April
issue, a Soviet announcement was quoted that pointed out the relations with
—
129
‘I dag’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 20 IV 1943.
130
PISM, A XII, 3/41, monthly report for April 1943 by Polish Military Attaché to Stockholm
Major F. Brzeskwiński to head of the Intelligence Department of the Staff of Commander-
in-Chief, Stockholm, 6 V 1943.
131
and Documentation, Stockholm, 13 V 1943.
223
Poland could have been re-established if ‘the semi-Fascist clique of the Polish
government resigned and was replaced by a new, more democratic govern-
ment.’ The commentary of the editors was concise: ‘This small example
proves to us what kind of independence is available for small and middle-
sized nations who are living under the shadow of great states.’132 In another
article, the Polish government was praised for its extensive achievements in
encouraging society to combat the Germans and creating a gallant regular
army in Great Britain.133
Having consulted Żaba, Otto Järte published an article in Svenska Dag-
bladet on 1 May, accusing Stalin’s policy of striving to subdue Poland. He was
not surprised with the break-up of the Polish–Soviet relations, as he thought
that this was the result of developments in relations between the two coun-
tries from September 1939 and of the extensive conflict, which together with
the Katyń issue, had reached its climax.134 It would seem that thanks to Żaba
argument, Järte became an advocate for the Polish matter. He consequently
opposed both Stalin’s imperialist plans and the concessions made by the
Western Allies in this area.135
Even Torgny Segerstedt attacked the Soviet diplomacy in one of his cyc-
lical commentaries on current topics from 27 April. He compared the state-
ments of Molotov to the tactics used by Ribbentrop: ‘One does not answer an
accusation, only puts forward a counter accusation.’136 He maintained that
Stalin broke up relations with the Polish government based on some minor
pretext to have the liberty to conduct activity in the territories that were part
of the Polish Republic in the moment of the war’s outbreak. After all, one
should note that in the context of the pro-Soviet commentaries, which were
dominant in this daily, this statement was exceptional. That very same
newspaper, on 10 July 1943, published an article by Jacob de Geer.137 In this
case Norbert Żaba pointed out that the text was ‘characteristic of the pro-
Polish Swedish circles’ views.’138 This circle was small though, and even de
Geer had reservations about the Polish policy towards the Soviet Union, both
—
132
‘Den diplomatiska fronten’, Arbetaren, 28 IV 1943.
133
‘Vad döljer sig bakom förlåten?’, Arbetaren, 28 IV 1943.
134
‘Kabal eller kris?’, Svenska Dagbladet, 1 V 1943.
135
T. Höjer, Svenska…, p. 78. Regular meetings of Järte and Żaba are mentioned by the
biographer of the Swedish journalist: I. Andersson, Otto Järte – en man för sig, Stockholm
1965, s. 276.
136
‘Situationen’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 27 IV 1943.
137
J. de Geer, ‘Polen och Ryssland’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 10 VI 1943.
138
and Documentation, Stockholm, 18 VI 1943.
224
before the war and after July 1941. What he considered a mistake was moving
the Anders Army, formed following the Sikorski–Mayski Agreement, from
the Soviet Union to Iran and then to the Middle East in 1942. The conduct
regarding the Katyń issue he described as ‘great blunder’. Such an attitude
within the Polish diplomatic circles was interpreted as the result of the
influence of British propaganda. The publicists at Göteborgs Handels- och Sjö-
farts-Tidning perceived the Soviet Union as a defender of liberal-democratic
ideas. They optimistically predicted that Soviet communism, thanks to co-
operation with the Anglo-Saxon countries, would start to evolve in the direc-
tion of democracy.139 In turn, Johannes Wickman from Dagens Nyheter on 3
May called for the focusing of efforts on defeating Germany rather than
sparking conflicts between the Allies. He accused the Polish government of
conducting improper policy, as a result of which German propaganda could
triumph. The Swedish opinion journalists suggested that these Poles wanted
to establish the course of the border before the war was over, oblivious to
Stalin’s attempt to approve its change as quickly as possible. Żaba treated this
type of commentary as offensive, since the dailies announcing such views
often hired members of the Swedish–Polish Association.140 In light of these
press releases, Żaba’s opinion that a breakthrough had taken place in com-
menting on the Katyń issue and Polish–Soviet relations by the Swedish
opinion-forming circles should be considered an exaggeration.
It was only in the report about the opinion of the provincial press on
Poland-related topics, in May 1943, that Żaba observed,
contrary to what was happening in February and March, the provincial press
showed consideration for the essence of the conflict and supported, in most
cases, the Polish matter. Only several dailies continued to accuse Poland of
having a lack of diplomatic far-sightedness, maintaining that it was in the
interest of Poland and peace to reach a compromise agreement with victori-
ous Russia, more so that the Polish eastern territories were not ethnogra-
phically part of Poland.
Żaba believed that the attitude of the press changed to the benefit of Poland.
It was mostly understood that ‘this was not only about certain revisions to
the Polish–Soviet border, but the existence of nations neighbouring with the
Soviets, and therefore a pan-European problem, which poses a danger to
—
139
T. Nybom, Motstånd…, p. 340.
140
225
Sweden in the future.’141 An anonymous opinion journalist for Östgöta Cor-

respondenten explained that the issue was not about the graves in Katyń, but
the fate of Poland, especially its independence and borders, and that the
solution to this issue depended on the position of the Soviet Union in the
group of Great Powers.142 The majority of commentators agreed that the
Allies that were bothered by conflicts inside the anti-Fascist coalition stood
in opposition to the Poles. The Polish government insisted on regulating the
issue of the border during the war, whereas the Polish–Soviet border from
prior to 1 September was ethically questionable.143 As highlighted, Russia’s
help was more important for England than that of Poland.144 A commentator
for Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten admitted, ‘from a purely human point
of view one sympathizes with the Poles. This is the worst affected nation in
this war. Both the Russians and the Germans inflicted great damage upon the
country. General Government is a colony in the middle of Europe.’ He also
added that, ‘one may find a grain of truth in the Katyń issue’ and that the
demand to re-establish the border from 1939 was ‘in many respects sensible
and understandable.’ However, he eventually acknowledged, ‘It is highly
improbable that the Poles will benefit from their hasty and poorly conducted
action,’ and, ‘they are completely dependent on England and its mighty
friend – America.’145
Some commentators bore no illusions as to Stalin’s intentions or the mo-
tifs behind his actions. Arbetaren accused the British of disloyalty towards its
Polish Ally, laying blame on the Germans without examining the issue and
accusing the Poles of disrupting the relations between the Allies:
Here we have the modern art of diplomacy! […] The Polish government asked
for an examination of the issue. […] In this situation the Poles faced charges
from England and America. Naturally there are no similar charges directed at
Russia, as Russia is strong, and at the moment its force is brutal and abides by
no laws. It was Poland who insulted Russia by submitting a request for an im-
partial investigation regarding the issue of mass graves. One should not do so,
not when one is so small and dependent on the powers. The powers of England
and America need the power of Russia.’146
—
141
142
‘Misstänksamma vapenbröder’, Östgöta Correspondenten, 28 IV 1943.
143
‘Ryssland och Polen’, Upsala Nya Tidning, 28 IV 1943.
144
R. Essén, ‘Det polska svaret‘, Dagsposten, 29 IV 1943.
145
‘Konflikten om Polen’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 30 IV 1943.
146
‘Statsmannakonst’, Arbetaren, 7 V 1943.
226
On 10 may, in the article ‘The Saviour of the Polish Nation’, Arbetaren

severely criticised the policy of the Soviet Union towards Poland. The article
closed with, ‘robbing the Poles of their Polish nationality and violently im-
posing on them the Soviet nationality is disgusting, anti-democratic and con-
trary to the principles propagated by the Allies as their war aims. What is
more, it was noted, ‘Soviet brutality is by no means different than German
brutality.’147
During this time, attaché Brzeskwiński heard a pessimistic prognosis for
the future in a conversation with General Henry Kellgren, head of the cabinet
of the Minister of Defence. The general stated:
Russia would like to be amply rewarded for its contributions to the war on the
side of the Allies. It is probably counting on obtaining Finland and the Baltic
States, over whose territories none of the Allies would most probably crush
their swords during the upcoming peace conference. Russia, in turn, will
demand for itself, and partially it already demands, the eastern provinces of
Poland, the Balkans and India.148
General Henry Kellgren also noticed that compensation in the shape of East
and West Prussia would by no means strengthen Poland, for it meant facing
the minority issue once again, this time a German one and much more dif-
ficult than the pre-war Ukrainian issue. The Polish criticism of the Swedish
press, which favoured the Soviet side as regards the Katyń-related conflict,
sparked an interesting reaction from Kellgren. Brzeskwiński reported,
the General’s answer to this was that the Poles in the current worldwide
turmoil may end up either on the side of the Allies or on the side of the Axis
Powers, they should never end up alone in the middle, which may actually
happen due to the current conflict. The Swedes want to see Poland take the
side of the Allies. Hence the critical but kind stand of the Swedish press, which
had to be taken, in the Polish–Soviet conflict.
The Swedes therefore instructed that, for their own good, the Poles should
avoid ending up on the losing side. Kellgren’s closing comments were that
after the announcement about the breaking up of Polish–Soviet relations,
—
147
‘Det polska folkets räddare!’, Arbetaren, 10 V 1943.
148
PISM, A XII, 3/41, monthly report for April 1943 by Polish Military Attaché to Stockholm
Major F. Brzeskwiński to head of the Intelligence Department of the Commander-in-Chief,
Stockholm, 6 V 1943.
227
suggestions emerged in the circle of military attachés of the Axis Powers that
they would soon be joined by the attaché of Poland.149
In this vein, Arvid Richert reported from Berlin that the attitude of Great
Britain and the USA was fuel for the German propaganda, as the Allies’
governments left Poland to its own fate and, in the context of the Katyń
tragedy, accepted the course of the future Polish–Soviet border established
following the September Campaign of 1939.150 The information conveyed by
the German propaganda was confirmed by the Swedish Envoy to London –
Prytz. To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs he wrote, ‘the Polish government
[is] very worried lately’, as ‘people are saying that Eden and Roosevelt have
reached an agreement in Washington and are intending to offer Stalin the
Curzon Line as the future Polish–Russian border.’151 Prytz pointed out that
the British press almost entirely omitted publishing information about Polish
prisoners held in the Soviet Union, and that there was even less news about
the murdered officers. He highlighted that, according to a person in Prime
Minister Sikorski’s closest circle, the Poles had irrefutable proof that the
massacre had taken place and that they rejected the position of the Allies,
who were trying to present the issue as if it were a crime committed by the
Germans. At the same time the Swedish envoy noted that Sikorski could not
officially engage in any controversy with his allies.
How can one evaluate the Swedish reaction to the Katyń issue? It seems that
the representative of South Africa in Stockholm, Stephanus F. N. Gie (the first
South African diplomat and a historian) came close to the truth. According to
Gie, which was recorded by the Foreign Office, Swedish comments about the
Polish–Soviet conflict were on the whole unfavourable towards Poland. The
publication of the German brochure Nackskottet. Dödskogen vid Katyń (A Shot
in the Neck. The Forest of Death in Katyń), presenting the accounts of people
who had been invited to see the site of the massacre, did not generate the
desired result. Gie’s Swedish interviewees maintained that the British should
have imposed a greater control over the official statements of the Polish
government, since the Poles should not have been raising issues which could
—
149
Kellgren described Brzeskwiński with sympathy in his memoirs as ‘very cheerful com-
panion’, always with a smile. He gave a similar, positive opinion about Brzeskwiński’s pre-
decessor (until the outbreak of the war) colonel Andrzej Marecki). See H. Kellgren, Sex
krigsår i Skölds skugga, Stockholm 1951, pp. 172–175.
150
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 485, letter by Swedish Envoy to Berlin A.
Richert to head of the Political department of UD S. Söderblom, Berlin, 28 IV 1943.
151
Ibidem, letter by Swedish Envoy to London B. Prytz to Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch.
Günther, London, 22 IV 1943.
228
harm the anti-fascist coalition and which, as they believed, were currently im-
possible to explain anyway. Interestingly, none of them doubted that the Soviet
NKVD had committed the crime, but at the same time everyone was aware of
the Soviet Union’s sacrifice in the fight with Germany. In general, a view
prevailed that the Poles should arrange its relations with the Soviet Union even
through force. The Katyń issue was treated by Swedish public opinion as an
unpleasant discord in the relations among the allies. This was considered dan-
gerous, not particularly due to the rift in the common front against Germany,
but that it was an ominous sign for the worsening of relations between the
victorious powers following the conclusion of the war.152
A representative opinion for Sweden’s position on the Polish–Soviet
conflict came from Sven Grafström, who in a conversation with Norbert Żaba
explained, ‘Given the geographical and political situation of Poland, it is
impossible to conduct simultaneous anti-Soviet and anti-German policy in
the face of which it would be more reasonable not to raise the border issue at
the present moment and not to react to the Soviet action.’ According to Żaba,
such a view was relatively widespread within Swedish pro-Ally political
circles. Their only option for Poland was to choose the lesser evil, namely to
cooperate with the Soviet Union against Germany.
The Swedish diplomats avoided revealing openly their position to the Poles,
though their contacts were again more intense than during the German hege-
mony in Europe. Maintaining these relations did not harm the external image
of Sweden.153 It is known that Prytz, Swedish Envoy to London, attended a
reception at the Polish Embassy in London, although no surviving Polish
documentation proves that these meetings were anything more than courtesy
visits.154 The Polish matters were discussed at times during meetings between
the Swedes and representatives of other countries. In a conversation with
British Envoy Mallet, in May 1943, Boheman stated that in his view the Poles
were extremely unreasonable. He knew the territories of the Polish–Russian
borderland from personal experience and claimed that the issue of the border
between these two countries was of no importance for the rest of Europe.
Mallet presented Boheman’s views in the following way:
—
152
NA, FO, 371/37077, telegram by the representative of South Africa in Stockholm, S. Gie,
to the South Africa House in London, 30 IV 1943.
153
Grafström even wondered in May 1943 whether Potworowski would be expelled from
Stockholm if the arrest of ‘the Warsaw Swedes’ took place at the time. See: S. Grafström,
Anteckningar 1938–1944, p. 490.
154
PISM, A 12, 651/10, guestbook used during receptions at Polish embassy in London.
229
He claimed that except for a few great landowners whose estates are in the
disputed province, most peasants’ lives under Soviet occupation would be at
least as good as under Polish rule. He judged that the situation in the villages
located in the Polish part of these territories seemed even worse than in its
Russian section. Besides, these people may not be ethnically Polish. Without
a doubt [however] the way the Russians addressed this issue in the context of
the current conflict is unjust.155
Boheman highlighted that the majority of Swedes thought the same as he did,
but naturally except for ‘the ordinary anti-Russian maniacs.’ The Swedes
pitied ‘the poor, stupid Poles’, but even though they were convinced that the
murder of the Polish officers was committed by the Soviets, they believed that
there was no justification for the conduct of the Germans, who exploited
Katyń as if they had never committed similar acts in Poland. That is why the
break-up in relations with the Poles by the Soviets was accepted with ap-
parent calm in Stockholm. According to Boheman, the Swedish press and
public opinion followed the entire Polish–Soviet dispute with objectivity.156 It
is certain that the Katyń issue caused a breakthrough in the Swedes’ approach
to the examination of various scenarios of political developments in Central
Europe. The statement by a Soviet Foreign Minister’s first deputy Oleksandr
Korniyczuk was a clear guideline for analytical papers devoted to this area.
He convinced Envoy Assarsson that Sikorski would never return to Warsaw,
even though a ‘certain liberal element in the Polish government in London’
had a chance to do so.157
—
155
NA, FO, 371/37078, letter by British Envoy to Stockholm V. Mallet to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs A. Eden, 25 V 1943, pp. 13–14. The Swedes probably associated the break-
up of the Polish-Soviet relations exclusively with the issue of the eastern border of Poland.
See: S. Grafström, Anteckningar 1938–1944, p. 486.
156
NA, FO, 371/37078, letter by British Envoy to Stockholm V. Mallet to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs A. Eden, 25 V 1943, pp. 13–14.
157
RA, UD, 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 519, letter by Swedish Envoy to Moscow V.
Assarsson to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kuybyshew, 6 VI 1943 r. What may be con-
sidered the crowning achievement of the Soviet military propaganda in Sweden regarding
the issue of the mass murder of Polish officers, is the screening of the film entitled Katyń,
which took place on 15 August 1944 in the Soviet Legation. The film presented the testi-
monies of the eye witnesses of the crime, who were to be forced by the Germans in 1943 with
beatings and tortures to testify to the disadvantage of the Soviet authorities. See PISM, A XII,
3/41, Note of Colonel S. Gano ‘Propaganda sowiecka’ (Soviet propaganda), 14 IX 1944.
230
6. SWEDEN’S RETURN TO STRICT NEUTRALITY
6. Sweden’s Return to Strict Neutrality and the

Normalisation of Relations with the Polish Government
The visit by the Minister of Industry,

Trade and Shipping Jan Kwapiński to Stockholm
The most important political event for the Polish–Swedish bilateral relations
of 1943 was the visit by Jan Kwapiński, Minister of Industry, Trade and Ship-
ping to Stockholm. Maurycy Karniol prepared the ground for this visit in
Sweden. He proposed to Torsten Nilsson, the leading activist of the SAP, that
the Polish minister become one of the international guests of the celebrations
of 1st May, organized by the Swedish social democrats Nilsson, who in mid-
April 1943 paid a visit to London, invited Kwapiński officially.1
During his stay in Sweden, Kwapiński met the most important represen-
tatives of the Swedish Social Democratic Party: August Lindberg, Torsten
Nilsson, Rickard Lindström, Prime Minister Hansson and Minister of Social
Affairs Gustav Möller. On 29 April, Kwapiński participated in a conference
with representatives of socialist parties from fourteen different countries. He
also took part in a session of the Polish–Swedish Chamber of Commerce (4
May) as well as a reception held by the Stockholm authorities (30 April).
When Kwapiński’s visit was agreed, Attaché Żaba would give this event a
much broader appeal. Following the example of a Belgian politician, who visit-
ed Stockholm and acquainted the public with the politics of his government in
exile, he convinced London that Kwapiński’s visit, as far as propaganda was
concerned, should be expanded beyond the party-related sphere. Żaba wrote
to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, ‘He would then have an opportunity to
redress the view that our Government consists purely of reactionists, as well as
explain the eastern issue during private conversations.’2
The programme for the visit was productive and Żaba’s expectations were
fulfilled to a large extent. Although, on issuing an entry permit, the Swedes
made it clear that this would be an unofficial visit. The planned speeches were
—
1
AAN, HI/I/305, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of
2
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, copy of letter by N. Żaba to M. Thugutt (Ministry of
Internal Affairs), Stockholm, 15 IV 1943.
231
to be treated as private.3 Kwapiński spoke not only as an activist of the PPS,

but also as a representative of the Polish government in exile. He stressed this
both in informal conversations as well as during public meetings. Even if the
intentions of organizers, or Kwapiński himself, were different, the Katyń
issue and the break-up of the Polish–Soviet relations created a unique atmos-
phere in Kwapiński’s meetings.
The climax of the public activity of the Polish minister in Sweden, was his
participation in an international convention on Labour Day, held 1 May in
Medborgarhuset (The Civic Building) in Stockholm. Its rich musical and
literary programme did not overshadow the political significance of the
celebrations or, most importantly, the speeches of the representatives of
various countries. This part of the meeting was opened by Walter Åman, the
leading activist of SAP, trade union secretary and famous for countering
communist tendencies in the party. He highlighted that the crucial moment
of the war had passed and that peace and the restoration of law were dawning.
Among the heroic victims of the battle with dark forces, he named Alter,
Ehrlich and Niedziałkowski. Willy Brandt, who was secretary of the Inter-
national Group of Democratic Socialists of Stockholm (the so-called Little
International), focused on presenting the plan for developing, following the
war’s conclusion, a new deal founded on democracy. He opened his speech
with the watchwords of the Atlantic Charter and talked about the need for
integration of European countries and cooperation dependent on a resigna-
tion from war reparations and the division of vanquishers, neutrals and the
vanquished. After Brandt spoke Martin Tranmæl from Norway, who sup-
ported of the idea of integration. In turn, Fritz Tarnow suggested that Ger-
many be treated carefully and that all actions be guided by reason and not
blind hatred to avoid killing off German democracy. The expectations of the
German social democrats were accentuated further by Edgar Hahnewald,
who claimed that Germans were the victims of terror and violence too. Jiří
Jakerle from Czechoslovakia was among the speakers who most clearly
marked their presence. He expressed his admiration for the heroic fight of
the Russian nation and the Red Army as well as for the armies of other
countries and soldiers of the underground resistance movement, including
the Germans. Jakerle’s words were in support of unity leading to victory,
declaring, ‘We welcome everything that strengthens this unity, we reject
everything that hinders it.’ In a tone very similar to that of Jakerle was the
—
3
232
speech of the Hungarian, Wilhelm Böhm, who also expressed his admiration
for the brave fight of the Russian nation and proclaimed that ‘the workers’
movement is determined to oppose with all its might all that could be harmful
to the security of the Soviet Union.’
The message of the speech delivered by Jan Kwapiński was different by
comparison. He warned the participants against the threat of communism.
He recounted the experiences of the interwar period, when the ranks of
several workers’ parties in Europe and France ‘were burst from the inside’ by
the Comintern. That is why, according to Kwapiński, the workers’ class ‘was
unable to defend itself with due force against the developing Fascist move-
ment in Europe, which was born and grew up on the havoc wreaked by the
communist party.’ His pointing to the threat from the Soviet Union, whose
army was about to reach the centre of Europe, was isolated and did not
harmonize with the choir of activists, who expressed their admiration for the
military effort of the USSR. Kwapiński simultaneously paid tribute to the
hosts of the meeting and reminded prematurely: ‘We were striving to create
good living conditions for the working class, according to your example. We
visited you often […], to jointly confer on the building of a better future and
working for it.’ Most of all, however, the Polish socialist emphasized the ques-
tion of current assistance, which had been provided by the Swedes to the
Polish refugees. He also presented the programme of the Polish government
which was to be implemented in the event of the Red Army’s entrance in to
the territory of the Second Polish Republic and the vision for the future close
Polish–Swedish cooperation:
Poland would rise to become an independent being, and we are sure that the
democratic nations would offer us their helping hand and grant us their sup-
port. Poland does not feel alienated in its underground battle. We know that we
have allies in free nations, that we have friends and allies here, in a country of
democratic liberties and social progress. […] Our country is divided from yours
only by a small space – a rather narrow strip of sea. We have always lived in
friendship, we maintained good political and economic relations. I may assure
you and your government that as soon as Poland regains independence, it will
establish a new, most friendly cooperation and coexistence with you. Our sister
parties will be brought even closer together, because both our countries will
have common purposes and common aspirations. We know that following the
war, you shall be firmly defending, just like you are today, justice and rightness
in international life and you shall not acknowledge acts of violence committed
233
during the war. Our friendship, cemented during the war, would last as long as
I shall live and develop our nations.4
According to the source in the British Legation, the speech given by the
Polish minister during the 1 May celebrations was received with offence
rather than sympathy owing to its hostile attitude towards Russia. In the dis-
cussion part, Prime Minister Hansson related to it formally, not leaving any
doubts about his disapproval. Minister of Social Affairs Möller was clearly
irritated and practically told Kwapiński that he was not a good politician. As
a matter of fact, during other meetings Kwapiński was also criticised for his
anti-Russian attitude. The Swedes maintained that Poland and the Soviet
Union should regulate their mutual relations in a friendly atmosphere, which
is why speeches that accentuated animosities towards Moscow were per-
ceived as unreasonable.5 Eventually, the members of the workers’ parties
from fourteen countries adopted a resolution where they wished the Allies
victory, and opted for the post-war renewal of democracy and integration of
the workers’ movement. They proposed that peace was based on democratic-
socialist solutions and experiences of the interwar period.
Polish fears and expectations for future events were accentuated by
Kwapiński on 4 May during an official dinner organized by the leadership of
SAP and LO in the Grand Hotel in Stockholm. While expressing gratitude
for the opportunity to spend several days in beautiful and happy Sweden, he
highlighted, ‘I am relaxing here mentally in an atmosphere where one senses
neither the war nor its consequences.’ He did not mention Germany, as he
claimed that its defeat was certain. He focused on the threat from the east:
‘We, the Poles, are after all situated between Russia and Germany. Bolshevik
Russia would be a victorious power and we are doomed to its neighbourhood.
[…] and this Russia is preparing itself to play a great role in post-war Europe.’
He then recounted that it was the attack from the east that put an end to the
fights in the first stage of the war:
But this was not the worst thing. The worst thing was the communist propa-
ganda, which tortured our nation, pulling apart its future, its establishments
and its life. Each and every one of us has forgotten his personal detriment, but
we have not forgotten and we may never forget our moral damages. For our
internal order, with all its errors, faults, shortcomings and defects, was better
—
4
PISM, col. 20, vol. 23, M. Karniol’s report from J. Kwapiński’s visit to Sweden, part 2,
Stockholm, June 1943.
5
NA, FO, 188/403, note by counsellor to the British Legation in Stockholm G. N. Lamming,
18 VI 1943.
234
than theirs. I am saying this on the basis of what I saw with my own eyes in
Soviet Russia.
For one thing, Kwapiński mentioned collectivisation, forced labour and the
terror reigning in Stalin’s country. For another, he pointed out that Poland
wanted to live with Russia in peace, but this was not permitted by the Soviet
leader himself:
We appreciated and are appreciating its current contribution in the fight
against Hitler. As a nation with chivalrous traditions we admired the heroism
of the Red Army, whose best expression is the legend of Stalingrad. But as an
Allied country and at the same time a country which was the first to put up
armed resistance to Hitler’s attack, we could not agree to lose half of the ter-
ritory of our country in the east in favour of Russia. We could not agree to a
situation where our Jewish, Ukrainian and Belarusian citizens would be con-
sidered Russian citizens. On fighting for the support for these deported people
we were facing Soviet countermeasures.6
Kwapiński patiently pointed to the absurdity of Soviet accusations empha-

sizing the idleness of Polish underground resistance. He explained that call-
ing for an immediate battle at that moment ‘would be tantamount to calling
for the murder of the Polish nation, as the Germans are still in possession of
sufficiently large military and police forces in Poland.’ In conclusion, he
brought up the Katyń issue: ‘On the subject of graves discovered near
Smolensk, the Soviets had told us that all our men had been released and that
they were free. Only now do they tell us that these people were left somewhere
nearby Smolensk. They were indeed left, but in graves.’
On summing up his speech the Polish Minister repeated that the Polish
nation had not turned Quisling. Without commenting on this fact he stated,
‘You understand this, because You feel who Quisling is for your fraternal
Norwegian nation.’ Prime Minister Hansson did not refer to Kwapiński’s
speech. He responded courteously:
We, the Swedes, find ourselves in an undoubtedly better geographical situation.
Nevertheless, the same problems that are encountered by Poland are also en-
countered by Sweden. Our security is dependent on the balance of forces in
Europe, and most importantly in Central and Eastern Europe. In order to make
—
6
PISM, col. 20, vol. 23, report by M. Karniol from J. Kwapiński’s visit to Sweden, part II,
Stockholm, June 1943.
235
this balance of forces really exist, there must exist free Poland. I unwaveringly
believe that free Poland would again rise to life and develop successfully.8
During his visit, Kwapiński met with Minister of Commerce Herman

Eriksson. Next, on 7 May, he sent him a letter presenting detailed plans
concerning the development of Polish–Swedish economic relations follow-
ing the war.9 Telegrams of thanks sent from London by Kwapiński straight
after his return (14 May) may prove that he also had other interlocutors not
mentioned in the reports. Kwapiński expressed his gratitude to Prime
Minister Hansson for his kind reception, to the head of LO, August Lindberg,
for his hospitality and, surprisingly, to Ernst Paul, representing the German
minority in Czechoslovakia, for his cooperation.10 On reporting the course of
Kwapiński’s talks in Sweden, Żaba highlighted the significance of Prime
Minister Hansson’s statement: ‘Sweden believes that an independent and
strong Poland will come into existence and is willing to strengthen the ex-
change of economic and cultural goods with Poland to a much greater extent
than before the war.’11 However, it would be hard to view this speech as some-
thing more than just a courtesy to a colleague from an ideologically similar
party. As was customary for Swedish politicians, the speech was not made
public and therefore did not gain the dimension of a political declaration.
Hansson promised Kwapiński that Poland would receive deliveries of food,
which initiated the process of preparing such arrangements.12 Procedural
issues delayed considerably these actions and the support was granted no
sooner than 1944.
Kwapiński also contacted the Swedish cooperative movement, with the
intention of developing a future cooperation on the rebuilding of Poland. At
least this was what counsellor Tadeusz Pilch communicated to the Ministry
of Industry, Trade and Shipping in February 1944. Pilch was to make use of
the favourable atmosphere that was created because of talks conducted by
Kwapiński and tried to maintain these contacts. Their dimension was not
only economic but also political, as the Swedish cooperative movement was
—
8
M. K[arniol], ‘Współpraca i przyjaźń socjalistów polskich i szwedzkich. Z pobytu tow.
Kwapińskiego w Sztokholmie’, Robotnik Polski w Wielkiej Brytanii, 1 VII 1943.
9
NA, FO, 371/37126, letter by W.H. Montagu-Pollock to A. Eden, 5 VII 1943.
10
PISM, col. 20, vol. 23, telegrams by J. Kwapiński to P. A. Hansson, A. Lindberg and E. Paul,
London, 14 V 1943.
11
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, copy of letter by N. Żaba to M. Thugutt (Ministry of
Internal Affairs) [?], Stockholm, 30 IV 1943.
12
AAN, HI/I/305, telegram by W. Babiński to Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki, 18
IX 1943.
236
dominated by social democrats who constituted the strongest party in

parliament and government, and the meaning of this party following the
conclusion of the war, according to Pilch, was to gain further power.13 The
editor-in-chief of the periodical Kooperatören, Thorsten Ohde, and the entire
management of Kooperativa Förbundet (KF, or the Swedish Co-operative
Union) headed by Albin Johansson were introduced to Kwapiński during his
stay in Stockholm. The union even threw a special breakfast in honour of the
Polish minister. During the celebrations of the anniversary of Niedziałkowski
and Thugutt’s death, Ohde delivered a speech on the Polish cooperative
movement and Stanisław Thugutt. Ohde assisted Leon Rappaport in his
studies on the cooperative movement in Sweden and in general was inte-
rested in the rebuilding of this movement in Poland following the war.14
Rappaport proposed setting up a special commission for the expansion of the
cooperative movement in Poland according to the Swedish model. In May
1943, he also developed the theses for Minister Kwapiński’s talks with the
director of KF Albin Johansson. What was expressed there was the will to
cooperate with the Swedish members of cooperatives on the organization of
the cooperative movement in Poland. According to Rappaport: ‘This co-
operation could include export and import of natural resources and com-
modities, exchange of patents, professional and technical support, various
types of agreements.’15
Kwapiński’s visit received a wide coverage in the Swedish newspapers.16 It
should be mentioned that on 7 May a special press conference was held, during
which the Polish minister answered the questions that were considered most
sensitive. He adopted a defensive attitude; most of all in response to the attacks
in Soviet propaganda, which depicted the Polish government as being gentry-
oriented, undemocratic and out of touch with its country. The minister talked
about the development of the Polish Underground State, its military and
civilian section. In his summing up, he pointed out, ‘The nation is listening to
—
13
AAN, HI/I/51, letter by T. Pilch, counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, to the
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping, Stockholm, 11 II 1944.
14
Ibidem, note by L. Rappaport regarding the relations with Kooperativa Förbundet,
Stockholm, 11 II 1944.
15
Ibidem, L. Rappaport: Wytyczne w sprawie wyzyskania spółdzielczości szwedzkiej dla
sprawy odbudowy w Polsce [Guidelines regarding the Utilization of the Swedish
Cooperative Movement for the Rebuilding Process in Poland], Stockholm, 10 V 1943.
16
PISM, col. 20, vol. 23, report from J. Kwapiński’s visit to Sweden from 25 IV 1943 to 12 V
1943, part. 3: ‘Pokłosie prasowe’ (Press comments), 2 VI 1943.
237
its government, moving blindly along the lines set by this government, and it
shall be doing so both now and in the future.’17
The following day, this meeting was reported on by the main dailies. The
account by Svenska Dagbladet polemicized with the Soviet propaganda and
was meaningfully entitled ‘The Polish Government is Democratic – the Visit
of the Polish Minister from London.’ The newspaper drew attention to the
meaning of the visit for the future of the Polish–Swedish relations. It high-
lighted that the minister:
[…] conducted preliminary talks with representatives from Swedish industry
as regards Swedish post-war supplies connected with the planned rebuilding
of Poland. These talks, relating first and foremost to the materials that Sweden
was able to deliver quicker than other countries, including equipment for
treating peat, residential homes and building materials, were crowned with
concrete Swedish proposals, which are taken by the minister to London.18
Thanks to the information obtained from Karniol, Allan Vougt wrote the
article ‘Poland is Fighting’, which was devoted to the 50th anniversary of the
setting up of PPS. The article, published 9 May in Social-Demokraten, under-
lined the significance of developing relations between the parties for the
future international relations.19 In one of the issues of the socialist youth
periodical Frihet, Torsten Nilsson, who was one of the leading activists of the
Social Democratic Party, presented Kwapiński’s profile. He also referred to
the dispute about the Katyń issue and Soviet accusations in the following
words: ‘To say that the Polish government is accommodating Hitler, is
definitely over the top.’ He then pointed out that Kwapiński’s visit to
Stockholm, which was so important for the development of Polish–Swedish
relations, took place during an exceptionally heated period in the relations
between the Polish government in exile and the Soviet Union. He described
Kwapiński with unconcealed appreciation:
Born in 1885 in Warsaw, he is the same age as Per Albin Hansson. Like many
Polish politicians, he had a very turbulent past. This has nevertheless left no
mark on him. He is cheerful, his countenance looks almost Swedish and one
might think that his origin is both Swedish and Polish. His soft and delicate
hands do not show that this man was throwing bombs and his gentle glance
—
17
Ibidem, M. Karniol’s letter to the Central Executive Committee of the PPS party,
18
‘Polens regering är demokratisk. Polsk londonminister på besök’, Svenska Dagbladet, 8 V
1943.
19
A. Vougt, ‘Polens kamp’, Social-Demokraten, 9 V 1943.
238
shows that he is full of wit and joy of living. His outlook proves that Poles are
aptly called the Frenchmen of Eastern Europe.20
On analysing the reaction of the press to Kwapiński’s visit in Sweden, Karniol

noted the provincial press continued to publish numerous editorials devoted
to Poland for two weeks and, with few exceptions, they were pro-Polish and
anti-Soviet.21 Making use of the interest in the Polish subject, Karniol not only
inspired, but also published his own articles in the Swedish press. On 13 May
1943, the social democratic Aftontidningen daily, published ‘Poles and
Ukrainians’ (most probably written by Karniol), where the author polemi-
cized with the Soviet propaganda and explained that nationality-related
problems of Central-Eastern Europe were simple only for dictators using
repression and deportation. The author of the article did not take sides in the
dispute about the Eastern Borderlands of the Second Polish Republic, but he
questioned the one-sided vision created by the Soviet Legation, which had
started to dominate Swedish public opinion.22 Karniol published a text in
Landsarbetaren devoted to the subject of the Polish Association of Agricul-
tural Workers, where he presented the profile of Jan Kwapiński. In the article,
he also highlighted that the reborn Poland would be founded on the princi-
ples of democracy and social justice.23 On 2 June, the article ‘50th Anniversary
of the Polish Workers Movement’ by Karniol was published in Metall-
arbetaren weekly. The publication of this text proved that Kwapiński’s visit
brought some propaganda-related results. The article was received by the
newspaper’s editorial office in November 1942 yet published over half a year
later. In the article Karniol provided a detailed description of the origin of the
Polish–Soviet conflict and explained the compromised character of the
border established by the treaty of Riga in 1921.24
Following his return to London, in an interview for the Polish government
newspaper Dziennik Polski, Kwapiński highlighted that he had visited
Stockholm on the invitation of SAP as chair of the Foreign Committee of PPS
to speak at the celebrations of 1st May. He pointed out that, ‘Already, the very
—
20
PISM, col. 20, vol. 23, M. Karniol’s letter to the Central Executive Committee of the PPS
party, Stockholm, 8 VI 1943.
21
Ibidem, report from J. Kwapiński’s visit to Sweden from 25 IV 1943 to 12 V 1943, part. 3:
‘Pokłosie prasowe’ (Press comments), 2 VI 1943.
22
‘Polacker och ukrainare’, Aftontidningen, 13 V 1943; IPMS, col. 20, vol. 23, M. Karniol’s
letter to the Central Executive Committee of the PPS party, Stockholm, 20 V 1943.
23
party, Stockholm, 20 V 1943.
24
party, Stockholm, 10 VI 1943.
239
fact of inviting a Polish socialist who is also a member of government to

deliver a public address in the capital of neutral Sweden, is a telling sign. My
taking the floor during this celebration prompted an ovation, which lasted
almost three minutes.’25 The minister evaluated his visit positively and ex-
pressed many courteous views about Swedish politicians, but the positive
statements were probably dictated by the requirements of the war propa-
ganda. Karniol’s correspondence, prepared for the Robotnik Polski w Wielkiej
Brytanii, was also enthusiastic. According to the representative of the PPS in
Sweden, Kwapiński ‘corrected his erroneous views on the reactionism of
Polish government in London and Polish policy.’26 The Polish press on the
whole promoted a picture of success regarding the visit to Stockholm by the
Polish minister. The contacts established they were to bear fruit in the im-
mediate future. Following the war they led to the renewal of economic rela-
tions between Poland and Sweden.27
Stockholm buzzed with rumours of the real purpose for Kwapiński’s visit
to Sweden. A Finnish journalist told Żaba of speculation about the inter-
mediation between Great Britain, Hungary and Bulgaria regarding peace.
The Polish minister’s main achievement at a special conference devoted to
this issue allegedly was to be Stalin’s agreement to the establishment of a
federation of countries headed by Poland and Czechoslovakia. According to
Żaba, this rumour was to confirm that ‘the news promoted here by various
rival subversive groups should be treated with reserve’,28 but one could not
entirely exclude that secret talks were conducted by the Polish minister. It is
a fact that Żaba maintained contacts with Hungarian diplomats with whom
—
25
‘Wrażenia i uwagi po powrocie ze Szwecji. Wywiad z ministrem Janem Kwapińskim’,
Dziennik Polski, 18 V 1943.
26
M. K[arniol], ‘Współpraca i przyjaźń socjalistów polskich i szwedzkich. Z pobytu tow.
Kwapińskiego w Sztokholmie’, Robotnik Polski w Wielkiej Brytanii, 1 VII 1943.
27
The Polish press, right before the minister’s visit, provided a positive evaluation of the
policy of engaging in the cooperation with Sweden, seeing it as a good basis for Kwapiński’s
plans. CH., ‘Szwecja na progu 1943 r. Stosunki polsko-szwedzkie i sympatie narodu
szwedzkiego’, Dziennik Polski, 5 II 1943; ‘Z pobytu min. Kwapińskiego w Szwecji’, Dziennik
Polski, 12 V 1943; ‘Po zerwaniu stosunków dyplomatycznych’, Dziennik Polski, 29 IV 1943
(There we find an explanation that London correspondents of the Swedish press were
avoiding anti-Polish tons, but they were making it clear that the Poles had no chances what-
soever in the conflict with the Soviet Union). Following his return to London, Kwapiński
held a meeting with President Raczkiewicz, but no detailed description of their conversation
has survived. See: brief information about the meeting on 18 May 1943: Dzienniki
czynności…, vol. 2, p. 71.
28
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, copy N. Żaba’s letter to the Ministry of Information and
Documentation, Stockholm, 17 VI 1943. During a government meeting on 17 May 1943
Kwapiński submitted a report from his stay in Sweden, but the manuscript has never been
found. See Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, vol. 5, p. 439.
240
he exchanged information on international developments. This was also the

source of his information on the situation in the General Government. For
many countries, Stockholm was a convenient venue to maintain casual con-
tacts, also because of military actions it welcomed political refugees with am-
bitions to represent the nations of their origin, and most of all, to formulate
original political programmes. By autumn of 1940 Polish diplomats in
Stockholm were trying to launch talks with pro-Ally oriented Estonians.29 No
documentation, however, survived confirming the speculation surrounding
a secret mission by Kwapiński.
Did Kwapiński’s visit to Stockholm bring success or failure? According to
Żaba, Kwapiński’s visit was very important, as it allowed the Swedes to become
familiar with the Polish point of view on current political issues, and especially
the Soviet issue. According to counsellor Pilch, discussions on economic mat-
ters were also successful. For Żaba, it was also important to organize Kwapiń-
ski’s meeting with the journalists, to challenge the view that the Polish govern-
ment was reactionary. According to Żaba, this venture was successful: ‘The
interviews were published in the press, they are brilliant and highlight that the
Polish government is democratic and in touch with the country.’30
Żaba considered the only tension to be a discussion on 1 May, during which
Jakerle issued a manifesto where he condemned all actions harming the unity
of the Allies (he meant the actions of the Poles) and during which he held the
Czechs as a model for national unity. Were the kind and courteous welcoming
statements a cover for the brutal political reality that prompted the Polish
government in exile to descend gradually from the diplomatic stage? And, in
the face of the passive attitude of the Western Allies, would the Swedish govern-
ment respect only the views of the Soviet Union regarding the Polish matter?
The Swedes decided to wait for the situation to develop. The talks with
Kwapiński were surely an important stage in the thawing of mutual relations
and taking up the discussion on the future of both countries following the
conclusion of the war. They paved the way to bilateral negotiations mostly on
the subject of economic cooperation, as well as, to some extent, political
cooperation. At the same time, the cool reception of the Polish minister’s
remarks on the subject of the aggressive policy of the Soviet Union again
proved that the best possible relations with the Soviet Union were more
important for the Swedes than the revival of relations with the Polish
—
29
This was mentioned during the parliamentary session on 19 November 1940 by Minister
A. Zaleski. See Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, vol. 2, p. 180.
30
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, N. Żaba’s letter to M. Thugutt (Ministry of Internal
Affairs) [?], Stockholm, 6 V 1943.
241
government in exile. The more the Polish–Swedish talks could harm these
relations the slimmer the chance for their continuation.31 Kwapiński thought
that an affinity between PPS and SAP would improve the position of Poland in
Sweden. Envoy Sokolnicki was right, however, when he treated this view
sceptically and disagreed with Kwapiński’s suggestion that he join PPS to
facilitate contact with the Swedish government.32
Change in the policy of the Swedish government

A breakthrough year in the Swedish policy was 1943, as it marked the con-
clusion of concessions to Germany. Together with the weakening of com-
mercial ties, a tendency appeared to intensify economic cooperation with the
USA and Great Britain.33 Part of the Swedish public opinion continued stub-
bornly to support the Germans. During the meeting of the German–Swedish
Chamber of Commerce in September of 1943, Sven Hedin expressed his deep
conviction that the Germans would win the war and ‘save Europe from the
Asian plague.’34 Nevertheless, the Swedish government was striving for the
return to strict neutrality and on 2 July 1943 cancelled the agreement of the
German army’s transit on the last day of that month.
The agreement was terminated on 29 July,35 and by 9 August 1943 the transit
had virtually stopped. This decision received a warm reaction from the press,
although the pro-Ally dailies criticised the government for acting too late.36
Prime Minister Hansson explained that the agreement concluded three years
earlier did not mean the abandonment of the policy of neutrality and was not
—
31
The fact that the visit was closely followed by the Soviet authorities was repeated by the
ambassador to the Ally governments in London, Aleksandr Bogomolov, who during a con-
versation with the Swedish diplomat kept asking for the details of the meetings which were
widely reported in many Polish newspapers. RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 519,
Swedish Legation in London to the head of the Political department of UD S. Söderblom,
London, 6 VII 1943.
32
H. Sokolnicki, In the service…, p. 292.
33
34
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, copy of N. Żaba’s note, Stockholm, 1 X 1943.
35
36
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, copy of report by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H.
Sokolnicki to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 13 VIII 1943. The Polish news-
paper in London as early as at the end of April 1943 predicted Sweden’s abandonment of the
policy of concessions to Germany: ‘It then becomes completely clear that the era when the
Swedish government maintained that it couldn’t allow itself to resist the German claims, is
now over. That now the direct German threat is no more the same absolute and undisputed
bugaboo for Stockholm as it was only a year ago.’ CEP, ‘Postawa Sztokholmu wobec Berlina.
Barometr szwedzki’, Dziennik Polski, 29 IV 1943.
242
tantamount to taking a side. During a rally in Roslagen on 8 August 1943

Hansson highlighted, ‘The neutrality we had proclaimed not only had a
negative purpose of keeping us far away from the war but also a positive pur-
pose of maintaining friendly relations with all fighting sides.’ As early as 5
August, the Polish Legation sent a report to the Polish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, warning that the Swedes confidentially informed the counsellor about
the forthcoming termination of the transit.37 What was accurate was the later
commentary regarding the termination of the transit, sent to London by Envoy
Sokolnicki. He evaluated Swedish foreign policy from the beginning of the war:
No matter the actual reasons for the conclusion of the transit agreement in 1940
(the threat of German invasion or economic pressure in connection with the
collapse of France and victorious advance of Germany) and the reasons for the
termination of the agreement (the dawning victory of the Allies – as some say –
and the weakness of Germany, or the sense of military fitness of Sweden
following the three years of feverish rearming, or, eventually, the intention to
win the favour of the Allies) – it is certain that the Swedish government only
strives to rescue its country from the disaster of war and to survive the period of
tempest raging over Europe peacefully and safeguarding political independence
and territorial integrity of Sweden. It is also certain that at the same time its
intention was to avoid indisposing anyone for the future, which is proven by
how shrewdly the transit agreement was done away with, without risking the
prestige of Germany and at the same time preparing ground for better future
neighbourly relations with Norway. The politics of Sweden, besides generous
financial and material support for Finland in 1939 and 1940, during the current
war has not been characterized by any heroic features, but has immediately set
an example of caution and fitness in implementing hurried corrections to the
pacifist ideology of the preceding years and realist, or let’s say “flexible”, policy,
which probably saved and will continue to preserve Sweden’s freedom and
sovereignty from the disaster of war.38
From mid-1943, the process of breaking-up all Swedish dependencies on

Germany was in progress, but the policy in this respect was extremely
cautious.39 It transpired that the transit of military materials nonetheless con-
tinued for some time, as Germany’s arms and ammunition supplies were
stored on Swedish territory. In official government announcements, there is
no mention of German transports following 20 August. When the issue came
to light it was severely criticised by the opposition press. What is more,
—
37
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, classified report by N. Żaba, Stockholm, 5 VIII 1943.
38
Sokolnicki to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 13 III 1943.
39
243
thanks to a special agreement, the Germans were permitted to continue

flights of their courier aircraft, which maintained contact between Norway
and Finland over Sweden. Sweden also allowed the movement of two Ger-
man postal carriages a day, from Norway to Germany. For Envoy Sokolnicki
this was a sign of the government ignoring public opinion. In addition, in
August the Germans moved the 25th Panzer Division from Norway to
France, indicating that the threat of the attack on Sweden was over, even if
more than 300 hundred thousand German soldiers remained in Norway.40
The Swedish authorities, however, provided humanitarian aid for the Nordic
countries occupied by the Germans. In October 1943, the Swedes challenged
Berlin over the German policy towards Jews in Norway and Denmark.
Subsequently, they would intervene following the arrest of professors and
students of Norwegian higher education institutions on 1 December 1943.41
In the second half of 1943, informal censorship ceased. Interference in the
content of the articles published in the Swedish newspapers also ended and
the freedom of speech put pressure on the Germans.42 The German courier
flights continued until April 1944, when customs officers discovered strategic
maps of Sweden in one of the trains heading to Norway. This discovery was
used as a pretext for the termination of the agreement permitting German
postal flights over Sweden. Between August and October 1944 the movement
of Swedish and German vessels between ports in both countries also gradu-
ally came to end.43
London maintained that the end of the German transits via Sweden was
an appropriate moment to stimulate bilateral political relations. Minister
Romer, on 21 August 1943, ordered Envoy Sokolnicki to start talks on post-
war cooperation opening with economic issues. Romer did not propose that
the discussion with the Swedes include the issue of complete normalisation
of diplomatic relations, as he was convinced that ‘this should happen some-
how automatically as the talks progress.’44
New threats, in the shape of excessive submissiveness of the Swedes
towards the Soviet Union, were emerging that would regulate mutual poli-
tical relations. According to an anonymous analyst, ‘This process is so careful
—
40
Sokolnicki to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 27 III 1943. Johansson, Per
Albin…, p. 328.
41
PISM, A XII, 3/41, classified study Polityka zagraniczna Szwecji, Sztokholm, December 1943.
42
43
G. Hägglöf, Svensk…, p. 300.
44
AAN, HI/I/305, telegram by Minister of Foreign Affairs T. Romer to Polish Envoy to
Stockholm H. Sokolnicki, 21 VIII 1943.
244
that it is only possible to grasp it behind the scenes of Swedish politics.’45

Sokolnicki thought opening talks with Sweden about economic issues first
was a sound decision, and in a reply to Minister Romer pointed to the diffi-
cult situation of the legation as regards the break-up of Polish–Soviet rela-
tions. He wrote, ‘The Swedish policy towards the USSR […] is and will be
focusing on, as long as possible, avoiding everything that could expose it to
the danger of conflict with Russia.’ The Swedish government was interested
in Stalin’s attitude towards Poland and society sympathised with the govern-
ment in exile, but for the sake of the state, Sweden avoided such matters, as
the powers were yet to define their political aims in this respect.46 Grafström
advised avoiding everything that could create an impression that the Polish
policy and the moods of Polish society were becoming more anti-Soviet than
anti-German under the influence of the approaching Soviet danger, as this
could harm the Polish matter in the Swedish territory.47 According to Polish
diplomats, Grafström confirmed the speculation that the Swedes were
starting to conduct the policy of concessions to the Soviet Union similar to
those conducted towards Germany 1940–41. The Swedish press published
numerous articles about the German crimes in the occupied countries. The
Poles estimated a greater number than that published in the English press.
Whereas, the anti-Soviet commentaries were avoided. Based on expert
opinion on Swedish policy, an anonymous Polish analyst predicted that in
the near future Sweden would adopt an opportunistic attitude towards the
USSR, more so now that Soviet influences were particularly strong in the
USA and Great Britain. In Sweden it was now not only the leftist circles that
showed sympathies towards the USSR. The industrialists expected that the
development of the exchange of goods would bring them economic benefits.
The author of the report claimed, ‘That is why these circles are inclined
towards cooperation with the Soviet Union, and they are even ready to
support compromises at the expense of Russia’s neighbours.’48 According to
the Press Attaché of the legation of Great Britain, Peter Tennant, the Swedish
policy towards the Soviet Union was becoming more submissive than
required by the geographical location of Sweden. There were not many sup-
porters of communism in Sweden, but the ‘realism which characterises the
—
45
PISM, A XII, 3/41, study Polityka zagraniczna Szwecji (Swedish Foreign Policy),
Sztokholm, December 1943.
46
AAN, HI/I/71, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of
47
PISM, A XII, 3/41, study Polityka zagraniczna Szwecji, Sztokholm, December 1943.
48
Ibidem.
245
Swedish policy and the sense of Sweden’s weakness force it – although its
attitude towards the Soviet Union is reluctant – to improve its relations with
Russia, independently from the changes that would be taking place in the
Swedish government.’49
By June Żaba had informed Mieczysław Thugutt, ‘During the talks with
foreigners the Swedes show more and more understanding and sympathy for
us, but are nevertheless afraid to raise the Soviet subject.’50 In September Żaba
predicted that Sweden would establish a new political stance towards the
Soviet Union:
The Soviet problem terrifies the Swedes and makes them look to the future
with apprehension. In the current situation, they are showing us more under-
standing, which nevertheless will not result in – knowing the Swedes – them
granting us adequately strong and open political support. They will most
likely employ the same tactics towards the Soviets as they did towards the
Germans at one time – namely that of avoiding everything that would need-
lessly aggravate relations.51
These forecasts were quickly confirmed by the news that following the
conclusion of the war the Swedes were ready to grant the Soviet Union a trade
loan of 125 million crowns. For Żaba, this was evidence that ‘certain Swedish
circles are full of illusions when it comes to commercial relations with
Russia.’52
Sweden’s position on the Polish matter (January–July 1944)

In the last days of 1943, Polish intelligence analysts note, ‘In the Swedish
industrialist circle economic philo-Sovietism took root, which was based on
the expectation of a large wave of exports to Russia immediately after the
war.’53 Some Swedish enterprises, like ASEA, were about to start production
with the intention of exporting to the USSR. According to Polish experts,
Swedish industrialists were convinced that the Soviets would make up their
main market as the Allies were not in need of Swedish products and because
Europe, now in ruins and led by the Germans, would be insolvent. The new
partner searched for in fear of the post-war crisis and unemployment. As well
—
49
Ibidem.
50
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, letter by N. Żaba to M. Thugutt, Stockholm, 3 XI 1943.
51
Ibidem, note by N. Żaba, 9 IX 1943.
52
Ibidem, note by N. Żaba, 22 X 1943.
53
PISM, A XII, 3/41, note by Colonel S. Gano ‘Filosowietyzm w Szwecji’ (Sovietophiles in
Sweden), 22 XII 1943.
246
as that, the industrialists managed to persuade the activists of the social de-
mocratic party to support the concept of expanding economic contacts with
the USSR. Nobody doubted that the USSR would be a dominant force in
Eastern Europe.54 At the same time, Germanophobia was increasingly evi-
dent, the evidence for which was the popularity of the anti-German book
Behind the Steel Wall. A Swedish Journalist in Berlin 1941–4355 by Arvid
Fredborg, where he listed German crimes, and first and foremost the slaugh-
ter of 2 million Jews and 1 million Poles.
The course of the October conference in Moscow was followed closely.
The Soviet–Polish agreement was expected to be reached under English–
American patronage. Nya Dagligt Allehanda reported that:
The Russians have shown their readiness to establish relations with the Polish
government in London, which, nonetheless, surely neither means that they
have withdrawn their claims nor that they recognise the government of
Mikołajczyk [successor of Sikorski] as the future Polish government, all the
more so that the latter adamantly defends his position. In connection with the
future moving of eastern military operations to the former territory of Poland,
the Russians intend to create some kind of modus vivendi, which would save
their armies from guerrilla activity at the rear.57
The editorial team for Svenska Dagbladet expressed their fears that Moscow
could become a new Munich, with the only difference that the role of Cham-
berlain was taken over by Churchill and Roosevelt.58
While the conference of the ‘Big Three’ was taking place in Tehran,
Stockholm awaited announcements about proceedings with apprehension.
The official statements, however, were a disappointment for the Swedish
—
54
‘Polens affärer’, Aftontidningen, 15 XII 1943.
55
A. Fredborg, Bakom stålvallen. Som svensk korrespondent i Berlin 1941–43, Stockholm
1943.
57
‘Sovjet och Polen’, Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 23 X 1943.
58
See ‘Lęk przed Monachium. Szwedzi o konferencji w Moskwie’, Dziennik Polski, 16 XI
1943. The Swedes were worried about their future. There were rumours that some con-
cessions have been introduced in the territory of Scandinavia to the benefit of the Soviet
Union. For the Allies it was important that Sweden joined the war and they expected
intensified pressures in this respect. Indeed, Molotov proposed that the Swedes were forced
to give up their air bases to the Allies. The British were less resolute as far as this question
was concerned. Churchill wanted Sweden to join the war, but not under compulsion. See L.
Leifland, ‘They must get in before the end’. ‘Churchill och Sverige 1944 och 1945’ [in:]
Utrikespolitik och historia. Studier tillagnade Wilhelm M. Carlgren den 6 maj 1987,
Stockholm 1987, pp. 113–143; Churchill Archives Centre, Sir Victor Mallet, Memoir, pp.
147A–147D.
247
press as they were too vague and allowed for much freedom of interpreta-
tion.59 A concern was expressed that the unity of the powers was established
at the expense of smaller countries of Eastern Europe, especially Finland.60
Żaba was under the impression that the Swedish press, in the face of the
impasse in Polish–Soviet relations, was waiting for all information from
English, American and even Soviet sources, and paid little attention to the
Polish news service.61
Based on the press announcements from the close of 1943, one may con-
clude that the Swedish dailies had no unambiguous views on the Polish mat-
ters. Periodicals published contradictory texts, and views alternated, in
favour of the Polish government or the Soviets at any given time. The causes
of the conflict were not completely recognized, but a belief grew that the stale-
mate would be only resolved by Stalin forcing his position.
At the outset of 1944, the Swedish press published consecutive commen-
taries due to the crossing of Poland’s pre-war border by the Soviet armies.
Attention was drawn to the need for the settling of the Polish–Soviet agree-
ment before the Red Army’s entrance in to the territory of Poland, because
‘the only person that can benefit from and be glad of the exacerbation of the
Russian–Soviet conflict is naturally Hitler.’ It was known from the start that
the Soviet side would dictate the conditions of the agreement.62 The main
commentator for Dagens Nyheter, Johannes Wickman, stated disapprovingly
that from among the ally governments only the Polish was provoking conflict
between its brothers in arms. He noted with clear condemnation that these
were the Poles who were setting the conditions of the cooperation with the
Soviet Union, which contributed to freeing them from the German oppres-
sion. He lacked understanding for the stubbornness of the Polish government
in defending their right to the Borderlands, which were conquered by Poland
when ‘chaos was reigning in Eastern Europe, when Russia was in the midst
of its greatest difficulties’, and which were mostly inhabited by Ukrainian and
Belarusian people who ‘were not doing well under the rule of their Polish
lords.’ What is more, Wickman presented Poland as an aggressive country,
traditionally causing problems for Europe, manifested by, according to his
—
59
60
Commentaries in Svenska Dagbladet from 7 XII 1943.
61
62
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, report by delegate of the Central Executive Committee of the PPS
party M. Karniol, ‘Prasa szwedzka o obecnej fazie stosunków polsko-rosyjskich’, 14 I 1944.
‘Polen än en gång’, Social-Demokraten, 7 I 1944.
248
view, the annexations of Vilnius in 1920 and Zaolzie in 1938 as well as the
participation in the propagandist Goebbels’ game around the Katyń issue.63
According to Żaba, Wickman’s attack on the Polish government was con-
ducted in a decidedly dishonest manner. Such an attitude was explained by
Wickman having become a very ‘intimate – as it has been reported – guest of
the Soviet Legation, and admirer of the Russians as the saviours of Europe.’
The Polish attaché nevertheless predicted that this was only the first wave of
actions against Poland in Sweden: ‘From conversations held during these
days by the Press Attaché of the Legation – Pomian – with the heads of poli-
tical newspapers and Swedish politicians it follows that the management
circles are alarmed by the discontentment that has been shown in response
to the Swedish policy in Moscow, and which turned out to be impossible to
appease, even by the Soviet Envoy, Ms Kollontai. Official and journalist
circles, supported by industrial-economic circles, were therefore striving to
get back into the good graces of the masters of the Kremlin by acting as lac-
keys of their propaganda.’64
Other Ally diplomats also noticed that Sweden was becoming increasingly
friendly towards the Soviet Union. While being satisfied with the defeat of
Germany, it showed intolerance towards the Finns, who did not see the need
to agree a separate peace with Stalin. The resigning envoy of South Africa,
Stephanus Gie, confirmed these opinions, pointing to signs of the growing
support of the Swedish political elites for the Allies, together with the up-
coming defeat of Germany and ever-diminishing concerns over Soviet
expansion. At the same time the new representative of the South Africa, Leif
Egeland, following a one-week stay in Stockholm, claimed that Swedish
opinion was more rigid than he thought. He generally did not, however,
contradict the views of his predecessor over the growing submissiveness of
the Swedes towards Stalin. His views were formed based on the talks with
Boheman and Söderblom as well as on reading the leading dailies. Boheman,
during their first telephone conversation, demonstrated a deep mistrust
towards the intentions of the Soviet Union, especially those connected with
Poland and Finland. The Swede did not believe in the possibility of estab-
lishing an amicable long-term cooperation between the British and the
—
63
J. Wickman, ‘Polens affärer’, Dagens Nyheter, 9 I 1944; PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, report by
the delegate of the Central Executive Committee of the PPS party, M. Karniol, ‘Prasa
szwedzka o obecnej fazie stosunków polsko-rosyjskich’, 14 I 1944.
64
and Documentation, Stockholm, 12 I 1944.
249
Americans and Stalin. Against this background, he held a dim view for the
future of Germany and predicted that the country would plunge into chaos.65
As the conclusion of the war was nearing, the Allies exerted increasing
pressure on Sweden to break up the relations with the Germans. The emis-
saries of the governments of Great Britain and the USA concluded an agree-
ment with SKF (Swedish ball bearing factory AB) 12 June 1944, under which
the Swedes obliged themselves to reduce the export of ball bearings to
Germany by 60 percent within the next four months.66 The forced arrange-
ment was nonetheless beneficial for the Swedish side, because four months
later all commercial relations with Germany all but ceased. On a limited scale,
the Swedes also started to engage in military cooperation. In the summer of
1944, debris from the V-2 missile that fell on Sweden was given to the
British.67 In a conversation with Norwegian Foreign Minister Trygve Lie, on
1 November 1944, Prime Minister Hansson permitted an American aircraft
to land in Sweden and to the transportation of Norwegian police forces
(formed by refugees) to northern Norway on board this aircraft.68 The Allies
expected that in the last stage of the war Sweden would, despite not wanting
to, assist Norway against the large German contingent.69 There is no doubt
that the desire to maintain best possible relations with the Soviet Union
would influence the attitude of the Swedes towards the Polish matter.
Meanwhile in February 1944, the Swedish Chargé d’affaires to Moscow,
Ingemar Hägglöf, explained to his superiors in Stockholm that the Soviet
Union, from the break-up of relations in April 1943, rejected ‘the reactionary
—
65
NA, FO, 371/43518, report by the representative of the Union of South Africa in
Stockholm, L. Egeland, 23 II 1944.
66
G. Hägglöf, Svensk…, p. 300.
67
On this subject see for instance: H. Denham, Inside…, p. 157; R. V. Jones, Most Secret War,
Chatham 1997, pp. 430–432; Churchill Archives Centre, Sir Victor Mallet, Memoir, pp. 156–
158.
68
A. W. Johansson, Per Albin…, p. 339; K. Åmark, Att bo granne med ondskan…, chpt.
Svensk flyktingpolitik 1939–1945 (Norrmännen).
69
It is worth noting that the Polish press in Great Britain, which until then consistently called
neutral Sweden to fight in the camp of the Allies, starting from 1944 entirely changed its
attitude towards this issue. What became its point of reference was the expansionism of the
Soviet Union, which according to Polish opinion journalists threatened entire Europe, and
especially areas neighbouring the Soviets – from Scandinavia in the north to the Balkans in
the south. See L. T., ‘Czy Szwecji grozi wojna?’, Dziennik Żołnierza APW, 6 III 1944; T. S.,
‘Po drugiej stronie Bałtyku’, Dziennik Żołnierza APW, 20 V 1944; ‘Kolej na Szwecję’,
Dziennik Żołnierza APW, 15 III 1945; ‘Skutki torpedowania Karty Atlantyckiej. Turcja i
Szwecja wolą neutralność’, Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, 30 III 1944. Already at the
outset of 1943 Erik Boheman told Mallet, Envoy of Great Britain, that Sweden’s policy would
be driven exclusively by its own interest and that Sweden would never become engaged in
the war. See H. Denham, Inside., p. 56.
250
and anti-Soviet-oriented emigrant clique from London.’70 The Polish matter

was becoming increasingly relevant on the international arena due to opera-
tions carried out by the Soviet armies in the Polish Borderlands from the
outset of 1944. The Polish side hoped that mediation by Western Allies in the
dispute with Stalin would take place, but it was becoming increasingly ob-
vious that the future of the neighbours of the Soviet Union would be internal
business. Together with the diplomatic offensive, a propagandist campaign
against the Polish government in exile took place. The Katyń issue returned,
as the Soviet authorities appointed a committee to examine it following the
German retreat from Smolensk. On 26 January the committee announced
that the Germans were guilty of the crime. Nevertheless, Hägglöf heard from
a foreign journalist, who was among those invited to Katyń by the Soviet
authorities, that ‘the committee presented circumstantial evidence, pointing
to the fact that the soldiers whose bodies were examined died no earlier than
the autumn of 1941, but no irrefutable evidence was presented to support this
claim, instead, gaps in the argumentation were evident.’ It was at that mo-
ment that Katyń became the symbol of subordination of Poland to the will of
Stalin. According to Hägglöf, the Allies lost hope that they would satisfy
Stalin by reconstructing the Polish government. The Envoy of Canada in the
Soviet Union, Leolyn Dana Wilgress, in conversation with the Swedish diplo-
mat claimed that the commission’s report was not accepted by the Polish
authorities and announced that Stalin would hold an election in Poland
under his control and, following the appointment of parliament, he would
set up a government that would be obedient to him. Hägglöf, having made
his observations of the relations between the Allies from the perspective of
Moscow, concurred with the opinion that despite their contradictory official
political declarations, the neighbours of the Soviet Union were becoming part
of its sphere of influence.71
This speculation was confirmed to a large extent by an employee of the
usually well-informed Czechoslovak embassy. The representative of Czecho-
slovakia, most probably Zdeněk Fierlinger, in a conversation with Hägglöf
emphasized that the Red Army had been given careful instructions regarding
suitable (korrekt) conduct towards the Polish people, including respecting
their religion and traditions. He also presented a plan for establishing a local
administration consisting of Poles, and a temporary high-level administra-
tion controlled by the Soviet command, but with the co-participation of
—
70
Moscow I. Hägglöf to Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch. Günther, Moscow, 6 II 1944.
71
Ibidem.
251
Berling’s army (the Polish First Army). Additionally, he claimed that a great
propagandist significance was to be attributed to the plan of introducing a
radical agricultural reform and division of land, which would grant both the
electoral victory to the supporters of close cooperation with the Soviet Union
and the appointment of a Moscow-friendly Polish government.72
In February 1944 a memorandum was prepared in UD, likely because of
internal discussions over the future developments in East-Central Europe. In
the summing up, it was highlighted that the Soviet Union would not back
down from the well-defined position on the Polish matter. Neither would it
permit the debate over the fate of the Baltic States. It was even expected that
far-reaching demands would be addressed to Stockholm. Some room for
manoeuvre was seen on the question of the future of Finland.73 Nevertheless,
there was optimism regarding Scandinavia surviving the offensive policy of
Stalin in Europe unscathed. Such position was presented predominantly by
the Swedish Envoy to Moscow, Assarsson.74
On 5 March Hägglöf discussed the Polish matter with the ambassador of
an English-speaking country, who confirmed the Soviet conditions of estab-
lishing relations with the Polish government were the reconstruction of the
government, the acceptance of the border along the Curzon Line and the
Soviet interpretation of the Katyń Massacre. At the same time, it became
obvious that the Poles had toughened their position and that Polish–Soviet
relations had reached a critical point. It was probable that Stalin would create
a subordinate Polish government in the territories annexed by the Soviet
armies. However, the Anglo-Saxon diplomat excluded the possibility of the
incorporation of Poland into the USSR.75 Such a vision of Poland’s future was
increasingly regarded in Stockholm as the inevitable scenario. Reports from
Moscow were intensified by the anti-Polish propagandist campaign con-
ducted by the Soviet diplomatic services. The attacks targeted at the London
government took the shape of an organized action. Żaba explained:
Unexpectedly, there flared up a violent anti-Polish campaign in the part of the
Swedish press that remained under the influence of Soviet propaganda on the
subject of the Russian claims towards the eastern territories of Poland. The
—
72
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 486, letter by Swedish chargé d’affaires to
Moscow I. Hägglöf to S. Söderblom, Moscow, 15 III 1944.
73
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 520, pro memoria, Stockholm, 25 II 1944 r.
74
Ibidem, report by Swedish Envoy to Moscow V. Assarsson submitted to the Riksdag’s
Commission of Foreign Affairs on 29 II 1944.
75
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 486, memorandum by Swedish Chargé
d’affaires to Moscow I. Hägglöf, Moscow, 6 III 1944.
252
synchronisation and orchestration of these attacks prove that the Soviet

Legation inspired the work of several opinion journalists who have been at its
service for a long time […].76
The campaign was consequently conducted by the communist Ny Dag daily,

which published the virulent ‘Panic among Polish Landowners’ on 7 January
1944. It was alleged that the Polish government withdrew the Anders’ Army
[the Polish Armed Forces in the East] from the Soviet Union so as to avoid
offering help to the Red Army.77 The Home Army was accused of helping the
Germans for a long time. Whereas on 18 January 1944 an accusation was cast
that, ‘the Poles of London, instead of fighting Hitler, are planning imperialist
conquests at the expense of the greatest opponent of Hitlerism’ while being
famous only for withdrawing their armies from the front and from propa-
gandist collaboration with the Germans.78 On 8 January, an attack was
launched by Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, where the Polish go-
vernment was criticised for, ‘its awful obstinacy regarding the issue of the
borders places obstacles on the Allies’ way to victory and helps the Germans
to break-up the coalition’, and after all ‘the lands to which Russia makes its
claims, are Russian, the Poles have always been an alien element in these
lands, they oppressed the indigenous people who awaited the Russians like
one awaits one’s saviour.’ An opinion journalist of a newspaper famous for
its anti-German attitude added, ‘The blame for the break-up of the diplo-
matic relations between Russia and Poland lies on the side of Poland and the
world cannot understand the madness that has overcome the Poles.’79 One
month later the same journalist predicted, ‘the Polish–Soviet border dispute
will become the subject of negotiations between the republics of Ukraine and
Belarus on the one hand and Poland on the other, whereas Russia would play
the role of mediator.’80 These examples are typical of many Swedish state-
ments about the Polish–Soviet dispute.
The representative of the Ukrainians, who were fighting for their own in-
dependent country, was against the Poles. In 1943 the head of the Ukrainian
Information Bureau in Helsinki, Bohdan Kentrschynskyj, who was born in
—
76
Sokolnicki to the Ministry of Information and Documentation, Stockholm, 12 I 1944, a
similar report: AAN, HI/I/80, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 12 I 1944.
77
‘Panik bland de polska godsägarna’, Ny Dag, 7 I 1944.
78
‘Polens affärer’, Ny Dag, 18 I 1944.
79
‘Situationen’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 8 I 1944.
80
‘Idag’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 8 II 1944.
253
Równe in 1919 and was a member of the Organization of Ukrainian

Nationalists (a faction supporting Andrij Melnyk), published the book San-
ningen om Ukraina (The Truth about Ukraine) in Swedish, where he argued
that Ukraine, which stands out against other countries thanks to its coal
mining, as well as grain and sugar beet production, could be a politically and
economically sovereign country. Kentrschynskyj accused mostly the Rus-
sians and the Poles of having oppressed the Ukrainian nation for a long time
and preventing it from peaceful development. He wrote that Poland was a
country dreaming of grandeur and colonies, although its internal relations
were not regulated, its economy was disorganized (industry and commerce
were mostly in foreign hands), it was lacking political unity, appropriate
roads and railway lines, had an insufficient number of schools, was wrestling
with the problem of high illiteracy rates and had only one port along more
than fifty kilometres of coastline. He confirmed that the Ukrainians from
eastern Galicia started to develop their cultural educational and economic life
only after being incorporated by the Germans in to the General Government.
In his view, although acting legally in the interest of independence was for-
bidden, the Ukrainians were closer to making their dreams come true than at
any time before, as their main enemies, the Russians and the Poles, were
weakened.81 In October 1943, he was contacted by the representative of the
Polish intelligence service in Stockholm. Kentschynskyj, in a conversation
with the Polish agent, declared confidentially, ‘the nationalists connected
with Melnyk wish that Poland not return West Ukraine to the Soviets.
Leaving these lands within the limits of Poland based on the concept of
federation or very wide-ranging autonomy they consider to be the lesser evil.’
He would also to add that the Poles were ‘more liberal and weaker than the
Muscovites.’82 He proposed that exchanging insults should be stopped,
although he warned that he ‘will continue to repeat loudly that Poland and
Russia are at odds not over their own lands but over the Ukrainian ones.’83
He presented similar views towards the end of 1944 in a conversation with
Żaba, when he criticised the Western Allies for their indifference towards the
plans of Stalin to introduce a Soviet hegemony in Europe. According to Żaba,
such stance could have been used for the purposes of the propaganda.
—
81
B. Kentrschynskyj, Sanningen om Ukraina, Helsingfors 1943, pp. 133–134, 152, 205–206.
82
Quoted after: Cz. Partacz, K. Łada, Polska wobec ukraińskich dążeń niepodległościowych w
czasie II wojny światowej, Toruń 2004, pp. 162–163.
83
PISM, A 11, 85/b/18, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of
254
Nevertheless, no traces of such attempts have ever been found.84 According

to Envoy Sokolnicki, Kentrschynskyj was a second-rate individual, or even
possibly a German instigator.85 That is why the Polish Legation in Stockholm
insisted that there was no Ukrainian representation in Sweden.86 On the one
hand, Kentrschynskyj denied the announcements of the Soviet propaganda
that Ukrainians wanted to join the Soviet Union, and, on the other hand,
openly refuted the announcements of the Polish propaganda that they would
prefer to become citizens of the Second Polish Republic.
A typical polemic on the subject of Polish border claims, based mostly on the
defence of the integrity of Second Polish Republic, was published in the pro-Ally
Trots Allt!. Józefa Armfelt, a Swede with Polish roots, protested calling Vilnius
the capital of Lithuania. She pointed out that Lithuanians made up a small
minority of the residents of Vilnius. Her anonymous adversary argued that the
Poles had performed an armed annexation of Vilnius in 1920, and although the
inhabitants of the city were Polish speakers this did not mean that they were
Poles. In another article Armfelt proved that General Żeligowski rather than
enslaving Vilnius in 1920, was liberating it, and that the Poles claimed no rights
whatsoever to ‘the proper Lithuania.’ The discussion was joined by Ludwika
Plater-Ankarhall, pre-war resident of Vilnius and official of the Polish Legation
in Stockholm. She accused the Lithuanians of extermination operations against
Jews and Poles, whose aim was to make the Vilnius region Lithuanian by means
of the Gestapo and the Waffen-SS methods.87
Of the numerous articles that were unfavourable towards Poland a few
were published, the authors of which attempted to remain objective. In the
Swedish language daily Huvudstadsbladet from Helsinki, it was stated that,
‘the incorporation of eastern Poland into the Soviet Union in 1939 was a con-
quest.’88 Svenska Morgonbladet daily claimed that the law was on the Polish
side and that it was unacceptable to settle questions of borders with violence
and so one-sidedly. From Poland’s point of view, as well, an alliance which
—
84
and Documentation, Stockholm, 20 XII 1944.
85
PISM, A 11, 85/b/18, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of
86
Ibidem, telegram by F. Frankowski to the Polish Legation in Washington, 18 I 1944 r.
87
J. Armfelt, ‘Var finns Wilnos litauer? En fråga till Signaturen – son’, Trots Allt!, 18 VIII
1944; eadem, ‘Polen–Litauen. En replik’, Trots Allt!, 8 IX 1944; L. Plater-Ankarhall, ‘Fakta
om Polen–Litauen’, Trots Allt!, 22 IX 1944.
88
‘Det polska ägoskiftet’, Hufvudstadsbladet, 12 I 1944.
255
allowed for the annexing of half of its territory by one of the allies seemed
peculiar.89 Journalists for Svenska Dagbladet were of a similar opinion.90
From the outset of 1944 the Polish matter became an important subject of
debate in the intellectual periodical Svensk Tidskrift. It was noted that history
did not decide which border between Poland and the Soviet Union would be
fair. At the same time, looking at the matter from a realist point of view, it
was predicted that future depended on the military situation. The obvious
advantage of the Soviet Union and the continuation of ‘the diplomacy’ of
Ivan the Terrible left no room for illusions. Only the Western Allies could
apply political pressure and stop Stalin’s expansion, while bandying about
with the argument of cooperation in the rebuilding of the Soviet Union. At
the close of June 1944, it was expected that Stalin would appoint the new
Polish government, which would administer the territories annexed by the
Soviet army. Hopes were continuously expressed that the Anglo-Saxon Allies
would engage in the Polish matter and treat it as a European matter.91
The Poles persevered with their point of view. On 28 January, Karniol gave
an interview to the social democratic Morgon-Tidningen daily, where he
presented a conciliatory position towards the Soviet Union. At the same time,
he emphasised that one should not blame those Poles who did not want to
lose half of their territory. He explained that the Polish government had
developed a programme of radical social and political reforms and antici-
pated the introduction of autonomy for national minorities.92 Adam Cioł-
kosz, in his letter from London, praised the publication. He said the article
was excellent, though he warned Karniol that, ‘in no event may we even create
the slightest impression that we have assumed nationalist or imperialist posi-
tions.’ This was a fervent highlighting of the following view: ‘We are defend-
ing democracy, self-determination and respect for international law – this is
—
89
‘Ryssarna i Polen ett nytt allierat problem’, Svenska Morgonbladet, 5 I 1944; ‘Polen hoppas
på sin frihet genom Sovjet’, Svenska Morgonbladet, 7 I 1944; ‘Ångvält i gång’, Svenska Mor-
gonbladet, 10 I 1944; ‘Öster om Bug’, Svenska Morgonbladet, 1 II 1944.
90
‘Problemet Polen-Sovjet mycket svårt’, Svenska Dagbladet, 7 I 1944; ‘Ryssland på fram-
ryckning’, Svenska Dagbladet, 9 I 1944; ‘Polska exilregeringens enda chans, tror London’,
Svenska Dagbladet, 12 I 1944; ‘Tyskt land i kompensation erbjuder Sovjet åt Polen’, Svenska
Dagbladet, 12 I 1944.
91
Dagens frågor: ‘Skuggor över Polen’, Svensk Tidskrift, 27 I 1944; ‘Ryssland, Polen och
Atlantdeklarationen’, Svensk Tidskrift, marzec 1944; ‘Dagens frågor: S. W., Ryssland–Polen
och Sosnkowski än en gång’, Svensk Tidskrift, 7 VI 1944; ‘Dagens frågor: S. W., Tillpolsk-
ryska frågan’, Svensk Tidskrift, 28 X 1944.
92
‘Hemligt parlament leder Polens öden’, Morgon-Tidningen, 28 I 1944; PISM, col. 133, vol.
297, letter by M. Karniol no. 154, Stockholm, 19 II 1944.
256
our stand, in agreement with our tradition and deepest conviction.’93 The
position of the Polish government and the PPS was explicit and proved that
‘the road to the agreement with Russia leads not only through Russia’s resig-
nation from the acquisitions it owes to the agreement with Hitler.’94 Svenska
Dagbladet and Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten published an interview with
Prime Minister Mikołajczyk on 10 February, which was prepared by Norbert
Żaba for the Swedish press on the basis of the conversation they had during
his stay in London on 27 January 1944. When speaking to Żaba, Mikołajczyk
declared that the entire nation would fight for independence. He explained
that the Polish government wanted Poland to be a democratic country and
that it had the support of Polish citizens for its social and political pro-
gramme. He also confirmed the willingness for an agreement with the Soviet
Union.95 Despite the energetic reaction, the Soviet propaganda put the Polish
information services on the defensive. They were forced to straighten out
opinions, also prevalent in Sweden, that the Polish government was reac-
tionary, showed no will to reach an agreement, was hostile towards the Soviet
Union and that the Poles were traditionally quarrelsome. The dominance of
the pro-Soviet orientation in the Swedish media was becoming increasingly
visible. The development of this trend was emphasized by the emigrant
Lithuanian political activist and diplomat Ignaz Scheynius. In a conversation
with one of the Poles, he stated that the phenomenon was a result of the
Swedes’ opportunism and their hope for establishing economic relations with
the Soviet Union following the war. From the information he possessed, it
followed that the Swedish dailies were pro-Soviet-oriented in principle.
Whereas, articles, in the case of Svenska Dagbladet and Nya Dagligt Alle-
handa, which were not in line with this trend, were not published.96
Another issue that complicated Polish–Swedish relations appeared on the
political horizon, namely a different perception of the course of the Polish–
German border as well as of the German future. The issue, which had been
recognised some time earlier, was even more prominent in informal discus-
sions and public debate.
At the turn of 1943 and 1944, the staff of the Polish Legation in Stockholm
was told of the visit of high-ranking German Catholic and Protestant priests
—
93
PISM, col. 133, vol. 296, copy of letter by A. Ciołkosz to M. Karniol, London, 1 III 1944.
94
Ibidem, copy of letter by A. Ciołkosz to M. Karniol, London, 14 III 1944.
95
‘Polen i dag en enda underjordisk stat’, Svenska Dagbladet, 10 II 1944; ‘Polen redo att
bekämpa attentat mot sin frihet’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 10 II 1944.
96
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, copy of note by N. Żaba to the Continental Action,
Stockholm, 9 X 1944.
257
and their talks with Minister Günther among others. According to

Sokolnicki, ‘The purpose of this visit was to re-examine the possibility to
appoint a temporary government in Germany, following the collapse of Nazi
regime, composed of the members of ecclesiastical institutions.’97 According
to the first secretary of the legation, Wiesław Patek, ‘the flexible-neutral
politics of Sweden […] would be increasingly open in seeking to counter-
balance the growing Soviet power manifested in the attempts to save the
remains of the German forces from their complete break-up by the Anglo-
Saxons.’ Patek also added: ‘The democratic Germany is a term to which the
Swedish policy would return increasingly often due to the existing – despite
all the Norwegian protests and resolutions of cultural associations – common
origin of the German nation.’98 Wiesław Patek’s reports presented a clear
picture of Swedish politicians who were anti-Hitlerian, but who cultivated
pro-German traditions at the same time. The information concerning a
secret meeting of clerics from various countries in a villa near Stockholm was
characteristic. The Germans tried to insist that it was the Nazi regime only
that was responsible for the outbreak and the course of the war, and that
German society was innocent. The opinion of the representatives of other
nations was different: ‘The issue of the collective blame of the German nation
was put forward by the Norwegians and the Danes, whereas the Swedes
seemed to be compassionate towards the poor Germans, who had not only
the allies but all of Europe against them. The Englishman’s position was that
of an objective observer.’99 In addition, the rumours were repeated about
setting up units of Hitler’s opponents, the so-called good Germans, since – as
the Polish Legation discovered – nearby Norrköping a course in ideology was
launched for several dozen German deserters under Robert Myrdal’s
supervision.100
The opinions which were heard only in the behind-the-scenes’ conversa-
tions of diplomats gradually started to filter into the press. On 18 March an
article by Josef Hofbauer appeared in Arbetet that was ‘a typical example of
the anti-Polish attitude of the German expatriates who are already in the
—
97
Foreign Affairs (together with attachment), Stockholm, 29 I 1944.
98
Ibidem, report by first secretary of the Polish Legation in Stockholm W. Patek to the
99
Ibidem, report by first secretary of the Polish Legation in Stockholm W. Patek to the
100
Ibidem, note by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 27 X 1944.
258
course developing an active campaign in the defence of the new Reich.’101

Hofbauer rejected all arguments supporting the incorporation of East Prus-
sia, Pomerania and Silesia into Poland. He also warned, ‘Following such a
solution of the German issue, millions of Germans, expelled from their
homes, would flock to Germany and call for revenge, making it impossible
for the German pacifists to work on the re-education of the German nation.’
He also admitted, ‘an immense injustice is inflicted upon the Poles but why
are they doing the same to the Germans?’ His protest at the relocation of the
western border of Poland was unusually emotional:
Are there other reasons that would justify these claims than the lust for
power? The Russians are explaining that this is about the territories that once
belonged to Poland and which were taken away from it and Germanised. So
then, does Poland have the right to East Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia?
Maybe it has such a right, just like Denmark to England, on account of the
fact that 900 years ago it was reigned by Cnut the Great.102
In turn, another expatriate, Immanuel Birnbaum, argued in Svensk Tidskrift

that dividing the German lands before the conclusion of the war intensified
the resistance of the German armies and excluded the battle of democratic
forces of the Third Reich against Hitler.103
In connection with such actions, efforts were made to inspire texts that
would be beneficial for Poland. In April 1944 Mellanfolkligt Samarbete
magazine published ‘The Issue of East Prussia’ by John Walterson. The
author highlighted that putting the territory of East Prussia in Polish hands
would not compensate for lost territories in the east. He had no illusions,
however, that it would end up within the territory of Poland. He pointed to
economic reasons and a natural Polish base for east-Prussian farming.
Moreover, he stated that, ‘The Masurians […] should be considered Poles,
just like Bavarians and Saxons are German.’ He also noted, ‘the results of the
referendum on 11 June 1920, devoted mostly to the Polish people, were
mostly to the benefit of the Germans, but one should remember that voting
—
101
102
J. Hofbauer, ‘Polen och den tyska Östern’, Arbetet, 18 III 1944.
103
I. Birnbaum, ‘Om Ostpreussens öden’, Svensk Tidskrift, December 1944. Birnbaum with
satisfaction quoted the neutral Swedish historian Nils Ahnlund, who was famous for his
restrained evaluations and who on 27 October 1944 in the article ‘Kompensationspolitik i
öster’ (‘Compensation Politics in the East’) in the Svenska Dagbladet presented his oppo-
sition to the claim of incorporating East Prussia into Poland.
259
was conducted when Poland was at war with the Soviet Union and the cir-
cumstances were not favourable for expressing objective opinions.’
Walterson also added, ‘It is beyond any doubt that separating East Prussia
from the Reich would create safer conditions for the existence of Poland.’ He
summed up, ‘in the interest of the future peace it is necessary to solve inter-
national problems fairly and thoughtfully.’104
Attaché Żaba planned to expand the action of creating the most beneficial
atmosphere possible around Poland. He was reaching for diverse propa-
gandist methods, and not only press publications. In May 1944 in Gothen-
burg, a screening took place of short Polish films.105 In June, Żaba had taken
the initiative of organising a large exhibition in Stockholm presenting the
history of Poland with a particular emphasis on the achievements that fol-
lowed the regaining of independence.106 He also maintained contacts with
Swedish radio to promote musical pieces of Polish composers.107
In March 1944 Żaba informed London, ‘A number of articles have been
published lately in the Swedish press presenting the Polish–Soviet issue in a
positive light’. He particularly favoured ‘Russia, England and Poland’ an
article published in Trots Allt!. The author analysed the Polish–Soviet dispute
from the point of view of Swedish interests,
It is not particularly interesting for Sweden whether the Polish–Russian border
be settled 100 kilometres farther or closer eastwards, but it is Churchill’s motifs
that are depressing. Firstly, he did not say a word about examining the views of
people of the discussed lands, and by doing so he violated the provisions of the
Atlantic Charter. […] And secondly, his attitude towards strategic reasons is
astounding. Against whom should Russia be protected in the west? Against a
considerably weakened Poland, which has not attacked Russia for hundreds of
years, and which numerous times fell victim to Russian attacks? Or maybe this
is about protection against the Germans, who will be defeated and helpless, with
—
104
J. Walterson, ‘Problemet Ostpreussen’, Mellanfolkligt Samarbete 1944, no. 2; AAN,
HI/I/40, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(together with attachment), Stockholm, 28 IV 1944.
105
AAN, HI/I/215, letter by Press Attaché of the Polish Legation in Stockholm N. Żaba to the
Ministry of Information and Documentation (together with attachment), 23 V 1944.
106
AAN, HI/I/221, report by Press Attaché of the Polish Legation in Stockholm N. Żaba to
the Ministry of Information and Documentation Stockholm, 30 VI 1944. The exhibition was
probably never organized.
107
AAN, HI/I/214, confidential report by Press Attaché N. Żaba to the Ministry of
Information and Documentation, Stockholm, 17 III 1944.
260
ruined cities and destroyed industry, without the possibility of rebuilding for
several generations?108
For the author of the article, the course of the Polish–Soviet dispute was
evidence for the fact that, in the future, force would continue to mean more
in Europe than the law. This should nevertheless be of interest to the citizens
of Sweden:
We consider Finland our entrenchment. Poland is a no less important en-
trenchment for Sweden. History has proven that Finland was attacked only
when Poland was unable to defend itself. For this reason, Sweden, for its own
safety, needs – to use the words of Churchill – a strong, integral and inde-
pendent Poland.
According to Żaba, what contributed to the change in attitude of the Swedish

commentators was the development of Finnish–Soviet relations. Many
dailies, which had condemned the policy of the Polish government, now
defended it. Counsellor Pilch, who scolded Söderblom, head of the Political
department of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for the negative
attitude of part of the press towards Poland, heard, ‘it is not in the interest of
Sweden to weaken Poland, and same goes for the Swedish press’ negative
comments on the subject of Polish problems.’ Żaba did not believe that the
local Ministry of Foreign Affairs, owing to a somewhat opportunist trend in
Swedish foreign policy, had instructed the press to treat the Polish authorities
in London kindly. Whereas, of great importance was that the representatives
of the ministry did not apply any pressure to stop all actions ‘with a certain
anti-Soviet tinge.’109 All the more so that the subject of Polish–Soviet relations
did not disappear from the press.
On 8 March, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning published a tele-
gram from a London correspondent, who explained, ‘the Russian govern-
ment has lost hope for ending the conflict about the border with the current
Polish government.’ And, in addition, after the order for the Home Army’s
cooperation with the Red Army was issued, ‘following the urgent examina-
tion of Sosnkowski’s speech, all doubts were dispelled in Moscow as far as the
true intentions of Poles were concerned.’110 In April 1944, Marika Stiernstedt
—
108
‘Ryssland, England och Polen’, Trots Allt!, 3–9 III 1944.
109
110
‘Ingen polsk-rysk uppgörelse utan regeringsförändring’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-
Tidning, 8 III 1944.
261
published two feature articles in Svenska Dagbladet from memoirs of child-

hood in the Eastern Borderlands. She denied that all the Poles who lived in
these territories were landowners or that the relations with Belarusian people
were hostile and the clergy had an unfavourable influence on the people. She
saw the chance for the agreement between the Poles and the Soviets, but
pointed out, ‘If these are the Soviets who really want to reach an agreement
with Poland, it is they who should take the first step in this direction, which
is the privilege of the stronger party.’ She also underlined that Poland had no
other choice than to live in agreement with its eastern neighbour.111
The recurring and perhaps the strongest arguments put forward by the
Poles were the contributions of Polish soldiers in the fight with the Germans
and the nation’s suffering under the brutal occupation. On 29 February 1944,
Dagens Nyheter made use of the Polska Nyheter bulletin, prepared by Karniol,
and published a note that, the title of which highlighted the disappearance of
3 million Poles from the territory of the General Government, could shock
the Swedish reader.112 At the same time, accusations towards the Poles of
cooperation with the Germans were denied owing to information about the
successful assassination of the leader of the Warsaw SS and police, Franz
Kutschera. Swedish newspapers published reports about this event, mostly in
the form of sensational stories. On 13 May, Morgon-Tidningen published an
article about the fate of Polish women in concentration camps, the hunger,
disease and medical experiments.113 Following the Soviet armies’ entering
into the territory of General Government, numerous reports poured in
discussing the painful traces of German rule. In August 1944, Ny Dag pub-
lished a long and shocking description of German crimes in the Lublin
district. The account included gruesome descriptions of crematoria, gas
chambers and warehouses with clothes and shoes of the murdered people.114
At the outset of June, reviews appeared for The Last Jew from Poland by
Stefan Szende. Żaba reviewed the book positively, despite criticism of some
passages. The author, a journalist sympathizing with communism, had a bad
—
111
M. Siernstedt, ‘Polsk-ryska minnen’, Svenska Dagbladet, 8 IV 1944; eadem, ‘Polen och
Ryssland’, Svenska Dagbladet, 13 IV 1944.
112
‘Tre miljoner polacker försvann under kriget’, Dagens Nyheter, 29 II 1944.
113
‘Polska kvinnotragedier i koncentrationsläger’, Morgon-Tidningen, 13 V 1944. On the
next day, the newspaper, still pursuing the feminine subject, published an extensive pane-
gyrical article about ‘female writer, minister of foreign affairs and honourable colonel of the
Red Army’ Wanda Wasilewska, see: C.-H. af Klintberg, ‘Wanda Wasilevska’, Morgon-Tid-
ningen, 14 V 1944.
114
and Documentation, 22 IX 1944 (Ny Dag, 19 VIII 1944).
262
reputation in the Polish Legation. Szende described the occupation in Poland

through the eyes of Adolf Folkman, an escapee from the Lviv ghetto. He
focused on the persecution of the Jews by the Germans and Polish black-
mailers. Alongside that, the author accused the pre-war authorities of mis-
treating national minorities, underestimating the Soviet Union and resorting
to Hitler’s foreign and internal policy.115 The reviewer expressed the opinion
that the nation which performed the crimes described by Szende was on the
margin of culture.116 At the same time, the book Landet utan Quisling (The
Country without Quisling) was published by the author under the pseudo-
nym Stefan Tadeusz Norwid. In fact, the publication was the result of co-
operation between a refugee from occupied Poland, Stefan Trębicki, and
Tadeusz Nowacki, who wrote down his account. Trębicki came to Sweden on
8 August 1943 hidden on a coal vessel. It was not until 1944 that he could
speak in public as a witness of the events that had taken place in the General
Government. It was difficult to convince the Swedish audience that the
tragedy was real. It ought to have been enough to mention that even Attaché
Brzeskwiński, and his wife, did not accept news of the mass murders of Jews
perpetrated by Germans about which Trębicki spoke. Żaba commented:
Should we be surprised that foreigners do not always believe in our words?
Today people believe less in the written word than in the testimonies of an eye
witness, about which propaganda needs to remember. We also need to offer
the journalists an opportunity to speak with the people who have come from
the country and take them to meetings and lectures.117
At the outset of July 1944, German refugee Ernst Pfleging published Det
Tyska Storrumet (The German Grossraum), documenting the system of legis-
lation in the occupied territories. Pfleging demonstrated calmly and precisely
that the Germans were striving to exterminate the Poles, resorting to the
death sentence on any pretext.118
—
115
S. Szende, Den siste juden från Polen, Stockholm 1944, pp. 5–6, 135, 140–141. See reactions
of attaché Żaba: AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, copy of report by N. Żaba to the Ministry
of Information and Documentation, Stockholm, 30 VI 1944.
116
‘Situationen’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 2 VI 1944.
117
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, report by N. Żaba, Stockholm, 28 VIII 1943. As writes A.
N. Uggla, Den svenska Polenbilden…, pp. 29–30, one of the reviewers even stated that: ‘We
cannot believe this. This is a lie, a lie of the English propaganda. If it was about Russia, the
case would be different. But after all the Germans are an enlightened (upplyst) nation. They
do not make such shameful deeds’.
118
263
Gunnar Almstedt was, according to Norbert Żaba, one of the most intel-
ligent Swedish journalists. For some time he was employed in the Press
Department of the Legation of Great Britain. Almstedt, in agreement with
Żaba, prepared a series of five articles ‘Dagligt liv i Polen’ (‘Everyday Life in
Poland’). These were based on the materials obtained from Żaba or owing to
the interviews he facilitated. On the basis of conversations with refugees from
the General Government, the author described the German policy of exter-
mination, the fights with Polish culture and education, the development of the
Polish resistance movement, the round-ups, and system of imprisonment.
Almstedt’s interlocutors convinced him that the nation supported the Polish
government in exile, and that Moscow controlled the communist movement.119
From June 1944, the texts appeared simultaneously in nineteen provincial
periodicals. Afterwards, Żaba would to publish them as a brochure. The articles
came from the account of Henryk Pawliszyn (‘Henryk Ostoja’), a refugee who
fought in the resistance movement, and in March 1944 left Warsaw. On 21
June, in the article ‘I Cannot Forget…’ , Żaba quoted Polish women who had
escaped forced labour sites in Norway and told him about the status of women
in occupied Poland.120 They told of the obligation to work, constant street
round-ups, limitations in electricity consumption and travel, and about crimes
which ‘in the civilized world […] are encountered only in protocols concerning
more severe sexual crimes, described at court hearings, but only those on
camera.’ In ‘One Buys Their Own Life on the Black Market’, the author high-
lighted that food rations ‘are too small to keep one alive, and therefore a Pole
either needs to resort to illegal trade or die.’121 He quoted prices of basic pro-
ducts converted into Swedish crowns. The conclusion was simple, everything
was remarkably expensive and that is why everyone was trading in order to
increase their income, in spite of the fact that doing so could not only bring the
confiscation of goods but also severe reprisals from the Germans. Pawliszyn,
independently from the series published by Almstedt, also gave interviews to
various Swedish dailies, which created the basis for subsequent publications
about occupied Warsaw.122
—
119
G. Almstedt, Dagligt liv i Polen, Ängleholm 1944. The review of Almstedt’s articles was
published in the London press: ‘W Szwecji o Polsce Podziemnej. Cztery artykuły Gunnara
Almstedta’, Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, 13 VII 1944.
120
AAN, HI/I/102, translation of the article by G. Almstedt.
121
Ibidem, translation of the article by G. Almstedt, attachment to letter by Press Attaché N.
Żaba to the Ministry of Information and Documentation, Stockholm, 1 IX 1944.
122
Ibidem, letter by Press Attaché of the Polish Legation in Stockholm N. Żaba to the
Ministry of Information and Documentation (together with attachment), Stockholm, 9 VIII
1944.
264
On 6 July, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning a former corres-

pondent of Italian periodicals, Mario Vanni, published the accounts of three
Poles who escaped to Sweden. The Swedish reader learned about the round-
ups, strictly observed curfews, burning down villages, lack of medication and
hunger. Vanni highlighted:
This hellish life is everyday life. Apart from this, active fighters of the under-
ground movement are living in constant danger. Each of them carries poison,
as they would rather die than be tortured and humiliated in German prisons.
The Poles, surrounded and tracked down for the last five years, constantly in
danger, and suffering innumerable torments, have not failed. Deprived of
everything, forced numerous times to live in indignity, they have never
decided to “cooperate”. Their patriotism is so great that no Quisling would be
tolerated by them, even for a moment.123
The Polish propaganda exposed the merits of defeating Germany and proved
that the government in London was democratic and constituted the only real
representation of the nation. On 4 April, Karniol gave a lecture on the Polish
underground movement in the Swedish Social Democratic Youth League
(SSU), and on 5 and 11 May in other locations in Stockholm. On 15 June,
invited by the Commission for Foreign Affairs, he spoke about the Polish
matter in front of Swedish parliament, which was the first case in the history
of a Pole taking the floor in the Riksdag (excluding a speech in the plenary
chamber).124 In June 1944, Karniol concluded an agreement with the social
democratic magazine Aftontidningen, which started to publish the news
broadcast by the secret radio station Świt. The station was in London, but
pretended to operate in occupied Poland in defiance of the Germans. As a
result, news about guerrilla fights in the Borderlands was announced on 22
June 125 and on 3 June news broke of the victories achieved by Polish partisans.
At the same time, news was published that the Germans were transporting
thousands of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz for immediate execution.126 News
began to pour in about the evacuation of Vilnius by the Germans and the
announcement of the city’s annexation by the Soviet armies. The appeal of
the representative of the Polish government in exile called for a peaceful and
—
123
M. Vanni, ‘Det dagliga livet i Polen’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 6 VII 1944.
124
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, report by M. Karniol no. 174, Stockholm, 14 VII 1944.
125
Ibidem, note by M. Karniol no. 177, Stockholm, 18 VII 1944.
126
‘Switrapport om stor drabbning’, Aftontidningen, 3 VII 1944; IPMS, col. 133, vol. 195, note
by M. Karniol no. 179, Stockholm, 20 VII 1944; ‘Massavrättningar dagligen i Polen av
ungerska judar’, Aftontidningen, 3 VII 1944; PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, note by M. Karniol no.
178, Stockholm, 18 VII 1944.
265
friendly attitude towards the approaching army and for the setting up of a
local administration.127 However, when Prime Minister Mikołajczyk des-
cribed Vilnius as a Polish city, Svenska Dagbladet described his utterance as
unfortunate as the chances of the Polish government reaching an agreement
with Stalin were so slight.128 Subsequent reports brought news of the intensi-
fication of the Polish sabotage campaign on the railway, attacks on prisons
and Gestapo officers.129 The magazine Murarnas Fackblad on 5 May 1944
published ‘The Polish Nation is United.’ In the article it was highlighted, ‘The
only basis of the agreement [with Stalin] is the treaty of Riga’, and ‘Russia
needs to resign from the acquisitions it made with help from Hitler.’ The text
was produced based on the Swedish version of a bulletin by the PPS.130 In
another article Jacob de Geer rejected the frequent accusations of anti-
Semitism directed at the Poles. He explained that the attitude of the Poles
towards the Jews was far from the slogans of Nazi ideology. He highlighted
that one may criticise the Polish government in London for its ineptitude,
but one may not deny that it was a coalition of all the main political parties.
He stated with sympathy, ‘What we see here is a great, strong and courageous
nation, which is treated by the vile soldiery like a defenceless animal.’131
On summing up the review of the Polish publications in the Swedish press
in June 1944, Żaba stated optimistically, ‘the balance of references to and
articles about Poland […] was extremely positive.’132 In June, efforts to convey
a positive message about the politics of the Polish government were con-
tinued. Karniol advances the information bulletin he had produced. Based on
this bulletin, Trots Allt! published a note that polemicized with communist
propaganda. Its author argued that the Polish government was preparing
legal foundations to transform the agricultural structure, ‘so that the material
existence of the masses will be regulated.’ In addition, a universal suffrage
—
127
‘Vilnas tyska befolkning flyr i panik’, Aftontidningen, 7 VII 1944; PISM, col. 133, vol. 195,
note by M. Karniol no. 180, Stockholm, 20 VII 1944.
128
‘Olyckligt polskt uttalande’, Svenska Dagbladet, 18 VII 1944.
129
‘Väpnad motstånd av polsk civilbefolkning’, Aftontidningen, 19 VII 1944; PISM, col. 133,
vol. 195, note by M. Karniol no.184, Stockholm, 21 VII 1944 r.; ‘Polska partisaner stormade
fängelser’, Aftontidningen, 17 VII 1944; IPMS, col. 133, vol. 195, note by M. Karniol no. 182,
Stockholm, 21 VII 1944 r.; ‘42 Gestapoagenter dödade i Polen’, Aftontidningen, 21 VII 1944;
IPMS, kol. 133, 195, note by M. Karniol no. 181, Stockholm, 21 VII 1944.
130
IPMS, col. 133, vol. 195, note by M. Karniol no. 176, Stockholm, 18 VII 1944.
131
J. de Geer, ‘Polen i motvind’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 4 VII 1944.
132
266
was to be granted.133 Żaba on the other hand, met with the editor-in-chief of
Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, a right-wing politician and a professor of
classical philology, Claes Lindskog, to explain the condition of Polish–Soviet
relations. During the exchange, he underlined that ‘the issue of Poland is the
touchstone of Stalin’s politics towards Europe.’134 This meeting bore fruit in
the article in which Lindskog argued, ‘it is beyond any doubt that most of
Polish society recognizes the government in London and agrees with it in all
cases that concern the country’s interest.’ If a Polish–Soviet agreement is not
reached, the reason would be excessive demands from Stalin.135
At the outset of July 1944, the Naval Attaché of Poland, Commander Lieu-
tenant Marian Wolbek announced that the Poles had a chance to intercede in
the contact between the Swedish authorities and the Allies, ‘The Swedes are
aware that they are currently isolated. It is no longer profitable to be on the side
of the Germans and it is impossible for them to establish closer relations on
local ground.’ Nevertheless, what remained at odds with this announcement
was Wolbek’s belief that the Swedes cared a lot about good relations with the
Soviet Union, which automatically excluded an association with the Poles. A
Swedish opinion journalist was told by Soviet diplomats in Stockholm that
Stalin was attempting to create something similar to the Polish Kingdom that
was established following the Congress of Vienna in 1815.136 Worth noting were
the visits by former members of the Polish–Swedish Association to the Polish
Legation and the suspension, at least temporarily, of press attacks on the
government in exile. Attaché Wolbek clearly overestimated, however, the role
of the Polish diplomatic mission in the foreign policy of Sweden.137 At the same
time, Ingemar Hägglöf, who lived in Moscow, was sure that the Soviet
authorities had started to support the State National Council (KRN), which was
established by the communists in occupied Poland, as ‘the basis for the cur-
rently set up Polish civil authorities and government, while constantly keeping
—
133
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, note by M. Karniol, the delegate of Central Executive Committee
of the PPS party, Stockholm, 15 VII 1944.
134
and Documentation, Stockholm, 8 XII 1944.
135
‘Polens öde’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 31 VII 1944.
136
PISM, A 11, 49/b/sow/16, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 10 VI 1944.
137
PISM, MAR, A V 9/2, report by Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm Commander
Lieutenant M. Wolbek to head of the Intelligence Department of the Staff of Commander-
in-Chief, Stockholm, 3 VII 1944.
267
the door open for the eventual participation of the interested so-called pro-
gressive circles of Polish expatriates.’138 In his view, the KRN, was to play the
role of executive in the territories occupied by the Soviet armies, until the
government’s formation, because in its resolution it referred to the democratic
constitution of 1921 and declared the formation of a Polish army under the
command of General Michał Rola-Żymierski. It also accepted Soviet demands
concerning the border along the Curzon Line. Its delegates, who arrived in
Moscow, had already met with representatives of Great Britain and the USA.
Hägglöf reported to UD:
They personally made a good impression. Judging from the propaganda […],
their internal policy would most importantly pursue the agricultural reform,
although with preserving the right to private land ownership, and further – to
the nationalization of large-scale industry and great banks. Whereas small
sized industry will remain private.139
Based on the press commentaries on Polish affairs at that time, it is possible

to detect the atmosphere of expectation for a breakthrough and Polish–Soviet
agreement. The majority predicted that the turning point would coincide
with the visit of Mikołajczyk to Moscow at the beginning of August 1944.
Stalin, meanwhile, showed his hand earlier and announced the setting up of
the Polish Committee of National Liberation (or Lublin Committee).
Swedish reactions to the birth of the Lublin Committee

The setting up the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) in July
1944 was commented on extensively in Sweden. It was obviously an alter-
native to the Polish government in exile with executive power formed under
the auspices of Stalin. Karniol informed the leadership of the PPS:
All periodicals, irrespective of political orientation, are providing details of
the members of the Committee and are occupying themselves with the stance
of the Polish government on this matter. In most cases the Committee does
not meet with the approval of the Swedish opinion. The periodicals are de-
monstrating their apprehension about the future of Poland despite assurances
—
138
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 486, telegram by Swedish Chargé d’affaires to
Moscow I. Hägglöf to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, 5 VII 1944.
139
Ibidem.
268
from Russia that there will be no Sovietisation of Poland or Russian inter-

ference in the internal affairs of Poland.140
On its front page Pro-German Stockholms-Tidningen ran with ‘Wasilewska’s

Government in Poland – Stalin eliminates Mikołajczyk – the Poles from
Moscow ahead of the New Committee.’ It was obvious to one opinion jour-
nalist for this daily that ‘the Soviets by means of their unilateral act came a
long way towards the establishment of Russian hegemony in Europe.’ He also
stated, ‘The Polish government in London, in practical terms, was mar-
ginalized.’ The Swedes’ mode of thinking is characterized further in the note,
‘Nobody knows with whom the Polish masses sympathize. It is probable that
the KRN has better contact with its compatriots than the government in
London.’ It is hard to deny that the communist propaganda triumphed, inde-
pendently of the awareness that ‘the choice of the civil authorities to take over
the administration in Poland will be made by the Russian army.’ Other
dailies’ commentaries were less enthusiastic, but all presented basic informa-
tion about the setting up of new administrative authorities in Poland backed
by the Soviets.141
In answer, as it were, to the establishment of the PKWN, Karniol gave
interviews to more than a dozen Swedish dailies. He explained that the Polish
Underground State, which functioned under the occupation, recognized only
the Polish government in London and enjoyed the support of 95 percent of
society.142 The titles of the articles that followed were explicit, ‘London Poles
Represent 95 Percent of the Nation’, ‘Poles Support a Legal Government’ and
‘Majority of Poles Recognise the Government in London.’143
Svenska Dagbladet published ‘The Future of Poland’, which presented its
favourable attitude towards the Polish government in London. Some doubts
as to whether the body of the PKWN would be independent from Russia were
expressed simultaneously. In the commentary ‘Polish Affairs’, referring to
the so-called Realpolitik, the social democratic newspaper Morgon-Tidningen
stated, ‘The victorious Red Army is surely an argument that means more in
London and Washington than the stance of expatriates, and this refers both
—
140
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, note by M. Karniol no. 186, Stockholm, 27 VII 1944.
141
AAN, HI/I/102, internal bulletin of the Polish Telegraphic Agency, 26 VII 1944.
142
‘London-Polen representerar 95 procent av folket’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 25 VII 1944;
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, note by M. Karniol no. 186, Stockholm, 27 VII 1944.
143
‘Majoriteten av polacker gillar Londonregeringen. Intervju med för polska socialistiska
partiet’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 27 VII 1944; PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, report by
M. Karniol no. 208, Stockholm, 6 XII 1944.
269
to the Baltic States and Poland.’ An opinion journalist for Sydsvenska Dag-
bladet Snällposten claimed that Stalin was ready to make decisions concern-
ing Poland without the participation of the Polish government in London.
He was nonetheless hoping that Mikołajczyk, who ‘is a good democrat and
good patriot, but who is at the same time free from strong anti-Russian
orientation – characteristic of many Polish politicians’ – would be able to lead
them to an agreement. Stalin was aware that the PKWN had no authority in
Polish society. In case a settlement could not be reached, Poland would share
the fate of Norway and face the so-called Quisling government.144
Preparations for Mikołajczyk’s visit to Moscow were followed with in-
terest. Although, following the announcement of the declaration of the estab-
lishment of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, some com-
mentators lost hope that an independent cabinet would rule Poland. The
experiences of the Winter War were recalled, when the puppet Finnish
government was formed under the patronage of Stalin and everyone expected
the dawn of the age of the Polish Kuusinen.145
The course of the visit, from the turn of July and in to August, was fol-
lowed closely by the Swedes. They believed that the results were to determine
further the strategy towards the Polish government. The Swedish Legation in
London unofficially asked for information about the Polish Prime Minister’s
journey to Moscow. A member of the Polish delegation provided a confi-
dential and exhaustive account of the negotiations, during which Stalin
insisted that the Curzon Line be the future Polish–Soviet border. According
to the Swedish report from London, the Poles were most concerned about
the Soviet leader’s statements regarding his desire to defend the freedom of
Poland and military alliance, which was interpreted as the attempt to estab-
lish a system of Soviet garrisons in the strategically most important Polish
cities, including Szczecin, with whose future the Swedes were particularly
interested. The Poles suspected that Szczecin could not be enough for Stalin
and that he would like to take control of Bornholm, which should attract the
attention of the Swedes.146 In turn, according to the new Swedish Envoy to
Moscow, Staffan Söderblom, who was completely under the influence of his
Soviet hosts, Mikołajczyk’s mission failed, as the Polish Prime Minister
—
144
‘Polens öde’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 31 VII 1944.
145
‘Polske konseljpresidenten rekommenderas resa till Stalin’, Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 18 VII
1944; ‘Politiska utbölingar säger London-polackerna’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 25 VII 1944;
‘Polsk pjäs på rysk affisch’, Hufvudstadsbladet, 26 VII 1944; ‘Överenskommelsen mellan
Moskva och polska utskottet’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 27 VII 1944.
146
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 486, memorandum by L. [?], London, 18 VIII
1944.
270
considered the PKWN to be a puppet government from the beginning.

According to the Swedish diplomat, the common perception was that the
PKWN was to stand at the forefront of the Polish country anyway, regardless
of whether Mikołajczyk or another Polish politician from London would join
it, or not.147
Newspapers published accounts from Mikołajczyk’s stay in Moscow. On
commenting about the Polish Prime Minister’s journey to hold talks with
Stalin, a correspondent for Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning in London
explained, ‘Moscow was very courteous towards Poland and its demands were
moderate and well-motivated, and most of all – realistic.’148 An opinion jour-
nalist for Nya Dagligt Allehanda had no such illusions about the situation and
predicted that there was no chance of a Polish–Soviet agreement:
The Russians turned out to be far more astute diplomats than the Germans and
they are only using the slogan of independent and democratic Poland. Their
purpose is nevertheless the same as that of the Germans – to take control over
Poland. For everything points to the fact that the Russians are intending to set
up a government in Poland, which would be sufficiently obedient and would
become a tool for creating a new system of alliances and forcing the Curzon
Line through. In the face of the victorious march of the Soviet army, the
Western Allies would not have much to say to Eastern Europe.149
Aftontidningen announced, ‘It is beyond any doubt that the Polish Prime
Minister is doing everything he can to conclude the agreement with Moscow,
but if the news about the establishment of diplomatic relations between the
Soviet Union and the Polish Committee of National Liberation is true, the
chances of reaching even a compromise are very slim.’150 Reports about nego-
tiations in Moscow depicted two governments at loggerheads. Some Swedish
commentaries again invoked the saying about the Polish parliament (polsk
riksdag). Compromise was considered the only solution to the Polish–Soviet
dispute.151 Following his return from Moscow to London, Swedish opinion
—
147
Ibidem, note by E. von Post, Stockholm, 23 VIII 1944. Söderblom in the telegram from 29
July 1944 stated: ‘The committee is now the only actual administrative authority in the
liberated Poland.’
148
‘Moskvas krav på Polen anses vara måttliga’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 1
VIII 1944.
149
‘Polens affärer’, Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 29 VII 1944.
150
‘Mikolajczyk-Molotov i god kontakt. Dock små utsikter för kompromiss tror London’,
Aftontidningen, 3 VIII 1944.
151
K. Andersson, ‘Kompromiss London-Moskva löser nya polska krisen’, Morgon-Tidningen,
27 VII 1944; ‘Polens framtid’, Svenska Dagbladet, 27 VII 1944; D. Viklund, ‘Polackerna i
London gör sista förlikningsförsök’, Dagens Nyheter, 28 VII 1944; ‘Moskva- och London-Polen
271
journalists perceived Mikołajczyk as a statesman who was able to accept the

Curzon Line and the communists’ entry into the government as the founda-
tion for compromise with the Soviet Union.152 It was accepted with content-
ment that the leaders of the Polish underground movement supported
Mikołajczyk in his efforts to come to an agreement with Stalin.153 It should be
noted that Soviet propaganda transformed the Polish matter from a conflict
between the Soviet Union and the Polish government in to an internal dis-
pute between the London government and the PKWN. The picture was
additionally obscured by disputes in ‘Polish London’ between the political
parties over tactics towards the Soviet Union. The socialist daily Ny Tid pro-
posed that ‘the only solution to the problem is for Mikołajczyk to ignore both
the government in London and the president and take control of the adminis-
tration in Poland.’154
Activity of the Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP) in Sweden

Activities of the group of Polish communists headed by Jerzy Pański trace
back to September 1939. When the war broke out, Swedish ports held eight
Polish commercial vessels and seven fishing cutters. In the second half of
September, prior the ships’ departure to Great Britain some of the seamen
decided to desert.155 Most sought the support of the Soviet156 or German157
authorities and some decided to remain in neutral Sweden. Among these sea-
men was Jerzy Pański, the second officer of the general cargo ship Chorzów,
which lay in Gothenburg, who explained in his memoirs that the cause of his
—
väntas bilda samregering’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 31 VII 1944; ‘Molotov negligerar polska
regeringen i London’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 4 VIII 1944; ‘Mikolajczyk ej
utan chanser’, Svenska Dagbladet, 12 VIII 1944.
152
‘Lösning av polska frågan möjlig. Mikolajczyk accepterade Curzonlinjen i princip’,
Morgon-Tidningen, 13 VIII 1944.
153
‘Polens underjordiska ledare stöder Mikolajczyks förslag’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 29 VIII
1944.
154
K. J. O-n, ‘Mötet i Moskva’, Ny Tid, 23 X 1944.
155
It is not exactly known how many sailors deserted. In the literature we either find the
information that desertions were frequent or that there escaped over 40 seamen and 1 officer.
See: J. K. Sawicki, Pod flagą komodora, Gdańsk 1992, pp. 72–73; idem, Polska Marynarka
Handlowa, vol. 1: 1939–1945, Gdynia 1991, pp. 35.
156
J. K. Sawicki, Pod flagą…, p. 72: ‘Referring to their affiliation to the communist movement
and Ukrainian nationality they volunteered at the consular post of the USSR’. Among them
was coalman from the ship ‘Wilno’ Aleksy Bandura, who later became an activist of the
Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden.
157
The volunteers who appeared at the German post were immediately sent to Gdynia. See:
J. K. Sawicki, Pod flagą, p. 73.
272
desertion on 29 September 1939 was his negative attitude towards the Polish
government in exile and communist views.158 Following the conclusion of the
Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, communists across Europe lost the ideological
support of Moscow in the political fight with the Nazis. For them, the war
with Hitler was not a just war, although Pański hoped that this would change.
The stance of the communist parties was considered by us to be transitory,
tactical. It was hard to imagine a coexistence with Fascism. Sooner or later
there must have come the moment of armed intervention, and then the libera-
tion of Poland in alliance with the Soviet Union seemed inevitable […]. We
trusted the policy of the workers’ left and we believed that ultimately all that
was beneficial for the International Labour Movement would be also bene-
ficial for Poland.159
On 30 September the group of seamen headed by Pański turned themselves

in to the police to obtain refugee status. Pański explained that he would not
go to Great Britain nor could he return to Poland, for, as he argued, ‘he was
a member of an anti-Nazi organization.’160 He expressed a wish to travel to
the Soviet Union. Other seamen likely did not share this intention, as police
reports confirmed that they wanted to remain under the supervision of
Swedish social services.161 Pański maintains in his memoirs that at the very
beginning of his stay in Sweden he established contact with local commu-
nists. The police took note of his meetings with a Lithuanian woman, Raja
Prottas, who was a Swedish citizen and suspected of illegal political activity,
which in police jargon probably meant being a communist. When it trans-
pired that Prottas was planning to hide Pański from the police, the Swedish
authorities decided on 7 December to deport the Poles and refuse them the
right to return to Sweden.162 The execution of this order was suspended due
to the on-going war and the occupation of Poland. The seamen were taken in
to custody. In the spring of 1940, they were moved to a prison camp in
Långmora, Dalarna province. During his stay in jail, Pański applied for a
Soviet visa, which was granted to him. Nevertheless, he refused to accept it
—
158
On the circumstances of J. Pański’s escape from the vessel, see ibidem, pp. 79–80.
159
J. Pański, Wachta lewej burty, Gdynia 1965, pp. 39–40.
160
RA-Arninge, SÄPO arkiv, P 2406 Jerzy Pański, löp 2, memorandum concerning the Polish
citizen and currently stateless navy officer, J. Pański.
161
Ibidem.
162
AAN, ZPPwSz, 434/3, excerpt from protocol of the Royal Board of Social Affairs (K.
Socialstyrelsen) from 7 XII 1939, pp. 18–19. The people who were to be subjected to deporta-
tions included: Jan Hins, Augustyn Jeka, Austin Lorenc (so written in Swedish text), Jerzy
Pański, Jan Papuga, Sergiusz Patejeruk.
273
due to family reasons, as he allegedly became engaged to a Swedish woman,

Gunvor Linde.163 In December 1940, Pański was released on the condition
that he would work on a Swedish ship. He was required to register with the
police on a regular basis. Initially he worked on a tanker running along routes
in the northern Baltic Sea. According to his memoirs, the vessel was tor-
pedoed. Later he decided to work as a lumberjack. In 1941 he became a farm
worker and in 1942 he enrolled in several month-long training courses for
workers, organized in Uppsala. After completing the courses, which were
financed by the Swedish authorities, he was assigned to work as a turner in a
furniture factory in Mariestad. In the autumn of 1943 he travelled to
Stockholm to continue his education and there he renewed his acquaintance
with the seamen he had once worked with, and acquainted himself with other
Polish refugees. He made contact with the Soviet Legation to become learn
of opportunities for evacuation to the Soviet Union.164 Sweden started to
receive news about the formation of the Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP) in
Moscow. Pański aspired to form a group of Poles to support the communists
acting under the patronage of Stalin. He wanted the group to possess a certain
organisational form. Whereas the instructions from Moscow and the direct
aegis of the USSR were to be its ideological foundation.165
In 1943, following the break-up of Polish–Soviet relations, and especially
in 1944, when after the conference in Tehran the picture of Poland’s future
under Stalin’s control started to become clearer, Pański became an important
figure both for the staff of the Soviet Legation in Stockholm and for the Polish
communists in Moscow. Based on his group it was possible to create a coun-
terbalance of sorts, at least in terms of propaganda, to the diplomatic repre-
sentation of the Polish government in exile.
According to Pański’s report, the founding committee of the Union of
Polish Patriots in Sweden was appointed in November 1943166 and at the time
the principal tasks of the organisation were included in its statute: conducting
cultural and educational activity among the members in line with the spirit
of patriotism and democracy, establishing contact and cooperation with
similar organisations abroad as well as providing mutual help. Each Pole who
—
163
RA-Arninge, SÄPO arkiv, P 2406 Jerzy Pański, löp no. 1, copy of report, Stockholm, 13 II
1940, p. 2–3.
164
J. Pański, Wachta…, p. 136.
165
In January 1945 A. Kollontai reminded the headquarters about the support that was
granted to the Polish communists in Sweden: ‘Upon the order of the NKID we set up a local
branch of the Union of Polish Patriots in Stockholm.’ Quoted after: W. Materski,
Dyplomacja Polski „lubelskiej”. Lipiec 1944 – marzec 1947, Warsaw 2007, p. 33.
166
Ibidem, p. 141.
274
accepted the statute of the union could become a member of the organisation.
A membership fee of 1 crown a month was mandatory.167 In December of
1943, Pański was to contact the ZPP in Moscow, specifically Zygmunt
Modzelewski, who was a political-educational officer of the Polish army in
the USSR. It should be highlighted at this point though that although this
information seems likely, in the surviving documentation there are neither
traces adopting a form of organisation prior to August 1944 nor of Pański’s
contacts with Moscow prior to October 1944.168 The statute provisions, which
are recalled by Pański in his memoirs, are identical with those contained in
the statute adopted in August 1944. There is no doubt that already in 1943
people from Pański’s circle began campaigning within Polish circles in
Sweden. In July 1943, they reached the Polish Home in Traneberg (on the
outskirts of Stockholm) where groups of 30–50 Polish refugees remained
under the care of the Polish Legation during the war. Due to the very poor
facilities there and difficulties providing sufficient food for the refugees, the
agitation of the ZPP brought positive results, which Envoy Henryk
Sokolnicki underestimated. He wrote to Minister of Foreign Affairs Tadeusz
Romer in September 1943, ‘The news that communism is spreading there
and that it is the object of the Soviet propaganda are greatly exaggerated.’169
Nevertheless, it was the house in Traneberg that was considered by Pański to
be an adequate place to conduct agitation. And although first attempts to win
keen supporters were unsuccessful, he emphasized, ‘my colleagues who
visited the refugees’ house in Traneberg assured me that our initiative was
met with interest.’170
—
167
AAN, ZPPwSz, 434/1, The Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden. Statute, p. 1.
168
It seems that Pański was closest to the truth in 1946, when, during a questioning
conducted by the Special Committee for Fraud and Economic Harmfulness Prevention in
Warsaw, he said: ‘As far as I remember, in July or in August 1944 I founded the Union of
Polish Patriots in Sweden and through the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm I established
contact with the Union of Polish Patriots in Moscow’. See: AMSZ, iss. 6, w. 78, vol. 1163,
transcript of the testimony of the witness [Jerzy Pański] put down on 30 September 1946 in
the Executive Office of the Special Commission in Warsaw, 5 X 1946 r., p. 4. Cf. S.
Jędrychowski, Przedstawicielstwo PKWN w Moskwie, Warszawa 1987, pp. 178–180.
169
A. N. Uggla, I nordlig hamn…, p. 149.
170
J. Pański, Wachta., pp. 136–137. Communist agitation in the Polish Home in Traneberg
was conducted by Iwan Tremtiaczy(j), who earlier became acquainted with socialist Jan
Masiak and found himself there thanks to the his recommendation. The police record of the
account by Kajetan Łowczyński, director of the post, indicates that Tremtiaczy was a
communist agent whose task was to win the Polish refugees’ trust towards the Polish authori-
ties in Moscow which were currently being formed. He became the leader of the Home’s
residents who were dissatisfied with their situation and sought every occasion to criticise the
Polish Legation. At the same time he informed everybody about the opportunity to join the
Polish army of General Berling. According to the police intelligence, Tremtiaczy had close
275
The propagandist offensive build up by the Soviet diplomacy in Sweden

drew the attention of the Polish Legation and related officers of the Polish
intelligence. By the outset of 1944, the Soviet propagandist apparatus had
grown. A note from an anonymous author (probably an employee of the
Polish Legation in Stockholm) from February 1944 highlighted, ‘What
becomes evident is the great advance of Soviet propaganda and the growth of
Soviet influence both in the press and the Swedish publishing industry.’171
Nevertheless, the presence of Pański’s group and its cooperation with the
Soviet Legation had gone unnoticed for a long time. The Polish intelligence
instead turned its attention to Aleksy Bandura, who was described as the
pillar of the Soviet intelligence.172 At the time his ambition seemed to be
becoming leader of Free Ukraine, just as Pański aspired to become head of
the Poles in Sweden. In February 1944 agents of the Swedish Security Service
(SÄPO) recorded Bandura’s meeting with the agents of the Soviet intelli-
gence. During this meeting Bandura was to show his support for the separa-
tist Ukrainian state, return the money he received for his espionage and from
that moment on await the conflict between the USSR and Great Britain.
Bandura’s actions were beyond the control of the Soviet Legation, and were
—
relations with the Soviet Legation and frequently met with the members of its personnel.
Allegedly, on 8 April 1944, he was to hand over a fourteen-page paper on the subject of Polish
intelligence agents hired in the Polish Legation. Following his dismissal from Traneberg he
hired himself in Grand Hotel. During the police hearing he told an incredible story about his
work on Swedish ships, his return to Gdynia during the occupation, his arrest in Kraków
and brutal Gestapo interrogations, and eventually his escape and making his way by ship to
Sweden at the outset of November 1943. Over the first few weeks he stayed in Traneberg,
and at the end of December 1943 he hired himself as a kitchen porter in Grand Hotel, where
he worked until 1 February 1944. After that for a month he became a commandant of the
camp in Fiskeboda. Later he returned to Stockholm and his work as a kitchen porter, but this
time in Carlton hotel. He denied that there existed a communist organisation among the
Polish refugees, he refused to admit that he was engaging himself in the communist
propaganda, although he did not hide that he was in favour of communism. In spite of all
that in the spring of 1944 it was still too early to turn to the Swedish authorities with the idea
of creating an organisation which was to represent the future Polish government elite while
being subordinated to Stalin. See: MUST arkiv, Försvarsstaben, Säkerhetsavdelningen, F VIII
e, vol. 31, police pro memorias concerning Polish citizen Iwan Tremtiaczy, 8 V 1944; police
report, 8 V 1944.
171
IPMS, A 9, VI 21/1, note ‘Wzrost wpływów sowieckich w Szwecji’ (Increasing Soviet
influence in Sweden), 10 II 1944.
172
On the suspicions of the Swedish police and recording facts connected with Bandura’s spy
activity in favour of the Soviet Union see: RA-Arninge, SÄPO arkiv, P 4701 Aleksy Bandura,
letter by M. Lundqvist (SÄPO) to M. Rosenström (Statens utlänningskommission), 14 II
1945. The document contains a strictly confidential recommendation that Bandura was
refused a permit to stay in Stockholm. According to the sources of SÄPO, Bandura took
pictures of industrial and military sites as well as repeatedly met with the residents of the
NKVD in Stockholm.
276
therefore limited. In August 1944, he would become a close partner of Pański

and a co-founder of the ZPP. It is not known how he was convinced to
continue the cooperation with the intelligence services. The Soviet propa-
ganda, in which he started to engage himself from that moment on, appealed
to the political realism of its audience. It was argued that the Red Army would
soon annex half of Europe, including all of Poland. Next, free elections would
take place and a government representative for the Polish society was to be
appointed, as opposed to the government in exile. It was also argued that
Great Britain and the USA would not stand on the side of the government in
exile, as their priority was to avoid a conflict with the Soviet Union.173
Initially the ZPP was managed by Mihail Vetrov. From 16 July, prepara-
tions to present it to a wider audience were directed by Vladimir Semenov.
The day before, Pański met with an employee of the Soviet Legation,
Oleynikov, among others, to discuss the forming of a branch of the ZPP in
Stockholm. The intention was to find Swedish citizens who could guarantee
the new organisation to the Swedish authorities.174
The breakthrough came with the formation of the PKWN and the an-
nouncement of its programme manifesto in July 1944. From that moment
Pański’s group, which was focused around the Soviet Legation, became an
international branch of the new political elites that were being formed in
Poland. An important occurrence was pointed out by Maurycy Karniol. He
noticed in October 1944 that together with the wave of refugees from Norway
and Finland the social structure of the Polish community in Sweden was
changing: ‘The refugees in Sweden were for the most part not divided into
supporters of the government and supporters of the Union of Patriots in
Moscow. Usually very few of them were pro-democratic. The majority of the
Polish refugees in Sweden were representatives of bureaucracy, landowners
and the families of military men staying in England. […] That explained why
the character of the local Polish colony was reactionary, both socially and poli-
tically, and they usually did not differentiate between the terms socialism and
communism, both of which were used to spread fear. Nevertheless, the situa-
tion changed with the illegal influx of Poles from Poland and Poles from
Norway and Finland. These included peasants, workers, craftsmen, working
intelligentsia, as well as a considerable number of youths. The members of the
former reactionary colony either emigrated to England or soaked into the local
—
173
PISM, A 11, 85/b/18, note by Colonel S. Gano ‘Zamierzenia sowieckie’ (Soviet plans), n.d.,
n.p. (supplement to the letter from 24 II 1944).
174
PISM, A XII, 3/41, note by Colonel S. Gano ‘Związek Patriotów Polskich w Szwecji’
(Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden), 14 VIII 1944.
277
bureaucratic apparatus, and even though some of them retained their sphere
of influence, their reduced numbers made them a minority.’175 At the outset of
August 1944, in a confidential letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Envoy
Sokolnicki, referring to information from the intelligence, predicted that the
Soviet Legation would found a branch of the PKWN. At the same time
Sokolnicki asked for information regarding the status of Polish–Soviet rela-
tions, maintaining that this was necessary to conduct a propagandist counter-
campaign. What he also considered indispensable in the current conditions
was increasing the subsidies from the Ministry of Social Welfare to support the
refugees, because it was obvious that ‘the suspension of these payments would
make the Soviets’ work much easier.’176 Several notes regarding this matter,
written by the head of the Department of Information and Intelligence of the
Staff of Commander-in-Chief, Colonel Stanisław Gano, prove that the
development of the activity of the ZPP in Sweden enjoyed much interest from
the Polish intelligence. Karniol, who criticised the method of surveillance,
claimed that it would be advisable to conduct a cultural campaign among the
refugees rather than to focus on recruiting snoopers.
The reconstruction of the details of the organisational-propagandist
action of Jerzy Pański, which was conducted by means of the Soviet diplo-
matic services in Sweden is not an easy task, due to the disparity of informa-
tion announced by various sources. What is clear is that we can agree with
the conclusion of the report prepared by the Polish intelligence: ‘In August
1944 the Soviet Legation in Stockholm set about forming a branch of the
Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden.’177 That moment was mentioned by
Pański in February 1945 during one of his speeches to the public. He said that
the ZPP had existed for six months, during which it had to overcome many
obstacles, including that many considered it a communist organisation.178
Based on intelligence reports from Stockholm on 5 August 1944 in the head-
quarters of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) a ceremony of the
opening of the ZPP (Union of Polish Patriots) in Sweden was held.179
—
175
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, report by M. Karniol no. 205, Stockholm, 20 X 1944.
176
PISM, A 9, VI 21/1, letter by Envoy H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (no.
85) received on 2 VIII 1944.
177
PISM, A 9, E/26, report ‘Działalność »patriotów polskich« w Szwecji’ (Activity of ‘Polish
patriots’ in Sweden), 9 II 1945. The ending is missing from the document. The Swedish
police was of the same opinion, see RA-Arninge, SÄPO arkiv, P 2406 Jerzy Pański, löp 2, pro
memorias concerning Polish citizen and currently stateless navy officer J. Pański.
178
RA-Arninge, SÄPO arkiv, P 2406 Jerzy Pański, löp 2, pro memoria, Sztokholm, 27 II 1945,
p. 75.
179
In the last sentence of the report an important information was provided: ‘if the Swedish
trade union […] had known that this was the Soviets’ work – they would have never agreed to
278
The endeavour nevertheless turned out to be unsuccessful due to the poor

attendance of Polish citizens. One of the SÄPO agents explained what was to
be obtained by Pański from the Soviet diplomats prior to the meeting: ‘Do
not order spy work, but manage the work so that every member considers its
duty to be watching everything that is being done by the others.’180 As there
was scarce interest from the refugees, the meeting was concluded quickly.
The Soviets blamed Pański for the weak and ineffective propaganda. He was
accused of exaggerating his influence among the Poles in Sweden. The
previously prepared membership cards turned out to be unnecessary. The
information-propagandist materials were identified by Polish intelligence as
a translation of the Soviet bulletins published in Stockholm. The activists of
the ZPP justified the absence of the refugees with the sudden reluctance of
the Poles towards the Soviet Union in connection with the suspension of
military operations on the front following the start of the rising in Warsaw.181
Following the meeting on 5 August, which was considered an embarrass-
ment by the Soviet diplomats, questions regarding the future of the ZPP in
Sweden were taken on by the first secretary of the legation, Vasiliy Razin.
Georg Branting, a well-known leftist activist and lawyer and the son of
Hjalmar Branting, a former eminent social democratic leader (until his death
in 1925), and who remained in touch with the diplomats, advised the organi-
sation to engage people who were known and admired by the Poles.
Negotiations were conducted with Zbigniew Folejewski, among others, who
was a Polish language teacher at Stockholm University. He was even men-
tioned as a member of the ZPP, although, as far as we know, he eventually
refused to affiliate himself with the organisation. The Soviet Legation advised
Pański to visit the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Colonel Gano high-
lighted, ‘According to information from a reliable source, Pański did not visit
the Secretary-General Boheman or any other official of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Branting, a lawyer, had paid them a visit, however. He could
have heard from Boheman that the Swedish government did not have its
representative to the Polish government in London or at the Polish govern-
—
leave their room at their disposal’; PISM, A XII, 3/41, strictly confidential note by Colonel S.
Gano ‘Zebranie organizacyjne ZPP w Szwecji’ (Organizational meeting of ZPP in Sweden), 13
IX 1944. M. Karniol in his report provides the date of 4 August, see PISM, col. 133, vol. 195,
report by M. Karniol no. 205, Stockholm, 20 X 1944.
180
RA-Arninge, SÄPO arkiv, P 2406 Jerzy Pański, löp 2, memorandum concerning Polish
citizen and currently stateless navy officer J. Pański, n.p., n.d.
181
PISM, A XII, 3/41, note by Colonel S. Gano ‘Zebranie organizacyjne ZPP w Szwecji’, 13
IX 1944.
279
ment in Lublin, and that the Swedish government would not oppose the for-
mation of the ZPP in Sweden.182 The Swedish authorities allowed organisa-
tions of this sort, but they were prohibited from political campaigning.
Cultural campaigning was permitted though. It appears that the half-solution
was decided by the increasingly conspicuous Soviet advantage over Central
Europe. In practice the Union was able to continue its propagandist activity,
and the diplomatic mission of the Polish government, which was still recog-
nized by Sweden, did not seem under threat, as it could count on official
support from the Swedish authorities.
In another note, Gano, channeling Razin, wrote, ‘the issue of the Union of
Polish Patriots is progressing with much difficulty and in fact nothing has
been achieved so far.’183 Nevertheless, on the same day a note was written that
conveyed the content of the cynical Soviet instruction given to the ZPP in
Sweden.184 The establishment of the ZPP would lead to a split among the Poles
in Sweden and to a withdrawal, at least for some of them, from the Polish
Legation in Stockholm. The pro-Soviet attitude of the Poles was to be
nurtured by instilling in them that ‘it is Stalin who grants freedom to Poland,
and not England or America.’ The commitment of spying and informing on
others was introduced. Contact with the Soviet Legation was reserved for a
small circle of the management of the ZPP and it was advised that this
privilege was not flaunted. It was considered advisable that the news-sheet be
published regularly and information that 75 percent of Polish refugees
belonged to the Union be promoted. The news-sheet advised, ‘To try to
convince people that the Polish government in London is a band of thieves
invoking the false constitution together with the stupid Atlantic Charter.’ At
the end it was proposed, ‘Make the members of the Union believe that the
London government works with the Gestapo.’185 On the next day com-
mentary on the note said, ‘the authenticity of the instruction [is] question-
able’, but the hints it contained were confirmed by the actions of the ZPP.
What draws most attention is the endless slander of the Polish government
in exile and the diplomatic mission in Stockholm.186 It is also worth pointing
out the consequent passing over of the question of close cooperation with the
—
182
Ibidem. Cf. J. Pański, Wachta…, pp. 144–145; A. N. Uggla, I nordlig hamn…, p. 151.
183
PISM, A XII, 3/41, note by Colonel S. Gano ‘Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego’, 14 IX
1944.
184
Ibidem, note by Colonel S. Gano ‘Instrukcja ramowa dla ZPP w Szwecji’, 14 IX 1944.
185
Ibidem.
186
280
Soviet Legation, which was particularly notable in J. Pański’s memoirs,187 as

well as the simultaneous emphasizing of harassment directed at the members
of the ZPP from Poles who were connected with the Polish Legation.188 Pański
followed Razin’s instructions from November 1944, so as to avoid official
contact with the Soviet Legation and so that he could meet with Razin in
neutral locations. This was to drive back the accusations towards the ZPP that
it was created by the Soviet authorities.189
Despite the failures in acquiring new members, Pański was not discouraged
and consequently pursued his objectives. The intelligence service of the Polish
Armed Forces in the West recorded the attempts to recruit people who could
report on the situation in the Polish Legation and the talks with the refugees
from the occupied territories. This could lead to the obtaining of information
of military significance. On 18 August, the Union published the one-off news-
paper Polska Wyzwolona (Poland Liberated), which contained the most
important legal acts of the KRN and discussed the PKWN’s activities. Whereas
every week, from 25 September the modestly edited Informator Związku
Patriotów Polskich w Szwecji (The Guide of the Union of Polish Patriots in
Sweden) was to be published. According to Pański’s the print runs were issue
1, 100 copies; issue 2, 200 copies and issue 3, 250 copies.
The meeting of the management of the ZPP, which consisted of seven
individuals, took place on 25 August. During the meeting both the statute and
the organisation’s authorities were approved. Jerzy Pański became chair,
Aleksy Bandura, vice-chair, Norbert Kopeć (replaced by Feliks Spała), secre-
tary, Tadeusz Borśniowski, treasurer and the members of the board were Leon
Mandel and Hanna Mohr. The participants agreed the details of the subsequent
meeting for the refugees, which was to take place on 31 August. On this occa-
sion, the organizers presented themselves as the supporters of the PKWN. The
meeting, which was attended approximately a dozen people,190 was interrupted
by Franciszek Górniak, who called it illegal, as the Polish Legation was not
—
187
Apart from the aforementioned contact with the Legation when it comes to the issue of
eventual evacuation to the Polish army which was being formed in the USSR, Pański men-
tioned in his memoirs the support of the cultural department of the Soviet diplomatic mis-
sion at the organisation of the screening of the newsreel service devoted to the Polish affairs
(p. 146) and the fact that he became acquainted with the Soviet representative in Stockholm
A. Kollontai (p. 151).
188
J. Pański, Wachta., pp. 145, 148. The agents of Polish intelligence were to beat up two
activists of the Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden: Tremtiaczy and Sawczuk.
189
IPMS, A XII, 3/41, note by Colonel S. Gano ‘ZPP w Szwecji’, 13 XI 1944.
190
Foreign Affairs, 9 IX 1944. The document contains the information that 24 people took part
in the meeting.
281
involved. As a result ‘the Polish refugees exited with cries of “Down with the
Committee.”’191 According to Polish intelligence, Semenov, afraid of another
embarrassment, sent a message to Moscow that the meeting had been attended
by a hundred people and that those who had caused a disruption had been
removed.192 On 2 September, in Aftontidningen the article ‘Poles in Sweden are
Granting Their Support to the Lublin Government’ was published. Subsequent
meetings of a small group of activists of the ZPP took place in the headquarters
of the Soviet Legation. Here newsreels and documentaries devoted to Poland
were also shown.193 At the same time, the Soviet Legation started to collect in-
formation about those who showed without reserve their aversion towards the
ZPP, together with the addresses of their families in Poland.194 On 15 September
Pański appeared at the Press department of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and requested registration as a correspondent of the Polpress agency.
He was told that nobody had heard of such an agency and that the only agency
known to them was the Polish Telegraphic Agency (PAT), the correspondent
for which already resided in Sweden.195 With support from the Soviet Legation,
however, Pański was accredited at the Press department of Utrikesdeparte-
mentet as a correspondent of the Polpress agency on 18 September. The agency
had been established in Moscow by the ZPP and the central press organisation
of the ZPP in Moscow, the Wolna Polska (Free Poland).196 At the time Pański
considered changing the name of the organisation to the Division of the Union
of National Liberation, which could be treated as a first step to the official
representation of the PKWN.197 Walter Taub of the Czech News Agency
—
191
Ibidem. Eleven people ‘protested and, manifesting their support for the Government and
the fighting Warsaw, ostentatiously left the room’. In the room remained ‘board members
(5), our agents (2) and four Jews – communists […] and two women citizens of Danzig –
communists.’
192
IPMS, A 9, E/26, report ‘Działalność »patriotów polskich« w Szwecji’, 9 II 1945. The end-
ing is missing from the document.
193
According to the Pański’s account: ‘Hundreds of people were coming to the cinema to
watch the screenings, the small room was usually full’, see: J. Pański, Wachta., p. 146.
194
195
PISM, A XII, 3/41, note by Colonel S. Gano ‘ZPP w Szwecji’, 10 X 1944.
196
It is worth to note that the current editor-in-chief of Wolna Polska was a namesake of the
head of the Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden, Jerzy Pański (1900–1979) – a literary critic,
a translator, an opinion journalist and a political activist. The first editor-in-chief of the
weekly was Jerzy Borejsza (as of 1 March 1943). Pański took over this post on 20 July 1944
and held it until 1 March 1945, when he was replaced by Roman Juryś.
197
PISM, A XII, 3/41, strictly confidential note by Colonel S. Gano ‘ZPP w Szwecji – zmiana
nazwy’, 13 [?] IX 1944.
282
(Československá tísková kancelář, or ČTK) played an important role in fami-

liarizing Pański with the circle of international correspondents. He acquainted
Pański with people who were later persuaded to use the Polpress news service
as well as information from the Polish–London journalists.198 The service
provided by Pański discredited the Polish government in exile and the Polish
Armed Forces in the West. In official speeches Pański described Commander-
in-Chief General Sosnkowski as a self-appointed commander, a fascist and an
enemy of the people. In his view, ‘The Polish army, which stays in England, is
not actually fighting.’ He also maintained, ‘Officers sit back, do nothing and
collect their inflated wages for the simple reason that they hold an officer
rank.’199 Another crucial role was played by Stanisław Milczarek, an employee
of the Czechoslovak diplomatic mission in Stockholm, who was a Polish citizen
before the war. He recorded information about the Polish Legation staff for
future purposes as he claimed, ‘to make their stay in Europe difficult’ in the
event they remained abroad as expatriates.200
It was only on 8 September 1944 that Pański sent a telegram to Lublin,
where he informed the PKWN that, ‘the Union of Polish Patriots has been
established in Stockholm and is operating on the same basis as the Polish
Committee of National Liberation’, and asked to be contacted.201 In October
1944, the management of the ZPP asked the PKWN for its official recognition
and patronage.202 On 12 October a report was sent to the PKWN with a des-
cription of the situation of the Poles in exile, consisting of various professions
– researchers, students and seamen – and numbering about one thousand.203
The authors of the report discredited the role of the Polish Legation. They
argued that the Polish diplomats, supporters and people trusted by the Nazis
were extremely unpopular among the refugees due to their laziness and
organisational ineptitude. The weak position of the Polish government’s dip-
lomatic mission was, according to them, the consequence of ‘the constantly
emerging acts of corruption, negligence and sympathy for Fascism’, and the
only ways to influence the refugees was to threaten them with deprivation of
—
198
PISM, A XII, 3/41, note by Colonel S. Gano ‘ZPP w Szwecji’, 3 XI 1944.
199
Ibidem.
200
PISM, A XII, 3/41, note by Colonel S. Gano ‘ZPP w Szwecji’, 15 IX 1944.
201
RA-Arninge, SÄPO arkiv, P 2406 Jerzy Pański, copy of telegram by J. Pański to the
PKWN, Stockholm, 8 IX 1944. The document was translated into Swedish from Russian.
202
AAN, ZPP w ZSRR, 216/29, report by the Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden no. 2, 30 X
1944, p. 13–14a. The authors highlight in the report that: ‘The attempts to reach an agree-
ment, both written and telegraphic, have so far been insufficient’.
203
This number was in accordance with the data announced in September 1944 by the
Swedish authorities, see: A. N. Uggla, I nordlig hamn…, p. 41.
283
help or bribe them with donations. Pański unfolded his vision, not so much
of breaking up Polish circles in Sweden but of moving into the political
vacuum. Referring to the opinion of the Soviet diplomatic mission, the
management of the ZPP suggested a need to create an official representation
of the PKWN in Sweden. The report revealed that the ZPP’s leader, Jerzy
Pański, had great ambitions, ‘The Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden has
sufficient orientation, organisational skills and qualified manpower to engage
in the preparatory work in this direction.’204 At the same time he added to the
contrary, ‘Our own chances are small at the moment. We have neither the
instructions that would help us conduct our work nor the access to your
documents and literature, and no sufficient material resources whatsoever.’
He pointed to the benefit resulting from the establishment of political and
economic relations with Sweden, which was ready to grant loans.205
According to the report, the moment of the formation of the ZPP in Sweden
was thought to be the meeting of 25 August 1944, which confirms speculation
that Pański was formerly the leader of an informal (and, it seems, a nameless)
small group, which remained in touch with the Soviet Legation.206 The report
stated that the ZPP in Sweden consisted of 82 members, which seems to be
an exaggeration. It was added that there was a constant rotation of the
members due to travel to Great Britain and the influx of new people. In the
correspondence of the ZPP, the Polish Legation in Sweden was presented as
sufficiently disgraced and of no threat to activities undertaken in the name of
the communist movement and the PKWN. All the more so that the Swedish
government, despite continuous recognition of the Polish government in
London, had not yet adopted any position regarding internal Polish affairs.
According to the already quoted report, the Polish Legation in Stockholm
tried to counteract the expansion of the group’s influence through acts of
violence towards the communist activists. There were reports of assaults,
break-ins, brawls during meetings, the removal of benefits from Poles who
—
204
AAN, ZPP w ZSRR, 216/29, report by the Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden, 12 X 1944,
p. 6–12.
205
Ibidem.
206
The management of the Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden passed the meeting of 5
August in silence. It seems that it was not the idea of the Polish intelligence. Pański could not
consider it a success, therefore he said nothing about it. Similar was the case with the meeting
of 31 August. It would be also hard to imagine that the statute was adopted and the board
was chosen only after the Swedish authorities had given their permission for the activity of
the organisation. Rather, these organisational measures were confirmed only then. Cf. IPMS,
A XII, 3/41, strictly confidential note by Colonel S. Gano ‘Zebranie organizacyjne ZPP w
Szwecji’, 13 IX 1944; AAN, ZPPwSz, 434/4, excerpt from the protocol of the Union of Polish
Patriots in Sweden produced on 5 X 1944, p. 16.
284
enrolled in the ZPP and informing on the supporters of the organisation to

the Swedish authorities for being dangerous elements.207 Pański reported a
burglary to the Swedish police and a theft that was to take place in his
apartment on 29 September 1944.208 It is hard to escape the fact that this event
coincided with the propagandist campaign in the press, which popularized
the information about the assassinations of the supporters of the PKWN by
soldiers of the Home Army.209 According to the police report, no traces of
burglary and no fingerprints were found in Pański’s apartment.210 According
to the ZPP management, gaining the support of all Poles was very easy –
namely, by granting them financial support which was so far provided only
by the Polish Legation. Following the failure of the action, conducted with
the help of the Soviet Legation, it has been concluded, ‘The recognition of our
union by the PKWN would have a decisive impact on the further develop-
ment of the Union of Polish Patriots. It was also highlighted, ‘This would give
us extra room for manoeuvre within the Polish colony in relation to the
Swedish authorities.’ In the conclusion it was stressed, ‘This would increase
the number of members, and most importantly, attract a greater number of
representatives of the Polish intelligentsia than before.’ In response, the head
of the PKWN Edward Osóbka-Morawski sent an invitation telegram to
Pański, which he treated as the first written evidence that the PKWN recog-
nized the organization. The activists of the ZPP, encouraged by the telegram,
drew up another report discussing the current situation of the Polish
refugees, the activity of the Polish Legation and the possibilities of entering
commercial negotiations with Sweden and obtaining humanitarian aid from
the Swedes as well as making Stockholm an opinion forming centre for other
countries. The management of the ZPP in Sweden argued, ‘Sweden as a
neutral country has gained special meaning in Europe. It is Europe’s window
to the world, a forum for exchanging international views, and at the very least
a source of information for Europe, as well as one of the few countries which
preserved their production and export facilities.’ That is why, ‘the existence
of the representation of Democratic Poland – the PKWN – becomes neces-
sary in the Swedish territory.’ Another request emerged that directives and
—
207
‘Polska striden ger eko i Stockholm?’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 3 X 1944. Cf. A.
N. Uggla, I nordlig hamn…, pp. 155–156.
208
209
‘Moskva och Lublin varna för polskt inbördeskrig’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-
Tidning, 16 IX 1944.
210
RA-Arninge, SÄPO arkiv, P 2406 Jerzy Pański, copy of pro memoria, Stockholm, 29 IX
1944, p. 62.
285
instructions were sent to the ZPP, and that in turn, it proposed that all Polish
citizens staying in Sweden be registered.211
Suspicion arises that the attempts to establish close contacts with the
PKWN resulted from Pański’s declining position among the staff of the
Soviet Legation. Towards the close of October 1944, Razin was dissatisfied
with Pański’s activities, as they did not bring the desired results contrary to
initial announcements of the leader of the ZPP in Sweden.212
In the reply telegram sent from Moscow on 13 November 1944, the repre-
sentative of the PKWN Stefan Jędrychowski assured Pański that he would be
granted a fixed fee as a correspondent for the Polpress press agency and that
the ZPP in Sweden would be given substantial funds to help the refugees. At
the same time, he advised that the Poles who were staying in Sweden be
registered, which would be helpful in preparation for repatriation. Personal
details were to be sent to Moscow on an continuous basis. Jędrychowski was
interested primarily in the military specialists and activists of democratic
parties who could be transported to Poland immediately. In addition, the
ZPP was asked to provide information about all the cases of Poles being per-
secuted by London agents so the PKWN to prepare an appropriate demarche
to the Swedish Envoy to Moscow. The ZPP was also to collect evidence
implicating agents of the London mission in a cooperation with the Nazi spy
network.213 Starting from autumn 1944, therefore, the ZPP in Sweden began
to play the role of an unofficial representative of PKWN. The group of related
activists included mostly the fugitives from Finland, Norway and Germany,
who were unwilling to leave and join the Polish army in Great Britain:
Kazimierz Kozłowski, Franciszek Pierkiel and Henryk Świętochowski (who
fled from the Todt Organisation in Norway), Józef Bick (a refugee of Jewish
origin who came to Sweden from Finland), Ludwik Prigonikier (an escapee
from a prisoner camp in Germany) and Andrzej Gołuchowski.214
—
211
AAN, ZPPwZSRR, 216/29, report by the Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden no. 2, 30 X
1944, p. 13–14a.
212
213
AAN, ZPPwSz, 434/4, telegram by representative of the PKWN in Moscow, S. Jędry-
chowski, to J. Pański from 12 XI 1944, p. 15. The telegram was written in Russian.
214
PISM, A 11, VI 21/590, letter by Envoy H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
26 III 1945.
286
7. The Double Game of Swedish Diplomacy
(from the De-Facto Recognition of the Lublin Committee
Poland to the Establishment of De Jure Relations)
The rising in Warsaw from a Swedish perspective

The establishment of organisational structures by the Polish communists in
Sweden coincided with the outbreak of the rising in Warsaw. Aftontidningen
was likely the first newspaper to announce this fact on 3 August.1 The rising
was started by the Home Army (Armia Krajowa or AK) led by gen. Tadeusz
Bór-Komorowski. The purpose of the rising was to seize the city before Soviet
troops reached it to demonstrate that the Polish resistance movement ans-
wered to the Polish government in London, which was the true host of the
country. The underground army was, however, insufficiently armed and
quickly suffered heavy losses. The rising lasted for 63 days until 2 October
when gen. Bór-Komorowski capitulated. About 16 thousand insurgents died
and 20 thousand were wounded. The Germans responded with cruel reper-
cussions against the civil population and killed 150–200 thousand inhabi-
tants of Warsaw. Over 600 thousand were forced to leave the city.
Every day, both the Swedish press and the radio transmitted the latest
news about the situation in Warsaw. Most opinions were pro-Polish.
However, as highlighted Żaba, ‘The only friction in the harmonious and
favourable chorus in the Swedish press were the distasteful reports by Göte-
borgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning from London, as well as, naturally, those
of the communist Ny Dag.’2
Żaba reported that the editorial section of the Gothenburg daily did not
share the views of its correspondent, which was supported in a favourable
article. The Press Attaché inspired numerous articles in many dailies, every
day the telegrams of the PAT were sent out, as well as a special bulletin every
three days.
In turn, the head of the base of communication with Poland, counsellor
Józef Przybyszewski, reported that the Swedish press was avoiding publishing
—
1
‘Öppen revolt i Warszawa’, Aftontidningen, 3 VIII 1944; PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, note by
M. Karniol no. 189, Stockholm, 27 IX 1944.
2
and Documentation, Stockholm, 20 IX 1944.
287
views that could offend the British and the Americans, who the Poles criti-
cized for not supporting the rising and not exerting pressure on the Soviet
authorities to mount a military campaign around Warsaw. What was also
noticeable was the self-restraint towards the Soviet Union. Although, the
report’s author highlighted, ‘there are clear voices that Russia’s negative
attitude towards the issue of supporting the fighting Warsaw is intentional
and its purpose is to force Poland to adopt the conditions of the agreement
dictated by Russia.’ Nevertheless, the report mostly highlighted the interest
devoted to the developments in Warsaw:
All in all, insofar as the indifference of Swedish society towards political issues
that are not directly related to them is commonly known, when it comes to
this issue the interest of the widest social spheres, who clearly sympathize with
Poland, is immense. This is for instance proven by the fact that the entire
press, including the provincial press, aside from other current events (France,
Romania, Bulgaria), publishes detailed information on the course of the bat-
tles in Warsaw.’3
According to Przybyszewski, the Swedes received news of the rising in

Warsaw with understanding. As he said, ‘they are well-oriented in the entire
situation, showing us great sympathy and providing accurate assessments of
Russia’s moves.’
Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, which Żaba was critical of,
published ‘The Mystery of the Warsaw Battle Commander’ on 9 August that
was written by its London resident. The author wondered who had decided
to initiate the rising, because ‘the Russian army cannot adapt its offensive to
the disposal of the Polish resistance movement, especially in the situation
when it is managed by the London circles who are not in touch with the
Russian commander.’4 On 10 August a report was published mentioning the
words of General Sosnkowski, who demanded that the allies grant support to
the embattled Warsaw.5 The Commander-in-Chief of the Polish army
informed the public in Great Britain that the Germans were murdering the
citizens of Warsaw indiscriminately. Nevertheless, the British passed their
responsibility to the Polish government in exile, which – according to the
—
3
PUMST, Sk. 8.26, letter by ‘Gryf’ [Józef Przybyszewski] to the head of the Special Division
of Commander-in-Chief, 29 VIII 1944.
4
‘Mystik kring ledaren av striderna i Warszawa’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 9
VIII 1944.
5
‘Brittisk omsvängning gentemot polska regeringen. Intriger kring tragedin i Warszawa
framkalla olust’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 10 VIII 1944.
288
7. THE DOUBLE GAME OF SWEDISH DIPLOMACY
British authorities – gave the order to start the rising without consulting the
British and Soviet leadership.
Nya Dagligt Allehanda published the article ‘The Blow of the Under-
ground’ by John Walterson that emphasized the loneliness of the insurgents.
The author argued that the activity of the Poles had made the task of the
Soviet army much easier and that it could initiate the attack on the Germans,
but, nevertheless, failed to do so for political reasons. The activity of the
Polish resistance movement, at least from 1941, and fierce battles in the
streets of Warsaw had proven most importantly that, as Walterson con-
cluded, the Resistance Movement of the Underground Polish State ‘was not
a product of propaganda, but an important element, which will have to be
respected by everybody both now and in the future.’6
By 12 August the press published the Reuters’ telegrams announcing the
conclusion of the struggle in Warsaw. In the following days, however, other
news reported that despite the advantage of the Germans and their cruelty
towards the civilians, as well as considerable losses amongst the insurgent
troops, the fight continued. On the same day, Gunnar Almstedt published an
article in Ystad Allehanda. He wrote that the rising in Warsaw constituted
only a part of the military effort of the Polish army, which from the very first
day had ceaselessly fought on land, sea and in the air.7 Göteborgs Handels- och
Sjöfarts-Tidning also published a text that highlighted the heroism of the
Polish underground movement during the several year-long struggle.8
On 24 August, Stockholms-Tidningen published an unusually suggestive
article with a map of Warsaw on which were marked the most important sites
in the city, including for the most part those which were currently in the
hands of the Poles. What was nonetheless most noticeable about the map was
the red line depicting the German–Soviet front, which exposed the inten-
tional inaction of the Red Army. The authors highlighted that the tragedy of
Warsaw being witnessed by Europe was the third that the city had encoun-
tered during the Second World War, following the German aggression in
September 1939 and the ghetto uprising in April 1943. When the Soviet army
reached the outskirts of the Polish capital, and when on 31 July the Soviet
radio Kościuszko called the Poles to battle, it seemed as if the Germans faced
defeat. The author of the article stated, ‘That is why General Bór issued the
—
6
J. Waltersson [sic!], ‘Anfall från underjorden. Polska partisaner strida i Warszawa’, Nya
Dagligt Allehanda, 11 VIII 1944.
7
G. Almstedt, ‘Armén, som aldrig kapitulerat’, Ystads Allehanda, 12 VIII 1944.
8
M. Vanni, ‘Storm. Den underjordiska kampen i Polen’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-
Tidning, 12 VIII 1944.
289
decision of the outbreak of the rising. Nevertheless, instead of receiving help,

the Poles endured attacks from Soviet propaganda, which accused them of an
armed attack without an agreement with Moscow.’9
Reports describing fights in the capital poured in throughout the follow-
ing weeks.10 ‘Tragedy’ appeared in these reports with increasing frequency.11
The journalist for Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning changed his tone
and reported that in London there were noises that the Soviet offensive was
intentionally suspended and that the insurgents were left to mercy of the
Germans.12 On 5 September, Stalin was accused by the same newspaper of
deliberate inaction on the outskirts of Warsaw:
The Russians withheld their offensive several kilometres outside the city
without any serious attempt to grant their support, and the gallant Warsaw
heroes have been left to their own devices. […] As long as the strategic reasons
that held back the help remain unexplained, the world will not abandon its
efforts to inquire into this mystery with feelings of reluctance.13
According to Żaba, the enthusiastic article by Torgny Segerstedt was suf-

ficient evidence for Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning to evaluate the
events in Warsaw in a different way. The Segerstedt article was published on
the day of the anniversary of the war’s outbreak and it praised the Poles for
fighting for the freedom of Europe in 1939. Segerstedt highlighted towards
the end, ‘Poland, paying a great price, acquired the right to become reborn as
a significant power in the European system of countries.’14 In an editorial
from 6 September, Arbetaren pointed out that the rising had broken out in
response to the appeal from the Allies, including the calls from Moscow. In
the first instance, the responsibility was placed on Stalin.
—
9
‘Hemsk tragedi väntar Warszawas patrioter. Ryssarna vägrade hjälpa, kapitulation efter
blodbad’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 24 VIII 1944. See: PUMST, Sk. 8.26. Translation of the
article quoted above.
10
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, notes by M. Karniol nos. 191–196, Stockholm, 27 IX 1944;
‘Fasansfulla förhållanden i Warszawa’, Aftontidningen, 28 IX 1944; IPMS, col. 133, vol. 195,
note by M. Karniol no. 197, Stockholm, 29 IX 1944; ‘Socialister hjälpa Warszawakämparna’,
Morgon-Tidningen, 31 VIII 1944; IPMS, col. 133, vol. 195, note by M. Karniol no. 198,
Stockholm, 30 VII 1944.
11
‘Warszawas hjältekamp för frihet världshistoriens största tragedi’, Morgon-Tidningen, 20
VIII 1944; ‘Den polska tragedin’, Svenska Dagbladet, 21 VIII 1944; E. Lindquist, ‘Tragedin i
Warszawa’, Morgon-Tidningen, 22 VIII 1944; ‘Tragedin Warszawa hotar allierade enig-
heten’, Morgon-Tidningen, 30 VIII 1944; Thorburn, ‘Vatikanen komplicerar tragedin för
Warszawa’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 4 IX 1944.
12
‘Situationen’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 25 VIII 1944.
13
‘Idag’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 5 IX 1944.
14
[T. Segerstedt], ‘Polens dag’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 31 VIII 1944.
290
Within weeks, some Swedish public figures were successfully motivated

to submit an appeal for aid for Warsaw. On 9 August, Göteborgs Posten circu-
lated a fiery appeal entitled ‘Hjälp Polen’ (Help Poland) by Jeanna Oterdahl.
She argued that no other country had suffered as much as Poland and that
the ‘innate humanitarianism of the Swedes makes it difficult for them to
imagine the infernal measures that are used by the occupants in Poland,
which are a brutal reality.’15 On 31 August 1944, the Swedish Social Demo-
crats, together with the refugees of twelve nationalities, organized a meeting
in Stockholm where the situation in Warsaw was discussed. During the
meeting, following the speech by Maurycy Karniol, a resolution was passed
containing messages of kindness for the insurgents and an appeal to the Allies
to provide support for the Home Army.16
The organisation Hjälp Polens Barn, headed by Marika Stiernstedt, initi-
ated Polish Week, which started on 15 September. Honourable patronage
over this event was assumed by Prince Eugen, brother of Gustaf V. The pro-
gramme included concerts, theatre, ballet and film, which were coupled with
charity collections for the citizens of Warsaw. In Stockholm, almost 100
thousand crowns was donated, but collections were also conducted in the
farthest reaches of Sweden.17 As part of Polish Week18 an appeal was made to
the Swedish society for the donation of books and teaching aids.
On 28 September, Bonniers, the largest of the Swedish publishing houses,
launched the 44-page booklet Warszawa! (Warsaw) of which 5 thousand
copies were printed. The booklet was co-authored by journalist Gunnar
Almstedt and one of the most popular Swedish writers Eyvind Johnson. It
was sold together with a 14-page supplement (‘Famous Swedes on Poland’)
containing short statements by 20 Swedish personages – intellectuals and
social activists of different political views – about Poland.19 The branch office
of the Ministry of Information and Documentation bought 3 thousand
copies, which were immediately sent to public libraries, schools, parliament,
—
15
‘J. Oterdahl, Hjälp Polen!’, Göteborgs Posten, 9 VIII 1944.
16
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, report by M. Karniol no. 219, Stockholm, 25 I 1945.
17
18
‘Hjälp Polen!’, Upsala Nya Tidning, 19 IX 1944; ‘Gripande Polen-soaré på KFUM i går’,
Upsala Nya Tidning, 20 IX 1944.
19
G. Almstedt, E. Johnson, Warszawa!, Stockholm 1944; Kända svenskar om Polen,
Stockholm 1944 (the supplement sold with the booklet Warszawa!). Cf: PUMST, Sk. 37.1,
letter by Press Attaché of the Polish Legation in Stockholm N. Żaba to the Ministry of
Information and Documentation together with two attachments, 5 X 1944.
291
various organisations and private individuals.20 In the first editorial, ‘The

Rising’ (dated 14 September), Almstedt pointed out, ‘The bewildering pace
of the attack of the Western Allies turned the attention of the public opinion
away from the tragedy of Poland.’ He also noted, ‘due to the political conflicts
between the powers it is so far advisable not to speak about the fighting Poles
too openly’, and ‘even in Sweden there are many voices accusing the Poles of
using the rising as a measure that would lead to the liberation of their
country.’ Almstedt repeated with sorrow that one could mostly read about
reactionism connected with the Poles’ ‘pointless incident of taking up an
armless battle’:
Whereas, the Warsaw Rising has nothing in common with the issue of reac-
tionism or non-reactionism. It is only the expression of ardent yearning of the
indomitable and freedom-loving nation to personally contribute to its own
liberation, and in the seizing of arms on 1 August 1944, which was undertaken
to shake off the yoke of bondage, there was equally little Polish “reactionism”
as in the decision to use armed resistance against the Nazi aggression of 1
September 1939. At least in such a neutral country as Sweden one should
avoid formulating such kind of accusations. It would be best for Sweden not
to address any accusations towards the Poles that they are not being polite
while being hanged!
Following an emotional introduction, Almstedt carefully clarified the genesis

and the course of the rising and explained the political conflict, which took
place around the fights in Warsaw at the behest of Stalin. The author con-
cluded his text with an equally strong tone. He underlined that if the can-
nonade that was heard by the insurgents in the Praga quarter was not a sign
of the upcoming liberation, then the war had become pointless.
The second text, ‘Warszawa’, written by Eyvind Johnson, was to convince
the Swedish reader that they should not be indifferent towards the fate of
Poland. The writer opened it with a phrase often repeated in Sweden: ‘Vad
angår oss polska affärer?’ (‘Why should we care about Polish affairs?’),21 and
further, ‘What do we care about the attempt to liberate Warsaw by General
Bór and his soldiers? Do we have a reason to engage in this – embarrassing
for most of us – conflict between the Polish government in London and the
—
20
Ministry of Information and Documentation, Stockholm, 28 XI 1944.
21
This is a reference to the words of the popular 18th-century Swedish poet Carl Michael
Bellman, who commented on the fact that his friend got battered for playing Polish tunes:
‘Why the hell do you get yourself into Polish affairs? […] Avoid playing Polish tunes!
Remember, from now on keep your mouth shut’ (Fredman’s epistle no. 45)
292
Soviet Union, or in the conflict between the Polish circles in the East and
Polish circles in the West? Or within the Polish circles?’ Johnson claimed that
under the influence of the propaganda the average Swede was unable to take
any position, had doubts, and that is why a neutral attitude was preferable,
which allowed him or her to refrain from taking a stand on the Polish issue.
This was so that these issues were so different from the Swedish needs, wishes
and the currently on-going parliamentary campaign. Meanwhile, Johnson
thought it should have been completely different, as Poland was the first
country to resist Hitler, to live through the terrible occupation and to engage
its troops on many fronts as well as underground. According to the eminent
writer, all that was known about Nazism was mostly the result of Poland’s
sacrifice. Johnson did not answer the question that was posed at the outset of
the text. As a matter of fact, he concluded it with, ‘Will the appeal to the world
for at least moral support, which is day after day sent out by the secret Polish
radio station from the besieged Warsaw, remain unheard also in this free and
enlightened country?’
The supplement ‘Famous Swedes on Poland’ opened with a statement by
the executive director of the American Bank in Warsaw in the pre-war
period, Harald Axell, who had stayed in occupied Poland for some time. He
argued, ‘We, the Swedes, who have so much in common with the Polish
nation, were unable to help it in liberating its country, but it is exactly for this
reason that we should not delay in providing as much of our help as possible
to the rebuilding.’ The activist of the Polish Aid Committee of Malmö, Sigma
Blanck, pointed to the heroism of September 1939 and the fights in the ghetto
in 1943. Warsaw was again making a sacrifice at the altar of freedom. Blanck
summed up, ‘May the world finally understand its debt towards You and
hurry to pay it off, as this is a great debt.’ Vicar Daniel Cederberg repeated
the words of the late archbishop Nathan Söderblom, who towards the end of
the First World War was ‘one of the many who were greedily expecting posi-
tive aspects’, and he found one such aspect in the resurrection of Poland.
Cederberg stated, ‘The tragedy of Poland and its uncertain future is for many
of us the darkest point in the gloominess of this war’, although ‘Poland
deserved the right to live more than any other country in the world.’
Remembering the Swedish sympathies for the Polish fights for independence
in the 19th century, he argued:
this is not only about some romantic sense of humanitarianism in our na-
tional character. This understanding has its source in the awareness that our
own existence is to a large extent dependant on the very same political factors
that have decided on the fate of Poland. That very same awareness lives in us
293
also today, as a matter of fact not only in our own nation but generally in all
small, freedom-loving nations around the entire world. For this awareness it
is difficult to find a better motto than that which accompanied the Polen-
hjälpen [‘Help for Poland’, humanitarian aid organisation] on launching its
charity collection: “The matter of Poland is the matter of mankind”.
Editor-in-chief of the Östgöten daily, Rolf Edberg, asked rhetorically ‘On 1

September we were convinced that the matter of Poland is the matter of the
entire world. Is it still so?’ Professor of Slavonic studies at the University of
Uppsala Gunnar Gunnarsson pointed out that it was not only about the fate
of Warsaw, but all of Poland, which the Soviet Union wished to enslave by
seizing half of its territory. An opinion journalist for Nya Dagligt Allehanda
Knut Hagberg, on the other hand, called for a strong and wealthy Poland.
Writer Harry Martinson, in turn, expressed an idealist view saying, ‘the
world’s conscience may set Poland free, may influence the statesmen’s deci-
sions at conferences and influence them in the name of justice.’ An appeal for
aid for Warsaw was submitted, although, as noted by professor Axel L.
Romdahl at the Gothenburg University:
Here in Sweden we are in the fortunate position that we are not forced to take
a stand regarding what is going on in the wider world. And after all, as human
beings, we must feel deeply outraged and moved by the suffering that has been
encountered by the Polish nation, and most importantly its capital Warsaw,
and by the fight they are now pursuing.
The director of the Swedish National Museum in Stockholm, Erik Wetter-

gren, invoking the stereotypical picture of Poland, appealed to the logically
thinking Swedes for specific help:
We are now too used to the fact that the Poles are managing their internal and
external disagreements on their own. However, this time we need to support
them in their march to freedom. Those that are to create new Poland, need to
have weapons and bombers, water and medicines, houses to live in and food
to eat; their children – starving, naked and wandering about without super-
vision – must be given clothes, food and something that would resemble their
family homes and parental care. With the help of our civilized world the heart
of this country needs to start beating again. Warsaw must be rebuilt.’
These views were shared by: social activist Kerstin Hesselgren, professor at
Lund University and editor-in-chief of Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten
294
Claes Lindskog; leading activist of the Social Democratic Party and editor-in-
chief of Morgon-Tidningen Rickard Lindström; authorizing officer of the
Gothenburg museum and head of the National Tourism Office in Stockholm
Gustaf Munthe; famous social activist Alva Myrdal; editor-in-chief of the
Trots Allt! magazine Ture Nerman; director of the ASEA company and
courier for the Polish underground movement Sven Norrman; women wri-
ters Marika Stiernstedt and Jeanna Oterdahl, editor-in-chief of Göteborgs
Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning Torgny Segerstedt; writer Axel Strindberg and
actress Naima Wifstrand. All their statements abounded in agitation, com-
passion and hope that the fate of Poland would change, as if it happened
otherwise it would mean the failure of the ideals of freedom across Europe.
An understanding started to dawn that the rising had fallen victim to inter-
national policy.22
Following the collapse of the rising, Elna Gistedt-Kiltynowicz travelled to
Sweden and gave an interview to Svenska Dagbladet. In her statement she
emphasized that despite the defeat ‘the Polish spirit is not broken, the nation
is alive and will live on.’23 She then attended a meeting with the representative
of the Polish Legation in Stockholm, to whom she told her story. On 7
September she was driven out of Warsaw by the Germans to Pruszków, where
she spent three days, from 8 to 12 September, in appalling conditions. She
told the legation’s staff member about public sentiments before the rising and
while it lasted.24 She remembered that the rumours about the preparations
before the rising were circulating for months, but everybody imagined that
the riot against the Germans would last only about three days, after which
help would arrive and the insurgents would somehow manage. Elna Gistedt,
who was the owner of a coffee house on Nowy Świat street, became ac-
quainted with most diverse gossip. On 31 July she learned about the insurgent
alert but there again on 1 August news spread that the order was revoked.
Later, at noon, one of the German customers told her not to leave home until
4 p.m. According to Gistedt, the Poles could not count on surprise, ‘The
Germans who had many spies at their disposal, were unfortunately informed
—
22
‘Ropet från Warszawa’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 6 IX 1944.
23
Attis., ‘Warszawa finns inte mera, inte en polack kvar i ruinstaden’, Svenska Dagbladet, 15
XI 1944.
24
PISM, PRM 161, copy of the interview with Elna Gistedt, Sztokholm, 18 XII 1944 r., pp. 2–
9. E. Gistedt-Kiltynowicz wrote the following memoirs: Från operett till tragedi, Stockholm
1946; Polish edition: Od operetki do tragedii. Ze wspomnień szwedzkiej gwiazdy operetki
warszawskiej, translated by M. Olszańska, Warsaw 1982.
295
in detail about the planned outbreak of the rising. Betrayal was omnipresent,
and the Germans had their men in almost all tenements.
Illustration 6: ‘Ropet från Warszawa’ [‘The Call from Warsaw’]. The caption reads ‘The
mournful music is spoiling the mood’.
On presenting the commonly known picture of the technical superiority of

the Germans and their cruelty, especially of the Kalmyk people and other
soldiers from Soviet republics at the service of the Germans, Gistedt em-
phasized:
At the beginning of the rising the Germans […] were in a very difficult situa-
tion and had Warsaw received sufficient support, the rising would have ended
differently. […] The mood was however not entirely optimistic, people
wanted to continue to believe in victory. Initially, each metre of the conquered
296
land was welcomed with enjoyment, because this land was “free”. The en-
thusiasm which ruled in Warsaw at the outset of the rising cannot simply be
described […].
Elna Gistedt claimed that there were in fact some individuals who maintained
that the fight in the barricades was folly and unreasonable. She then identified
with the combatants: ‘I nevertheless told them that although I am Swedish, I
understand them, this moment is ours, and this piece of land is ours!’
The bitterness connected with the defeat turned most of all against the
Soviets. According to the Swede, there also appeared disappointment with the
position of the British. Żaba maintained that the intelligence had great pro-
pagandist value. He claimed, ‘it breathes inexhaustible hope in the future of the
nation, which can show such resistance, and it describes the moods in Poland
– even following such horrible shocks, as being full of hope in victory.’25
The interest with the rising continued after its downfall. In Arbetaren, on
4 October, the article ‘Warszawa’ appeared, marked with a black cross. The
attitude of the allies towards the insurgents was commented on briefly: ‘They
have been cold-bloodedly submitted to extermination.’ The author named
the reasons for the defeat with clear outrage: ‘The insurgents gave up, because
they did not receive help from the Allies, and they were not granted ammu-
nition, because they were not granted weapons. That is why Warsaw will be
‘a bloody stain in the register of deeds committed by the Allies, a wound, from
which blood will always stream, an ever-lasting accusation, which would
never be abated.’ The author of the article quoted the accusations against the
insurgents very emotionally. He was clearly on their side and proclaimed the
following manifesto in their defence:
Is it possible to find freedom fighters, which were as ridiculed as they were?
Why did they start the rising? Why didn’t they wait? Why didn’t they establish
cooperation with the Russian army? Why didn’t they wait for the advice from
the Allies? Why all the hurry? Such excuses are flung in their face by the
antagonists who should have helped them like brothers and companions-in-
arms. Why are people sometimes so defiant that they try to shake off the yoke
of bondage? To free oneself from tyrants, to overcome the system of terror,
—
25
297
which took delight in their torment? Why do people love freedom so madly?
Even the seven sages cannot answer these questions.26
In response, the communists launched a propagandist attack against the com-

mand of the Home Army and the Polish government in London. After the
press announcement of the news from Osóbka-Morawski and Żymierski, there
were claims voiced that Bór-Komorowski, who staged the rising, was not even
in town, and the responsibility that was placed on him for what had happened,
made him a traitor of the nation.27 The role of the Soviet propaganda mouth-
piece was continuously played in Sweden by Ny Dag. Following the failure of
the rising in Warsaw, the newspaper lay blame for the defeat on the Home
Army command, which gave the order to attack the Germans, as ‘General Bór
and his group were unfortunately controlled by political reasons, which had
nothing to do with the interests of the Polish nation.’ What was presented was
the account of an anonymous Home Army soldier, who made his way to the
other side of the Vistula River and accused Bór-Komorowski of conducting a
private, harmful policy without considering the opinion of other officers of the
Home Army. Only the PKWN rose to the occasion, as its members, though
they ‘considered the rising to be premature and criticised those who were
responsible for it’, ‘at the same time all did their best to rescue the situation and
to conquer the Germans.’28 In this vein a series of articles devoted to the rising
was created. The articles were to show ‘how great the gap was between the
Polish nation and these masters who, in pursuit of power, become involved in
affairs, for which the nation has to pay.’29 Despite the aggressive propaganda,
after the collapse of the rising, probably nobody in Sweden had any doubts that
Stalin sabotaged all attempts of help.30 This did not change the predictions that
after the Germans’ withdrawal from the Polish capital, the PKWN would
proclaim itself a legitimate government.31
The landscape after the battle was presented by Göteborgs Handels- och
Sjöfarts-Tidning. The defeat of the rising, on 4 October, was named the most
—
26
‘Warszawa’, Arbetaren, 4 X 1944. Cf.: IPMS, col. 133, vol. 195, report by M. Karniol no.
220, Stockholm, 25 I 1945; AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, copy of the Legation’s press
report for October 1944 (‘Obrona Warszawy w prasie szwedzkiej’).
27
H. Shapiro, ‘Warszawa-generalen hotas av befrielseutskottet’, Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 1 X
1944; ‘General Bor ansvarig for Warszawa tragedin’, Arbetet, 2 X 1944.
28
Varför slutade upproret i Warszawa med nederlag?, Ny Dag, 22 XI 1944.
29
‘I Berlin ska Warszawa hämnas’, Ny Dag, 24 XI 1944. ‘Warszawas befolkning förde den
utsiktslösa kampen med stort mod’, Ny Dag, 23 XI 1944.
30
‘Warszawa’, Vestmanlands Läns Tidning, 4 X 1944.
31
‘En europeisk fråga’, Dagens Nyheter, 4 X 1944.
298
tragic event of the war.32 On the next day, the author of the series of articles
on the current situation stated that it was possible to avoid the tragedy that
took place in Warsaw, and he asked a rhetorical question about whether
Warsaw fell victim of the cruel, cold Moscow imperialism. He also added:
‘The fire of Warsaw illuminates not only the tragedy, but also sheds light on
the intentions of Russia, which may be indeed fake, but which are noticed by
the world not without anxiety.’33
The series of articles on the city’s capitulation was published in Dagens
Nyheter by its Berlin correspondent Ivar Vesterlund.34 The author highlighted
that he was the only Swedish journalist who had an opportunity to visit the
ruins of Warsaw:
After about three hours the walk comes to an end. The most extraordinary
and the most macabre walk, I have ever taken in my whole life. I walked
through a completely deserted city. Not a single store, nor a sign of any life
whatsoever. […] The only people I met were either single German soldiers or
groups of these soldiers on their way to the first line of the front or back.35
Vesterlund presented a picture of ruined buildings. Stopping at the ruins of

sites that were the symbols of the Polish capital, he told stories of the insur-
gents, about the defence of the barricades, about marching through sewers,
about the extreme conditions in hospitals. The correspondent described the
structure of the Home Army and the fate of the city’s people following the
fall of the rising. He passed over in silence the ordeal of the Poles who were
chased off to the camp in Pruszków, and in general he was very under-
standing towards the German occupational policy. In his last report from 14
November he wrote about German efforts to persuade the Poles to fight with
the Soviet army.36
There is no doubt that the rising in Warsaw encouraged the Swedish
media to write more favourably about Poland. In mid-September, Żaba
reported to the Ministry of Information and Documentation that in the past
weeks the Swedish press, in most cases, adopted a positive attitude towards
Poland:
—
32
‘Krigets mest tragiska kapitel – Warszawa’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 4 X 1944.
33
Jc., ‘Situationen’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 5 X 1944.
34
The first article: I. Vesterlund, ‘Chopins hjärta räddad ur lagorna’, Dagens Nyheter, 3 XI
1944.
35
I. Vesterlund, ‘Warszawas överleva boende i arbetsläger’, Dagens Nyheter, 8 XI 1944.
36
Polish government in exile daily in London Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza (9, 11, 12,
13, 14 XII 1944) published a series of Vesterlund’s articles.
299
Both under the influence of the developments in Finland and to the attitude
of the Soviets towards us, the voices that are critical of Moscow are gaining in
strength. If it wasn’t for the cynical letters of the collaborator of the London
Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, as well as the naturally hostile arti-
cles of the communist press (Ny Dag) and, possibly, the somewhat cold atti-
tude towards the socialist government presented by such newspapers as the
social democratic Aftontidningen, the syndicalist Arbetaren and several pro-
vincial periodicals dependant on the aforementioned orientations, we would
be dealing with almost uniform, sympathetic, Swedish opinion. What parti-
cularly stands out in terms of positive attitude is the provincial press.’37
Żaba emphasized the positive overtones particularly in the reports of Kurt

Andersson from London for Morgon-Tidningen, Thorburn from London for
Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten and Per Persson from New York for
Svenska Dagbladet.
The political circumstances, which were closer to the Swedes and which
were presented by Żaba, had their meaning. As noted the Attaché, ‘It was
only the tragedy in Warsaw that has tilted the balance to our side.’ He also
pointed out: ‘The lonely battle of Warsaw has undoubtedly stunned Swedish
public opinion.’ The provincial press ‘pointed out Russia’s behaviour towards
Poland, holding it responsible for what has happened in Warsaw.’ Żaba
named several anti-Polish-oriented opinion journalists as exceptions. It is
nonetheless worth noting that they were popular figures and their voice in
the political debate was important. Two such examples were Johannes
Wickman, opinion journalist for Dagens Nyheter, or Nils Lindh, a former
counsellor of the Swedish Legation in Moscow and a consul of the Åland
Islands – at the time a consultant for Soviet affairs by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs – who wrote articles for the social democratic Morgon-Tidningen
newspaper.38 The latter argued on 19 September, ‘It would be difficult to as-
sume that the Provisional Government, already functioning in Poland,
—
37
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, copy of report by Żaba to the Ministry of Information
and Documentation, Stockholm, 14 IX 1944.
38
and Documentation, Stockholm, 25 X 1944. There is an interesting description of Lindh’s
work as a press expert, press attaché and finally chancellor of the Swedish legation in Moscow
in the years 1924–1938 by Wilhelm Carlgren: Nils Lindh. Pressombudsman, pressattaché
och legationsråd i Moskva, [in:] Människan i historien och samtiden. Festskrift till Alf W.
Johansson, Stockholm 2000, pp. 82–91. According to Carlgren: “He was a cold and careful
observer and thought that he was well informed”. He built a network of contacts and used it
to prepare long and detailed reports, but “the attitude of the Swedish Foreign Office to the
Soviet Union was more critical and negative than the Lindh’s one” (pp. 90–91).
300
which, what is more, obtained authorization from the [State] National Coun-
cil would agree to hand over its power to the government in London and
satisfy itself with a small representation in the new government.’ In the next
article, published on 21 September, he presented his doubts about the social
support of the government in exile among its compatriots in Poland, which
was invoked in the official speeches of Prime Minister Mikołajczyk. He con-
sidered the only possible solution to be a split in the government and seeking
agreement with the PKWN through the representatives of the moderate
circles.39
In the press report from the end of October, Żaba emphasized, ‘the favour-
able situation continues.’ Swedish public opinion was clearly interested in
Stalin’s behaviour towards his neighbours, as it was worried about the fate of
Finland, whose capitulation coincided with the closing phase of the rising.
According to Żaba, the Swedish government reacted too late to the spontane-
ous opinions, which reflected the critics of the ruthless Soviet policy:
The opportunist attitude towards the Soviet Union of some the Swedish of-
ficial circles, like for instance the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or some socialist
groupings or financial circles, so far did not manage to exert any influence on
the Swedish press, all the more so that some other, no less influential Swedish
bodies are either granting their silent support to our propaganda or at least
tolerate it. Therefore, despite only few exceptions, the Swedish press is not
hiding their sympathy towards the Polish matter and expresses anxiety about
the future fate of smaller European countries, while admitting that the Polish
cause has become a cardinal issue of our continent.40
Independently of these political connotations, the feelings that were pre-

dominant in Swedish society following Warsaw’s tragedy were reflected in
the empathy-filled poem ‘To Poland’ (‘Do Polski’) by Jeanna Oterdahl, trans-
lated by Stanisław Baliński and published in the Dziennik Polski and the
Dziennik Żołnierza on 30 October 1944.41 The poetic appeal brought pro-
pagandist results, but also considerable material gifts for the people of
Warsaw from the ordinary citizens of Sweden. Moreover, the popularity of
—
39
R. I. [Nils Lindh], ‘Polacker i öster och i väster’, Morgon-Tidningen, 19 IX, 21 IX 1944;
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, report by M. Karniol no. 219, Stockholm, 25 I 1945.
40
and Documentation, Stockholm, 25 X 1944.
41
The Swedish first edition of the poem has not been found. The piece was not included in
the writer’s collected works.
301
the rising undoubtedly contributed to the decision by the Swedish govern-

ment to organize a significant humanitarian campaign in the occupied terri-
tories of Poland.
The propagandist campaign for the recognition of Poland’s

right to sovereignty and territorial integrity
The Polish propagandist services made every effort to make the voice of the
Polish government heard. They submitted reference materials to the editorial
sections of the Swedish dailies and at times they inspired the publication of
books. This led to several publications that attempted to familiarize the
Swedish reader with the genesis, course and possible solutions to the conflict
between the Polish authorities in London and Stalin. Of the least persuasive
character was the publication by the famous journalist and historian Åke
Thulstrup, who, in the brochure Den polsk-ryska konflikten (The Polish–
Russian Conflict) dated 27 June 1944, discussed the ethnic relations in the
Eastern Borderlands, the history of conflicts between the Poles and Russians
throughout the 19th and 20th century, the minority-related issues of the
Second Polish Republic as well as the difficult relations during the Second
World War. The author tried not to take any position and only presented the
facts. The closing excerpts, however, proved that, given Stalin’s determi-
nation in setting the border along the Bug River, it would be difficult to
imagine another solution. What needs to be treated as a postscript, which
questioned the possibility of the London government’s return to Poland, are
the two closing paragraphs devoted to the PKWN. These were most probably
added by Thulstrup after the publication had gone to press.42
Inspired by the Polish press attaché’s office, other publications also ap-
peared, presenting the fundamental controversial issues in the relations with
the Soviet Union from the point of view of the Polish government in exile.
These publications include Öster om Bug. Fakta kring de östpolska problemen
(To the East of the Bug River. The Facts Around the Issue of Eastern Poland)
by John Walterson and Polens öde. Ett europeiskt cardinalproblem (The Fate of
Poland. The Fundamental Problem of Europe) by Paul Olberg.
Olberg opened with an outline of the history of Poland, primarily focusing
on the post-partition chapter. He highlighted Poland’s contribution to world
culture, the work of Chopin, Słowacki, Mickiewicz, as well as the achieve-
ments in the field of education. He presented the history of Poland following
—
42
Å. Thulstrup, Den polsk-ryska konflikten, Stockholm 1944.
302
the return to independence, its relations with Germany and the Soviet Union,
crowned with the triumph of imperialism of both these countries in the shape
of ‘the fourth partition’. Then, Olberg discussed the brutal, contrary to inter-
national laws, everyday life of both occupations, including deportations,
confiscations of property, economic drain and the extermination of people.
An important excerpt from the book was devoted to the fate of the govern-
ment and the Polish soldiers following the September defeat, as well as to the
activity of the underground movement in Poland. Olberg argued that both
political parties in exile and their representatives in occupied Poland were
striving to rebuild their homeland not only as a sovereign country, but also a
democratic one. The author acknowledged the difficult task of integrating
parts of the country that were previously controlled by the partitioning
powers. With respect and admiration, he named the examples of bravery
among the soldiers of the Polish army during the defence of Poland against
the German aggression and on other fronts later during the war. He perceived
the Polish–Soviet dispute to be another manifestation of the imperialism of
Stalin, whose successes in the war with Hitler encouraged him to launch a
diplomatic offensive with the purpose of conducting the Sovietisation of
Eastern Europe, and Poland in particular. Based on the arguments that were
announced publicly by Adam Pragier, the famous activist of the PPS, Olberg
rejected situating the border along the Curzon Line, which lacked historical
foundation and was only a less awkward alternative to the demarcation line
established by Stalin with Hitler in 1939. Olberg admitted that the Polish
authorities treated national minorities unfairly before war broke out. He
nevertheless added that the reign of the Soviet dictatorship was tantamount
to the complete lack of national rights for Ukrainians and Belarusians. He
compared the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) to the
government of Kuusinen, an entity which was completely dependent on the
thirst for territorial expansion by Stalin. Naming subsequent actions of the
Home Army, he polemicized with the Soviet propaganda, which announced
that the Polish resistance movement was inactive Galicia with Lviv were
inseparably connected with the Polish state. He underlined that the Curzon
Line had never constituted a Polish–Soviet border, and never before had
either the Polish side or the Soviet side introduced a proposal to establish a
common border on this basis. Making use of official statistics, popularized
by the Polish Ministry of Information and Documentation, he presented a
picture contrary to reality, that Polish group of nationalists existed in greater
numbers than all other groups, although he emphasized that the Soviet
deportations and policy of extermination which was conducted by the
303
Germans undoubtedly contributed to the decrease in the number of Poles in

these areas. He also argued that there existed a friendly atmosphere that
facilitated the development of the cultural-educational life of the Ukrainians,
the Belarusians and the Lithuanians in the Second Polish Republic, and he
provided information about grants for schools teaching Ukrainian language,
financial support of the Polish government for the Ukrainian Scientific
Institute in Warsaw and the unhampered activity of the national minorities’
cooperative associations. Based on witness accounts, the situation in the
Eastern Borderlands under the Soviet occupation was described by Walter-
son as ‘the period of lawlessness, terror and fear.’ He estimated, excessively,
the number of deported Poles to be 2 million people. He summed up that,
‘for the neutral Swedish observer it would be absurd if Poland was forced to
give up 55 percent of its territory and one third of its population to the benefit
of one of the Allies.’43
Both publications were well received, although accounts and reviews
continuously highlighted the pro-Polish attitude of Olberg and Walterson.44
The only exception was the review by Nils Lindh, who on 20 November 1944
in Morgon-Tidningen harshly criticized the publications inspired by the
Polish diplomatic mission. According to Karniol, this was ‘the first unfavour-
able review in a pro-Soviet environment.’ In the opening sentence Lindh
asked rhetorically, ‘should we really make special efforts to arouse sympathy
for Poland?’ Personally, he maintained that despite some Swedes’ belief that
Polish affairs were none of their business, ‘sympathy for Poland is so wide-
spread and uniform in Sweden that convincing the Swedish public on Poland
is excessive zealotry.’ He claimed that the issue was exclusively about the
Polish internal conflict between the government in London and the PKWN.
He concluded, ‘In this situation a Swede who sympathizes with Poland the
most becomes helpless.’ That is why the supporters of the London govern-
ment decided to turn Swedish sympathies in their direction. Lindh con-
cluded, ‘The intention is to convince you that this Poland – with no state,
—
43
J. Walterson, Öster om Bug. Fakta kring de östpolskaproblemen, Stockholm 1944, pp. 51–
52, 71, 89, 94–95, 132–134, 150–153.
44
See the review of eminent historian N. Ahnlund: ‘Det polska problemet’, Svenska
Dagbladet, 11 IX 1944; others: ‘En ny polsk september’, Östgöta Correspondenten, 22 IX 1944;
C. Br, ‘Polens öde ett europeiskt kardinalproblem’, Norrbottens-Kuriren, 9 X 1944; ‘Den
polska tragedien’, Aftonbladet, 5 X 1944; ‘Europeiska problem’, Norrköpings Tidningar, 12 X
1944; S. S., ‘En bok om Polen’, Upsala Nya Tidning, 13 X 1944; ‘Nya krigsböcker’,
Barometern, 14 X 1944; ‘Polens öde’, Falu Kuriren, 18 X 1944; F. Severin, ‘Polens öde’,
Aftontidningen, 19 X 1944; Jc., ‘Det polska problemet’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-
Tidning, 20 X 1944; E. Arrhén, ‘Polen och Atlantachartan’, Göteborgs Morgonpost, 8 II 1945.
304
with men, women, soldiers scattered across many countries and with its
government in another nation – is right and the Soviet Union is wrong. When
we understand this, we will start to feel a liking towards this Poland, and in
connection with this, aversion and disgust towards the Soviet Union.’ Lindh
considered the aforementioned books about Poland to be biased, and the
policy of the Polish government as ‘simple speculation in the shape of con-
trasting the Western Allies with the Soviet Union.’45
The response by Soviet propaganda to the publications inspired by the
Poles was the book Om Västukraina och Västvitryssland (On Western
Ukraine and Western Belarus) written by Vladimir Pitjeta, first rector at
Belarusian State University in Minsk. The author attacked the Second Polish
Republic for persecuting national minorities and called the government in
London fascist. In a perverse manner, he referred to the views of Polish
historians, who considered the expansion of Poland to the east, in the period
of the Nobles’ Democracy, to be a mistake. Pitjeta described Walterson’s
discourse as biased, arguing that what needed to be remembered above all
was the Polish imperialism, Polish conquests in the East and the policy of
Polonisation. Whereas, it was hard to speak about the national pressure from
the authorities in Moscow due to the Ukrainians’ and Belarusians’ conscious-
ness, as well as their ethnic, linguistic and religious affiliation to the Russian
nation. Pitjeta also refuted Walterson’s thesis of the long-lasting (for cen-
turies) hostility of the Russians towards the Poles, which was to be denied by
the political actions of Tsar Paul and Tsar Alexander as well as the political
writings of Decembrists, Alexandr Hercen and Russian revolutionists headed
by Lenin. It was Poland which was to be responsible for the poor Polish-
Soviet relations after the First World War, as almost all its governments,
including the government in London, conducted aggressive eastern policy.
According to Pitjeta, their thoughtless actions led to the downfall of the
country in 1939. The Soviet scholar argued that Ukrainians constituted an
ethnic majority in Eastern Galicia and in Volhynia. The entering of the Soviet
army into the Polish Eastern Borderlands was considered by him to be the
solution to the issue of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Pitjeta rejec-
ted the accusations of forceful incorporation of these territories into the
Soviet Union. He also refused the Poles the right to evaluate the course of the
plebiscite on this matter, for he considered them ‘reactionists, who carried
the tragedy of the Polish nation on their backs, who had clearly forgotten that
—
45
R. I. [Nils Lindh], ‘Polens sak’, Morgon-Tidningen, 20 XI 1944; IPMS, col. 133, vol. 195,
report by M. Karniol no. 219, Stockholm, 25 I 1945.
305
the nations of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus never voluntarily ac-
knowledged the superiority of the Polish government, and these areas had
been incorporated by force.’ The issue was simple: ‘Polish magnates and their
satellites’ should make no comments about ‘the democratic character of the
elections’, thanks to which the rebuilding of Ukrainian and Belarusian eco-
nomic and cultural life was initiated, the peasants were granted land and
thousands of farm animals, and the Soviet government made a decision to
fight illiteracy, which was widespread in the Polish era. He described the
federation as a fantastical plan, where Poland played the central role. He
explained, ‘The entire plan is founded on the claims towards the alien ter-
ritories and clearly reveals the plans of Polish fascists’ expansion.’ At the same
time, he distinguished the Polish government in London from the Polish
nation, which was capable of building a sovereign and strong country within
ethnographic borders under the leadership of the Union of the Polish Patriots
(ZPP) and the activists of the PKWN, who formed the Provisional Govern-
ment in Warsaw. Surely the greatest calumny which appeared in the book
was the accusation of the Polish government in exile of the plan of creating,
together with the Germans, the Home Army (Pitjeta calls it a defensive army)
to fight the Red Army. The command of these units was to be proposed to
General Grot, who, after refusing to accept it, was instantly arrested.46
Following the breakdown of the rising, Karniol started to hold speeches on
the subject of the current situation in Poland.47 The principle purpose of
Karniol’s journalist activity, which was set by him in the spring of 1944 was to
convince the Swedish public of the ‘democratic spirit of the Polish Under-
ground State.’48 Karniol’s writings on the Polish matters and interviews with
—
46
V. Pitjeta, Om Västukraina och Västvitryssland, Stockholm 1945, pp. 39, 41, 47–56, 82–83,
98, 112–113, 136–137, 170–172, 174–176, 191–194, 209–210, 212–213, 219, 225. Gen. Stefan
Grot-Rowecki was the first commander of the Home Army. After his arrest in 1943 the com-
mand was taken by gen. Bór-Komorowski. Grot was killed, probably just after the outbreak
of the rising in Warsaw in August 1944.
47
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, telegram by M. Karniol no. 218, Stockholm, 12 XII 1944 r. The
lecture on the subject of the defence of Warsaw was held on 12 October at the seat of the
trade union of typographic workers, on 13 October that very same lecture was delivered for
the union of the workers of the Konsum cooperative, on 1 November – in the seat of the
trade union of urban property workers, on 21 November – in Gustaf Vasa socialdemo-
kratiska föreningen, on 23 the lecture on the future of East-Central Europe was delivered in
the council house Alvik on the invitation of the social democratic party unit of Bromma
district. Karniol, on 11 and 27 November, met with the Poles from the refugee camp Rosöga
nearby Strängnäs and in Traneberg on the anniversary of Poland’s independence.
48
306
him were published in many Swedish dailies.49 In September 1944 Karniol

managed to publish an article in Trots Allt! by Adam Ciołkosz, a leading activist
of the PPS residing in London. The name of its author was not disclosed by the
newspaper. Ciołkosz did not disguise his feelings in the letter to Karniol: ‘The
omission of the name is surprising. The English never do such things…’
Ciołkosz regularly provided Karniol with the issues of a written information
service entitled Kroniki Generalnej Guberni (The Chronicles of General
Government). Karniol’s task was to translate the texts into Swedish and publish
them in the Swedish press.50 From 16 November 1944 onwards the newspaper
of the Vasa quarter in Stockholm began publishing announcements about the
fights in Warsaw, presented together in the bulletin published by Karniol.51
Whereas, on 6 December Morgon-Tidningen published an interview with
Karniol. The Polish socialist emphasized that the PPS was counting on the sup-
port of the international worker’s movement in connection with the Polish
matter.52 According to him, the presence of Socialists in the government
guaranteed social reforms in liberated Poland.53
Despite numerous acquaintances, Karniol did not always manage to
convince the editors of the periodicals to publish the texts he suggested. In
October 1944, Karniol wrote to Ciołkosz that the editorial section of Social-
Demokraten halted his article about Tomasz Arciszewski. He commented,
‘Perhaps this is a coincidence or perhaps it is not. Lately I have been noticing,
even in the political party press, a somewhat adaptation to Russia, like the
adaptation to Germany, just like in the years 1940–1941.’54
Karniol even mentioned to Allan Vougt, ‘the authorities of the parties in
Sweden often describe the government, where our party sits, to be reaction-
ary, and they often paint an excessively rosy picture of Lublin, thereby going
hand in hand with the communists.’55 He managed to convince Vougt of the
—
49
‘Expressporträttet: Jan Kwapinski’, Expressen, 26 XI 1944; ‘Expressporträttet: Arciszewski’,
Expressen, 1 XII 1944; M. Karniol, Thomas Arciszewski, ‘Polens vicepresident’, Morgon-
Tidningen, 14 X 1944; PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, note by M. Karniol no. 212, Stockholm, 9 XII
1944. P. Grant, ‘Warszawa Polens Paris-kommun’, Örebro-Kuriren, 13 X 1944 (this was a
local daily, but issued by vice-president of parliament H. Åkerberg); PISM, col. 133, vol. 195,
report by M. Karniol for the period XXII 1944, Stockholm, 31 I 1945.
50
PISM, col. 133, vol. 296, copy of letter by A. Ciołkosz to M. Karniol, London, 20 IX 1944.
51
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, two issues of Vasaröster, the organ of the Gustaf Vasa Soc. Dem.
Förening, n.p., n.d.
52
‘Polska regeringsskiftet stärkte hemlandskontakt’, Morgon-Tidningen, 6 XII 1944; PISM,
col. 133, vol. 195, note by M. Karniol no. 214, Stockholm, 10 VII 1944.
53
‘Londonpolackerna lovar stora sociala reformer’, Aftontidningen, 3 XII 1944; PISM, col.
133, vol. 195, note by M. Karniol no. 216, Stockholm, 12 VII 1944.
54
55
Ibidem.
307
idea of summoning (on 30 October, during the session of the parliament) a

special conference of the representatives of the party and its press organs.
Karniol was to present the position of the Polish government towards the
issues of international policy and situation in Poland. It is hard to evaluate
the propagandist results of this event, as we do not have any sources on this
subject. Nevertheless, what was characteristic was the content of Karniol’s
report to Adam Ciołkosz from December 1944, ‘Political work needs to be
conducted very carefully and discreetly in this period, for there are tendencies
in the Swedish worker’s movement to maintain a somewhat detachment as
far as Polish matters are concerned.’56
In September 1944, Karniol appointed a citizen’s committee, gathering
mostly individuals who had recently come to Sweden from Poland, and on
13 September he held a special meeting where a resolution was passed in the
honour of the Warsaw insurgents together with the declaration of loyalty
towards the Polish government in London.57 The founding committee in-
cluded attorney Stanisław Adamek, teacher Zbigniew Folejewski, refugee
Michał Lisiński, Associate Professor Bolesław Skarżyński, as well as Stefan
Trębicki, co-author of the famous book Country without Quisling, which was
translated into various languages.58 Karniol intended to express the support
of the Polish refugees for the Polish government in London, in response to
the earlier meetings of the Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP) in Stockholm,
which were attended by small groups of Poles who were dissatisfied with their
fate. The meeting, prepared and led by Karniol, was attended by more than
three hundred people. In a heartfelt speech, Rickard Lindström stated, ‘if the
freedom of Poland will be violated, then all what is noble and what humanity
is fighting for will be violated.’ On the next day, reports from the meeting
were published in the main newspapers. In light of the Karniol’s reports, the
management of the Polish Legation considered it important to initiate an
awareness campaign in the form of talks and lectures for the public.59
Meanwhile, Karniol tiresomely continued his propagandist activity. On 8
November, he organized a reception for Polish and Swedish guests on the
anniversary of the formation of the first Polish socialist government in Lublin
(1918). His intention was to point out that as a representative of the PPS he
—
56
PISM, col. 133, vol. 296, letter by M. Karniol to A. Ciołkosz, Stockholm, 30 XII 1944.
57
58
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, invitation to the meeting, 13 IX 1944.
59
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, report by representative of the Central Executive Committee of
the PPS party M. Karniol. The first page is missing from the document.
308
was politically independent, and to gauge whether ‘the current political situa-
tion and propaganda of the [Polish] Committee of National Liberation
[PKWN], which made its presence felt in Stockholm, had an impact on the
position of the Swedish leftist spheres.’ A day after the celebrations of the
anniversary of the October Revolution in the Soviet Legation, Karniol
decided to organize his own meeting. It transpired that celebrations would
continue until 8 November. In a note submitted to London, Karniol high-
lighted that despite this about seventy people attended the reception, includ-
ing twenty Poles headed by Envoy Sokolnicki. The Swedish guests included
vice president of the Riksdag Harald Åkerberg, president of Stockholm Carl
Albert Andersson, president of the Association of Cooperatives Albin
Johansson, Allan Vougt and editors-in-chief of six main dailies. The recep-
tion was also attended by the socialists, who were representing the groups of
refugees from various countries. Karniol considered the reception a success.
Although, some of his good friends, for example, Torsten Nilsson, August
Lindberg, Ragnar Casparsson and several other leading social democratic
activists, did not appear. He suspected that they preferred to attend a
reception in the Soviet diplomatic mission instead. As a consolation, he
quoted those members of parliament who had confirmed choosing his over
the Russian invitation.60
In the first half of November 1944, articles about Poland were published
less, which Press Attaché Żaba explained was due to, ‘on the one hand the
Polish–Soviet issue had come to a standstill, and on the other perhaps also pres-
sure from the Soviets.’ According to Żaba press opinions were mostly favour-
able towards Poland, ‘The correspondents of the Swedish press in London
reported the course of the Polish–Soviet relations objectively for the most part,
maintaining that Prime Minister Mikołajczyk was making honest efforts to
come to an agreement with Russia, and his moderate policy earned him more
and more supporters. Attention was drawn to the fact that the Polish govern-
ment could not accept the Curzon Line without being guaranteed the course of
its western borders and the independence of the new Polish state.61
By the end of November, the Polish issues again gained in popularity. Two
novels devoted to the Polish cause were published, Indiansommar 39 (Indian
Summer of 39) by Marika Stiernstedt and Så lång vi leva (As Long as We Are
Alive) by Helen MacInnes. Stiernstedt’s book focused on the events of
—
60
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, note by M. Karniol: The meeting on the anniversary of the
formation of the first people’s government of the Polish Republic, Stockholm, 10 XII 1944.
61
309
September 1939 and MacInnes’ presented everyday life under German occu-
pation and paid tribute to the Home Army soldiers.62 Stiernstedt described
the fate of villagers in the eastern Subcarpathia region until the outbreak of
the war and tragic events of September 1939. According to a Polish reviewer,
the author ‘wanted to present how the peaceful, conservative, religious Polish
countryside became transformed into a defensive fortress and opposed the
invader, and how an industrious peasant who was cut off from the world and
a researcher who was also a man of Europe [protagonists of the novel] turned
into fearless fighters.’63
In early December 1944, a Swedish radio programme, part of the series
Dokument och ögonvittnen (Documents and Eyewitnesses), presented the
stories of different occupied countries.64 An episode devoted to Poland
featured Slavicist Gunnar Gunnarsson, who talked about the Soviet occupa-
tion, industrialist Sven Norrman, who shared the reports about German oc-
cupation, Marika Stierntedt, who read excerpts from Indiansommar 39.65 At
the end of the programme, the Polish national anthem was played. At the
same time, Röster i radio weekly published extensive material about the parti-
cipation of the Poles in the Second World War.66
Did the Polish propagandist activity bring notable results? Considering
the evaluations expressed by attaché Żaba in his press reports, they were
surely doomed to fail from the very start. In December 1944, Żaba noted the
growth in the critical attitude of the Swedish press towards Polish govern-
ment policy saying, ‘Although the majority of Swedish society and Swedish
opinion is essentially unfavourable towards Russia, and favourable towards
us, the Swedish “realism” or “opportunism” force us to count on the fait ac-
compli and with the currently mighty power.’67
—
62
Ministry of Information and Documentation, Stockholm, 16 XI 1944.
63
B. Skarżyński, ‘Motywy polskie w piśmiennictwie szwedzkim w czasie wojny’ (continua-
tion), Nowa Polska 1946, iss. 1, p. 6264.
64
K. Lindal, Självcensur…, p. 172. In May 1945 the recordings of 11 programmes were
published in a book: Detta hände i Europa. Härtagna länder 1938–1941, Stockholm 1945.
65
According to the opinion of the book’s reviewer, who worked for Göteborgs-Tidningen (1
XI 1944) the novel by M. Stiernstedt was ‘a noble product, which glows and warms’.
66
‘Audycja w radiu szwedzkim o Polsce. Polska walczy na wszystkich frontach o najwyższe
wartości moralne’, Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, 7 XII 1944.
67
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, copy of report by N. Żaba do the Ministry of Information
and Documentation, Stockholm, 12 I 1945. The survey of the Swedish press’ response to the
establishment of T. Arciszewski’s government was published in the London press: ‘Prasa
szwedzka o sytuacji Polski’, Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, 9 XII 1944. It needs to be
highlighted that the Polish press commentaries softened the negative evaluation of the
Swedish opportunism. See T. Norwid[-Nowacki], ‘Gospodarczo-wojenna polityka Szwecji’,
310
The conservative press was favourable towards the Polish government,

whereas the liberal dailies and a great many of the leftist press started to prefer
telegrams from Moscow and Lublin instead of the Polish reports from London.
The journalists for the Ny Tid daily were surprised that Moscow continuously
considered the Polish government to be reactionary, since it was dominated by
the socialists, ‘The Poles of London may be accused of everything, but not of
collaboration with the Germans. Neither can Arciszewski and Kwapiński be
counted among the reactionaries.’68 The commentators of the communist Ny
Dag daily had another opinion, ‘The composition of the new Polish govern-
ment is, as it seems, even more reactionary than that of the former one. Just
like the German Nazi leaders, it counts on turning England and America
against Russia.’69 Even Marika Stiernstedt, an advocate of the Polish matter and
famous for many earlier publications in a slightly different vein, referred un-
questioningly in Ny Dag to the economic and social achievements of the Soviet
Union and was delighted when Stalin, to whom it was necessary to show gra-
titude for freeing Europe from Hitler, did not want to force kolkhozes on
Poland, but to hand over the land to the peasants.70
The social democratic local Skaraborgaren daily explained the purpose of
the Soviet attack on the Polish government. When new (from November
1944) Prime Minister Tomasz Arciszewski, a socialist who fought against
tsarism and for the resistance movement after 1939, was hailed a reactionary
in Moscow, it became obvious that the Soviet Union would only acknowledge
a government that it had appointed.71 This conviction turned out to be
accurate, as in the first half of December Swedish dailies announced that the
PKWN was to proclaim itself Provisional Government, and they reported
news of the first transports of Polish repatriates, leaving the Eastern
Borderlands and heading towards Central Poland. The communist Ny Dag
daily commented that the government in London ‘has been exposed as a
reactionary junta of expatriates with no chance of playing a role, and whom
—
Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, 27 XI 1944: ‘Both the certain growth of both the pro-
Nazi trends in 1940 and pro-communist trends in 1944 do not deviate from the charac-
teristics of a phenomenon occurring a result of current favourable circumstances, with no
practical meaning whatsoever. The internal political structure of Sweden gives all the
warranties that this country is unable to yield to totalitarian trends.’
68
‘Polackernas nya regering’, Ny Tid, 4 XII 1944.
69
‘Reaktionens förhoppningar’, Ny Dag, 1 XII 1944.
70
M. Stiernstedt, ‘Sverige och Sovjetunionen’, Ny Dag, XII 1944.
71
A. Jn, ‘Polens affärer’, Skaraborgaren, 6 XII 1944.
311
nobody can make see reason.’72 The social democratic Aftontidningen, how-
ever, repeated in line with Moscow gossip about the collaboration between
the Poles and the Germans.73 For Żaba the significance of these commentaries
pointed to the fact that Sweden wanted to continue its traditional foreign
policy:
What needs to be stated in general is that the position of the British press had
a great influence on Swedish opinion, which, moreover – while intending to
avoid all international complications in the future and re-acquire the lost sales
markets – always sides with the mightiest power. Desiring to maintain peace
in Europe and avoiding the outbreak of the third war at all costs, the attitude
of the Swedish press towards the question of the division of Germany and us
being granted East Prussia is normally negative, as it perceives such a solution
of the Polish–German issue to be a hotbed of the third world war.74
Żaba highlighted that as far as the Polish government was concerned, the
Swedish press’ attitude was like that towards Finland, ‘it wishes to save the
independence of the nation and therefore it urges the introduction of con-
cessions to Russia.’
On the issue of forming the new Polish cabinet in London, Stockholms-
Tidningen daily commented bluntly that the Polish matter had no chance of
being solved in a situation where the position of Arciszewski’s government
was uncompromising. It was suggested that the underground movement
might have a different opinion to that of the politicians in London.75 Göte-
borgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning presented the opinion of its London cor-
respondent, who was hostile towards the Polish government, ‘It is a hopeless
thing to support the nation, which owes its doom to itself.’76 Svenska Dag-
bladet daily regularly quoted the British press, which attacked the Polish
government for its persistent adherence to the sanctity of the eastern border,
although eventually it was suggested that the Western Allies’ departure from
Poland was improper.77
Opinions of the pro-Hitlerian press began to overlap those of the Soviet
propaganda. In November 1944 the famous opinion journalist Rütger Essén,
—
72
‘Polska frågan löses?’, Ny Dag, 16 XII 1944.
73
‘Regeringen i Lublin skapad av folkviljan’, Aftontidningen, 10 I 1945.
74
and Documentation, Stockholm, 12 I 1945.
75
‘Den olösliga polska frågan’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 5 XII 1944.
76
‘Hopplöst söka hjälpa folk, som arbetar på egen undergång’ Göteborgs Handels och Sjöfarts-
Tidning, 1 XII 1944.
77
‘London och Lublin’ Svenska Dagbladet, 2 XII 1944.
312
for Dagsposten, stated, ‘the role of the governments-in-exile residing in

London was never more significant’, and ‘their moral authority in the coun-
tries they represent, was also small, as these countries, fairly or unfairly, had
a sense of disappointment.’ What is more, he sneered, ‘When a government
in exile is only a brief episode, this is still acceptable, but when it lasts years,
the situation is becoming tragicomic.’78 Gunnar Müllern from Aftonbladet
could not comprehend the persistence of the Poles. He maintained, ‘It is fore-
seeable that regardless of the circumstances Russia would include the area of
West Belarus and West Ukraine in its territory.’ A consequence of this was to
be the promise of granting Poland compensation in the form of western ter-
ritories. In the eyes of the pro-Hitlerian opinion journalist the fact that the
Polish government was far from accepting this gift was evidence of political
intelligence. Müllern explained:
The Germans will get back on their feet after this war despite their terrible
losses and material damage. And even a democratic and thoroughly rebuilt
Germany would never accept the fact that its vast territories inhabited by a
German population are to remain under Polish rule. To maintain their exist-
ence, the Poles will be then condemned exclusively to the help of Russian
bayonets. The sovereignty of Poland will be a fiction.79
It was not only the commentators of the pro-Hitlerian dailies that re-submit-
ted their doubts as to the merits of awarding Poland with German territories.
The atmosphere was heated with the statements of the PKWN. Osóbka-
Morawski and General Żymierski at a press conference held at the close of
August 1944 announced that Poland should be awarded with East Prussia
and the territory reaching to the Neisse (Nysa) and Oder (Odra) rivers,
whereas the German population should be displaced.80 The opinion journalist
for Svenska Morgonbladet, who on 5 September called for joining the Warsaw
insurgents in their suffering, soon afterwards asked how it was possible that
a nation so touched by the fate and so freedom-loving intended to, against
the professed values, oppress the entire, guilty and not guilty population of
East Prussia.81
—
78
R. Essén, ‘Exilregeringas sorgliga lott’, Dagsposten, 24 XI 1944.
79
G. Müllem, ‘Stormaktsdiktat i polska frågan’, Aftonbladet, 1 XII 1944.
80
‘Polen kräver Oder som gräns men ingen tysk minoritet’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-
Tidning, 29 VIII 1944; ‘Vi önska ingen tysk minoritet. Polskt uttalande om Östpreussen’,
Hufvudstadsbladet, 30 VIII 1944.
81
EN., ‘Också en förhoppning’, Svenska Morgonbladet, 5 IX 1944.
313
The anxiety about the incorporation of substantial German territories into

Poland, together with a great number of native people, was expressed by Syd-
svenska Dagbladet Snällposten, ‘It would be interesting to know what outline
of this border will be established by the dictators.’ The journalists also won-
dered if the Poles would be exporting coal to Sweden through Gdynia or
through Szczecin.82 Already at the outset of February 1945, information ap-
peared in the press about the upcoming takeover of power by the Polish
administration in Silesia.83
Falu-Kuriren newspaper continued to convince the Poles in London to
make concessions regarding the issue of the eastern border, but at the same
time expressed doubts when it came to the issue of compensation in the west:
It is about time that men capable of taking over the management of Polish
affairs finally emerged from the lowest classes of the Polish people, un-
burdened with the pre-war problems. Another issue is whether the territorial
compensation on a larger scale – certain revisions of the borders must take
place regardless – would be justified… The lands granted to Poland in this
way need to be somehow cleansed off the German element.’84
Similar reservations were presented by Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tid-

ning, ‘expelling the Germans from East Prussia, the population of which is
more or less of the same size as that of Sweden, is not an easy enterprise, for
it is not known whether the Germans would be capable of absorbing such
mass of people. Besides, in the future such a solution could become a hotbed
of new political complications.’85 The Dagens Nyheter daily noted in wonder-
ment that the government of Arciszewski would like to keep the former
border in the east and, what is more, move the Western border in a way that
would be beneficial for Poland: ‘It is hard to resist the impression that the
Poles in London believe in the possibility of creating such great Poland,
which – in the east, in the north and in the west – would be rounded off with
Russian and German lands.’86 Skånska Socialdemokraten suggested: ‘The
Polish–Russian issue needs to be of course regulated based on the principle
of ethnicity.’ This was to mean that, ‘Part of the easternmost Polish lands are
nothing more than Belarusian territories that were stolen by Poland, and the
returning of which to Russia would not be, by any means, a sacrilege towards
—
82
Pabang, ‘Om gränsen blir vid Oder…’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 2 II 1945.
83
‘Lublin och Moskva på väg att dela Östpreussen’, Upsala Nya Tidning, 6 II 1945.
84
G. A., ‘Den polska regeringskrisen’, Falu-Kuriren, 12 XII 1944.
85
Jc [Emil Jacobsson], ‘Situationen’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 16 XII 1943.
86
‘Polens öde’, Dagens Nyheter, 17 XII 1944.
314
the Polish nation’, and ‘the Belarusians, who suffered at the hands of the
Poles, would gladly return to the Soviet Union.’ Naturally, the incorporation
of East Prussia into Poland would be a true disaster and a reason for another
world war.87
Diplomatic chess
For Swedish opinion journalists, the fundamental issue that stood in the way
of solving the Polish issue was the impossible division into two political
camps. It was imagined that the PKWN was a potential partner for the gover-
nment in exile in sharing political power over Poland. Göteborgs Tidningen
explained, ‘The dispute between Bór and the Committee of National Libera-
tion presents a very disheartening impression of an internal rift.’88 At times
the journalists demonstrated their helplessness, as it was impossible to estab-
lish the true reasons of the conflict around Poland. Commentary published
in Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten was extremely pessimistic, ‘To the neu-
tral observer the problem of Poland is so complex that it seems to be impos-
sible to find its solution.’ It was nonetheless obvious to everyone that there
was hostility between the Polish government in London and Stalin, the main
source of which was seen to be the dispute over the border.89
Meanwhile in Stockholm, Envoy Sokolnicki attempted to use Karniol’s
contacts to intervene with the Swedish authorities to appoint a Swedish envoy
at the Polish government in London. Karniol threw a dinner and invited,
among others, Allan Vougt, head of the parliamentary club of social demo-
crats. Vought promised to show his support for the Polish efforts to Minister
Günther.90 Eventually, the only developments that took place were that the
Swedish government approved Ragnar Victor Wengelin as Polish consul to
Gothenburg and Folke Edgren as Polish vice-consul to Kalmar on 24
November 1944.91
With the onset of the autumn of 1944, the diplomatic deception accele-
rated in connection with another visit to Moscow by Prime Minister Stanis-
ław Mikołajczyk. Following the August talks between him and Stalin, the
counsellor of the Polish Legation in Stockholm, Tadeusz Pilch, explained to
—
87
‘Polen allvarlig krigsfråga’, Skånska Socialdemokraten, 18 XII 1944.
88
‘Polens tragedi’, Göteborgs Tidningen, 3 X 1944.
89
‘Polens tragedi’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 12 X 1944.
90
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, telegram by M. Karniol no. 174, Stockholm, 14 VII 1944.
91
utrikesdepartementsärenden, Stockholm, 24 XI 1944.
315
Rolf Sohlman, head of the trade department of UD, that Mikołajczyk had
suggested that the representatives of the PKWN be co-opted by the Polish
government in London, and that the initiative regarding the border issue be
handed over to Stalin. Mikołajczyk was to be offered, by the Soviet dictator,
the Curzon Line in the east and the Oder river (excluding Stettin) in the west.
In such a situation the Poles had to resign themselves to the loss of Vilnius,
but they did not lose hope that they would keep both Lviv and the oil fields
in Eastern Galicia. Whereas, all Upper Silesia was to become part of the ter-
ritory of Poland.92
Pilch’s assurances about the subjective treatment of the head of the Polish
government in Moscow were most probably not treated seriously in the con-
text of pessimistic information that poured in from other sources, as well as
the anti-Polish campaign, inspired by the Soviet propagandist services.
The youth newspaper Frihet published the article containing the following
statement, ‘the Polish government is indeed not the same clique of reaction-
ary generals and colonels as those who governed Poland in 1939 and whose
policy led Poland to disaster, but old trends still have enough strength and
influence in the new Polish army.’ What was also mentioned were the anti-
Jewish incidents in the Polish army.93 The arguments about the anti-Semitism
of Poles, which confirmed the lack of political tolerance, were used especially
by the communists as a propagandist weapon.94 Some opinion journalists
were counting on conclusion of the Polish–Soviet agreement by means of
further direct negotiations between Prime Minister Mikołajczyk and Stalin.
These negotiations took place in October 1944.95 In the press commentaries
an optimistic approach towards the development of the Polish-Soviet rela-
tions would dominate, but at the same time concerns were raised as to
—
92
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 486, memorandum regarding the statement of
counsellor T. Pilch about Polish–Russian relations, Stockholm, 13 IX 1944.
93
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, M. Karniol’s report ‘Szwedzka prasa socjaldemokratyczna o
Polsce. Czerwiec, lipiec, sierpień 1944’, Stockholm, 26 X 1944; article in the issue no. 2 from
1944.
94
PISM, A 11, 49/sow/16, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki together with
attachment (G. Brzeskwiński’s report from the meeting of the international circle examining
the problems of post-war Europe, which took place on 14 XI 1944 in Ognisko), Stockholm
1944.
95
‘Till Moskva’, Ny Tid, 28 VII 1944; ‘Tre polska ministrar äro i Polen’, Ny Tid, 29 VII 1944;
‘Polens konseljpresident uppmanas besöka Stalin’, Arbetet, 18 VII 1944; ‘London-Polen
söker kontakt med Moskva’, Morgon-Tidningen, 27 VII 1944; ‘Kompromiss London-
Moskva löser nya polska krisen’, Morgon-Tidningen, 27 VII 1944; PISM, col. 133, vol. 195,
M. Karniol’s report ‘Szwedzka prasa socjaldemokratyczna o Polsce. Czerwiec, lipiec, sierpień
1944’, Stockholm, 26 X 1944.
316
whether Mikołajczyk would manage to convince other politicians in London

to make concessions to the communists.96
In October 1944, Söderblom, Swedish Envoy to Moscow, reported the
results of the talks between Churchill and Eden (in the presence of Miko-
łajczyk) and Stalin. In his view, no results had been determined concerning
the Polish matter.97 He reported:
Still in August, the Curzon Line was only a basis for setting the future border,
and now the Russians have taken a firmer stance and are demanding that the
Curzon Line be approved for definitive as the border. Mikołajczyk may still
become Prime Minister of the new government, but he would have no in-
fluence over its formation. Such a government will be formed by the current
Lublin Committee.’
Meanwhile the British were pressurizing Mikołajczyk to come to an agree-

ment with the Polish communists, as Great Britain ‘cannot risk serious com-
plications in the relations with the Soviet Union due to the Polish govern-
ment in London.’ Similar was the tone of the telegram Envoy Prytz sent to
Stockholm following his conversation with Polish Ambassador to London
Raczyński after Prime Minister Mikołajczyk’s return from Moscow.
Raczyński confirmed that the quick agreement regarding the Polish matter
was not to be counted on as the Polish authorities considered the proposal
that they accepted the new border with the Soviet Union to be an imposed
settlement and refused to approve it without a referendum in the territories
annexed by Stalin in 1939.98 In the subsequent confidential report, based on
the conversation with a participant of Mikołajczyk’s expedition to Moscow,
the Swedish Legation in London presented the picture of a desperate and
hopeless attempt to defend the position of the Polish government regarding
the issue of the eastern border and the principles of the formation of the new
cabinet including the representation of the PKWN. According to informa-
tion obtained by the Swedes, the Poles had no illusions about the postulates
of the British and pinned their hopes on the president of the USA.99
—
96
‘Den polska bekymren’, Aftontidningen, 7 IX 1944; ‘Polacker i öster och i väster’, Morgon-
Tidningen, 19 IX, 21 IX 1944; ‘Polens extremister driva ett farligt spel’. ‘De allierade regering-
arnas tålamod icke oändligt’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 25 IX 1944.
97
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 486, note by A. Croneborg, Stockholm, 23 X 1944.
98
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 486, note by S. Grafström, Stockholm, 26 X 1944.
99
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 486, memorandum on the subject of Polish-
Soviet relations, concerning the meeting in Moscow 9–18 X 1944, London, 6 XI 1944.
317
By November 1944, the stance of the Swedish policy regarding the Polish
matter was obvious. Söderblom took over the initiative. The diplomat, as-
sociated with the former concessions to Germany, was now, with a sense of
mission, intending to provide Sweden with best possible relations with the
Soviet Union.100 On 6 November, he held a meeting with the representative of
the PKWN in Moscow, Jędrychowski, and informed him of the quality of the
relations between the Swedish government and Polish government in London.
He explained that relations were practically not maintained for several years.
The explanation resembled the justifications that were submitted to the
German diplomats in the period of Third Reich’s preponderance in Europe.
Subsequently, the Polish envoy presented Jędrychowski with the list of Swedish
companies operating in Poland and declared that the Swedes were willing to
establish commercial cooperation with Poland, especially for the import of
Polish coal. Jędrychowski took up this initiative and assured his interlocutor
—
100
S. Grafström, Anteckningar 1938–1944, pp. 514, 622. The opinion which was devastating
for Söderblom (son of the famous Protestant bishop Nathan Söderblom, who was a fore-
runner of ecumenism), noted down on 7 November (pp. 616–617): ‘His reports about the
Soviets are shocking. Servility and tail-wagging, which are presented to the people of the
Kremlin, have only one equivalent – his own conduct at the time when the Germans were
prevailing. He clearly does not notice this himself. He has simply forgotten the actions he
performed in 1940 and 1941. I regret that I cannot quote here the report he submitted
following his first visit at Molotov’s’. On visiting Molotov on 22 July Söderblom highlighted
that he was authorized by Gustaf V to deliver his personal greetings for Marshal Stalin and
to express King’s wish to maintain good and full of trust relations between Sweden and the
Soviet Union. On passing on the greetings for the Prime Minister and the head of the
Swedish diplomacy, he assured that ‘the entire nation is unanimous in its will to develop and
intensify the future good relations between our countries.’ On discussing the subjects from
the field of foreign policy, he assured Molotov that Sweden considered eo ipso the incor-
poration of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. He highlighted that nobody in Sweden
was thinking seriously about political-military integration of the Nordic States. He was
forced to justify the submissive policy towards Germany. He announced that the Swedish-
Soviet cooperation would be initiated, starting with commerce and ending on student and
cultural exchange, ‘as quickly as this would only be possible’. He convinced Molotov that the
attack on the Soviet Union and its heroic defence made Sweden react with ‘sympathy and
interest to all signs of Russian intellectual life.’ In his report from October 1944, on the basis
of Moscow’s example, he enthusiastically discussed the civilizational development of the
Soviet Union in the period of several recent years: the increase in the number of cars, bridges,
asphalt roads and residential buildings, the strengthening position of the Russian ruble in
the financial markets. See: RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 12, vol. 520, copy of report
by Swedish Envoy to Moscow S. Söderblom to UD; telegram by Swedish Envoy to Moscow
S. Söderblom to UD, Moscow, 27 VII 1944; vol. 521, strictly confidential report by Swedish
Envoy to Moscow S. Söderblom to E. von Post, Moscow, 4 X 1944. On the role of Söderblom
during the conversations with the representatives of the PKWN, and later the representatives
of the Provisional Government, see: O. Österberg, ‘Det problematiska erkännandet. Sverige
och ett Centraleuropa i förändring’ [in:] Polen & Sverige 1919–1999, H. Runblom & A. N.
Uggla (ed.), Uppsala 2005, pp. 189–195.
318
that the entire Upper Silesia would be included in the territory of Poland, and
that the wish of the authorities of ‘new Poland’ was the greatest possible trade
with Sweden: ‘Swedish experiences in the area of industry and its resources
would be very useful at the rebuilding [the country].’101 Jędrychowski also
claimed that the Swedes were at that moment ready to send their humanitarian
aid to Lublin via the Soviet Union. According to Söderblom, such gesture could
have been of utmost propagandist importance. Jędrychowski also mentioned
the formation of the Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden (ZPP), which was
strongly fought against by the Polish Legation in Stockholm. Söderblom clearly
accepted the Polish partners. In his reports he spoke well of Jędrychowski. He
characterised him as ‘an experienced and diligent person, surprisingly moder-
ate in his opinions about the Germans.’ Jędrychowski’s co-worker, commercial
attaché Wojciech Chabasiński, reminded him of ‘the bright and intelligent
student from Uppsala.’102
By the end of December, in a letter to Stockholm, Söderblom emphasised,
‘Nurturing the best possible relations with Poland seems to me in line with
the most important interests of Sweden, whereas when it comes to the ter-
ritorial claims [of Stalin], one may think whatever one wants about them, but
we, the Swedes, have no influence on them coming true.’103 Count Folke
Bernadotte, who managed Swedish humanitarian campaigns, most probably
had taken these remarks to heart, as the visit to Lublin was included in the
programme of his stay in Moscow at the outset of 1945, although the Swedish
—
101
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 12, vol. 890, telegram by Swedish Envoy to Moscow
S. Söderblom to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, 6 XI 1944. Jędrychowski in his
correspondence to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the PKWN presented exactly the
same course of the conversation. See: AMSZ, iss. 27, w. 2, vol. 15, report by representative of
the PKWN in Moscow S. Jędrychowski to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the PKWN,
Moscow, 8 XI 1944 r., p. 50; W. Materski, Dyplomacja…, pp. 31–32, see: facsimile of the
report (p. 23). The author informs that Söderblom contacted Jędrychowski already in
October. Similarly writes A. Kłonczyński, Stosunki…, p. 28. The conversation is mentioned
by W.T. Kowalski, Polityka zagraniczna RP 1944–1947, Warszawa 1971, pp. 14–15. In Lub-
lin, according to him, it was expected that Sweden would actively participate in the rebuild-
ing of Poland. Stefan Jędrychowski provides in his memoirs the date of 5 November, when
the meeting took place and quotes his full report from 8 November 1944. He also adds the
description of the session of the PKWN from 22 November, when the floor was taken by
head of the Department of Communication, Jan Rabanowski, who expressed his interest
with the purchase of communications equipment from Sweden. Jędrychowski considered
that coming into an agreement with Sweden was probable, as we may promise coal. See: S.
Jędrychowski, Przedstawicielstwo…, pp. 158–160.
102
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 39, vol. 1620, letter by Swedish Envoy to Moscow S.
Söderblom to E. von Post, Moscow, 12 XII 1944.
103
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 39, vol. 1620, report by Swedish Envoy to Moscow S.
Söderblom to Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch. Günther, Moscow, 30 XII 1944.
319
government still refrained from establishing official relations with the Polish
Provisional Government in Lublin.104
Towards the end of the year, Pilch, the counsellor of the Polish Legation,
sent a summary of memoirs by Einar Ekstrand to London. Ekstrand partici-
pated in Swedish humanitarian actions following the First World War,
including in Soviet Russia.105 Pilch was planning common Polish–Swedish
humanitarian undertakings in the territory of Poland. He maintained that
making use of the Swedes’ experience in countering the economic and health-
related cataclysm that broke out in Poland several years after the occupation,
was necessary. The Polish Legation, however, was no longer a partner for the
Swedish government in such talks.
From the protocols of the PKWN, it follows that the circle of Polish com-
munists started to attach considerable importance to relations with Stockholm
by. This issue was the subject of the PKWN’s session on 22 November 1944.106
First to raise awareness was the community of Poles. Jędrychowski, on dis-
cussing this issue, stated, ‘What we are facing is the issue of bringing these
people back from Sweden to Poland.’ Interest in Sweden was mainly due to its
participation in the humanitarian campaign in the territories from where the
German army was being driven out by Allied forces. The Committee wanted
to make use of this support by forcing Swedish institutions to suspend talks
regarding this matter with the Polish government in exile.107
On 21 December 1944, Pański was authorized by Jędrychowski’s telegram
to represent the interests of Poles in Sweden before the Swedish government
and to register the future repatriates on behalf of the PKWN.108 The financial
resources Pański obtained from Moscow allowed him to conduct propa-
gandist activity (the Polish intelligence suspected that Pański was in posses-
sion of considerable funds).109 Pański also initiated the recruitment of the
Polish army of General Berling, which was attached to the Soviet army. Not
—
104
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 39, vol. 1620, memorandum by Count F. Bernadotte
to Swedish Envoy to Moscow S. Söderblom, no date.
105
AAN, HI/I/113, letter by the counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, T. Pilch, to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (together with attachment), Stockholm, 19 XII 1944.
106
AAN, PKWN, I/4, protocol from the PKWN’s session that took place on 22 XI 1944, pp.
254–255.
107
Ibidem. Cf: E.J. Pałyga, Dyplomacja Polski Ludowej 1944–1984 (kierunki – treści – mech-
anizmy), Warszawa 1986, p. 35; P. Jaworski, ‘Problemy stosunków polsko-szwedzkich w latach
od 1944 do 1948’, Wrocławskie Studia z Polityki Zagranicznej 2001, iss. 1, pp. 24–26.
108
AAN, ZPPwSz, 434/4, telegram by Jędrychowski to J. Pański, n.p., 21 XII 1944, p. 17. The
telegram was written in French.
109
IPMS, PRM 163, secret note by director of the Security Department of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs A. Ostrowski, London, 23 I 1945.
320
far from Huddinge, near Stockholm, a camp was set up to provide shelter for
Poles who were ready to leave Sweden. Agents of the Polish intelligence
declared, ‘these are mostly people of low moral character.’ They were granted
financial aid in the amount of 60 crowns to cover the costs of their travel to
the camp and minor daily expenses.110 The Polish Legation attempted to
counteract this campaign. Information was withheld about the group of 300
hundred refugees who allegedly declared their willingness to become relo-
cated to the territories annexed by the Red Army.111 In fact, according to the
information of the Polish intelligence, no more than seven such people were
registered until the end of 1944.112 Pański was exposed as a deserter from the
Polish merchant navy with no Polish passport.113
Meanwhile Pański continued his uncompromising political battle with the
circles gathered around the Polish Legation. During the meetings held on 5
and 19 November, the items on the agenda were the attacks on Henryk Soko-
lnicki and other employees of the Polish diplomatic mission.114 At the meeting
of 10 December 1944, Iwan Tremtiaczy, who had ‘his speech instructions
written down on paper,’ ‘Instantly attacked […] Minister Sokolnicki, called
counsellor Pilch, Patek, Kowalewski and Karniol a pack of reactionaries,
thieves and thugs. […] He accused them of the lawless suspension of financial
aid for those who refused to leave for England. […] he then threw insults at
the members of the [Polish] Aid Committee, and later, referring to them, told
a joke which was allegedly famous all over Stockholm that “one makes a
better living off the PPS than off any business”.’ The audience, and especially
the board members, expressed their support for the speaker with repeated
applause.115 According to Karniol, Tremtiaczy, who introduced himself as a
pre-war PPS councillor of the city of Gdynia, gained the trust of Jan Masiak,
a socialist who had lived in Sweden for years. He nevertheless claimed, ‘On
—
110
PUMST, A.5.1.4.2, head of the Department of Information and Intelligence of the Staff of
Commander-in-Chief Colonel S. Gano to the Special Division of the Staff of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, n.p., 30 XI 1944 r., p. 144.
111
In his memoirs, Pański mentioned that he managed to collect four hundred signatures of
army volunteers. See: J. Pański, Wachta…, p. 158. The Polish Legation kept sending out
disclaimers to the Swedish newspapers regarding the efficiency of the recruitment conducted
by Pański. See: quotations from the Swedish press: ‘Kompromitacja delegata lubelskiego w
Szwecji’, Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, 2 I 1945; ‘Kompromitacja delegata Lublina w
Sztokholmie’, Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, 20 I 1945.
112
IPMS, A XII, 3/41, note by Colonel S. Gano ‘Polacy w Szwecji – wyjazd do Rosji’, n.p., 30
XII 1944.
113
A. N. Uggla, Polacy w Szwecji., pp. 170–172.
114
IPMS, A XII, 3/41, note by Colonel S. Gano ‘ZPP w Szwecji’, n.p., 1 XII 1944; note by
Colonel S. Gano ‘ZPP w Szwecji’, n.p., 19 XII 1944.
115
PISM, A XII, 3/41, note by Colonel S. Gano ‘ZPP w Szwecji’, n.p., 30 XII 1944.
321
referring to us, he was nevertheless acting against us.’116 The action of vilifying
the employees of the Polish Legation was accelerating. On 27 December 1944,
the Soviet Legation submitted a complaint to the Stockholm police regarding
the alleged battering of the supporters of the Union of Polish Patriots. Notes
on this subject were also submitted to the legations of Great Britain and the
USA. For Razin it was important to spread the opinion that the Polish Lega-
tion occupied itself only with provocative activity. According to the informa-
tion of the Polish intelligence, commissioner Lindberg from the Stockholm
police department was aware that this was a political provocation of the
Soviets and he considered staying away from it to be the best solution.117 On
5 January, Pański was summoned to the headquarters of the criminal police
force. There, he was advised to observe the ban on engaging in political and
propagandist activity. The Swedish official pointed out that this recom-
mendation ‘is not caused by sympathy or antipathy towards this or other
country or government, but its purpose is to maintain peace among the
foreign refugees.’118 As a result, the Soviet Legation advised Pański to suspend
the Poles’ registration so as not to irritate Swedish and Polish opinion in
Stockholm. It certainly did not have the desired effect, and, from the Soviet
point of view, it failed.119
Pański expanded his circle of acquaintances, for example, reaching out to
Marika Stiernstedt, who was elected an honorary member of the ZPP.120
Pański persuaded her (she was an activist of the Hjälp Polens Barn com-
mittee) to organize the sending of food and clothes to the territory of the
Lublin Committee, Poland. For the Swedish authorities, this activity was to
be the sign of good will in establishing relations with the new authorities in
—
116
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, report by M. Karniol no. 205, Stockholm, 20 X 1944.
117
PISM, A XII, 3/41, note by Colonel S. Gano ‘ZPP w Szwecji’, n.p., 2 II 1945.
118
PISM, A XII, 3/41, note by Colonel S. Gano ‘ZPP w Szwecji’, n.p., 26 I 1945.
119
Ibidem.
120
AAN, ZPPwZSRR, 216/29, report by the Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden no. 2, 30 X
1944, p. 14. Towards the end of the war Marika Stiernstedt, who was connected with Poland
because of her Polish mother Maria Ciechanowiecka, accepted the new authorities in Poland,
which were dominated by the communists. When at the end of July 1945, the building of the
Polish Legation in Stockholm was taken over by the group who arrived from Warsaw, she
wrote enthusiastically in her diary: ‘Det nya Polen!’ (‘New Poland!’). Several months earlier
she received a telegram with thanks from the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government,
Edward Osóbka-Morawski, for her dedicated service at organising humanitarian aid for
Polish children. In 1946, several months after her visit to Poland, she published the book
Polsk revolution (Polish Revolution), where she shed a good light on the actions of Polish
communists. See: Carolina Rediviva, ‘Handskriftsavdelning, Marika Stiernstedts samling’,
Dagboks-almanack 1944–1945; telegram by E. Osóbka-Morawski from 3 IV 1945.
322
Poland.121 Pański’s aim was also to persuade the Union of Polish Jews in
Sweden to grant humanitarian aid to Poland. In doing so he referred to the
telegrams he received from Emil Sommerstein, the chair of the Central Com-
mittee of Jews in Poland, and asked for clothes, food and medication to be
sent to the Jewish population residing in the territories annexed by the Soviet
army. As a result, the Union of Polish Jews asked the Swedish Jewish organi-
sations to grant financial support to the organisation Hjälp Polens Barn.122 In
March 1945, Marika Stiernstedt arranged a meeting in her apartment for the
founders of the Polish–Swedish Association. According to an anonymous
source, the meeting was attended by H. Axell, Professor Arne, Doctor
Schück, merchant Dahn and Pański. It was Stiernstedt, who praised Ny Dag
and everything relating to the Soviet Union. She was considered by the agent
of the Swedish police, therefore, to be the most pro-communist oriented
member of this group. Characteristic, nonetheless was that Pański explained
that he did not want his companions to be communists.123
The Polish Committee of National Liberation (the PKWN and later the
Provisional Government) expected Pański to prepare a repatriation cam-
paign. First slogans calling for the return to homeland appeared in the New
Year’s proclamation of the ZPP, announced at the beginning of January 1945.
The name of the Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden (ZPP) was also extended
with the word ‘Repatriation’. The proclamation contained the address of the
ZPP (Fridhemsgatan 72/5, Stockholm), which was to welcome individuals
willing to depart for Poland. It was announced that contact with Poland had
been re-established. Catchy slogans were used to encourage people to return
to their homeland, ‘There is enough work for everyone. Farmers will be given
land. Private property is being returned to its owners. All citizens, regardless
of religion, social background and political views have an equal right to live
in Liberated Poland.’ At the same time it was emphasized, ‘The borders of the
Republic of Poland are closed only to traitors and agents of Fascism.’124 This
—
121
Pański was trying to make the plan of granting immediate aid to Poland a tool of propa-
ganda, see: AMSZ, iss. 27, w. 3, vol. 45, series of Polpress reports entitled Pomoc szwedzka
dla Polski, pp. 5–13.
122
AMSZ, iss. 6, w. 79, vol. 1182, copy of memorandum for director G. Josephson, chair of
the Mosaisk Församlingen in Stockholm, 12 I 1945.
123
RA-Arninge, SÄPO arkiv, P 2406 Jerzy Pański, löp 2, pro memoria, Stockholm, 10 III
1945, p. 78.
124
AAN, ZPPwSz, 434/1, copy of the appeal ‘Polacy w Szwecji!’, n.p., 8 I 1945, p. 3.
323
led to a campaign in Polish society, including information about the sub-

marine crews who were interned in September 1939.125 Efforts were made to
distribute leaflets to all the Poles containing such content.126 At the same time
Pański sent an application, or rather a questionnaire, to the refugee camps
that, according to its heading, consisted of formalities connected with depart-
ure to Poland. It was advised that the application be filled in immediately and
sent back to the address of the Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden – Repatria-
tion.127 The declarations concerning a return to Poland were also declarations
for joining the Union of Polish Patriots. Using these questionnaires, Pański
collected about one hundred declarations, which he announced immediately
in the press. Maurycy Karniol denied these assertions in Aftontidningen. He
explained that the only reliable documents were the refusals to depart to
Great Britain, of which there were only a few.128
On 27 December 1944, under the pretext of taking over care of the Poles
in Sweden, Pański visited Sverker Åström, who was a high official of the
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Pański informed Åström that he had
done so on the recommendation of secretary Razin from the Soviet Legation.
Most of all, he presented the Swede with the telegram from Jędrychowski –
the representative of the PKWN in Moscow – authorizing him to represent
the Polish interests before the Swedish authorities. Pański stated that repa-
triation of Poles to their homeland via the territory of the Soviet Union had
become a current issue. He knew of about two hundred people who allegedly
wanted to return to their homes using this route. This was his reason for
wanting to know whether the Swedish authorities would consider him the
official representative of these Poles. Åström’s defence was to argue that the
Swedish government, just like American and British governments, did not
recognize the PKWN, and therefore a delegate of the committee could not
act as representative of Poland in Sweden. However, on the subject of refu-
gees, Åström clarified that the Swedish authorities would not object to them
returning to their homeland. He personally saw no obstacles to Pański help-
ing his compatriots who asked him for a ticket or permission to travel to the
Soviet Union as a private person. In case he would contact the National
Migration Commission (Statens utlänningskommission), he would have the
—
125
More about the sentiments of the seamen and marginal interest with the communist cam-
paign, see: A. N. Uggla, I nordlg hamn…, pp. 156–158.
126
PISM, A XII, 3/41, note by Colonel S. Gano ‘ZPP w Szwecji’, n.p., 30 XII 1944.
127
RA-Arninge, SÄPO arkiv, P 2406 Jerzy Pański, notification by A. Lisiecki, p. 90.
128
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, report by M. Karniol for the period X–XII 1944, Stockholm, 31 I
1945.
324
right to represent only one Pole at a time with their permission and would
not be able to act as an official representative for all his compatriots.129 The
caution expressed by the Swedish official did not hide the fact that the sphere
of contacts between the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the agendas
of the Lublin Committee Poland gradually expanded. In the following
months, pressure from the representatives of the PKWN, acting under the
supervision of the Soviet authorities, towards granting recognition to the new
Polish de facto authorities grew even more. The convenient means of exerting
this pressure became the promises of a quick conclusion of the contracts for
the supply of coal.130
Around Yalta
Towards the end of October 1944, in an analysis of the situation, the Swedish
Staff of Defence claimed,
Although the closing stage of the Second World War is most probably in pro-
gress – namely, the defeat of Germany – the development of situation is
dependent on so many factors that each attempt of drawing a full picture of
the military-political situation following the conclusion of the war must be
burdened with considerable deficiencies.131
Following such a cautious introduction, the Swedish staff officers most pro-
bably considered that Germany would be defeated and temporarily occupied
by the Allies. They also considered that the international policy would be sub-
stantially influenced by the existence of two global blocs – the Soviet Union
and the USA and Great Britain – together with their voluntarily affiliates,
whereas the neutral countries would encounter serious difficulties if they
tried to conduct policy of complete independence. It was predicted that the
course of the borders of Finland, unless the country became occupied, would
remain the same as those set in the truce arrangement. In addition, the Soviet
—
129
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 12, vol. 890, memorandum by S. Åström, Stockholm,
27 XII 1944. Full text of the document, see: RA-Arninge, SÄPO arkiv, P 2406 Jerzy Pański,
löp 1, p. 69.
130
W. Materski, Dyplomacja…, pp. 53–54, 60. As the author himself noted, similar strategy,
encouraging to establish de facto relations with the authorities of Lublin Committee Poland,
was used towards the governments of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands,
Norway and Italy. Cf: K. Tarka, Emigracyjna dyplomacja. Polityka zagraniczna rządu RP na
uchodźstwie 1945–1990, Warszawa 2003, pp. 13–47; K. Strzałka, Między przyjaźnią a
wrogością. Z dziejów stosunków polsko-włoskich (1939–1945), Kraków 2001, p. 495.
131
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 40, Defence Staff Analysis: ‘Military-political
situation’, 31 X 1944 r. General H. Jung’s visiting card was attached to the document.
325
Union would be able to exert direct military-political pressure on the Finnish

government. It was beyond any doubt that the Baltic States would be again
annexed as Soviet republics, just like a considerable part of East Prussia, with
Königsberg. In doing so, the Soviet Union was to guarantee itself a dominant
role in the Baltic Sea region. The Polish–Soviet border was to be set along the
Curzon Line and Bessarabia and Bukovina were to be definitively separated
from Romania. The Swedish staff officers were cautiously predicting:
One may establish that these territorial claims from Russia are final, but one
may also think that they are only the first stage of its wide-ranging imperial-
ism. There are also good reasons that support the first assumption – that
Russia intends to provide security and shape the sphere of its influences in the
western border through other means than direct territorial annexations.132
The examples of this were arrangements with Finland, Bulgaria and Ro-
mania. Attempts to reaching agreement with Marshal Tito and the formation
of communist Polish government in Moscow proved that there were in-
tentions to appoint ideologically similar authorities in the countries located
within the intended sphere of influence. The support for General de Gaulle,
and making use of the group of captive German generals, showed different
ways of achieving objectives by the Soviet diplomacy. The Soviet zone was to
include Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Eastern
Germany, most probably Hungary and possibly Austria. Less certain were the
predictions about the developments in other parts of Europe. The USSR
gaining control over the Turkish straits was unlikely, and the situation in Italy
was uncertain. It was stated that, ‘strong communism in Western Europe
could throw these countries into the arms of Russia.’ Nevertheless, the sup-
port for the English and American liberators could also grant them income.
The future of Denmark and Norway, all of which found themselves in the
Soviet sphere of political interests was also unknown. What was considered
seriously was the option of creating a Soviet enclave around Narvik. The
dominance of Finnish language across the Norwegian and Swedish arctic
regions could also become a crucial pretext for the territorial claims put for-
ward by Moscow. It was beyond any doubt that the Soviet Union had strong
military arguments, as with the support of the Allies it created an efficient
military machine, which following the conclusion of the war was most pro-
bably to remain in combat readiness.
—
132
Ibidem.
326
The Swedes believed that following the downfall of Germany, the victori-
ous powers would likely continue their cooperation to maintain peace. The
announcements of the foundation of the United Nations organization proved
that things were heading in this direction, but even the best theoretical
foundations could not grant an efficient and better – than that of the League
of Nations’ – operation of such an organisation. All was dependant on the
possibility of further cooperation between the powers:
That is why the fortunate development of the world requires the chief qualities
of these countries’ leaders to be utmost wisdom and moderation. The diffi-
culties in the mutual understanding among the Allies when their common
enemy is not yet defeated prove that there exist considerable differences and
the overcoming of which would not become any easier even when this enemy
is defeated.
In this situation, what was the best solution for Sweden? The answer:
[…] our country has found itself in the borderline between two global blocs.
That is why it is natural that the Swedish nation hopes for and, as far as it is
possible, also strives to guarantee permanent peace. It would be however ir-
responsible not to consider the possibility of another conflict until the mo-
ment the new peace order is ready, working and meets all expectations.
The belief was now shared that Sweden risked being dragged into the war.
The greatest risk was taking a position in the conflict between the USSR and
Great Britain regarding the shape of the sphere of influences in Scandinavia.
According to the Swedish staff officers, the Scandinavian Peninsula was no
less exposed to a military attack following the conclusion of the war than
during the war, since the territory of Sweden was an ideal location for
launching operations of both the Soviet air force or the Royal Air Force.
Following the victories over the German army, it was beyond any doubt that
the Soviet army had no equal opponent in Europe, and aggression against the
Swedish territory should be expected:
The truth that we need to look straight in the eye is that in the event when –
despite the peace-oriented actions – the new intense conflict cannot be
avoided, the situation for our country will become highly critical. There is a
risk that in case of conflict we may be exposed to pressures or direct inter-
vention of the side that would attempt to gain a convenient starting position
in the expected clash between the powers. The occupation of Sweden would
bring the greatest strategic benefits directly to England and the USA. From
the Russian point of view, the attack would be mostly motivated by preventive
327
objectives. The military weakness of Sweden would create a risky void that
would encourage aggression.133
One consideration was the union of three neutral Scandinavian countries in

defence of sovereignty. This excluded, however, that any of the powers would
accept the idea. The only solution which was considered possible in the
nearest future was further armaments with the intention to scare off an even-
tual opponent. It was stated that, ‘the options for the Swedish government’s
actions in defending the freedom and peace of our nation in the uncertain
and full of dangers future are increasing.’
On considering Sweden’s limited room for manoeuvre in the sphere of
foreign policy, a strategy of opportunism was chosen, focusing on preserving
good relations with the victorious powers at the least cost. Support for the
Polish government in exile was impossible in this situation; it would put
Sweden at risk of international complications. In connection with this, Polish
evaluations of the influence of the developments in Europe on the Swedish
policy at the outset of 1945 had to be full of bitterness. Military Attaché
Brzeskwiński reported cautiously, ‘Swedish foreign policy has adopted a
wait-and-see attitude, with a bias towards the USSR.’134 At the same time,
Envoy Sokolnicki informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs more bluntly,
‘Despite its neutrality, Sweden finds itself deeper and deeper in the sphere of
Russian influence and is characterized by realism and opportunism.’ In April
he presented Sweden in his reports as a country entirely conquered by the
Soviet propaganda, ‘The military and political successes of the Soviet Union
caused a change within Swedish society – especially in the circles of bourgeois
intelligentsia, who were hitherto blindly devoted to the cult of Germany as a
nation excellent in all fields of civilization – in the shape of a sudden wake of
equally boundless adoration of the Soviet Union.’135
The Swedish press increasingly was publishing appeals calling for estab-
lishing closer relations with the Soviets, teaching Russian language and becom-
ing more acquainted with Russian culture. The critics were in retreat:
Very cautious voices, expressing doubts so as to the possibility of establishing
closer relations with the society in Russia, were refuted either by the accusa-
tions of being blinded with the anti-Russian mania, or by assurances that
—
133
Ibidem.
134
PISM, PRM 163, secret note by deputy head of the Armed Forces Staff Colonel H.
Piątkowski, n.p., 12 I 1945.
135
Sokolnicki to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 19 IV 1945.
328
Russia has been in the course of transformation for dozens of years now, that
Bolshevism is disappearing and that over time – and in fact in the nearest
future – Russia will resemble western democracies.136
Such were the impressions of the head of Polish diplomatic mission in Stock-
holm in the spring of 1945.
The leaders of the Swedish diplomacy were convinced of the veracity of
the policy of gestures of friendship towards the Soviet Union. Sven Grafström
noted in his diary with distaste in January 1945 that former Envoy to
Moscow, and at the time assistant of vice minister Vilhelm Assarsson, toge-
ther with Rolf Sohlman claimed, ‘we need to tread carefully with the Russians
mostly because otherwise we will not sell anything to the Soviets. The con-
sequence of this would be unemployment, increased dissatisfaction and the
growth of communism in Sweden.’137
Opponents of the Polish government in London tried to disparage him in
the eyes of the newspapers’ readers. The adverse atmosphere around the
London government was created by the repeated, starting from 1944, anti-
Semitism accusations in the Polish army. The soldiers of Jewish descent were
to desert due to the harassment they encountered from their Polish col-
leagues. These conflicts reportedly concerned even ministerial offices.138 The
other charge, which was aimed at disgracing the Polish government in exile,
was the accusation of placing political opponents in special prisons in
Scotland. Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning treated this charge as high-
ly probable, ‘If it is true what is being said about Polish prisons in Scotland
and what is going on there, it needs to be said that English hospitality and
patience are considerable.’139 News was published about fights between the
Poles – supporters of the government in exile – and the communists in refu-
gee camps. That very same event, discussed several times over several weeks,
gave the impression of constant politically motivated wrangles among the
Poles, whereas the initiators of the rows were naturally the supporters of the
London government.140
When the few reports from Poland were published, it transpired that
Polish society had accepted the new state authorities. Ralph Parker wrote in
—
136
Ibidem.
137
S. Grafström, Anteckningar 1945–1954, ed. S. Ekman, Stockholm 1989, p. 629.
138
For instance: ‘Våldsam kris i det polska lägret. Militär antisemitism hotar spränga
regeringen’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 15 V 1944; ‘Grov antisemitism frodas
i londonpolackernas armé’, Ny Dag, 12 IV 1945.
139
Jc., ‘Situationen’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 13 VI 1945.
140
‘Vilt politiskt gräl mellan två polacker’, Expressen, 8 I 1945.
329
his article for Svenska Dagbladet, ‘This is the only thing that explains the suc-
cess of the grain harvest and relatively high abundance of food in towns,
which caused a gradual drop in the free market prices, just like there is no
other explanation for the success of army recruitment.’ Parker in fact made
it clear that he did not notice any enthusiasm towards the Lublin government,
but ‘time is on its side’, and ‘the division of land among the peasants has
smoothed away the fear against collectivisation.’ The key to success was also
to be the unusual guardedness of the Soviet soldiers, whose behaviour was
the example of excellent propriety.141 Aftontidningen even published the con-
tent of a telegram from Moscow stating that the Provisional Government of
Poland was the only lawful Polish government.142 Generally speaking, on the
issue of Polish–Soviet relations, the Swedish press used the easiest possible
strategy by avoiding taking a position while reporting the course of events.
When commentaries appeared, the government in London was accused of
reconciling with the thought of ceding the Borderlands to the Soviet Union
too late. At the same time Żaba wrote, regarding the western border, ‘What
is felt is the reluctance of Swedish opinion to grant us compensation at the
expense of Germany, and this is for fear that it would become a hotbed of a
new war.’143
The commentators of the pro-Nazi newspapers triumphed. Gunnar
Müllern continued to argue in Aftonbladet:
Versailles Poland was, in general, a structure which was impossible to main-
tain, which sooner or later had to fall apart by itself. The moment when Russia
and Germany, weakened by the previous war, regained strength, the former
territorial disputes have been settled. Now the Poles must feel bitterness.
Although they were fighting more diligently than other allied nations and in
spite of the fact that they did not create a Quisling, they are treated worse than
the vassals of Germany.
This, according to Müllern, only proved that the powers should not be
trusted.144 Other commentators also maintained that the Polish London
government was fighting a losing battle,145 and the communist Ny Dag called
the Swedish diplomacy to action, ‘The quicker our ministry of foreign affairs
—
141
R. Parker, ‘Lublin regeringen vill skapa en stark polsk militärmakt’, Svenska Dagbladet, 28
I 1945.
142
‘Regeringen i London skapad av folkviljan’, Aftontidningen, 10 I 1945.
143
and Documentation, Stockholm, 9 II 1945.
144
G. Müllern, ‘Den polska frågan inför avgörandet’, Aftonbladet, 13 I 1945.
145
Y. Lg., ‘Polskt fait accompli’, Aftontidningen, 21 I 1945.
330
realizes that the government in London is not representing its country – the
better.’146 The Vistula river offensive of the Soviet armies, which began 12
January 1945, was to solve all issues of a diplomatic nature. Although, it was
noted that the Polish army, which was fighting on several fronts, posed a
certain problem.147
The Press department of the Polish Legation attempted to counter the
Soviet propaganda. Nevertheless, modest bulletins, based on the news service
of the Polish Telegraphic Agency (PAT) and translated into Swedish, could
not match the political strength of materials sent out by the press services of
the powers. Press Attaché Żaba noted, ‘Unfortunately the news from Lublin,
or inspired by Lublin, gain increasingly growing access to the Swedish press
thanks to English and American agencies, which endorse these news items.’148
At times Polish disclaimers were taken into consideration. The editorial
section of Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, on 29 January 1945,
quoted the explanations it obtained from the Polish Legation about the situa-
tion in the Polish territories and the rules of ‘Russian–Polish Quislings’
headed by Osóbka-Morawski. The following bitter conclusion was added at
the time: ‘Therefore there exists administration with dictatorial power, but it
uses the support of foreign bayonets and it is only an instrument of foreign
rule, contrary to the sovereignty of Poland. This explanation provides hope-
less prospects for the future.’149
A famous social democratic activist and a close acquaintance of Karniol,
Allan Vougt was right stating at the outset of February 1945 in Arbetet: ‘The
Lublin government enjoys actual popularity in Sweden, which is far greater
than that of the London government.’ He was seeking the explanation in the
British–American and Soviet propaganda, which ‘made most of the Swedes
think that the Poles in London were a community of reactionary old fogeys
(perukstockar), whereas their compatriots in Lublin were a true embodiment
of the will of the Polish nation.’ This attitude was not even changed by the
actual target of the government in London, which was ‘to create independent
Poland, in the strict sense of this word.’150
According to Sokolnicki, the Swedes, towards the end of 1944, established
de facto relations with the PKWN owing to a humanitarian action, which was
—
146
‘Lublinregeringen’, Ny Dag, 18 I 1945.
147
‘Östoffensiven och östpolitiken’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 22 I 1945.
148
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, copy of report by Polish Envoy to Stockholm N. Żaba to
the Ministry of Information and Documentation, Stockholm, 15 I 1945.
149
Jc., ‘Situationen’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 29 I 1945.
150
A. V[ou]gt, ‘Kampen om Polen’, Arbetet, 7 II 1945.
331
conducted in agreement with the new state authorities in Poland. The pro-
tests of the Polish government could, according to Sokolnicki, lead to the
division of competences ‘between ourselves and Lublin.’ The Swedes at the
time cared about the quick development of the humanitarian campaign and
outclassing the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
(UNRRA), which would be of great propagandist benefit and contribute to
diminishing political pressures from the Allies.151 Sweden continued to
convince the Western Allies that it did not need to join the military opera-
tions to support the rebuilding of the destroyed countries.152 According to
Sokolnicki, ‘the attitude towards us essentially did not change.’ Nevertheless,
it was evident that the Swedes gradually started to develop relations with the
Provisional Government in Lublin and with much attention observed the
evolution of relations between the Western Allies and the Polish government
in London. Prytz, Envoy of Sweden to London, passed on a confidential mes-
sage to Stockholm. In the message it stood that Minister Eden informed
Mikołajczyk on 11 January that although the British government continued
to recognize the Polish government in exile, it would out of necessity estab-
lish relations with the Provisional Government in Lublin.153
At the same time, Pilch filed a protest at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs against the formation in Lublin of the Polish Provisional Govern-
ment. He expressed his hope that in connection with the humanitarian aid
sent to Poland, Count Folke Bernadotte would not travel to Lublin as this
would give the action ‘an official label’, and Sweden did not recognize the
Polish Provisional Government. According to his view, it would also seem
odd if a representative of Sweden first discussed the subject of humanitarian
aid for Poland with the representatives of the UNRRA and Poles in London,
and then visited Moscow regarding this matter and contacted the local Polish
community.154
Nevertheless, the Polish legation in Stockholm remained on the defensive.
Swedish diplomats considered the most convenient moment to break off
relations with the Polish government in exile. At the outset of January 1945
Polish Minister of foreign affairs Tarnowski, through the agency of Soko-
lnicki, requested Boheman take over custody of the Polish citizens residing
—
151
PISM, A 11, E/1099, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, n.p., 6 I 1945.
152
153
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 12, vol. 890, pro memoria, n.p., 19 I 1945.
154
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 12, vol. 890, pro memoria, Stockholm, 11 I 1945 r.
332
in Romania, which was annexed by the Russians.155 The Poles had to face
refusal, which was justified by the lack of contact with their legation in
Bucharest.156 In the Polish Legation in Stockholm methods were pondered for
how to weaken the propagandist message of the action organized by the
Swedes in support the people from the territories under the administration
of the Lublin government. Minister Tarnowski wanted to force the Swedes
not to make this action official and not to publicise it. For this reason, it was
important for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the action’s leader was not
Folke Bernadotte.157 Although, the stance could not be too insistently demon-
strated, to avoid it being interpreted as a lack of consent of support for the
Polish territories annexed by the Soviet army.
Nothing is known about meetings between Envoy Sokolnicki and Prime
Minister Hansson which took place at the time. Only Karniol, the repre-
sentative of the PPS, managed to meet with the head of the Swedish govern-
ment and the Social Democratic Party. In a conversation on 3 February,
Karniol lay bare the sacrifices of the Polish nation, ‘These sacrifices have not
managed hitherto to restore our freedom. The Russians treat our movement
as hostile, they arrest our activists, bring the officers of the Home Army
before the court and shoot many of them.’158 Karniol convinced Hansson that
Mikołajczyk showed the greatest possible submissiveness towards Stalin,
which nevertheless brought no Polish–Soviet compromise, since the head of
the government became the socialists, Arciszewski and Kwapiński. The mea-
sure of moderation and democratic approach was to be self-restraint towards
the projects aiming at moving the western border of Poland closer to the
Oder and Neisse rivers and incorporation of Wrocław (Breslau) and Szczecin
(Stettin). The only Polish weapons were ‘high moral values,’ this included
supporting the International Labour Movement and public opinion of demo-
cratic countries. Karniol maintained that it was the pressure from public
opinion that could bring a favourable result. That is why he asked the Swedish
government for support in not recognising the Provisional Government in
—
155
AAN, HI/I/334, telegram by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Tarnowski to Polish Envoy to
Stockholm H. Sokolnicki, n.p., 5 I 1945.
156
AAN, HI/I/334, copy of telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 5 III 1945; RA UD avdelningar och byråarkiv 1864–
1952, Andra B-avdelningen, vol. 183, memorandum by S. Grafström, n.p., 11 I 1945 and a
note from 17 I 1945. Grafström also added that Romanians would definitely not recognise
the Swedish mandate to exercise such a custody.
157
PISM, A 11, E/1099, telegram by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Tarnowski to the Polish
Legation in Stockholm, 9 I 1945.
158
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, copy of report by M. Karniol no. 223, Stockholm, 5 II 1945.
333
Warsaw. Hansson reassured, most of all, that his country was in a favourable
position. The Germans no longer demanded anything from Sweden and that
he was not expecting any complications even in the case of military opera-
tions in Denmark or Norway. As he noted, ‘Currently there are no pressures
on Sweden from any other side in any direction.’ He added that after the war
he would like to develop international cooperation founded on the sovereign
decisions of individual countries. He also summed up, ‘In this respect our
efforts are overlapping with those of Poland.’ He nevertheless did not hide
that for the Swedes it was most important to cooperate with the Nordic
countries. On the subject of the Provisional Government of Poland, he did
not want to make any binding declarations, although he noted reassuringly,
‘this matter is not current in Sweden, we are not interested in this matter and
we are not intending to forward it ourselves.’ He emphasized once again that
there were no pressures regarding that matter. He moreover guaranteed, ‘We
are recognising Your Government and Your Legation in Sweden and we see
no reason at the moment for this to change.’ Somewhat contrary to these
assurances was the policy of the Swedish government regarding the planning
of humanitarian aid for Poland and attempts to establish economic relations
with Poland. Hansson claimed, ‘On these matters, we would naturally have
to somehow consider the local de facto authorities. It is hard to determine at
this point what form this would take. There are many possibilities in the
entire spectrum between the de iure and de facto recognition.’ Lastly, the
Prime Minister offered support for the members of the PPS who wanted to
make their way from Poland to the west of Europe.
Two days later, on 5 February, Karniol met with Gustav Möller, Minister
of Social Affairs, who was also a high-ranking activist of the Social Demo-
cratic Party.159 He addressed a similar request to the Prime Minister, asking
the Swedish government to refrain from recognizing the Provisional Govern-
ment of Poland. He used Swedish public opinion to support the Polish matter
and made it easier for the PPS activists to escape from Poland. Möller was
interested in the composition of political forces in Poland, whether the occu-
pation had changed it and whether right-wing forces had started to dominate.
He also raised the issue of national minorities. As Karniol reported, ‘He
always had an impression that Versailles Poland was excessively extended
eastwards, had too many lands populated by a non-Polish majority and for
this reason was unable to solve the nationality-related issue.’ Karniol ex-
plained that the eastern border of Poland was a compromise and that the
—
159
Ibidem.
334
Borderlands were an ethnically mixed region, whereas the lands Stalin

wanted to incorporate into Poland in the west, were populated by not even
one percent of a Polish population. According to Karniol, the position of the
Polish government was not only in line with ethnography, devoid both of
chauvinism and any traces of imperialism, but it was also a democratic ap-
proach to the issue of peace in future Europe. Möller accepted the plan of
sneaking people out of Poland on Swedish ships and granting provisional
passports to activists who wanted to leave Poland. He also confirmed the
words of Prime Minister Hansson, that the Swedish government treated the
issue of recognizing the Polish Provisional Government as no longer import-
ant. He nevertheless added that this situation could be changed by a relevant
decision by Great Powers. He openly suggested that the Swedes adopt a wait-
and-see attitude in the face of the opening of the Yalta conference. Möller
gave an optimistic answer to Karniol’s question on whether Stalin’s creating
dependent centres of power in Central and Eastern Europe against the
people’s will would not exert a negative influence on the development of the
socialist movement, ‘One beautiful day, the Russians, seeing the determined
will of the people of occupied Europe in supporting democracy, would
liquidate all these governments, and change the entire system.’
It would be hard to perceive Karniol’s talks with the most important poli-
ticians of the Swedish government at the time as the Polish government’s
attempt to come out of international isolation, since the relations with
Sweden had no impact on the position of Arciszewski’s cabinet. Karniol was
aware that the Swedes were traditionally guided by the international policy
of the Great Powers and would never decide to undertake actions for the
benefit of Poland which could considerably compromise their own position.
It is worth underlining that Prime Minister Hansson talked with Karniol as
if he was a regular representative of Arciszewski’s government, which proved
that the delegate of the PPS enjoyed a high status in the sphere of Swedish
political elites. Nevertheless, the head of the Swedish government did not
make any declarations and did not oblige himself to anything, which con-
firmed Karniol’s opinion presented in the reports he sent to London about
the Swedes’ adaptation to the Soviet Union.160
At the outset of January 1945, the new Moscow ambassador of the Pro-
visional Government of Poland sent a note to Söderblom, where he expressed
his hope to establish relations with the representative of Sweden.161 On 6
—
160
PISM, col. 133, vol. 195, copy of report by M. Karniol no. 224, Stockholm, 5 II 1945.
161
335
February 1945 though, he paid him a visit. Modzelewski planned to find out
whether the Swedish government discussed the issue of establishing official
relations with the Polish Provisional Government and future commercial
relations. Söderblom replied evasively that he possessed no thorough infor-
mation on this subject. So far it was he who encouraged his government to
take up more courageous actions in granting recognition to the new Polish
authorities. He wrote to Stockholm:
[…] for a long time now I have had the pleasure of maintaining the best pos-
sible relations with the representation of the Polish Provisional Government
in Moscow regarding the discussion of the issues connected with the defence
of Swedish economic interests in Poland and Swedish humanitarian aid. I am
convinced that Sweden has already been devoting attention to the issue of
developing the future Polish–Swedish commercial relations.’162
Modzelewski assured Söderblom that the Swedes could count on the supplies
of Polish coal, because thanks to the rapid movement of the Soviet armies,
the mines of Upper Silesia were saved from destruction. He announced that
Poland would be mostly in need of agricultural machinery, rolling stock and
diverse machinery. He mentioned that in connection with military opera-
tions, the gauge of the railway routes was adjusted to the Russian norms, but
he assured that following the war Poland would re-introduce the European
track gauge. Söderblom had a high opinion about Modzelewski, ‘Ambassador
Modzelewski impressed me as a kind-hearted person. In comparison to other
representatives of new Poland he seems to be serious, determined and patri-
otically-oriented.’
Söderblom declared that the Poles’ desire to establish good relations with
Sweden seemed to be strong and true. He also claimed, ‘Our country can
count on lively sympathy from Poland.’ On 8 February Modzelewski, sent a
short telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
I met with the Swedes. I put the matter on a rational level. I think that it would
be possible to start talks soon. They became interested in our possible orders
of equipment and machines. Although they are making it clear that they pos-
sess coal supplies, they in fact do not, and this would put a pressure on them.163
—
162
S. Söderblom to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, 3 V 1945.
163
Söderblom to Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch. Günther, Moscow, 15 II 1945.
336
As early as on 12 February, Söderblom paid a follow-up visit to Modzelewski

and committed a minor indiscretion; he was not certain whether the con-
versation could be conducted in French. Meanwhile, it emerged that
Modzelewski had studied in Paris in 1920s and had command of French.
Söderblom was glad that he had another occasion to emphasize the Swedish
interest in ‘new Poland’ before reaching arrangements at the conference in
Yalta. The most important result of the meeting was the assurance made by
Modzelewski that Poland could supply coal to Sweden. According to the am-
bassador, the coal mines were already exploited at the time, and from the
moment of reaching Upper Silesia by the Soviet army 15 thousand carriages
of coal were loaded and it was only the lack of rolling stock that slowed down
output. Söderblom also discussed the details of donating 27.5 tons of food,
clothes and shoes via Hjälp Polens Barn. He announced that the transport
had already reached Turku and from there it would be taken to Leningrad by
rail, where it should be delivered around 17 February 1945. In addition, 15
tons of crisp bread, oat flakes and medication, with an estimated worth of 40
thousand crowns, was being prepared for the Jewish population in Poland.
Moreover, he promised that approximately 2 tons of clothes would soon be
sent to Poland. There was also an expectation that the array of support
resources would be expanded, as on 3 February a special academic committee
was established in Sweden to collect scientific instruments, tools and litera-
ture for the universities in Poland.164
Mallet, British Envoy to Stockholm, informed London that some Swedish
companies (Billners, Folke, Appelquist, Bratt) had already contacted the
Soviet Legation to obtain information about the options of obtaining supplies
from Polish mines.165 On giving an account of his conversation with Bohe-
man, Mallet informed London that Kindgren, director of the Committee of
—
164
AMSZ, iss. 6, w. 78, vol. 1159, copy of message no. 144 by Z. Modzelewski to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, 8 II 1945, p 1.
165
Söderblom to Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch. Günther, Moscow, 15 II 1945. The Swedes also
cared about the property of their companies in the Polish territory. On 14 March 1945,
Ingemar Häglöff, First Secretary of the Swedish Legation in Moscow, presented Commercial
Attaché Wojciech Chabasiński with aide-mémoire regarding this issue. Chabasiński wrote:
‘Having informed the Ministry about the above, I would like to draw attention to the fact
that the memorandum was submitted at the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Sweden, and not on the initiative of the Legation. The Swedish capital is undoubtedly seri-
ously worried about the fate of the factories and the warehouses, which are its property and
are located in the territory of Poland. The relevant pressure is exerted on the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. I would also like to mention that in the conversation, Häglöff showed a clear
interest in the issue of possible safeguarding the rights of the Swedish companies in the
337
Swedish State Reserves, visited Moscow to discuss the issue of possible deli-
veries and prices of coal. Mallet predicted that Kindgren would most pro-
bably meet with the representatives of the Lublin government: ‘The Swedes,
as Boheman said, are naturally interested in the opportunity to obtain coal
from the Polish coal mines, especially that the pace of the Russian march in
the direction of Silesia allows one to assume that the coal mines will not be
destroyed.’ He justified the necessity of the existence of representation for the
Polish Lublin administration, like that possessed by the French, who, despite
continuously recognizing the government of London as the official govern-
ment of Poland – sent what could be described as a commercial delegation to
Lublin. Despite their commercial prospects, the Swedes had commercial
interests in Poland, which required attention.166
Jerzy Pański presented offers of cooperation to the Swedes personally. He
promised coal in exchange for machinery and prefabricated homes. Posing
as the representative of ‘new Poland’ he accepted the offers of Swedish coal
importers. The Swedish industrialists came directly to him to express their
willingness to cooperate with the future authorities of Poland, whose har-
binger was the PKWN.167 Envoy Sokolnicki confirmed, ‘Pański carried out
diverse surveys in Swedish economic circles on the subject of future Swedish–
Polish commercial relations.’ However, he added, in a reassuring tone:
‘these surveys are not serious, because Pański is not familiar with those issues
and does not possess any reworked material. He initially tried to make some
efforts with industrial and commercial companies, but when his interlocutors
realised that he was not presenting any serious economic concepts, they broke
contact with him. Therefore, he now limits himself to contacts with various
minor companies, and especially with intermediaries, people who are con-
sidered irresponsible in this territory, and who are often placed on the index
of the local Association of Exporters.168
—
territory of Poland.’ See: AMSZ, iss. 6, w. 78, vol. 1164, report no. 2 by Commercial Attaché
W. Chabasiński to the Ministry of Industry, Moscow, 7 IV 1945, p. 1.
166
NA, FO, 371/48048, telegram by the Envoy of Great Britain to Stockholm V. Mallet to the
FO, 1 II 1945.
167
NA, FO, 371/48048, letter by Envoy of Great Britain to Stockholm V. Mallet to Ch.
Lamming, 3 VI 1945.
168
AMSZ, iss. 6, w. 78, vol. 1163, transcript of witness account [Jerzy Pański] put down on
30 September 1946 in the Executive Office of the Special Commission in Warsaw, 5 X 1946,
p. 4–7. Pański, on mentioning his activity in Sweden in the years 1944 and 1945 – among the
Swedish companies which addressed him with a request for information of a commercial
nature – named the concern Axel Johnson (at first the owner handed to him 3 thousand
crowns ‘as a means of support for the Poles-democrats’) and Svensk-Ryska AB (represented
by Ruben Ljundberg, who promised his support in the propagandist activity in favour of the
338
Meanwhile, Pański informed Moscow in April 1945, ‘commercial and in-

dustrial spheres in Sweden are showing interest in the opportunities of future
relations with Poland’, and ‘Swedish companies divided themselves into
“democratic” (namely believing in the permanence of the Provisional
Government) and “London”.’169 There was a lot of truth in Pański’s opinion,
but his role in the initiation and development of bilateral relations was over-
estimated. What was crucial for the Swedes were direct conversations, con-
ducted in Moscow with the representative of the Polish Provisional Govern-
ment. It was there that the settlements of the issue of future mutual relations
between Sweden and Poland were taking place. This nevertheless did not stop
the Soviet political offensive in Sweden. Sokolnicki, whilst wanting to under-
estimate the possibility of establishing economic cooperation between
Sweden and the Polish Provisional Government, also reported anxiously, in
the summing up of his letter to London from March 1945, ‘what is expected
in the nearest future is the arrival to Stockholm of 15 new officials to the local
Soviet Legation.’ Among them was a specialist in Polish matters.170 The Polish
intelligence informed London in April 1945 about the special training in the
Soviet Legation of Poles who were to be sent to their country as officials of
different levels of administration. The group of trainees included Pański and
other leading activists of the Union of Polish Patriots in Sweden.171 According
to the SÄPO files, Pański established an indefinite contact with British
intelligence.172
On 3 February, Minister Günther met with Italian Envoy Giovanni Bat-
tista Guarnaschelli and explained to him that Pański had no official status
and no steps had been taken to grant him such status. The issue of granting
recognition to the government, about which Günther said ‘it may be already
—
Lublin Committee Poland). Through Ljundberg’s agency he met the representatives of the
Union of Coal Importers.
169
PISM, A 11, E/590, letter by Envoy H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 III
1945. Sokolnicki gave one specific example of Pański’s contactswith Ericsson’s representative
in Poland – Björklund. Also, in this case Sokolnicki consequently discredited Pański’s acti-
vity: ‘As a matter of fact Björklund also, on getting to know who Pański was, reported the
meeting to the Legation and stated that he would not see Pański ever again.’
170
AAN, ZPPwSz, 434/3, telegram by J. Pański to the Polish Embassy in Moscow, 3 IV 1945,
p. 14. Last companies mentioned by Pański were the electrical concerns ASEA and SVEA
Export, which allegedly financed the press campaign of the Polish Legation in Stockholm,
whose purpose was to attack the Provisional Government.
171
PISM, A 11, VI 21/590, letter by Envoy H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Stockholm, 26 III 1945.
172
PISM, A XII, 3/41, note by the head of the Department of Information and Intelligence of
the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Colonel S. Gano, ‘Szwecja – komuniści polscy’, 19 IV
1945.
339
called Warsaw government’, was not yet taken up by the Swedish government
and it continued to recognise the Polish government in exile. Nevertheless,
the Swedish minister of foreign affairs pointed out that what was at stake were
the crucial economic interests of his country in the territory of Poland, which
continued to remain under the control of the Provisional Government. This
fact needed to be considered by the Swedish government. Günther provided
an example of two French representations which existed in Stockholm during
the war – that of Vichy and that of General de Gaulle – and announced that
the Swedish government would wait for the situation to unfold and for an
organic solution to this problem to present itself.173
Several days later, the Foreign Office (FO) advised the Swedes through
Mallet to postpone the delegation of their representation to the Provisional
Government in Lublin to the moment of the conclusion of the conference in
Yalta.174 When Mallet communicated this message to Boheman, the Secre-
tary-General expressed his gratitude and replied that the Swedish govern-
ment had already made such a decision.175
‘The natural solution of the Polish matter’ was to be delivered by the con-
ference in Yalta. The Polish border was established along the Curzon line.
Poland was to incorporate Eastern German territories. The future Polish
government was to be formed by ministers of both the London government
and the Provisional Government in Warsaw. Stalin promised to allowed free
elections in Poland. During the first days following its conclusion, the
Swedish press did not publish any information that would explain the
development of the situation from the perspective of the Polish government
in London. The only exception was the government’s protest, which was pub-
lished in all dailies. Żaba explained such a stance with the influence of the
British press and fear of the Soviet Union, whose annoyance everyone wished
to avoid.176
In general, the final settlements of the conference were received in Sweden
with contentment. It was only on closer analysis of the resolutions that the
initial enthusiasm on the part of the Swedish press, became more realistic
—
173
RA-Arninge, SÄPO arkiv, P 2406 Jerzy Pański, note regarding J. Pański’s meeting on 2 III
1945 with J. H. Walter, who remained in contact with the Naval Attaché of Great Britain, H.
Denham.
174
NA, FO, 188/492, telegram by Envoy of Italy to Rome G. B. Guarnaschelli to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in Rome, 3 II 1945.
175
NA, FO, 371/48048, telegram by FO to Envoy of Great Britain to Stockholm V. Mallet, 10 II
1945.
176
NA, FO, 371/48048, telegram by Envoy of Great Britain to Stockholm V. Mallet to FO,
n.p., 11 II 1945.
340
approach.177 Żaba’s remark referred to the conservative dailies (Svenska Dag-

bladet, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten) and the weeklies (Svensk Tidskrift,
Obs!). The opinions of the press were divided. Positive commentaries in
relation to the position of the Polish government were published by Arbetet,
Ny Tid and Arbetaren. However, the leading opinion journalist for the liberal
Dagens Nyheter, Johannes Wickman, traditionally believed that Polish poli-
tics is completely incomprehensible and Great Britain would end up in a
conflict with the Soviet Union, in case it wanted to conduct such policy.178 On
14 February, though, Stockholms-Tidningen commented on the results of the
conference in Yalta with contentment and clear relief. It was stated, ‘the
Polish issue ceased to be a problem, owing to the most dangerous obstacle
being removed.’ The author confirmed that formally a compromise had been
reached, but, ‘the Russian point of view was acknowledged by both Anglo-
Saxon powers.’ This meant, ‘The Western countries have saved their prestige,
and the Soviet Union has won the case.’179 A little anxiety was expressed due
to the trimming of Poland in the east and extending of its borders in the west.
The socialist Ny Tid considered that the faithful ally was aggrieved by the
returning to the idea of the border established in the pact between Hitler and
Stalin.180 Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten claimed that probably many Poles
believed that they belonged to the losing camp in this war.181 Other com-
mentators for Stockholms-Tidningen daily, known for its pro-German sym-
pathies earlier in the war, argued:
We, the Swedes, are concerned about what is happening, not only when looking
at it from the Polish perspective. Although we are also risking various accu-
sations of joining the campaign of compassion for Germany, it ought to be
stated that a similar case of relocating such a considerable portion of the popu-
lation constitutes an unnecessary burden for those who are no more to blame
for the deeds of Nazi Germany than other nations, and it would constitute a
foundation for hatred, which may turn out to be dangerous in the future.’182
—
177
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 486, letter by Swedish Envoy to London J.
Beck-Friis to E. von Post, n.p., 19 II 1945.
178
E. Boheman, På vakt. Kabinettssekreterare…, p. 304.
179
180
What may be considered its expression is the characteristic graphic commentary: ‘Hem
med Curzonlinjen’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 16 II 1945.
181
J. Wickman, ‘Krimreflexer’, Dagens Nyheter, 22 II 1945.
182
‘Dokumentet från Krimkonferensen’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 14 II 1945.
341
The most extreme commentaries mentioned the fifth partition of Poland.183

Surely the Swedish diplomats were aware of the bitterness that prevailed in
‘Polish London.’ The Polish Envoy to the Norwegian government in exile,
Władysław Günther-Schwarzburg, openly communicated to the Swedish
Envoy to London, Johan Beck-Friis, that Churchill had sold Poland to the
Soviets.184 The Polish diplomat was pessimistic about the developments in
Poland. He maintained that there was no chance for free elections and that
the economy would undergo Bolshevisation. When he was asked by the
Swede how Poles imagined the solution to such a complicated Polish issue,
Günther-Schwarzburg replied, ‘nobody is thinking about such a solution and
in fact there exists no such solution.’ Boheman most probably maintained
that Sweden had no other option than to acknowledge the grim reality of the
situation as the Western Allies were. In the first days of May, when defeat of
Germany was being celebrated, he would nonetheless express his anxiety
regarding the submissiveness of Great Britain and the USA towards Stalin, ‘I
am afraid, I said, that it would be either impossible or very difficult to force
the Russians to leave the territories they now occupy.’185
After the Yalta agreements, the Swedes gradually prepared the diplomatic
ground to establish international relations with the government in Warsaw.
On 27 March, Söderblom talked to American ambassador Georg Kennan
about the intention of sending a representative of the Swedish government to
Warsaw.186 He explained that Sweden was expecting the renewal of trade with
Poland, including efforts to launch the deliveries of Polish coal. Nevertheless,
the decision was not yet made, as the Swedes were unwilling to ‘step over the
line.’ Added to which, there were fears that the representative chosen by the
Swedes would not be accepted by the Soviets, which would make Stockholm
risk an unpleasant refusal. Kennan explained informally that the chances of
solving the Polish matter were few. British and American authorities, in his
view, would have nothing against Sweden sending its representative to
Poland, on the condition that such action would assume the character of a de
facto recognition of the government in Warsaw and would be conducted
without any excessive publicity. According to the American diplomat, the
—
183
K. J. O-n, ‘Polens affärer’, Ny Tid, 15 II 1945.
184
‘Polens sak’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 16 II 1945.
185
‘Underhusdebatten om Polens framtid’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 2 III 1945. E. Boheman,
På vakt. Kabinettssekreterare…, p. 304.
186
‘Polens femte delning genomförd av dess bundsförvanter. Rysk inblandning i Polens in-
rikespolitik legaliserades i Jalta’, Dagsposten, 14 II 1945; ‘Polsk lösning teknisk elegant’, Afton-
bladet, 13 II 1945.
342
Soviet authorities would construe such a move in a positive way, because it

was important for them to stabilize the Warsaw government.
Meanwhile, on 3 April 1945, Modzelewski again asked in an official letter
about the Swedes’ plans concerning the establishment of relations with the
government in Warsaw. The alleged reason became the Soviet army’s arrival
in Gdańsk and Gdynia. According to Modzelewski, the Swedish companies
themselves started to report to the departments of Polish Provisional
Government, but the ambassador emphasized that the Polish government
preferred to negotiate with the Swedish government. He pledged that Poland
was intending to export coal and zinc to Sweden, and that the only problem
that needed to be solved were the transport difficulties, namely the lack of
engines and trucks. Modzelewski stated that the agreement with Mikołajczyk
was sealed and that Sweden was acting unwisely by suspending its decision
to officially grant recognition to the Provisional Government of Poland. He
expressed thanks for the aid, which had just arrived, and pursued questions
about the deliveries of specialist equipment, which had already been discus-
sed much earlier. Söderblom, as usual, could only assure his interlocutor that
good relations with Poland were very important for Sweden and that he
would hand a relevant report from the conversation to the appropriate party.
Indeed, on concluding his account he emphasized:
Personally, I have already suggested in August 1944 that a representative of
Sweden be delegated to new Poland. I assume that it is now essential to find
some form of answer to the Polish démarche that would be heading in a positive
direction. If we had delegated our representative last autumn, we would have
gained remarkably. When following the renewal of official relations with
Czechoslovakia nothing was done or announced to Poland, I am afraid that the
currently strong sympathies for Sweden will gradually pass and hinges in the
doors will rust up when the contacts become established, which in any event
must take place in the nearest future.187
Nevertheless, the government’s instructions were different. The telegram

from 7 April banned Söderblom from taking any initiative until negotiations
between the powers concluded with an explanation of the fate of Poland. It is
worth underlining that the officials of UD considered it appropriate to soften
the message of its categorical instruction:
We are naturally following the developments with utmost interest and it is
important for us to establish traditionally friendly relations with Poland as soon
—
187
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 486, pro memoria, Moscow, 27 III 1945.
343
as possible. At the same time, we are hoping that what becomes revived parti-
cularly quickly would be the booming trade, and we are ready – within the
realms of our possibilities and obligations towards other countries – to support
the rebuilding of Poland.’188
What is more, already on 14 April, the Swedish government ordered Söder-

blom to submit to Modzelewski a proposal to delegate a special representative
to Poland – first secretary of Swedish Legation in Helsinki Brynolf Eng – to
become acquainted with the options of trade between Poland and Sweden.189
This decision could be somehow influenced by Mikołajczyk’s decision to
return to Poland and to accept the office of deputy Prime Minister in the
Government in Warsaw. Besides, the coal mines and the ports were already
occupied by the Soviet armies and, as the Polish interlocutors of the Swedes
in Moscow maintained, the industrial infrastructure was not destroyed. The
proposal was accepted by Poland on 22 April.190 Meanwhile, in the Swedish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sokolnicki was reassured that Eng was not to
travel as a diplomatic representative but only as a delegate of the government
to accompany the members of the fuel commission. It was highlighted that
the mission’s character was exclusively economic and was by no means tanta-
mount to granting recognition to the Warsaw government by Sweden.191
Ingemar Hägglöf based on the report of Elliot M. Shirk, the representative
of the American Red Cross, on 10 April produced a report devoted to the
humanitarian aid that was granted to Poland. From the turn of 1944 and
1945, Shirk spent five years in Poland and controlled the packages trans-
ported along the route that was like that used for the transports of the
Swedish route – running through the Soviet territory, by air to Moscow, and
then westwards by railway. The Americans, as opposed to the Swedes, de-
manded that the distribution of medication that were submitted to the Polish
Red Cross be controlled. It was only after a couple of days in the second half
of December that consent was given for Shirk to be transferred to Lublin
together with the entire cargo. It turned out that the batch of medication that
had been sent previously had never arrived. The authorities of the Polish Red
—
188
S. Söderblom to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, 2 IV 1945; vol. 890, memorandum
concerning Polish-Swedish economic relations, Stockholm, 12 IV 1945.
189
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 12, vol. 890, telegram by the government of Sweden
to Swedish Envoy to Moscow S. Söderblom, 7 IV 1945.
190
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, telegram by Envoy of Sweden to Mos-
cow S. Söderblom, Stockholm, 14 IV 1945.
191
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, telegram by Envoy of Sweden to Mos-
cow S. Söderblom, Moscow, 23 IV 1945.
344
Cross had no idea about aid from Sweden. According to Shirk, the Polish Red
Cross was the only organization which provided effective help for countless
numbers of people in Poland, whereas the help from the Soviet Union was to
be directed exclusively to the Warsaw Praga quarter. The orientation of the
Poles was anti-Russian due to the numerous excesses of the Soviet troops
towards the civilians, to the arrests of the members of the underground and
to ‘the fact that the Russians left General Bór at the mercy of events.’ Sanitary
conditions were in a critical state, and water supplies and sewers in large cities
did not function. The American was already familiar with the popular Polish
saying: ‘since we have managed to survive five years of the German occupa-
tion, we will manage to survive a year of such freedom.’192 Shirk’s report, sub-
mitted to Stockholm through Hägglöf, painted a grim picture of the situation
in Poland. Shirk viewed the Polish Provisional Government as a Soviet pup-
pet government. Despite these alarming reports about the actual situation in
the Polish territory, the Swedish government intended to continue its efforts
to reach an agreement with the Polish authorities in Warsaw. Besides, ac-
cording to the Swedish diplomacy, the Polish government in London found
itself in the state of self-compromising internal disintegration. From the
reports which were prepared by Envoy Prytz at the outset of April, it could
be understood that ‘the prestige of the Polish government in London, which
was never too high, has recently plummeted.’193 This was the result of four
leading socialist activists dissociating themselves from the policy of the
government directed by Arciszewski on 19 March. Later, on 22 March, the
president dissolved the National Council, where a small number of poli-
ticians were considering an option of reaching a compromise with the Soviet
Union and calling for the establishment of a democratic government in
Poland based on the agreement with Moscow. For Prytz it was obvious that
Prime Minister Arciszewski had no influence on the developments or deci-
sions being made by the powers. The Swede drew attention to the announce-
ment of the leaders of the underground movement, which accepted the invi-
tation to hold talks with the Soviet authorities. On 27 and 28 March, fifteen
Poles appeared on the spot where the meeting was to be held and from then
on nothing was heard from them. It was discovered later that they had been
—
192
193
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 39, vol. 1620, copy of secret memorandum by I.
Hägglöf, Moscow, 10 IV 1945.
345
arrested.194 The announcement communicated by Prytz contained an in-

sinuation that they had been murdered. According to information he ob-
tained, the Poles found themselves in Kiev and there they conducted the
negotiations. These discussions were to, according to him, lead to the forma-
tion of the new government, announced at the conference of Yalta, which
perhaps was to happen early enough to make its representatives take part in
the conference in San Francisco. Prytz claimed that such a solution would put
the British government in a delicate situation, since it could not refuse to
grant recognition to such government.
At the outset of April, news was announced that several leaders of the
Polish Underground State were missing. The issue was re-visited in May
regarding Molotov revealing them to have been arrested by the Soviet
authorities. Żaba wrote to London, ‘It is beyond any doubt that the new cyni-
cal Soviet step has made a great impression here, and though the newspapers
were filled with dramatic descriptions of Germany’s agony, much space was
devoted to the last event in the Polish–Soviet relations.’195 Later, in June, the
Soviet authorities held their show trial in Moscow.
A characteristic example of such press responses was the article by Gunnar
Pihl the Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten. Pihl expressed serious fears about
the political objectives of Stalin.196 The dailies also provided the details of the
Poles’ arrests ‘under large headlines and in a sensational form.’ In mid-June,
when the circumstances of the Poles’ kidnapping to Moscow and the
practices of Soviet authorities in the territory of Poland were already known,
the tone of the articles changed slightly. Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-
Tidning first published the comments about mixed feelings regarding the
recent actions of the Soviet authorities towards the leaders of the Polish
Underground State, and later more precise information about the mass
arrests of Polish patriots and their deportations. The lack of knowledge on
this subject was justified with the nearly complete isolation of Poland from
the outside world.197
—
194
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 486, letter by Swedish Envoy to London B.
Prytz to Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch. Günther, London, 9 IV 1945.
195
‘15 framstående polacker försvunna’, Upsala Nya Tidning, 7 IV 1945; ‘Polska ledare
försvann på väg till ryskt möte’, Dagens Nyheter, 7 IV 1945; ‘Polsk skuggregering borta. GPU
uppges som kidnappare’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 7 IV 1945.
196
G. Pihl, ‘Både demokrati och demokrati’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, 7 IV 1945.
197
‘Moskva löser polska frågan utan de västallierade. Det senaste schackdraget framkallar
blandade känslor’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 9 IV 1945; P-k, ‘De bortförda
polska patrioterna’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 15 VI 1945.
346
The person who again commented on the Polish matter was Józefa Arm-
felt, who in an article for the liberal Vestmanlands Läns Tidning daily ex-
pressed her grief in dramatic words, ‘The conscience of the world is not clear
and neither is the conscience of Great Britain!’198 It is worth underlining that
voices critical of Stalin reflected a broader tendency which was particularly
visible in the press.
In the first half of May, Press Attaché Żaba noted that the certain opti-
mism regarding the settlement of the Polish matter by the Allies, which had
been felt following the conference in Yalta, disappeared:
What is noticeable is the clear concern with the turning of events around the
Polish matter on the international arena, as well as with the frictions it causes
in the Allied camp. Some evaluations of Russia’s conduct are very bold, which
deserves to be emphasized, especially because of the restraint or even timidity
of the local press, which is very well known to us.199
Stockholms-Tidningen claimed that the greatest friends of Russia were not

able to substantiate Stalin’s conduct towards the leaders of the Polish under-
ground movement.200 Whereas, a commentator for Svenska Dagbladet main-
tained that Stalin’s attitude towards the Polish matter proved that the dictator
was not going to respect the agreements of Yalta, treated the future of Poland
as the internal issue of the Soviet Union and could cause the greatest crisis
from the time of the establishment of the anti-fascist coalition.201 It was only
at that moment when the voices were heard that the propaganda, which
claimed that the Polish government of London was reactionary or that it only
cared about the interests of upper classes of society, might have been false
and failed to get to the root of the entire dispute over the Polish matter. Falu-
Kuriren emphasized, ‘We, the Swedes, naturally do not have any possibility
to influence international developments, but we should focus our attention
on the course of events in the country which will take control over a vast
stretch of the Baltic Sea coast.’202
The reports about the repressions which had been used against the sol-
diers of the Home Army and the Polish Underground State did not stop the
—
198
J. Armfelt, ‘Polska röster om Polens sak, -och utländska’, Vestmanlands Läns Tidning, 18
IV 1945.
199
200
‘Stor bitterhet i London över ryska Polenkonflikten’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 7 V 1945.
201
T. G. W., ‘Polska frågan prövosten för Jaltaandan’, Svenska Dagbladet, 8 V 1945.
202
‘Polens sak’, Falu-Kuriren, 11 V 1945.
347
process of formalizing the contacts between Sweden and the Polish Provi-
sional Government. On 11 May 1945, Eng received a phone call from Pański,
who, under the pretext of the need to discuss some press-related issues, sug-
gested a meeting. Eng defended himself by explaining that the press did not
fall within his remit, nevertheless, Pański pressed him further and claimed
that the information he was in possession of would spark the Swede’s interest.
The meeting took place a day later. Pański assured his interlocutor that des-
pite acting as a representative of the Polpress agency, he was in fact
authorized to act as intermediary in the contact between the Warsaw govern-
ment and Sweden, as proof he had already presented relevant documents to
Utrikesdepartementet (UD). Nevertheless, due to the lack of official relations
between Stockholm and the Polish Provisional Government, he made it clear
that his words should be treated as his private statements. Eventually, Pański,
on behalf of the Polish representation in Moscow, stated that Eng was wel-
come to come to visit Poland with his secretary. Eng answered evasively that
he had recently returned from Helsinki and lacked sufficient orientation on
the issue of the Polish–Swedish relations. Nevertheless, Pański did not aban-
don his efforts to discover whether Sweden would recognize the Warsaw
government. During the discussion, he expressed an opinion that the de facto
recognition would be enough for the moment. He announced that Eng’s visa
would be prepared in the coming days, although he did not answer whether
he had obtained confirmation from Moscow on this matter.203
The persistence of the representatives of ‘new Poland’ both in Moscow
and in Stockholm was beneficial for the Swedish government as it wanted to
establish relations with its Baltic neighbour as soon as possible, but at the
same time was evasive towards London. In this instance, utilitarianism
clashed with ethics. In Moscow on 18 May 1945, Söderblom discussed with
Modzelewski, who had recently been appointed as deputy minister of foreign
affairs of the Provisional Government of Poland, the future of Polish–
Swedish relations. He considered the delivery of 1 million tons of coal during
the coming summer to be possible in terms of production, but was not sure
whether Poland was capable of its transport. Eng’s arrival to Moscow was
expected at any time. Prime Minister Osóbka-Morawski, on 3 May, publicly
announced that the Polish Provisional Government had established coopera-
tion with Sweden, but Modzelewski made no mention of the necessity to gain
legal recognition of his government from the Swedish authorities. Still,
—
203
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 12, vol. 890, memorandum by B. Eng, Stockholm, 12
V 1945. Economic issues raised by Pański on this meeting are discussed in Chapter 10.
348
Söderblom attempted to convince Stockholm that, ‘sending a Swedish dele-

gate to Poland would be highly beneficial for general policy-related reasons
and would increase the chances of obtaining coal – otherwise this was ex-
cluded.’204 The actions connected with sending a Swedish representative to
participate in the talks on coal import, were treated by the European press as
the first step by Sweden to recognising the Polish Provisional Government
before the governments of the Western Allies.
The principal aim of the Swedish diplomacy was to secure Polish coal sup-
plies while avoiding simultaneous legal recognition of the Polish authorities
in Warsaw, which had been formed under Soviet control before the decision
of the Western Allies. For the Polish side though, it was important that the
commercial and political issues were connected. The following weeks
brought cautious actions on both sides, who aimed to reach these two mutu-
ally exclusive objectives.205
In May 1945 the Swedes started to analyse the situation in Europe and its
strategic position following the conclusion of the war. The tone of the report
of Sweden’s Defence Staff was pessimistic:
The German armed forces have capitulated. Nevertheless, peace did not start to
reign in Europe. The Allies completed one task together – so far the most im-
portant one – Germany has been militarily defeated. Other tasks were brushed
—
204
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 12, vol. 890, memorandum regarding the establish-
ment of relations with the Provisional Government of Poland, Stockholm, 22 V 1945.
205
For Sweden it was undoubtedly important to rebuild economic relations with Poland,
regardless of the shape of its new government, due to Sweden’s own raw material needs. In
turn, the new authorities, which were formed in the Polish territory under the Soviet super-
vision, were striving to become legitimized in the international arena. No less important was
the economic motivation, namely seeking international partners at the rebuilding of the
destroyed country. Cf. J. Dorniak, Stosunki…, pp. 46–48. It is also worth mentioning yet
another aspect of the entire issue: for some communist activists the development of relations
with Sweden was to constitute the evidence for the existence of some range of sovereign
actions of the Provisional Government in Warsaw in the area of foreign policy. Leon
Finkelstein during the session of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers’ Party (e.g.
communist party) on 20 and 21 May 1945 claimed with a clear exaggeration: ‘The policy of
Poland needs to be convergent with the foundations of the policy of the Soviet Union, but
within this policy we have the opportunity to conduct the defence of our interests – there is
much room for self-reliance […] Relations between the Soviet Union and Sweden are frigid.
In spite of this fact it is possible for us to maintain relations with Sweden.’ See: Protokół
obrad KC PPR w maju 1945 roku (The protocol of the session of the Central Committee of
the Polish Workers’ Party), compiled by A. Kochański, Warszawa 1992 (Dokumenty do
dziejów PRL, iss. 1), p. 3. Cf. A Kłonczyński, Stosunki…
349
aside when fights were taking place, and new tasks appeared following
Germany’s downfall.206
Most of all, these tasks included relations between the countries and the estab-
lishment of borders as well as the countries’ internal relations. The first issue
concerned all Central Europe, the Balkans and Northern Europe (Bornholm,
Finland and Norway), and the second Germany mainly, but also the Soviet
Union. The analysts of the Swedish staff were aware that on many of these
matters, the interests of Russia and the Western Allies were divergent:
According to all probability both sides would like to solve their problems
without starting an open conflict. The will of both sides is certainly reaching
a successful solution (for each of the sides) or a good position for reaching
these solutions during the next peace conference, in the situation when war-
ravaged Europe may still be shaped and the powers themselves are in posses-
sion of the necessary military measures.’
Various scenarios of possible developments were appearing and from the

Swedish perspective the need to remain cautious required considering any of
the following options: ‘In any case it would be unwise now, before it is pos-
sible to foresee the unfolding of events with much certainty, to take the steps
which, in case the developments are unfavourable, could put our country in
a risky situation.’
With regard to the landing of the British army in Denmark and Norway
and the annexation of the entire eastern and southern coast of the Baltic Sea
(including Bornholm) by the Soviet army, the Swedish staff officers proposed
that the Swedish army remain in the highest operational readiness, and the
counter-intelligence services were to play an exceptional role in the face of
the expected revival of the activity of foreign intelligence services in the ter-
ritory of Sweden in the nearest future. The clearly increasing concern with
the Soviet infiltration was evident.
The propagandist activity of the Polish Legation in Stockholm started to
bear fruit, although in April some commotion was caused by the fact that the
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare of the Polish government in exile
authorized Maurycy Karniol as a delegate to Scandinavian countries. Pilch
wrote with outrage to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that according to
Karniol the Ministry of Labour was not satisfied with the work of the Polish
Legation as far as the preparation of Swedish humanitarian aid for Poland
—
206
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 1, vol. 40, memorandum of the Defence Staff regard-
ing the military-political situation of Sweden in the summer of 1945, 30 V 1945.
350
following the war was concerned: ‘I must admit that the above statements of
Mr. Karniol were particularly unpleasant to me, all the more so that accord-
ing to the dictates of my conscience – they were unfair. For several months
of the Legation’s operation there has been not a single day that we would not
devote our closest attention to this issue. In the current, very difficult for us,
political situation when we are, unfortunately, no longer a valuable, irre-
proachable partner for the Swedes, we are using every moment and occasion
not only to maintain all the necessary contacts with the Swedish relief
authorities, but also to convince them to the rightness of our theses, to con-
tinue talks with us, to become interested with our projects etc.’207
Pilch was even more surprised with the opinions reported by Karniol that
he formerly did not receive any negative signals whatsoever concerning his
work in Stockholm, even during his latest visit to London. The counsellor
openly asked his superiors whether he was to acquaint Karniol with the issue
of the talks with the Swedes. He proposed that they were conducted exclusively
by one person, if the stage of semi-official negotiations was over. He refused to
provide Karniol with more detailed information concerning the negotiations,
and at the same time he informed about the contacts of people connected with
him with the activists of the Warsaw government.
What is more, on 16 April 1945 Żaba handed in his resignation from the
office of head of the Delegation of the Ministry of Information regarding
Karniol being granted the title of Polish envoy ad personam. In the letter to
the ministry he pointed out that so far, he only came under the authority of
Envoy Sokolnicki. In connection with that he explained:
Making all my decisions dependent on the agreement of Doctor Karniol I
must treat not only as my demotion from the currently occupied position but
also as a so-far unheard of precedent of subordinating officials of other minis-
tries, who are also diplomatic officials of the legation, to the trusted repre-
sentative of the Party [PPS], equipped with more powerful authorizations
from the Polish envoy himself, which is for me impossible to accept due to
my perception of rightness and democracy.208
—
207
AAN, HI/I/115, letter by the counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, T. Pilch, to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 18 IV 1945.
208
and Documentation, 16 IV 1945. Simultaneously Żaba sent by the same mail the letter to the
Ministry of Internal Affairs with a request to become appointed as an official of this Ministry
at the Polish Legation in Stockholm, see: Ibidem, copy of report by N. Żaba to the Depart-
ment of Continental Action of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 16 IV 1945.
351
Together with Żaba, three of his clerks also resigned. The Attaché wanted to
secure himself formally in the event of being subordinated by Karniol. He
was hoping to continue his current duties in the very same team and place,
but under a different title. Karniol’s competences concerning the Delegature
of the Ministry of Information and Documentation were quickly removed.
The conflict seems odd when one considers that both parties were aware
that the mission of the Polish diplomatic post was coming to an end. In the
current situation, the Ministry of Information and Documentation advised
Żaba not to make any future commitments.209 What was most important by
the end of June was providing financial security for the post, which was to be
liquidated, although the publishing activity was not suspended, and certain
plans were still being pursued.210
The Polish military contribution to the defeat of Germany was still em-
phasized in the propaganda. The Swedish edition of the book The Story of a
Secret State by Jan Karski, was published on 9 April 1945 by the prestigious
publishing house Natur och Kultur.211 Positive reviews for the book started to
appear, which pointed out that emotions were held at bay and unbelievable
things were presented in a matter-of-fact manner: German cruelty and the
bold actions of the Polish nation.212 Tadeusz Nowacki with Stefan Trębicki
later wrote the book Warszawa Rapsodin (The Warsaw Rhapsody). This
novel described the fate of the Warsaw Jews from September 1939 until the
rising in the ghetto in 1943. Żaba convinced the editors of the Bonniers pub-
lishing house to publish the novel En dam och sju excellence (Seven Excel-
lencies and One Lady) by Aleksander Piskor in 1945. Bo Enander’s book Så
härskade herre-folket (So Ruled the Nation of the Lords) rallied against the
campaign of compassion for Germany. The wave of dislike towards Ger-
many, however, was presented only in the reports about life in concentration
camps following their liberation in the spring of 1945.213 Seger är inte nog
—
209
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, copy of letter by R. Przedpełski (European Department
of the Ministry of Information and Documentation), London, 15 III 1945.
210
Ibidem, copy of letter by N. Żaba to the Ministry of Information and Documentation, n.p.,
27 VI 1945.
211
J. Karski, ‘Den hemliga staten’, Stockholm 1945.
212
Jc., ‘En stat under jorden’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 1 VI 1945; R., ‘Korta
recensioner’, Svenska Dagbladet, 16 IV 1945; M. S-hl, ‘Skräckinteriörer från de tyska lik-
fabrikerna’, Karlstads-Tidningen, 25 IV 1945; R., ‘Hemlig stat’, Upsala Nya Tidning, 27 IV
1945; Gvs., ‘En stat under jorden’, Stockholms-Tidningen, 30 IV 1945; G. Frösell, ‘Polens strid
efter nederlaget’, Aftonbladet, 6 V 1945; Th:son, ‘Över och under jorden’, Syd-svenska Dag-
bladet Snällposten, 14 V 1945.
213
and Documentation, 9 VI 1945. See: H. Dahlberg, I Sverige…, p. 88.
352
(Victory is Not Enough), the book by the American journalist John Scott,
translated into Swedish, was less favourable. The author’s main source was
Edmund Rappaport, supporter of the ZPP, who ‘in exaggerated colours des-
cribes the pre-war anti-Semitism in Poland and claims that these were mostly
the partisans of Eastern Poland who resisted the Germans.’214
In the press report Żaba highlighted, ‘When it comes to Sweden, here it is
followed nevertheless with great interest the development of the situation in
the country which is one of the owners of the greatest stretch of the Baltic Sea
coast.’ Whereas, the attitude of Stalin towards Poland was to give an idea
about the Soviet dictator’s political plans towards his other neighbours.215 On
9 May, in the liberal Västernorrlands Allehanda it was stated that, ‘there is
little hope of finding an agreed solution of the Polish matter.’ According to
the commentator of this local daily, the Western Allies had little to say at the
time, and ‘Russia, if it wants to, would throw up an iron curtain and close the
door.’216 The moderate daily Karlshamns Allehanda repeated on 12 May that
it was Poland who suffered the most during the Second World War and that
this happened also with assistance from of Stalin, who deported Polish people
deep into the Soviet Union. The author concluded the article, ‘no one should
be so stupid as to think that what is normally called freedom in Sweden, could
also develop in the territories that end up under Russian administration.’217
Similar were the views of an opinion journalist for Gotlänningen, who on 22
May, referring to The Economist, claimed that Poland could undergo a quick
Sovietisation. The author of the article believed that Poland found itself in a
similar situation to Finland, as the Lublin government’s policy had to con-
sider the wishes of Moscow, but at the same time was free to manage internal
policy. The Poles had to accept these limitations, as they had no other choice,
even more so that Stalin was the only warrant of the new Polish-German
border.218 On 30 May, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning published a
protest by a group of Poles against unfriendly articles appearing in the same
daily. They explained that such propaganda had already inflicted irreparable
damage, and that they belonged to the group of unfortunates who would
never again see their families residing in the part of Poland annexed by the
Soviet Union where the population is never allowed to express their opinion.
—
214
and Documentation, 27 IV 1945.
215
Ibidem, copy of report by N. Żaba to the Ministry of Information and Documentation,
216
‘Den polska frågan’, Västernorrlands Allehanda, 9 V 1945.
217
E. B., ‘Polen återigen’, Karlshamns Allehanda, 12 V 1945.
218
K. L., ‘Polens affärer’, Gotlänningen, 22 V 1945.
353
Finally, they called for their right to independence, equal to that of the Danes
and Norwegians, be recognized. They appealed, ‘Nobody paid for their free-
dom with more blood and suffering than we did.’219 According to Żaba, ‘The
protest’s tone is unfortunately too teary-eyed to make an impression.’220 In
fact, the editors appended the article with several opinions that were in favour
of Poland, ‘however with a reservation that […] freedom and independence
in publishing news would be a greater favour to the Polish matter than pub-
lishing the news that was in line with Poles’ wishes.’ In the final commentary,
the Swedes claimed that they were carrying out their duty and not making
any propagandist moves. Instead, they were trying to explain the complex
issues concerning Poland to their local readership. Nevertheless, in mid-June
an article prepared by the Polish consulate in Gothenburg was published on
the mass deportations of Polish patriots, representatives of the intelligentsia
and workers’ leaders. It contained a detailed description of the arrest of the
leaders of the Polish Underground State in Pruszków (March 1945), empha-
sizing that foreign observers were banned from visiting Poland.221 Contrary
to many Swedish press commentaries, the situation was evaluated soberly by
Stanisław Adamek in Svensk Tidskrift. He had no doubt that Stalin was ap-
plying the policy of faits accomplis, the arrangements of the Yalta conference
were not a compromise but a step towards the Sovietisation of Poland, and
the trial of the sixteen leaders of the Polish Underground State he considered
to be the ultimate proof for the enslavement of Poland.222
A different tone dominated in the communist press. The Polish govern-
ment in London was attacked in the Ny Dag article ‘The Carriers of the Nazi
Poison’ by Per Meurling, published on 22 June 1945. Meurling wrote, ‘the
bankrupt Kwapiński-Arciszewski clique keeps sending their smelly anti-
Soviet bombs every day from Great Britain, which are reaching the press all
over the world and destroying all reason.’ Numerous crude accusations were
made, using the famous language of the communist propaganda. The author
argued, ‘Last year the Polish reactionaries of London had started the Warsaw
Rising too early, and subsequently they accused the Russians of deceiving the
Polish patriots’, and ‘causing the English–German–Polish war against the
country of socialism.’ According to Meurling, the Trial of Sixteen in Moscow
—
219
‘Polsk protest’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 30 V 1945.
220
221
P-k, ‘De bortförda polska patrioterna’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 16 VI 1945.
222
Dagens frågor: ‘Polen under tyskt regemente’, Svensk Tidskrift, 1 II 1945; Dagens frågor:
S. W., ‘Polen efter Jalta-konferensen’, Svensk Tidskrift, 2 V 1945; Dagens frågor: S. W., ‘För-
likningen i Polen’, Svensk Tidskrift, 7 VII 1945.
354
had already proven that the Polish government was preparing an armed riot
against the Red Army. Although the London expatriates remained in isola-
tion, they continued to conduct a propagandist campaign against the govern-
ment in Warsaw. A commentator of Ny Dag, with the Polish–Swedish eco-
nomic negotiations in mind, explained, ‘What is necessary is our fast and
determined action, so as not to squander – due to the reactions and hostility
towards the Soviets puppet government of Poland – the Swedish interests.’
Responsibility for the daring campaign, and the worsening of relations
between Sweden and the Soviet Union, he placed on ‘the socialist renegade’
Karniol (twice as hostile due to his contacts with the leadership of the LO and
the SAP) and on ‘the Nazi’ Żaba. Both, according to the journalist, were
spreading lies in the style of Goebbels.223
Sweden’s break-up of diplomatic relations

with the Polish government in exile
The Swedes attempted to maintain good relations both with the Western
Allies and the Soviet Union. They expected that Stalin bore no bad intentions
towards Sweden. The announcement of Aleksandra Kollontai’s return to
Stockholm, after a visit to Moscow, was interpreted as a continuation of
Moscow’s lenient policy towards Scandinavia. At the same time, during a
closed session of the first chamber of the parliament, held on 27 April 1945,
Fredrik Ström wondered why the Soviet authorities allowed for the brutal
treatment of the staff of the Swedish Legation in Budapest: ‘We must consti-
tute a kind of bridge between the East and the West. It is odd that the Russian
soldiers and officers, who behave impeccably in Norway and in other coun-
tries, as we hear, could behave in such a way towards Sweden.’224
On this subject, Günther replied that there was no reaction from the
Swedes up to this point, but a protest and demands on the Soviets for com-
pensation were planned.225 On 19 April, the Stockholm press published
extensive reports devoted to the fate of the Swedish diplomatic representa-
tion in Budapest.226 It was known that the secretary of the legation, Raoul
Wallenberg, disappeared without trace on 17 January, and fourteen members
—
223
P. Meurling, ‘Nazistiska giftspridare’, Ny Dag, 22 VI 1945; AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collec-
tion, copy of report by N. Żaba to the Ministry of Information and Documentation,
224
Protokoll…, p. 346.
225
226
‘Budapestlegationen har bott i källare i Buda’, Svenska Dagbladet, 19 IV 1945.
355
of staff were transported, first by bus and then by rail, to Bucharest. From
there they were transported, via Odessa and Moscow to Turku in Finland.
Some members of staff remained in Budapest.
Envoy Sokolnicki tried to prevent the forming of relations between the
Swedish government and the Polish Provisional Government in Warsaw. In
line with the instruction from Minister Tarnowski he emphasized that the
Warsaw government would not be granted recognition by the Western Allies.
Tarnowski explained, ‘If Sweden agreed to delegate its observer, this fact would
be undoubtedly exploited by the propaganda of the Lublin “government”,
which would certainly harm the Swedes in international eyes’, and after all, ‘in
the face of the unstable situation and transport obstacles, such a step would not
bring the currently anticipated economic benefits in the shape of coal sup-
plies.’227 Sokolnicki obtained an assurance from the Swedish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs that ‘there only existed the intention of sending a delegation
with a limited purpose of examining the opportunities for coal supplies.’228
Having completed the visa procedure, Eng arrived in Moscow on 31 May.
There is no doubt that this was the next stage in the consequent policy of the
Swedish government towards the Polish matter.229
Following Eng’s arrival to Moscow, the Poles wanted him to first sign a
relevant commercial agreement with them in Moscow, and only then go on
to Warsaw. For the Poles, it was clearly important that Sweden grant recog-
nition to the Provisional Government of Poland on the international arena.
Söderblom attempted to explain that the Swedish government had not been
maintaining relations with the Polish government in London for many years
by then and that the signing of a preliminary commercial agreement by the
Swedish delegate with the representation of the Polish Provisional Govern-
ment would be a sufficiently suggestive fact. He repeated the arguments to
Stockholm and claimed that the possible coexistence of two Polish repre-
sentations in Stockholm would be of no great significance, as proven by
experiences with the French, who during the war were represented both by
the Vichy government and by General de Gaulle. Besides, Söderblom made
the effort to use the tense situation among the Poles in Sweden to his benefit.
—
227
PISM, A 12, 53/40U, telegram by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Polish Envoy to
Stockholm H. Sokolnicki, sent on 2 V 1945.
228
PISM, A 12, 53/40U, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, received on 6 V 1945.
229
NA, FO, 371/48057, telegram by the Ambassador of Great Britain to Moscow, A. Clerk-
Kerr, to the FO, 17 IV 1945.
356
He maintained that the exacerbation of the confrontation between the sup-

porters of the government in London and the government in Warsaw would
be a setback. According to Söderblom, it was the gradual recognition of
Osóbka-Morawski’s government that would be more beneficial for Warsaw.
In such a situation, Modzelewski only called for the Polish refugees who
remained in Sweden. He emphasized that it was the will of the Polish govern-
ment that these people return to their homeland. The Swedish envoy assured
him that the will of the Swedish government was the same, but any obligation
in this matter was naturally out of question.
Eventually, on 8 June, Eng, the first secretary of the Swedish Legation in
Helsinki, was authorized by the government and the king following the
signing of the commercial agreement with the Polish Provisional Govern-
ment.230 On 16 June Eng departed from Moscow on a flight to Warsaw. The
Polish side proposed sending its representative to Stockholm. Söderblom
could perform a satisfactory retrospective of his Moscow mission, which
lasted until July 1944. He considered one of his principal targets to be the
establishment of Polish–Swedish relations, ‘most of all due to the Swedish
demand for coal and coke, and later owing to general policy-related rea-
sons.’231 Söderblom revealed that he had been given no directives regarding
this issue up until the close of 1944. The pretext for contact with the Poles in
Moscow became the issue of passing on Swedish humanitarian aid, which as
it turned out was the first gift from abroad for destroyed Poland.
With the formation in Warsaw of the Provisional Government of National
Unity, on 28 June, which fulfilled the provisions of the conference in Yalta
according to the Swedes, and with the expected recognition of this govern-
ment by the USA, the USSR and Great Britain, the Swedish government made
a decision one day later (on 29 June) to grant recognition to the new Polish
government as soon as possible, in line with the powers listed in the resolu-
tion.232 On that very same day information was published in the Swedish press
about the government of Sweden granting recognition to the government in
Warsaw, which was agreed with the Polish side.233 At that point only the coal
agreement was signed, although the Under-Secretary of State Jakub Berman
—
230
Utrikesdepartementets ärenden, 8 VI 1945.
231
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 12, vol. 890, copy of report by Swedish Envoy to
Moscow S. Söderblom to Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch. Günther, Moscow, 18 VI 1945.
232
Utrikesdepartementets ärenden, 29 VI 1945.
233
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 39, vol. 1620, copy of letter by B. Eng to R. Sohlman,
Warsaw, 29 VI 1945.
357
pressed the Swedes to grant legal recognition to the government in Warsaw

earlier than Great Britain and the USA, which would be of great importance
for the future development of the Polish–Swedish relations.234 Simultaneously
he proposed that the Swedes took part in the rebuilding of the ports of
Gdańsk and Gdynia, which was accepted, as highlighted Berman, by the
Soviet authorities.
According to the information obtained by Sokolnicki, in the conversation
with Grafström, this was the same as granting recognition to the government
in Warsaw. The granting of recognition was put off, as the Swedes were
waiting for the decision of the Western Allies.235 Similar information was pas-
sed ashamedly by Grafström to one of the staff members of the Legation of
Great Britain.236 Sokolnicki was prepared for the concluding his diplomatic
mission. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had earlier sent the text of the note
which was to be submitted to the Swedes, following the withdrawal of recog-
nition for the Polish government in exile.237 On 2 July, Sokolnicki paid a visit
to Minister Günther, and then to under-secretary Sohlman. Both confirmed
what the Polish envoy heard from Grafström several days earlier.238 The
Swedish government granted recognition to the Polish Provisional Govern-
ment of National Unity on 6 July 1945.239 At the same time Eng was appointed
temporary representative of Sweden in Poland in the rank of chargé d’af-
faires.240 Günther and Grafström would inform Sokolnicki of this appoint-
ment. The Polish envoy, as Grafström noted in his journal, had tears in his
eyes. According to the Swedish diplomat who was sympathetic towards
Poland, this was ‘one of those countries and unfortunate nations that were
tormented by the recurring misfortunes and cursed.’ On the one hand he
noticed with disgust that the government, which fought with the Germans
on all fronts, was sent away empty-handed, and on the other, as Grafström
wrote, ‘The Poles have many brilliant talents, but they are in fact crummy
politicians.’ He accused them being unable to make a timely prediction that
—
234
Ibidem.
235
of Foreign Affairs, 30 VI 1945.
236
NA, FO, 371/48057, telegram by the Legation of Great Britain in Stockholm to the FO, 30
VI 1945.
237
PISM, A 11, E/1099, telegram by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Tarnowski to Polish Envoy
to Stockholm, 7 VI 1945.
238
of Foreign Affairs, 2 VII 1945.
239
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 12, vol. 890, pro memoria, Stockholm, 8 VII 1945.
240
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 12, vol. 890, telegram by S. Grafström to the Swedish
Legation in Moscow, 6 VII 1945.
358
the support from the Anglo-Saxon powers would not be everlasting, especi-
ally regarding the possible aggravation of relations with ‘the Russian bear.’
On that occasion he compared the situation of Poland with that of Sweden
and stated with relief that the Swedes, as opposed to the Poles, were not faced
by Stalin with faits accomplis, to which he included the establishment of the
border along the Curzon Line and the formation of ‘the Polish counter-
government under the aegis of the Soviets.’241
On 7 July 1945 in Moscow, Söderblom paid a visit to ambassador
Modzelewski and announced Sweden’s de jure recognition of the Provisional
Government of National Unity.242 He sent a letter to Stockholm on the same
day, in which he reminded Stig Sahlin that it was a priority to transfer the
detained submarines as quickly as possible to Poland and clear the advance
payment for the purchase of the equipment ordered from the Bofors com-
pany by Polish authorities before the outbreak of the war. In addition, the
buildings of the Polish Legation, located on Karlavägen in Stockholm, were
to be handed over to the new authorities as soon as possible.243
—
241
S. Grafström, Anteckningar 1945–1954, pp. 685–686.
242
AMSZ, iss. 6, w. 78, vol. 1159, k. 2, The Polpress Information, Moscow, 7 VII 1945.
243
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 12, vol. 890, letter by S. Söderblom to S. Sahlin,
Moscow, 7 VII 1945.
359
360
PART 2
Economic Issues
361
362
8. Swedish Presence in Occupied Poland
During the war, the central economic aim for Sweden was acquire necessary
supplies independently of the military developments in Europe. The Swedes
wanted to avoid repeating the situation that occurred during the First World
War, when a blockade was introduced and Swedish ships struggled to service
the trade with other countries. The prime ministers and ministers of foreign
affairs of the Nordic States met on 18–19 September in Copenhagen to affirm
their will to preserve strict neutrality, and highlighted that it was important
for them to maintain traditional commercial relations with all countries,
including those which were currently engaged in the war.1 Sandler warned
the British Minister of Trade, Robert S. Hudson, during his visit to Stockholm
in April 1939, that in the event of war Sweden would attempt to preserve its
economic ties with both sides of the conflict. Dissatisfied, Hudson reported
that this would only prolong the war.2 Nevertheless, not long after the out-
break of the war the Swedes managed to regulate its commercial relations by
means of relevant arrangements both with Great Britain (7 December 1939),
and with Germany (22 December 1939).3 These agreements formed the basis
for trade that proved satisfactory for Sweden until the German attack on
Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940. At the time, the Polish government
in Angers first and foremost hoped that orders for missiles for the destroyers
ORP Grom and ORP Błyskawica would be completed in Sweden. Yet, at-
tempts to initiate the discussions on this subject turned out to be fruitless.4
The problem that Polish diplomatic services had to face right from the very
first day of the war was securing the interests of Polish exporters, mainly
those dealing in coal.
Sweden endeavoured to adapt to the new situation in Europe. Following the
conclusion of the commercial agreements with the British and the Germans, in
1940 Sweden signed commercial arrangements with other countries: Turkey
(28 February), Estonia (15 May), Greece (24 May), Norway (8 July and 17
December), Denmark (24 July), Hungary (31 July), Finland (7 September), the
Soviet Union (7 September), the Netherlands (7 September), and Belgium (7
—
1
G. Hägglöf, Svensk…, pp. 9–10.
2
3
W. M. Carlgren, Svensk utrikespolitik…, pp. 29–35; G. Hägglöf, Svensk…, pp. 52–103.
4
Polska Marynarka Wojenna., p. 57.
363
September). The end of year was crowned with the renewal of the agreement
with Germany (17 December), which controlled international trade in the oc-
cupied countries, and therefore in a considerable part of Europe.
Following 9 April 1940, Sweden was almost entirely reliant on the trade
with Germany. In 1937 and 1938, 21 percent of Swedish imports came from
Germany, in 1940 (including the occupied countries) this had risen to 50
percent and by 1941 as much as 70 percent.5 It was from Germany that
Sweden imported coal, coke, metal products, chemicals and artificial ferti-
lizers. In addition, Sweden granted Germany a loan for 100 million crowns.
From Sweden the Germans imported iron ore, wood, paper pulp and paper,
as well as ball bearings. The Swedes also attempted to preserve the sea route
to Great Britain through the Finnish port in Petsamo, but as of September
1940, following the tightening of the German blockade, exporting goods from
there became impossible. In turn, following the outbreak of the German–
Soviet war, on 22 June 1941, the British stopped using the route.6 Commercial
relations with the countries of Central Europe, the Balkans and Western
Europe were also dependent on the transit route that ran through Germany.7
The extraordinary solution of sea traffic to Gothenburg facilitated contacts
with America. A special agreement with Great Britain and Germany on 9
September 1940, allowed the tanker Sveadrott to carry 13 tons of oil from
New York. On 28 November 1940, the Swedes obtained the consent of Great
Britain to send four merchant ships to and from the port for one month. The
Germans accepted this on 7 February 1941, but as early as in 29 December
1940 the transatlantic liner Gullmaren reached Sweden with a cargo of food
supplies. Over the next two months, and then from the summer until the end
of 1941, and throughout 1942, the Swedes were, thanks to this agreement, in
touch with the world outside territories controlled by the Germans.8
Cut off from Great Britain and non-European markets brought about an
economic crisis, which Sweden battled throughout the war. Gradually, by
1943, Swedish foreign trade was reduced by 50–60 per cent, as compared to
the years before the war.9 Substitute production, for instance cellulose feed,
was developed. Obviously, food was rationed. It was impossible to maintain
high standards of living, and their decline could only be slowed down by
—
5
G. Hägglöf, Svensk…, pp. 152–153.
6
Ibidem, pp. 170–171, 185.
7
Ibidem, p. 142.
8
E. Boheman, På vakt. Kabinettssekreterare…, pp. 138–139; G. Hägglöf, Svensk…, pp. 179–
181; H. Dahlberg, I Sverige…, pp. 149–153.
9
K. Åmark, Sweden. Negotiated neutrality, [in:] R. Bosworth, J. Maiolo (eds.), Cambridge
History of the Second World War, vol. 2: Politics and Ideology, Cambridge 2015, p. 254.
364
8. SWEDISH PRESENCE IN OCCUPIED POLAND
becoming part of the German system of economic dependence. The govern-

ment in Stockholm chose to dodge between Berlin and Moscow whilst simul-
taneously maintaining minimum contacts with the global market (most
importantly the USA).10 The German pressure, especially in the initial years
of the war, continuously worsened the situation. The Germans employed the
tactic of selling their own products at inflated prices, whilst at the same time
forcing their economic partners to lower the prices of goods they exported,
and in several cases Sweden had to export goods from Germany. When coal
transports from Great Britain and Poland became impossible, Germany
became Sweden’s sole supplier. Moreover, following the annexation of iron
ore deposits in France, Belgium and Luxembourg, Germany reduced its
dependence on Swedish supplies. In 1939, 41 per cent of the total German
consumption of iron was imported from Sweden, in 1943, the figure was 27
per cent.11 In 1939 Sweden was forced to conduct unprofitable trade with
Germany, and, on top of that, needed to hire five hundred carriages for coal
transport, lower the price of iron ore by several percent, increase the supplies
of wood and accept the 20 percent increase in the prices of German coal. One
solution was increasing trade, from 1940, with the Soviet Union, but this
lasted only until June 1941, which was not long enough. In December 1940
the Polish Legation estimated that Sweden’s trade with Germany continued
to maintain forms of exchange like those it maintained by before the war, and
it did not become entirely economically dependent on Germany.12 A signifi-
cant role in controlling the size of economic difficulties was played by the
reserves of foreign currency and gold, collected in the period of the pre-war
upturn in the economy.13
On 9 September 1939, Potworowski wanted to discuss with Hägglöf the
situation following the Germans’ possible takeover of the Polish coal mines
and their intention to continue their operation and selling coal to Sweden.
However, Hägglöf avoided granting him any declarations in this matter. He
explained that Sweden, as a neutral country, would not take a hypothetical
—
10
AAN, HI/I/10, letter by Envoy G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Stockholm, 27 XII 1940.
11
K. Åmark, Sweden. Negotiated neutrality, p. 255.
12
13
365
theoretical stance regarding the events that had not yet taken place.14 When
the Polish envoy returned to the issue from 21 September he was told the
specific stance of the Swedish diplomacy. Potworowski was informed that it
was impossible for the Swedish government to issue directives for private coal
importers who were relishing the freedom of choosing suppliers. The same
was the case with the yet to be finalized payments to the Polish coal com-
panies. The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs could nevertheless advise the
envoy, without commitment, against the conclusion of contracts with the
companies who had taken over the Polish coal mines. It was pointed out that
it was all but impossible to check if German suppliers were selling coal from
Germany or Poland at any particular moment.15 When in July 1940 Pot-
worowski was persistent in inquiring about the potential regulations of the
Swedish–German commercial treaty concerning the Polish occupied ter-
ritories, he again received evasive answers from Boheman or information
which were in fact false:
As far as coal is concerned, it is being brought mostly from Szczecin, and its
actual origin is not revealed. Only small amounts of coal are obtained from
Westphalia and from Silesia, since it is principally transported to Italy and
Russia. Relations with the General Government? Clearing? He only knows
that some quantities of sugar are obtained from there.16
It was nonetheless known that the coal from the Polish Upper Silesia would
continue to be exported to Sweden. According to the pre-war statistics, ap-
proximately 2.5 million tons of coal annually originated from Poland, which
constituted nearly 43 percent of the Swedish import of coal. Great Britain
managed to provide almost 47 percent of the supplies as part of the relevant
contracts, and Germany – nearly 10 percent. Following the outbreak of war,
Swedish statistics reflected the import of Polish coal only in trace amounts,
but it is known that the rapidly annexed coal mines were not destroyed and
that the Germans were able to begin their operation. By the end of September,
all but one of the coal mines resumed their usual operation. The coal output
from the Polish coal mines in 1938 was 38.1 million tons, in 1940 up to 45.7
—
14
RA, Handelsdepartementet, Huvudarkivet, Rapporter från UD, F II aa, vol. 210, memo-
randum by G. Hägglöf [?] concerning the import of coal from occupied Poland, Stockholm,
9 IX 1939.
15
Ibidem, memorandum by G. Hägglöf [?] concerning the import of coal from Poland,
Stockholm, 21 IX 1939.
16
Notes by Polish envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski 1939–1942, entry from 21 VII 1940.
366
million tons, and in 1943 up to 57.5 million tons.17 Naturally, part of the an-
nual supplies from Germany, approximately 4.2 million tons of coal, origi-
nated from the same coal mines and was sold by Poland to Sweden up until
the outbreak of the war, and which were at that point taken over by the
German entrepreneurs. According to the estimates of the Swedish negotia-
tors who conducted the talks with the German delegation in September 1940,
this amount was even to constitute the greater part of coal supplied by the
German side, about 2.4 million tons. According to the findings of Swedish
historian Sven-Olof Olsson as much as 66 percent of coal imported from
Germany to Sweden was transported along the trunk route, which was
constructed as early as in the period of the Second Polish Republic, and then
loaded onto Swedish ships in Gdańsk and Gdynia.18
For the Polish authorities it was also important to secure the interests of
their native shipping companies. The Transport Committee was founded in
Paris, the task of which was to save the Polish ships moored in the ports of
neutral states. The funds for the entire campaign were granted by the ship-
ping companies. The government only granted a loan which was to be
returned by the Polish companies. On 31 October, a new Transport Commi-
ttee was established by the minister of industry and commerce, as an assist-
ing, consultative, and executive authority for the operation of the Polish com-
mercial fleet and the sea fishing sector. Its members were Engineer Leonard
Możdżeński (officer for naval affairs at the Ministry of Industry and Com-
merce), Tadeusz Geppert (representative of the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce at the Inter-Allied Committee of Maritime Transport) and Feliks
Kollat (Geppert’s deputy). In Stockholm, from September 1939, it was
Władysław Potocki who acted on behalf of the former Transport Committee.
The Polish ships moored in Swedish ports sailed to Great Britain having been
insured by the local agencies. Potocki was sure that such actions were neces-
sary to, ‘show our good will to these people or companies who actually pro-
vided us with professional services, and to show them that their trouble is
compensated by us in an appropriate way.’19
The Polish Legation in Stockholm immediately passed on handling the
issues connected with the payments due by the Swedes to Polish companies.
—
17
J. Jaros, Historia górnictwa węglowego w Zagłębiu Górnośląskim w latach 1914–1945,
Katowice–Kraków 1969, pp. 227–228.
18
S.-O. Olsson, German coal and Swedish fuel 1939–1945, Gothenburg 1975, pp. 68–69, 79,
82–83, 98–100, 147, 161, 177–178, 202–203.
19
AAN, Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping (Paris), 708, letter by W. Potocki to F.
Kollat, Stockholm, 21 X 1939, pp. 141–142.
367
Payments from the importers of the Polish coal were to be transferred to the
account of the legation.20 Potworowski requested powers to act on behalf of
the Bank of Poland and to be given access to these sums based on the Polish
foreign exchange legislation, to prevent the Germans seizing the amounts due
to the Upper Silesian coal mining and metallurgical companies.21 The ac-
counts of Polish coal concerns in the Swedish banks held considerable funds
acquired from the final coal deliveries prior to the war. On 12 September 1939
Potworowski still maintained that these funds, ‘are not yet in great danger,
because they can only be accessed upon the order of the account owner, after
being marked with a stamp and relevant signatures, and importers would fear
to risk making payments to unauthorized persons.’ Nevertheless, the envoy
proposed he be authorized by Polish coal concerns to access these funds, and
even transfer them into the account of the Polish Legation. Three days later
the matter became urgent, as it transpired that the Germans were acting to
seize these accounts.22 The Swedish banks were also holding sums owned by
Polish banks: the Bank of Poland (Bank Polski), the American Bank (Bank
Amerykański), the Commercial Bank (Bank Handlowy), the Western Bank
(Bank Zachodni), the Common Credit Bank (Powszechny Bank Kredytowy),
the Discount Bank (Bank Dyskontowy) and others.23 Potworowski secured 50
thousand crowns for Bank of National Belongings (Bank Gospodarstwa
Krajowego). Subsequently he accounted for the amounts due for the sale of
scrap iron load that was intended for the Ostrowiec steelworks (Zakłady
Ostrowieckie) and transported to Gdynia on the ship Consul Korfitzon. The
remaining sum of 13 500 crowns was transferred by him to the Midland
Bank. A similar thing happened with the payment for the load carried by the
ship Ulven. The Minister of Treasury, Adam Koc, wanted to examine the
sums held in the accounts of the Commercial Bank of Warsaw in the Swedish
banks. The company’s management authorized the government to unfreeze
these sums.24 Some Swedish companies settled their accounts by contacting
—
20
AAN, HI/I/243, telegram by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Szembek to Polish
Legation in Stockholm, 12 IX 1939.
21
of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 13 IX 1939.
22
Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 15 IX 1939. p. 53, 55.
23
Potworowski to the Polish Embassy in London, 22 IX 1939. pp. 38–39.
24
AAN, HI/I/246, telegram by Polish Ambassador to Paris J. Łukasiewicz to the Polish Lega-
tion in Stockholm, 29 X 1939.
368
the foreign branches of Polish companies. In July 1940, the Johnson’s con-
cern transferred 1800 pounds sterling to the account of the Bank of National
Belongings at the Bank of Lazarth Brothers for it to be allotted to the Wspólne
Biuro Sprzedaży Węgla i Koksu w Cieszynie (Common Office of Coal and
Coke Sales in Cieszyn).25 Łódzka Fabryka Pluszów i Dywanów (The Łódź
Plush and Carpet Factory) set out to recover the sum of over 10 thousand
crowns from the Swedish company Mystrodt.26 One of the Swedish com-
panies owed nearly 50 thousand crowns to Towarzystwo Żyrardowskie (the
Żyrardów Society) for supplies of linen. Others, in contrast, managed to
import textile materials from Bielsko.27 The legation assumed responsibility
for the fate of the cargoes, which were already being prepared for transport
to Poland on Swedish ships. This was the case too for the load of leather, wool,
cotton and quebracho wood, most of which belonged to the Kugler Banking
House (Dom Bankowy Kugler) in Gdynia. What was also accounted for was
selling the goods in Sweden.28
On 9 October 1939 the Polish Legation sent out a letter to the Swedish
companies which had earlier traded with Poland, pointing out to the Swedish
businessmen that any payments made to the accounts of the Polish com-
panies placed in German receivership would be considered invalid by the
Polish government. In case of any disputes regarding this issue the Polish
owners would have to enforce their rights before the Swedish courts. The
payments were advised to be made to the account of the legation or depo-
sited. Simultaneously, the legation emphasized that the purchase of goods in
occupied Poland could bring about financial claims from the owners of
Polish companies under German management.29
The activity of the Swedish–Polish Chamber of Commerce was not termi-
nated, but this was only of symbolic significance. No meetings were held,
nobody paraded about being a member of this organisation, and a portion of
the Swedish companies decided to leave it, including almost all coal com-
panies. Thanks to the membership fees, paid in by only a few companies, its
—
25
of Foreign Affairs, 25 VII 1940; AAN, HI/I/87, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G.
Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.p., 10 VIII 1940.
26
Potworowski to the Ministry of Treasury, Stockholm, June 1941, pp. 1–2.
27
AAN, the Polish Legation in Stockholm, 18, letter by Polish Consul to Malmö J. Głębocki to
commercial counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm T. Pilch, Malmö, 6 XI 1939, p. 27.
28
AAN, the Polish Legation in Stockholm, 18, letter by commercial counsellor to the Polish
Legation in Stockholm T. Pilch the Polish Embassy in London, 5 XII 1939. pp. 23–24.
29
AAN, the Polish Legation in Stockholm, 18, circular by commercial counsellor to the
Polish Legation in Stockholm T. Pilch, Stockholm, 9 X 1939.
369
business establishment continued to be rented, necessary expenses were

covered, and even a financial reserve was established. In December 1941 the
Chamber asked companies that were former members, to pay in their mem-
bership fees. Helge Norlander, the owner of Sveaexport company (a pre-war
importer of coal from Poland), proposed that coal companies, which were
formerly part of the Polish Coal Committee in Stockholm, but later left the
Chamber, manifested their will to establish economic relations with Poland.
This gave rise to a debate as counsellor Pilch opposed the initiatives that were
with companies that, according to his view, had compromised themselves.
This issue also had a deeper undercurrent, since the coal sales structure prior
to 1939, according to the assessments of the officials of the Polish Legation,
left much be desired.30
Poland’s financial obligations towards Sweden at the end of 1939 included
a debt relief. The conditions for its payment were established in the agree-
ment of 14 March 1935, where it was stated that Poland was to pay instal-
ments amounting to approximately 6.15 million crowns up until 1 January
1942. The sum due to be paid in 1940 amounted to 760 thousand crowns,
payable in two instalments on 1 January and on 1 October. Another national
debt of Poland to Sweden was the so-called match loan the repayment of
which took place in half-yearly instalments of approximately 930 thousand
dollars each. The 1 October instalment was not paid.31 On 24 February 1940,
the Polish Embassy in Paris informed the international committee of credit
assistance that at that moment Poland was temporarily incapable of paying
off the rest of the debts due to the current circumstances. At the same time,
it declared that the negotiations concerning the repayment would be initiated
on the first date available. On 15 March 1940, the Swedish government dis-
cussed the issue of the debt relief. It consented, as did the remaining creditor
nations, to the debt’s payment extension. The remaining part of Poland’s debt
was 1 293 600 crowns.32
On 15 December 1939, still before the signing of the Swedish–German
economic arrangement, Potworowski met with Günther and Boheman to
discuss the matter of further economic activity of Swedish companies in
Poland. Seemingly, both diplomats were rather avoiding this subject. They
—
30
AAN, the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping (London), 88, letter by Polish Envoy
to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 XII 1941.
31
Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 5 XII 1939. pp. 73–75.
32
Utrikesdepartementets ärende, Stockholm, 15 III 1940.
370
suggested that there were ‘no hopes for the development of the Swedish capi-
tal in occupied Poland.’33
An important financial matter to be regulated by the diplomatic services
were the Polish advances, paid to the Bofors company as part of orders the
execution of which was made impossible by the war. Part of the sum, ap-
proximately 371 thousand crowns, was transferred to the account of the
legation in December 1939. Envoy Potworowski left 325 thousand crowns in
cash in Stockholm at the disposal of the Ministry of Finance, and approxi-
mately 46 thousand crowns were transferred to the Midland Bank.34 In the
spring of 1940 the commander of the Polish Navy, Rear-Admiral Jerzy
Świrski, started demanding the return of the advance payment of 2 063 594
crowns. The Swedes countered, mentioning the sum of 2 773 172 crowns
minus 192 335 crowns for unpaid bills, the sum as part of the letters of
guarantee amounted to 4 842 788 crowns35, whereas the remaining part of the
sum allotted to the ammunition supplies and payments due for the army
supplies were to be accounted for in the future.36 By the end of May 1940, the
Bofors company initially proposed to repay another 462 687 crowns under
two contracts. In exchange it demanded the termination of these contracts,
the returning the relevant letters of guarantee regarding the contracts exe-
cuted prior to the war and the payment of 230 503 crowns for unpaid navy
and army bills. The Polish side would receive 232 184 crowns that was to be
returned by a third party. At the same time the Swedes did not yield to the
Poles and did not provide drawings for 120 mm missiles.37 Świrski accepted
the proposed repayment of loans under two agreements, but he described the
plan to repay the remaining advance payments by a third party as unlawful
and dishonest.38 It was on 4 July 1940 when, following long-term negotia-
tions, an agreement was reached under which all orders placed with the
—
33
Notes by Polish envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski 1939–1942, entry of 15 XII 1939.
34
35
PISM, MAR, A V 9/1, radiogram by Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm Captain T.
Podjazd-Morgenstern to head of the Polish Navy Command Rear-Admiral J. Świrski,
36
PISM, MAR, A V 9/1, radiogram by head of the Polish Navy Command Rear-Admiral J.
Świrski to Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm Captain T. Podjazd-Morgenstern, Stockholm,
12 IV 1940.
37
PISM, MAR, A V 9/1, radiogram by Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm Captain T.
Podjazd-Morgenstern to head of the Polish Navy Command Rear-Admiral J. Świrski,
38
Świrski to Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm Captain T. Podjazd-Morgenstern, Stockholm,
27 V 1940.
371
Bofors company were cancelled due to the circumstances at the time, and the
issue of returning the advance payments paid by the Polish party was regu-
lated. Upon the request of the Swedes, the agreement was dated to 20
December 1939, which did not clash with the commercial treaty concluded
with the Germans two days later. It was thanks to this agreement that the
Polish government most importantly saved its due payments from German
recovery. That is why the Polish negotiators, who wanted to avoid making
the talks difficult, did not guarantee the transfer of the entire amount due and
appropriate interest rate on the debt. The Swedes only accepted the interest
rate for the period between 20 December 1939 and 4 July 1940.
As part of the repayment, on 6 July 1940, the Swedish side paid approximately
237 thousand crowns to the legation’s account39 and Envoy Potworowski
informed the government that two agreements with the Bofors company had
been terminated, that the accounts of the army and the Polish navy, 99 907.85
and 130 287.26 crowns respectively, had been settled, and that on 5 July the total
sum of 516 276.49 crowns had been added to the account of the legation.40
Obtaining subsequent payments turned out to be impossible. Only the letters of
guarantee were successively prolonged. According to Pilch, this created favour-
able conditions for the systematic repayment of advance payments, although
everyone was aware that obtaining this return would be dependent on the general
political situation. From the point of view of the Polish side, the arrangement was
also important as a beneficial precedent in the legation’s process of payment
recovery from other Swedish companies.41 Nevertheless, the efforts towards the
recognition of the right of the Polish companies to their own due payments or
property drew on for months. In the summer of 1940 Potworowski informed
London that the Swedes adopted the strategy of not recognising the claims of
both the Polish companies and the German receivership management.42 Taking
action was made difficult due to the lack of the Polish diplomats’ authorization
by the Polish companies and the lack of communication with Western Europe,
where the board members of these companies may have resided. Initially, the
legation focused on the receivables of three Polish companies: Robur, Polskie
Biuro Sprzedaży Rur (the Polish Office of Pipe Sales) and the Zjednoczone
—
39
AAN, HI/I/87, copy of note by commercial counsellor to Polish Legation in Stockholm T.
Pilch, 6 VII 1940.
40
PISM, MAR, A V 9/1, radiogram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski,
41
AAN, HI/I/87, letter by commercial counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm T.
Pilch to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 29 VII 1940.
42
Finance, n.p., 19 VIII 1940.
372
Fabryki Związków Azotowych (United Factories of Nitric Compounds). The

results of the proceedings were to decide whether other cases would be con-
sidered.
At the outset of December 1939 Władysław Radziwiłł paid a visit to
Sweden as a representative of the Committee of Property and International
Debts Defence (Komitet Obrony Mienia i Wierzytelności Zagranicznych) with
the intention to establish the Committee of Swedish Creditors of Poland
(Komitet Szwedzkich Wierzycieli Polski). This initiative was to transform the
so far one-sided procedure of securing Polish receivables in Sweden.
Potworowski’s feelings were mixed, as he believed that the procedure could
lead to the implementation of a clearing procedure, which, given the passive
pre-war balance of payments between Poland and Sweden, would result in
blocking the process of recovery of Polish assets in Sweden. On the other
hand, the so far one-sidedness had hindered contact with the Swedish com-
pany owners. The private initiative of Radziwiłł had therefore filled a gap and
presented a good opportunity to enter talks with the leading local financiers
about the future of Swedish property in the occupied territories. It was exactly
owing to the talks with Norlander, Gunnar Bolander and Jacob Wallenberg
that Potworowski became acquainted with the result of the Swedish–German
negotiations on this matter. The Germans allegedly were to demand that the
Swedes recognize the annexation of Poland in exchange for the protection of
their financial interests in this territory, and especially for making the transfer
of assets possible. Due to the negative attitude of the Swedes, an agreement
was not reached. Potworowski discovered that, ‘The Germans only agreed to
allow the representatives of the Swedish companies to enter the territory of
Poland to settle the economic affairs of these companies, on the condition
that the Swedish industrial institutions would continue their activity in
Poland and set about the necessary renovations or, alternatively, invest-
ments.’ In connection with this, Potworowski proposed to wait for the un-
folding of the situation and for the conclusion of the negotiations between
Sweden and Germany and the simultaneous establishment of contacts with
the Swedish creditors by the delegate of the Committee of Transport and
Navy, Władysław Potocki, who agreed to become a temporary representative
of the Committee of Property and International Liabilities Defence.43 The
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained that the presence of foreign
companies in the occupied territories would be useful, on the condition that
—
43
Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 5 XII 1939. pp. 1–5.
373
they would be working for the benefit of civilians. The companies which were
contributing to the increase of the military potential of Germany were evalu-
ated negatively.44
Despite these multilateral actions, the process of recovery of due amounts
from the Swedish companies was suspended. The legation watched over this
matter but as time went by and the war continued it was decided in 1941 that
no claims would be addressed towards the Swedish companies, in order to
‘avoid provoking any counteractions from the Germans, on whom Sweden
was currently to a large extent dependent.’ The trade volume between Sweden
and Germany increased over two times from 1939 to 1942. As Scandinavia
was isolated from the rest of the world, its dependence on German supplies,
especially coal, was obvious.45 Taking more radical steps was avoided because
Swedish companies were not transferring any assets to the accounts of the
Polish companies which were placed under German receivership, and that
the amounts due were placed on notary’s deposit. In cases when the disput-
able issues were submitted to court, the latter always defended the interests
of the former Polish owners of the companies which were seized by the
Germans. The recovery took place only in individual cases, when a particu-
larly favourable stance was presented by a relevant Swedish company or when
the debtor decided to make a payment to the legations’ account in exchange
for receiving a certificate proving the settlement of his liabilities towards the
Polish contracting party.46
In 1941, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs entered the next stage of
the negotiations regarding the advances paid to the Bofors company. Of
somewhat importance were the maintenance costs of the interned seamen
and Polish vessels. At the time, the Ministry of Treasury authorized Envoy
Potworowski to use 500 thousand crowns of the so-called ‘Bofors sums’ for
the payment of the vessels’ maintenance costs, as such a solution was per-
ceived as an opportunity to unfreeze the advance payments.47 However, it was
only in June 1943, namely in the generally favourable political atmosphere,
that a specific Swedish proposal was presented regarding making an advance
payment to the Polish side, on the condition that part of it would be allocated
—
44
AAN, the Polish Legation in Stockholm, 20, letter by commercial counsellor to the Polish
Legation in Brussels L. Litwiński to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, 16 XI 1939, pp. 6.
45
K. Wittmann, Schwedens Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zum Dritten Reich 1933–1945, München
1978, p. 197.
46
AAN, the Polish Legation in Stockholm, 20, letter by the Polish Legation in Stockholm to
the Ministry of Treasury, Stockholm, 13 VI 1941. p. 45.
47
AAN, HI/I/271, telegram by the Ministry of Treasury to Polish Envoy to Stockholm G.
Potworowski, 1 IX 1941.
374
to covering the costs of the internment. Sokolnicki was planning to use 1

million crowns to cover the costs and to transfer 1.5 million to the legation’s
account.48 On 29 July 1943, the envoy sent a note to the Swedish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs with a proposal of the final settlement of the issue of receiv-
ables from the Bofors company. Sokolnicki demanded that a sum of approxi-
mately 1.5 million crowns be paid to the account of the legation and 800
thousand crowns be used to cover the costs of the Polish submarines’ main-
tenance. The payment due for the maintenance of the interned seamen was 2
million crowns. The envoy was unofficially informed that the Polish proposal
would be accepted. The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was interested
in this matter only on the condition that taking over the debt of the Bofors
company would settle part of the state treasury’s liabilities towards the arma-
ment manufacturer and would make the ministry obtain the advance pay-
ment for the maintenance of the interned seamen. The Swedes were never-
theless unwilling to pay the Poles the due sums in cash.49 That is why there
had been silence on this matter for many months and it was only on 28
February 1944 that Sokolnicki and Pilch were invited to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to discuss the issue. The Bofors company offered to make a
payment totalling 2.31 million crowns on the condition of a guarantee from
the Swedish treasury. In turn, the state treasury officials expressed their readi-
ness to grant a guarantee provided that the Swedish side submit 1.81 million
crowns as an advance on the Polish government’s liabilities from the costs of
the maintenance of submarines and interned seamen. By the end of 1943
these liabilities amounted to approximately 2.25 million crowns. The remain-
ing amount, approximately 500 thousand crowns, was to be paid to the lega-
tion. Sokolnicki wanted to begin negotiations about increasing the amount,
which would be submitted in cash as an advance on the maintenance of the
interned, but the Swedes declared their proposal final. Sokolnicki had no
other choice but to accept.50 The Ministry of Treasury advised the envoy that
he did his utmost and negotiated the appropriate interest rates and a higher
sum which was to be submitted in cash.51 Eventually, Sokolnicki, during his
negotiations with the Bofors company, only discussed the matter of the
—
48
AAN, HI/I/305, copy of telegram by Polish Envoy to H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 2 VI 1943. Sokolnicki was granted consent to such solution from
the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, E. Raczyński.
49
AAN, HI/I/87, letter by the Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of
50
51
Ibidem, telegram by the Ministry of Treasury to Polish Legation in Stockholm, 31 III 1944.
375
interest rate on the sum due from the day of informing the Polish side about
suspending the execution of orders for the Polish Navy, that is from mid-
September 1939. The first person to comment on this, director Oscar Lindén,
neither questioned the principle of using the interest rate nor its duration,
but he pointed out that in such circumstances the Bofors company would also
make financial claims due to the inability to execute the orders for Poland.52
On 27 May 1944 Sokolnicki was surprised to receive a letter where Linden,
on behalf of the supervisory board, without reason refused to settle the
current liabilities. The only choice the Poles had was to intervene with the
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a conversation with Grafström, on 9
June, Pilch highlighted that part of the payment from the Bofors company
was to be allocated to the support for the refugees. According to Pilch, this
argument was effective as Grafström promised to take care of this issue.53
Pilch also proposed that 500 thousand crowns be paid in monthly instalments
of 50 thousand crowns, and the issue of interest rates only be settled following
the conclusion of the war.54
Swedish industrial and diplomatic circles attempted to adapt to the situa-
tion after the Polish defeat in September 1939. On 5 October a meeting was
held in Stockholm, which was attended by the Envoy to the Polish govern-
ment, Joen Lagerberg, Gunnar Hägglöf and Nils Ihre from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the famous banker, Jacob Wallenberg and the director of the
Sveriges Allmänna Exportförening (Swedish Export Association or SAE),
Gunnar Bolander. According to the surviving protocol, an informal discus-
sion was held regarding commercial and financial relations with Poland,
mostly with the forthcoming Swedish–German commercial negotiations in
mind. The participants ruled out the introduction of the payment blockade
in the relations between Sweden and the occupied territories, describing it as
an unfavourable solution for the Swedish side, since the claims of the Polish
companies were relatively small, and surely less than the value of the Swedish
goods, which were already located in Poland, but not yet paid for. This
solution was abandoned because of the expected difficulties of legal nature.
It was decided that the SAE would carry out an inventory of the property of
—
52
Ibidem, letter by T. Pilch, counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, to the Ministry
of Treasury, Stockholm, 11 II 1944.
53
of Treasury, Stockholm, 17 VI 1944.
54
Ibidem, note by T. Pilch, counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, to the Swedish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 17 VI 1944.
376
the Swedish companies in the occupied territories. All securities, which con-
stituted the basis for the claims towards the companies in Poland were to be
transferred to the Stockholms Enskilda Bank, where their legitimacy would
be verified and where it would be examined as to whether the Swedish banks
were holding any company accounts of debtors. It was considered unneces-
sary to raise the issue of the separate treatment of the occupied territories
during the negotiations regarding the trade with Germany. It was predicted
that the settlement for the coal from the Polish mines would be nevertheless
performed as part of the clearing procedure. The possible Swedish exports to
Poland were to take place by means of an import organisation in Germany,
from where all the goods would be transported to the Polish territory.55 These
preliminary considerations were to be verified in the reports of the Swedish
diplomats and businessmen, who were observing the policy of the German
occupation authorities in Poland.
The first news concerned the requisitions of goods in Gdynia and Gdańsk.
The so-called treuhänders (trustees), who were taking control over the Polish
companies, were not inclined to pay the amounts due (for the Swedish
goods), which were not settled until the outbreak of the war. However, they
insisted on the payments from the Swedes, in cases when they were not paid
in to the accounts of the Polish contractors. Some of them resorted to black-
mail. The non-settling of a debt by Swedish shipowners, it was threatened,
would result in their vessels being confiscated soon after arriving at the
German port. Consul Knud Lundberg predicted pessimistically that the
Swedish companies could suffer losses by fulfilling their obligations, whereas
the receivers of the Polish companies would evade theirs. Lundberg’s last
resort was to present the German authorities with the lists of goods that the
Swedish companies claimed rights to.56
Sven Grafström, who returned to occupied Warsaw on 12 November
1939, was left with depressing impressions. In his diary he noted talks with
German officials who did not hide that the General Government would be
treated as a colony:
The Germans are trying to exploit Poland as much as possible. The people are
to be impoverished. The aim is to force everyone, especially the so-called intel-
ligentsia, to perform physical labour for the Germans to stay alive. What follows
from these assumptions is that contrary to the situation in the incorporated
—
55
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2735, memorandum by N. Ihre regarding
Swedish-Polish commercial-payment relations, Stockholm, 6 X 1939.
56
RA, Handelsdepartementet, Huvudarkivet, Rapporter från UD, F II aa, vol. 210, copies of
letters by Consul K. Lundberg to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gdańsk, 14 XI, 28 XI 1939.
377
parts of Poland, the Germans were making no efforts to launch the local eco-
nomy. For instance, the banks have no right to make pay-outs from the ac-
counts, this excluding only insignificant sums. Post, telephone and telegraph
services will be re-launched only for German purposes. This to a large extent
also concerns the railway sector. Jewish companies are being confiscated, Aryan
companies are being deprived of material possibilities to operate.57
Grafström reported that the representatives of companies which were owned

by the Swedes, were able, at least for the time being, to continue their opera-
tion in subdued Poland. The representatives of the Monopol Zapałczany (the
Match Monopoly), Bank Amerykański and the ASEA company were already
back in Warsaw. Leave permits were granted, although the bureaucratic pro-
cedure was protracted. This was dependent on whether the companies were
to continue to function or become liquidated. Goods designated for sale were
not confiscated by the Germans, but it was not advised that they be removed
from the warehouses in Poland either. It was possible to take payment for
goods in cash, in Polish or German currency, but transfer abroad was pro-
hibited. As a result, Grafström advised the agents of the Swedish companies
not to sell goods. An exception to this were transactions for the occupation
authorities, performed on their request. It was feared that if such transactions
were refused goods would be confiscated regardless. Communication prob-
lems, sending the goods back to Sweden, was also excluded. The situation of
representative companies was particularly difficult, because most of them
were managed by individuals of Jewish origin. Grafström highlighted that the
Jews were subjected to consistent repressions and could be arrested at any
time. He was hoping that the certificates he issued about employment in
Swedish companies would protect them against forced labour for the
Germans. Nevertheless, for the benefit of the goods which were held in the
warehouses, Grafström advised that they were placed in ‘Aryan hands.’ Part
of the goods disappeared or were, nevertheless, destroyed during the military
operations. What was most reliable was the Swedish service, for which the
Germans still felt a certain respect. When, in Radom, following the Germans’
entry into Poland, the Swedish engineers from the L. M. Ericsson telephone
factory, E. Rundström and K. Forsberg, went missing (on 7 September they
headed off to Warsaw with a group of refugees and were found following the
capitulation), the Polish employee Walenty Madajewski attempted to con-
vince the German military and civil authorities that the confiscation and re-
—
57
S. Grafström, Anteckningar 1938–1944, pp. 189–190.
378
quisition were inappropriate. It was only the emissary of the Swedish Lega-
tion in Berlin who guaranteed the factory’s allegiance.58 Grafström supported
Bolander’s proposal to create an information centre for the Swedish com-
panies maintaining commercial contacts with Poland. Such an institution
would have a great deal of work to do. Its responsibilities would include
collecting debts and, where possible, their transfer to Sweden, carrying out
inventories of submitted goods, which were eventually not paid for, breaking
commercial relations and the simultaneous recruitment of representatives
who were to develop contacts in favourable conditions. According to Graf-
ström, it was impossible to exclude compensation for the goods which were
lost by the Swedes, in the form of goods which were exported from the
General Government and which were not interesting for the Germans, such
as oak wood or zinc white.59
In reports to ASEA’s authorities Sven Norrman described his attempt to
recover a 1 million zloty loan granted to the power station in Włocławek. The
German commandant would answer little could be done for now and that
they should wait until the end of the war.60 Continued management over the
Swedish companies’ property was significantly limited. It is beyond any
doubt that the Swedish capital was facing the difficult task of maintaining its
presence in the Polish territory, especially in the first months of the German
occupation. The Germans intended to exploit the Polish industrial potential.
Industrial equipment, means of transport and raw materials were to be taken
to the Reich. Czesław Łuczak, expert in economic policy of the Third Reich
in occupied Poland, claimed such actions were to ‘plunder everything that
could be of any value for the military economy of Germany, and also to
dismantle and move industrial plants to Germany, this excluding small
manufacturing companies, which were essential for satisfying the minimum
needs of the local population.’ The General Government was to become a
farming region and a source of workforce. In mid-November 1939, Hitler
changed his mind and consented to the launch of industrial companies. The
dismantling of machinery continued, but the campaign was slowed consider-
ably. The outbreak of the German–Soviet war in June 1941 created favourable
conditions for various services, including repairs of defective devices and
—
58
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, R 20, vol. 565, copy of report by C. Petersén regarding the
visit in Radom, Berlin, 25 X 1939.
59
randum by S. Grafström regarding the Swedish interests in Poland following the conclusion
of military activity, Warsaw, 23 XI 1939.
60
S. Thorsell, Warszawasvenskarna. De som lät världen veta, Stockholm 2014, p. 45.
379
means of transport. Some of these repairs were performed in the General

Government, being a natural back room of the Eastern Front.61
The confiscations and liquidations of companies included, in the first
instance, those of other occupied countries, but the gradual takeover of com-
panies with the neutral states’ capital share was also planned. Jewish owners
were fighting a losing battle and the remainder were usually placed into
receivership. Łuczak claimed the friendly attitude towards the Third Reich
ensured the economic activity of entrepreneurs representing the neutral
states on their own account. One example he mentioned was the Swedish
Nazi John Weibull, who owned shares in a factory producing tannins in
Warsaw. In 1942 his company ownership rights were restored, and he was
even granted a loan for its development.62 Nevertheless, the Germans while
maintaining the appearance of legitimacy, were trying to remove foreign
owners from occupied Poland, including Swedes. Some cases became the
subject of interest for Polish diplomats. One such example was a factory pro-
ducing railway signal systems in Bydgoszcz, owned by the Gasaccumulator
company in Stockholm. The Swedes presented the factory’s treuhänder with
documents proving their ownership of the factory, which they had purchased
in 1938 from the Siemens company for approximately 1.12 million marks. It
came to light that they had used simulated Polish co-owners to acquire the
controlling share. In this situation the German receiver proposed paying the
Gasaccumulator company 700 thousand marks for the factory. The Swedes
concluded that it was of benefit to sell the factory, even at such a low price as
its value under German receivership would continue to fall. The transaction,
however, was not completed, as the Polish authorities filed a protest in
Stockholm citing that there existed, previously fictional, Polish co-owners.63
The ASEA company made claims regarding payment for machines and
the steam turbines distributed by its Warsaw daughter company. It was only
at the outset of 1942 that the German treuhänder transferred the due funds
to the account of Exportkreditbank AG in Berlin. It quickly transpired that a
transfer to Sweden was impossible as the maximum transfer amount in
Swedish–German relations for the given period had been reached. The funds
were to be held in a special account until a later date. The only retribution the
—
61
Cz. Łuczak, Polityka ludnościowa i ekonomiczna hitlerowskich Niemiec w okupowanej
Polsce, Poznań 1979, pp. 32–33, 35–36.
62
63
AAN, the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping (London), 88, letter by Polish Envoy
to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Finance, Industry and Trade, Stockholm,
17 XII 1941, p. 25; copy of letter by G. Dalen to commercial counsellor to the Polish Legation
in Stockholm T. Pilch, Stockholm, 2 XII 1941, p. 26–27.
380
Swedes could use was a refusal to maintain the equipment that had not been
paid for, but this did not have the desired effect.64
It was the Swedish Chamber of Commerce, with its registered office in
Warsaw, and managed by Hilding Molander and Carl Herslow, that became
the institution which provided information to Swedish companies interested
in occupied Poland.65 The organization, derived from the Polish–Swedish
Chamber of Commerce, was established in 1930 and would operate in special
conditions as an outpost for the Swedish economy in the territory of the
General Government. Both Molander (in Warsaw) and Bolander (in Stock-
holm) independently reflected on the Chamber’s future. Following the
mutual consultations, the Swedish Chamber of Commerce together with the
SAE watched over the interests of the Swedish companies in the General
Government. Both these institutions were consulted by dozens of Swedish
companies, which were engaged in trade with Poland and learned about the
fate of their contractors as well as the goods which were sent but not yet paid
for. Molander was also the basic source of information about German policy
in Poland and the fate of the companies with Swedish capital. Together with
the authorities of the SAE, Molander sought the best solution on the matter
of Swedish goods that were still to be paid for or still yet to be sold by Polish
agents. A proposal was presented in Stockholm to organize one central ware-
house, controlled by the Chamber, to store the goods awaiting sale or being
sent back to Sweden. It was also advised that when improving the operation
of the Chamber, it would be worth establishing a permanent executive
committee as well. A working committee was established and its members
included the head of the American Bank, Harald Axell, the director of ASEA’s
daughter company, Sven Norrman, and Molander. Others who operated in
the Chamber, besides Carl Herslow, were the head of Svea’s daughter com-
pany and the former military attaché to Warsaw Colonel Axel von Arbin, the
director of L. M. Ericsson Sigge Häggberg, and the director of SKF, Per Olof
Silfverskiöld. This group also included businessmen Axel Bentzler, Nils
Fernström and F. Sarnek. In January 1940 Molander highlighted in the letter
to Bolander that nobody expected that the costs incurred during the process
of gathering information about the fate of the assets would ever be retuned,
—
64
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2373, letter by S. Norrman to UD, Västerås,
24 IX 1942.
65
RA-Arninge, Sveriges Allmänna Exportförening, E 1 a, vol. 814. The file contains volumi-
nous correspondence between the Swedish Chamber of Commerce in Warsaw and the
management of the SAE and, occasionally, the German authorities, in the period between
November 1939 and May 1941.
381
unless they concerned great outlays on essential travel.66 Nevertheless,

Bolander began charging small amounts for the information activity of the
Chamber. The establishment of the border between the General Government
and the lands incorporated into the Reich simultaneously determined the
scope of the Chamber’s activity. In the territory of the Reich its members were
virtually unable to fulfil their tasks. In the letter to Bolander, in February
1940, Molander explained that the controller of the company, or the
treuhänder, risked a penalty for bringing outsiders in the company’s ware-
house. Nevertheless, despite great difficulties, part of the goods was success-
fully brought to Sweden. However, another part was lost without compensa-
tion. No definite German policy existed in this area, besides the tacit consent
of the authorities in Berlin to the liquidation proceedings. Each case was
considered on an individual basis. The Germans initially confiscated the
property, and only then was it possible to enforce one’s rights. According to
Molander, foreign owners stood a better chance of receiving compensation
than Polish or Polish-Jewish owners. In the case of the latter, there was no
chance at all.
At the outset of 1940, Molander met with the authorities of the Warsaw
district and proposed a re-launching of trade with Sweden involving cash
sales of goods from the General Government or the exchange of Swedish raw
materials for Polish goods. The idea attracted interest, but no commitment.
In September 1941, the Swedish industrialists in Warsaw imagined that
the German occupation was short-term. They started to consider their own
role in the rebuilding of Polish economy after the war. Harald Axell, in his
conversations with the Poles in Stockholm, emphasised that he was ‘against
various German suggestions focused on exploiting the capital of the Ceks (the
Swedes’ code name) from the country and replacing it, as well as against
investment projects adapted only to the current situation and convenient for
the Germans.’ In Warsaw he discussed the future of the Polish–Swedish rela-
tions and actions calculated for long-term cooperation with the former offi-
cial at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Karol Bertoni.67
—
66
Ibidem. The report by the Chamber’s official Halmstedt from such travel to Lublin in
March 1941, whose purpose was to find the traces of the company J. Turkeltaub – an inter-
mediary in the sales of the products of the Garphytte Bruk company from Garphyttan in
Sweden.
67
PISM, col. 25/17, general note from the talks with Samuel [Harald Axell] from 27 Sep-
tember and 2 October 1941. The author of the note was most probably M. Thugutt, who, on
behalf of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was managing communication between London
and the General Government.
382
The German authorities tolerated the Chamber, which was the only
Swedish institution to exist under the occupation, but they did not make its
operation straightforward. The Chamber’s account in the Bank Amerykański
held funds of 55 thousand zlotys, the withdrawal of which was blocked in
October 1939, and later rationed according to the binding principles under
the occupation. Each withdrawal required prior application. Consent for the
withdrawal was never given. This situation resulted in no cash for covering
either the costs of the Chamber’s operation or maintaining its members.
Bolander managed to obtain a benefit of 5 thousand crowns from the Swedish
government for the Chamber’s activity; it was granted for the first time in
December 1939 and half a year later another subsidy of 10 thousand crowns
was announced. At least once, in May 1940, Molander asked Bolander for a
small transport of basic food supplies with a total worth of 150 crowns),
which he justified due to insufficient supplies and high prices on the black
market. The correspondence between the Chamber and Sweden took place
through the diplomatic courier service of the Swedish Legation in Berlin, and
it was by means of this service that cash in dollar banknotes was delivered to
Warsaw, outside the official channels. The principles of the functioning of
the Swedish Chamber of Commerce constituted a foundation for the hu-
manitarian activity and cooperation with the Polish underground move-
ment, which was performed by the Swedes independently, but in line with
the intentions of the Swedish financial leaders. Sven Norrman, the most dis-
tinguished Swedish courier of the Polish Underground State, many years
later said that Marcus Wallenberg, who managed Stockholms Enskilda Bank-
en (now Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken), namely an institution engaged in
virtually all investments in Poland, advised the Swedish businessmen, who
were trying to redeem their property in the General Government: ‘we need
to take actions which will let us return there after the war with our heads held
high.’68 The activity for the benefit of the underground movement and ordi-
nary people in the need of help has already been described in detail by Józef
Lewandowski. It may only be added that the arrests in July 1942 led to the
suspension of the Chamber’s activity in Warsaw.
At times the German officials in Kraków had doubts concerning the
legality of such an institution. In 1941, in a memorandum to the authorities,
Herslow explained that the existence of the Swedish Chamber of Commerce
in Warsaw did not breach German regulations, and was also in their interest,
because the Swedes were trying to initiate trade between Sweden and the
—
68
J. Lewandowski, Polska…, pp. 15–16; J. Szymański, Skandynawia–Polska…, p. 208.
383
General Government. This was impossible at that point due to the lack of
exports in the Polish territory, which would be subject to compensation
required by the Swedish–German trade.69
The Germans also made efforts to establish direct trade between the
General Government and Sweden. In December 1940, the German Chamber
of Commerce in Sweden addressed a letter to Sveriges utrikeshandels kom-
pensations AB, a company dealing with Swedish foreign trade compensation,
where the exchange of fish for rock salt was proposed to the General Govern-
ment, and the commercial headquarters in Kraków and Warsaw were to be
parties in this transaction. Subsequently, at the request of the same Chamber,
the seat of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was visited by German
businessman Imhof, who represented the R. Th. Möller & Co. company from
Hamburg with a branch in Warsaw. He proposed the exchange of goods for
compensation, instead of payments to settle accounts. What Sweden was to
import from the General Government was salt, chlorinated lime, potassium
chlorate, window panes, gin and vodka, whereas the Germans were counting
on the import of cellulose, wood pulp, paper, mining stands, iron ore and
herring. Imhof was sure that the consent of the German authorities in Berlin
was not necessary, as ‘commercially and politically the General Government
needed to be treated as an independent entity.’ Nils Ihre, who welcomed the
German in UD, showed interest in importing the proposed goods as they
were unavailable on the market, whereas he referred to Sweden’s export capa-
city with reserve and only permitted the sale of herring. Imhof, encouraged
by the favourable course of the conversation, was planning to complete the
formalities related both with the German authorities and Sveriges utrikes-
handels kompensations AB.70 In May 1941 the Maklerstwo Handlowe/Han-
delsmaklerei from Lublin sent out its offer of intermediation in commercial
contacts with the General Government to many Swedish companies. Refer-
ring to the permission from the German authorities for the purchase of an
export calendar for 4 crowns, the representatives of the company argued that
trade, even in the form of foreign exchange dealings, was possible. It was ob-
—
69
RA, Handelsdepartementet, Huvudarkivet, Rapporter från UD, F II aa, vol. 230, copy of
memorandum by C. Herslow about the activity of the Swedish Chamber of Commerce in
Warsaw, 31 VII 1941.
70
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 3735, letter by the Sveriges Utrikeshandels
Kompensations AB to UD, Stockholm, 28 XII 1940 r.; Ibidem, memorandum by N. E. Ihre,
Berlin, 30 XII 1940.
384
vious for Molander that such a sum could be neither evidence of a break-
through nor a precedent in the commercial relations of the General Govern-
ment with the rest of the world.
In October 1941 AB Karlstads Mekaniska Werkstad asked UD if any regu-
lations existed on which pre-war relations with Poland could be terminated.
Ihre replied that there was nothing that had occurred to date which could
predict success in talks with the relevant authorities on settling outstanding
Swedish debts in the General Government.71
In December 1942 the German company Heinrich Brand GmbH in
Kraków requested the German authorities’ permission to pay compensation
for a purchase in Sweden of 200 tons of chromium salt in exchange for 125
tons of paraffin, worth 330 thousand crowns, to be sent to Sweden.72 The
German authorities agreed, on the condition that as part of the purchase the
Swedish company ASEA would send replacement parts, worth 50 thousand
crowns, for the turbines used in the General Government. The Swedish
authorities had no objection. They established that the Germans’ partner in
this matter was the AB Hugo Mattssons Eftr. company from Stockholm.73 The
German authorities’ claim made the issue even more complex, as it trans-
pired that the partners had already made a deal. The Swedes purchased 125
tons of paraffin, reported the amount due, but did not pay it in cash, as they
were planning to use the entire sum to purchase 200 tons of chromium salt
in Portugal for the Germans; whereas ASEA agreed to supply the replacement
parts, but demanded first the settlement of the debt by the new owners for
the turbines, 158 955.18 crowns (where 1 zloty = 0.84 crowns), which the
Polish owners of the salt mine in Wieliczka, the electrical plant in Zamość
and the sugar factory in Strzyżów were unable settle before the war. Statens
handelskommission (Sweden’s board of trade) also added that after satisfying
the financial claims of ASEA, 20 tons of paraffin should be sent as compen-
sation for the claim regarding the machine replacement parts worth 50 thou-
sand crowns. The German authorities in Kraków were inclined to cover these
—
71
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2735, letter by AB Karlstads Mekaniska Werk-
stad to the trade department of UD, Karlstad, 8 X 1941; Ibidem, letter by N. Ihre (trade
department of UD) to AB Karlstads Mekaniska Werkstad, Stockholm, 11 X 1941.
72
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2735, letter by Attaché P. Zethelius from
Swedish Legation in Berlin to N.E. Ihre, Berlin, 9 XII 1942.
73
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2735, letter by Sweden’s board of trade to the
trade department of UD, Stockholm, 22 XII 1942.
385
liabilities, but no such permission was granted by the Reich’s Ministry of Eco-
nomy.74 The issue of the replacement parts was not settled.
At the outset of April, Garvamnes AB Weibull from Landskrona received
a purchase order for 100 tons of calf skins, cow skins, ox skins and bull skins
from one of the companies operating in the territory of the General Govern-
ment. Statens industrikommission (Sweden’s Board of Industry) requested
detailed pricing for the types of skins to calculate the compensation.75
In May 1943, representatives of ASEA, the clearing committee and UD
met. The Swedish authorities emphasized that payment for the supplies for
the General Government could not be made as part of the Swedish–German
clearing procedure as a matter of principle. On the question of the agreement
between ASEA and the relevant the German authorities, regarding the sup-
plies for the General Government as part of the settlement of ASEA’s German
foreign currency quota, the Swedish authorities made an unusual decision.
These supplies would be settled as part of the Swedish-German clearing
procedure. ASEA’s Berlin daughter company had 100 thousand crowns in its
account at Exportkreditbank in Berlin. The aim was to transfer this sum as
part of the clearing procedure and to deliver replacement parts of an equal
value to the General Government.76
The General Government was also receiving cream separators produced by
the AB Separator company in exchange for feathers. In October 1943 the im-
port of feathers and the trade were terminated due to the risk of animal
disease.77
It is hard to determine the size of trade between Sweden and General
Government. It was certainly not extensive, as the General Government offered
little. Technical cooperation was necessary only to the extent that it allowed for
increasing or at least not interrupting the economic exploitation of conquered
Poland. The Swedes in turn, as time went by and as the prospect of the defeat
of Germany and the conclusion of the war in Europe was becoming increas-
ingly likely, had to respond to the statements of the governments of the Allied
countries, including Poland, that any transactions by citizens from the neutral
states with the occupied countries were unacceptable, and the legal acts of the
—
74
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2735, letter by N. E. Ihre to Attaché P. Zethelius
from the Swedish Legation in Berlin, Stockholm, 28 XII 1942.
75
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2735, copy of Garvamnes AB Weibull’s letter
to UD, Landskrona, 9 IV 1943.
76
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2735, ASEA’s letter to N. E. Ihre (the trade
department of UD), Västerås, 21 V 1943.
77
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2735, letter by L. Belfrage (Sweden’s board of
trade) to the Trade Division of UD, Stockholm, 30 X 1943.
386
occupying forces – invalid, this including purchasing ‘directly or indirectly of

property, rights and interests of any kind’ which belonged to the citizens of the
occupied countries on the day of the aggression.78
Worse was the issue of the custody of Swedish property located in the part
of Poland that was occupied by the Soviet Union. The members of the
diplomatic circles of Moscow did not delude themselves that it was possible
to recover the property of international companies, which had already been
nationalized or confiscated. Neither did anybody expect any compensation.79
In December 1939 Swedish Envoy to Moscow Wilhelm Winther informed
Stockholm, that it was difficult to obtain credible information about the
situation in eastern Poland.80 Despite incorporating these territories into the
Soviet Union, the regular passport control was maintained on the former
borders. Foreigners were not authorized to enter the annexed territories. The
only exception were diplomats, whose responsibilities forced them to visit the
Borderlands. The commercial counsellor of the Italian consulate, which had
been liquidated in Lviv, presented Winther with the report from his journey.
He said that Lviv was overcrowded with refugees, that there were shortages
of food and other essentials, and that prices were increasing every day. An
intensive nationalization campaign was in progress, but in many cases the
members of both staff and management of the companies decided not to
leave their workplaces and keep their jobs. The receivers’ oversight, never-
theless, was omnipresent. As early as on 20 September the Polish–Swedish
match factory in Pińsk ran three shifts, the number of its industrial workers
doubled, and production improved significantly. Several days earlier,
Winther talked to the Vice-Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Solomon
Lozovsky, who announced the setting up of a special committee for foreign
property legal affairs.81
***
—
78
As early as on 30 November 1939, the Polish president enacted a decree on the invalidity
of legal acts issued by the occupying forces (the Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland,
Angers, 2 XII 1939, no. 102, item 1006). On the works on the common statement of the
Allied governments in this matter see Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej, vol. 4, pp. 387, 405–408.
79
randum regarding the attitude towards property rights in the territories of Poland annexed
by the Soviet Russia, Stockholm, 10 XI 1939.
80
report by Swedish Envoy to Moscow W. Winther to UD, Moscow, 20 XII 1939.
81
letter by Swedish Envoy to Moscow W. Winther to UD, Moscow, 7 XII 1939.
387
During the war, just as prior to 1939, the most important natural resource
imported by Sweden from Poland was hard coal (anthracite). Following the
German annexation of Upper Silesia, coal mining increased, and exports
continued. No statistics exist that show precisely how much German coal
exported to Sweden came from Upper Silesia, that is from Polish coal mines.
Historian Sven-Olof Olsson estimated nearly 6 million tons 1940–41 and
1942–43.82 In January 1945, Pilch, acting Chargé d’affaires, on behalf of the
eighteen Allied states, submitted a declaration to the Swedish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, concerning the non-recognition of the changes in proprie-
tary relations, performed by the occupational authorities during the war.83 On
this occasion he reminded Ragnar Kumlin, Deputy Director of the Political
department of UD, that as a commercial counsellor of the legation, together
with Envoy Potworowski, he paid a visit to the head of the trade department
of UD, Gunnar Hägglöf, in October 1939. At the time they indicated that the
Polish government would not recognize the payments for the import of
Polish goods to Sweden, which were made by Swedish companies before the
war to the German receivership management. In addition, the Poles noticed
that the Germans had launched the transports of coal from the Polish coal
mines, and that the Swedish companies receiving this coal were risking that
the moneys paid to the Germans for the delivered coal would be later
recovered by the rightful Polish owners of the mines. An interesting com-
mentary about the 1943 declaration of the Allied governments regarding the
exploitation of the occupied territories, which was to warn the neutral states
against participation in the robbery of property, was published on 15 January
1943 by Trots Allt!. It was suggested that following the war the Polish govern-
ment would have the right to demand from the Swedish government the
payment for the coal which was currently imported by the Germans from
Poland.84 The Polish authorities were aware that the Swedish companies often
settled their pre-war liabilities towards the Polish companies in the form of
agreements with the treuhänder, who were controlling individual companies
in the General Government. The Polish Ministry of Finance even examined
a possibility to make use of the information on this subject during the finan-
cial negotiations with Sweden after the war.85 The Swedes’ official stance,
—
82
S.-O. Olsson, Swedish-Polish…, p. 32.
83
AAN, HI/I/102, letter by Chargé d’affaires ad interim T. Pilch to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs together with attachments, Stockholm, January 1945.
84
‘Skarp allierad varning för olaga statsaffärer. Hur går det med Sveriges tyska handel i Polens
kol?’, Trots Allt!, 15 I 1943.
85
AAN, HI/I/285, telegram by Minister of Treasury H. Strasburger to Polish Envoy to
Stockholm G. Potworowski, 18 VIII 1942.
388
however, was that they were not using the Polish coal reserves but importing
coal from German coal mines.86
—
86
389
390
9. Plans of Polish–Swedish Post-War
Economic Cooperation
At the turn of 1942 and 1943, when it was obvious that the Germans would
lose the war, the Swedish authorities started to examine the possibility of
launching talks with the Polish government in London on the rules for post-
war trade. At the same time, they were constantly struggling in their nego-
tiations with their partners from Germany, Great Britain and the USA, as far
as the issue of regulation of the current trade was concerned. Together with
the weakening of Germany’s position in 1943, the Allies were pressing
Sweden for gradually reducing the trade with the Germans. It was mostly
about shrinking the export of iron ore, although the most sensitive issue was
the sales of ball bearings. The Swedish government explained that it was
impossible for it to completely quit cooperation with Hitler, as this would put
the country at risk of occupation, and mostly at risk of becoming cut-off from
coal supplies. In September 1943 Sweden concluded an arrangement with the
USA and Great Britain, as part of which it committed itself to reducing the
export of iron ore from 10 million tons every year to 7.5 thousand tons in
1944. As a compensation for the continuation of the existing policy regarding
the sales of ball bearings to Germany, they offered to sell them also to the
British. From 1944 onwards, five English motorboats with volunteer crews
were fighting their way through the Skagerrak strait and collecting the preci-
ous cargo. It was known that the German supply sources would eventually
run out and that no compromises with the Allies would be of any help.
In 1943 Statens bränslekommission (Swedish fuel) started to examine the
possible post-war coal supply sources for Sweden. This most probably gave
the impulse for the letter, which was written by the Polish-Swedish Chamber
of Commerce to the Minister of Industry, Trade and Shipping, Jan Kwa-
piński, towards the end of 1942. Later, the exchange of correspondence
between Kwapiński and Sweden’s board of trade took place. It was obvious
that the Swedes were mostly preoccupied with the coal supplies. In 1944
closer contacts with the Poles were re-initiated, although Stockholm was
sceptical about the actual point of the talks due to the expected occupation of
the territory of Poland by the Soviet armies and slim chances for the Polish
government’s return from exile. The Swedish diplomats, on establishing
initial contacts with the PKWN in Moscow in November 1944, were aware
391
that in the face of the lack of chances for importing coal from other countries
only the Polish coal mines could become the possible supplier of this raw
material. Envoy Sokolnicki maintained that preliminary economic negotia-
tions should be initiated. Similar was the opinion of Kwapiński, although it
was slowly becoming clear that the Swedes were interested in contacts with
the Soviet side, which they started to consider as more competent in making
decisions concerning Poland. Press Attaché Żaba was gathering information
on this subject. This is what he heard from the famous journalist Arvid
Fredborg at the end of 1943: ‘Certain Swedish economic circles are of the
opinion that post-war Russia would be a perfect destination market for
Swedish goods and therefore they favour the option of cooperation with the
Soviet Union, and they [are] even ready to support compromises at the
expense of Russia’s neighbours.’ Peter Tennant, Press Attaché of the British
Legation, also stated that ‘for several months now the Swedish government
has been conducting the policy, which need to be described as a pro-Moscow
policy.’ According to Tennant, such tendency was determined by economic
considerations. In turn, the chief editor of Svenska Dagbladet daily, Otto
Järte, admitted that the Swedish government was starting to conduct the
same policy towards the Soviet Union as the one he conducted in the years
1940–1941 towards Germany. The overall situation was different, but, ac-
cording to the eminent opinion journalist, one could expect that Sweden
would avoid even ‘the slightest appearances of anti-Soviet attitude.’1 The
stance of Swedish economic circles was evaluated slightly differently by the
famous friend of Poland, Sven Norrman. He convinced the Naval Attaché of
Poland, Commander Lieutenant Wolbek, that ‘all Swedish industrialists
would rather deal with Poland, for they strongly fear the Soviets.’ He believed
that the Polish government was not sufficiently protecting its interests and
that the Soviet diplomats were much smarter, which resulted with the
pressure from the Swedish economic circles on their own government to
develop good relations with Moscow.2
—
1
PISM, A 9, VI 21/1, note based on Żaba’s reports to the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
2
PISM, MAR, A V 9/2, report by the Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm, Commander M.
Wolbek, to the head of the Intelligence Division of the Staff of Commander-in-Chief, n.p., 4
XI 1943. What is interesting is that opinion journalist Tadeusz Nowacki, in the Polish press
in London, also criticised the passivity of the Polish government in its relations with the
Swedish authorities about the subject of initiating economic and political cooperation: T.
Norwid[-Nowacki], ‘Na marginesie stosunków polsko-szwedzkich’, Dziennik Polski i
Dziennik Żołnierza, 28 XI 1944.
392
9. POLISH–SWEDISH ECONOMIC COOPERATION
The first voices supporting the initiation of international discussion about

the plan of post-war economic development appeared in Sweden in the sum-
mer of 1942 and were raised by the members of the youth branch of the liberal
party (Folkpartiets ungdomförbund). In January 1943 numerous proposals
were submitted by the liberals to the parliament. Their intention was mostly
to ensure that Sweden received imports of coal and coke, chemicals and food.
It was assumed already then that Germany would become occupied and the
goods that were purchased there by Sweden during the war would have to be
sought elsewhere. Nobody expected generosity from the USA, which was
perceived as a country whose evaluation of the Swedish policy of neutrality
was negative.3
The Minister of Finance, Ernst Wigforss, proposed on 15 October 1943 to
form a special commission for post-war economic planning with the budget
of 10 million crowns allocated exclusively to economic issues and 100 million
crowns allocated to rebuilding and humanitarian actions. Wigforss predicted
that the support would be granted not only to the Nordic neighbours, but
also to other European countries ruined by the war, and especially to those
whose quickest possible revival was in the vital interest of Sweden.
The natural point of departure for the Polish side to the rebuilding of eco-
nomic relations with Sweden was the presence of Swedish capital in Poland
before the war. In 1937 it was ranked on the ninth place among all foreign
capitals and amounted to 2.6 percent of the share.4 The Swedes invested in
electric and technical industry, chemical industry, woodworking industry,
textile industry, metal industry and paper industry. The most renowned
companies included: Polska Akcyjna Spółka Telefoniczna w Warszawie (the
Polish Telephone Joint-Stock Company in Warsaw), Polskie Towarzystwo
Elektryczne ASEA (the Polish Electric Association ASEA – most of its shares
was owned by the ASEA company in Västerås), Polski Monopol Zapałczany
(the Polish Match Monopoly, entirely owned by the Swedes). The Swedish
capital was also represented by the companies: Radocha (producer of potas-
sium, sodium chlorate and other chemicals), Linoleum and Quebracho (both
representing the same segment as Radocha), Wikander, Polski Przemysł
Korkowy (the Polish Cork Industry) and Trak (woodworking industry),
Stockholm AB Privat (textile industry), Mokwin (paper industry), Optimus
and Gaz Akumulator (metal industry). Apart from that there also operated
three trading companies: SKF Łożyska Kulkowe i Rolkowe (SKF Ball and
—
3
K.-R. Böhme, ‘Handel och hjälp’ [in:] Nya fronter…, pp. 351–353.
4
AAN, HI/I/86, attachment to the report by the Polish Legation in Stockholm, Stockholm,
22 XII 1943.
393
Roller Bearings), Svea and Inwestycje (Investments). Moreover, most of the

capital of Bank Amerykański was owned by the Swedes. The Swedish capital
also provided the Polish government with issuance loans. Part of the 1927
stabilization loan was taken out in Sweden and through the agency of the
Swedish match concern a loan in dollars was financed in 1930. Poland also
owed Sweden part of the interest-free loan, which was provided to it directly
following the First World War (the so-called relief loan), similarly to the
loans granted by other countries (payment of the final instalment fell on 1
January 1942). The regional governments of Kalisz and Włocławek received
from Sweden loans for the construction of urban power plants.5
First mentions about the future post-war Polish-Swedish economic co-
operation started to appear in the reports of the Polish Legation in Stockholm
in 1943. In the spring of 1944 one could already speak about a systematic
submission of information about the economic situation of Sweden, which,
according to Sokolnicki, was to constitute ‘the point of departure which made
the establishment of commercial relations between Poland and Sweden
easier.’6 Councillor Pilch emphasized from the very outset that Poland could
find itself in a convenient position for the negotiations, provided it managed
to deliver coal and coke following the conclusion of military operations.7
Gathering reliable information and preparing comparative studies was
impossible without the cooperation of the Swedish industrial circles. Coun-
sellor Pilch attempted to induce the renowned potentates to prepare reports
about the Swedish trade and finance, but in 1944 the issue was not getting
any easier than in the period when the Swedes feared the contacts with the
legation due to the inconveniences from the Germans. When in August 1944
Pilch encouraged the famous merchant Waldemar Dahn to prepare an eco-
nomic analysis for the purposes of the legation, he received his firm refusal.
Dahn, just in case, communicated this fact to the security police and told
them about his speculation that the task had been probably undertaken by
director Axell.8 This issue tells us much about the atmosphere of suspicion,
which reigned in Sweden during the war, and about the attitude towards the
contacts with the Poles, which were considered dangerous both because of
—
5
J. Szymański, Stosunki…
6
7
8
RA-Arninge, SÄPO arkiv, P 201 Polish Legation, pro memoria, Stockholm, 22 IX 1944.
394
Germany (in the initial years of the war) and because of the Soviet Union (in
the final period of the war).
At the outset of 1944 Sokolnicki noted a revival in the Swedish–Soviet
commercial relations, which had to have an impact on the future trade with
Poland. In March 1944 Żaba wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ‘An
increased activity of the local Russian commercial representation has been
noticeable lately. Talks have been initiated with the Swedish government on
the subject of providing additional loans, and a special mission consisting of
the representatives of the local Soviet Legation has been visiting individual
Swedish industrial centres, taking interest in the capacity of the Swedish post-
war production.’9 Counsellor Pilch confirmed: ‘the members of local eco-
nomic circles are, so to speak, under the spell of the serious future trans-
actions with Russia, which naturally also impacts the Swedish policy towards
the Soviet Union, as well as the attitude of part of the local press towards the
Russian problems. […] What is more, the Swedish economic spheres are
taking into their attention the fact that even prior to the conclusion of the
war, in the case of Russia’s annexation of the Baltic Sea coastline, or alter-
natively, following the conclusion of the Finnish-Russian war, the practical
opportunities would open up for Sweden to communicate with Russia, and
thereby, the opportunities for the increased Swedish-Russian trade right
before the penetration of this market by the Western Allies.’10
Already in December 1942 the Polish-Swedish Chamber of Commerce in
Stockholm asked the Minister of Industry, Trade and Shipping of the Polish
government in exile, Jan Kwapiński, to raise the subject of revival of Poland’s
commercial relations with Sweden following the conclusion of the war. The
authors of the memorandum, G. Klemming, the chair of the Chamber, and
Przemysław Kowalewski, the director of the Chamber’s office and a local
delegate of the Polish Red Cross, were trying to found the future of the Polish–
Swedish economic relations on the import of coal from Upper Silesia to
Sweden and on the investments of Swedish capital in Poland. The then tem-
porary head of the Polish Legation in Stockholm, T. Pilch, presented Kwapiński
with a list of issues to discuss with the Swedes in the future: value of liabilities
arising from trade up until the outbreak of the war, analysis of economic
relations between Sweden and the General Government in terms of com-
mitments which had arisen during that period, situation of the Swedish capital
—
9
10
PISM, col. 20/23, letter by counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm T. Pilch to the
395
in the territory of Poland, analysis of the Swedish import and export market
with particular focus on coal market, use of the Swedish commercial fleet in
supplying goods to Poland and cooperation in the area of military defence
(mainly with the Bofors company).11 Kwapiński responded to this initiative by
sending a letter on 20 January 1943 where he accepted the idea of preliminary
talks regarding these issues.12 Director Helge Norlander from AB Sveaexport
forwarded Kwapiński’s letter – which took the shape of a form containing
specific questions – to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Hägglöf, on thanking for the letter, pointed out that the character of many
of the questions assumed the participation of Swedish authorities in discus-
sing the subjects concerning the Polish-Swedish economic relations (or at
least their approval). That is why the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
reserved itself the right to participate in the discussions about the issues
which would be raised by Kwapiński in the future.13
During his visit to Stockholm Kwapiński took more specific actions and
on 1 May 1943 he submitted a written inquiry to Helge Norlander. In the
document he communicated his needs. He also wanted to know whether it
was possible to rely on the Swedish commercial fleet when it comes to the
transport of goods imported by Poland.14 The answer was mostly positive,
which only strengthened the Polish conviction that ‘Sweden, with its reliable,
technically advanced industry developed already during the war […] may
play a quite important role at initial supplies to Poland.’15 In connection with
the fact that many other countries were interested in economic cooperation
at the rebuilding of the destroyed infrastructure, this including the Soviet
Union, Norway and the Netherlands, the Polish diplomats considered that it
would be necessary to start, as quickly as possible, submitting orders requir-
ing competitive down payments, and, in case of need, to place the goods,
most importantly the machines, in warehouses.
On 6 May the Sveaexport company sent the answer to Kwapiński. Its
representatives claimed that without the delivery of the materials (mainly
—
11
AAN, HI/I/88, letter by Polish Chargé d’affaires to Stockholm T. Pilch to the Ministry of
Industry, Trade and Shipping, Stockholm, 18 XII 1942.
12
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2735, copy of letter by the Minister of Industry,
Trade and Shipping, J. Kwapiński, to the chair of the Polish-Swedish Chamber of Commerce
in Stockholm, London, 20 I 1943.
13
Ibidem, copy of letter by G. Hägglöf to director H. Norlander, Stockholm, 24 III 1943.
14
Ibidem, letter by head of the AB Sveaexport company H. Norlander to G. Hägglöf (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs) together with attachment, Stockholm, 15 X 1943.; AAN, HI/I/71, copy of
the memorandum ‘The Issue of future Polish-Swedish Trade’, Stockholm, 6 V 1943.
15
AAN, HI/I/71, copy of report by the Polish Legation in Stockholm, 9 V 1943.
396
metal sheets) the Swedish shipyard would not be able to sign any shipbuilding
contracts. This meant that this would be impossible before the conclusion of
the war. But it was possible to repurchase ships from the Swedish shipowners,
and Norlander proposed that this was done with four units. It was possible
to sell one of those ships right away, and the other three also, but on the
condition that they would by flying the Swedish flag until the end of the war.
The Svenska Orient Linien company also offered one ship for sale. The lega-
tion suggested that some other ship sale offers were sought for. It was only
after considering all offers that an expert from London would make the pur-
chase decision.16
The talks conducted by Minister Kwapiński during his visit to Stockholm
were an important stage in the unfreezing of relations with the highest
authorities of Sweden, also as far as economic issues were concerned. On 7
May 1943 Kwapiński sent a proposal to the Minister of Trade, Herman
Eriksson, to discuss, through the Polish Legation in Stockholm, the issue of
the future Polish-Swedish economic relations. A memorandum of the same
content was sent also to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During the
meeting with Eriksson, who received it several days later, Sokolnicki raised
the issue of Polish-Swedish economic negotiations and the issue of Hägglöf’s
nomination as the representative of Sweden at the Polish government in
London. The Swede was unwilling to make any commitments and used the
excuse that he was to resign in the autumn, and said that the communication
difficulties with Great Britain were virtually making it impossible to use the
support of Hägglöf, who resided in London.17 More promising was the answer
that came on 27 May from the deputy head of UD’s bureau for foreign trade,
Rolf Sohlman. It expressed interest in the future commercial relations with
Poland. According to Sokolnicki: ‘As for […] the local relations, and especi-
ally the tendencies of feigning strict neutrality by the local Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, this letter needs to be considered as very positive.’ Neverthe-
less, the Swedes requested that the issue was treated confidentially.18 One day
later Sohlman sent a letter to Statens handelskommission with the request that
the Polish proposal was analysed.19 The letter was passed on further to Statens
—
16
Ibidem.
17
18
AAN, Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping (London), 92, letter by counsellor to the
Polish Legation in Stockholm T. Pilch to Minister of Industry, Trade and Shipping J.
Kwapiński, Stockholm, 5 VI 1943, pp. 13–16.
19
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2735, copy of letter by R. Statens handelskom-
mission (Sweden’s board of trade), Stockholm, 28 V 1943.
397
industrikommission (Sweden’s board of industry), Statens livsmedelskommis-

sion (Sweden’s board of food), Statens bränslekommission (Swedish fuel) and
Statens trafikkommission (Sweden’s board of transport). A meeting between
Sohlman and Pilch took place during which the expectations of both sides
were initially determined together with the procedure of agreeing orders. It
was the trade department of UD, directed by Hägglöf and Sohlman, that was
to be the partner in these talks. The Swedes predicted difficulties in the even-
tual filling of the orders for the machines. They explained these difficulties as
a lack of raw materials and rationing, but did not exclude securing special
allocations for the Polish production. The Swedish companies would also
expect large deposit payments and procurement specifications. During this
time, the Polish diplomats established contacts on their own initiative with
companies and banks regarding possible cooperation. It was known that the
Swedes were most preoccupied with coal supplies. This information was used
by Polish negotiators to their advantage. In one of the reports to London, the
legation even suggested that the Swedes be promised a preference clause in
this area.
Statens handelskommission (Sweden’s board of trade) received two ans-
wers, on 13 September, from the State board of industry and on 16 September
from Swedish fuel. Both analyses were sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
on 12 October. Sweden’s board of industry emphasized in its analysis that the
opinions listed in both Polish memoranda regarding the circumstances
favouring the Polish–Swedish cooperation were shared by the experts there.20
The need to settle satisfactory payment conditions was also pointed out at the
very beginning was.
The first Polish–Swedish conference, with Envoy Sokolnicki, counsellor
Pilch and Hägglöf in attendance, was held on 18 October 1943. The discus-
sion took the shape of preliminary negotiations, which upon the request of
the Swedes were to remain classified. During this meeting, Hägglöf under-
lined immediately Sweden’s particular interest in supplies of Polish coal
following the conclusion of the war, in light of the anticipated closure of the
British and the German markets. His estimate of Swedish demand was 5.8
million tons of coal and 2 million tons of coke per annum. He suggested that
the governments of Poland and Great Britain address the matter of parity of
coal supplies to Sweden based on the agreement concluded before the out-
break of the war, when it was established that both sides, the British and the
—
20
Ibidem, copy of confidential letter by R. Sohlman to Statens handelskommission, Stock-
holm, 12 VIII 1943.
398
Polish, would each supply the market with 47 percent of the material. The
point was to free Poland from this commitment.
The Poles were very cautious in their evaluation of the possible post-war
export opportunities for Poland. They noticed the need for making the
Swedish rolling stock accessible and for the Swedes to participate in the
rebuilding of Polish ports. The Poles also requested consent to purchase
medicines in Sweden and their storage until the end of the war, when they
would be sent to Poland. The cost of which was estimated to be 2.5 million
crowns.21 Hägglöf declared the intention to invest Swedish capital in Poland
and organize supplies of iron ore. He expected difficulties in accessing vari-
ous iron alloys, which were mentioned in the Polish memorandum. These
were iron nickel and iron tungsten alloys, as well as graphite and carbon elec-
trodes. As far as the machines were concerned, Hägglöf requested a detailed
list, but saw no obstacle to the filling of orders for wooden barracks, seeds
and livestock. He also suggested that Poland and Sweden had common
interests in servicing Polish trade by means of the Swedish fleet. The Polish
party put forward a draft for a loan, initially for 20 million crowns, which was
to be granted as quickly as possible to the Polish government and which was
to settle deposit payments for the orders. In exchange, the Poles offered to
pay the loan off with coal supplies following the conclusion of military opera-
tions. The additional guarantee was the storage in the local warehouses, until
the conclusion of military operations, of the goods purchased in Sweden.
Hägglöf suggested that obtaining the guarantee from the British or American
banks, or possibly, from international organisations dealing in economic
support would be prudent. In the second meeting on 9 November, apart from
addressing affairs connected with supplies of humanitarian aid from Sweden
to the General Government, the participants re-addressed the matter of a
trade loan for Poland. Hägglöf indicated that for Sweden it was very im-
portant that coal supplies were delivered during the first year following the
conclusion of the war. That is the reason why he pressed forward on the issue
of the priority for Sweden’s in the Polish export. The Poles, on the other hand,
wanted to use this argument as a bargaining chip in the future.22
Meanwhile, the Swedish experts on economy continued their work. Karl-
Gustaf Ljungdahl, on behalf of the Swedish fuel, focused exclusively the
—
21
Ibidem, letter by G. Hägglöf (UD) to the Materials Commission of the Medical Manage-
ment Board (Komisja Materiałowa Zarządu Medycznego), Stockholm, 21 X 1943.
22
AAN, Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping (London), 92, note regarding the current
Polish-Swedish economic issues, Stockholm, 10 XI 1943, pp. 41–49.
399
question of coal and coke import. Sweden’s board of transport (Statens trafik-
kommission) sent its analysis to Sweden’s board of trade (Statens handels-
kommission) on 25 November,23 whereas on 12 November a similar analysis
was sent by Sweden’s board of food.24 The latter commission made the
supplies to Poland dependent on the supply needs of Sweden as well as on
the needs of its Nordic neighbours, who were to be prioritised over others.
Expectations were low for exports to Poland in the initial period following
the conclusion of the war. It was established that, later, exports to Poland of
fish and fishery products, and initially, herring would be possible. The sale of
a large number of pigs was also excluded. Whereas, it was predicted that the
seeds of high-quality cereals (oats, rye and wheat) would be exported only in
small amounts. On 11 December, the commission sent the memorandum
concerning the seeds.25
Polish–Swedish contacts concerning economic planning were also being
developed in London. On 7 June 1943, Envoy Prytz sent a memorandum
from London to Stockholm regarding economic cooperation between Poland
and Sweden, which he received four days earlier from the Polish government.
The document highlighted the opportunity for making large Swedish invest-
ments in Poland, including electrification projects. The Polish side empha-
sized that it was necessary to continue the export of Polish coal to Sweden,
more so that the export opportunities of Great Britain in this area were to be
limited.26 In the memorandum it was indicated that Sweden may, to some
extent, replace Germany as Poland’s economic partner, due to the destruc-
tion of German industry during Allied bombings. According to the Polish
analysts, German export and import opportunities would decrease in the
forthcoming years. The German occupational policy introduced a psycho-
logical element, namely, a Polish unwillingness to conduct any business with
the Germans. What was mentioned were the numerous circumstances that
would favour the development of Swedish–Polish economic contacts: the
differences in the economic structure of both countries, the excess of capital
in Sweden and a lack in Poland, the urgent need for the rebuilding of Polish
infrastructure, agriculture and industry, the neighbourhood across the Baltic
—
23
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2735, copy of letter by A. Granholm (Sweden’s
board of transport) to the Statens handelskommission (Sweden’s board of trade), Stockholm,
25 XI 1943.
24
Ibidem, copy of memorandum by C. G. Widell (Sweden’s board of food) regarding the
possible export of food to Poland following the war, Stockholm, 12 XI 1943.
25
Ibidem, memorandum by C. G. Widell regarding the export of seeds to Poland following
the war, Stockholm, 11 XII 1943.
26
Ibidem, letter by Swedish Envoy to London B. Prytz to UD, London, 7 IV 1943.
400
Sea, and the lack of political conflicts which could disrupt economic relations.
Naturally coal was the strategic resource to be exported through Poland to
Sweden. In addition to coal, zinc and zinc ash export would be of value.
Agricultural products could also be taken into consideration. Poland needed
machines and equipment of all kinds, as well as iron ore. The participation of
Swedish companies in the electrification of Poland was counted on. The
Swedish plan from 1935, regarding the construction of motorways was
revisited. The Swedes were also offered the opportunity to partake in residen-
tial construction, mainly as instructors and qualified workers. The coopera-
tion in the field of shipping was a separate issue.27
The Polish Legation in Stockholm started to be visited by the represen-
tatives of Swedish companies who were hoping to enter (or re-enter) the
Polish market following the war. In November 1943, counsellor Pilch was
visited by representatives of Svepolex (Svensk-Polska sillexportföreningen) –
an association of companies which, before the war, were dealing with the
export of fresh and frozen herring to Poland. Their share in this export at the
time was over 80 percent. They informed Pilch that their company was still
operating and that following the liberation of Poland it would be possible for
them to organize the transport of fish from Sweden. On the condition of
obtaining a guarantee for the transfer of part of the gains and tax advantages
they were also willing to invest their capital in the foundation of a fish import
and processing centre in Gdynia. Moreover, they offered to provide training
to twenty Polish refugees in herring trade and fish processing (the initiator
of the training was a Norwegian, Herman Mathiessen).28 Initially, the legation
prepared a list of twenty two candidates to take part in the training.29 The
Swedish companies showed good will, but the project faced difficulties from
the authorities during implementation; during the war, for safety reasons, it
was decided that foreigners were prohibited in port areas. As a result, it was
all but impossible to acquaint the trainees with fish processing, as fish pro-
cessing plants were usually located within port areas. Eventually, the training
was completed by only three Poles.30 Nevertheless, the management of Sve-
polex expected the subject of fish export to Poland to be taken up during
—
27
Ibidem, copy of Polish pro memoria.
28
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping, Stockholm, 1 XII 1943.
29
AAN, Polish Legation in Stockholm, 46, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki
to the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping together with attachment, Stockholm, 12 II
1944, pp. 1–3.
30
Industry, Trade and Shipping, Stockholm, 3 III 1944; AAN, Polish Legation in Stockholm,
401
bilateral negotiations.31 One of the fish exporters, Algot Bergström, made

direct contact with two Polish trainees and decided to obtain, as quickly as
possible, a permit to trade in Gdynia and Gdańsk and to fish cod and herring
in the Baltic Sea with modern fishing boats. The Swede planned to supply
other countries as well as Poland, and the Polish ports would act as distri-
bution centre for Central Europe.32
In contrast, the company Geoprint AB from Stockholm submitted an offer
to print maps and atlases. Counsellor Pilch announced the news that there
was an option of printing books and manuals in Sweden, as Sweden had an
unlimited amount of paper.33 The ASEA company sent its catalogues to the
Polish Legation. The latter, on the other hand, asked the Nohab company to
send it its catalogue about the production of locomotives and freight wagons,
which it was famous for before the war.34
At the same time the Polish Red Cross in London turned to its branch
office in Stockholm to request permission from the Swedish authorities to
buy medicines to send to Poland in the near future. The director of the trade
department of UD informed Sokolnicki that priority for purchasing the
medicines was granted to the Nordic States, especially Norway. This informa-
tion was passed on to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Doctor
Nilsson from the Medical Management Board, which was responsible for the
supply of medicines. As the supplies to the Nordic States were a priority, he
advised against assuming any responsibilities towards the Poles.35 As a result,
the Swedish diplomats pointed to the importance of reaching an agreement
with the Norwegian government in London to find out the country’s
demands for medicines. Eventually, they agreed to allocate sufficient quan-
tities for Poland. For the legation it was important that the issue was con-
cluded before the forthcoming economic negotiations with the Swedes. Pilch
asked London for an immediate transfer of funds. He emphasized that the
purchase represented the first practical result of the rebuilding of Polish–
—
46, letter by counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm T. Pilch to the Ministry of
Industry, Trade and Shipping, Stockholm, 8 IV 1944, p. 18.
31
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, letter by C. E. Wallén (Svensk Sillexport)
to UD, Gothenburg, 23 XII 1944.
32
Ibidem, copy of letter by A. Bergström to the Ministry of Trade in Warsaw, Gothenburg,
12 III 1945.
33
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping, Stockholm, 5 XI 1943.
34
AAN, Polish Legation in Stockholm, 104, letter by counsellor to the Polish Legation in
Stockholm T. Pilch to the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping, Stockholm, 27 XI 1943, p. 1.
35
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2735, memorandum regarding the shipment
of medicines to Poland after the war, Stockholm, 16 XI 1943.
402
Swedish economic relations.36 In November 1943, the delegate of the Polish

Red Cross, Przemysław Kowalewski, informed the Ministry of Labour and
Social Welfare in London of the opportunity to purchase the medicines in
Sweden. Earlier, Envoy Sokolnicki informed the Swedish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs about the demand for 2.5 million crowns’ worth of medicine. The
Swedes answered that some vaccines, among other things, were available for
purchase. Thus, Kowalewski turned to the largest pharmaceutical companies
with a request to submit their offers.37 At the same time, he warned the minis-
try in London against shipping the medicines to Poland due to the likelihood
of their seizure by the German authorities. Minister Stańczyk, somewhat
surprised by these reservations, explained that the transports of the Interna-
tional Red Cross, sent from Geneva, were reaching the Central Welfare
Council (Rada Główna Opiekuńcza) in Kraków.38 Meanwhile, on 10 March
1944, Pilch sent a letter to the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping to
brief them on his meeting with the representative of the NeoPharma
company.39
The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs took some purchases in Sweden
into consideration, including the medicines. The United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), the intention of which was to mo-
nopolize humanitarian aid in Europe following the conclusion of military
operations, imposed restrictions that made it impossible to purchase goods
for the post-war period without its participation. Nevertheless, there were
attempts to evade these rules. Medicines were purchased whilst the war was
in progress. Officially this was done to meet demand, but in reality they were
deposited for use after the war.40 Initially, the very possibility of talks between
Envoy Sokolnicki and the Swedes on economic matters was rejected due to
the international commitments of the government. One possible solution
was talks through intermediaries.41 Eventually, a different solution was found.
The medicines were purchased and stored until the end of the war. The Polish
—
36
AAN, HI/I/86, copy of letter by counsellor T. Pilch to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
37
Ibidem, copy of letter by delegate of Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare P. Kowalewski
to the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, Stockholm, 22 XI 1943.
38
Ibidem, letter by Minister of Labour and Social Welfare J. Stańczyk to the delegate of the
Polish Red Cross in Stockholm, P. Kowalewski, London, 13 XI 1943.
39
Ibidem, letter by counsellor T. Pilch to the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping,
40
Ibidem, letter by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Labour and Social
Welfare, London, 15 XII 1943.
41
AAN, HI/I/86, letter by Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs W. Babiński
to the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, London, 18 XI 1943.
403
Legation in Stockholm received an offer for the construction of concrete

barracks from the Gunnar Westholm AB. Nolander was the shareholder and
director of this company, as well as one of the interviewees of minister
Kwapiński during his stay in Stockholm in 1943.42 At the start of November
1943, the offer was sent by counsellor Pilch to London, where it stirred up an
unexpected reaction from the FO.43 On 4 January, the British demanded ex-
planations concerning the economic negotiations conducted in Stockholm.
The Polish government clarified that the talks were not negotiations but more
of an exchange of information.44
Towards the end of December 1943, Pilch submitted to the Ministry of
Industry, Trade and Shipping the offer from the Sandvikens Jarnverks AB,
which was interested in supplying Poland with cutting tools for metal and
wood treatment and non-corrosive and acid-resistant steels among other
items. Pilch emphasized that before the war the company had owned a saw
factory in Warsaw.45 In January 1944, Pilch reported that L. M. Ericsson,
which invited him to visit its newest factory, proposed the renewal of its con-
tacts with Poland.
Following the talks with the Swedish industrialists, Pilch was optimistic
about further cooperation and so was the tone of his messages to London.
Nevertheless, on this occasion he ignored the Soviet threat. Following his visit
to the L. M. Ericsson factory he wrote:
On this occasion I would like to point out that the local industrial circles, in-
dependently of our current political difficulties, are very optimistic about the
result of our clash with Russia, and therefore our talks on the subject of the
future development of economic relations with Sweden are currently un-
burdened of our political situation in this area. These circles believe the Polish–
Soviet conflict is only part of the political difficulties of England and the USA
on the one hand, and Russia’s difficulties on the other, and it needs to be settled
in the interest of the Anglo-Saxon powers at a suitable moment. During the
recently recurring talks and contacts, it was additionally possible for me to state
that the local industrial and economic spheres are adopting a very favourable
—
42
Ibidem, copy of letter by T. Pilch, counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, to the
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping, Stockholm, 4 XI 1943.
43
Ibidem, letter by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Industry, Trade and
Shipping, London, 18 I 1944.
44
Ibidem, letter by Secretary-General of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping J.
Kożuchowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, London, 27 I 1944.
45
of Industry, Trade and Shipping, Stockholm, 28 XII 1943.
404
approach towards increasing trade with Poland in the future and are willing to
grant us more serious trade loans at the initial stage after the war.46
The Swedes were also willing to assume the role of an intermediary in the
commercial contacts between Poland and other Scandinavian countries. The
focus was to import cod liver oil and insulin from Norway and medicines
from Denmark.47
In February and March 1944, counsellor Pilch informed the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs that he was working on offers concerning accommodation and
hospital barracks. The Swedish government did not object regarding the plans
to export prefabricated houses to Poland as part of future trade.48 The Polish
project assumed that the Swedes would build three border stations (with one
hundred beds in each) with full hospital equipment. The Sveaexport company
invited Pilch to visit the disinfection station in Stockholm, which provided
shelter to the refugees from Finland. Pilch submitted a detailed description of
its disinfecting devices adding, ‘the licences to produce these devices were
purchased by the Germans and the Finns, who are to use them on a large
scale.’49 In general, the information sounded encouraging:
Without going into detail, I only want to point out that the devices are extremely
easy to use, do not require any additional special equipment like, for instance,
specially sealed rooms, they are easily portable (one piece of equipment weighs
about 18 kg), and their operation is very cheap. These devices are produced in
Sweden by a company the production capacity of which is 30 devices per month.
However, this capacity may be considerably extended.
However, Pilch requested that an expert be sent from London, who, ‘will be
able to gain the best insight into the local opportunities and establish contact
with numerous Swedish experts.50 At the same time, Pilch announced that he
would help Tadeusz Olszowski, who was to arrive in Stockholm, make con-
tact with a representative of one of the Swedish companies. Then, discussions
could take place about the conditions for placing an order, through Sweden,
for a ship from the Swedish shipyards for one of the Polish shipping lines.
—
46
Ibidem, letter by counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm T. Pilch to the Ministry
of Industry, Trade and Shipping, Stockholm, 20 I 1944.
47
Ibidem.
48
AAN, HI/I/86, letter by T. Pilch to the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping,
Stockholm, 25 II 1944.
49
of Industry, Trade and Shipping, Stockholm, 23 III 1944.
50
Ibidem.
405
The Swedish intermediary assured the counsellor that the order for a ship for
Poland could be placed right away, on the condition that the official client
would be a Swedish company, and that it would be delivered to Poland after
the war. There were many indications that this was how the Germans ordered
ships in Sweden.51
In April 1944, the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping drafted the
future Polish–Swedish agreement. In the initial part it was indicated that the
provisions of the possible agreement could not interfere with the obligations
imposed on Poland by the UNRRA or other international organisations.
Poland was to declare its intention to meet the Swedish demand for coal,
equal to that prior to the war, as soon as possible following the repair of the
ports, with priority given to supplies for Sweden and using the Swedish com-
mercial fleet. Sweden would commit to supplying iron ore and other minerals
at prices no higher than those offered to other recipients or those calculated
based on official stock exchange listings. Moreover, Sweden was to grant
Poland an open loan, yet it not exceed the value of half of the annual coal
supply. The agreement was for one year only, with the option of an automatic
extension.52 The plans regarding the agreement with Sweden would be com-
municated to the FO.53 Meanwhile, in the report from 6 April 1944, the
officials of the Polish Legation in Stockholm recounted the talks which had
taken place in the British and American Legation. The British were interested
in the Swedish Market and were unwilling to allow the establishment of
specific Polish–Swedish talks regarding the issue of coal export. They pre-
ferred Sweden to accumulate the largest stocks of coal possible before the end
of the war, thus allowing it manage during the period when supplies from
Great Britain would be impossible. Similar opinions, unfavourable towards
the Polish efforts to conclude the agreement with Sweden, were uttered by
the British in London. The Poles relied on the support of the Americans, as
it was important for them that trade between Sweden and Germany cease as
quickly as possible.54 The commercial counsellor of the legation of the USA,
Christian M. Ravendale, informed Pilch in the conversation on 6 April 1944
that the negotiations with the Swedes about stopping exports to Germany
were taking place. The Swedes justified exports with the explanation that coal
—
51
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping, Stockholm, 25 IV 1944.
52
AAN, Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping (London), 92, draft of Polish-Swedish
agreement, London, 7 IV 1944, pp. 74–77.
53
Ibidem, draft of letter to the Foreign Office, London, 7 IV 1944, pp. 78–79.
54
AAN, Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping (London), 92, note regarding Polish-
Swedish economic relations, pp. 94–99.
406
and coke from Germany were indispensable for industry. Even in the event
of a rapid end to the war, the Swedes were counting on the supplies from
Great Britain and Poland. This argument was not altogether convincing for
the Americans, who estimated that Swedish coal stocks were sufficient for at
least 18 months, but even up to two and a half years. Although they shared
the opinion of the Swedes and rejected greater supplies from the British
mines, they did not consider coal supplies from the USA. Instead, the inten-
tion was to familiarise themselves with the opportunities for supplies from
Poland. They were curious whether the Poles had established contacts with
the Swedes on this issue. Pilch responded that the preliminary talks were
ongoing, though their character was semi-official, emphasizing, ‘It is never-
theless highly likely that from the small number of goods that Poland, devas-
tated by the war, would be able to export relatively soon after the end of the
war, coal should be given absolute priority.’ Pilch considered the Swedish
market to be the natural market for Poland and noted that the Swedes were
very interested in procuring coal from Poland. At that moment it was impos-
sible for the Polish side to commit to providing any supplies, but it was pos-
sible to consider certain warranty provisions. Based on the agreements con-
cluded before the war, Poland secured its percentage share in coal supplies
for Sweden. Any changes in this area could only be performed as part of the
agreement with Sweden and Great Britain, which Pilch considered to be the
issue of ‘both loyalty as well as formal necessity.’ He left the initiative in this
respect to the government in London. He counted on the Swedish offers that
would consider not only their own import demands but also ‘facilitate and
speed up investments and make it possible to put port transport and handling
equipment in order’, as well as consider the necessity to grant Poland a lease
on rolling stock. Pilch added that when it came to Sweden Poland expected,
as he put it, ‘certain exceptional imports’ in the shape of various industrial
equipment and agricultural products necessary for the rapid rebuilding of the
country. Pilch drew the attention of his superiors to the information on
abundant Swedish coal stocks. He considered that this situation was not
beneficial to Poland, as it weakened its negotiating position. Moreover,
during the talks with the Allies, the Swedes made pessimistic evaluations of
Poland’s export opportunities. Pilch demanded that the Polish government
adopt an active approach during the negotiations between the Allies and
Sweden regarding coal:
Since it is quite probable that Sweden would have to give way as a country
being economically dependent on international commercial relations; what
407
we could also do is make it easier for both sides to reach a compromise, there-
by obtaining some actual warranties regarding coal export from Poland to
Sweden after the war.
The Swedes would be guaranteed coal supplies, and the Allies would speed
up negotiations with Sweden. As far as Poland was concerned, Pilch claimed,
‘for us, this would not only be a warranty concerning the future export of coal
to Sweden. This would also represent our meaningful entry into further
concrete economic negotiations with Sweden as well as strengthen our posi-
tion regarding this issue.’ Pilch considered it important that the Polish
authorities in London attempt to establish contacts with the Swedish nego-
tiator Gunnar Hägglöf (who was at the time staying in Great Britain) as he
did not exclude that, ‘on the occasion of the current talks between the Allies
and Sweden certain decisions may be made without our participation, which
would constitute a precedent not only to the export of our coal to Sweden,
but also to the overall economic cooperation.’ At the same time, he examined
the ways of acquiring a loan in Sweden. He put forward an idea of using the
funds blocked in the USA and Great Britain, for the orders of barracks and a
ship in Sweden, which would require purchases in the country of the deposi-
taries anyway.55 A few days later, Pilch spoke with the commercial counsellor
to the British Legation in Stockholm on a similar matter. The meeting con-
firmed his earlier conclusions, but the diplomat pointed out in his subsequent
note that the entire issue needed to be conducted with great care. He also
demanded that the government explain in detail what the possible reper-
cussions of the Polish cooperation with the UNRRA (Poland’s principal
donor) could be on the talks with the Swedes. This was to be the principal
source of the substantial part of goods donation assistance for the ruined
country. He explained, ‘This is all the more important as we may be asked
questions on this subject by the Swedes, and we must be acquainted with the
local Allied legations, which may reveal tendencies to introduce a certain
degree of control over our talks with Sweden.’56
Because of these talks, as early as in April 1944, during the meeting with
the Swedes, Envoy Sokolnicki planned to raise the matter of exporting Polish
coal to Sweden. He believed that it would be possible to make use of the
English–American pressures aimed at forcing the Swedes to reduce the
—
55
AAN, HI/I/86, note by T. Pilch, counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm,
Stockholm, 6 IV 1944.
56
Ibidem, note by T. Pilch, counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, Stockholm, 9 IV
1944.
408
supplies of iron ore and ball bearings to the Germans, since he assumed, the
Swedes were justifying the necessity of maintaining commercial contacts
with the Germans with the fact that they had no other coal and coke supplier.
Sokolnicki argued, ‘In this context certain compromises may be reached,
which to some or other extent may consider the issue of Sweden’s post-war
supply of coal, in which we are naturally very much interested.’57
Sokolnicki agreed with Pilch that this was a good moment to contact
Hägglöf in London to acquaint him with the issues of the future trade
between Poland and Sweden. Moreover, Sokolnicki emphasized, ‘The estab-
lishment of contact with Hägglöf may be of certain political benefit for us, as
it may facilitate and speed up my efforts to appoint him minister plenipo-
tentiary to the government of Poland.’
In May 1944, Ravendale, commercial counsellor to the legation of the USA
in Stockholm, again turned to counsellor Pilch to ask whether the Poles had
considered the issue of initiating talks with the Swedes about post-war Polish
coal supplies. According to the American diplomat, ‘this issue is currently
mature enough for it to be discussed with the Swedish side and it could faci-
litate the American–British efforts to limit the ore transportation from
Sweden to Germany.’58
The Minister of Industry, Trade and Shipping, Jan Kwapiński, supported
the view of Sokolnicki and Pilch (and Ravendale) that at that point the Polish
government should have already launched preliminary talks with the govern-
ments of other countries about future trade. In the letter to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs he explained:
it is not about any specific steps regarding the conclusion of commercial con-
tracts, but rather about considering the opportunities existing after the war,
estimating the readiness of individual countries to provide some or other sup-
plies (either not included or insufficiently included in the UNRRA program-
me), explaining the form of the future arrangements, becoming informed as
to the import demands of individual countries and so on.’59
Eventually, at the inter-ministerial conference held on 15 June 1944, it was

established that the negotiations with the Swedes should begin as soon as pos-
sible and conclude with an appropriate agreement for the post-war period. The
—
57
Ibidem, letter by H. Sokolnicki, Polish Envoy to Stockholm, to the Ministry of Industry,
Trade and Shipping, Stockholm, 12 III 1944.
58
Ibidem, letter by Minister of Industry, Trade and Shipping J. Kwapiński to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, London, 19 V 1944.
59
Ibidem.
409
point of departure to the establishment of parity of coal supplies was to be the

pre-war agreement granting the Polish side a 47 percent share of the import of
the raw material to Sweden ‘including the clause concerning a possible increase
in the share depending on the results of the future talks with the English.’
Besides, it was necessary to obtain a loan to fill the orders that were already
being placed. The procedure of making payments for the supply of goods
permitted a clearing procedure. On the pre-war trade, receivables would be
omitted.60 Reservations were voiced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
Ministry of Finance regarding the idea of extending the instructions for
Sokolnicki and Pilch from the very start by two options of payment for the
Swedish goods: by means of foreign currency dealings and settlement. The
Department of Economy and Sales was of another opinion, maintaining that
what needed to be considered first were the short-term priorities:
The Agreement needs to be of special character, concluded for a transitional
period, which is most important for us, and its main objective [underlined in
the original] is to obtain the necessary resources, machines and tools at all
costs [underlined in the original]. The instruction should clearly indicate to
Sokolnicki and Pilch that although it would be important for us to establish a
loan and foreign exchange arrangement, which would be beneficial for us, this
issue is nonetheless of secondary [underlined in the original] importance in
relation to the principal target – obtaining goods from Sweden.’61
Pilch believed that speed in establishing mutual relations to beat the Soviets
in bringing their resources to the Swedish market would prove to be import-
ant.62 He soon sent the text of the article from Affärsvärlden magazine, where
it was recounted that the following companies were present in Poland prior
to the war: Szwedzkie Towarzystwo Zapałczane (the Swedish Match Com-
pany) (29 million dollars), the L. M. Ericsson telephone network with 140
thousand customers and the ASEA company factory that held shares in
Polish power plants. According to the author of the article: ‘All the Swedish
businesses mentioned add up to a substantial amount.’ At the same time, the
author confirmed Pilch’s apprehensions that the most important decisions
would be made in Moscow, ‘What will be Russia’s position regarding the
areas where Sweden conducted its business and which, as it may be assumed,
—
60
AAN, Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping (London), 92, note from the conference
devoted to Sweden held on 15 VI 1944 with Minister J. Kożuchowski, pp. 100–101.
61
Ibidem, note by T. Łychowski regarding the instructions for the talks with Sweden,
London, 6 VIII 1944, p. 151.
62
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping, Stockholm, 4 VIII 1944.
410
would remain under Russian administration? This will become apparent in

the future.’63
In June 1944, at the request of the Minister of Treasury, counsellor Pilch
contacted Sohlman, deputy head of the trade department of UD, to discuss
the matter of printing Polish zloty banknotes in Sweden. The Minister of
Treasury anticipated the need to prepare a stock of banknotes totalling ap-
proximately 30 billion zlotys.64 Sohlman showed interest in the Polish plans,
but after consulting the Riksbank, returned a negative response. Pilch was
told that Sweden would have no major reservations about the order, but that
insurmountable technical difficulties existed.65 The printing house, which
satisfied the needs of the Swedish state, was too small to execute this parti-
cular task. No orders of this kind from abroad had ever been received before.
Nevertheless, the Swedes wanted to avoid making a bad impression. Pilch
pointed out, ‘The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wishing to present its
best side to us, has agreed to provide a certain amount of the necessary special
printing paper, on the condition that the printing process would take place
in the territory of another country.’66
It was also necessary that the transport of the paper took place discreetly
and be kept secret from the Germans. The Swedes maintained that the
conclusion of agreement with the British would make it possible.
On 8 December 1943, the Swedish government established the National
Reconstruction Board (Statens återuppbyggnadsnämnd) directed by Stig
Sahlin and the Svenska kommittén för internationell hjälpverksamhet (Swe-
dish Committee for International Assistance) chaired by the president of the
Svea Court of Appeal Lars Birger Ekeberg. These institutions would deal with
the planning and settlement of business connected with the Swedish partici-
pation in the post-war reconstruction of European countries. On 20 July
1944, UD sent a letter to the National Reconstruction Board, informing them
of the goods that Poland was interested sourcing from Sweden. Relating to
this, the board requested the State Industry Commission issue a statement.
On 2 July 1944, Erik Grafström from the Foreign Trade Office at Sweden’s
board of industry replied that firstly the Poles would need a complete set of
equipment for the paper mill. They also needed equipment for chemical and
—
63
Ibidem, ‘Szwedzkie interesy w Polsce’ [translation of the article], Stockholm, 19 VIII 1944.
64
Ibidem, letter by the Minister of Treasury to T. Pilch, commercial counsellor to the Polish
Legation in Stockholm, London, 31 V 1944.
65
of Finance, Stockholm, 22 VI 1944.
66
Ibidem.
411
mechanical production. The Karlstad Mekaniska Verkstad AB focused on the

development of a detailed offer, which was to be ready on 1 September. It was
impossible to carry out the feasibility study for the order until the Swedes had
access to this analysis. Yet, the board was able to present preliminary
information regarding the order and accepted its contents. It was emphasized
that Polish–Swedish economic relations in the paper-making industry had
existed before the war. In general, nothing should prevent the filling of the
order.67
On 18 August the instruction regarding negotiations concerning the eco-
nomic arrangement with Sweden was sent to Sokolnicki.68 The document
proposed opening negotiations for a loan of 26 million dollars for the first
nine to twelve months after the war according to the demand for the goods
based pre-war prices (considering the upsurge in prices – 34 million dollars).
The Polish side intended to secure the quickest and most efficient way of
supplying Swedish goods to Poland. In exchange it was ready to take on com-
mitments concerning the supplies of Polish coal to Sweden. The agreement
was to be based mostly on the loan granted to Poland, guaranteed by coal
supplies, which, as it seemed, was not an issue for the Swedes. The Polish
negotiators demanded that the loan be repaid over a long time, as long as ten
years, due to the destruction of the country during the war. The basis for the
mutual relations was still to be the treaty of commerce and navigation of
1924, whereas the trade quota arrangement of 1936 was treated as expired by
the Polish side. The Poles were unwilling to raise the issue of the management
of Swedish assets invested in Poland or other receivables from before the war.
The position was voiced that these issues would be solved by a multilateral
international agreement concluded after the war. In line with the instruction,
any future arrangement was not to be a long term economic one, but a single,
ad hoc agreement, meeting the needs of both parties. The basic postulate of
Poland was a loan immediately following the signing of the agreement. The
purpose was also to negotiate the best terms for repayment. The loan was to
be sufficient to cover the purchase and transport of the goods included on the
government list. The sum of 34 million dollars would allow for a free hand-
ling of foreign currency from coal sales. The limit for repayment was set at
five years, and the annual interest rate could not exceed 3 percent. The repay-
ments were to be based ‘on mutual allocation of free exchange.’ It was
—
67
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, copy of letter by E. Grafström from
Sweden’s board of industry to the National Reconstruction Board, Stockholm, 3 VII 1944.
68
AAN, HI/I/86, instruction regarding the negotiations on the economic arrangement with
Sweden, [August 1944].
412
assumed that Poland’s future trade balance would be positive, and that is why
it was necessary to avoid clauses on clearing exchange. The Polish govern-
ment wanted to make purchases directly or through authorised companies.
Sea transport, used for the exchange of goods, was to be provided by the
Swedes, although the Polish government would reserve the right to use ves-
sels that were either Polish or chartered by Poland. Envoy Sokolnicki was
burdened with developing a preliminary draft of the agreement based on the
obtained instruction. Finally, it was pointed out that it was important for the
Polish government to sign the arrangement and begin the exchange of goods.
The list of Swedish goods demanded by Poland, which were to be exported
there during the first year after the war, included: raw materials (especially
iron ore), high speed cutting steel, metal tools, measuring and workshop
instruments, drilling tools, ball bearings, electric welders, machine tools, saw
blades, excavators, road rollers, compressors with associated fittings, mixers,
combustion engine pumps, power units, tractors, one- or two-cylinder
engines, electrical equipment, cereal seeds, scythes, breeding cattle, horses,
diary equipment. The government instruction also included a proposal that
Sweden deliver equipment for two plants producing edible animal fat and
plants producing insulating boards from wood pulp. In line with the pre-war
Polish–English coal arrangement, Poland was entitled to meet 47 percent of
Swedish coal demand. It was calculated that in the post-war period Sweden
would demand approximately 6 million tons of coal annually, of which
Poland would supply 2.785 million tons. According to the average price of
30–31 shillings per ton, the value of export of the Polish coal was estimated
at 85 million shillings 17 million dollars (US).
In the instruction of 18 August, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Tadeusz
Romer announced that Envoy Sokolnicki would decide on the form and mo-
ment for addressing the Swedish government to initiate talks on an economic
arrangement ‘without risking refusal.’69 The minister emphasized, ‘It is im-
portant for the Polish government to conduct the talks and, afterwards, to sign
the arrangement as soon as possible so that there was certainty that the goods
included on the import list would be delivered to Poland in the expected time
frames.’ In the face of economic negotiations with the USA, the Polish govern-
ment wanted to find out to what extent it could count on the import from
Sweden. The Polish side was keen to quickly reach agreement, even without
signing, provided this would be possible at any moment. According to experts,
—
69
Ibidem, letter by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Polish Envoy to Stockholm H.
Sokolnicki, 18 VIII 1944.
413
the rapid launch of industry was dependent on obtaining the supplies of goods
from Sweden included on the list drawn up in London.70 In addition, on
awaiting talks with the Americans about future economic aid, the Polish
government wanted to know what goods and in what amounts may be ex-
pected from Sweden,71 since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumed that part
of the relief aid for Poland would not be received from the UNRRA. As far as
agricultural goods were concerned these included seeds (2 thousand tons),
scythes (400 thousand tons), machines and tools for the processing of agri-
cultural products, as well as special varieties of breeding livestock, including
cows (500 thousand) and horses (100 thousand) from Sweden.72
On 31 August 1944, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to the
Polish Legation in Stockholm with instructions for Engineer Borys Saryusz-
Zaleski from the Department of Agriculture at the Ministry of Industry,
Trade and Shipping, regarding the negotiations with Sweden. The Under-
secretary of State, Kuźniarz, requested Saryusz-Zaleski to ‘remain in close
contact with the Polish Legation during the negotiations to provide profes-
sional explanations concerning the agricultural import to Poland and in to
obtain the final decision whether and when the conditions necessary for
conducting concrete talks with the Swedish experts in the form of orders,
concluding transactions etcetera will be in place.’73 The ministry offered to
purchase 400 thousand scythes from the Odenberg and Olson company. It
was pointed out that as part of the UNRRA supplies Sweden was put forward
as the additional supplier of 1 million scythes, which would meet Polish
demand. What is more, there was a plan to purchase 60 stallions and 60 mares
of the nordsvenska breed. Just as in the case of scythes, however, as part of the
agreed UNRRA supplies with Sweden specified as the seller, there was an
intention to order an additional 100 stallions and 100 mares. The Ministry
intended to purchase 1 thousand heifers and 100 lowland black-piebald bull
calves, as well as 1 thousand tons of oats, 600 tons of rye and 400 tons of
wheat. For the seeds, there was a proposal to renew relations with the Polish–
Swedish seed production company Svalöf, but the Ministry of Defence was
unable to provide the final quantities of the seeds. The demand for machines
and dairy equipment also remained unspecified. There was an interest in 10
—
70
Ibidem, note by W. Czyszkowski regarding Polish–Swedish commercial negotiations,
London, 4 XII 1944.
71
Ibidem.
72
AAN, HI/I/86, note, 18 IX 1944.
73
Ibidem, copy of letter by T. Kuźniarz, Undersecretary of State to the Ministry of Industry,
Trade and Shipping, to B. Saryusz-Zaleski, London, 16 VIII 1944.
414
sets of equipment for the collection and urban distribution of pasteurized

milk with a daily processing capacity of 45 thousand litres and approximately
100–200 sets of devices for making butter (the daily capacity of which was
processing 10–25 thousand litres of milk into butter). Towards the close of
September, the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping extended the
demand list with 1 thousand arithmometres worth about 200 thousand dol-
lars.74 In exchange, Poland offered to sell Sweden sugar and salt.
The Statens återuppbyggnadsnämnd (National Reconstruction Board)
accepted the Polish proposals. The export of the amount of grain determined
by the Poles did not pose a problem. The same was true of horses and cattle.
In contrast, the import of Polish sugar was excluded as the Swedes had the
means to produce it on their own. The import of Polish salt became an issue,
as prior to the war Sweden had imported it in small amounts from Poland.
The Board left the issue open for Poland to determine the price and export
options for the countries from which salt was currently purchased (Germany,
the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the Netherlands).75
The Polish side was clearly striving to formalize the bilateral agreements.
On 13 September 1944, Pilch, at a meeting with Sohlman, made an unofficial
and preliminary declaration that the Polish government was willing to begin
economic negotiations on bilateral relations following the conclusion of the
war. He warned him that Sokolnicki was planning to hold a meeting on this
matter with Minister Günther. They both informed the Swedish partners that
they had obtained full powers from their government regarding this issue.
According to the instruction from the government, Pilch highlighted that the
basis for future relations should continue to be the Polish–Swedish treaty of
1924. Coal was to remain the main Polish export commodity (3 million tons
annually). Poland counted on a long term loan of 35 million dollars, out of
which 2–4 million dollars was expected as soon as possible. Sohlman re-
quested that the Polish proposals were submitted in writing. For his part, he
demonstrated interest, but at the same time pointed out, on examining the
Polish proposal, that Sweden would also be forced to consider matters of
general policy.76
—
74
Ibidem, letter by J. Kożuchowski, Secretary-General to the Ministry of Industry, Trade and
Shipping, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [received on] 29 I 1944.
75
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, letter by S. Sahlin to UD, [received on]
15 VIII 1944.
76
Ibidem, memorandum regarding Polish–Swedish post-war economic relations (T.
Göransson), Stockholm, 13 IX 1944.
415
In another meeting on 3 October 1944, Sokolnicki presented the Swedes

with the memorandum regarding future Polish–Swedish economic relations
for the first twelve months after the war together with the list of goods Poland
intended to buy from Sweden. As a preliminary remark, Sohlman pointed
out that before taking any specific actions he would rather wait for the result
of the Polish–Soviet talks in Moscow. Regarding Poland’s idea of Gunnar
Hägglöf’s engagement in the Polish affairs, he expressed doubt whether he,
considering his service as envoy to the Dutch and Belgian governments and
service as plenipotentiary in the Swedish–American and Swedish–British
negotiations, was the right person for the task. Talks with the Poles were of a
general, preliminary, and non-mandatory character. According to Pilch, the
reasons of personal importance could be of some significance here, as, al-
legedly, Sohlman’s ambition was to conduct the talks with Poland on his own.
The Polish diplomat clearly comforted himself and at the same time underes-
timated that the Swede was very much interested in the course of Prime
Minister Mikołajczyk’s visit to Moscow.77 Perhaps this optimistic attitude was
the result of Sohlman’s discussion of the Polish memorandum with the Poles
on the next day.78
The meeting on 4 October was attended by counsellor Pilch and T.
Olszowski. Sohlman was accompanied by Tord Göransson, who recorded the
minutes. The Swedes confirmed that they accepted Polish quota demands for
cereal seeds, breeding cattle and horses, but did not plan to import salt and
sugar from Poland, as they either had their own stocks (sugar) or planned to
purchase supplies from other countries (salt). Sohlman pointed to the issue
of the possible sanctions imposed by the Allies on the Swedish commercial
fleet. He was not certain, however, whether the vessels would be involved in
commercial relations with Poland. The Poles assured him that the Baltic Sea
area was not subject to any limitations. The Swede mentioned that telephone
equipment was not part of the Polish quota proposals and also expressed his
dissatisfaction with the small amount of electrical equipment. The issue had
to be expressed firmly, as Sokolnicki noted, ‘we will lose support for our loan
demands from our friends in Sweden.’ Besides, the Swedes considered the
virement clause (moving loans from one quota to another) hard to accept,
—
77
E. Boheman made a rather accurate assessment of R. Sohlman’s activity in his wartime
memoires: ‘his tolerance for the Soviet Union and its policy was often far beyond the
boundaries of reason and therefore I considered it unacceptable.’ E. Boheman, På vakt. Kabi-
nettssekreterare…, p. 25.
78
AAN, HI/I/86, letter by H. Sokolnicki, Polish Envoy to Stockholm, to the Ministry of
416
whereas they agreed to replace the automatic virement clause by a contra-

hendo clause, namely a preliminary contract listing the goods and the prices
that were to be covered by the future loan agreement. Sohlman also wanted
Swedish companies, with branches in Poland, to receive special treatment.
He reiterated that Polish partners constantly highlighted the loyalty of the
Swedish capital. An important issue discussed during the meeting were the
coal supplies for Sweden; Sohlman asked about the earliest possible date for
beginning the transport. He mentioned six months from the end of the war
and the Swedish order of 8 million tons of coal per year, of which Poland’s
contribution would be 3.76 million tons. Sokolnicki declined to commit to a
time for the deliveries. In addition, instead of the arbitration agreement, the
Poles proposed the establishment of government commissions the sessions
of which were to be held quarterly. Points of contention were to be settled
separately in each individual contract, although one commercial partner
from the Polish side, namely the government commission for purchases,
pointed to the practical value of developing a standard procedure for the
resolution of disputes. The Swedes considered the Polish suggestion of a 3
percent interest rate to be too low. They referred to the example of Swedish
national liabilities, for which the rate was set at 3.5 percent, and of a loan to
the Soviet Union, the rate of which was higher still. Besides which, Sohlman
inquired about the date of repayment of the earlier, outstanding loans.79
This first meeting made it possible for both sides to become acquainted
with mutual expectations. Previously determined priorities were confirmed.
The loan’s interest rate, a contested issue, seemed not to pose problem.
Sokolnicki and Pilch had already decided beforehand to create an atmos-
phere for further economic negotiations thanks to having established closer
contacts with the Swedish economic circles, with whom the relations during
the war they described as ‘rather loose.’ The consent of the Ministry of
Industry, Trade and Shipping to provide a small loan (50 pounds) for the
promotion of Poland made a series of conferences and receptions possible,
which were attended by representatives of companies operating in Poland
prior to the war. In September meetings took place attended by Norrman
(ASEA), Norlander (Sveaexport), Magnusson and Grounes (Sandviken),
Raab and Jacobson (the Johnsons concern), Brolin (Karlstad Mekaniska
Verkstad), Magnuson and Bylund (Defibrator), Hellstedt (Separator), Ström
—
79
Ibidem, attachment no. 2 to confidential letter by the Polish Envoy to Stockholm H.
Sokolnicki to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 14 X 1944; RA, UD 1920 års dos-
siersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, memorandum regarding Polish–Swedish commercial relations,
Stockholm, 4 X 1944.
417
and Kollberg (Sweden’s board of coal), Vinell (Swedish Export Association),

Calisendorf (Enskilda Banken) as well as representatives of other companies
and institutions.80 Whereas, the meeting of the board of the Swedish–Polish
Chamber took place on 26 September. Following these meetings and talks the
Polish diplomats thought that, ‘The representatives of industrial and coal sec-
tor are most enthusiastic about our projects […] The least enthusiastic are
the representatives of banking sector.’ At the same time, they highlighted that
the investors were far kinder towards Poland than towards the Soviet Union,
because, ‘For the local economic spheres the very form of trade with the
Russian market, which is alien to the capitalist system, is rather objection-
able.’ Hence the allure of the Polish market, which was smaller than that of
Russia. In addition, the Poles received the news of the Swedish–Soviet nego-
tiations, which the Swedes were disappoint by:
It can also be expected that some preparatory works connected with the new
Swedish–Russian credit agreement, which have been conducted for some
time now by the local Soviet commercial representation, put off some repre-
sentatives of Swedish industry due to the ruthlessness in putting forward
various claims towards Swedish industry. The purpose is most probably to
extend certain production departments, and thereby to intensify some deli-
veries to Russia.
The news was vague and unproven, but they strengthened the Polish Lega-
tion’s hope talks regarding the Polish–Swedish economic arrangement. It was
known from the industrialists that the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
put pressure on them to accept Russian demands. In connection with this,
Rolf Sohlman from the trade department of UD was accused of Russophilia,
reinforced him being married to a Russian who sympathized with the Bol-
sheviks. To some extent it was anticipated that, ‘Independently of our poli-
tical situation we may most probably count on great sympathy especially
from the local industrial spheres, and expect a certain cautiousness from the
Swedish authorities.’ It was hoped, however, that it would be possible to
—
80
AAN, HI/I/86, attachment no. 3 to letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 14 X 1944. The Ministry of Industry, Trade and
Shipping at the request of Envoy Sokolnicki agreed that the Polish Legation in Stockholm
used the 50 pounds – primarily allocated for the training of experts in sea fishing – to prepare
materials for the commercial negotiations with Sweden and to cover the costs of represen-
tation, according to the request of Envoy Sokolnicki. See Ibidem, telegram by the Polish
Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 5 IX 1944;
Ibidem, letter by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Industry, Trade and
Shipping, 11 IX 1944; Ibidem, copy of letter by General Secretary of the Ministry of Industry,
Trade and Shipping J. Kożuchowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 IX 1944.
418
return to the pre-war Polish coal supplies to Sweden, even more so that, ac-
cording to the Poles’ knowledge, the Swedes, during talks with Soviet repre-
sentatives, were to be informed that they could expect coal supplies initiated
by Russia, but that the coal would not necessarily be Russian. In the legation
representatives of the Swedish coal companies started to appear who had
been informed by the Legation of Great Britain that starting transports from
the British Isles was unworkable. The companies that found themselves on
the so-called black list were excluded from the cooperation. What was un-
clear was the future of the companies that had paid for coal and imported it
before the war to the treuhänder. The adopted position was not outright. On
13 October Sokolnicki, informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the
Johnson company, one of the main coal importers, ‘is ready to accept the first
payment in pounds sterling and will provide the allocation of steel in ex-
change for being included in the future coal import.’81 This position, which
was beneficial for Poland, was conclusive for Sokolnicki: ‘The company is
currently going along with us, by facilitating our gaining orientation in some
factories’ production capacity as well as by showing its readiness to make it
easier for us to place orders for the construction of ships at local shipyards.’
The envoy nevertheless did not make a final decision and waited for the
arrival of Julian Cybulski, director of the Department of Industry at the
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping, who was to conduct the final stage
of the negotiations with the Swedes.
By preliminary talks the Polish side had to consider Swedish reservations
mostly concerning the excessive quantity of raw materials and semi-finished
products included in the list of Polish demands. The tone of the commentary
indicated that the Poles acknowledged the Swedish point of view: ‘our list
seems to be too detailed and in practice it would undoubtedly have to be sub-
stantially altered.’ It was also noticed: ‘one cannot shake off an impression
that the list may be of only theoretical importance.’ According to the Swedish
postulates, the telephone and electric equipment was included:
The export of this equipment prior to the war from Sweden to Poland was one
of the most important items of the Swedish export agenda. In the face of the
damage of Polish telephone lines during the war, the absence of telephone
equipment on the list of our future orders is unintelligible. On the contrary, a
concern should be expressed that this may be caused by the competition,
especially American. The same thing may be said about the ASEA company,
—
81
Ibidem, telegram by the Polish Envoy H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13
X 1944.
419
which believes that the quantities of electrical equipment, included in our

quota list, are disproportionately small.82
An argument in favour of considering the Swedish reservations was the con-

viction that, ‘the support from the Ericsson and ASEA companies towards
our claims regarding the loan is very important and we must have these com-
panies support us, and not be against us, or alternatively, have them express
their so-called désintéressement.’ The Swedes warned that the UNRRA would
be mostly expecting the deliveries of food (not installations) and that is why
it was worth considering cooperation with Sweden around non-consumable
goods. The Polish offer regarding orders in Sweden was passed on to Statens
industrikommission, where a counter-proposal of the presented quota list was
to be prepared. It seemed that the Swedes accepted the proposal of the eco-
nomic arrangement. They only highlighted their fear that the trade in the
hands of the Polish government commission would become centralized. A
proposal was put forward that the companies who already had their repre-
sentative offices in Poland would become the first to be granted the oppor-
tunity to conduct direct sales, outside the government commission. The Poles
reassured the Swedes that a compromise on this matter was highly probable.
For the Swedes it was also very important that the Poles try to obtain a private
loan based on a state guarantee. Although in this case obtaining a long-term
loan, which was important for the Polish side, was an uncertainty despite a
state guarantee.
For the Poles, the initial talks were satisfactory, as the Swedes did not raise
any political matters, giving the impression that they were not crucial for the
progression of the negotiations. Nevertheless, a careful reading of the report
would reveal signs of adverse developments: ‘It is vital for the economic
interests of Sweden that the talks be continued, but their pace may be slowed
down due to the intention of waiting [for] explanations in the meantime
[and] solving our political problems in relation to Russia.’ It is therefore hard
to understand the optimism of the Polish side on this issue, especially because
‘one of the more serious representatives of the industry’ explained that
Sweden could not make any arrangements with the Polish government,
which may be significantly reconstructed in the near future, or even based on
‘the current representatives in the Lublin Committee.’ Despite this, the Polish
Legation tried to influence the Swedes to speed up negotiations. The incen-
tive for which was another instruction from the Ministry of Industry, Trade
—
82
Ibidem, attachment no. 3 to letter by the Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 14 X 1944.
420
and Shipping developed together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
Ministry of Finance on 31 October, which was sent to Sokolnicki on 9
November. The government in London agreed to increase purchases of elec-
trical and telephone equipment including equipment for telephone ex-
changes and railways among other things.
Work on the implementation of earlier commitments was still underway.
The correspondence on the negotiations shows that Minister Kwapiński at-
tributed a great importance to the fate of Ericsson’s daughter company – the
Polish Telephone Joint-Stock Company (Polska Akcyjna Spółka Telefoniczna,
PAST). Referring to the pre-war concession, which was granted in 1922 for
twenty-five years,83 he drew attention to the limitations regarding the
development of a state telephone industry, which were unfavourable for
Poland. Considering the widespread devastation in many cities, Warsaw in
particular, Kwapiński believed that the execution of the concession should
only apply to the areas beyond the range of military operations. At that point
it was difficult to determine the magnitude of destruction. The talks about
potential loss and compensation for the Ericsson company were, therefore,
considered by the Polish minister to be premature and he advised not raising
the issue during the economic negotiations. The issue was quite complicated,
as many years earlier, in exchange for obtaining the so-called match loan,
Poland obliged itself to purchase a certain quantity of Ericsson telephone
equipment.84 The assessment of the quality of the Swedish telephone ex-
changes had to consider compatibility with other communication systems.
In Poland, Ericsson’s competitor, the English Strowger company operated
and additional devices were necessary for their connection with Ericsson
technology. This was the reason for the Poles position of non-commitment.85
The Polish party also attempted to persuade the Swedes that the trans-
actions with international companies should be carried out by the Polish state
apparatus, since many private owners had died during the war and documen-
tation of many companies had been destroyed. What is more, the govern-
ment intended to carry out reconstructions as part of its specific economic
—
83
Ibidem, copy of note regarding the PAST concession. Telephone exchanges in Warsaw,
Łódź, Lviv, Bydgoszcz, Lublin, Boryslav, Drohobych and Białystok fell under the concession
which expired on 1 July 1947.
84
Ibidem, copy of letter by the Minister of Industry, Trade and Shipping, J. Kwapiński to the
Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki, 4 XI 1944.
85
Ibidem, note by W. Czyszkowski regarding Polish–Swedish commercial negotiations,
London, 4 XII 1944.
421
plan and import was to be subjected to this, which, while maintaining the
overall freedom of trade, required introducing certain restrictions.86
Yet, instead of successive reports from the talks with the Swedish nego-
tiators, on 16 November counsellor Pilch sent an alarming letter to Deputy
Minister Kożuchowski, where he highlighted, ‘Our situation in relation to
Sweden is becoming increasingly delicate.’ He also suggested that, ‘the lack
of agreement with Russia sees us increasingly pushed aside. According to
Pilch, the Swedes’ position towards the Soviet Union was increasingly sub-
missive, which he associated with the policy of isolation used against
Stockholm by the Western Allies. It is worth noting the comparison of the
current Swedish policy with that at the time of the Third Reich’s prevalence
in Europe:
[Sweden] expects to settle its relations with Russia in its own capacity and by
means of methods which were successfully applied during its relations with the
Germans. Besides, Sweden is aware that for Russia, just like for Germany before,
it may be important that it “calmly” encouraged its industry to a closer coopera-
tion with Russia, which is heading more and more towards conducting an
intensive policy of rebuilding war damage and increasing its industrial potential
by turning it into a more multilateral direction, namely by focusing on the
consumer goods production much more than before the war. For Russia it may
be important, at least to a small extent, to become independent from the ex-
clusive American supplies or the Anglo-Saxon supplies in general, and therefore
Russia’s interests are turning to a close cooperation with Sweden, which may be
always politically pressured by it and blackmailed as it once was by Germany.
Sweden on the other hand is under the spell of its successful actions during the
on-going war with Germany, to whom she granted economic concessions for
the price of being left alone and for the price of avoiding, as much as possible,
political concessions, in order not to risk being accused of too drastic aban-
donment of its traditional policy of neutrality. What is characteristic for the
Swedish society – extremely disciplined and suffering from an overall inferiority
complex – is that such an approach towards the problem is generally convenient
for it, more so that the fear [towards] Russia is common here.87
As a result, both the government spheres and the economic spheres started
to yield to the Soviet demands: ‘Criticism towards everything that is Russian
is avoided, future commercial relations with Russia are discussed, and at the
same time a lot of caution is being shown towards us, while emphasizing our
—
86
Ibidem, letter by Minister of Foreign Affairs to Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki,
London, 9 XI 1944.
87
Ibidem, copy of letter by T. Pilch, counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, to J.
Kożuchowski, Stockholm, 16 XI 1944.
422
“strange obstinacy” and uncompromising attitude in reaching agreement

with Russia.’ Therefore, in the face of supply difficulties, Sweden:
decided nolens volens to implement the policy from 1940 – under which it
concluded the first serious commercial arrangement and provided Russia
with loans – involving seeking compensation in Russia both in the sphere of
export and, especially, in the sphere of import, for it is believed that Russia
may supply Sweden with a certain amount of raw materials, or perhaps even
coal, as Russia keeps moving further west and towards the annexation of the
Silesian coal basin.
Sweden wanted coal. On 27 November, during his visit in London, Boheman

commented on Sweden’s economic needs in the upcoming months. He
talked about the lack of coal and hoped that at least part of it would be from
Poland, highlighting that the Swedes worried little about the source of coal,
if their basic needs were satisfied.88
In practice, the Swedes began to avoid contact with the staff of the Polish
Legation. The meeting on 4 October 1944 was the only official meeting that
took place and where negotiations continued. Later, there would only be very
detached, non-committal, private conversations. Pilch claimed, ‘silence en-
sued.’ Contact was denied using various excuses. The actual reason was the
weakening political position of the Polish government in exile. The suspen-
sion of the negotiations with Pilch and Sokolnicki coincided with the fiasco
of Prime Minister Mikołajczyk’s visit to Moscow and the establishment of
relations with the PKWN representative by Envoy Staffan Söderblom.
Pilch also drew attention to the increasingly efficient activity of the Union
of Polish Patriots in Sweden (ZPP). At first, this activity centred on the circle
of Polish refugees. Later, Jerzy Pański began to reach out to various Swedish
companies interested in trade with Poland. He promised them intermedia-
tion and major facilitations. As Pilch noted: ‘Even if major Swedish com-
panies will not take these steps seriously, the result will be nevertheless even
greater cautiousness towards us and pushing our issues aside.’ Another issue
was that following the conclusion of the war various Swedish entrepreneurs
requested Polish consulates and the legation mediate in contracts with new
or former, pre-war contracting parties. They were informed, however, that
this was impossible, as the ‘political situation in Poland, is, as we know, un-
—
88
NA, FO, 371/43509, note from the conversation between D. Foot and E. Boheman, 27 XI
1944.
423
clear, and until its conclusion establishing any contacts with Polish manu-
facturers is not permitted.’89 It also transpired that the character of the nego-
tiations with the representatives of the Polish Legation could have been
exclusively instrumental. One of Pilch’s Swedish interlocutors stated frankly,
‘what will be done today with the Polish government in London would cer-
tainly be accepted by Lublin if things went in that direction.’90 What proved
to be the most effective, according to Pilch, were Pański’s efforts to obtain
Swedish humanitarian aid for the people from the areas occupied by the
Soviet army. Pilch summed up, saying, ‘our political situation has currently
weighted over our economic arrangements.’ According to Pilch, it was coal
that was the chief Polish asset in the negotiations with Sweden:
This final argument was also the reason why I defined the coal-related issues
in our draft of the arrangement right away in detail, without waiting, as one
usually does, for further negotiations. My intention in doing so in this difficult
moment for us was to withdraw our “visiting card”, even though the oppor-
tunities it created for us were rather favourable.91
Towards the close of 1944, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested specific
information about the possibility of supplies of accommodation and hospital
barracks from Sweden. The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare was pre-
pared to delegate experts from London to conduct the negotiations on this
matter.92 In London there was confusion about the assessments provided by
an UNRRA expert who estimated the Swedish production potential as far as
the barracks were concerned to be much lower than the estimates of coun-
sellor Pilch. The Polish Legation in Stockholm suggested a purchase of over
2.1 million square metres of barracks over six months, whereas the UNRRA
estimated that the Swedes could deliver 500 thousand square metres. Conse-
quently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Pilch for an explanation.93
—
89
AAN, Polish Legation in Stockholm, 103, correspondence from May 1945 between Polish
Consul to Malmö B. Żukowski and Swedish companies: Broderna Rejme – Boras, Oscar L.
Wallin – Smålands Taberg, and letter to the Polish Legation in Stockholm regarding the
contacts of A. Esklung with the Łódź Plush and Carpet Factory, pp. 3–9.
90
AAN, HI/I/86, copy of letter by T. Pilch, counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm,
to J. Kożuchowski, Stockholm, 16 XI 1944.
91
Ibidem.
92
AAN, HI/I/86, telegram by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Polish Legation in
93
Ibidem, letter by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 25 XI 1944.
424
At the outset of December, the Polish Legation became acquainted with

the offer of SKF, which, prior to the war, had a large warehouse with its pro-
ducts in Warsaw. Per Olof Silfverskiöld, the current representative of SKF in
Poland who, in the common view, compromised himself due to his pro-
German sympathies, attempted to redeem himself and repeatedly empha-
sized his pro-Polish attitude. It was through him that SKF paid 10 thousand
crowns to the account of the poverty-stricken children of Warsaw.94 The
ministerial list included 50 tons of ball bearings. Pilch argued that the offer
by SKF (Swedish ball bearing factory AB), which included the delivery of over
257 tons of bearings in the first year after the war, was worth accepting. He
noticed that this quantity covered Polish demand for a three-month period
in the year 1939, this excluding the bearings for cars, aircraft and other
specialist machinery and that accepting SKF’s offer would grant Poland the
support of this company, which was very influential in Sweden, at further
negotiations.95
In response to the 14 October report by the Polish Legation in Stockholm,
the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping, ignoring the letter by coun-
sellor Pilch of 16 November 1944, completed the instructions about further
economic negotiations with Sweden. London considered it a wise tactic not
to provoke Sweden until the negotiations were formally concluded. It was
explained unofficially to the Swedes that the Polish government understood
their cautiousness and was ready to continue talks in confidence. The Polish
side agreed to postpone the signing of the contract until a time when the
international situation had become clearer and Polish–Soviet relations were
regulated. At the same time, the Poles saw no obstacles to agreements on is-
sues regarding future Polish–Swedish trade, or even to drawing up the entire
text for arrangements that could be only concluded later. The legation made
the Swedes aware that the PKWN was far from representing Polish society,
that its long-term existence was in doubt and that, naturally, none of its ar-
rangements would be acknowledged by the legitimate Polish government.
The ministry asked whether it would be advisable, despite the difficult posi-
tion of the Polish government, to conclude certain current transactions by
private Polish companies, for instance the Gdynia-Ameryka Line (GAL)
joint-stock company order for 4 cargo ships, 6 fishing trawlers and 10 fishing
cutters. The issue of the initial date for delivery of coal supplies to Sweden
was put bluntly. It was stated in the instruction that it was mainly dependant
—
94
of Industry, Trade and Shipping, Stockholm, 2 XII 1944.
95
Ibidem.
425
on two factors which were at that moment impossible to determine – the ex-
tent of damages in the coal mines and the condition of communication infra-
structure between Silesia and the ports. Where damages were small, the plan
was to begin deliveries within six months of the conclusion of the war.
Further, it was explained that, according to the new Polish interpretation, the
matter of the telephone equipment purchase was not included in the match
agreement to which the Swedish negotiators referred. At the time, the Swedes
forced Poland purchase additional products manufactured by L. M. Ericsson,
but this was an ad hoc incident and not the subject of any larger financial
arrangement. The demand list was to be completed by the order for a battery
of accumulators for the submarines interned in Sweden – ORP Sęp and pos-
sibly ORP Wilk.96
The essential demand of the Polish side continued to be a loan in Sweden
for goods, whereas its disbursement would occur immediately following the
signing of economic arrangement to facilitate orders with Swedish com-
panies at the close of 1944. The optimal sum for the loan was thought to be
34 million dollars. Within the time limit no shorter than five years and in
annual instalments of approximately 8.5 million dollars, the loan would need
to be repaid, together with the accrued interest. These repayments would
represent half of the value of Polish coal supplied to Sweden. The second half
would be the free exchange from the Swedish market. Naturally, the Polish–
Swedish arrangement could not include the goods that were to be part of the
UNRRA supplies for Poland, unless they were purchased in Sweden on the
UNRRA’s account. This, however, went beyond the Polish–Swedish negotia-
tions. The greatest problem was the issue of handling former Polish liabilities
towards Sweden. The Swedes expected that Poland would oblige itself to
repay the amounts due by means of post-war export. For the Polish side such
a solution was unacceptable as this would create a precedent for other credi-
tors, who could require the payment of the debts in the most difficult period
of the country’s reconstruction. The Ministry of Treasury estimated Poland’s
debt to be approximately 100 million crowns. In December 1944, analyst
Witold Czyszkowski supposed that the Swedes would not engage themselves
—
96
AAN, HI/I/86, draft of letter by the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding economic negotiations with Sweden, n.p., 1944. [no
exact date provided]. The instructions, supporting the position of the negotiators in
Stockholm, but not as detailed as their earlier drafts: AAN, Ministry of Industry, Trade and
Shipping (London), 92, letter by J. Kożuchowski, Deputy Minister of Industry, Trade and
Shipping, to T. Pilch, counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, 15 I 1945; Ibidem,
letter by T. Łychowski, director of the Department of Economy and Trading to T. Pilch,
counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, 17 I 1945, pp. 328–329.
426
in further talks on post-war deliveries for Poland if the issue remained un-
settled. He, therefore, proposed a financial agreement postponing the pay-
ment of the former debts for about five years.97
These considerations nonetheless turned out to be pointless. Pilch was
right. Some divergences in the negotiations did not have a decisive impact on
the reserved attitude of the Swedish side. What prevented the Swedes from
progressing with the negotiations was the uncertain political position of the
Polish government. Hägglöf wrote to Envoy Prytz: ‘No one can predict the
fate of the Polish government in London. On attempting to guess, it should
be noted that most probably the one to act in Warsaw after the announce-
ment of ceasefire will not be the government.’98
It is hardly surprising then that the Polish government in exile was not a
credible borrower, even more so because the support for the Polish govern-
ment in London would be very much frowned upon in Moscow.99 Neverthe-
less, the Swedes were unwilling to officially send the Poles away with nothing.
Sokolnicki was assured of the good will of the Swedish government and of its
interest, especially with the import of Polish coal, and at the same time they
asked for more detailed information about the excavation prospects and the
sea transport of coal to Sweden immediately following the liberation, which
could turn out to be useful in the future. In his war memoirs, published in
1947, Jan Kwapiński wrote, not without reason, with disappointment, that
the plan of concluding a trade agreement with Sweden, prepared by the
Polish government in exile, was wilfully used during the negotiations with
the Warsaw government.100 It is possible that some details of the ongoing
negotiations, were, already at their initial stage, forwarded to Moscow and to
the PKWN by Staffan Söderblom, who, on finding out about, for example,
the plan of creating five transit camps on Polish borders, asked for permis-
sion to consult with Stefan Jędrychowski and Commercial Attaché Wojciech
Chabasiński on this matter.101
According to the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping, the Polish
Legation in Stockholm should nevertheless do everything it could to prevent
the negotiations from being aborted. What was considered crucial was the
—
97
AAN, HI/I/86, note by W. Czyszkowski regarding Polish-Swedish commercial negotia-
tions, London, 4 XII 1944.
98
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2735, copy of letter by G. Hägglöf (UD) to B.
Prytz, Swedish Envoy to London, Stockholm, 24 XI 1944.
99
Ibidem.
100
J. Kwapiński, 1939–1945 (kartki z pamiętnika), London 1947, p. 81.
101
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, letter by S. Söderblom, Swedish Envoy
to Moscow to R. Sohlman, Moscow, 5 XII 1944.
427
GAL order for ships with simultaneous payment of advances on all receiv-
ables, which were to be settled following the signing of the Polish–Swedish
treaty. It was believed that such transactions did not pose any risk, secured
the delivery of goods necessary for Poland, and on top of that should contri-
bute to the strengthening of Poland’s position within Swedish economic
circles. In addition, the ministry decided that, just as in the case of aid cam-
paigns conducted by the UNRRA, consent would be granted for sending
Swedish aid to part of the territory of Poland annexed by the Soviet armies:
‘It would even seem politically beneficial if our legation in Stockholm, of-
ficially and out loud, communicated such an attitude, and even, if possible,
actively participated in the organisation of such aid.’ At the same time, it was
advised that the efforts not be neglected and the attempts to organize such
campaigns in the territories permanently controlled by the Germans were
prioritized in circumstances when Sweden, apart from Switzerland, was the
only country who could allow itself to do so.102
Nevertheless, on 7 December, counsellor Pilch again confirmed, ‘In the
meantime, these negotiations have not moved forward.’ He explained that he
was not urging the Swedes so as not to risk the response that the negotiations
were postponed to the moment of resolving the political situation. At the
same time, the Polish diplomatic mission maintained direct relations with
Swedish economic circles, including the members of Sweden’s board of
industry, working on the list of demands prepared by the Polish side. Owing
to these contacts, Pilch unofficially found out about the Swedes’ reservations
concerning both import and export goods. In his letter he provided a detailed
analysis of the proposals for changes that were presented by Sweden’s board
of industry. In fact, at that point they were not submitted by the Swedes and
could be changed by UD, but for Pilch it did not seem very probable.103 The
Swedes were to agree to the delivery of 1.2 million tons of iron ore as well as
of 25 thousand tons of both cellulose and wood pulp. Other raw materials
were provided in small amounts. There was no consent for any quantities of
high-speed steel cutting tools, drills, cutters, saws (up to 30 percent of Polish
demand), files (up to 50 percent). The quantity of other products was
substantially reduced, especially for electrical hand drills and welders. The
Swedes agreed to supply three-phase motors, but refused to supply electrical
conductors. In most cases they did not object to supplies of chemical
—
102
AAN, HI/I/86, copy of note for the Minister of Industry, Trade and Shipping regarding
commercial negotiations with Sweden, London, 4 XII 1944.
103
Ibidem, letter by T. Pilch, counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, to J. Kwapiński,
Minister of Industry, Trade and Shipping, Stockholm, 7 XII 1944.
428
equipment. Similar was the case with agricultural goods, although the deli-
very of as many as 400 thousand scythes was excluded. On 15 January Pilch
forwarded an additional detailed list of Polish import demands to the
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which became the condition for the con-
tinuation of the negotiations and the signing of the treaty. The Swedes, how-
ever, were procrastinating. The National Reconstruction Board pointed out
in the letter to UD that, ‘in the current circumstances there is no reason to
raise the issue of regulating future trade and the issue of payment in the form
of a treaty.’ The only proposal was to prepare a report with the results of
analyses carried out by various supply commissions dealing with the Polish
proposals.104 In contrast to the preliminary analyses from 1944, some items
were challenged. The State Food Commission, referring to the poor harvests
of 1944, disagreed with the export of 1000 tons of oats.105 The State Industry
Commission had nothing against the orders for machines manufactured in
Sweden, but drew attention to the fact that some of the arithmometres were
not used in Sweden. The same Commission highlighted that the export of
telephone equipment and electrical machines could take place only through
subsidiaries of L. M. Ericsson and ASEA. Also, part of the proposals concern-
ing the equipment for post offices and railway lines were questioned.106
Bearing in mind the detailed analyses prepared by the Swedes, perhaps Pilch
was hoping that his talks with the delegation of trade department of UD
would continue.
In mid-March 1945, following Pilch’s visit to London, subsequent meet-
ings took place. On 14 March, the counsellor talked to Sohlman and con-
firmed that he would submit the complete list of goods Poland was interested
in importing. Pilch also renewed his contacts with the L. M. Ericsson and
ASEA.107 Following Pilch’s assurances, the Swedes expected to receive within
twelve months 5 million tons of Polish coal valued at 100 million crowns. At
the same time, Poland could delivery other goods. The Poles expected pay-
ment to be made partially by a loan and partially through funds obtained
—
104
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, letter by S. Sahlin to the trade depart-
ment of UD, Stockholm, 23 I 1945.
105
Ibidem, copy of letter by C. G. Widell (Sweden’s board of food – Statens livskommission)
to the National Reconstruction Board (Statens återuppbyggnadsnämnd), Stockholm, 15 I
1945.
106
Ibidem, copies of classified letters by E. Grafström (Sweden’s Board of Industry – Statens
industrikommission) to the National Reconstruction Board (Statens återuppbyggnads-
nämnd), Stockholm, 11 I, 23 I 1945.
107
IPMS, A 11, E/446, copy of letter by T. Pilch, counsellor to the Polish Legation in
Stockholm, to Deputy Minister of Industry, Trade and Shipping, J. Kożuchowski,
429
thanks to the export of coal. Pilch had no option but to accept the position of
the Swedes, who in the current political situation were unwilling to assume
any commitments, especially loans. He pointed out, however, that for the
Polish authorities it was important to prepare the arrangement as quickly as
possible so as not to lose time in the period when fundamental political issues
would be clarified. Sohlman promised that as soon as Pilch provided detailed
specifications for the goods, they would be studied carefully by competent
services. He also highlighted the issue of political difficulties. Pilch arrived
initially at the number of 1 thousand railway carriages for the transport of
coal. He expected that Sweden would begin the transport of food at once. In
connection with the planned Swedish humanitarian aid campaign in Poland,
he expected that wooden houses worth 50 million crowns would be supplied.
Sohlman confirmed that earlier arrangements were binding for the Swedish
side, but that it was impossible for him to commit to supplying more houses.
Finally, Pilch informed Sohlman confidentially that the Polish–British talks
regarding the division of the coal market were in progress. It was initially
settled that part of the supplies for Sweden would be handled by Poland, and
a possible option would be to transport coal initially from Poland to Great
Britain and only then to Sweden.108 Shortly after this meeting, Pilch confirmed
the intention to purchase emergency supplies (food and clothes) in Sweden
for around 40 thousand dollars.109 Sohlman prolonged negotiations, asking
for a specific proposal, as well as information as to how and when such
transport would be provided.110
Meanwhile, the Swedish press called for bolder talks to be held with the
Polish communists and Stalin about the import of Upper Silesian coal. On 10
January 1945, the newly launched Expressen afternoon daily published an
interview with the alleged Minister of Trade to the Polish Provisional
Government, the so-called ‘Petrowski.’ From the article it followed that
Sweden could count on the coal supplies from Poland. The text presented a
vision where Poland was to be included in the economic system of Scandi-
navia, following the absorption of vast areas of the German territory.111 One
month later, in that very same daily it was argued that Swedish industry
needed direct contact with Poland:
—
108
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, memorandum regarding Polish pro-
posals, Stockholm, 14 III 1945.
109
Ibidem, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm T. Pilch to R. Sohlman, Stockholm, 19 III
1945.
110
Ibidem, letter by R. Sohlman to counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, T. Pilch,
111
‘Lublin-polskt intresse för handeln med Sverige’, Expressen, 10 I 1945.
430
A certain well known entrepreneur stated in Expressen that to launch trade

with Poland in the current circumstances it was crucially important to estab-
lish commercial relations as quickly as possible. The current political situation
naturally hindered even the preliminary commercial negotiations – our
source says – but despite all the difficulties a temporary solution must be
devised in the shape of sending a representative and have him investigate the
options of launching coal transports for Sweden.’112
The publication of the article almost coincided with the announcements of

the imminent acquisition of control over Silesia and East Prussia by the
Warsaw government and with the press mentioning the need to establish
economic cooperation with Poland. Although, concerns were raised about
the condition of coal mines and port facilities in Gdynia.113 The Swedish
government was criticised for granting recognition to the Polish government
in exile and rhetorical questions were posed whether the Swedish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs understood the crucial importance of Polish coal for
Sweden.114 On 11 April, several dailies published correspondence from
London, the authors of which were convinced, referring to the Polish pro-
Soviet opinion journalist Stefan Litauer, that Polish coal would soon be on its
way to Sweden. Pański confirmed these rumours in an interview with the
press. On 23 May, the opinion was voiced by Dagens Nyheter that even the
misunderstandings between the powers ‘on a long-term basis should not
hinder the economic relations between the two countries, which have
become very extensive before the war, especially when it comes to coal.’115
Other dailies published articles concerning future trade between Poland and
Sweden. At the close of April, news was announced that a Swedish delegation
had been sent to Poland to begin economic talks.116
It was Staffan Söderblom who encouraged his government, as already
mentioned, to undertake more courageous action in contacts with the Polish
Provisional Government in Warsaw. In mid-March, he called for starting
talks on trade, and most importantly, on the issue of coal and coke import by
Sweden.117 At the outset of April, ambassador Modzelewski officially turned
—
112
‘Våra industrier behöver direkt-kontakt med Polen’, Expressen, 6 II 1945.
113
114
‘Polen i behov av svensk varukredit för inköp av maskiner och avelsdjur’, Expressen, 29 III
1945.
115
‘Svenska ombud till Warszawa för förhandling om kolinköp’, Dagens Nyheter, 23 V 1945.
116
‘Kontakt med Polen för handelsutbyte’, Expressen, 31 V 1945.
117
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, letter by S. Söderblom, Swedish Envoy
to Moscow, to R. Sohlman, Moscow, 16 III 1945.
431
to Söderblom to establish commercial relations. The Swedish Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, on 14 April, presented its instruction requiring him to report
the readiness of Sweden to send its delegate to Poland to examine the
perspectives for the re-establishment of trade. Two days later, Modzelewski
convinced Söderblom that in the face of Mikołajczyk’s negotiations regarding
the reconstruction of the government in Warsaw, the government’s recogni-
tion by the Western Allies was only a matter of time and that nothing pre-
vented the establishment of bilateral Polish–Swedish relations. At the same
time, Modzelewski assured Söderblom that none of the Polish ports were
destroyed and that it would soon be possible to use both for the shipment of
goods. He also sent a representative of his government to Stockholm to agree
the course of the Swedish humanitarian aid campaign in the territory of
Poland.118 In turn, on 22 April, during the accidental meeting of Söderblom,
Modzelewski and Minister of Industry Hilary Minc (who had recently visited
Moscow) in the Grand Theatre, the Polish ambassador stated that the
Swedish delegate would receive a warm welcome in Warsaw. He guaranteed
that many millions of tons of coal were waiting for Sweden in Poland. What
Poland expected to receive as part of the settlement were trucks, iron ore and
machinery. Minister Minc also anticipated that the Swedish side would make
its trade fleet available to Poland. The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
instructed Söderblom that the demands put forward by the Polish Provi-
sional Government would be met on the condition that Poland organize the
quick transport of coal. There were no objections to this being carried out
with the support of the Swedish fleet.119 In the Polish embassy, on 25 April,
Söderblom officially proposed Modzelewski and Minc send Eng to Poland as
a Swedish delegate at the Polish government in Warsaw. Modzelewski initi-
ally accepted this candidacy and announced detailed talks about the ma-
chinery, which were required by Poland, as well as payment methods. He also
confirmed for Söderblom that the port in Gdańsk was in good condition.
Söderblom, though, met with the Soviet Deputy People’s Commissioner for
Foreign Affairs, Vladimir Dekanozov, to secure the acceptance of his actions
and preliminary permission for a transit visa for Eng.120 Modzelewski referred
to another of Molotov’s deputies, Andrey Vyshinsky. For Söderblom, this
—
118
Ibidem, memorandum regarding the establishment of relations with the Polish
government in Warsaw, Stockholm, 24 IV 1945.
119
Ibidem, memorandum regarding commercial relations with Poland, Stockholm, 25 IV
1945.
120
Ibidem, memorandum regarding commercial relations with Poland, Stockholm, 28 IV
1945; Ibidem, letter by S. Söderblom, Swedish Envoy to Moscow, to Swedish Minister of
Foreign Affairs Ch. Günther, Moscow, 30 IV 1945.
432
was proof that, ‘the Poles were keen to open maritime and telegraphic links
with Sweden and Europe at all costs.’121
The possible coal import from Poland was a subject of discussion in
Swedish parliament. Fears about the political future of Scandinavia were
mixed with concerns about Swedish coal supplies. During the closed session
of the first chamber of the Swedish parliament, on 19 April, the Minister of
Trade, Bertil Ohlin, was asked about the possibility of concluding an agree-
ment with the new Polish authorities regarding coal supply. Ohlin explained
that the Swedish government maintained contact with the government in
Warsaw concerning the immediate exchange of goods between Poland and
Sweden. The goods he mentioned included Polish coal and Swedish
machinery, adding that the analysis of the opportunities for the transport of
these goods was in progress. At the same time, he highlighted that this contact
was not politically motivated. Ohlin also mentioned the Swedish humani-
tarian aid campaign in Poland, which was not directly connected with the
discussions on trade, but the minister believed that it contributed to a favour-
able atmosphere.122 In contrast, communist leader Sven Linderot claimed
openly that one could not count exclusively on, as in the case of the Western
Allies, commercial trade. The starting point would nevertheless have to be
political issues. That is why Sweden could buy coal in Poland and gain other
benefits.123
Meanwhile, Eng started to receive information from the Swedish com-
panies about the interests conducted in Poland, for example with L. M. Erics-
son, by Svenska Tändsticks AB (Swedish Match AB or STAB) and Allmänna
Svenska Elektriska AB (General Swedish Electric Company or ASEA). There
was a request for information about both the condition of the estate as well
as the fate of the staff.124 A study by Sven Norrman contained a detailed report
about the future of ASEA’s daughter company, Polskie Towarzystwo Elek-
tryczne S. A. [the Polish Electrical Association Joint Stock Company], which
following the September Campaign renewed its production, although on a
smaller scale than before the war (before the German aggression it hired 400–
450 labourers and from 1940 until the Warsaw Rising 150).
—
121
Ibidem, telegram by S. Söderblom, Swedish Envoy to Moscow, to UD, Moscow, 29 V 1945.
122
Protokoll…, p. 370.
123
Ibidem, p. 361.
124
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, memorandum to the secretary of the
legation B. Eng concerning the interests of L. M. Ericsson in Poland, Stockholm, 15 V 1945;
Ibidem, memorandum regarding Stab’s business matters in Poland, Jönköping, 15 V 1945;
Ibidem, S. Norrman: Memorandum concerning the ASEA concern’s business matters in
Poland, Västerås, 16 V 1945.
433
The Swedish Export Association sent Eng a list of 43 companies, which in

1940 claimed the right to the debts of Polish companies totalling more than
100 thousand crowns. The Swedish companies demanded compensation of
approximately 58.5 million crowns. Within a few years there were con-
siderable changes, as part of the receivables of the Swedish side was taken
over by the German banks and therefore in these cases it was Germany that
became the addressee of the claims. The association also counted on ad-
ditional income from the interest.125
Modzelewski was also contacted by Ruben Ljundberg, who was negotiat-
ing trade with the Soviet Union for a long time as director of a Swedish–
Russian Commercial Enterprise (Svensk–Ryska Handelskammaren Service
AB). On 8 February 1945, he sent a letter to the ambassador of the Polish
Provisional Government in Moscow announcing Sweden’s intention to buy
5 million tons of coal and 1 million tons of coke. One month later he sent a
list of 13 Swedish companies interested in the import of Polish coal. He
expanded the list further in the following month.126 On 23 April 1945,
Modzelewski responded firmly, ‘The Polish government is ready to initiate
the negotiations regarding coal supplies, but on the condition that normal
diplomatic relations between Swedish and Polish governments are estab-
lished.’127 Ljundberg and Modzelewski, contrary to during the negotiations
conducted by Söderblom, never discussed the issue of the leasing of Swedish
locomotives or railway trucks. Yet, on his own initiative, the Swede offered
to lend to the Polish side ten special harbour cranes. Following the initial
insight, he concluded that only the reloading of coal from railway trucks on
to the ships could present some difficulty. As far as he knew, the harbours,
the mines and the railway lines were not significantly damaged. On 2 May
1945, Ljundberg informed the head of the State Fuel Commission that Polish
partners were ready to send their representative to Stockholm and according
to his estimates it would be possible to reach an agreement regarding the issue
of coal import within eight days. As he learned, the shipment of Polish coal
via the harbours of Gdańsk and Gdynia to Leningrad and to former harbours
of the Baltic States was already in progress. The daily volume of reloading was
—
125
Ibidem, letter by the SAE to B. Eng, Stockholm, 15 V 1945. See detailed specification: RA,
UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 94, vol. 2373, list of liabilities of Swedish companies in the
territories under German, Soviet and Lithuanian occupation (as of April 1940).
126
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, copies of letters by R. Ljundberg to the
Polish Ambassador to Moscow Z. Modzelewski, 8 II, 7 III, 3 IV 1945 r. See AMSZ, issue 27,
w. 4, vol. 55, letter by R. Ljundberg, 8 II 1945.
127
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, copy of telegram by the Polish
Ambassador to Moscow Z. Modzelewski to R. Ljundberg, 23 IV 1945.
434
estimated by him to be 5 thousand tons, but he noticed an opportunity to

double it. Ljundberg convinced his Swedish friends that finally there were no
obstacles, not even from the Soviet authorities, to purchasing the coal from
Poland. He was certain that the Polish Provisional Government would
continue its mission and would be granted recognition from the Western
Allies as soon as the Polish politicians from London became part of it. Sweden
should therefore take the chance to provide itself, as quickly as possible, with
a source of energy, indispensable for both industry and households. The
board did not feel competent enough to settle complex issues in the field of
international policy, but in the analysis prepared for UD it highlighted that
guaranteeing the quickest possible coal import to Sweden was the issue of
highest priority.128
The Swedish diplomacy treated the idea of granting recognition to the
government in Warsaw with indifference. Söderblom was to explain in Mos-
cow whether the Polish side was in fact insisting on the official establishment
of diplomatic relations. In such a case sending a Swedish delegate to Poland
would be pointless. On 18 May, Söderblom was told by Modzelewski, who had
just been appointed vice minister of foreign affairs, that the supply of 1 million
tons of coal, as early as in the summer of 1945, was highly likely. The Polish
diplomat did not mention granting de iure recognition to the government in
Warsaw. The meeting between the Swedish envoy and head of the Polish coal
industry Topolski, his closest collaborator Biernacki and Attaché Chabasiński
took place on 19 May. The Poles proposed that the coal negotiations between
Eng and Minc be initiated in Warsaw in the near future.
They announced that during the forthcoming summer months the trans-
port of 1 million tons of coal and 150–200 thousand tons of coke would be
possible. The transport of coal from Upper Silesia to Gdańsk, Gdynia and
Szczecin required 150 locomotives and 8–10 thousand carriages. Sweden was
requested to supply some rolling stock, which was to be settled during the
negotiations. The Poles emphasized that the more rolling stock that reached
Poland, the quicker the completion of transport would be. They also expected
to receive mine scaffolding, trucks, iron ore, machinery, electric motors and
—
128
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, V.P.M. by K.-G. Ljungdahl regarding
information on the subject of Polish coal, Stockholm, 2 V 1945. Ljundberg most probably
operated alone and served the interests of his own company. Anyway, no trace has been
found of the authorisations from the Swedish government circles. Similar conclusions: A.
Kłonczyński, Stosunki…, pp. 33–34.
435
telephones.129 They submitted their suggestions in writing to Söderblom on

22 May.
Some Swedish companies began pressurizing their ministry of foreign
affairs with letters requesting the Swedish diplomacy mediate in their com-
mercial relations. The company of Oscar Hirsch wanted to purchase zinc,
lead and scrap iron.130 Companies dealing in fish sales were to make similar
requests of the Swedish diplomacy. Utrikesdepartementet (UD) replied con-
stantly that the delegation headed by Eng was to negotiate only the coal sup-
plies and that extensive trade with Poland was surely a matter for the future,
and that raising the subject at that moment seemed premature.131
The Polish Legation in Stockholm underestimated the matter of estab-
lishing relations between the Swedish government and the Polish Provisional
Government in Warsaw in the economic sphere. On 26 April, Sokolnicki
argued, ‘the attempts to establish economic relations with us are gaining in
momentum every day, more so because the Swedes are convinced that the
agreement regarding the Polish matters, whose starting point is Yalta, would
be reached.’132 At the outset of May, Sokolnicki tried to calm London down,
‘The news of the intention to send a delegation only for the purpose of
examining the issue of coal supplies is being confirmed.’ The delegation was
to consist of an expert and an official from the trade department of UD,
which, according to Sokolnicki, lowered the rank of the enterprise.133 Towards
the close of May, Sokolnicki’s tone was similar:
E[ng], in a conversation with his source described his travel as an introduction
to the recognition of the Lublin government. When this fact was communica-
ted to Prime Minister [Hansson] he commented on E[ng’s] attitude harshly
and announced that he would see him. The Prime Minister also stated that
the purpose of E[ng’s] delegation is not only the resolution of the coal issue,
—
129
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, memorandum concerning coal import
from Poland, Stockholm, 19 V, 22 V 1945.
130
Ibidem, letter by O. Hirsch to UD, Stockholm, 23 V 1945.
131
Ibidem, letter by I Secretary of UD, T. Göransson, to the company Mauritz Breijer,
132
AAN, Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping (London), 92, letter by H. Sokolnicki,
Polish Envoy to Stockholm, to the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping, Stockholm, 26
IV 1945, pp. 397–399.
133
PISM, A 11, E/1099, telegram by H. Sokolnicki, Polish Envoy to Stockholm, to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 V 1945.
436
and that Sweden will keep granting recognition to the Polish government in
London as long as it would be recognized by the Western Allies.’134
However, the British envoy, Victor Mallet, was of a different opinion. He

stated that the needs of the Swedes on the matter of coal supply were so great
that they were determined to send any representation to Poland if this would
guarantee them coal supplies.135
—
134
Ibidem, telegram by H. Sokolnicki, Polish Envoy to Stockholm, to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 26 V 1945.
135
NA, FO, 371/48057, telegram by Envoy of Great Britain to Stockholm V. Mallet to FO, 17
V 1945.
437
438
10. The Mission of Brynolf Eng
The delay concerning the formation of the new Polish government following
the conference in Yalta caused the Swedes to seek other solutions that would
give them economic benefits without political concessions. Among such
ideas was Eng’s mission. When it was known that Eng would become the
Swedish negotiator, Jerzy Pański visited him on 12 May and gave assurances
that the output of coal in the Polish mines was increasing successively. The
leader of Polish communists in Sweden also convinced Eng that the transport
conditions were constantly improving, evidenced by the air connection
between Gdańsk and Warsaw. In his opinion, the export of coal could begin
immediately following the conclusion of the commercial arrangement and
the Polish side would be able to supply Sweden with 5 million tons. He saw
no risk in withholding the export from the Soviet authorities, saying, ‘the
access to coal in new Poland is so extensive, and the extraction – so efficient,
that the Russians, due to the current transport opportunities, would not
regard it as a breach of their interests.’1
The negotiations were to take place in Moscow. It was only following the
signing of the coal agreement that Eng was to travel to Warsaw. This gua-
ranteed that the significance of his presence in Poland would not be exclu-
sively political.2 Sokolnicki intervened with UD and informed the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in London that, ‘the announcement made in connection with
E[ng’s] departure contains [underlined in the original] our wishes.’3
However, when the Swedish dailies began to speculate that it was about more
than coal negotiations, Pilch expressed the wish that the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs issue another announcement, belying that Sweden wanted to establish
diplomatic relations with Warsaw. Pilch’s idea was rejected and he was told
that the earlier announcement sufficed.4
—
1
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, memorandum by B. Eng, Stockholm, 14
V 1945.
2
NA, FO, 371/48057, telegram by A. Clerk-Kerr, Ambassador of Great Britain to Moscow,
to the FO, Moscow, date unknown.
3
PISM, A 11, E/1099, telegram by H. Sokolnicki, Polish Envoy to Stockholm, to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 2 VI 1945.
4
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, memorandum regarding the conver-
sation with the counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm T. Pilch, Stockholm, 29 V
1945.
439
On 31 May, Eng flew to Moscow,5 and on 6 June he was followed by coal

experts Karl-Gustaf Ljungdahl and Ture Ström, which on this occasion was
correctly interpreted by Sokolnicki as a sign of progress in the negotiations.6
These assumptions were confirmed several days later when the Legation of
Great Britain reported that the coal quota was initially settled at 1 million
tons.7 In the instruction for the Swedish delegation, which was prepared in
the trade department of UD, and the content of which was confirmed with
Minister of Trade Bertil Ohlin, it was pointed out that the aim was to con-
clude the preliminary commercial agreement as quickly as possible, at that
point only for the period between 1 July and 30 September 1945 and with the
possibility of its extension by another nine months. The Swedes were to find
out immediately whether it would be possible to conclude such an agreement
having taken the needs of the Polish market into account. From the Polish
side, the delegation was to be given confirmation of the delivery of 1 million
tons of coal and 150–200 thousand tons of coke within three months for no
more than 30 crowns per ton with reference to the FOB clause. This meant
that the Polish side was to cover the costs of delivering goods to the harbour
and loading them on vessels. The Swedish delegates became familiar with the
prices of zinc, zinc white, common salt, potassium salt and paraffin. The
Swedish export offer included 300 thousand tons per year of low phosphorus
iron ore, whereas in the next three months it was only possible to deliver 150
tons. There was an abundance of high phosphorus iron ore meaning supply
was unlimited. From Sweden it was possible to transport 75 thousand square
metres of mine scaffolding. Fulfilling the order for 2 thousand carriages was
not a problem, on the condition that they each weighed no more than 3 tons
and cost no more than 3 thousand crowns. Sweden also offered 200 railway
carriages at 12 thousand crowns each. What is more, the Swedish railway
would offer up to 1350 carriages and 20 locomotives. As part of the offer, a
private owner provided 325 carriages and 5–7 locomotives, all of which came
at a high cost (7.50 crowns per carriage per day). Locomotive rental (80
crowns per night) was permitted only in special cases. L. M. Ericsson
committed itself to supply telephone equipment at a price of 1.1 million
crowns. The Swedes expected detailed specifications of the demands for
—
5
NA, FO, 371/48057, telegram by V. Mallet, Envoy of Great Britain to Stockholm, to the FO,
6
PISM A 11, E/1099, telegram by H. Sokolnicki, Polish Envoy to Stockholm, to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 7 VI 1945.
7
Ibidem, telegram by H. Sokolnicki, Polish Envoy to Stockholm, to the Ministry of Foreign
440
10. THE MISSION OF BRYNOLF ENG
electrical equipment from the Polish side, although Eng’s task was to initially
assure the Poles that this issue should not pose any difficulties. At that point
the Swedish authorities had not yet made a decision regarding the export of
agricultural equipment, but Eng was to confirm the delivery of 100–200
tractors at 13–14 thousand crowns each, 100 harvesters at 11–12 thousand
crowns each and 100 threshing machines at 8–9 thousand crowns each. The
payments were to be made in Swedish crowns through the Bank of Sweden
(Sveriges Riksbank), where a special account was to be opened for the Polish
authorities. The delegation was to make sure that the provisions of the
commercial contract were consistent with the policy of the Swedish govern-
ment regarding the issue of granting recognition to the government which
exercised authority in Poland, although Minister Ohlin claimed that it was
not in Sweden’s interest to hold on to the principle of not granting recogni-
tion to the government in Warsaw before the Western Allies.8
On 1 June, Eng and Söderblom (2 June according to Eng’s report) visited
Modzelewski in the Polish embassy. The Polish Deputy Minister, accom-
panied by Matwin, First Secretary of the Embassy, and Commercial Attaché
Chabasiński, assured the interlocutor that Poland was ready to launch the air
connection with Sweden. He confirmed that it was possible to perform a
quick launch of coal transport across the sea to Sweden, but that this would
only be by means of the Swedish trade fleet and railway. He saw no problem
exporting coal and coke in the amount required by the Swedish side (1
million plus 200 thousand tons). He insisted that the Swedish delegation visit
Warsaw and that a group of Polish economic experts be sent to Stockholm at
the same time. Modzelewski suggested that the arrival of the Polish ‘de facto
representatives’ may stoke unrest since a diplomatic mission of the London
government was also operating in the capital. According to Eng’s report,
Söderblom went on to say that as far as he was concerned, there was no Polish
envoy in Stockholm. Whereas Eng himself, according to the instruction from
Stockholm, insisted that the initial agreement was signed already in Moscow.
Regarding this he referred to communication difficulties, which would signi-
ficantly delay the conclusion of the principal agreement, and both Swedish
and Polish side were pressed for time. Modzelewski also raised the issue of
interned submarines. Returning them to the government in Warsaw would
—
8
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, memorandum for the delegation travel-
ling to Poland, Stockholm, 30 V 1945; Ibidem, notes from the conversation with Minister B.
Ohlin, Stockholm, 30 V 1945; Ibidem, excerpt of the protocol of the government session,
441
constitute a friendly gesture. Söderblom claimed that the issue was compli-
cated and that the Swedish government was not yet prepared to make any
settlements. He pointed out that the delegation to be sent to Poland would
focus only on technical and economic issues, and therefore no political con-
ditions should be made towards it. The Poles expressed their disappointment
with Sweden’s inability to supply the desired quantity of trucks of the re-
quired class to the Polish side. The Polish negotiators accepted the Swedish
reservations concerning the hiring of locomotives with clear disapproval. As
far as the coal trade was concerned, the Polish side would be represented by
the state-run monopoly, and the Swedish side by individual import com-
panies. The Polish side reserved its right not to maintain commercial rela-
tions with the companies which cooperated with Germany and with the
Polish government in exile. Eng attempted to explain that the companies
which had submitted offers to the government in London were only intend-
ing to re-launch their business in Poland and that these were not acts of
political demonstration.9 The Poles generally accepted Swedish proposals,
both on import demands as well as the prices of goods which were to be sold
to Poland, but the latter would be based on international market prices.
It is worth mentioning that the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping
in London produced an analysis showing that export perspectives for Poland
were minimal at that point.10 On 6 July 1945, in the Ministry of Industry,
Trade and Shipping, the analytical work regarding the future trade treaty
with Sweden was still in progress.11 On that same day, Söderblom and Eng
again held a meeting with Modzelewski and Chabasiński. During their con-
versation, the Swedish envoy raised the issue of rapid demining of the Baltic
Sea routes, which should be conducted in agreement with the Soviet side.
Modzelewski agreed to discuss this issue with competent authorities in
Moscow. He referred to the issue of sending a commercial delegation from
Warsaw to Stockholm, and to the inevitable, in his opinion, local conflict with
the Polish Legation. He also suggested that Sweden place at least one cargo
—
9
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, telegram by S. Söderblom, Swedish Envoy
to Moscow, to UD, Moscow, 3 VI 1945; Ibidem, memorandum regarding negotiations with
Poland, Stockholm, 4 VI 1945; Ibidem, B. Eng: memorandum notes no. 1 and no. 2 concern-
ing Swedish-Polish commercial talks, Moscow, 2 VI 1945.
10
PISM, A 11, E/1099, telegram by T. Gwiazdoski to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, 7 VI
1945.
11
PISM, col. 20/7, letter by T. Kuźniarz (Department of Agriculture at the Ministry of
Industry, Trade and Shipping) to Agricultural Officer of the Polish Legation in Stockholm,
B. Saryusz-Zaleski, 6 VI 1945.
442
ship at Polish disposal, which would be of remarkable psychological import-

ance. He emphasized the significance of such gestures, underlining the Polish
national character. Söderblom expressed his understanding for the issue of
relations between the Swedish government and the representation of the
London government at the time being raised by the Polish government in
Warsaw. He promised to address both this issue and the proposal to hand
over a commercial ship to Poland in Stockholm. Whereas Eng and Cha-
basiński were to continue ‘the talks of technical nature.’12 During the nego-
tiations, Eng understated the number of carriages that were to be delivered
to Poland to leave some room for concessions in the future.13 He also
informed his superiors in Stockholm that according to the UNRRA repre-
sentative responsible for supplies of goods to Poland and Czechoslovakia,
Colonel Cecil Cross, Chabasiński’s promises regarding the unblocking of
Polish harbours by 25 June 1945 were impossible to realize. In his opinion,
this would be possible by mid-July at the earliest.14
Eventually, on 8 June, Eng, the first secretary of the Swedish Legation in
Helsinki, was authorized by the Swedish government to sign the commercial
agreement with the Polish Provisional Government.15 Then, the coal experts
Ljungdahl and Ström arrived in Moscow on 12 June to support Eng in his
conversations with the Poles. Accompanied by Söderblom, they held a meet-
ing in the presence of Molotov and Vyshynsky, on 14 June, with the highest
authorities of the People’s Republic of Poland in the Polish embassy in
Moscow. President of the State National Council (KRN) Bolesław Bierut
mentioned the earlier friendship between the Polish and Swedish nations and
expressed a hope for the best possible the relations between the two countries
in the future, which was eagerly confirmed by representatives of the Soviet
authorities.16
On 16 June, Eng, clerk Arne Waldenström, typist Denise Eriksson and the
coal experts departed on a special flight from Moscow to Warsaw, where they
—
12
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, memorandum no. 2 regarding nego-
tiations with Poland, Stockholm, 8 VI 1945; Ibidem, B. Eng: memorandum no. 5 regarding
Swedish-Polish commercial discussions, Moscow, 6 VI 1945.
13
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, B. Eng: memorandum no. 6 regarding
Swedish–Polish commercial discussions, Moscow, 7 VI 1945.
14
Ibidem, B. Eng: memorandum no. 7 regarding Swedish-Polish commercial discussions,
Moscow, 9 VI 1945.
15
Utrikesdepartementets ärenden, Stockholm, 8 VI 1945.
16
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 12, vol. 890, copy of report by S. Söderblom, Swedish
Envoy to Moscow, to Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch. Günther, Moscow, 18 VI 1945.
443
stayed in Hotel Polonia.17 Intensive negotiations took place 18–20 June. The
Polish delegation was headed by Hilary Minc. An important role was played
by E. Gorączko, head of the newly established Centre for Merchandising of
Coal Industry Products (Centrala Zbytu Produktów Przemysłu Węglowego),
an expert in coal-related issues who was earlier engaged in the trade with
Swedish companies from Stockholm, Malmö and Gothenburg as a repre-
sentative of the Giesche coal company. Within three days the agreement was
concluded, under which Sweden was to obtain from Poland 1 million tons of
coal and 200 thousand tons of coke. The deliveries would begin on 15 July
and end within three months, with the option of a two-month extension.
Prior to the signing of the arrangement, Eng travelled to Stockholm to con-
sult with his government. He returned to Warsaw on 28 July, and initialled
the agreement the next day. Sweden would be the first country to sign the
agreement with the Provisional Government of National Unity.18
Thanks to the ad hoc agreement, the Swedes secured deliveries of the raw
material that was indispensable for their economy. At the close of July in
Stockholm other negotiations began on a long-term economic arrangement.
According to the new agreement, Sweden was to obtain as much as 4 million
tons of coal and 800 thousand tons of coke from Poland in the first nine
months of 1946. The arrangement was signed on 20 August 1945. It soon
transpired, however, that Poland was unable to fulfil these orders. In 1945
only 122 tons of the agreed upon 1 million tons were delivered to Sweden and
in 1946 only 1642 million tons from the anticipated 4 million tons. The Polish
negotiators had to be aware of the technical difficulties preventing the im-
plementation of the provisions of bilateral agreements with Sweden. At the
same time documents from the on-going talks proved that the Poles were
making great efforts to meet Swedish demands. Both sides wanted to sign the
—
17
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, memorandum no. 8 concerning nego-
tiations with Poland, Stockholm, 16 VI 1945.
18
The agreement consisted of two parts – commercial arrangement and coal arrangement.
The Swedes committed themselves to deliver various types of iron ore, although in some
cases (iron-tungsten alloy, titanium-iron alloy, nickel-iron alloy) the quantities were much
smaller than those demanded by the Polish side. In Sweden there was shortage of carbon
electrodes and it was completely impossible to import them from there. The Swedish side
also agreed to borrow (not give away) 1300 railway wagons at a unit price of 5 crowns per
night. The Swedish delegation managed to avoid making commitments involving granting
access to their locomotives. RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2736, letter by E.
Grafström from Sweden’s board of industry (Statens industrikommission) to B. Eng,
Stockholm, 27 VI 1945; Ibidem, memorandum regarding the borrowing of railway wagons
to Poland, Stockholm, 29 VI 1945. See also S.-O. Olsson, Swedish-Polish…, p. 36; A.
Kłonczyński, Stosunki…, pp. 144–145.
444
agreement at all costs. It should be highlighted that in the initial years fol-
lowing the war, despite breaching contracts, Poland was Sweden’s main coal
and coke supplier (59 percent and 30 percent, 1945–48).19
Statistics on Swedish exports to Poland 1945–48 show that trade with
Sweden was of vital importance for Poland. There was no other country that
provided Poland with industrial products in comparable quantities. The
exchange was important also for Sweden as there was no alternative to the
Polish coal supplies. The situation in Germany continued to be uncertain,
and the Western Allies had neither an option nor will to support a neutral
state that was not enduring damages inflicted by the war. The opinion of the
Swedish researcher Olsson was justified in that the Polish coal supplies,
although smaller than those scheduled, fulfilled their task.20 It would also be
worth examining the sense of the Swedes’ negotiations with the represen-
tatives of the Polish government in exile. At the beginning it was most prob-
ably thought that the reconstruction of the Polish government was possible
while retaining the London politicians’ influence on the shaping of relations
between Warsaw and other countries. In addition, negotiations made it
possible relatively early to gain orientation in the needs and demands of the
Polish side as well as in what it could offer in return.
—
19
S.-O. Olsson, Swedish-Polish…, p. 39.
20
Ibidem.
445
446
PART 3
Humanitarian Mission of Sweden
447
448
11. The Fate of Polish Refugee
Until the outbreak of the Second World War the number of foreigners in
Sweden was insignificant. They were admitted rather reluctantly, treated with
distrust and there were no plans of a broader opening to them. Experts on
this matter emphasized that the Swedes, just like the citizens of other Euro-
pean countries, considered themselves to be superior to other nations, which,
reinforced by a belief in racial purity, bred nationalism, anti-Semitism and a
general disapproval towards foreigners. This was coupled with a widespread
fear of competition in the labour market.1
Nevertheless, in the 1930s, as Europe faced an increasing political refugee
problem, some associations formed in Sweden, the task of which was to pro-
vide aid for people persecuted for their political beliefs. The oldest organisa-
tion of this sort was Röda Hjälpen (Red Aid), the Swedish branch of Inter-
national Red Aid (MOPR) that was founded in Moscow in 1922 to provide
support for communists being persecuted in various countries. The social-
democratic circles set the tone for the humanitarian activity. After Hitler
came to power, the social-democratic party, the Swedish Trade Union Con-
federation (LO) together with the Swedish Social Democratic Youth League,
established an organisation which from 1936 was known by the name
Arbetarrörelsens flyktinghjälp (translation: Labour Movement’s Committee
for Refugee Aid). It collaborated with many other similar organisations and,
most of all, with state authorities.2 It focused the supporters of asylum right
liberalisation, and its opponents were associated with the right wing. These
divisions became clear in the second half of 1930s, when the discussion on
the amendment of the refugee act was in progress. Ethical reasons favoured
the facilitation of the refugees’ arrival in Sweden and the simplification of
procedures for acquiring the right to permanent residence. Aversion was
caused by the typical fears about the disruptions in the labour market and,
generally, about the influx of foreigners. The Swedish government predicted
that the prolonging political tensions in Europe would cause an increasing
wave of immigration. Relating to this they preferred to introduce strict rules
that would allow the control of the inflow of foreigners and at the same time
—
1
H. Lindberg, Svensk flyktingpolitik under internationellt tryck 1936–1941, Stockholm 1973,
pp. 37–38.
2
449
did not oblige the state authorities to accept all people who declared them-
selves as political refugees. This was to be the way to preserve a certain
balance between two opposite attitudes towards the issue of migration. To
preserve the freedom of actions in this area, Sweden did not ratify the refugee
convention, which was put forward by the League of Nations at the outset of
1938, although the Swedish government did not generally reject the possi-
bility of accepting a certain number of people. After all, the aim was to avoid
a situation where a large group of refugees would arrive on a one-off basis,
which it was believed posed a threat both from economic and socio-psycho-
logical point of view. In the diplomatic reports one could read, among others,
the opinion that the inflow of a large group of Jews could spark a wave of
anti-Semitism.3 In 1937 the new act on foreigners came into force, the aim of
which was to provide control over their arrival and residence. The issues of
granting visas as well as residence and work permits or arrival of citizens of
the countries with which Sweden signed the agreement on visa-free move-
ment, were handed to the management of various specialized institutions.
This decentralisation continued to raise fears about the irrepressible inflow
of foreigners. It was especially the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs that
did not trust in the efficiency of the Swedish system of border control and it
was mainly thanks to its diplomatic interventions that the wave was success-
fully held back.4
The Swedish authorities were responding to social pressure as 1938–39
saw protests in some circles against excessively liberal immigration law.
These included associations of small entrepreneurs, textile traders, colonial
goods retailers, shop assistants and restaurant musicians. In February 1939
pharmacists and students in various disciplines demonstrated against ‘the
import of Jewish physicians, dentists and pharmacists.’ Most attention was
devoted to the discussion organized by students of the Uppsala University on
17 February 1939. In the new tennis hall, a capacity-exceeding crowd com-
posed a resolution to the king, expressing opposition towards the influx of
foreigners. Nevertheless, at the same time in the Riksdag, where social demo-
crats had the edge over committed opponents of immigration, an act was
passed, allocating 500 thousand crowns for covering the refugees’ cost of
living and professional training. Following the German annexation of
Austria and the Sudetes the head of the Arbetarrörelsens Flyktinghjälp, Axel
Granath, pledged that Sweden could admit several hundred refugees from
—
3
Ibidem, pp. 71–74, 77–118, 169.
4
Ibidem. Following the Anschluss of Austria, the Swedes managed to revoke the agreement
on the visa-free movement with Germany.
450
11. THE FATE OF THE POLISH REFUGEES
the annexed territories. The motivation to do so was financial aid, which was
promised by the British government to cover the immigrants’ cost of living.
After 15 March 1939, and following the liquidation of Czechoslovakia,
Granath began to contact the Polish authorities and the British refugee
committee regarding the issue of the migration of a small group of refugees.
He declared in Warsaw that it was possible for his organisation to take care
of certain individuals ‘due to their profession and other circumstances.’
Eventually, a list of 94 people was drawn up, but the outbreak of the war pre-
vented them from leaving. Only some of them reached Sweden. Because of
the wave of refugees from the war-stricken areas, and due to other repres-
sions, in 1939 the Bank of England eventually donated over 550 thousand
crowns to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Most of this sum reached
the account of the Arbetarrörelsens flyktinghjälp.5
Socialstyrelsens utlänningsbyrå (translation: National Board of Health and
Welfare’s agency for foreign nationals), established in 1938, was a small unit
of the Office for Social Affairs – an agency of the Ministry of Social Welfare.
Within five years, by 1 July 1944, the Office was transformed into Statens
utlänningskommission or SUK (translation: national migration commission),
which employed over six hundred people. The immigrants’ affairs were
usually dealt with by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, from 1939
the Nämnden för statens flyktingshjälp (translation: Committee for National
Refugee Aid) was in operation (known as the Government Board of Refugee
Relief (Statens flyktingsnämnd) from 1 October). Its task was to provide arriv-
ing immigrants with financial security. The Swedish state provided funding
for refugees mostly in agreement with the diplomatic missions of their
countries of origin. These matters were also managed by non-governmental
organisations. In 1944 there were sixteen such organisations. They co-
operated with the Government Board of Refugee Relief. The Swedish govern-
ment provided financial support for this organisation, covering up to 40
percent of the cost of benefits, and up to 70 percent in the case of children.
Towards the close of 1944, the Polish Aid Committee was financed to an even
larger extent by the Swedish authorities even.6 Local humanitarian organisa-
tions were also operating, including Polenhjälpen (Aid for Poland), which
—
5
H. Lindberg, Svensk…, pp. 119–122, 200–202, 208, 251, 257.
6
L. Olsson, Pa tröskeln till folkhemmet. Baltiska flyktingar och polska koncentrationsläger-
fångar som reservarbetskraft i skånskt jordbruk kring slutet av andra världskriget, Lund 1995,
pp. 45–46. See also: A. Berge, Flyktingpolitik i stormakts skugga. Sverige och de sovjetryska
flyktingarna under andra världskriget, Uppsala 1992, pp. 31–32.
451
operated in Malmö and Lund and earned a particularly good reputation for
the collection of clothes and other items called.
In November 1938 Swedish offices estimated the number of refugees to be
1800–2300 people. By 10 January 1939, nearly 1800 people had applied for
an arrival permit, but only 900 were approved.7 In mid-1939, 4300–4800 fo-
reigners resided in Sweden, including 400–500 political refugees and 2500
German citizens.
During the first years of the war, asylum seekers were held under strict
control. By 22 August 1939, diplomatic and consular posts in Sweden were
instructed to show as much restraint as possible in granting entry permits.
After 1 September, border control was tightened. Foreigners without visas
could not cross the border. Lennart Nylander, head of UD Passport Office,
warned of the wave of refugees from Poland. He explained to his superiors,
‘If Sweden adopts a favourable attitude towards the transit of these refugees,
one would have to count on that some of them would remain here.’ The Poles
were treated like other nationalities. On evaluating the pre-war period and
the first years following the outbreak of the war, one may agree with the
Swedish researcher Hans Lindberg’s point of view that the immigration po-
licy conducted according to the individual national interests of Sweden was
extremely cautious.8 It changed, however, at the turn of 1943, when credible
information about German crimes began to reach Stockholm.9
Poles and citizens of the Baltic States, and from 1940, Norwegians and
Danes, affected by the German or Soviet occupation gradually started to flow
into Sweden. Precise statistics for the numbers of refugees cannot be found.
Official lists exist of foreigners who were granted permanent residency, how-
ever. These lists do not include children under the age of 16, as they were
granted visas automatically with their parents. These lists neither include
special cases, for instance the thousands of Finns who were evacuated fol-
lowing the conclusion of the Finnish–Soviet ceasefire in September 1944 nor
the former German concentration camp prisoners, who were brought to
Sweden from shortly before the conclusion of the war and several weeks after.
Following the evacuation of the Jews to Denmark, in October 1943, 35
thousand refugees resided in Sweden. The largest group was composed of
Norwegians (18 thousand), Danes (9 thousand), Germans (3 thousand),
Estonian Swedes (2 thousand), Poles (800), Czechs (700), and Austrians
—
7
H. Lindberg, Svensk…, p. 292.
8
Ibidem, pp. 266, 293.
9
P. A. Levine, From indifference to activism. Swedish diplomacy and the Holocaust, 1938–
1944, Uppsala 1996, 134, passim.
452
(600). Finnish children constituted a separate group (12 thousand). At the

turn of 1944, over 90 thousand refugees were already registered, caused by
the wave of refugees from Finland and the Baltic States. In September and
October 1944, about 50 thousand Finns (with approximately 30 thousand
breeding animals) moved west and crossed the Swedish border in fear of
repression both from the German army, which was retreating to Norway
after the conclusion of the Finnish–Norwegian ceasefire, as well as from the
Soviet army, which continued its offensive. At the turn of October and
November these refugees began to return home, and by July 1945 all had left
Sweden. Nearly 30 thousand refugees travelled to Sweden from the Baltic
States, including many former soldiers who fought under German command.
In Sweden there were still 30 thousand Norwegians, 15 thousand Danes and
more than 5 thousand Germans.
According to official records, in Sweden 1940–44 there were 362–759
Poles, whereas in 1945 there were 3521. Even if the number of refugees from
Poland was higher (900–1000 by spring 1945, according to expert estimates),
as a proportion of all foreigners in 1940 (18 thousand) and 70 thousand in
1944, this was not a large group. The proportions changed only following the
arrival of approximately 6500 Polish women from the concentration camps
in April and May of 1945 and a further 9 thousand following the conclusion
of the war. Yet, one needs to remember that at the time the total number of
all refugees rose to 100 thousand.10
The Poles fled to Sweden throughout the war. Initially, in the autumn of
1939 and in the spring of 1940 a wave of refugees came in the immediate
aftermath of the September defeat. Later, these were fugitives, personnel of
the Todt Organisation in Norway or people who managed to escape occupied
Poland on Swedish ships carrying coal, moving from Gdynia to Swedish
harbours. Most of the refugees moved on to France and Great Britain to join
the Polish army. The Poles, just like other foreigners, were placed in refugee
camps. In May 1945, 24 transitional and 22 permanent camps already existed.
In the transitional camps the refugees stayed for between three and six
months. Thanks to such camps located in Sweden nearly 4 thousand Poles,
1942–45, joined the Polish Armed Forces in the West. The unemployed refu-
gees were paid benefits of 170 crowns per month by the Polish Aid Com-
mittee. At the same time, the organisation tried to find them employment,
but the possibilities were limited.11 The demands of the local market saw the
—
10
L. Olsson, På tröskeln…, pp. 22–28.
11
Ibidem, pp. 43, 48.
453
Swedish authorities reach out to the refugees and allow them to carry out
unpopular hard labour, especially in forests.
During the war, relating to serious difficulties caused by insufficient fuel
and coal imports, the Swedish government determined the needs of industry
and private households to be 63 million cubic metres of wood. To guarantee
such a high volume, all men over twenty were mandated to work in the winter
at the turn of 1942 and 1943. Anyone willing to take work in logging was
welcomed, and many fugitives would come to choose it as their occupation.
A majority of the candidates were Norwegians (20 thousand), who were used
for the work involved. In March 1943, the Swedish authorities decided that
logging, farming and peat-digging should not require a permit. To encourage
the refugees to work in the forest, it was announced that workers had to stay
a minimum of four months in such jobs before seeking other employment.
Some of the Polish refugees also worked in logging. In 1943, thanks to the
refugees, one fifth of the demand for wood was met.12 One sawmill employed
the last commander of the Border Protection Corps (KOP), General Wilhelm
Orlik-Rückemann, who was stranded in Sweden on his way to France,13 as
well as Jerzy Pański, the Polish communist and deserter from the commercial
ship.14 Many refugees considered such occupations to be persecution and
occasionally both Norwegians and Poles protested the working conditions.15
Following the German aggression of September 1939, thousands of Polish
refugees, soldiers and civilians, attempted to move from the Baltic States to
France via Sweden. Sandler promised Potworowski his ‘utmost support’ in the
—
12
H. Dahlberg, I Sverige…, pp. 139–140.
13
A. Kralisz, Na straży wschodnich rubieży. Biografia ostatniego dowódcy KOP gen. bryg.
Wilhelma Orlik-Rückemanna (1894–1986), Warszawa 1999, p. 126, fig. 19.
14
J. Pański, Wachta…, pp. 101–107.
15
L. Olsson, På tröskeln…, pp. 52–53. See the recollections of a former volunteer, in the
Winter War, in defence of Finland from his work in the forest in Sweden: A. Bogusławski,
Pod Gwiazdą…, pp. 124–125: ‘Our work in the forest involved cutting down large trees so
that the smaller ones could grow better, have more space and light. The branches of the fallen
trees had to be cut off. Then the trunks were cut into parts of equal length which later, with
the help of wedges and axes, were split into smaller logs. We had to find the right spot to
place the wedge. The logs were arranged in piles of clearly defined size and we got paid for
each “metre”. This job was hard and difficult. Another type of work was cleaning the limbs
and large branches and removing shoots with axes and saws. Afterwards, the wood was
arranged in sharp angled racks. The thickest parts of wood were placed one on another until
the rack reached the desired height. This was much easier, so as a novice I started my job
with this task. My salary was meagre, far worse than what I was getting on the farm in Svart-
sjö. What took time was sharpening axes and saws and keeping the tools in good condition.
But nobody forced us to do this work. Everybody earned as much as one was able to chop
and cut up. I worked there for only a while, most probably for a little over a month. I was so
tired after work that I took trip to a village nearby on a borrowed bike only once.
454
organisation of their transit.16 At the turn of November and December of 1939,

before the reconstruction of the government and Sandler’s resignation,
Potworowski was forced to intervene, however, to prevent Swedish diplomats
from holding up the process of issuing visas.17 After a few months, travel via
Sweden to the west grew more difficult due to the reluctance of the Swedish
authorities and the German conquests in northern and Eastern Europe. During
that period, the Germans warned the Swedes that supporting Polish efforts to
reach France and Great Britain was contrary to the principle of neutrality.18 The
Swedes were therefore subjected to pressure from Berlin, the aim of which was
to prevent the transit, but they were also afraid that the refugees would stay in
their country for good. Nearly 4100 people were denied entry to Sweden in
1940 and 1942–44, which was about 5 percent of people who applied for a
Swedish visa. Only an small fraction of those individuals who were permitted
to enter Sweden met the criteria to be granted political refugee status. One
researcher pointed out that such inconsistent behaviour could be the result of
concerns about an excessively large group of foreigners remaining per-
manently in Sweden. It was assumed that their stay should be temporary and
that the emigrants would eventually return to their homes.19
Therefore, leaving Lithuania or Latvia was by no means easy. According to
information passed on to Paris by the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) activist
Maurycy Karniol at the beginning of 1940, only passengers under eighteen and
over fifty years of age were admitted on to the flight bound for Stockholm.20
This measure was coupled with the painstaking procedure of obtaining
Swedish and French visas, where possession of the latter was a condition for
securing the former. Also, starting in the summer of 1939, Swedish diplomats
were banned from issuing visas to Jews. In general, most of the Poles entered
Sweden illegally. Refugees started to flow in relatively early, prior to the con-
clusion of the military campaign in Poland. Five seamen, Edward Skrzypek,
Michał Przepiórczyński, captains of commercial fleet Jerzy Lewandowski and
—
16
AAN, HI/I/246, telegram by G. Potworowski, Polish Envoy to Stockholm, to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 5 IX 1939.
17
18
RA, mf. F 035-3-32252, copy of memorandum by the head of the Political Department of
UD S. Söderblom of his conversation with counsellor to the German Legation in Stockholm
C. von Below from 27 X 1939.
19
A. Berge, Flyktingpolitik…, p. 27.
20
PISM, col. 133, vol. 283, postcard by M. Karniol to B. Wojciechowski, Kaunas, 12 I 1940;
Ture Nerman in his book form 1942 delivers a number of 3 000 Poles in the Baltic States
who were even refused to buy tickets for flight to Stockholm by Svenska Aerotransport. See
T. Nerman, Sverige i beredskap, Stockholm 1942, p. 117.
455
Władysław Grabowski and mechanic Brunon Wyglądacz from Gdynia reached

Karlskrona on the sailing boat Olga.21
The PPS activists, who managed to reach Paris following the defeat of the
Polish army (or like Herman Lieberman who had been in France since the
beginning of the 1930s), tried to make the journey from Lithuania to Sweden
easier for a large group of Polish socialists. Adam Ciołkosz, through the
minister for labour, Jan Stańczyk, sent the Swedish authorities a list of nine
refugees and proposed preparing an aircraft from Stockholm, where the
Swedes would ‘order and send the aeroplane.’22 Similar actions were taken by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, the Labour Movement’s
Committee of Refugee Aid (Arbetarrörelsens flyktingshjälp) in Stockholm
received a request from a socialist Artur Salman (who after the war used the
name Stefan Arski) for support in evacuating himself and his comrades from
Lithuania.23 At this request, Herman Lieberman wrote a letter to Zeth
Höglund, the leading activist of Sweden’s Social Democratic Workers’ Party
(SAP), as he expected that the Polish efforts to obtain visas for as many as
thirteen people would be supported (Karniol’s name was last on the list).24
Nevertheless, he achieved little. Karl-Erik Jansson from the Labour Move-
ment’s Committee of Refugee Aid explained that when the Poles had
obtained French visas, in line with procedure, nothing would prevent their
Swedish transit visas being issued.25 This explains why the evacuation action
had come to a standstill and Karniol’s immediate arrival in Stockholm, in
March 1940, was an exception. Thanks to associates of Jan Masiak, a Polish
socialist who had been living in Sweden for a long time, Karniol came to
know many activists of the Swedish social democracy, including from the
Labour Movement’s Committee of Refugee Aid, who he desperately asked
for a swift intervention. In the letter to Paris he reported:
I pointed to the danger, which was facing our people who were still fighting,
and that it is impossible to adopt a bureaucratic attitude towards the issue of
aid, that when once every 30 years the PPS needed support from the Swedeso
—
21
B. Chrzanowski, Organizacja…, p. 14.
22
PISM, col. 133, vol. 283, copy of letter by A. Ciołkosz to J. Stańczyk, Paris, 1 II 1940.
23
PISM, col. 133, vol. 283, postcard by M. Karniol and A. Salman to H. Lieberman, Kaunas,
6 II 1940.
24
PISM, col. 133, vol. 283, copy of letter by H. Lieberman to Z. Höglund, Paris, 4 II 1940.
25
PISM, col. 133, vol. 283, letter by K.-E. Jansson to H. Lieberman, Stockholm, 10 II 1940;
Ibidem, letter by K.-E. Jansson to A. Ciołkosz, Stockholm, 10 II 1940.
456
for only a couple of units, the slogan ‘working men of all countries, unite!’
should be actually in force.’26
Because of these appeals, Emil Wallin provided substantial help in issuing

visas to the Poles, whereas K.-E. Jansson, secretary of the Committee, proved
to be a not-so-pleasant figure.27 Rapid military developments on the western
front in the spring of 1940 made the protracted issue of the French visas
outdated. Most of the refugees left Lithuania and travelled by train to
Vladivostok and on by ship to California. By July 1940 a couple of activists
had reached Stockholm.28
What may seem surprising is that Polish refugees also attempted to reach
Sweden legally, directly from German-occupied Pomerania. The German
authorities planned to expel all Poles to the General Government. In October
of 1939 Konstanty Jacynicz, former director of the GAL company (Gdynia-
America Shipping Lines), who was a long-time collaborator of the Polish
intelligence and commander of Civil Guard during the September fights for
Gdynia,29 asked Knud Lundberg, Swedish consul to Gdańsk, for permission
to transport six hundred Polish refugees, women and children, mostly Polish
seamen’s families, to Sweden. Although he did not object to the project,
Lundberg considered it unrealistic as every day he met the starving and op-
pressed wives of Polish seamen, who visited him asking for help. On the one
hand, a ship from Sweden needed to be organized, and on the other, refugees
from Sweden needed to be taken care of, as it was not known whether they
would be granted entrance in to other countries. The German authorities al-
legedly promised Jacynicz that the evacuation of the families of Polish
seamen deep into Poland would be postponed in anticipation of the Swedish
ship. Lundberg communicated this to Richert30 and on 30 October it was
discussed by the government. Minister Sandler together with Minister Möller
—
26
27
RA-Arninge, Sapo arkiv, P 1945 Maurycy Karniol, testimony by M. Karniol, n.d., n.p., pp.
67–68.
28
D. Urzyńska, Polski…, p. 27.
29
From the beginning of the occupation Jacynicz was engaged in the operation of the under-
ground movement. He soon became the officer of the Home Army. See the biographies of:
A. Gąsiorowski, Konstanty Jacynicz (1889–1970) [in:] Zasłużeni Pomorzanie w latach II
wojny światowej: szkice biograficzne, Wrocław–Gdańsk 1984, pp. 102–107; R. Mielczarek,
Jacynicz Konstanty Leon (1889–1970) [in:] Słownik Biograficzny Pomorza Nadwiślańskiego,
ed. S. Gierszewski, vol. 2, Gdańsk 1994, pp. 256–258; B. Chrzanowski, A. Gąsiorowski, K.
Steyer, Polska Podziemna…, pp. 600–601.
30
RA, mf. F 035-3-32252, copy of letter by Consul K. Lundberg to the Swedish Envoy to
Berlin A. Richert, Gdańsk, 18 X 1939.
457
supported the idea of bringing the wives of the Polish seamen to Sweden, but
other members of the government voiced their doubts. Initially, consent was
granted to look into the matter further.31 On 15 November, the Swedish ship
company offered its ship Ragne to carry the refugees (341 children and 397
adults) from Gdynia to Stockholm in two trips by the end of the month.32 At
the same time, Rederi AB Svea offered to transport 350 people from Riga on
two ships for 55 thousand crowns.33 In Stockholm preparations were made
for the admittance of a large group of refugees from Gdynia. Possible ac-
commodation and quarantine facilities were examined. Nevertheless, on 20
November, the decision was made to scrap the project. The plan of transport-
ing a group of armed Polish soldiers was also rejected.34 When the Lithuanian
authorities put pressure on the Swedes regarding the admittance of 1 thou-
sand Polish refugees from their territory, the head of the legal department of
UD, Gösta Engzell, answered on 11 December that, ‘due to the current extra-
ordinary relations I see no possibility to respond favourably to the proposal.’35
He then explained that the admittance of a much smaller number of Poles,
approximately 700 wives and children of Polish seamen from Gdynia, was
also evaluated negatively, as it was determined that this matter would require
asking the Riksdag for 500 thousand crowns.36 This distancing attitude from
the idea of providing support for the Poles, was mostly the result of the on-
going Winter War and the plan to help the Finns. It is hard to find a definitive
explanation for the news that Potworowski sent to the Polish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs on 11 December 1939. The Polish envoy reported that he had
negotiated permission to issue visas for 80 women and children from Gdynia,
who remained following the German deportations.37 The Swedes likely
decided, discreetly, to admit a much smaller number of refugees that most
likely included the wives of officers from the Polish submarines interned in
Sweden.
The Swedes considered that the Germans should not delay the process of
the seamen’s wives and their children leaving Gdynia, as their deportation to
—
31
K.G. Westman, Politiska…, pp. 43–44.
32
RA, mf. F 035-3-32252, copy of letter by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 15 XI
1939.
33
RA, mf. F 035-3-32252, copy of note by K. Bergström, Stockholm, 16 XI 1939.
34
K.G. Westman, Politiska…, p. 52.
35
RA, mf. F 035-3-32252, copy of letter by G. Engzell to the Swedish Legation in Kaunas,
36
RA, mf. F 035-3-32252, copy of letter by G. Engzell to Swedish chargé d'affaires in Kaunas
C. Westring, Stockholm, 12 XII 1939.
37
458
the General Government had been ordered. It was only on 2 December that
the German authorities agreed to issue the passports immediately after visas
had been granted by the Swedish authorities. This became the practice that
was enforced until the spring of 1940. Interventions by the Swedish authori-
ties did not provoke disputes and Polish citizens in possession of such pass-
ports could leave the German-occupied territory mostly as stateless persons.
The situation began to change in March 1940. On the pretext of spreading
hostile propaganda (Greuelgeschichten) about the living conditions in
Gdynia, the Germans started to deny the refugees the right to travel abroad.
Consul Lundberg claimed that there was no point in asking the German
authorities to issue passports at that time, as this would cause trouble for
those seeking to leave. Besides which, the Swedish diplomat’s permit to stay
in Gdynia was no longer valid. He clarified for his colleagues from the
Swedish Legation in Berlin that life in Pomerania was different to the rela-
tions that existed in Berlin. The Germans also treated the area of the former
Free City of Danzig (Gdań as an occupied territory and the Gestapo was given
power over it. The institutions that had previously maintained contact with
the representatives of other countries were liquidated, and the officers of the
Reich were brought into the city. Lundberg was under constant pressure due
to the surveillance he was subjected to. The clearest sign of this was the
officially recognised telephone tapping.38 He proposed that the most appro-
priate solution would be an intervention by the central authorities of Ger-
many in Berlin. This was arranged for the wife of a Polish seaman, Klotylda
Winiarska, for instance, who had been refused a passport in Gdynia.39
According to von Post, the Germans intended to seal their border, which was
reflected in their overall policy of introducing restrictions in the movement
between the Reich and the General Government. He did not consider it ap-
propriate to go beyond the boundaries that had been imposed by the German
authorities.40
Through the Swedish agency, the Polish government attempted to find
out something about the Poles who came to be living under the Soviet occu-
pation. The Swedes called on their German colleagues for information and
permission for the Polish citizens to leave to the General Government. Such
—
38
letter by the Swedish Consul to Gdańsk K. Lundberg to the counsellor to the Swedish Lega-
tion in Berlin E. von Post, Gdańsk, 28 III 1940.
39
Ibidem, copy of letter by the Swedish Consul to Gdańsk K. Lundberg to the counsellor to
the Swedish Legation in Berlin E. von Post, Gdańsk, 2 IV 1940.
40
the counsellor to Swedish Legation in Berlin E. von Post to J. Lagerberg, Berlin, 4 IV 1940.
459
attempts met with resistance from the Soviet authorities. The Swedish Lega-
tion in Moscow informed Lagerberg that it would be extremely difficult to
extricate the people living within the borders of the Soviet Union, and that
only a miracle could save them, especially the prisoners of war.41
At the outset of January 1940, Envoy Potworowski informed the Swedish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that, together with envoy Lagerberg, he was seek-
ing an organisation in Sweden that could rescue at least a group of several
hundred Polish children. Rädda Barnen (Save the Children Sweden) was the
organisation considered most. Engzell promised to examine the matter, but
he took no further action.42 It is worth mentioning that the representatives of
the Transport Committee in Paris, who were tasked with recovering Polish
ships located in neutral countries, made efforts in Sweden to bring from
Poland the families of soldiers who were staying in France. The only condi-
tion for taking action in individual cases was an advance payment for the cost
of travel and stay in Sweden (which was to be a transit point).43 Władysław
Potocki, a representative of the Committee in Stockholm, tried to gather
information about the fate of people whose names were sent to him from
London by Feliks Kollat. In January 1940 he claimed that ‘it is easier to take
people out via Italy.’44
Based on the surveillance of the Polish correspondence, the Swedish police
concluded that these people were harmless. The attitude towards Sweden of
over three hundred Poles, who found themselves mostly in Stockholm, was
positive. They admired its culture and ‘with tenderness noted the successes
in many areas.’ Criticism was rare and mostly focused on food, which was
considered too sweet.45 The letters mostly mentioned visa-related issues. Very
rarely, the letters to the USA covered the situation in occupied Poland. Their
senders preferred to remain anonymous, but based on other letters it was
possible to establish their identity. The Swedes also turned their attention to
the report that was sent to Chicago in November 1940, concerning the co-
operation between Polish and Jewish socialists. The authors of the document
—
41
counsellor to the Swedish Legation in Moscow L. Nylander to J. Lagerberg, Moscow, 30 XI
1940.
42
RA, mf. F 035-3-32252, memorandum by G. Engzell, Stockholm, 10 I 1940.
43
AAN, Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping (London), 708, letter by T. Geppert
(Transport Committee) to P. Kowalewski together with attachment, n.p., 5 IV 1940, pp. 23–
26. The list included the names of fifteen Polish sailors.
44
AAN, Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping (London), 708, Letter by W. Potocki to F.
Kollat, Stockholm, 3 I 1940, p. 81.
45
RA-Arninge, SÄPO arkiv, P 201 Polish Legation, report ‘Underground movement in
Poland with branch in Sweden’.
460
called upon their colleagues in America to create a central unit for financing
the activity of socialists in Poland. The senders of the letter, Władysław
Malinowski, Artur Salman with his wife Halina Lauer, Wiktor Ehrenpreis
and Bolesław Mendelsohn, were identified by the police. From further letters
it followed that the Jewish socialists in Poland received financial support of
20 thousand crowns. The return letters contained reports from the Polish
underground press. The Swedes suspected that the materials from Poland
were reaching Sweden together with the refugees. What remained a puzzle
was the method of money trafficking to the General Government.
Following the German attack on Denmark and Norway in April 1940,
transit via Sweden to the West became virtually impossible. In the autumn of
1940, Military Attaché Major Brzeskwiński took care of 49 people who ‘for
some reason became stuck in Sweden and have a direct or indirect relation with
the army.’ By and large, there was no chance of evacuation. Brzeskwiński saw
the only chance in leaving through the Soviet Union, but such journey involved
great risk, and most importantly difficulties in obtaining transit visas.46 At the
outset of September 1941, 592 people remained in the custody of the Polish Aid
Committee. Until mid-1942 when this number was reduced by approximately
50 people, who left for Great Britain or the USA.47 From the beginning of the
war to the end of 1941, 16 Polish illegal refugees arrived in Sweden.
An increasing number of Polish refugees reached Sweden through the
green border from Norway. According to the findings of Andrzej Nils Uggla,
the largest number of people escaping forced labour was reported in the sum-
mer and in the autumn of 1944, when the overall number grew by as many
as hundred people. Not everyone escaped, however. The press reported that
some Poles had been shot by the German guards or froze to death on their
way through the mountains.48 The refugees who reached the border were
supported there by Doctor Einar Wallquist.49
The number of Polish fugitives trafficked on Swedish ships transporting
coal from Gdynia or Szczecin to Sweden grew in 1943. According to Żaba,
this was related to the growing disorganisation in Germany. According to the
information of the Press Attaché, ‘the refugees were mostly supported by the
Swedish seamen who sympathised and made it a point of personal honour to
—
46
PISM, A XII, 4/175, report by Polish Military Attaché to Stockholm Major F. Brzeskwiński
for October 1940, 3 XI 1940.
47
AAN, HI/I/448, annual report by the activity of the Polish Assistance Committee in
Stockholm for the period between 1 IX 1941 and 3 VIII 1942, Stockholm, September 1942.
48
‘Två polacker funna döda i fiskestuga. Dukade efter tapper ödemarkskamp’, Göteborgs
Posten, 30 X 1944.
49
A. N. Uggla, I nordlig hamn…, pp. 32–34.
461
save the Poles.’50 Special efforts were made by the crews of Agne, Ultklippan,
Gustaf, Ingrid and Beta VI. As Żaba said, ‘The crews never reveal anyone, but
one needs to avoid the captains, as many are sympathetic to the Germans.’51
Żaba was personally acquainted with the three seamen who purposefully
sailed to Gdynia and Szczecin to transport Poles, mostly seamen. According
to the reports of the fugitives, more people could have taken advantage of this
opportunity, but all were concerned about the fate of their families back
home. Some of the Swedish crews had to be bribed. In Sweden, the fugitives
were treated cordially and hospitably, even by the police.52 The Swedish press
was keen to publish notes on the illegal arrival of the refugees, which posed a
problem for the Polish mission, as this immediately led to a stepping up of
German harbour controls. According to the reports by Żaba, all efforts to
prevent the Swedish dailies from publishing information of this sort failed.53
As time went by the number of Poles grew, and the Polish Legation was
the destination not only for refugees travelling on ships or escaping through
the green border, but also for fugitives from German harbours who were
travelling through Sweden. These were the Poles who were forced to join the
Wehrmacht. Having deserted they turned themselves in to the Swedish
authorities, and the Polish Legation made efforts to secure their release. In
this way two groups of refugees found themselves in Sweden on 23 March
and 2 April 1943. In total, 19 soldiers deserted, who, after Envoy Sokolnicki’s
intervention, were considered civilian political refugees and subsequently
discharged.54 As Żaba wrote in his report to London, ‘It was a sensation when
they were brought to the Polish Legation in two taxis wearing German
uniforms.’ He added, ‘A year ago the Swedes would never have allowed this,
—
50
AAN, Norbert Żaba’s collection, 17 VIII 1943. See also Ibidem, note by N. Żaba regarding
7 people who were smuggled to Sweden in May 1943, place and date unknown.
51
Ibidem, note by N. Żaba, place and date unknown.
52
Ibidem, report by N. Żaba, Stockholm, 19 VIII 1943. A colourful description of the illegal
trip by Swedish ship from Gdynia to Gotland (April 1943), then of return from Stockholm
to occupied Poland via Stettin (June 1943) was given by Jan Nowak-Jeziorański in his
memoirs. He appreciated the kindness of the Swedes: ‘A year ago I knew them as dangerous
enemies of Poland from the novel Deluge by Sienkiewicz. Now I felt like telling them that I
will become a friend of Sweden and Swedes, especially seamen, by the end of my life – no
matter I will live for a long or for a very short time.’, J. Nowak, Kurier…, p. 111.
53
Ibidem, report by N. Żaba, Stockholm, 19 VIII 1943. The reports about Poland already at
the beginning of 1943 contained complaints on restrictions which were introduced by the
Germans in harbours, since the Swedish seamen were prevented from disembarking in
Gdynia. Visiting ships was also prohibited. See Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945,
vol. 6, doc. 1747, p. 296.
54
Affairs), Stockholm, 9 IV 1943.
462
which also proves the change in their attitude.’55 At that point the Swedish
authorities even agreed to their evacuation to Great Britain.56
What was the fate of the Polish refugees? Although the authorities placed
fugitives in special camps and employed them as loggers for meagre pay,
Brzeskwiński emphasized that the attitude of the Swedes towards the refugees
was generally good. The refugees could not leave the camps, which were in
rural areas, without a special permission. It was noted that, ‘The Swedes are
trying to relieve their capital city of the immigrant community.’ Such a stra-
tegy made it very difficult for Attaché Brzeskwiński to evacuate the Polish
army volunteers to Great Britain.57 In 1943, the Polish–Swedish agreement
was signed, which laid out detailed rules for procedures regarding Polish
citizens arriving in Sweden, for example, their stay in Stockholm was limited
to ten days. During this time, the refugees were given clothes, verified in
terms of grounds for granting them Polish passports, and subsequently given
food stamps. The evacuation was drawn-out considerably by a lack of trans-
port. It was not until the outset of 1945 that the Polish Legation would sign
an agreement with AB Aerotransport (ABA), a Swedish government-owned
airline, regarding the provision of an aeroplane. Carrying twenty passengers
and at intervals of several days, the plane serviced the route from 2 February
to 15 March 1945 and transported 146 volunteers to Great Britain in total,
which according to Andrzej Nils Uggla was more than the total number of
evacuees in the years 1942–44.58
The fate of the fugitives could have been worse. On two occasions the
Swedes turned the refugees over to the Germans. On one occasion, a Polish
seaman arrived in Sweden as crew on a German cargo ship. The Swedes
denied his request for asylum. An intervention by Envoy Potworowski failed
too. Minister Günther consequently explained that the general rules of con-
duct in such cases were never specified, and that each case was and would be
considered separately.59 The Polish seaman was refused the right of residence
and later turned over to the Germans. In December 1941 Zygfryd Lipkowski,
—
55
Ibidem, letter by N. Żaba to M. Thugutt (Ministry of Internal Affairs), Stockholm, 22 IV
1943. The issue was recorded by the Polish intelligence, see: Armia Krajowa w dokumentach
1939–1945, vol. 6, doc. 1764, p. 334 (here exact personal details of the escapees).
56
57
IPMS, A XII, 4/175, letter by the director of the Stockholm evacuation facility Major F.
Brzeskwiński to the head of the Staff of Commander-in-Chief, n.p., 6 V 1941.
58
A. N. Uggla, I nordlig hamn…, pp. 37–41.
59
Notes by Polish envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski 1939–1942, entry from 21 I 1941.
463
who came to Sweden as a stowaway, was dealt with in the same way. Pot-
worowski commented, ‘the decisions of the Swedish authorities vary between
genuine humanitarianism and reluctance to keep dubious foreign elements
in Sweden.’ In addition, before making a decision in each case, the Polish side
was forced to provide material guarantees. Nevertheless, the Polish diplomat
considered the most important factor to be the German pressure, especially
in the situations where the fugitive was part of ship’s crew. The compassion
shown by the local police played a role. Several days after the incident, for
instance, four stowaways from ships running between Gdańsk and Gothen-
burg were released from custody.60
Despite these rare incidents, in general Envoy Potworowski supported the
opinion of Attaché Brzeskwiński. He claimed that the attitude of the Swedish
authorities towards the Polish refugees was correct.61 Residency permits in
more than 60 cases were extended without complications, and the Swedes
also supported them in finding work. Considerable financial and material
help poured in to the Polish Aid Committee in Stockholm from various
Swedish social and charity institutions. In May 1940, the Committee for the
Support of the Nordic States, operating under the auspices of the heir to the
Swedish throne, donated the modest amount of 10 thousand crowns for the
refugees, with the promise of further donations. Obtaining visas for Poles
wanting to leave the Baltic States annexed by the Soviet Union What was
particularly difficult, however. The Swedish authorities stopped the inflow of
refugees, most probably in fear of Soviet infiltration. In the spring of 1941,
less optimistic news came in from Stockholm, regarding the intention of the
Swedes to rid themselves of the Polish refugees by enthusiastically granting
financial aid for their departure to America through the Soviet Union. It was
emphasized, ‘It is impossible to find any kind of work in Sweden, and the old
foxes who have managed to find temporary jobs as specialists are being eradi-
cated by competition and often end up in prison.’62
Following Hitler’s aggression towards the Soviet Union, Finland joined
the war and, because of pressure from Germany, demanded the Polish diplo-
matic mission in Helsinki be liquidated. Many Polish citizens, for fear of
internment, fled to Sweden. The Swedish government agreed to accept them
on the condition that they be placed in a special camp and that the costs be
—
60
AAN, HI/I/448, letter by the Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry
61
PISM, A 12, 3/2, part 2, letter by Polish Envoy G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Stockholm, 22 VII 1940, p. 538–539.
62
AAN, HI/I/436, note: ‘Wiadomości otrzymane ze Sztokholmu’, n.p., 11 IV 1941.
464
covered by the Polish side. Although the number of Poles in the camp gradu-
ally fell due to being evacuated to Great Britain, expenses continued to rise
due to inflation. The Swedes demanded the quickest possible settlement of all
liabilities, and the legation maintained that timely payments were indispens-
able ‘due to the influence they may have on the attitude of the relevant
Swedish authorities towards the Polish refugees.’63 When in 1944, together
with a group of refugees from Finland, Sweden began welcoming immi-
grants, for example, Poles who had deserted the Todt Organisation and for-
mer soldiers who were forcibly conscripted into the Soviet Army, the Swedes
posed no problem. Origins were not investigated and visas were granted,
despite the delicacy of the matter concerning granting visas.64
It is worth mentioning at this point the cultural events which were
organized by the Polish refugees in Sweden. A good example was the afore-
mentioned Polish–Norwegian art exhibition held in Stockholm in November
1942. In January and February 1943 recitals by Polish singers Lucjan Prus-
Bar and Antoni Frankowski took place in Stockholm.65 In December 1944,
Poles, together with Norwegians, Danes and Czechs, participated in a literary
evening that was organized in Stockholm and devoted to the countries under
German occupation.66 Education constituted a separate activity for the Polish
refugees.67
Relating to the gradual increase in the number of refugees, in 1943 the
Refugee Support Office (Biuro Opieki nad Uchodźcami) was established in
the Polish Legation in Stockholm.68 Officially, custody of the refugees was
—
63
AAN, HI/I/448, copy of letter by counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm T. Pilch
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 9 VII 1942.
64
AAN, HI/I/478, letter by the Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 6 X 1944. The Poles who were hired in the Todt Organisation
and who escaped to Sweden are mentioned by: E. Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, Polska siła
robocza w Organizacji Todta w Norwegii i Finlandii w latach 1941–1945, Toruń 1999, pp.
234–237. See also W. Biegański, M. Juchniewicz, S. Okęcki, Polacy w ruchu oporu narodów
Europy 1939–1945, Warszawa 1977, pp. 167–169. This book contains a description of an
unsuccessful escape of the group of Poles from Norway (together with Witold Pławski, son
of Captain E. Pławski). They were captured and shot dead.
65
‘List ze Szwecji’ [‘Letter from Sweden’], Wieści Polskie, 28 II 1943.
66
‘Wieczór literacki w Sztokholmie’ [Literary evening in Stockholm], Dziennik Polski i
Dziennik Żołnierza, 13 XII 1944.
67
For extensive information on this subject see A. N. Uggla, I nordlig hamn… See also ‘Jak
się wiedzie Polakom w Szwecji?’, Dziennik Żołnierza, 31 VII 1941; N. Ż[aba], ‘Nauka polska
w Szwecji w sprzyjających warunkach’, Dziennik Polski, 23 VII 1942; T. Potworowski,
‘Liceum Polskie w Sztokholmie’, Wiadomości Polskie, 5 XII 1943.
68
AAN, HI/I/469, justification of the budget estimates for the year 1944, Stockholm, 10 XI
1943.
465
taken over on 15 January 1944 by the delegation of the Ministry of Labour

and Social Welfare.69
In February 1942, Potworowski again asked the Swedish authorities for a
permission to bring children from Poland to Sweden. The Swedes, who were
recognized for similar campaigns involving bringing children mainly from
Finland, but also from France and Belgium, did not refuse, but on the account
of the experiences of Norway, did not expect that the Germans would agree to
such arrangements.70 The issue of the evacuation of children from Warsaw to
Sweden or to Switzerland was re-addressed during the session of the Polish
government in London on 9 October 1944 at the request of Minister of Labour
and Social Welfare Ludwik Grosfeld and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tadeusz
Romer. Initially, Prime Minister Mikołajczyk was sceptical whether such
operation could be carried out.71 Nevertheless, during the session on 13 Octo-
ber the government adopted the authorization for the Minister of Foreign
Affairs to initiate the negotiations with the governments of Switzerland and
Sweden regarding the acceptance of children from Warsaw. The Polish govern-
ment committed itself to bearing the cost of their support. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs was to seek support in this matter from the governments of the
USA and Great Britain. At the same time, the Minister of National Defence
pledged that he would ensure that the Polish Red Cross turn to the Inter-
national Red Cross to request that Germany allow the children to leave to the
neutral states.72 In March 1945 Sokolnicki was asked by his government if he
knew whether the Swedish government would agree to admit the evacuees
from Warsaw to hospital for treatment. The Swedish side proposed a number
it would be willing to accept. Minister Tarnowski guaranteed that the Germans
had already agreed to the departure of the Polish women.73 It was only at the
outset of April 1945 that Sokolnicki confirmed Prime Minister Hansson’s
consent to accept 25 thousand Polish children ‘on the condition of considering
further […] technical details […] with the Swedish executive authorities, which
—
69
PISM, A 11, E/508, letter by the Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry
of Labour and Social Welfare, Stockholm, 15 I 1944.
70
AAN, HI/I/498, letter by G. Potworowski, Polish Envoy to Stockholm, to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, February 1942.
71
Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, vol. VII, p. 504.
72
Ibidem, p. 517.
73
Stockholm H. Sokolnicki, n.p., 22 III 1945.
466
may give rise to certain complications.’ This number could include a certain
group of people who were to take care of the children.74
Towards the end of April, events would alter the aforementioned plans.
During the last weeks of the war, between March and May 1945, Sweden
admitted several thousand former concentration camps prisoners, who were
transported in dramatic circumstances connected with the so-called White
Buses operation headed by Count Folke Bernadotte. Himmler, who was keen
to establish contact with the Western Allies to begin peace negotiations, had
made a gesture of good will and agreed to release all prisoners from the
Scandinavian countries. Bernadotte, having talked to Heinrich Himmler and
Joachim von Ribbentrop and managed the operation’s logistics, prepared the
transport of many more than the total number of Scandinavians (mainly
Norwegians and Danes) in Germany. He also attempted to convince the
Germans that they allow the Swedes to take prisoners of other nationalities,
most importantly French women. This request was the consequence of talks
with the authorities of an already liberated France. Himmler also agreed to
release Jewish women from the women’s camp in Ravensbrück. Though, he
wanted to hide this from Hitler. This political game, further meetings and
discussions, led to the release of about 7.5 thousand Polish women from the
camp in Ravensbrück.75
These women were then cordially welcomed by the Swedes in Malmö.76
They were accommodated at a castle, in the theatre, in a ballroom, tennis hall
—
74
PISM, A 12, 53/40, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, n.p., 4 IV 1945.
75
A. N. Uggla, I nordlig hamn…; S. Persson, ‘Vi åker till Sverige’. De vita bussarna 1945,
Rimbo 2003, pp. 347–363; K. Åmark, Att bo granne med ondskan…, pp. 598–613; L. Einhorn,
Handelsresande i liv. Om vilja och vankelmod i krigets skugga, Stockholm 1999. See the
reports of the participants: F. Bernadotte, Slutet. Mina humanitära förhandlingar i Tyskland
våren 1945 och deras politiska följder, Stockholm 1945; S. Frykman, Röda korsexpeditionen
till Tyskland, Stockholm 1945; N. Masur, En jude talar med Himmler, Stockholm 1945; F.
Kersten, Samtal med Himmler. Minnen från Tredje Riket 1939–1945, Stockholm 1947. Folke
Bernadotte, in his other book Människor jag mött (Stockholm 1947), tried to convince the
reader that the reason for his request to Himmler, to take women from Ravensbrück camp,
was a striking view of a group of prisoners he experienced on his trip to Berlin. The woman
leading the group impressed him by holding herself with dignity (p. 14). Another impression
was made by Polish princess Sapieha, the wife of a French nobleman, who was engaged in
the resistance movement. She was imprisoned and suspected of the same crime as her hus-
band. Bernadotte, on behalf of her Swedish relatives, asked the Germans for releasing the
woman. She met her in Berlin and was impressed: ‘Proud, brave, calm, she saved all these
habits’ (p. 90).
76
PISM, PRM 175, telegram by M. Karniol to Prime Minister Arciszewski, 8 V 1945, pp.
183–185. See also article with expressive title: ‘Nigdy Szwedom tego nie zapomnimy! 6120
467
and school buildings. Following quarantine, they were moved to refugee

camps in southern Sweden. One large group of Poles was immediately trans-
ported to Ystad and, just like in Malmö, housed in formerly prepared lodg-
ings, located mostly in schools. Others were placed at a castle, at a citadel near
Landskrona and in school buildings in Lund.77 Envoy Sokolnicki hoped that
the expenses connected with the Poles’ stay would be taken by the Swedes
from a fund that was previously reserved for the arrival of Polish children.78
In his correspondence to London he highlighted Bernadotte’s efforts and
individual cases, for example, the release of Princess Sapieha, the Skórzewski
family and Consul Komierowski, who had been imprisoned in Berlin. In
response to the telegram and with thanks from Prime Minister Arciszewski,
Bernadotte wrote that he was ‘happy that he could fulfil this task.’79 On the
day before the withdrawal of recognition towards the Polish government by
Sweden, Envoy Sokolnicki decorated Bernadotte with the Polonia Restituta
order. Earlier, on Gustaf V’s birthday, President Raczkiewicz sent his best
wishes and thanked the King for his hospitality, which had benefitted numer-
ous Poles.80
Zbigniew Łakociński, lector at Lund University, collected testimonies
about the everyday life in German concentration camps and founded the
Polish Source Institute (Polski Instytut Źródłowy) in Lund. He asked the
Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Utrikespolitiska institutet) in
Stockholm for financial support and began interviewing former prisoners.81
He and his colleagues interviewed over 500 individuals. The questionnaires
were deposited at the Lund University Library. Similar work was undertaken
by the Swedish professor and his wife, Einar and Gunhild Tegen. They
interviewed women survivors and published a book shortly after based on
—
Polek z piekła niemieckiego do Szwecji’, Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, 7 V 1945; W.
Bogatic, Exilens dilemma. Att stanna eller att återvända…, pp. 170–172.
77
L. Olsson, På tröskeln…, pp. 14–15; According to Inga Gottfarb, who took care of the
former prisoners, the Polish women looked much worse than other nationalities: ‘Short,
lean, pale. Dirty shawls, untidy clothes, knocking wooden shoes and no stockings or
stockings with holes in them. Many in prisoner’s striped clothes.’ See I. Gottfarb, Den livs-
farliga glömskan, Stockholm 2006, p. 187.
78
79
PISM, PRM 175, telegram by Count F. Bernadotte to Prime Minister T. Arciszewski, 16 V
1945.
80
‘Prezydent RP do Króla Szwecji’, Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, 18 VI 1945.
81
E. S. Kruszewski, Polski Instytut Źrółowy w Lund (1939–1972). Zarys historii i dorobek,
London–Copenhagen 2001.
468
the collected material.82 Interest in these unique sources was only spiked at
the beginning of the 21st century.83
The literature contains information that proves that clear distinctions
existed between Polish and Jewish women prisoners, consolidated by mutual
accusations of anti-Semitism and anti-Polonism. Sokolnicki estimated there
to have been two thousand Jewish refugees. He communicated these conflicts
to London:
‘Unfortunately, various disputes were taken from Germany and the concen-
tration camps and dragged into Sweden, and complaints are coming from
both sides. Some of them are brought to light by foreign elements. I, however,
have been doing everything I could from very beginning to relieve all frictions,
and I gave everyone comprehensive instructions to counteract all impulses of
this sort, which caused an unpleasant surprise here, and, at the same time to
counteract the distribution of inaccurate and exaggerated news which were
then used by the foreign propaganda to its benefit. The issue is nevertheless
not so easy and I anticipate difficulties.84
According to Sokolnicki, it was only in mid-May that Jewish organizations

resigned from isolating Jewish women from Polish women and the conflicts
died down:
It seems that the issue of isolating the Jewish women has lost on its validity,
and definitely on its severity. The initiative, which was undertaken by certain
Jewish circles on charges of manifestation of anti-Semitism, was inhibited by
the triviality of the accusations, by our action, by the fact that on the spot the
delegation of the Association of Polish Jews became familiar with the
important context and took our stand towards other Jews, and learned that
isolating people who want to consume food ritually is neither popular nor
appropriate etcetera.’85
On 11 May, the women were joined by 760 men. In total, in mid-May nearly
7300 Polish citizens, former concentration camps prisoners, were already
—
82
G. & E. Tegen, De dödsdömda vittna. Enquêtesvar och intervjuer, Stockholm 1945.
83
Eugeniusz Kruszewski published 20 questionnaries (Mówią świadkowie Ravensbrück,
wybór wstęp i opracowanie E. S. Kruszewski, Copenhagen 2001), Artur Szulc chose some
questionnaires and presented them with comments in order to show typical lots of prisoners
(A. Szulc, Röster sam aldrig tystnar. Tredje rikets offer berättar, Stockholm 2005). Pia-
Kristina Garde was interested in the lot of the prisoners after 1945 (P-K. Garde, De döds-
dömda vittnar – 60 år senare, Bromma 2004).
84
85
Affairs, Stockholm, 18 V 1945.
469
residing in Sweden. They were placed in 19 transitory camps and 33 permanent

camps in the Skåne and Småland provinces. The workers of the Polish Legation
in Stockholm and the Polish consulate in Malmö collaborated with the Swedish
authorities on camp management. They recorded the names of the evacuees
and issued passports. This work was performed by the group of 16 interned
officers and submarine seamen. Towards the end of May, successive transports
arrived carrying a total of 5300 Polish former prisoners, who were sent to
Sweden on the initiative of the UNRRA. In autumn 1945, a further 1300 Poles
(former concentration camps prisoners) came to Sweden within the action of
family reunification. Altogether, 13 800 Poles came to Sweden from Germany
in 1945.86 This brought the total number of Poles to 15 000.
According to the first secretary of the legation, Wiesław Patek, both the
Swedish authorities and society ‘viewed the newcomers favourably and were
full of compassion.’87 The head of the legal department of UD, Gösta Engzell,
already during his first conversation with Patek, shortly after the arrival of
the women prisoners, however, inquired about the date of their departure to
Poland and whether they would be transported across the sea to Gdańsk or
Gdynia. According to Sokolnicki, such interest proved ‘that the Swedes con-
sidered the issue to be very important and that it could perhaps be necessary
to discharge the groups of recently arrived refugees.’88 Patek claimed that their
quick departure to the West would prevent the Swedish authorities from
establishing relations with the government in Warsaw. In the end, 5200 Poles
left Sweden for Poland.
—
86
87
The publications of the Polish press in Great Britain were dominated by the feeling of
thankfulness towards the Swedes. The Polish women were telling the correspondents that:
‘We feel just like in heaven’. See ‘Opowiadania Polek w Szwecji o nieprawdopodobnych
zbrodniach Niemców’, Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, 16 V 1945; ‘Opieka nad
Polkami przybyłymi do Szwecji’, Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, 15 V 1945
(‘Organizacja pomocy władz szwedzkich przebiega bez zarzutu’, ‘Nastroje wśród Polek są
znakomite’); ‘Pozdrowienia od Polek w Szwecji’, Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, 23 VI
1945; ‘Sympatie Szwedów dla uchodźców Polskich’, Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, 23
VI 1945.
88
AAN, HI/I/508, report by W. Patek, Director of the Consular Department and First
Secretary of the Polish Legation in Stockholm, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm,
15 V 1945. On 9 July the Swedes started to persuade the Poles that they returned to their
homeland: ‘We would like to help you to regain health, to build up strength and to return
home. However the resources at our disposal are limited. […] Therefore we cannot help you
as much as we would like to: it will not be possible to satisfy all your needs.’ See the complete
text of the appeal: ‘Apel do Polaków radia szwedzkiego’, Dziennik Polski i Dziennik
Żołnierza, 12 VII 1945.
470
Yet, in the spring of 1946, about 8 thousand Poles resided in Sweden, and
they did not intend to return to their homeland.89 This is clearly why the
Swedish government categorically refused to admit contingents of any size,
containing former soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces in the West, when the
British government made such a suggestion to Stockholm in April 1946.90
One could notice that, after the war, the Swedish attitude towards the refugee
issue was the result of a clash between two opposite tendencies: humanitarian
reasons and political and social interests.
—
89
90
NA, FO, 188/561, letter by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Envoy of Great
Britain to Stockholm, 23 IV 1946.
471
472
12. Swedish Humanitarian Aid for Poland
Humanitarian activity 1939–44

On 8 September 1939, on Envoy Potworowski’s initiative, the Polish Aid
Committee (Polen Hjälpen) was established in Sweden, with his wife
Magdalena Potworowska as its head. The Committee, which had access to
the legation’s financial resources, to the subsidies of the local National Board
of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen) and of other Swedish charity institu-
tions, tried to provide financial aid to the refugees.1 Humanitarian efforts
focusing on the Poles affected by war were needed on a much grander scale.
From the first day of the German aggression, representatives of the
American Red Cross examined the possibility of sending medical supplies to
Poland.2 The Swedes, however, maintained that it would be better to wait
until the conclusion of the fights. Meanwhile, on 16 September, the Ameri-
cans informed Stockholm that the ship Drottningholm would start out from
New York with a cargo of 10 thousand wide gauze bands, 5 thousand cotton
bandages and 100 kilograms of cotton wool, intended for the Polish people.
At the time, branches of the Swedish Red Cross all over Sweden began
receiving gifts from Swedes, which were to be dispatched to Poland. Clothes
were transferred to Rädda Barnen. Individual deposits were also made. Sister
C. Wallengren of Tollarp (who requested anonymity), for instance, donated
10 thousand crowns to support the Polish refugees in the Balkan countries,3
whereas J. Palmen offered her services as a nurse. On justifying her decision,
she referred to the experiences she gathered during the First World War, her
Polish origin and command of several foreign languages.4 On 24 September,
the head of the Swedish branch of Rotary International, the former consul to
Russia during the First World War, Carl Harald Trolle, proposed organizing
a collection of clothes and shoes for the Swedish Red Cross, which were to be
—
1
See: A. N. Uggla, I nordlig hamn…, pp. 74–81. The Polish State Railways (Polskie Koleje
Państwowe, PKP) were operating throughout the entire war.
2
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 44, copy of letter by E.
Stiernstedt to Sweden’s board of trade in Stockholm, 18 IX 1939.
3
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 44, letter by C. Wallengren to
the Swedish Red Cross, Tollarp, 3 X 1939.
4
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 44, letter by J. Palmén to the
Swedish Red Cross, Stockholm, 14 X 1939.
473
sent the people in Poland. In the letter to Baron Stiernstedt from the manage-
ment of the Swedish Red Cross, he emphasized, ‘Poland was always popular
in Sweden and its fight for freedom in the past we have always followed with
sympathy. I am convinced that the appeal made by the Red Cross regarding
this matter would meet with utmost understanding and would certainly bring
great results.’5 Initially, the option of taking action was examined. As early as
September, the Swedish Red Cross transferred 20 thousand crowns to Geneva
for the refugees in Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary and Romania, nearly half of
which was sent to Lithuania. Nevertheless, shortly after, on 9 October 1939,
the Management of the Swedish Red Cross, ‘in connection with the uncertain
political situation in Finland’, decided not to participate in the collections to
support the Polish refugees in the neighbouring countries.6 In October,
Sweden had planned to hold a great state collection for the Polish refugees,
where the Swedish Red Cross were to participate. However, the project was
abandoned because of the news about preparations for war on the Finnish–
Soviet border. The intention then was to limit the aid campaign of the
Swedish Red Cross to the Nordic States. Eventually, Prince Carl, chairman of
the Board of the Swedish Red Cross 1906–1945, informed Envoy Potworow-
ski in writing on 13 October 1939 that the Swedish Red Cross had allocated
an insignificant sum of 10 thousand crowns for the refugees from Poland,
including 6 thousand crowns for Lithuania, and 4 thousand for Hungary and
Romania.7 What therefore proved to be pointless and belated was the appeal
for further aid for the Polish refugees in Lithuania, where the Lithuanian Red
Cross found it impossible to support 30 thousand Poles, including 14 thou-
sand soldiers. There were nearly 100 thousand refugees staying around
Vilnius.8 On 6 November, the management of the Swedish Red Cross refused
to grant financial aid to the Lithuanian Red Cross.9 Two days earlier, on 4
November 1939, however, the Swedish Red Cross had allocated another
insignificant sum of 300 crowns to the activity of the Polish Aid Committee.10
—
5
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 44, letter by C. H. Trolle to E.
Stiernstedt, Kalmar, 24 IX 1939.
6
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 44, copy of letter by Prince
Charles to the members of the board, Stockholm, 25 XI 1939.
7
Charles to Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski, Stockholm, 13 X 1939.
8
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 44, copy of report ‘Informacje
Litewskiego Czerwonego Krzyża’, Kaunas, 17 X 1939.
9
Charles to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 13 XI 1939.
10
Stiernstedt to the Polish Aid Committee, Stockholm, 4 XI 1939.
474
12. SWEDISH HUMANITARIAN AID FOR POLAND
What is more, three churches, in Balingsta, Hagby and Ramsta donated 105
crowns.11 The outbreak of the Winter War held back the Swedish campaigns
for occupied Poland. The Swedes were mostly focused on helping their
Nordic neighbours. The war over their eastern border presented serious com-
petition for humanitarian initiatives for Poland,12 which became occasional
activities at best.
When diplomat Sven Grafström travelled to Warsaw in November 1939,
the Swedish Red Cross, most probably at his request, provided him with 1
thousand crowns that he was to allocate at his discretion. Prince Carl was also
interested to know whether the Luftwaffe respected the symbols of the Inter-
national Red Cross placed on hospital buildings during the September
Campaign.13 At the earliest opportunity, Potworowski transferred a consider-
able sum of money to Grafström and requested it be forwarded to one of the
people from a list he had included. After reaching Warsaw, the Swedish dip-
lomat handed the money to Prince Zdzisław Lubomirski, who was engaged
in the activity of the Social Self-Help Committee of the Capital City of
Warsaw (Stołeczny Komitet Samopomocy Społecznej).14 Grafström tried to
locate various people, to whom he was to send correspondence, money, or
simply information about their friends and families who were outside the
country. Grafström saw the city under the German terror, if only the first
weeks of a cruel year-long occupation. He intervened with the Gestapo to
release a Swedish woman who was a Polish citizen. He could see humiliation
of Jews in the streets. However, as Klas Åmark underlined in his book,
Grafström did not think about a possible way to make Poles or Polish Jews
leave the country. It is one of the examples how much the Swedish policy
towards refugees in the beginning of the war was restrictive.15 A similar
description to that made by Grafström, was included by Sven Norrman in
reports to ASEA’s authorities on his return to Warsaw in autumn 1939.
Norrman wrote that the ‘impression from Warsaw is depressing’. He esti-
—
11
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 44, letter by J. Cullberg to the
Swedish Red Cross, Balingsta, 23 XI 1939.
12
Finland was a competition for Poland also in the context of assistance organized in the
United States of America. See Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej,
vol. 1, p. 176.
13
Stiernstedt to S. Grafström, Stockholm, 27 X 1939 r. S. Grafström described his mission in
his diary: Anteckningar 1938–1944, pp. 163–197.
14
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 39, vol. 1586, letter by S. Grafström to Z.
Przybyszewski-Westrup, Warsaw, 24 XI 1939.
15
K. Åmark, Att bo granne med ondskan…, p. 546.
475
mated that 70 percent of the city was destroyed by the German bombard-
ments. He was shocked by the news that ‘all Polish professors, teachers and
priests were arrested and deported to the camps in East Prussia’ and Jews
were repressed in an extraordinary way. Norrman registered also that the
Germans were robbing works of art.16
Alarming letters about the situation under the German occupation were
flooding in from Gdańsk, from Vicar Sven Hellqvist, who was a chaplain for
the seamen. The Swede not only reported the consequences of the bombings,
but also the omnipresent poverty as well as shortages of food and fuel for the
winter. On top of that the Germans launched a hurried displacement of the
Poles, which included, according to Hellqvist’s estimates, about two hundred
people. Each Pole could leave with no more than 200 zlotys and only items
they could carry. Then, they were all loaded onto trains and transported to
the General Government, where they were left to their own devices. At the
time the Germans did not allow any humanitarian aid from abroad. Hellqvist
was never granted permission to enter the General Government. He pur-
posely summed up his brief correspondence from 24 October, ‘When reading
between the lines it is possible to see the [true] picture of disease, exhaustion
and cold, hunger and death.’17 Carl Petersén, who managed the B Division of
the Swedish Legation in Berlin, informed Minister Sandler of the threat of
epidemics and starvation in the Polish territory. The Swedes felt obliged to
take some steps relating to the agreement regarding the protection of the
Polish citizens in Germany. However, the lack of a possibility to carry out the
duties under this agreement justified the passive attitude of some of the
diplomats. Petersén told the Swedish Red Cross that an efficient campaign in
Poland would require at least 1 million crowns.18 Initial discussions within
the diplomatic circles about the possible organisation of humanitarian aid for
Poland were begun in September 1939. On 22 September, the Chargé
d’affaires to Kaunas, Claes Westring, inquired with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in Stockholm whether it was possible to send aid to the Polish refugees
in Lithuania. The plan was to send 1 thousand crowns, which was collected
by the Polish–Swedish Association. However, two days later, when Westring
spoke to Engzell and relayed the news that the British had rushed to help
—
16
S. Thorsell, Warszawasvenskarna. De som lät världen veta, Stockholm 2014, pp. 46–51.
17
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 44, letter by S. Hellqvist to E.
Stiernstedt, Gdańsk, 24 X 1939.
18
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 44, copy of letter by C.
Petersén to Swedish Envoy to Berlin A. Richert, Berlin, 29 XI 1939.
476
Poland, even this idea was abandoned.19 At the outset of October, Westring
repeated his request, but the issue had been forwarded to the management of
the Swedish Red Cross.20
In mid-December 1939, the B Division informed Swedish Envoy to Berlin
Richert, who was in Berlin, that Polish professors had been arrested in
Kraków. The first to be mentioned was Professor Władysław Konopczyński,
who was a member of various Swedish academic societies and one of only
twelve foreign members of the Swedish Academy of Science. The authorities
of the Academy pushed for an intervention in this matter, but in connection
with the elimination of the mission to protect Polish interests in Germany,
UD shirked from taking official steps.21 In December 1939, Richert, Swedish
Envoy to Berlin, announced that the Germans had nothing against the
Swedes submitting gifts for the Poles through the German Red Cross.22 On 5
January 1940, the German Red Cross planned to establish a special branch,
which was to search for the Poles, both civilians and the prisoners of war, in
the camps. Poles in the neutral countries now had an address to send their
letters to. Those in the countries at war with Germany could only write to
Geneva. The same procedure applied to money transfers.23
The Swedish Red Cross activity report for 1939 listed 10 thousand crowns,
which was remitted to the Polish refugees in Lithuania and Latvia, as well as
an additional 3 thousand crowns, allocated to the aid for the intellectuals. The
aid for Poland did not go beyond routine activities undertaken on the
national arena.24 From the internal correspondence of the Swedish Red Cross,
we know that these were individual donations and the foundation for the aid
for the Poles. Sweden, as a neutral country, could continue its role as the
centre for searching for persons missing since during the acts of war or as a
result of politics conducted by the occupants. From Sweden it was also
possible to send parcels with food and clothes to the Poles in the occupied
territories.
—
19
RA, mf. F 035-3-32252, note by G. Engzell, Stockholm, 24 IX 1939.
20
RA, mf. F 035-3-32252, memorandum by G. Engzell regarding Polish refugees in
Lithuania, Stockholm, 5 X 1939.
21
letter by J. Beck–Friis to Swedish Envoy to Berlin A. Richert, Stockholm, 16 XII 1939.
22
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 44, copy of letter by Swedish
Envoy to Berlin A. Richert, Berlin, 21 XII 1939.
23
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 44, copy of excerpt from letter
by E. von Post to J. Beck-Friis, Stockholm, 22 XII 1939.
24
Berättelse över Svenska Röda Korsets verksamhet under år 1939, Stockholm 1940, pp. 124–
127.
477
On 3 January 1940, Hilding Molander, who represented the Swedish

Chamber of Commerce (Svenska Handelskammaren i Polen), shared the
content of his conversation with the Swedish Red Cross with the delegate of
the Polish Red Cross, who requested aid for the Polish refugees in the Baltic
States. News of aid donated by the Swedish and Dutch branches of the Inter-
national Red Cross was gratefully received by the Polish Red Cross. The Poles
also learned the delegate of the American Red Cross, Malcolm Davis, was to
visit Stockholm and take with him 25 thousand dollars in aid for their com-
patriots. The Polish Red Cross requested that the information about the allo-
cation of this sum be passed through Molander.25 On 12 January Stiernstedt,
responded that the Swedish Red Cross would send 20 thousand crowns for
the refugees through Geneva. For financial reasons and the circumstances at
the time, he was unable to offer more. Support from the USA, in the form of
20 thousand kilograms of cold-weather clothing, was on its way to Norway,
then by rail on to Stockholm, and later to Lithuania and Latvia.26
The Swedish Red Cross did not send packages individually. Stiernstedt
said that he had not considered sending clothes to Poland and regarded the
money collected of greatest important.27 In March 1940, the local authorities
in Helsingborg requested the Swedish Red Cross mediate in the sending of
packages to Poland, as there were so many.28
The issue was addressed in a letter from a resident of Gothenburg, who
wanted to know if it would be possible for her to send a package to a relative
in Lublin. The response to such inquiries was to confer with the Polish Aid
Committee in Stockholm, which was likely preparing a larger transport for
Poland, or with the Swedish Aid Committee for War Victims (Hjälp Krigets
Offer).29 Requests for packages be sent to specific people were refused, as well
as to territories annexed by the Soviet Union. The message that it was only
possible to send a letter or a postcard was constantly repeated.
The postal service operated in the occupied territories by the outset of
October. Stiernstedt advised that anyone seeking information about their
—
25
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 66, letter by H. Molander to
the Swedish Red Cross, Warsaw, 3 I 1940.
26
Stiernstedt to H. Molander, Stockholm, 12 I 1940.
27
Stiernstedt to C.H. Trolle, Stockholm, 10 X 1939.
28
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 66, copy of letter by E. Laurin
to the Swedish Red Cross, Malmö district, Helsingborg, 21 III 1940.
29
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 66, letter by Ch. Wanner to
the Swedish Red Cross, Gothenburg, 20 III 1940; copy of letter by E. Stiernstedt to Ch.
Wanner, Stockholm, 27 III 1940.
478
relatives send ‘postcards with short inquiries in German’ to the B Division.30

On 30 January 1940, Envoy Richert informed the Swedish authorities that the
Germans, just like the Soviet authorities, would resume their postal service
between the Polish territories and abroad, on the condition that packages
came from neutral countries and were addressed to residents in the former
territory of Poland. In this way the agency of the German Red Cross, which
had previously dealt with all correspondence, was lifted. According to
Richert, language limitations were no longer an issue. To avoid delays, how-
ever, the envoy advised that letters be written in German, there content short
and that only personal or trade-related matters be mentioned.31 From
October 1939, reminders regarding this issue arrived in large numbers in to
the Swedish Red Cross, as part of every-day questions mostly from relatives
or friends of people who remained in Poland. Folke and Estelle Bernadotte,
who were members of the royal family, unexpectedly turned to the B Division
for information about the fate of the Smoluchowski family. During a visit in
the USA, the Bernadottes became acquainted with their relatives and agreed
to help gather information about them.32 In August 1940, Lagerberg handed
a letter to UD secretary Stig Unger, which was obtained by Boheman from an
acquaintance of the Krzysztoporski family from Lviv, who were deported to
the Urals. Lagerberg believed that it would be possible to help the Poles
through the German authorities. However, UD refused to grant its support.33
In November 1939, Professor Gunnar Rudberg from Uppsala inquired about
the fate of his colleague from Warsaw, Professor Tadeusz Zieliński.34
Zbigniew Merdinger, counsellor of the Polish Embassy in London, via the
Swedish Red Cross, attempted to send a letter and money to his wife, who
lived near Warsaw.35 In December 1939, the agency of the Swedish Red Cross
made it possible for Milla Steinberg, who was staying in Paris, to obtain
—
30
Stiernstedt to Consul J. Hüttner, Stockholm, 13 X 1939.
31
Envoy to Berlin A. Richert to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin, 30 I 1940.
32
RA, UD avdelningar och byråarkiv 1864-1952, Andra B-avdelningen, vol. 358, letter by E.
Bernadotte to J. Lagerberg, New York, 17 IX 1939.
33
RA, mf. F 035-3-32252, copy of letter by J. Lagerberg to Secretary S. Unger, Stockholm, 19
VIII 1940. Unger’s answer is dated to 18 IX 1940.
34
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 44, letter by G. Rudberg to the
Swedish Red Cross, Uppsala, 15 XI 1939.
35
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 44, letter by attaché M. von
Wachenfelt to E. Stiernstedt, London, 17 XI 1939. The Germans refused to deliver the
package.
479
information about her mother Judyta Grynberg.36 Franciszek Sokal sought

the location of the prisoner camp where his son was being held.37 The Polish
Aid Committee and later the Swedish Red Cross received many similar letters
with requests for help or searching for family members staying in the General
Government.38 In November 1940, the Swedish Red Cross received a letter
from Mira Jarczyk from Katowice who was seeking information about her
husband, who was taken prisoner by the Soviet armies. Adolf von Rosen from
the Swedish Legation in Berlin sent a letter from Berlin to Stockholm with a
clue that perhaps such information could be gathered through the Swedish–
Soviet circle of doctors. At the same time, he asked for information, if not
about the results or the action, then at least about making such an attempt.
Stiernstedt explained that Stockholm referred such matters to Geneva.39 A
special task was locating the family of president in exile Władysław
Raczkiewicz and presenting them with the letter and the money. By
December 1939, contact was established and then discreetly maintained with
assistance from Swedish entrepreneurs.40 In later years, there were far fewer
such attempts, but it is worth noting that in January 1944 Grafström used the
Swedish Red Cross to acquire information about the sister of Janusz
Kruszyński from the Polish Embassy in London, who once worked as a
secretary in the Polish Legation in Stockholm,41 whereas in December 1944
Carl Bergenström, director of the Polish Match Monopoly (Polski Monopol
Zapałczany), sought information about her mother in law, Marianna
Tarnowska, who lived in Otwock, Poland.42 The Swedish industrialists, until
the arrests of seven of them in summer 1942, willingly and selflessly helped
private individuals find information regarding their loved ones. The director
of the Polish Match Monopoly, Carl Herslow, while travelling to Warsaw in
—
36
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 66, correspondence regarding
this matter in the period between October and December 1939.
37
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 66, letter by C. Ekman to the
Swedsh Red Cross, Gothenburg, 8 III 1940.
38
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 66, letter by the Polish Aid
Committee to the Swedish Red Cross, Stockholm, 14 X 1940.
39
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 66, letter by A. von Rosen to
E. Stiernstedt, Berlin, 28 XI 1940; Copy of letter by E. Stiernstedt to A. von Rosen, Stockholm,
18 XII 1940.
40
of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 23 XII 1939; P. Jaworski, Brev kring…, pp. 287-293.
41
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 180, letter by S. Grafström to
E. Stiernstedt, Stockholm, 8 I 1944; copy of letter by E. Stiernstedt to S. Grafström,
Stockholm, 12 I 1944.
42
Envoy to Moscow S. Söderblom [sender unknown], Stockholm, 5 XII 1944.
480
1939, carried a letter from General Sikorski to his wife, who was staying in
the capital.43 Opportunities for this type of activity also existed later. For
example, the former vice president of Kalisz, Mateusz Siwik, who was ac-
quainted with Sven Norrman of the ASEA company, ended up in Palestine
following the war. There, in November 1943, he visited the Swedish consulate
and asked to be put in contact with Norrman, through whom he hoped to
obtain some information about his family which resided in Warsaw under
the German occupation. Norrman, lacking permission to enter Germany,
was unable to contact Siwik’s family personally, but thanks to the staff of
ASEA, whose branch in Warsaw was not liquidated by the Germans, passed
him news of his family’s survival in May 1944.44
The management of the Swedish Red Cross expected that the Red Cross
in Germany and in the Soviet Union would open special centres in the occu-
pied territories, where it would be possible to make a direct request for help
or information.45 These were false hopes though, especially in the territory of
Eastern Borderlands. The Swedes resigned from searching for people there.
They referred those in need to the German Red Cross, which had ‘direct
contact with the Red Cross organisation in Soviet Russia’46 or to the head-
quarters of the International Red Cross in Geneva.47 It is difficult to evaluate
the exact scale of the activity of searching for missing members of families
and friends, but the extensive documentation of the letters submitted proves
that it undoubtedly involved searches for thousands of people.
In mid-April 1940, for fear of the German aggression towards Sweden, the
Polish Aid Committee persuaded the Swedish Red Cross to open a special
account using a name that would not suggest that it belonged to the Poles.
Press attaché Alf de Pomian-Hajdukiewicz and envoy Potworowski asked
that the 10 thousand crowns, which was promised by the Swedes and allo-
cated as aid for the Polish refugees in Sweden, was paid in to this account.
The persons authorised to use the money in the account were Consul Pomian
—
43
J. Lewandowski, Knutpunkt Stockholm…, p. 82–83.
44
RA, UD avdelningar och byraarkiv 1864–1952, Andra B-avdelningen, vol. 363, letter by
M. Siwik to the Swedish consulate in Jerusalem, November 1943; letter by S. Norrman to B.
Johansson, Västerås, 13 V 1944.
45
Stiernstedt to the Swedish Red Cross, branch in Gothenburg, 10 X 1939.
46
Stiernstedt to I. Scharfstein, Stockholm, 29 III 1940.
47
Stiernstedt to E. Sommerfeld, Stockholm, 2 IV 1940.
481
and Maria Ramstedt.48 On the same day as the deposit was paid in to the
Hjälpkassan (Help Fund) account in Stockholms Enskilda Banken. An iden-
tical sum was to be transferred through Geneva, and subsequently by means
of a representative of the American Red Cross, to Poland, for the families of
the Kraków professors who were imprisoned by the Germans in the Sach-
senhausen concentration camp.49 Initially, the Germans did not agree to the
transfer of money to Poland.50 Potworowski advised that the sum be distri-
buted through the Aid Committee in Kraków which was managed by Arch-
bishop Adam Sapieha.51 In 1940, 20 thousand crowns in total was allocated
for those in need, half of which for the families of the arrested Kraków
professors and rest for people in Warsaw and Kraków. This campaign was
carried out with the co-participation of the Polish Aid Committee in Stock-
holm and the Swedish Aid Committee for War Victims. The total weight of
packages sent was 6300 kg with a total value of 10 thousand crowns. The
money was transferred by UD to the German Red Cross which forwarded it
on to the archbishop’s committee in Kraków, which allocated the funds to
the families of the scholars.52
On 23 April, the Polish Aid Committee produced a list of articles (822.5
kg in total), which were to be sent to the General Government, the prisoner
camps in Germany and to the Polish refugees in Lithuania, together with a
request for dispatch.53 The first two batches of packages contained food, and
—
48
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 66, letter by the Polish
Assistance Committee to the Swedish Red Cross, Stockholm, 16 IV 1940.
49
Charles to P. Hallström [Swedish Academy], Stockholm, 5 V 1940.
50
of Foreign Affairs, n.p., 18 VII 1940.
51
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 66, letter by Envoy G.
Potworowski to E. Stiernstedt, Stockholm, 13 XII 1940.
52
146. In June 1941 Lagerberg returned to the issue of sending 10 thousand crowns to the
families of Polish professors. Due to the difficulties that were posed by the German side
during the transfer, he suggested that the entire sum be converted into German marks. The
German authorities were to agree to this but on the condition that the official exchange rate
was unfavourable to the recipients. It is not known whether this considered the non-executed
transaction or another sum, or whether the Swedes wanted to make the unofficial transfer
legal. See RA, UD avdelningar och byråarkiv 1864–1952, Andra B-avdelningen, vol. 297,
copy of letter by commercial counsellor to the Swedish Legation in Berlin T. Vinell to the
Swedish Red Cross, Berlin, 15 VII 1941.
53
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 66, letter by the Polish Aid
Committee (Polska Hjälpkommiten i Sverige) to the Swedish Red Cross, Stockholm, 23 IV
1940.
482
the last, to Lithuania, mostly clothing. The first transport to Poland was dis-
patched by rail on 16 July, the second, on 28 September, and the third, on 13
December 1940. On the second occasion, 182 kg of food was sent to Kraków,
and 1367 kg to Warsaw, and the third time, 232 kg to Kraków and 1175 kg to
Warsaw. The Swedish railway exempted the transport from fees, but this did
not apply in the territory of Germany.54 Not all boxes containing bacon and
butter reached their destination.
In March 1941, the management of the Swedish Red Cross decided to
donate a further 10 thousand crowns, half was to be allocated for the refugees
and half for those deported from the Eastern Borderlands to the Soviet
Union. Support for the Father Baudouin orphanage in Warsaw was also ar-
ranged in the shape of personal care products, which were sent by the resident
of the German Red Cross in the General Government. In addition, the Polish
prisoners in Germany were sent five-kilogram food packages, for which 3
thousand kilograms of food was used, which was earlier bought in South
America and shipped to Gothenburg. The Swedish Red Cross was an inter-
mediary in this initiative.55
In September 1941, the Polish government discussed purchasing grains in
Sweden to sell in Poland, where food supplies were meagre. The Swedish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed to such sales following the approval of the
project by Great Britain, payment in foreign currency and conducting
negotiations with the Germans by the USA. Counsellor Pilch asked on this
occasion, on behalf of the Polish government in London, whether it was
possible to purchase rye and wheat in Sweden and then send grains and flour
to the Polish territory under occupation. The Swedes doubted the possibility
because of a poor harvest.56
In December 1941 grains totalling 200 thousand dollars were bought. The
Swedes expected the Western Allies to agree, whilst ignoring blockade provi-
sions, to send the transport to occupied Poland. Following the attack on Pearl
Harbour, and Hitler’s declaration of war on the USA by, the content of the
talks between the Americans and the Germans proved no longer valid. Envoy
Potworowski was tasked with assessing whether the Swedish authorities
could assist in talks with the Germans, and later in the process of purchasing
the goods, organizing transport and distribution. On this occasion, Bohe-
man’s stance was firmer. He considered that the purchase of grains in Sweden
—
54
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 66, letter by N. Ahlberg (the
Management of Royal Railways) to the Swedish Red Cross, Stockholm, 8 X 1940.
55
Berättelse över Svenska Röda Korsets verksamhet under år 1941, Stockholm 1942, p. 124.
56
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 64, vol. 2735, pro memoria, Stockholm, 26 IX 1941.
483
was impossible due to the poor harvest. Nevertheless, he did not exclude that
the project could be implemented if the grains originated from outside the
territory of the blockade, meaning not from Sweden.57 The matter ended
there.
In 1942, Potworowski attempted to organize a special medical mission to
Poland to control the epidemic of typhoid fever. What made the Polish envoy
propose this initiative was on the one hand reminders from London and on the
other the promising results of research into vaccination against the disease,
performed by the director of the Swedish State Institute of Bacteriology,
Professor Carl Kling. Detailed information on this subject was provided to the
Polish Legation by Doctor Bolesław Skarżyński, who had been working at
Kling’s laboratory for several years then. Prince Charles, fully supported this
initiative as a head of the Swedish Red Cross, whereas Minister Günther
pledged that he would try to convince the Germans to agree for the mission’s
arrival to Poland.58 Potworowski claimed that this would make a good occasion
to send a greater amount of different types of medicines to Poland. However,
the answer of the president of the German Red Cross was negative.59
The budget of the Ministry of Social Welfare at the Polish government in
exile also included funds for Poles residing in Sweden. At the end of December
1941, during the session of the Council of Ministers in the preliminary
estimates of the department’s expenditures for 1942, it was stated with
satisfaction that ‘social welfare in Sweden and Portugal poses no difficulties’,
which was naturally a consequence of the insignificant number of refugees in
these territories and the friendliness of local authorities.60 The Ministry of Social
Welfare was planning to allocate 4 thousand pounds for parcels. For this
purpose, a special list was produced, containing addresses of political and social
activists, scholars, artists, writers and military families.61 At the outset of 1942,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs inquired whether Envoy Potworowski had
undertaken actions aimed at obtaining a declaration of providing aid for the
—
57
AAN, HI/I/271, telegrams by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 29 IX, 19 XII 1941; Ibidem, telegram by acting Minister of
Foreign Affairs E. Raczyński to Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski, 13 XII 1941.
58
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 2 IV 1942.
59
Ibidem, letter by Chargé d’affaires of the Polish Legation in Stockholm T. Pilch to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 6 XI 1942. Copy of letter by Prince Charles Edward
to Prince Charles, Berlin, 30 VII 1942; translation of letter by Prince Charles to Polish Envoy
G. Potworowski, Stockholm, 1 IX 1942.
60
Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, vol. IV, p. 51.
61
AAN, HI/I/271, telegram by the Ministry of Social Welfare to P. Kowalewski, n.p., 2 XII
1941.
484
Polish population under occupation and, most importantly, for children.

Among other things, of crucial importance were the typhoid vaccines. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs counted on the opportunity to send a neutral com-
mission to Poland, the members of which would acquaint themselves with the
situation and propose the character and scope of aid required.62 Independently
of the plans, Envoy Potworowski was also asked to organize the sending of fish
oil to the children in Poland.63 The branch of the Polish Red Cross dealt with
sending packages, but Potworowski explained, ‘It is completely out of question
to provide aid on a larger scale by sending locally purchased food or clothing.’
The funds that were available to the delegate were insufficient and they only
allowed the sending of 500 packages a month to individuals and for inter-
mediation in sending 250 packages by people residing in Sweden and Great
Britain to their families and friends. According to the Swedish Red Cross
activity report, until the close of 1941 the institution acted as a go-between in
sending 3600 five-kilogram packages to the Polish prisoners of war. It also
dispatched three carriages of goods for the Father Baudouin orphanage in
Warsaw. Besides the financial issue, export laws were problematic as they
restricted the dispatch of the packages by social welfare and charity institutions.
Potworowski offered the import of food and clothing from Sweden to the USA,
which could then be freely sent on to Poland. In relation to this, the Swedish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was asked to allocate part of the tonnage (3 tons or
1 thousand packages equivalent) to the goods for Poland, which were shipped
from America to Gothenburg. The Swedish Red Cross accepted these parcels
and dispatched them to individual addressees in occupied Poland. The parcels
contained clothing, underwear, shoes and canned sardines. Moreover, in 1942
another 3 thousand similar parcels were successfully purchased in the Swedish
market. Nevertheless, further dispatches were mainly dependant on supplies
from America.64 In the second half of 1942 and in 1943, 17 transports, 3
thousand kilos each, were transported from Sweden to Polish prisoners. In
1944, the next transports, of 10 thousand kilograms each, were prepared
following the granting of permission. In total, 12 thousand parcels totalling 150
thousand crowns were successfully sent, which was supplemented by 120
thousand crowns worth of sardines purchased in Sweden. The Swedish Red
—
62
AAN, HI/I/497, letter by director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs K. Morawski to Polish
Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski, London, 13 I 1942.
63
Ibidem, letter by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Social Welfare, London,
13 I 1942.
64
133.
485
Cross continued to act as a go-between sending parcels to Poles residing in the

General Government. In July 1943, parcels totalling 3 thousand kilograms were
sent from the USA and, in September, further 7 thousand kilograms of clothing
and shoes. In total, 5 thousand clothing parcels with a value of 300 thousand
crowns were successfully delivered, as well as 25 thousand food parcels with a
total value of 450 thousand crowns. Aid continued to be sent to the Father
Baudouin orphanage, containing nappies, paper towels and medicines. The
committee Hjälp åt Europas Judar (Help for the Jews in Europe) sent a carriage
with duvets.65 In the second half of 1944, aid for the prisoners was doubled
thanks to the increase in sea transport from Argentina.66
Of greatest difficult when organising dispatches with food supplies, was
convincing the British to transport the goods to Portugal and Sweden to send
them on to Poland. In April 1942, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed
other government departments, ‘the British authorities have adopted a nega-
tive stance towards our postulate in this respect, pointing to, among other
things, the fact that making an exception for us would naturally result in the
allocation of similar quotas for other Allied governments.’ Nevertheless, a
way was found to evade the regulations concerning the blockade of Germany
and the occupied countries. As the British authorities did not prohibit the
transport of goods to Portugal and Sweden, they were sent in parcels to the
prisoners of war from there. That is why the three-ton cargo of goods from
America was allocated to the parcels for the prisoners, and only part of it was
planned to be reserved for the parcels to Poland.67 At occasion, spontaneous
actions were undertaken depending on the circumstances. In October of
1942, counsellor Pilch asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for permission
to dispatch 20 thousand cans of sardines to Poland, which according to
standard procedure had not been agreed with the British authorities. In this
case, however, the commercial counsellor of Great Britain, Jack Mitcheson,
who was fond of Poland, was inclined to grant an exception without con-
sulting London.68 Mitcheson, who at the moment of the outbreak of the war
acted as commercial counsellor in Warsaw, tried to support the Poles in their
—
65
137. See the mentions on the Swedish aid for the orphanage of Father Baudouin: A.
Słomczyński, Dom ks. Boudena 1939–1945, Warszawa 1975, pp. 99, 126, 141.
66
Berättelse över Svenska Röda Korsets verksamhet under år 1944, Stockholm 1945, p. 146.
67
AAN, HI/I/497, copy of circular by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [April 1942].
68
Ibidem, telegram by chargé d’affaires T. Pilch to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Stockholm, 20 X 1942. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Labour and Social
Welfare gave their consent.
486
activities. He convinced his superiors on the appropriateness of the postu-

lates regarding granting permission for sending goods to Poland despite
regulations.69 At the time, the parcel-sending action was directed by the
delegate of the Polish Red Cross and the member of the Management Board
of the Polish Aid Committee, Przemysław Kowalewski, who had over 200
Polish addresses, to which he was sending nearly 140 parcels a month. Chargé
d’affaires Pilch, who managed the mission following Potworowski’s expul-
sion from Sweden in 1942, considered this solution to be optimal:
It seems that in the conditions of the current work here, where utmost caution
is necessary to avoid putting individual people at risk and maintaining the
operation of various posts, where this is only possible, there needs to be
observed the principle of greatest possible simplification of the work and its
concentration in the hands of one individual.
According to Pilch, Kowalewski was perfect for this role as he dedicated him-
self to this activity, unlike Maurycy Karniol, for instance, who was famous for
his opinion journalism and propagandist activity, or Stanisław Kocan, who
had maintained relations with the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs.70 In
December of 1942, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that it would
allocate more funds (3 thousand pounds) to parcels for Poland and nappies
for the Father Baudouin orphanage in Warsaw.71
The secretary general at the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare,
Ludwik Grosfeld, on 10 June 1943, presented a draft for expanding the aid
campaign for the people in occupied Poland by increasing the number of
parcels with food, medicines and clothing that were being sent from the neu-
tral states. During a government session, he demanded that the funds which
were to be transferred to Portugal and Sweden be increased and permission
be obtained to send supplements, condensed milk and vitamins, tea and
coffee.72 Do the numbers provided in the Polish and Swedish statements
mean that a considerable portion of aid for Poland was transferred through
Sweden? Such an assessment is not easy due to the chaotic records. It is also
hard to evaluate this from the perspective of an occupied country, where each
parcel was gratefully received. From the perspective of the aid organizers, the
—
69
70
AAN, HI/I/497, letter by Chargé d’affaires T. Pilch to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
71
Ibidem, telegram by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the delegate of the Polish Red Cross
in Stockholm P. Kowalewski, London, 3 XII 1942.
72
Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej, vol. 5, p. 475.
487
Swedish channel was not the most effective. Polish diplomat Stanisław
Schimitzek, who evaluated the situation from the perspective of Lisbon,
recorded in his memoirs that until the initiative of Minister Grosfeld, the
shipment of parcels to Sweden and Turkey was small and it could not replace
the mission in Portugal.73 Schimitzek was not motivated by the intention to
display his Portuguese post. This is demonstrated by the surviving annual
programme of providing aid for Poland, drawn up in September 1943,
included the plan to organize a monthly dispatch of 100 thousand 500-gram
food parcels, 80 percent of which were to be dispatched from Portugal and
only 20 percent from Sweden. What is more, Minister Grosfeld planned to
buy, mostly in the USA, but also in the territory of Sweden, medicines, vita-
mins, bandages, and clothing. In total, the campaign of sending parcels
totalled 2.169 million British pounds, out of which only 98 thousand was to
be spent in Sweden.74 On 3 April 1944, Grosfeld presented a request he had
prepared in collaboration with the minister of the treasury, regarding the
draft budget of the main charity institution of the Polish-American com-
munity, the Polish Relief Fund, for 1944. The draft included expenses
amounting to approximately 7 million dollars. The plan was that 400 thou-
sand dollars would be spent in Sweden on 2500 parcels, which would be sent
to Poland by mail, as well as on six transports with nappies and swaddles for
the Father Baudouin orphanage.75
Officially, however, many of the parcels had to be dispatched to the
prisoner camps. In the summing up of the Swedish aid campaign for Poland,
in November 1943, it was written that, ‘All attempts of expanding this cam-
paign to include civilians in Poland, or, possibly, political prisoners in
—
73
S. Schimitzek, Na krawędzi Europy. Wspomnienia portugalskie 1939–1946, Warszawa
1970, p. 547.
74
Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, vol. 6: September 1943–July
1944, scholarly editing by M. Zgórniak, compiled by W. Rojek in cooperation with A.
Suchcitz, Kraków 2003, pp. 92–96. The parcels certainly did not satisfy the needs of the Polish
community, but it is known from the surviving memoirs that the day of receiving a parcel
was the day of a great celebration to each family. See M. Wojciechowski’s foreword to the
book by S. Schimitzek, Na krawędzi…, pp. 5–7. There was one tragic case when receiving a
parcel by PPS activist Stanisław Dubois, who was held in the concentration camp in
Oświęcim, led to his exposure and death. See: J. Garliński, Oświęcim walczący, London 1997,
p. 118.
75
Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, vol. 6, pp. 519–525.
Already in 1943, the orphanage managed by Father Baudouin received two lots of parcels,
firstly 227 parcels, mainly with nappies, totalling 12 thousand kilograms, and then 282 par-
cels totalling 14 thousand kilograms. See: AAN, HI/I/502, copies of certificates by Maria
Wierzbowska, director of the orphanage of Father Baudouin, Warszaw, 19 III 1943, August
1943.
488
Germany, did not bring any results in spite of constant interventions and
returning to this subject on every occasion.’76 The British stubbornly upheld
their objection towards violating the blockade rules. Towards the close of
1943, the English and American authorities accepted only the monthly dis-
patch of 300 tons of donated clothing. The Swedes on the other hand, agreed
to increase the quota from 3 to 10 tons. Every month, the Father Baudouin
orphanage received a carriage load of sheets, nappies and paper, to cover its
needs. At the time, Kowalewski sent nearly 2500 parcels with food and cloth-
ing a month to Poland, whereas due to the laws that were in force, this was in
secret thanks to the support of Swedish companies. The legation made use of
this option and kept sending parcels to various institutions and private indi-
viduals from Great Britain. This was in addition to parcel dispatch by those
individuals who had obtained permission from Swedish authorities. Poles
residing in Great Britain used the opportunity to send their own private mes-
sages to families in Poland via Stockholm, thanks to Polish citizens who had
reached Sweden in the first months of the war. The Swedish address of the
sender acted as a good cover.77
The issue of expanding aid that was being sent to Poland from Stockholm
was raised by Envoy Sokolnicki during his stay in London towards the close
of 1943. In the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, he obtained permis-
sion to increase, by 500 thousand crowns, the quota of goods sent to the
people under German occupation, with focus on children. Towards the close
of 1943, Sokolnicki set out to obtain a permission from the Swedish authori-
ties to buy medicines worth approximately 2.5 million crowns. They were
held in storage until the end of the war and sent to Poland afterwards. The
envoy expected the Swedish government to leave the clothes and the food,
valued at 500 thousand crowns, at the disposal of the legation as soon as the
Polish government was given permission by the Allied authorities.78 The
Swedish side agreed that the goods be sent while reserving its right to approve
the list of articles accepted for dispatch.79 The list, prepared by the Ministry
of Labour and Social Welfare included sugar, marmalade, milk powder,
—
76
AAN, HI/I/469, note by the Polish Legation in Stockholm regarding the Swedish aid
campaign for Poland, n.p., 10 XI 1943.
77
P. Cegielski, Listy do okupowanego kraju. Nieznany epizod z działań sztokholmskiej Polonii
w czasie II wojny światowej, ‘Acta Sueco-Polonica’, nr 18 (2012), pp. 39–46.
78
Ibidem.
79
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 1 XII 1943.
489
pasta, bouillon cubes, cheese, dried vegetables and secondhand clothes.80

Minister Stańczyk pointed out that the majority of expenses connected with
the purchase of these articles was to be covered from the funds collected by
the organisation Hjälp Polens Barn. The Swedish activists of the committees
of aid for Poland made efforts to make the members of parliament and
ministers of various government departments interested in the needs of
Polish society. Sigma Blanck intervened with the Swedish Ministry of Finance
to procure a permanent subsidy for the Polish Aid Committee in Malmö,
which she was head of. The approach towards the issue of sending nappies
for the Warsaw Father Baudouin orphanage was different.81 The bureaucratic
procedure required several-months-long efforts to complete all formalities
both in London, to secure the Allies’ permission for the trade, which was
incompatible with the blockade of Germany, and in Stockholm, in order to
agree upon the export of a greater amount of goods necessary in the internal
market.82 The limiting of export licenses acted as a strong brake on the pro-
cess of dispatching parcels from Sweden. The aid committees had substantial
stocks of clothing, but they were unable to send them to Poland due to export
restrictions.83 Export from the countries which were located within the
blockade limits, including Sweden, was treated not as rigorously as in the case
of non-European countries, but making a decision to liberalise the regula-
tions was complicated. This decision was affected by the bilateral agreements
that regulated trade between Great Britain and other countries, and by
whether the goods originated from an internal market or from the area out-
side the blockade, or whether they were purchased or donated, and in the
case of purchases it was also important where funds originated. What was
eventually considered was the goods’ mode of transfer. The decision was
made jointly by the British and American authorities, which lengthened the
procedure further and made it more complicated.84 Aid, however, was
—
80
AAN, HI/I/502, letter by Minister of Labour and Social Welfare J. Stańczyk to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, London, 30 XII 1943.
81
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 29 XI 1943; telegram by W. Babiński to the Polish Legation in
Stockholm, London, 18 I 1944.
82
AAN, HI/I/501, extensive correspondence regarding this matter between the Polish dip-
lomatic post in Stockholm, Polish embassy in London, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare between January and March 1944.
83
84
AAN, HI/I/501, note by counsellor to the Polish embassy in London J. Weytko from the
conversation with W. A. Camps from the Ministry of Economic War on 17 III 1944, London,
21 III 1944.
490
gradually becoming more effective. The report by the Polish Aid Committee,
31 March 1943–13 March 1944, mentions a dispatch to Poland of 330 parcels,
totalling approximately 1500 kilograms, and 447 parcels, totalling 4470 kilo-
grams, for the prisoners.85 At the outset of 1944, the British and American
authorities initially agreed to increase the import quota from South America
to Sweden from 3 to 10 tons, so that it was possible to dispatch food parcels
that were still officially intended for Polish prisoners of war who were being
kept in camps in Germany.86
The plans for providing post-war humanitarian aid

The Swedish side gradually began proposals to launch cooperation with
Poland following the conclusion of the war. In January 1943, in Stockholm,
on the initiative of Swedish students and researchers, a new organisation
called Studentförbundet för internationellt samhällstudium och uppbyggnads-
arbete (translation: The Student Union for International Society Study and
Construction, or SISU) was established, the purpose of which was charitable
work and the post-war rebuilding of Europe. On 13–14 June at a conference
in Vigbyholm, the SISU organisation’s work programme for the years ahead
was presented.87 According to the legation’s official Ewa Zahorska, who was
invited to take part in the meeting, the session was one of many signs that
Swedish society was willing to take part in the rebuilding of Europe. The
conference was attended by politicians, researchers and social activists,
refugees from Norway, Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia. Poland was
represented by Zahorska. The Swedes announced the launch of special
training courses, focusing on medical personnel initially, but also for other
professions in readiness to travel to the countries destroyed by the war. There
were also plans to organize language courses as well as meetings dedicated to
the culture of the destination countries. Zahorska noted that the Swedes
devoted much of their attention to the issue of the re-education of German
society the switching to the democratic way of thinking. One of the Swedish
speakers, editor Bo Enander, emphasized that Sweden lacked the economic
resources of the USA, and help would, therefore, be limited to Norway in the
—
85
AAN, HI/I/501, attachment to letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the
86
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 4 II 1944.
87
AAN, HI/I/130, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki with the report by E.
Zahorska, Stockholm, 14 VIII 1943.
491
first instance, ‘and when it comes to other countries, to Poland, which is

closest to Sweden and with which Sweden is historically connected.’ The
chair of the meeting gave the floor to Zahorska, who spoke about Polish
education before the war and about the underground struggle of the Polish
youth during the war. He then highlighted, ‘Poland is not only geographically
close to Sweden, but is always close to Swedish hearts.’
It took no time for the representatives of the SISU organisation to contact
the Polish Legation to glean information about the Allied plans to rebuild
war-torn Europe. The British Legation’s attitude towards the Swedes was
reserved, whereas Norbert Żaba opined, ‘the Swedish initiative was worthy of
our support, all the more so that [the Swedes] are first of all keen to go to
Poland’ and argued:
The arrival in Poland, after the war, of a certain number of people prepared
to provide emergency aid to the occupied country undoubtedly lies in the
interest of our propaganda, as this way it would be possible for us, to gain
from amongst the younger Swedish elites, a group of people who know our
country very well and whose attitude towards it is very positive.
Żaba then asked the Ministry of Information and Documentation to acquire

appropriate letters approving the Swedish proposals and expressing the will
for cooperation from the American institutions, Leath-Ross Committee and
Lehman Commission, which were planning the post-war rebuilding of
Europe.88 In July, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that in line with
the guidelines sent to Envoy Sokolnicki already on 9 April, regarding the
matter of fighting against the epidemics and hygiene-medical assistance, talks
should be held in Poland with relevant Swedish circles, including the intel-
lectuals. At the same time, it was highlighted that all campaigns conducted
outside the UNRRA structures should take place with the knowledge and
permission of this organisation to coordinate the assistance provided.89
Sokolnicki, therefore, continued talks with the SISU organisation, and treated
exchanges very seriously. To the legation’s seat, he invited one of the main
activists of the SISU organisation, Gunnar Rügheimer, who was a student of
Stockholm University employed in the legation of the Netherlands. During
this visit, Rügheimer mentioned that he was invited to Great Britain by the
British Council to attend a six-month course in social welfare (Relief and
—
88
AAN, HI/I/ 112, letter by N. Żaba to the Ministry of Information and Documentation,
89
Ibidem, letter by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Polish Envoy to Stockholm H.
Sokolnicki, London, 27 VII 1943.
492
Social Welfare Course for Allied Nations) and that he was currently applying
for a visa. At the same time, he pointed out that contrary to other Swedish
organisations, which were focusing their interests on the Nordic States, the
SISU organisation would like to ‘also prepare the group of young Swedish
intellectuals to help on the continent’, especially Poland as, ‘the country that
was most devastated by the war.’ This declaration was followed by Rügheimer
presenting the plan of sending Swedish doctors and nurses to Poland, the
Swedes’ participation in international assistance commissions operating in
the territory of Poland, and sending economic experts to Poland in agree-
ment with the Swedish trade unions of qualified workers. The plans of assist-
ance that was to be provided by Sweden to the occupied countries following
the conclusion of the war, ‘in the first place to Poland’, were confirmed by the
official message from the Health Office on 27 August. The message an-
nounced that qualified doctors would be provided. For this purpose, special
courses were organized, preparing the medical staff for their visit to the conti-
nent. What was very important, according to Envoy Sokolnicki, was a favour-
able reception of the Swedish initiative by international organisations, in
which Poland was represented. He highlighted,
[this] will be an incentive to further organisational efforts in the local area and
will constitute an argument for the Swedish parliament to implement ap-
propriate loans for this purpose. On the other hand, it is necessary that the
Ministry support Mr. Gunnar Rügheimer’s efforts to obtain an entry visa to
England […]. Besides, it is desirable that Mr. Gunnar Rügheimer come to
England some time before the start of the course, which was mentioned
earlier, to contact our aid organisations and become familiar with our needs.90
The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered the readiness of the SISU
organisation to become engaged in the rebuilding of Poland as an issue both
important and worthy of support.91 Towards the close of 1943, it intervened
with the British authorities to provide Rügheimer with a visa.92 An additional
encouragement was the telegram from envoy Sokolnicki, who advised that
the Swedish Minister of Finance, Ernst Wigforss, supported the SISU organi-
sation’s initiative and had a positive attitude towards both the of a special
subsidy for the Health Office’s training of doctors before their departure to
—
90
91
AAN, HI/I/ 112, circular by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, London, 13 IX 1943.
92
Ibidem, letter by Second Secretary of the Polish Embassy in London to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, n.p., 8 XI 1943; Ibidem, letter by general secretary of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs W. Babiński to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, London, 10 XI 1943.
493
Poland and for their remuneration in their destination, as well as towards the
plan of allocating additional funds from the state treasury for qualified
workers to be sent to Poland to help with its rebuilding.93 The Ministry of
Internal Affairs supported the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It
was stated that:
[Sweden] has brought the democratic model of government almost to perfec-
tion and its social structure is perhaps the most developed in entire Europe.
Sweden is, moreover, more familiar with the relations across the continent
than England and America, and therefore it will play an important role for us
not only during the reconstruction of our economic life following the war, but
also in the current circumstances.94
Nevertheless, in December 1943, in an official statement the Polish Ministry

of Foreign Affairs considered the initiative to be premature, as the UNRRA
conference devoted to the issue of post-war humanitarian aid was still in
progress and the principles for providing this aid were not specified:
The interested authorities are therefore assuming that although making greatest
possible use of cooperation with Sweden is very much desired, it is nevertheless
impossible to present any specific figures or demands. The failure to set specific
figures or their periodical change could only create a bad impression here and
that is why for the time being it would be most desirable to limit ourselves only
to general conversations, registering specialists, supporting courses for doctors
and medical practitioners and this way preparing the ground for cooperation in
the post-war period.95
For this reason, the answer was not categorically negative. Counsellor Pilch,
from the Polish Legation in Stockholm, according to the guidelines he
received from the ministry, announced, ‘As soon as the legation receives
further detailed information about the decisions which have been made, You,
Sirs, will be notified and then the delegate of the SISU organisation will be
joyfully invited to establish direct contact with the Polish authorities in
London.’ He also claimed, ‘The Polish Legation is always ready to assist the
SISU organisation in supporting and organising training courses for indi-
viduals willing to go to Poland and is also ready to keep a register of specialists
—
93
94
AAN, HI/I/112, letter by Minister of Internal Affairs W. Banaczyk to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, London, 22 IX 1943.
95
Ibidem, letter by general secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs W. Babiński to the
Polish Legation in Stockholm, London, 10 XI 1943.
494
interested taking part in such an expedition and make their names known to
the Polish government.’96 In his note from London, Żaba highlighted that the
relations with the SISU organisation should not be neglected. He pointed out,
‘the fact that such people are going to visit Poland must be considered as a
chief asset for our propaganda, since my experience has taught me that our
best and most active friends in Scandinavia are in the circle of people who
have visited Poland and relate to Poland with the thread of personal
relations.’97
Another kind of initiative which was to take place as part of the Swedish
post-war assistance for Poland was the idea to organize a campaign to sup-
port the Polish institutions of higher education. In Uppsala, on 10 December
1944, a conference took place, which was attended by the rectors of the local
university, Lund, Stockholm and Gothenburg, representatives from
Karolinska Institutet of the Swedish Academy of Science, the Swedish Com-
mittee of International Aid and SISU. The result of this meeting was a
memorandum, where a separate passage was devoted to Poland’s cultural and
intellectual losses. The situation of Polish science was described as catastro-
phic, and a decision was made to send laboratory equipment, tools, instru-
ments, academic literature etcetera to Poland. Young Polish researchers were
also to be offered places on courses held at Swedish universities.98
The Swedish plans of taking part in the post-war rebuilding of Europe
were officially commented on by Prime Minister Hansson in a speech he
delivered on Labour Day, 1 May 1944. Pilch quoted Hansson’s words, who
convinced the audience that, ‘no interests of any kind but only the sense of
general human solidarity makes us help those suffering and unhappy.’
However, subsequent statements said that neutrality was not tantamount to
isolation and keeping away from international cooperation in humanitarian
campaigns gave these sort of actions political meaning.99 The Minister of
Finance, Ernst Wigforss, established that just as following the First World
War, Sweden would provide help through the Swedish Red Cross and other
private organisations in the shape of medicine and food to the prisoners of
—
96
Ibidem, letter by T. Pilch, counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, to SISU,
97
AAN, the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Shipping (London), 413, note by Press Attaché
of the Polish Legation in Stockholm N. Żaba, London, 3 I 1944.
98
AAN, Polish Legation in Stockholm, 35, letter by commercial counsellor to the Polish
Legation in Stockholm, T. Pilch, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with attachment,
Stockholm, 16 XII 1944, pp. 1–6.
99
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 V 1944.
495
war, to the sick, and to children. Nevertheless, what he considered indispens-

able was the state’s input in this activity. The Riksdag accepted his proposal
to make financial gifts, intended as humanitarian aid and above 1 thousand
crowns, tax deductible for every citizen. Initially, Count Folke Bernadotte,
who was to manage the work of the Swedish Red Cross, did not seem to notice
Poland on the list of the countries that were to receive Swedish aid. His
proposal was to, in addition to neighbouring countries, focus on the Baltic
States and Germany. He argued that these territories would receive least aid
from Great Britain and the USA. In his opinion, Poland ought to be priori-
tized by the Allies as the war began there.100 The Svenska kommittén för
internationell hjälpverksamhet (Swedish Committee for International
Assistance, SIH), contrary to the plans of Count Bernadotte, substantially
extended the territorial range of its activity and included Poland. It ought to
be highlighted that Sweden became engaged in mitigating the social impact
of the Second World War in Europe. At the same time, it should be
remembered that humanitarian campaigns were closely related to the
Swedish policy regarding food supplies from other countries, and with the
actions of the Swedish government in international trade.101 Therefore, this is
from the perspective that the change in decision regarding the issue of
territorial range of the Swedish humanitarian aid needs to be evaluated.102
In the autumn of 1944, the Swedes established contact with the UNRRA
to discuss their participation in supporting European countries after the
conclusion of the military operations. Although the neutral countries were
not invited to become part of this organisation, the material and territorial
range of the Swedish humanitarian contribution needed to be decided. This
was planned for during the Swedish Relief Committee’s visit to London (the
committee was composed of vice president of the Swedish Red Cross, Count
Folke Bernadotte, Baron Erik Leijonhufvud and Ulf Nordwall). The visit of
the Swedish delegation also served as an opportunity to analyse, together with
the Polish authorities, the issue of providing the humanitarian aid to Poland.
On 7 November 1944, Bernadotte met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
—
100
K.-R. Böhme, ‘Handel och hjälp’ [in:] Nya fronter…, p. 367.
101
Ibidem, p. 380.
102
The Swedish plans of providing humanitarian aid for Poland were systematically commu-
nicated in the Polish press published in Great Britain: ‘Szwedzi o pomocy dla zniszczonych
krajów’, Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, 26 VIII 1944; ‘Młodzi Szwedzi chcą pomóc
Polsce’, Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, 20 IX 1944; ‘Szwedzki Tydzień Dziecka
Polskiego’, Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, 20 IX 1944; ‘Szwedzka ofiarność’, Dziennik
Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, 17 X 1944; ‘Ofiarność na pomoc Polsce w Szwecji’, Dziennik
Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, 23 III 1945.
496
Tadeusz Romer, the Minister of Industry, Trade and Shipping, Jan

Kwapiński, and Ambassador Edward Raczyński. He guaranteed that Sweden
was not planning to send any missions to the territories controlled by the
Soviets, but what was to be expected after the conclusion of the war was its
direct support on a large scale. Two days later, a meeting took place in the
Swedish Legation in London between the delegation of Bernadotte and the
representatives of the Polish government headed by K. Załuski, the director
of the Office for State Supplies (Biuro Zaopatrzenia Kraju) at the Ministry of
Industry, Trade and Shipping. The Poles informed the Swedes of their
expectations regarding humanitarian aid following the war. Following these
talks, the Swedish side was presented with a memorandum where the Polish
needs were outlined. Minister Kwapiński pointed out that the memorandum
concerned humanitarian aid (relief purposes) only, ‘Poland is very much
interested in obtaining certain relief supplies from Sweden as the possibly
closest source, to save time by securing the direct transport of goods to cover
the most urgent needs.’103
For the Polish government the memorandum was a point of departure to
more specific talks, the subject of which was presented in five points: hospital
and residential barracks, layettes for infants and midwives, food, clothing and
shoes and seeds.104 In addition, the Polish government expected Swedish doc-
tors and nurses to be sent in teams to Poland, as they lacked such personnel.
The matter of Swedish aid to Polish agriculture was dealt with separately.
Further conversations were to be conducted through the Polish Legation in
Stockholm. Kwapiński finished his memorandum with a solemn appeal for
initiating cooperation between Sweden and the Polish government.
A copy of the list that had been delivered to the UNRRA, of the necessary
scientific and laboratory equipment, was also received by Count Bernadotte.
Bernadotte highlighted that he could not yet declare the exact extent of
Swedish aid to Poland, explaining that the humanitarian campaign would
focus on the Nordic States in the first instance.105 Sokolnicki informed
London that the Swedish parliament had allocated 600 million crowns for
humanitarian aid, out of which, he learned, nearly 10 percent was to reach
Poland. Behind the scenes, the envoy also acted to increase this amount as
—
103
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 39, vol. 1620, copy of memorandum by Minister of
Industry, Trade and Shipping J. Kwapiński.
104
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 39, vol. 1620, letter by E. Leijonhufvud from the
Swedish Committee of International Help to R. Sohlman from UD, Stockholm, 7 XII 1944.
105
AAN, HI/I/114, letter by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Polish Legation in
Stockholm, 22 XI 1944; Ibidem, notes by commercial counsellor to the Polish Embassy in
London Z. Merdinger, 7 XI and 8 XI 1944.
497
much as possible. Initially, it was established that the liaison between the
Polish Legation in Stockholm and Swedish humanitarian organisations
would be Harald Axell, who before the war was the director of the Bank
Amerykański in Warsaw and at that point the treasurer of the Hjälp Polens
Barn committee.106 Following the talks in London, the director of the Depart-
ment of Social Reconstruction of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare,
T. Nieduszyński, pointed out that after the war Sweden should become an
important centre for providing aid to Poland, as it seemed destined to
become due to its location in relation to Poland and its resources having
remained untouched by the war, and due to the Swedes’ positive attitude
towards the action.107 On 2 December 1944, the press reported that on the
initiative of the Swedish Chamber of Commerce a central institution,
Swedish Aid for Poland (Svenska Polenhjälpen), was established to deal with
organising aid for Poland. Its launch was demanded by the Polish Legation
as early as September 1944. Polenhjälpen was to coordinate the work of all aid
committees. Its chair was Count F. Bernadotte and its secretary Henrik Beer.
The new institution also included Marika Stiernstedt, representing the Hjälp
Polens Barn organisation, Inger Bagger Jöback from Rädda Barnen (Save the
Children Sweden), Baron Erik Stiernstedt from the Swedish Red Cross,
Sigma Blanck representing the local committees dealing with aid for Poland,
Brita Holmström from the Inomeuropeisk Mission organisation. The delegate
of the Polish Red Cross, Przemysław Kowalewski, was to be invited to indi-
vidual sessions.108
The mission of Sven Hellqvist in the General Government

The tragedy of the Polish people living in the occupied territories was made
public to such an extent that in 1944 public appeals for current material aid
for the Poles became more widespread. The press presented heart-breaking
images of poverty and hunger in the General Government. Sigma Blanck, the
diligent chair of the Aid Committee for Poland in Malmö, was giving
repeated lectures and provided information to the press about the campaign
of collecting funds. Mia Leche Löfgren, who associated with the Swedish Red
—
106
Ibidem, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki, 28 IX 1944; Ibidem, letter
by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 X 1944.
107
AAN, HI/I/114, note by Director of the Department of Social Reconstruction of the
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare T. Nieduszyński, 27 XI 1944.
108
498
Cross, in the Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, demonstrated the

urgent need for humanitarian actions for Poland. She also quoted letters and
reports proving how the Poles were grateful for the offered support, em-
phasizing, ‘what we are doing for Poland is not only of material, but also
symbolic dimension. We are paying tribute to the nation, which, through its
martyrdom became a model for small nations.’109 In the context of the reports
from Warsaw, these appeals reached fertile ground.
Following the outbreak of the Warsaw Rising, Envoy Sokolnicki at-
tempted to familiarize both Utrikesdepartamentet (UD) and other Swedish
institutions with the tragic situation in the Pruszków camp.110 A public col-
lection for the people of Warsaw was instantly launched. At the same time,
the press services of the legation informed the newspapers about the catas-
trophic situation of the inhabitants of the war-stricken capital of Poland. A
discussion flared up in the press about organising a large humanitarian cam-
paign.111 The issue was publicized so effectively that the Swedish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs started to admonish its legation in Berlin about the news on
the opportunities of providing immediate material aid to the General
Government. The Swedish Red Cross then asked Geneva to provide accurate
information.112
Towards the close of September, the Swedish government awarded a 500
thousand crown grant to the Swedish Red Cross, which was intended for the
Poles in the General Government. The money was spent on medicine, sani-
tary products and food. Clothing and shoes were to come from the USA. The
materials were to be taken to Pruszków. The management of the Swedish Red
Cross decided that the Swedish delegates should be present when the aid was
distributed and only on this condition was the aid to be sent.113 Prince Carl
was convinced that the best candidate for supervising the Swedish transports
would be the chaplain of Swedish seamen in Gdańsk, vicar Sven Hellqvist,
who, ‘on many occasions mediated and controlled the process of sending aid
—
109
M. Leche, ‘För Polen’, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning, 26 VI 1944.
110
111
‘Pruszków’, Morgon-Tidningen, 29 VIII 1944.
112
113
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 180, memorandum by
General Secretary E. Stiernstedt, Stockholm, 28 IX 1944.
499
from Sweden to Poland’, and therefore ‘the difficult and delicate mission sup-
ported by the Swedish government’ would be placed in good hands.114 The
Prince convinced the German authorities that Swedish control was necessary,
as the property belonged to the state, and was only formally handed over to
the Swedish Red Cross. He asked that such an explanation be presented to
Envoy Richert in Berlin.115 The Swedish Red Cross contracted vicar Hellqvist,
entitling him to remuneration as well as insurance. The contract would ter-
minate on the vicar’s return to Sweden.116
On 10 October 1944, a carriage laden with 245 boxes of tinned sardines and
30 boxes of underwear and stockings was sent from Stockholm to Pruszków
near Warsaw, where the capital’s inhabitants relocated following their
expulsion by the German troops. One day later, the second transport set off
with 15 tons of sugar and 10 boxes of clothing. On 21 October, 20 tons of crisp
bread was sent. At the close of October 1944, Pilch informed London, ‘The
dispatch campaign is in full swing, and so far, it has not met any obstacles.’117 A
request was submitted to the Legation of the USA that the Americans agree to
increase relief quotas from the territory of Sweden. Sweden’s suspension of
shipping to German ports led to transports sent by rail through Denmark to
Kraków. There, they were handed over to a delegate of the German Red Cross.
Further distribution was to be controlled by a delegate of the Swedish Red
Cross. Most of the resources allocated came from the Swedish government,
which had placed, as mentioned previously, 500 thousand crowns at the
disposal of the Swedish Red Cross. The additional 100 thousand crowns came
from the Hjälp Polens Barn organisation, 40 thousand crowns from the
Swedish Aid Committee for Poland in Gothenburg, and 37 thousand crowns
from the Swedish Aid Committees of Malmö, Uppsala and Borås. What is
more, Rädda Barnen declared its intention to help evacuees from Warsaw. The
total provided was 677 thousand crowns.
Following the talks at the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and at the
headquarters of the German Red Cross, Hellqvist expected that he would
quickly be granted the necessary permission from Hans Frank and head off
on a one-week expedition to the General Government. Nevertheless, Frank
—
114
Charles to King Gustaf V, Stockholm, 2 X 1944.
115
Charles to Swedish Envoy to Berlin A. Richert, Stockholm, 23 X 1944.
116
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 180, contract between the
board of the Swedish Red Cross and pastor S. Hellqvist, Stockholm, 1 XI 1944.
117
500
ignored the reminders of the Auswärtiges Amt and the interventions of the
Swedish envoy.118 It was not until 7 November that Hellqvist could leave
Berlin. On 8 November, he met with the management of the Central Welfare
Council (RGO) in Kraków. The chair of the Council, Konstanty Tchórznicki,
informed him that 450 thousand evacuees, including 30 thousand children,
from Warsaw, needed immediate assistance. The number of residents
needing to leave the city was 700 thousand. Nobody, especially those who left
Warsaw at the beginning of August, was thinking about the approaching
winter. Many thought that it would be possible to return home beforehand,
after the short-lived fighting had ended. People were, however, facing
shortages of winter clothing. Those who were evacuated during the last stage
of the rising were exhausted by the primitive living conditions they had suf-
fered for several weeks. They dispersed throughout the General Government
in search of shelter. Many people required immediate medical assistance,
were wounded and burnt. In his reports, Hellqvist emphasized the devotion
of the Polish doctors and nurses who brought relief to the sick gathering in
overcrowded hospitals and hastily prepared rooms of the Jagiellonian
University. The vicar also visited Częstochowa and Radomsko as well as
several suburban towns around Warsaw: Pruszków, Piastów, Milanówek
(where the Father Baudouin orphanage, regularly receiving material support
from the Swedish Red Cross, was evacuated), Grodzisk and Tworki.
Everywhere he saw members of all social groups united in a nation-wide
suffering. He was surprised when he saw that the Kraków warehouses of the
Central Welfare Council contained parcels of crisp bread, sent several days
earlier from Sweden. The explanation for which was the need to save the
stocks for the time when international aid would be suspended. In other
towns and villages amounts of Swedish sugar and milk were stored together
with coats. Hellqvist also suspected the Central Welfare Council of selling
canned sardines on the black market, instead of distributing them, to raise
money for buying cheaper products for a greater number of people. The vicar
viewed these practices with mixed feelings. They were not in line with the
intentions of the Swedish authorities, and he was aware of the specificity of
the situation under the German occupation. He maintained that there was no
control over the distribution. He could only instruct the Central Welfare
Council on how to keep up-to-date and thorough records of donations.119 In
—
118
PISM, PRM 161A, note by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki ‘Informacje uzyskane
od pastora S. Hellqvista, delegata Szw[edzkiego] Czerwonego Krzyża w Krakówie’, p. 26.
119
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 180, S. Hellqvist: report from
the travel to the General Government between 7 and 15 XI 1944, Berlin, 18 XI 1944; copy of
501
general, according to Hellqvist, the food situation ‘was not disastrously bad.’
The shoe and clothing situation was bad, but worst of all was the lack of
detergents. There was also a dire shortage of duvets and blankets. Among the
necessary items he also mentioned hospital equipment, soap, detergents,
nappies, towels, tooth brushes, combs, buckets and mugs. He informed about
an insufficient number of trucks and typewriters, which made it particularly
difficult to organize the distribution in rural areas.120
After Hellqvist had submitted his first report about the difficult conditions
in which he was forced to perform his humanitarian mission in the General
Government, Stiernstedt continued to maintain the position of the Swedish
government that the control of transports and distribution was necessary,
and he reminded the vicar that this was state provided aid they were talking
about. He showed appreciation for the finding of his aunt Mary Ciechano-
wiecka, to whom the vicar was to offer his help.121 Several transports of tinned
sardines, clothes, sugar, bread and salt had already arrived in Poland by that
time. The last transport of clothing and food for Poland arrived in Lübeck on
5 December. Hellqvist was planning to set off on another expedition to
Kraków and follow the transport, but he did not gain the relevant permission
from the German authorities. Further monitoring of the aid from Sweden
was impossible due to the approaching front. In December, the dispatch was
suspended, since as it was stated in the official announcement of the Swedish
authorities, ‘the German authorities are making it difficult for the Swedish
delegate to access the territory, where the submitted items are being distri-
buted.’ When the campaign was over, the chair of the Central Welfare Coun-
cil in Kraków, Konstanty Tchórznicki, sent a telegram on 21 December 1944
to Prince Charles with thanks for the engagement of the Swedish Red Cross
in helping the evacuated people of Warsaw.122
Sweden sent the total of 8 carriages with food products to Poland. These
transports included 30 thousand tins of sardines, 15 tons of sugar, 2 tons of
—
letter by S. Hellqvist to S. Grafström, Berlin, 23 XI 1944; final report by S. Hellqvist from the
journey between 7 and 15 XI 1944, Berlin, 5 XII 1944. Head of the SS and Police in Warsaw
P. O. Geibel issued a permission for S. Hellqvist to travel across the ruined capital. The
Germans even did not object to him taking photos of it. The vicar examined the building of
the Swedish Legation, which survived together with all its equipment. In the piggery nearby
Grodzisk he found the former staff member of the legation, Margit Vingqvist-Jelnicka.
120
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 180, letter by S. Hellqvist to
the board of the Swedish Red Cross, Berlin, 19 XI 1944.
121
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 180, letter by general secretary
of the Swedish Red Cross E. Stiernstedt to S. Hellqvist, Stockholm, 30 XI 1944.
122
RA-Arninge, Svenska Röda Korset, Överstyrelsen, F I a, vol. 180, telegram by K.
Tchórznicki to president of the Swedish Red Cross, Kraków, 21 XII 1944.
502
fish oil, 20 tons of milk powder, 20 tons fish preserves, 20 tons of peas, 20
tons dried vegetables, 20 tons of jam, 4 tons of vegetable stock cubes, 20 tons
of meat preserves, 20 tons of crisp bread, 20 tons of flour, 50 tons of salted
fish, 10 tons of clothes, 1 ton of socks, 2.5 tons of soap, 500 kilograms of
vitamins, as well as 40 thousand crowns’ worth of medicine, intended for 10
thousand people. The total value of aid that was sent to Poland is estimated
at 300 thousand crowns. At the same time, the Swedish Red Cross acted as a
go-between in the dispatch of parcels, with a total value of approximately 625
thousand crowns, from Polish aid organisations.123
Hellqvist made two short trips to the General Government over the period
of two months; this included a visit to Kraków, to Warsaw and its nearby
towns as well as to Kutno and Kielce. Following his return, he recounted his
experiences not only to his superiors but also to the Polish Legation. In his
view, the Polish people detested the Germans for the several cruel years of
occupation, but at the same time they feared the approaching Soviets. The
amount of supplies was not the worst, better than in the case of Germany.
There was a shortage of clothing and the prices were high.
What needs to be highlighted is that the Swedish aid for the Poles living
under German occupation was of considerable significance. It should be
noted that the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare continued to express
regret in its reports that the British and American governments ignored the
requests of the Polish government regarding the lifting of the blockade of the
territories controlled by the Germans and permission for supplying food
both to the occupied territories of Poland and to the neutral states, where, as
it was initially established, 50 thousand Polish children were to be sent.124
Swedish transports of humanitarian aid

to the Lublin Committee Poland
At the same time the Swedes, without much publicity, decided to send im-
mediate humanitarian aid to Poland through Moscow. In December, while
on his way back to Moscow from the consultations in Stockholm, Söderblom
carried 212 kilograms of medicine on to the plane, with a total value of over
15 thousand crowns. This was the gift for Poland from the committee led by
Marika Stiernstedt, which was delivered to Stefan Jędrychowski, the repre-
sentative of the PKWN. In transpired that this was the first humanitarian aid
—
123
Berättelse över Svenska Röda Korsets verksamhet under år 1944, pp. 146–147.
124
PISM, PRM 161A, note regarding the aid for Poland in 1944, n.p., 16 XII 1944.
503
package sent to the Polish territory following the entrance of the Soviet
armies. The representative of the PKWN announced that all items would be
sent to Bolesław Drobner, who held the post of head of health department at
the Lublin Committee. According to Söderblom, Jędrychowski was clearly
familiar with the structures of the Swedish organisations of international aid.
The Swedish diplomat attributed this knowledge to the efforts of Jerzy
Pański. Söderblom clearly wanted to please his Polish interlocutor and ex-
pressed his personal view that appropriate aid would be granted by the
Swedish state institutions as soon as the territory of Poland was liberated.
Then, in line with the received instructions, he proposed that vice chair of the
Swedish Red Cross, Count Folke Bernadotte, should come to Lublin as part
of his visit to Moscow to help him to develop an opinion about the current
situation in the territory of Poland. Jędrychowski declared his readiness to
accept Count Bernadotte in Lublin, provided his visit to Moscow would take
place and that the situation on the front allowed it. In addition, he promised
to forward him the list of needs, which was drawn up for the UNRRA.
Söderblom considered it necessary for the time being to continue small deli-
veries of humanitarian aid from private committees, before launching regular
state deliveries. According to his information, the Hjälp Polens Barn organi-
sation was to send 9 tons of clothing and shoes, some amount of food, sheets
and paper towels, whereas other organizations in Sweden prepared amounts
of pearl barley, peas and clothes.125 Söderblom informed UD that the Poles
were also interested in obtaining scientific and medical equipment, specialist
literature (especially medical) for the Lublin University. In the near future,
he was expecting to welcome Polish professors on this matter.126 On 8
December, he was visited by director of the PKWN’s science department
Stanisław Skrzeszewski, director of the department of healthcare and Profes-
sor in Bacteriology Edward Grzegorzewski, together with two other profes-
sors, radiologist Murzyński and dean of the faculty of philosophy of the newly
established Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin Konstanty
Strawiński. He explained to Söderblom about the need for equipment and
materials in the Polish laboratories and academic libraries. For Söderblom,
this was another occasion for Sweden to show itself off in Poland in a way
that was both relevant and immediately noticeable. He proposed, therefore,
that the equipping of Polish research facilities be expanded to include not
—
125
Söderblom to Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch. Günther, Moscow, 5 XII 1944.
126
Ibidem, memorandum regarding humanitarian aid for liberated Poland, Stockholm, 7 XII
1944.
504
only appropriate committees providing aid to Poland, but also individual

Swedish higher education institutions. He informed that the American Red
Cross, following the reception of the long-expected approval from the Soviet
authorities, had already initiated the dispatch of aid to Poland via the Soviet
Union, which, ‘was allegedly accepted by the Polish government in London.’
To acquaint himself with the attitude of the Soviet authorities towards the
Swedish humanitarian campaign, Söderblom posed a question about this
subject to vice commissary for foreign affairs Vladimir Dekanozov, who
without hesitation answered, ‘friendly’.127 On 12 December, the Swedish
envoy received a list of needs from the PKWN, which was submitted to the
UNRRA for the Montreal conference.128 Eventually the Hjälp Polens Barn
committee was granted permission to dispatch approximately 22 tons of food
and 5.5 tons of clothes and shoes to Poland. Commercial Attaché Wojciech
Chabasiński explained to the Swedes that the dispatched supplies should pass
through Leningrad, and from there they should be transported to Lublin. In
connection with the lack of access to the port in Leningrad throughout the
winter, Söderblom suggested that the aid for Poland be shipped to a Finnish
port, and then by rail to Leningrad. He considered the coordination of the
entire action extremely important. The Poles in Moscow were notified early
enough about the date of the transport’s arrival in Leningrad and given the
option of taking over before its transport to Moscow and Lublin.129
At the outset of November 1944, when a two-way (focused also on the
territories controlled by the Germans and the Soviet armies) aid transport for
Poland was undertaken, unpleasant polemics took place. Marika Stiernstedt
accused the actions of vicar Hellqvist of being ineffective due to the alleged
German robberies, and argued that the aid should be sent to the areas con-
trolled by the PKWN.130 Envoy Sokolnicki rejected these arguments, maintain-
ing, ‘Aid should be sent to the places where the needs are the greatest, and to
the places it can reach the quickest.’131 In his report to London, he complained,
‘The current situation has been caused by both neutrality and Sovietophilia, as
—
127
Ibidem, letter by Swedish Envoy to Moscow S. Söderblom to Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ch. Günther, Moscow, 12 XII 1944.
128
Ibidem letter by Swedish Envoy to Moscow S. Söderblom to Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ch. Günther, Moscow, 7 XII 1944.
129
Ibidem, letter by Swedish Envoy to Moscow S. Söderblom to Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Moscow, 12 XII 1944.
130
131
AAN, HI/I/501, note regarding the matter of sending material aid from Sweden to Poland
occupied by the Soviet armies, London, 13 XII 1944. Cf. S. Jędrychowski,
Przedstawicielstwo…, pp. 202–205.
505
well as by the intention to establish relations in advance with the part of Poland
that has been liberated from the Germans (where some Swedish facilities are
located, for example, the branch of the Bank Amerykański in Vilnius).’ Pański’s
activities were of great importance. On behalf of the PKWN, he established
relations with the Swedish industrialists, especially director Harald Axell (who
was treasurer of the Hjälp Polens Barn committee), and the patronage of the
Soviet Legation (‘Mrs. Kollontai is casting a spell on Mrs. Stiernstedt’). The
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was unwilling to officially become engaged
in this dispute.132 Meanwhile Pański, as a correspondent for the Polpress
agency, presented an off-the-record interview with Stiernstedt as a radio an-
nouncement, where the Swedish writer argued the necessity of sending aid in
cooperation with the PKWN. On 7 December 1944 in Gothenburg, at a meet-
ing of the local Polen Hjälpen committee the writer attacked the campaign of
sending parcels to the General Government. According to Stiernstedt, this
initiative was undertaken only because the Polish diplomats in Stockholm
wanted to give it a political tone. Vice Consul Borys Żukowski explained, ‘The
responsibility of this support and the ability to use the collected funds lies
exclusively on the Swedes, who, undoubtedly have the right to offer this help
in the form they consider most appropriate and to whom they consider most
appropriate.’ Żukowski described the writer’s accusations as unfair and argued
that the Polish Legation only played an advisory role. When reservations were
raised about the action of sending aid by Moscow to Lublin, they concerned
‘technical issues’ meaning the Swedes could exercise control over its transport
and distribution. Aid was expected to be delivered quickly by the Allies but the
population of the occupied part of the Polish territory could not expect the
same.133 Eventually, Stiernstedt was persuaded that some of the help should be
sent to the territories controlled by the Germans. Of the 180 bags of clothing,
collected by the Hjälp Polens Barn committee, 100 bags were sent through
Germany, whereas following the turn of the new year, 80 were to be sent to
Lublin.134 15 thousand crowns worth of items were sent to the Soviet controlled
Polish territories.135 The Swedish authorities responsible for humanitarian aid,
headed by the management of the Swedish Red Cross and the Swedish Com-
mittee of International Assistance, refrained from sending further aid to
—
132
133
Ibidem, letter by Vice Consul B. Żukowski to the Polish Legation in Stockholm,
Gothenburg, 7 XII 1944.
134
Affairs, Stockholm, 16 XII 1944.
135
Berättelse över Svenska Röda Korsets verksamhet under år 1944, p. 147.
506
Poland from state funds with help of or through the Soviet authorities and the
PKWN until the political situation stabilized. In the short term, aid would
originate from the stocks of the Hjälp Polens Barn committee. The Union of
Polish Jews in Sweden, wanting to avoid contact with Pański due to the
declared political neutrality, turned to this organisation to request aid be sent
to Lublin.136 Minister Tarnowski accepted Sokolnicki’s decision that the cam-
paign of sending aid to the territories controlled by the Soviet army was taken
into consideration, and at the same time, efforts were continued to bring
further transports to the German-controlled territories of Poland.137 The Polish
diplomats considered that the actions of Marika Stiernstedt were caused by the
reaction of the Soviet Legation and Jerzy Pański to the propagandist success of
the so-called Polish Week, a collection of money for the people of Warsaw, 15–
22 September, which was organized to a large extent by the Hjälp Polens Barn
committee.138 It ought to be noted that the event, mostly associated with the
rising’s defeat, was planned in May 1944.139
In mid-February 1945, when virtually the entire territory of Poland fell
under the control of the Soviet armies, the only option for the Polish govern-
ment in exile was to send humanitarian aid to its homeland. Minister
Tarnowski instructed Sokolnicki, ‘Due to the immense needs of the people,
it is important for us that the aid reach Poland by any route possible.’ In
December 1944 the branch of the Polish Red Cross in Stockholm was sent a
hundred tents with heaters and equipment, which made them suitable for
children. This was supplemented by 2 thousand parcels with a total value of
25 thousand crowns, which were to be handed out to the poorest Warsaw
inhabitants. In March 1945, the Polish Red Cross received 17 tons of clothing
and shoes, and in April an ambulance and four cars adapted for carrying the
sick140 For Tarnowski, it was important that the distribution was carried out
by the Swedish Red Cross. This would ensure adequate control and allow for
subsequent shipments without the risk of items being distributed against the
—
136
AAN, HI/I/501, note regarding the matter of sending material aid from Sweden to Poland
occupied by the Soviet armies, London, 13 XII 1944.
137
Ibidem, telegram by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Tarnowski to Polish Legation in
Stockholm, London, 3 XII 1944.
138
139
IPMS, A 11, E/508, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of
140
134.
507
wishes of their donors.141 This may explain why, at the outset of May 1945,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suspended the dispatch of parcels to Poland.
Food stocks that had been gathered for this purpose were allocated as aid to
the Poles located in the territory of Germany.142
Final negotiations regarding humanitarian aid

in the post-war period
In December 1944 and January 1945, counsellor Pilch met with the represen-
tatives of Swedish humanitarian organisations to convince them to talk with
the Polish government in exile about the organisation of the post-war aid for
Poland.143 Pilch claimed that the talks with the Swedes were of great political
significance. Insofar as the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs avoided
contact with Jerzy Pański, it did not prevent him contacting the Swedish relief
authorities. Pilch argued, ‘That is why an important issue was to present our
political situation to these relief bodies as clearly as possible and convince
them that our relief programme is the only programme that considers the
entire issue together with the aid provided by the UNRRA’ and was based on
the will of the state representatives of the Polish government in London. He
also emphasized that he had not established contact with the highest-level
representatives of relief bodies, as their role was partial and more that of a
figurehead, but with young people, who were committed solely to the acti-
vities of the relief body. On 29 January 1945, Pilch was permitted access to
materials that were to be sent to the Swedish government and relief com-
mittees for final approval. These materials were, at most, preparatory works
concerning sanitary and medical assistance, whereas the basis for the draft
work programme was the Polish memorandum produced under the leader-
ship of Doctor Nordwall. As part of Swedish aid campaign, provisional hos-
pitals (barracks) were to be constructed, to house 3–4 thousand beds, at a cost
of 15 million crowns. For a further 15 million crowns, the Swedes would also
equip the hospitals and provide medicine and medical personnel for one year.
A total of 30 million crowns then, including the costs, was donated by the
Swedish government. It was estimated initially that 350 Swedish doctors and
200 nurses would be employed in Poland. Experience from the humanitarian
—
141
Stockholm H. Sokolnicki, n.p., 19 II 1945.
142
Ibidem, telegram by J. Kisielewski to S. Kocan, n.p., 2 V 1945.
143
AAN, HI/I/115, letter by counsellor to Polish Legation in Stockholm T. Pilch to the
508
mission in the Soviet Russia at the beginning of 1920s proved that the activity
in Poland should focus on certain counties (powiaty) and larger cities.
Moreover, the Swedes planned to open orphanages. All these activities were
to be managed directly by the Swedes. In addition, Pilch received a proposal
from the Internationella Arbetslag för Återuppbyggnad organisation (transla-
tion: International team for reconstruction or IAfÅ) to set up a network of
Finnish saunas, which would serve as sanitary stations. The cost of this initia-
tive were to be divided between the Swedish and Polish sides. At the outset of
1945, the IAfÅ gathered a group of 43 individuals to perform humanitarian
aid in Poland after completing special training acquainting them with the
conditions of work and the basics of the Polish language.144 The group was
composed of mostly young representatives of various nationalities (mainly
Swedes) including university students, craftsmen, engineers, mechanics,
clerks and nurses of the Swedish Red Cross. The IAfÅ introduced a system of
badges for those undergoing disinfection, which was to prevent excessive
bureaucracy in the organisation of medical treatment.145 Pilch was presented
with a detailed description of the sauna installation, the cost of which was
about 3 thousand crowns. The IAfÅ organisation encouraged the Polish
authorities to buy the Finnish saunas, arguing ‘there is no expert in the area
of public healthcare who is familiar with the Finnish bastu [sauna], and who
would not be glad to see the bastu introduced to the continent as an effective
means of fighting all epidemics and taking public health to a higher level.’146
There were fears that the Poles would be suspicious of the Swedish equipment
and resist its introduction. Employing a Polish citizen to work at every sani-
tary group was to solve this. Swedish activists took into account that the bastu
could have adverse health effects on the weak and sick. The argument for the
saunas was that they were small stations managed by assistance teams and
not medical centres. They were cheaper and for psychological reasons
seemed to be a more convenient and beneficial solution as each person was
treated individually and not as part of a group of patients.
Pilch was certain that the initiative to organize humanitarian aid for Poland
was not a consequence of the belief that Poland most affected by the war. He
claimed, ‘Behind this there are naturally also the Swedish economic interests
—
144
Ibidem.
145
AAN, HI/I/115, complementary project of simplified sanitation control system, n.d., n.p.
146
Ibidem, memorandum regarding the matter of bastu saunas, n.d., n.p.
509
and this is not only the hope to obtain coal from Poland, but also good ex-
periences from the Polish–Swedish economic cooperation before the war.’147
On 19 January, Pilch submitted a memorandum to Sohlman, regarding
the Swedish relief aid for Poland. Its content was in line with the document
forwarded to Count Bernadotte in November 1944. This was the outcome of
Pilch’s meeting with Lars Birger Ekeberg, Stig Sahlin, Folke Bernadotte, Erik
Lejionhufvud and Henrik Beer on 17 January, when the counsellor made the
Swedes aware of the expectations of the Polish side.148 On 30 January 1945,
Pilch informed the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare that Sweden was
willing to grant Poland certain privileges regarding the shipments of barracks
and prefabricated houses, if it received transports of coal and coke in a rela-
tively soon.149 In the spring of 1945, the Polish side began to formulate a list
of specific demands. Poland expected Sweden to supply wooden barracks, 84
thousand blankets, artificial limbs, cooking pots, disinfection equipment,
paper pallets used by the Swedish army, iron beds bunk beds, potato peelers
and weighing scales.150 In March 1945, social activists Alva Myrdal and Astrid
Requel, who were in London at the time, were consulted on the printing
Polish school and academic manuals in Sweden.151 These conversations were
problematic for the Swedes. On 22 May, Beer asked Sverker Åström from UD
about what regarding reminders issued by Pilch, who scolded the Swedes for
being slow to act and not arranging the meeting with president Ekeberg. Pilch
expected that specific steps would be taken relating to the list of demands,
which he had proposed previously. Beer asked what reply should be issued
regarding the suggestions from UD to maintain the greatest possible caution
in relations with the Polish Legation, which had been accomplished pru-
dently so far, as no contact had been initiated. Åström advised that a method
often used in UD be applied, namely only giving Pilch answers verbally.152
—
147
of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 23 XI 1944.
148
AAN, HI/I/115, copy of letter by counsellor to the Polish Legation in Stockholm, T. Pilch,
to R. Sohlman, Stockholm, 19 I 1945.
149
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, Stockholm, 30 I 1945.
150
of Labour and Social Welfare, Stockholm, 13 IV 1945.
151
152
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 39, vol. 1620, letter by H. Beer to S. Åström,
Stockholm, 22 V 1945. The letter contains addressee’s note with the instruction what was to
be done.
510
Throughout the war, Sweden primarily concentrated on granting hu-

manitarian aid to its Nordic neighbours. Until 1940 Sweden provided
humanitarian aid to Finland in various forms, totalling 145 million crowns,
105 million crowns of which was in cash.153 In Sweden each year, Swedish
families welcomed thousands of Finnish children, who took shelter from the
Soviet bombings that plagued Finland.154 Sweden or the International Red
Cross also sent food aid to Greece, which was systematically transported on
the Swedish ships from the outset of 1942 until 1944. In 1944, a similar aid
campaign was organized for the Netherlands. In 1942, a special train brought
several hundred Belgian children for treatment in Sweden.155 Poland did not
receive any priority treatment, and it was excluded from the initial plans for
post-war aid. The decision to award Poland with a large government grant
for the immediate support of people living in the General Government in the
autumn of 1944 needs to be associated with Sweden’s strong response to the
tragedy of the Warsaw Rising and with the intention of importing coal from
Poland as soon as the military activity ceased.
—
153
S. Söderberg, Svenska röda korset 1865–1965, Stockholm 1965, pp. 277–279.
154
155
Ibidem, p. 317.
511
512
13. The Problems of Polish Soldiers Interned in Sweden
Submarine crews
In September 1939, under the Hague Convention of 1907, three Polish sub-
marines, Sęp, Ryś and Żbik, were detained in Sweden.1 The Swedes initiated
internment before the twenty-four-hour limit for vessels lying in home ports,
to which the Polish submarines were entitled to. Neither the crews nor Envoy
Potworowski reacted to this. They most likely predicted that none of the units
would be able to reach the Baltic Sea within twenty-four hours; the submarine
ORP Sęp was badly damaged. All the vessels were moored around the Vax-
holm fortress, within the limits of the Stockholm archipelago.
Other Polish vessels reached Sweden. On 2 October 1939, the cutter
Batory carrying sixteen escapees from the Hel Peninsula (ten officers, three
civilians and three customs agents) arrived on Gotland.2 All were arrested and
detained in Stockholm until the case was clarified. Several days later they
were granted a two-week visa which was valid until their departure to Great
Britain. The matter was publicized when the freed refugees from Poland
complained to Envoy Potworowski about the conduct of Swedish policemen.
Based on explanatory reports, the Swedish authorities rejected the complaint.
One consequence of this report is that the allegations which were contained
in the letter of complaint to the envoy had been raised by the Poles during
their time in custody. A large majority of the focus fell on the statement of
—
1
This issue has been numerously discussed in both Polish and Swedish historiography. See:
A. N. Uggla, I nordlig hamn…, pp. 42–71; D. Nawrot, ‘Internowanie i rehabilitacja załóg
polskich okrętów podwodnych w Szwecji w latach II wojny światowej’, Przegląd Historyczno-
Wojskowy 2001, iss. 2, pp. 9–40; J. Pertek, Mała flota wielka duchem, Poznań 1989, chpt VIII:
‘Na bocznym torze wojny’, subchpt 1: ‘Sześć lat internowania w Szwecji’, pp. 447–461; Z.
Wojciechowski, ‘Internowanie polskich okrętów podwodnych w Szwecji’, Przegląd Morski
1991, no. 11; E. Jarneberg, ‘Internering av polska ubåtar med besättningar i Vaxholms
fästning’, Vaxholms fästnings museum meddelande 1981, pp. 41–60; U. Sobéus, ‘SEP, RYS,
ZBIK, de polska ubåtarna. Ett 60-årsminne’, Vaxholms fästnings museum årsbok 1999, pp.
5–13.
2
RA, mf. F 035-3-32252, police report, 5 X 1939. According to the Polish studies, on board
of the Batory vessel there stayed six officers, four non-commissioned officers and seamen
and two civil border guards. See: D. Nawrot, Internowanie…, p. 11.
513
one of the policemen, ‘The Poles should be shot’ or ‘handed over to the Ger-
mans.’3 Not all passengers were released by the Swedes. Six people were
interned.
At the outbreak of war, the tall ship Dar Pomorza was berthed in Stock-
holm. Its young crew was not interned, but the ship remained in Sweden for
six consecutive years. In March 1940, the idea of selling Dar Pomorza was
considered, but the government decided to hold on to the ship for propa-
ganda purposes. There were fears that the sale of a symbol of generosity from
the residents of Pomerania could undermine morale (the ship was bought
thanks to the public money collection in 1929).4 Instead, the two fishing
cutters were sold, Marie Alice and Mir 9, which had arrived in Gothenburg
in August 1939, as part of an expedition organized by the Marine Fishing
Institute in Gdynia.5 A third cutter Cecylia, which also took part in the
expedition, was captured by the Germans in April 1940 in Bergen, Norway.
The maintenance costs of the Dar Pomorza and the Batory became a burden
for the legation in later years.
During the war analyses were carried out to establish whether the Polish
submarines fulfilled their objectives and if they left for Sweden prematurely.
The naval commander’s order of 14 September said that the military action
against the Germans should be continued, and follow that the navy should
move to Great Britain. The submarines were only to travel to neutral Sweden
if this became impossible. There were doubts from the beginning whether the
commanders, especially of Ryś and Żbik, had reasons to return the units to
the hands of the Swedes.6 In 1944, a commission was set up to examine the
issue of the commanders of the submarines detained in Sweden. Its chair,
Captain Czesław Petelenz, convinced Rear-Admiral Świrski that the orders
of the Navy Command, where Sweden was called a partner and a friendly
country, were of particular importance, although any specific arrangements
were out of the question on the matter of a possible operational collaboration
with the Swedish side: ‘Constant pointing to Sweden could make the com-
manders presume that some possibilities existed only there and could
undermine their spirit of initiative.’7
—
3
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 39, vol. 1541, correspondence regarding this matter.
4
5
AAN, HI/I/232, note by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G. Potworowski and counsellor to the
Polish Legation in Stockholm T. Pilch, Stockholm, 30 VI 1940.
6
D. Nawrot, Internowanie…, pp. 14–18.
7
PISM, MAR, A V 9/5, letter by Com. Cz. Petelenz to head of the Polish Navy Command
Rear-Admiral J. Świrski, Brighton, 12 XII 1944.
514
13. POLISH SOLDIERS INTERNED IN SWEDEN
From the beginning the submarines were of interest to the Polish supreme
military authorities in exile. According to the head of the Polish Navy Com-
mand, Rear-Admiral Jerzy Świrski, to place the submarine crews under
appropriate care it was necessary to know the stance of the naval attaché to
Stockholm, even at the cost of eliminating the function of military attaché.
Initially, Świrski proposed that commodore Czesław Petelenz, who at the
time resided in Lithuania, assume the post of naval attaché. As Świrski
informed General Sikorski:
the crews of the three submarines interned in Sweden (Ryś, Żbik and Sęp)
require permanent care from the officer with appropriate authority, who
could exert a moral impact on them. The vessels themselves also require care.
What is indispensable are constant talks with the Swedes regarding these
matters and watching over the political fluctuations, which could at some
point make it possible for the vessels to leave Sweden and move to England.8
Sikorski did not agree with the proposal and motivated his decision by the
need to organize the evacuation of Poles from the Baltic States, which was to
be decided by Attaché Brzeskwiński. Świrski insisted that the evacuation was
a short-term task and, therefore, the office of naval attaché would be suf-
ficient for Sweden. Eventually, independently of the military attaché’s post,
the post of naval attaché was also created. The person to assume the post,
however, was not Petelenz, who was 60 years old and had retired before the
war, but a serving officer, commodore Tadeusz Podjazd-Morgenstern.9 The
matter of agrément for Morgenstern was examined in greater detail. He
arrived in Stockholm on 18 December 1939 and, regardless, had to settle all
matters through a military attaché.10
On 1 December 1939, the Polish submarines became the subject of the
session of the Swedish government. In response to the royal instructions of
20 October, a discussion took place about covering the costs of food and ac-
commodation of the Polish crews, composed of 180 officers and seamen.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sandler proposed to conclude a special agreement
in this matter with the Polish side.11
—
8
PISM, MAR, A V 31/3, letter by head of the Polish Navy Command, Rear-Admiral J.
Świrski to Minister of Military Affairs General W. Sikorski, Paris, 7 XI 1939.
9
Ibidem, letters by head of the Polish Navy Command, Rear-Admiral J. Świrski to Minister
of Military Affairs General W. Sikorski, Paris, 7 XI, 27 XI 1939.
10
PISM, MAR, A V 9/3, letter by Com. T. Podjazd-Morgenstern to the Polish Navy Com-
mand, Stockholm, 3 II 1940.
11
utrikesdepartaments ärenden, Stockholm, 1 XII 1939.
515
Independently of the Swedish authorities’ concern with financial issues,

their attitude towards the Polish crews was ‘very correct’, as Commodore
Ludwik Ziembicki put it, who with Bronisław Łątkiewicz visited the intern-
ment camp posing as alleged relatives of the interned seamen. Although, he
quickly added that ‘a strict adherence to the camp’s internal regulations is
necessary.’ Nevertheless, he admitted, ‘Rooms are decent, food is good.’ All
officers submitted an official written commitment to King Gustaf V, that they
would not leave the camp for the next two months. Owing to this, they were
permitted twenty-four hour’s leave to visit Stockholm. The seamen arranged
curfew with the guards, in exchange for payment.12
From the beginning, the command of the Polish navy considered libe-
rating the submarines from internment. Acting Sub-Lieutenant Mieczysław
Zygmunt Cedro, assistant of the Polish attaché to Stockholm, discussed the
topic with Captain John R. Poland, who was assistant of the naval attaché of
Great Britain in Stockholm and Lieutenant Lambert, who represented
France. He assured them that the submarines were to be ready for operation
by the end of the year. The attitude of the Swedish authorities was promising.
They began to assist in the restoring of the vessels to operational condition,
which was contrary to their attitude during the previous several weeks, when,
posturing as strictly neutral, they simply allowed maintenance work to be
performed.13
Meanwhile, at the outset of December, various sources reported on the
German demand that the submarines be released to them when the Polish–
German war was concluded. And so, on 30 November, the Germans re-
quested the Swedish authorities release the submarines. The issue was discus-
sed at the government level and the decision was that no official response
would be given to the Germans. Nevertheless, an implication would be made
that their demand was inappropriate and incompatible with the generally ac-
cepted rules of international law (from Article 6 of the Sea Convention), since
Poland was at war.14 At that point, and for the first time, the British Naval
—
12
PISM, MAR, A V 31/2, report by Sub-Lieutenant B. Łątkiewicz about his visit to the
internment camp for submarine crews in Sweden, n.p., 8 XII 1939. The visit took place
around 15 November.
13
NA, FO, 371/23709, note by Captain J. R. Poland for the Admiralty intelligence, n.p., 9 XII
1939, p. 229.
14
G. Andolf, ‘Militära interneringar i Sverige under de första krigsåren’ [in:] Vindkantring…,
p. 194; C.-A. Wangel, ‘Neutralitetsrätt – regler och tillämpning’ [in:] Sveriges militära bered-
skap 1939–1945, ed. C.-A. Wangel, Köping 1982, p. 66.
516
Attaché Captain Henry Denham advised the Poles that they should prepare
to destroy the submarines if the Swedes attempted to seize them.15
For the Poles, it was important that the submarines were sea worthy. On
15 December, the Polish Naval Attaché to London, Captain Tadeusz Stoklasa,
informed the British admiralty that Rear-Admiral Świrski had decided free
the Polish vessels from Stockholm. Ryś and Żbik were to be ready to set sail
on 20 December and Sęp on 25 December. Stoklasa asked the British to assist
in the entire undertaking, and most importantly in provide information on
activity in the Danish straits, about the minefields on the route to the North
Sea and the rendezvous point with the British navy following the successful
passage to the Baltic Sea. Rear-Admiral Świrski’s reached the crews through
the British naval attaché to Stockholm.16 It caused embarrassment in the circle
of the British Admiralty, which was reflected in the nervous written ex-
changes between the highest-ranking navy officers, as well as between the
Admiralty and the Foreign Office (FO). The British were unable to solve the
issue of assistance to the Poles without creating problems for the Swedes.
Alan Ker from the Admiralty agreed that the action was too risky, but if the
Poles decided to go through with it they should be provided with all the
information that could help. The German demand that the submarines be
released to them was additional motivation that the plan be executed.
Seemingly against it, besides risk, was the prospect of employing the vessels
in the future on the Baltic Sea, in the service of Finland or Sweden and the
role that they would play in the British operations on the North Sea.17 The FO
maintained that the liberation of the Polish submarines could become a
pretext for a German or Soviet campaign against Sweden, and should, there-
fore, be abandoned. Moreover, the Swedes were dissuaded from passing any
information to the Poles which could facilitate their escape, as there was no
trust in the loyalty of the command of the Polish navy and their ability to
await approval from the British. According to the British plans, the Polish
vessels were to cooperate with the Finnish navy in the Baltic Sea. The danger
of releasing them to the Germans was trivialized by the British diplomacy,
which did not believe that the Swedes would make such a concession.18
—
15
NA, FO, 371/23709, telegram by Naval Attaché of Great Britain to Stockholm [H.
Denham] to the Admiralty, 13 XII 1939, p. 231.
16
Ibidem, letter by T. Stoklasa to R.H. Carter [Admiralty], 15 XII 1939, p. 228.
17
Ibidem, A. Ker to D. W. Lascelles [Admiralty], 20 XII 1939, pp. 226–227.
18
Ibidem, letter by the FO [head of the Northern Department of the FO L. Colliers?] to A.
Ker [Admiralty], 21 XII 1939, pp. 232–233.
517
From the information reported by Polish Military Attaché to Helsinki,

Colonel Władysław Łoś, Marshal Mannerheim proposed the Polish sub-
marines fight in the Winter War against the Soviet navy. Morgenstern main-
tained that this would be an opportunity to liberate the vessels, considering
the equipment and volunteers for the armed forces provided to Finland by
Sweden. At the time, he learned that Polish pilots flying English aircraft,
having reached Sweden en route to Finland, could enter Finnish airspace and
fight on the Finnish–Soviet front. Nevertheless, in London there was a belief
that if the Allies moved against the Soviet Union, Sweden would not dis-
charge the vessels in fear of reprisals from the Germans, who were Stalin’s
ally at the time. The best, if unrealistic, solution from the Polish perspective
seemed to be a joint campaign with the Swedish navy.19
On 2 January 1940, Captain Morgenstern sent a report to Świrski, where
he described the political situation of Sweden and the condition of the Polish
submarines. In his view, the circumstances forced Sweden to comply with the
principles of neutrality. That is why he decided that the talks on the possible
release of the vessels ‘are not appropriate, and for the time being even seem
inadvisable, as they could arouse concern among the Swedes and cause
reaction in the shape of restrictions towards […] the submarines and their
crews, which would naturally make their […] work difficult.’20 Despite this,
Morgenstern only considered the option of Sweden joining the war on the
side of the Allies. Meanwhile, he was making plans to escape internment. The
British were striving to settle the situation. Commander Poland noticed the
excitement of the Polish crews after the submarine Orzeł managed to break
through the Danish straits. According to the reports, which were sent to
London, he advised against similar attempts by the vessels interned in
Sweden. He claimed, ‘it is almost impossible to break out of Vaxholm on your
own.’ Nobody was familiar with the area, which was fully guarded, and it was
also difficult to progress to the North Sea. The British officer advised the crew
to stay in Sweden and join the military operations on the Baltic Sea at a
suitable moment, since he expected that in March 1940 the Germans and the
Soviet Union would attack Scandinavia. Poland added that he considered two
Polish officers to be incapable of commanding ‘as their nerves were not
—
19
IPMS, MAR, A V 9/3, report by Captain T. Podjazd-Morgenstern to head of the Polish
Navy Command Rear-Admiral J. Świrski, Stockholm, 2 I 1940. note on the margin by J.
Świrski from 16 I 1940.
20
Ibidem.
518
strong enough.’21 At the same time he was aware of the immense enthusiasm
of the Poles, who were very eager to take actions. Nevertheless, he predicted
that without help from the Swedes the submarines would be unable to escape.
He also pointed to the fact that, with or without the help from the Swedes,
the escape of the Polish submarines could trigger a German attack in retalia-
tion for not keeping the internment restrictions. It was this issue that was a
decisive factor in assessing the plan of escape. Poland argued:
Sweden is in a very difficult situation at the moment, and it may end up in a
state of war with Germany or Russia, or with both these countries at the same
time, and therefore the presence of three additional excellent submarines on
the Baltic Sea would be extremely valuable for the Allies. My French colleague
agrees with me on this matter and that is why during today’s meeting, among
the three of us, we advised patience in waiting for the instructions from the
Admiralty, preparation of the vessels as quickly as possible and not doing
anything which would cause difficulties to the Swedes.22
However, for the proposition of any action to be conceivable, the submarines

had to be technically sound. The report by Captain Morgenstern revealed
that only the condition of the ORP Sęp submarine could be described as
‘generally good.’ The condition of Żbik was ‘generally satisfactory’, whereas
the riskiest would be sending the damaged Ryś out to sea. The attaché
informed that ‘the Swedes […] have generally already agreed to carry out this
repair’, but they were neither rushing its launch nor did they adequately
protect the vessels against winter. Another issue was the mental state of the
crew members, which was mentioned by Commander Poland to the Polish
attaché. His view was confirmed by Morgenstern, who noted that the com-
mander of Sęp, Lieutenant-Commander Władysław Salamon, and the com-
mander of Ryś, Lieutenant-Commander Aleksander Grochowski, ‘seem to be
mentally exhausted.’ Other officers, according to his view, broke down
during the military action. However, he had no objections towards the sea-
men: ‘The mood among the crew members, despite the three-month stay in
a closed camp, was not the worst, but constant action is required to keep up
their spirits and faith that their fate would change in the near future and there
is a constant search for inventive ways to keep them occupied.’ The seamen
—
21
Ibidem. See also: NA, FO, 371/23709, note by Captain J. R. Poland for the Admiralty
intelligence, 9 XII 1939, p. 229.
22
Ibidem, p. 230. See also: T. Skinder-Suchcitz, ‘Próby uwolnienia okrętów podwodnych z
internowania w Szwecji. Wrzesień 1939 – czerwiec 1940’, Zeszyty Historyczne 1996, iss. 115,
pp. 59–72.
519
helped with renovations and repairs, but were nevertheless burdened by

concern for the fate of their families in the occupied country, from whom
they received desperate letters.23 Over time the seamen assumed the role of a
transit channel for the letters and money sent by their colleagues from Great
Britain to the families of the Polish seamen who were in Britain after
September 1939. Morgenstern noted, ‘large, in the current situation, sums of
money are passing through their hands […]. For instance […] over two
months nearly 4500 crowns from fellow British seamen were sent to
Poland.’24 Świrski only suspended sending money to Poland via interned sol-
diers by the end of April 1940.25
Protecting the Polish submarines became an urgent matter after the Soviet
bombing of Sweden on 14 January 1940. Two days later, Attaché Brzeskwiński
turned to the Swedish authorities and demanded the submarines be armed,
refuelled and overhauled, to ensure they could be evacuated if called upon. The
violation of the Swedish airspace was, therefore, used as a pretext to prepare
the submarines’ escape to Great Britain. This was one of the least likely of the
developments that were presented by Morgenstern. The captain believed that
the escape was ‘exceptionally difficult and has minimal chance of success.’ The
submarines were carefully guarded by Swedish soldiers and located too far
away from the open sea. A major obstacle between southern Sweden and
northern Germany were the minefields, which prevented access to the Danish
straits. A report produced in the Headquarters of the Navy Command, based
on Morgenstern’s reports, contained the analysis of the preparations for the
escape. Some elements of the plan sounded incredible, ‘he designed ways to
dull the Swedes’ and the Germans’ vigilance’, and, ‘he designed ways to supply
oil on the sea’. Moving the submarines further inland, however, which the
Swedes planned to do, was considered to create favourable conditions for the
action to be initiated. Both the British and the French opposed the escape and
—
23
PISM, MAR, A V 9/3, report by Commodore T. Podjazd-Morgenstern to head of the
Polish Navy Command Rear-Admiral J. Świrski, Stockholm, 2 I 1940. Seamen were sending
small amounts of money home that they were receiving for their service on the ships.
24
PISM, MAR, A V 31/3, report by Naval Attaché Commodore T. Podjazd-Morgenstern to
head of the Polish Navy Command, Rear-Admiral J. Świrski, Stockholm, 24 III 1940
Morgenstern demanded that the process of sending money from Great Britain be suspended,
mainly due to its influence on the morale of the crews who were paid less than the seamen
living in Great Britain.
25
Świrski to Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm T. Podjazd-Morgenstern, 28 IV 1940. The chan-
nel had to be efficient. This was mentioned by the then officer of the ORP Wilk – the warship
which broke through to Great Britain in September 1939. See: B. Romanowski, Torpeda w celu!
Wspomnienia ze służby na okrętach podwodnych 1939–1945, Gdańsk 1997, p. 85.
520
advised against the planning of it. They maintained that the submarines would
prove more useful on the Baltic Sea and would cooperate with the Swedish navy
on the side of the Allies. In the event of a threat from Germany or the Soviet
Union, destroying the vessels and facilitating the escape of the crews was also
considered. If alerted, the crews had prepared even explosives to be detonated.
In the short-term, however, the Polish high command pressed for the
preparation of the submarines. In mid-February General Sikorski sent a
telegraph to Attaché Morgenstern, ordering him to announce preparation for
the escape. Morgenstern would disappoint the Commander-in-Chief on this
occasion, as his answer fell in line with the advice from the British:
The escape of the submarines without the permission of the Swedes is impos-
sible now. From previous negotiations with the Swedes it follows that in the
current political situation they would refuse to grant their consent to the
escape. An intervention is currently inadvisable, because it would make
further actions difficult. Now ice is blocking the straits. The Polish Navy Com-
mand is in possession of information about the critical situation and the sub-
marines’ operational readiness.26
While omitting the issue of a noticeable lack of communication between the

Commander-in-Chief and the navy command, it should be noted that
Morgenstern had adopted a British point of view, including the concern
about the position of Sweden in the Baltic Sea region. Perhaps these were only
appearances, as preparations for the action were proceeding, which may be
evidenced by the plan for bringing Lieutenant Borys Karnicki to Sweden to
take command of the submarine Sęp. Lieutenant Jerzy Rekner, appointed by
Świrski, became the commander of the submarine Ryś and Lieutenant-Com-
mander Michał Żebrowski continued to be commander of the Żbik. Officers
performing inadequately in September 1939 were not assigned any posts.27
It was impossible to execute the escape plan as the submarines Ryś and
Żbik were in poor condition. The Swedes, to prevent the escape, compro-
mised the structure of the submarines and systematically checked that the
Poles had not introduced any alterations. Morgenstern ordered the necessary
parts in London, but the only way they could be delivered to Sweden was by
diplomatic mail, the operation of which was beyond all Swedish control.28 The
—
26
Świrski to Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm Com. T. Podjazd-Morgenstern, 19 II 1940.
27
Ibidem, radiogram by head of the Polish Navy Command Rear-Admiral J. Świrski to Polish
Naval Attaché to Stockholm Com. T. Podjazd-Morgenstern, 19 II 1940.
28
Ibidem, study on the subject of solving the issue of Polish ships interned in Sweden [the
Polish Navy Command, March 1940].
521
Polish attaché feared exposure, which could bring restrictions from the
Swedish authorities and render the escape impossible.29 Świrski answered
correctly that failure to deliver the essential parts for the submarines would
nevertheless prevent any actions, so the risk was small. He also said, ‘The only
thing that may be harmful is [exposure] in general politics, which could have
a negative impact on the opportunity of obtaining consent to escape.’30
Eventually, Morgenstern did not accept the package, which raised suspicion
among the Swedes.31 The escape plans were additionally hindered by weather
conditions, since the frozen Baltic Sea, as reported Morgenstern, ‘excluded
the option of sailing out to sea at least until the end of March.’32
What is more, the Swedes, for whom it was important that the Winter War
was concluded as soon as possible, were trying to increase the protection over
the submarines and prevent their preparation for going to the sea.33 However,
in the last days of the Winter War, the Finns were more interested in being
ceded with Poland’s orders for the supply of cannons and ammunition from
the Bofors company than in the collaboration with the Polish submarines.34
Świrski made efforts to make the Polish navy join the Finnish–Soviet conflict35
and eventually appointed Lieutenant Bogusław Krawczyk to become Sęp’s
commander. However, he came to Sweden towards the close of March, when
the political and military circumstances were already completely different.36
The armistice between Finland and the Soviet Union was concluded on 12
March and ‘the spirit of the ORP vessels’ crews has visibly fallen at the mo-
ment.’37 For Morgenstern this meant increasingly difficult working conditions:
‘All the efforts of the Swedish policy are currently focusing on manoeuvring
—
29
Ibidem, radiogram by Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm Com. T. Podjazd-Morgenstern
to head of the Polish Navy Command, Rear-Admiral J. Świrski, Stockholm, 27 II 1940.
30
Naval Attaché to Stockholm Com. T. Podjazd-Morgenstern, 28 II 1940.
31
Ibidem, radiogram by Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm Com. T. Podjazd-Morgenstern
to head of the Polish Navy Command, Rear-Admiral J. Świrski, Stockholm, 5 III 1940.
32
Ibidem, radiogram by Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm Commodore T. Podjazd-
Morgenstern to head of the Polish Navy Command, Rear-Admiral J. Świrski, Stockholm, 21
II 1940.
33
Ibidem, letter by Naval Attaché Commodore T. Podjazd-Morgenstern to head of the Polish
Navy Command, Rear-Admiral J. Świrski, Stockholm, 27 II 1940.
34
Ibidem, radiogram by Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm Commodore T. Podjazd-
Morgenstern to Commodore H. Pistel, 20 II 1940.
35
Ibidem, radiogram by head of the Polish Navy Command Rear-Admiral J. Świrski to
Commodore K. Korytowski, 22 II 1940.
36
Ibidem.
37
IPMS, MAR, A V 31/3, classified report by Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm Com-
modore T. Podjazd-Morgenstern to head of the Polish Navy Command, Rear-Admiral J.
Świrski, Stockholm, 24 III 1940.
522
between the Germans and the Allies, whereas the policy is more flexible and
submissive towards the former, and more framed and firm towards the latter.’38
What did this mean for the Polish interests in Sweden? Morgenstern was
exacting when he wrote in that same piece of correspondence: ‘There is tacit
tolerance towards Poland. There is no doubt that the existing good will or even
kindliness comes up against certain limits. In the case, it touches on the risk of
the Germans’ dissatisfaction – it is, very diplomatically, withdrawn.’
The Polish Naval Attaché formulated his evaluation mostly based on the
statements regarding the Swedish authorities’ treatment of the Polish sub-
marines. In March 1940 he wrote, ‘All the matters which seemed to be already
settled and decided, like the work of our non-commissioned officers with our
torpedoes and docking of the submarine Ryś has been, for the time being,
under various pretences, suspended, and all my new demands are meeting
with courteous, but evasive answers.’ According to Morgenstern, ‘The fear
against the great neighbour paralyses all good intentions.’ The high-ranking
officers of the Swedish navy told the attaché repeatedly that, ‘The Germans
are keeping a close watch […] on the interned submarines and all that is hap-
pening on them.’ That is why he believed that the issue of putting the Polish
warships out to sea would become valid only after a radical change to the
political situation. The escape without the Swedes’ consent owing to small
chances of success had to be treated as the last resort.39
Moreover, the Bofors company completely withdrew from executing the
orders. The company’s representative offered to return the advance payments
with compensation for the unpaid bills, to terminate the non-executed con-
tracts and to return various letters of guarantee.40 It seemed that the Swedish
authorities, just in case, wanted to avoid being accused of providing the
Polish army with more arms, and at the same time it was important for them
that this did not make them lose out financially.41
The political situation changed radically after the Germans had attacked
Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940. At the time, the Minister of Foreign
—
38
IPMS, MAR, A V 9/2, classified letter by Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm Commodore
T. Podjazd-Morgenstern to head of the Polish Navy Command, Rear-Admiral J. Świrski,
39
Ibidem.
40
PISM, MAR, A V 9/1, radiogram by Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm Commodore T.
Podjazd-Morgenstern to head of the Polish Navy Command, Rear-Admiral J. Świrski,
41
Naval Attaché to Stockholm Commodore T. Podjazd-Morgenstern, 16 III 1940; Ibidem,
radiogram by Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm, Captain T. Podjazd-Morgenstern to head
of the Polish Navy Command, Rear-Admiral J. Świrski, Stockholm, 4 IV 1940.
523
Affairs, August Zaleski, forwarded the Polish Legation in Stockholm the

order of High Command, according to which the tall ship Dar Pomorza,
which was moored at the Stockholm port, was to be scuttled, whereas the
submarines were to use every occasion to attempt an escape to the approach-
ing English navy.42 The ideas, resulting from the anticipation of an inevitable
German attack, were replaced with the request of the Poles that the vessels
were hauled away to the centre of Stockholm, where they would be better
protected from air raids thanks to the anti-aircraft defence, and where it
would be possible to conduct the necessary repairs. From 15 and 16 April the
crews were accommodated at the tall ship Dar Pomorza, whereas the re-
furbishment and rearming of the submarines was initiated. It seemed that the
Swedes were expecting the German attack. On 16 April, Morgenstern report-
ed that ‘the Swedes are returning everything except for the mechanical
parts.’43 Two days later, General Sikorski ordered, ‘In the face of the successful
development of the war in the North, I expect You, Captain, to offer your full
support in taking our submarines and the ship Pomorze [sic!] to the Baltic
Sea.’44 On the next day, Morgenstern reported that the Swedes ‘are returning
torpedoes, ammunition and oil.’ They refrained from returning mechanical
parts, cannon locks and torpedo detonators.45 After only a couple of days the
disappointed attaché informed the Polish Navy Command, ‘In the face of
[…] a somewhat relaxation of the political situation, as well as due to the
slowness of the Swedes and excessive bureaucracy, it turned out to be im-
possible to keep up the efficient work speed and therefore the works have
come to a temporary halt.’ Nevertheless, he added, ‘It is my intention to make
an appropriate use of the current, exceptionally favourable attitude of the
Swedes towards our matters by trying to do everything for which there may
be later not enough time.’46
—
42
AAN, HI/I/256, telegram by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Zaleski to Polish Envoy to
Stockholm G. Potworowski, 11 IV 1940.
43
IPMS, MAR, A V 9/1, telegram by Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm Captain T. Podjazd-
IV 1940.
44
Ibidem, radiogram by Commander in Chief General W. Sikorski to Polish Naval Attaché
in Stockholm Captain T. Podjazd-Morgenstern, 18 IV 1940.
45
Ibidem, telegram by Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm Commodore T. Podjazd-
IV 1940.
46
IPMS, MAR, A V 31/3, letter by Polish Naval Attaché in Stockholm Commodore T.
524
On 26 April, at the government session, General Sikorski still optimis-

tically reported on the progress of Sweden’s preparations to join the war on
the side of the Allies:
Regarding the possibility of Sweden joining the war, there is hope that our
interned submarines, which have been repaired by the Swedes, will be ready
for action as soon as they receive cannon locks and torpedo point finders; a
matter of seconds. It will be possible for them to fight efficiently in the Baltic
Sea, which is greatly appreciated by the English. The relative potential of the
Swedish navy, with which they would most probably cooperate, due to the
extensive losses of the German navy, became relatively strong. […] The
Swedes on the other hand, are doing all they can to hinder the passage of the
German vessels across the Swedish territorial waters. […] Sweden is inten-
sively preparing itself for the defence […] Our envoy in Stockholm will
receive instructions of the advance agreement with the Swedes; currently
everything is being arranged there between our military representative and
the English.47
The optimism of the Polish Prime Minister and the Commander-in-Chief

General Sikorski turned out to be excessive. The refurbishments were pro-
gressing, but the torpedoes were never given to the Poles.48 The crew main-
tained the installations, the Swedish labourers took care of the hull, and
Morgenstern evaluated that the Swedes’ work as very sound. The Polish
attaché was not allowed to enter the shipyard, as the internment rules had to
be observed, but all crew members were granted access to their submarines.
Towards the close of April, the Swedes began to examine the possibility of
moving the vessels further inland, which on the one hand would make it
easier for them to keep an eye on the Poles, and on the other, constitute a
valuable gesture towards the Germans. Morgenstern made every effort to
fight against this idea with Admiral Claes Lindström, but he believed that the
final decision would be dependent on the development of the situation on the
western front. According to his estimates, ‘So far, the Germans are very
strong here.’49 In mid-May 1940 Świrski, referring to the decision of the
British admiralty, in a telegram to Morgenstern, considered three scenarios
of the development of events.50 If Sweden maintained its neutrality, the sub-
marines were to remain where they were. If Sweden joined the war on the
—
47
48
head of the Polish Navy Command Rear-Admiral J. Świrski, Stockholm, 29 IV 1940.
49
Ibidem.
50
Discussion of British analyses, see: T. Skinder-Suchcitz, Próby…, pp. 68–69.
525
side of the Allies, the Polish submarines were to act as part of the Swedish
navy and eventually become interned in Finland, ‘provided this is safe, and
that the Germans did not capture them.’ The third solution was to destroy
them. If Sweden yielded to the German demands, the submarines were to ‘go
out to sea and act as it was outlined in the second option, when the bases are
taken away.’ In other circumstances, ‘Where the stance of the Swedes is
wavering, the vessels will be lifted out to the sea, before any decision is made,
and we shall see what is next.’51 The instruction was equally imprecise as that
of September 1939. Morgenstern was most likely focused on ‘and we shall see
what next’, since eventually no actions were taken. The fate of the Polish sub-
marines in Sweden was mostly decided by the French campaign which was
lost by the Allies. The attaché reported, ‘Everything seems to […] prove that
recurring German interventions forced the Swedes to limit the current works
only to those concerning maintenance and repairs, excluding new installa-
tions, which they nevertheless are unwilling to officially admit.’52
Between 4 and 7 July 1940 all the submarines were hauled away to Lake
Mälaren. Over a dozen seamen were moved to central Sweden nearby Falun.
Morgenstern characterized the situation as follows: ‘the position of Germany
in Sweden and the last English-Swedish clashes are not making the atmos-
phere pleasant.’53
In August of 1940, the Polish Navy Command intended to take actions
leading to the release of four interned officers and two seamen. They were
planning to make use of the circumstances which occurred relating to the
decision of the Swedish authorities to release all the interned soldiers of both
fighting parties of the Norwegian campaign.54 Nevertheless, the Swedish
authorities claimed that in the case of the crews interned in 1939, the release
was out of question. Despite the unfavourable decision, the envoy accepted
the Swedish statement with approval. He found it to be ‘an indirect claim that
the Swedish government did not consider the Polish war as concluded.’55
—
51
Świrski to Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm Commodore T. Podjazd-Morgenstern, 15 V
1940.
52
head of the Polish Navy Command, Rear-Admiral J. Świrski, Stockholm, 21 VII 1940.
53
Ibidem.
54
AAN, HI/I/480, telegram by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Zaleski to Polish Legation in
Stockholm, 20 VIII 1940.
55
Affairs, Stockholm, 29 VIII 1940.
526
By mid-October 1940, the three submarines and their crews resided in

Mariefred, a small town be Lake Mälaren.56 The representative of the munici-
pal authorities welcomed the Polish seamen warmly:
We often think about how great our gratitude would be for the kindness
shown to our fathers and sons if they came to share that very same unfortu-
nate fate of being interned in a foreign country. We consider it to be our plea-
sant duty and our achievement in these painful times to show kindness to our
Polish guests.57
The command of the Swedish navy was convinced that as the stay of the Poles
in Sweden was prolonged it was necessary to offer a social programme, and
at little cost, provide an opportunity for professional development. Thanks
to the improvement of housing conditions, it was possible to maintain the
positive atmosphere. A sightseeing tour of the surroundings was organized,
as well as lessons in Swedish and weekly social meetings, during which films
were screened and plays performed.58
More turbulence over the submarines was caused by the outbreak of the
German–Soviet war on 22 June 1941. One day later the commandant of the
internment camp, Captain von der Burg, ordered a special assembly and an-
nounced that the submarines would be separated from the crews and moved.
He informed Captain Salamon that the Swedish authorities had discovered
attempted sabotage by the Poles and were intending to repair it. Attaché
Morgenstern intervened on 26 June with the head of the navy cabinet at the
Ministry of Defence, Admiral Marc Giron. He referred to the hitherto
impeccable and loyal behaviour of the crews. Giron expressed surprise with
the situation, but confirmed that the Swedes were planning to move the sub-
marines to Stockholm to carry out a technical inspection. Morgenstern was
convinced that, ‘The Swedes, due to some reason, which I am unfamiliar
with, simply want to have the submarines in Stockholm.’59 On seeing that he
—
56
KA, Marinkommando Ost, Interneringsläger no. 2, series B I, Utgående skrivelse, vol. 1:
1940–1943, report by commander of HM Cerberus to the commander of the eastern coast,
16 XI 1941.
57
Ibidem.
58
The situation of the interned crews was often described in articles and notes of the Polish
press in exile: ‘Jasełka w Szwecji’, Dziennik Polski, 10 I 1941; ‘Internowani Polacy w Szwecji’,
Dziennik Polski, 17 I 1941; ‘Jak żyją żołnierze polscy internowani w Szwajcarii i Szwecji’,
Dziennik Polski, 3 VI 1941; ‘Polscy marynarze w Szwecji’, Wieści Polskie, 11 VI 1943; ‘Polacy
internowani w Szwecji’, Dziennik Polski, 3 XI 1943.
59
527
would gain nothing in this matter, he only noted that it would be unaccept-
able to separate the crews from their submarines and that this ‘would be a
very serious issue of a highly political character, especially in the current
circumstances.’ Following another meeting and consultation with the Naval
Attaché of Great Britain, Denham, he telephoned one of the Polish officers,
to forewarn the crews about the Swedish plans and to order the removal of
‘all, even the smallest traces that would prove that the submarines could have
been prepared for destruction.’ However, at that moment it was too late.
Whilst Morgenstern was visiting Giron, the submarines were boarded by the
Swedish seamen and hauled away to the base in Stockholm without the Polish
crews on board. Only Captain Salamon fought his way onto the Sęp sub-
marine without the consent from the Swedes, and refused to leave. The at-
taché communicated his objection to Giron, but Giron again answered that
he knew nothing and would deal with the matter on the following day. The
day after, Potworowski submitted a protest to Boheman against the action,
which he described as sudden and treacherous. Boheman calmly explained
that this was how the Swedish authorities reacted to the information about
potential sabotage and denied the existence of plans where the submarines
were to be handed over to the Germans. He justified himself by stating that
he knew no details of the action and promised to discuss the possibility of
allowing the Polish crews to return to the submarines with the navy com-
mand.60 Boheman was also consulted on this matter by the Envoy of Great
Britain, Mallet, who had heard the same news as Potworowski. Boheman
emphasized that he had no evidence that sabotage had been planned, but ‘in
at present there is always risk that somebody could act too hastily.’ He con-
firmed that the decision on occupying the vessels was made by the Swedish
government, in the case the sabotage did take place, the Germans would
accuse Sweden of breaching obligations under internment regulations, and
could put forward claims. He assured that the Swedes would never hand over
the property of the Polish government, the submarines, to the Germans, and
that they would sooner destroy them. Moreover, Boheman admitted that the
possibility of the Soviet arrival on the banks of Sweden meant that it was
important to demonstrate that the Swedes’ treatment of the interned would
be tough, as ‘the Swedish government would not trust Russian seamen, as it
had trusted the Polish.’61 The Polish government raised the issue of seizing
—
60
PISM, A 12, 53/37J, telegram by Envoy G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Stockholm, 27 VI 1941, p. 26.
61
NA, FO, 371/29663, telegram by V. Mallet to the FO, 27 VI 1941.
528
the vessels at the session of 28 June 1941. There was an announcement that a
protest would be carried out against this unexpected action.62
Morgenstern issued an order to break all outside-service relations that
were maintained by the interned crews with the Swedish officers and sea-
men.63 He unofficially learned that the action was inspired by the Swedish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff of the Swedish Army, and
that the staff of the navy most probably knew nothing about it, and therefore
the outrage of Captain Giron was sincere. On 1 July, Söderblom suggested
Potworowski visit the shipyard and see the vessels in the company of Admiral
Lindström. On the following day, the envoy together with Attaché Mor-
genstern met with the admiral. Lindström stated that the submarines had
been moved to Stockholm due to the threat of an air strike and for necessary
renovation. The submarines were towed without crews on board, as the
interned soldiers were banned from entering the Swedish capital. The ad-
miral expressed his regret that the event had taken place and ordered that
Polish flags be raised on masts of the submarines. This was met with a cutting
remark from Envoy Potworowski to Lindström that despite the order for the
Polish flags to be raised, they were not visible, which again proved that ‘not
everything happens in line with his orders.’64 As it was impossible to force the
admiral to compensate the crews or issue any declarations regarding the
return of the crews to the submarines, in July Potworowski visited the head-
quarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to meet with Söderblom. The
Swedish diplomat stated that Admiral Lindström had failed to inform the
envoy on the most important issue, namely that the search carried out on the
vessels had failed to confirm suspicions of sabotage. In the evening of that
very same day, the Swedes agreed that three technicians should be allowed
on the submarines. The meeting in the Ministry of Defence, during which
Attaché Morgenstern demanded that fifteen crew members be permitted to
board each renovated vessel, took place on 5 July. On 9 July, Captain Dyrssen
informed the Polish naval attaché that five men from each crew would be
enough, and besides ‘he expressed his hope that the submarines […] would
soon return to their former berthing place, as it seemed to him that the
security conditions “were improved”, and the renovation does not require a
long period of standstill in the shipyard.’ Eventually, by way of compromise,
ten crew members per submarine was agreed. On 17 July, Potworowski
—
62
Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, vol. 3, pp. 25–26.
63
64
Ibidem.
529
informed London that the intervention both with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and with the navy command led to the Polish crews returning to the
submarines. The Swedish side admitted that ‘the examination of the sub-
marines did not confirm any suspected sabotage’ and expressed their regret.
The envoy suspected that after completing the on-going renovations, the sub-
marines would return to their former berthing place, which eventually took
place at the beginning of September.65 The British considered that the inci-
dent was explained satisfactorily.66
In his report to the Polish Navy Command, Attaché Morgenstern ana-
lysed the reasons why the Swedes hauled the Polish submarines away without
the crews to another berthing place. He considered the official reasons to be
untrue. Morgenstern was convinced that he was right:
I consider it a certainty that the initiative of taking away the submarines
started in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which, on the one hand, wanted to
forestall any possible démarché [of Germany] in this matter, whereas Ger-
many, relating to the outbreak of the Russian war, made demands towards
Sweden. In such a case, the ministry’s intention was to demonstrate that the
Polish submarines were most certainly in Swedish hands. On the other hand,
in the face of the emergence of a possibility of the Russian vessels’ internment,
the ministry perhaps thought that it was necessary to toughen up the regime
towards the interned submarines, and thereby to facilitate the proceedings
with the (perhaps even bigger) Russian vessels which could be interned [in
the future].’67
According to the Poles, the rumours about the sabotage were to serve as a
perfect excuse to take an action, which turned out to be misguided. Morgen-
stern highlighted the sympathetic attitude of the command of the Swedish
navy, and he described the case of Admiral Lindström, who was in command
of the eastern section of the Swedish coast and well-known for his strong pro-
German sympathies, as isolated.
What was in fact the origin of the Swedish decision? The plans for des-
troying the submarines were forged in autumn of 1939, when the Germans
began contact with the Swedish authorities regarding their release. With
—
65
PISM, A 12, 53/37J, telegram by Envoy G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Stockholm, 17 VII 1941, p. 29; AAN, HI/I/87, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm G.
Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 24 IX 1941.
66
NA, FO, 371/29664, telegram by Naval Attaché of Great Britain to Stockholm Commodore
H. Denham to Naval Intelligence, 17 VII 1941.
67
PISM, MAR, A V 31/3, report by Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm Commodore T.
530
every increase in the threat from Germany, these plans became more cre-
dible. In June 1941, the plans became of great interest to the British, who
secretly, courtesy of the Poles, came into possession of plans for rendering
the submarines inoperable without the need for explosives or scuttling in
deep water. Bombing was inconceivable, as the submarines were a most dif-
ficult target for an aerial attack. The Polish specialists considered sinking the
submarines in shallow waters, where they were located, by opening all
hatches, doors, blockades, valves etcetera. Nevertheless, the engine rooms
would be the target for most damage including short circuiting.68 The British
came in to possession of these plans only three weeks before Hitler’s aggres-
sion against the Soviet Union, and the analyses were conducted in mid-June.
In the internment camps, keeping secrets was no doubt impossible. The
potential destruction of the submarines by the crews was treated seriously.
Rumours of sabotage, as mentioned by Morgenstern in his report to London,
took the form of specific plans. Doubts are cleared up by Admiral
Lindström’s letter to the commander of the navy, where he explained that he
the report came from military intelligence. One of the officials of the Polish
Legation allegedly initiated the preparations for sabotage on the submarines.
Relating to this, he received the order to remove the crews from the sub-
marines as quickly as possible, and to tow them away to Stockholm.69
From the Swedish police records we learn that on 22 May attaché
Morgenstern requested the chauffeur of the Polish Legation, Krupski, pur-
chase 10-litre petrol canister. On the same day, the captain took the canisters
to Mariefred and ordered that they be kept on board the submarines or in
other appropriate places and used to destroy them in the event of an at-
tempted relocation. According to agent ‘Kalle’, the legation feared that the
German demand for the submarines would be met. It was, therefore, pre-
ferable to destroy the submarines than to place them in the German hands.70
Was Morgenstern really preparing for sabotage? Following the incident, the
Polish naval attaché investigated the matter. He looked for a spy among the
seamen, but in his own report to London he does not mention sabotage.71
Many disparities in the reports mean it is hard to discover what truly
happened. However, in the light of earlier preparations, from as early as the
—
68
NA, ADM, 223/489, note by Campbell to the naval intelligence, 4 VI 1941 [together with
the analysis from 12 VI 1941].
69
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 22, vol. 1110, letter by C. Lindström to Admiral M.
Giron, 4 VII 1941.
70
RA-Arninge, SÄPO-arkiv, P 201 Polish Legation, memorandum by O. Danielsson,
71
Ibidem, memorandum, O. Danielsson, Stockholm, 5 VIII 1941.
531
autumn of 1939, the version confirming sabotage seems credible. Inde-

pendently of whether Kalle’s report was true, it spurred the intervention of
the Swedish authorities.72
No similarly dramatic events would occur following this. In late autumn
1941, the Swedish commandant of the camp highlighted that the atmosphere
around the Polish crews was quite good:
In summing up, it may be stated that the seamen of the so-called internment
camp for the Polish submarine crews, placed under the navy’s command, have
gained a good reputation among the town’s population owing to their good
behaviour during their work and following its conclusion. This means both
the Swedes and the Poles. Both are being welcomed by various associations in
Mariefred. The Poles especially deserve respect for the way they have been
enduring their fate. After a year of my service as the internment camp’s com-
mandant, it is obvious to me that the humanitarian treatment of the interned
is perhaps a seed which may bear fruit in the future, when international
cooperation will be resumed.’73
Nevertheless, the crew were placed in various conditions. Officers and non-
commissioned officers were accommodated at Ekbacken, a villa near
Strängnäs, whereas the seamen were housed in two old barrack boats. This
caused resentment among the seamen, as the living conditions on the vessels
were dreadful.74 Only in March 1942 would the Swedes allocate funds for the
construction of new barracks, but the matter was not settled instantly. In
September, at the request of the new Naval Attaché, Captain Eugeniusz
—
72
In the files of the Swedish counter intelligence, it is highlighted that the observation of the
submarines was initiated in connection with the information of the prepared sabotage,
which was communicated to the police 11 June 1941. See: MUST arkiv, Försvarsstaben,
Säkerhetsavdelningen, F VIII e, Underrättelsetjänst och sabotage, Polsk underrättelsetjänst,
vol. 26, letter by Captain G. von Döbeln to head of the Security Department, 11 X 1941, pp.
115–116.
73
KA, Marinkommando Ost, Interneringsläger nr 2, serie B I, Utgående skrivelse, vol. 1:
16 XI 1941.
74
There was a rumour spread among the seamen that the large sums of dollars allocated for
the operation of the submarines (fuel, repairs) in the event of them being cut off from their
home bases, were in fact used for private purposes by the officers. For more on this subject
see: A. Staniszewski, Na bocznym torze…, pp. 58–59. A crew member of Ryś, Władysław
Słoma, recalled the difficult housing conditions the crews had to endure, which were quite
contrary to those offered to the privileged officers, and rumours about using official funds
for private purposes of the commanders (based on the author’s conversation with W. Słoma,
12 VII 2005). On the animosities between the officers and seamen also in England see: B.
Romanowski, Torpeda…, pp. 75–76. Słoma published a memoir about the years of war that
he spent in Sweden and where he stayed for good after 1945: W. Sloma, En polsk ubåtsman
i Mariefred, Nyköping 2006.
532
Pławski, Envoy Potworowski demanded that the Swedish authorities begin

the construction of the new wooden barracks without delay. He agreed that
the Polish government should bear the costs of the investment. Potworowski
explained to the headquarters that he was forced to take decisive steps due to
the ill health of the seamen and the cold time of the year.75 On 17 December
1942, the Swedish government again discussed the issue of the interned
Polish seamen. The discussion was sparked by the letter from the Polish
Legation with a proposal that the Swedes granted a cash benefits to the crews
of the submarines for the purchase of civilian clothes. In the letter it was
argued that such benefits would by no means be at odds with the decision of
the Swedish court from 1 December 1939, when the allocation of funding for
clothing was to be made. The Polish side proposed donating 400 crowns
benefit in the first year of internment and 250 crowns every subsequent year.76
The seamen who were fed up with their continuous service on idle vessels
demanded an option of civil employment outside the camp, partly to increase
their modest income. Initially, the Swedish authorities’ refused and the sea-
men, who had demanded the right to work, were either severely punished or
moved to other camps. Nevertheless, 1942, just like 1941, was summed up by
the camp being commanded in a manner which would benefit the Poles’
‘Ability to adapt, conscientiousness and suitable behaviour – these are the
characteristics of the interned, which were also shown by them in the pre-
ceding year.’77 Not a single case of alcohol abuse was recorded.78 Perhaps
Naval Attaché Captain Eugeniusz Pławski claimed that the interned were
treated badly due to their poor living conditions. It was not until the final
period of his office, at the outset of 1943, that he would describe them as first-
class.’ From the beginning he examined the possibility of Sweden joining the
the Allies and the Polish submarines taking part in the military operations.
Nevertheless, the vessels were showing signs of age and, in November 1942,
—
75
AAN, HI/I/285, telegram by Envoy G. Potworowski to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Stockholm, 22 IX 1942; HI/I/488, letter by Rear-Admiral J. Świrski to the Ministry of
Finance, 29 X 1942. The head of the Polish Navy Command highlighted that the Swedes
were obliged to accommodate the interned in the conditions fulfilling the necessary health
requirements, the costs of which were to be covered by the Polish side following the war.
76
utrikesdepartementsärenden, Stockholm, 17 XII 1942.
77
KA, Marinkommando Ost, Interneringsläger nr 2, serie B I, Utgående skrivelse, vol. 1:
5 I 1943.
78
G. Andolf, Militära interneringar i Sverige under de första krigsâren [in:] Vindkantring…,
p. 195.
533
only Sęp was considered a viable craft. The crews of the two remaining sub-
marines were to be, on an appropriate occasion, transported to Great Britain
or employed in the Swedish navy. Pławski verbosely dubbed his project ‘the
Baltic Flotilla.’ On arranging the framework of actions, he wanted to prepare
for the talks with the Swedes ‘as a partner who knows what he wants’ and who
came ‘not only to take their orders but also to bring orders from Admiral
[Świrski].’ In the conclusion of his letter he pointed out, ‘All this is certainly
very fluid, it may become subject to the most unexpected changes or it may
never happen at all.’79 The cooperation with the Swedes was very uncertain.
Having concluded his mission, Pławski’s assessment of relations with the
Swedish military authorities, and especially the navy command, which held
sway over the eastern section of the Swedish coast, was very negative. For this
reason, he addressed UD on every matter in the first instance.80
At the beginning of April 1943, Commander Marian Wolbek, acting as a
naval expert, visited Stockholm. The instructions of Rear-Admiral Świrski
did not change from the autumn of 1939. He expected Wolbek to undertake
efforts to make ‘the submarines achieve full combat readiness as quickly as
possible, both technical and that in terms of their crews, in the event of
Sweden’s involvement in the war.’ He also claimed that, ‘If the Swedes would
like to remove the crew from one or more submarines, or, by other means,
try to remove the submarines out of our sphere of influence, then the sub-
marines would need to be destroyed and scuttled by us.’ There was a further
suggestion that the decision to destroy the vessels was to be made by Świrski,
‘if the time comes to contact me’. If no such possibility arose, the decision
was to be left to the naval attaché. What is more, Świrski forbade the employ-
ment of the seamen in any sort of intelligence activity.81
In his first report to Rear-Admiral Świrski, Wolbek recalled, ‘What I came
across was the courteous attitude of the Swedes.’82 Despite this, one of the
meetings took a bizarre turn. Count Folke Bernadotte raised the issue of an
unpaid bill for shoes purchased for Acting Sub-Lieutenant Nowacki, which
Wolbek claimed, had been lost by the Swedes. Bernadotte asked Wolbek to
reimburse the 45 Swedish crowns, as otherwise it would need to be paid by
—
79
PISM, MAR, A V 9/4, letter by Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm Commodore E. Pławski
to Rear-Admiral J. Świrski, Stockholm, 25 XI 1942.
80
KA, Försvarsstabens marina avdelningens hemliga arkiv, F IV, Personliga anteckningar,
vol. 2: 1940–1944, letter by Swedish Naval Attaché to London Captain J. G. Oxenstierna, n.p.,
2 IV 1943.
81
Polska Marynarka Wojenna., pp. 206–207.
82
PISM, MAR, A V 9/4, report by naval expert Commodore M. Wolbek to head of the Polish
Navy Command (KMW) Rear-Admiral J. Świrski, Stockholm, 4 V 1943.
534
the commandant of the camp in Falun. When Wolbek visited the camp in
Mariefred, the mood of the interned there was ‘not too good’. Although, the
documentation of the camp administration recorded only rare cases of insu-
bordination or more serious incidents. For instance, in October 1940,
Stanisław Zajączkowski was sentenced to 10 days imprisonment for beating
assaulting colleague, and in March 1943, Karol Kowalik was sentenced to 14
days imprisonment for refusing to wash the dishes.83 Among the recorded
cases these were the most usual type. The seamen were thinking about the
future and their internee status, which were unregulated by Polish laws. It
seemed as if almost no one considered the option of military action in the
crippled submarines. What also changed from the moment of the outbreak
of war was the approach to underwater operations, meaning the seamen were
not prepared for immediate deployment. According to Wolbek, sending ‘the
better ones to Great Britain’ was the model solution and later, he reiterated
that ‘the finest should be sent first.’ The principled stance of the Swedes posed
an obstacle as they opposed releasing the interned. On occasion the Poles
were reminded of the rules that limited their freedom. For instance, Wolbek
was permitted to invite only a modest number of guests to a party in Marie-
lund on 12 September 1943. A regulation was cited that only those who had
‘official relations with the interned’ could enter the camp.84
An unpleasant incident occurred on 24 May 1943, when Acting Sub-
Lieutenant Kazimierz Sadowski, and Boatswain Franciszek Graczyk were
arrested for using a radio in the internment camp. On discovering that they
were monitoring news, the Swedes underestimated the incident. They did not
find connections between this incident and the legation, which is why it did
not jeopardise the relationship between Envoy Sokolnicki and the Swedish
authorities85 nor did it impact the living conditions in the camps.
In 1943, the matter of receivables from the Bofors company remained un-
settled. In September 1943, Wolbek informed London, ‘the Bofors case is
constantly deferred.’ The Polish side wanted the outstanding orders to be
filled as soon as possible. Wolbek suspected the Swedes of deliberately delay-
ing the process, as their intention was not to pay amounts due to the Poles: ‘I
do not know whether the behaviour of the Bofors company is sincere or
—
83
KA, Marinkommando Ost, Interneringsläger no. 2, serie A, Förhörsprotokoll, vol. 1: 1940–
1945.
84
PISM, MAR, A V 9/4, letter by naval expert Commodore M. Wolbek to head of the Polish
Navy Command (KMW) Rear-Admiral J. Świrski, Stockholm, 14 IX 1943.
85
AAN, HI/I/489, letters by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 5 VI, 11 VI 1943. Sadowski was sentenced to fifteen months and
Graczyk to nine months in prison.
535
whether it is motivated by the want to protract the matter of returning the

money as long as possible – until the end of the war, when the bills for the
internment will be paid by us […].’86
Until the close of 1942, the costs of internment reached 1.7 million
crowns. The advance that was paid to the Bofors company could cover all the
costs, but the company management withheld these sums to the Polish side.
In 1944, the company objected to settling the matter in this way.87
Another issue raised by the Poles concerned the release of a small number
of seamen from internment, while disregarding the formal basis for doing so
in some of the cases. Six Polish officers (Lieutenant Ceceniowski, Lieutenant
Korsak, Lieutenant Milisiewicz, Sub-Lieutenant Męczyński, Sub-Lieutenant
Górski, Acting Sub-Lieutenant Tarczyński) and three seamen tried to obtain
the fugitive status, as they had initially escaped from the Hel Peninsula on an
unarmed, private boat and only boarded the patrol boat Batory once at sea.
In February 1943, Attaché Brzeskwiński informed London that efforts to free
them had failed. The Swedes justified their refusal by pointing out that the
officers were subject to internment regulations, as they had not fled German
bondage, but rather, left with the consent of the commander of the defence
of the Polish coast, Admiral Józef Unrug, and departed prior to the Hel
Peninsula falling in to German hands.88 In May 1943, to re-examine the case,
the Polish Legation in Stockholm employed professor Håkan Nial, from
Stockholm University, who was a specialist in international law.89 Re-ad-
dressing this issue relates to the visit of Minister Jan Kwapiński to Sweden at
that time. On 2 May, Kwapiński, accompanied by Envoy Potworowski, Mili-
tary Attaché Brzeskwiński, Lieutenant Konstanty Kowalski and Commander
Wolbek visited the internment camp in Mariefred. According to Wolbek,
‘The visit by the minister had a very positive impact on the moods of the
officers and seamen, as he was able to sense their feelings and answer ques-
tions that concerned them.’90 Following his return to London, during the
—
86
PISM, MAR, A V 9/4, letter by Polish naval expert to Stockholm Commodore M. Wolbek
to head of the Polish Navy Command Rear-Admiral J. Świrski, Stockholm, 14 IX 1943. Also
the Tudor company, where the Poles ordered batteries for Sęp, did not propose its offer ‘in
spite of constant pressures from our side.’
87
G. Andolf, Militära interneringar i Sverige under de första krigsåren [in:] Vindkantring…,
pp. 194–195.
88
PISM, A XII, 4/76, letter by director of the Main Evacuation Facility Stockholm
(Kierownicza Placówka Ewakuacyjna Sztokholm) Major F. Brzeskwiński to head of the
General Organisational Office of the Ministry of National Defense, 26 II 1943.
89
PISM, MAR, A V 9/4, report by naval expert Commodore M. Wolbek to head of the Polish
Navy Command Rear-Admiral J. Świrski, Sztokholm, 4 V 1943.
90
Ibidem.
536
government session, Kwapiński asked the minister of defence, on behalf of

the seamen, to grant them visitation by a priest and send books and cigarettes.
He also emphasized that bringing the seamen from the boat Batory to Great
Britain would be useful, as there they could be employed on Polish Merchant
Navy vessels.91
At the outset of August 1943, the Swedish authorities released five officers
and three seamen.92 In September 1943 Minister of Foreign Affairs Romer
suggested that Sokolnicki feel out the Swedish side, whether ‘in the face of the
changing moods in Sweden’, it would be possible to release more seamen,
who were not required for the maintaining of the submarines.93 The matter
was not simple, however.
In the telegram from the Polish Legation in Stockholm, it was stated, ‘As
the release of our officers is undoubtedly an act of politeness in light of a far-
fetched interpretation of the internment regulations […], the Swedish
authorities continue to maintain their current view that these officers cannot
leave Sweden on a Swedish aircraft.’ This hindered greatly the evacuation, as
the only other transport was an English single-passenger plane, running
irregular flights from mid-1941.94 Sending these seamen to Great Britain
would help the progression towards the release of another group of the
seamen. It was, therefore, important that the Polish side settle the issue of
transport as soon as possible. Despite this, the evacuation caused problems
until January 1945 when the legation was permitted to use a B-17 bomber as
a Swedish passenger aeroplane.95
In the autumn of 1944, the Poles raised the issue of releasing the seamen
again. They asked Professor Nial to provide a relevant legal assessment. The
Swede did not hide the fact that the issue of releasing the Polish seamen was
not legal, but political. On this occasion, Nial’s and Pilch’s efforts with UD
brought success. In October of 1944, Pilch informed the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs that the Swedish authorities had released three officers and seventeen
—
91
92
PISM, A 11, E/508, letter by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of
93
AAN, HI/I/305, copy of telegram by Minister of Foreign Affairs T. Romer to Polish Envoy
to Stockholm, 4 IX 1943.
94
H. Denham, Inside…, p. 42. Denham mentioned Dakota. Also the small Mosquito was
flying on the route between Scotland and Sweden.
95
537
non-commissioned officers and seamen from the crews of the Polish sub-
marines.96 Nial did not expect the Swedish authorities to agree to further
releases, but promised to continue his efforts. He justified his requests with
humanitarian arguments, namely the adverse effects of long-term intern-
ment such as depression.97
The future of the Polish submarines were the subject of fitful diplomatic
negotiations in 1945. Following the capitulation of Germany, the envoy of
Great Britain requested that the Swedish government released the Allied sol-
diers and returned the military equipment. The Swedes did not object to this.
The Poles issued a special request for British support in the efforts to release
the interned submarines and the seamen of the Polish Navy.98 The crews and
the submarines were released from internment, but the release of the sub-
marines was not straightforward.99 The Bofors company’s debts with Poland
did not cover the total costs of the internment. Damage to the submarines
also was so extensive that they had to be towed to Great Britain.100 The British
did not seem interested in the outdated vessels and advised they be sold.101
Rear-Admiral Świrski asked the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to initiate
discreet talks with the Swedish authorities regarding the towing of the sub-
marines to where they would be taken over by the British navy.102 Neverthe-
less, the Swedes hesitated, as they feared the reaction of the Soviet authorities.
This was even confirmed to the Polish naval attaché by Admiral Giron, who
was described by Sokolnicki as ‘the fictional custodian of the submarines.’
Giron proposed that the submarines be kept temporarily in Sweden and that
only their crews be evacuated.103 Meanwhile, Minister Tarnowski demanded
—
96
97
Ibidem, copy of letter by H. Nial to counsellor to Polish Legation in Stockholm, Nockeby,
10 X 1944. The Swede sent back the remuneration in the amount of 100 crowns, he described
as ‘modest input in the entire issue.’ He requested that the money be submitted to the sup-
port fund for Polish children.
98
NA, FO, 371/47796, letter by Northern Department of the FO the Legation of Great Britain
in Stockholm, 15 V 1945.
99
Ibidem, letter by the Legation of Great Britain in Stockholm to the Northern Department
of the FO, 24 V 1945.
100
PISM, A 11, E 81, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 12 V 1945.
101
Ibidem, telegram by Polish Envoy to Stockholm H. Sokolnicki to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 25 V 1945.
102
Ibidem, letter by Polish Naval Attaché to London Captain T. Stoklasa to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 19 V 1945.
103
Affairs, 22 V 1945.
538
that efforts continue to convince the Swedish authorities to agree to the

moving of the submarines to Great Britain.104 On 1 June, Sokolnicki an-
nounced that he had taken initial steps concerning the issue of returning the
tall ship Dar Pomorza and the yacht Kaparen, which were to be moved to
Gothenburg.105 The British promised further support and assistance.106 For
security reasons, the possibility of navigating the vessels through the Göta
Canal was considered.107 On 26 June Minister, Tarnowski informed Sokol-
nicki that Captain Pławski would travel to Stockholm in connection with the
submarines. The Swedes announced that the crews had been released and, as
of 1 August, would be no longer supported by the Swedish government and
that for the time being the submarines would not be able to leave their current
location and that the Swedish side would be responsible for their res-
toration.108
The Foreign Office (FO) refused to grant official support to the efforts of
the Polish government. The British only promised to consider supporting the
Polish claims with the Swedes unofficially:
The FO considers our special claims to be justified and unofficially advises us
to continue our efforts with the Swedes along this line. If the Swedes were to
refuse to place a collateral on the German property, then it would have to be
stated that we consider the Swedes to be directly responsible and we demand
compensation from them for all the losses.109
Several days later, both Great Britain and Sweden withdrew their recognition
of the Polish government in exile, yet the submarines returned to Gdynia in
October 1945.
—
104
Ibidem, telegram by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Tarnowski to Polish Envoy to
105
of Foreign Affairs, n.p., 1 VI 1945.
106
Ibidem, telegram by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Polish Legation in Stockholm,
9 VI 1945.
107
Ibidem, telegram by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Polish Legation in Stockholm,
19 VI 1945.
108
Affairs, 22 VI 1945.
109
Ibidem, telegram by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Tarnowski to Polish Legation in
539
Aviators
During the Second World War, Sweden became the landing location, either
due to emergency reasons or desertion, for 327 aircraft carrying nearly 1900
people (most of whom were the Americans, whose aircrews normally con-
sisted of 9–10 people),110 which included one Polish civilian aircraft, two
bombers on a special mission to Poland and two bombers from the Bomber
Squadron No. 300 of Great Britain, performing air strikes in Germany. These
aircrafts brought twenty Polish pilots to Sweden, and apart from them two
other pilots managed to break through into Sweden from Denmark, where
they were shot down. The nationality of the crew members of the last aircraft
from the Bomber Squadron No. 300, which landed in Sweden in the summer
of 1944, is unknown. The identities of all the pilots are not known either.
The first Polish aircraft to land in Sweden following the outbreak of the war
was the leisure aircraft RWD-13.111 Acting Sub-Lieutenant Edmund Jereczek and
Reserve Second Lieutenant Tadeusz Nowacki, started out from Gdynia on 13
September and reached Gotland three hours later.112 There, Jereczek, wearing
civil clothing, was released and by 2 October he had headed off to France, and
later to Great Britain, where he served in the Royal Air Force. The case of Second
Lieutenant Tadeusz Nowacki was unique. He was interned because he was
caught wearing a military uniform. Towards the close of 1942, Nowacki engaged
a lawyer, Hugon Lindberg, and turned to the court to question the legal basis for
his internment, which took place, because at the time Sweden did not permit for
the transit of soldiers representing any of the sides of the conflict. Nevertheless,
in mid-1940, relating to the conclusion of the Swedish–German transit agree-
ment, the regulations changed so that uniformed and unarmed soldiers from
countries engaged in the war could be transported through Swedish territory.
Towards the close of 1942, Nowacki began arguing that these regulations should
be also applicable to the soldiers of other armies, including the Polish. From the
point of view of international law then, such transit was acceptable and there
were no grounds for the internment of Second Lieutenant Nowacki. Therefore,
he should be released without delay. He obliged himself to leave the territory of
—
110
B. Widfeldt, R. Wegmann, Nödlandning. Främmande flyg i Sverige under andra världs-
kriget, Nässjö 1998, p. 183.
111
Ibidem, p. 8.
112
Nowacki was told to fly from Gdynia to Vilnius. He received the sum of 115 thousand
zloty which was to be spent on the military families. In Gotland the Poles wanted to buy fuel
and then continue their flight. Cf. T. Nowakowski, ‘Polak, który wstrząsnął Szwecją –
prozaik, publicysta, sowietolog Tadeusz Jan Nowacki (1902–1976)’, Archiwum Emigracji
2001, issue 4, p. 280.
540
Sweden as soon as he was freed. His efforts were supported by the Związek
Armatorów Polskich (Baltic Exchange Chamber), which emphasized in a letter
to Polish military authorities that Nowacki, who was a famous journalist and
economist, would prove useful to the Polish commercial navy in Great Britain.
However, the attitude of Commander Pławski towards this issue was negative.
He convinced Rear-Admiral Jerzy Świrski that Nowacki ‘did not represent any
particular value as an officer, and his local reputation is average.’ In addition,
Pławski clarified that he was unfamiliar with Nowacki’s achievements as an
opinion journalist. He noted that he rather preferred officers engaged in active
military service, who could be useful during armed combat.113 In turn, Attaché
Brzeskwiński was against releasing Nowacki if it would not lead to further
releases of other officers (besides those serving on the interned submarines) for
fear that morale could become undermined.114 Following long discussions, the
Polish Legation in Stockholm promised the Swedish authorities that it would
facilitate Nowacki’s departure from Sweden after he had fulfilled all the required
formalities. The Poles declared that Nowacki was only soldier of the Polish army
whose intention was to pass through Sweden, that his was an exceptional case
and that it would not constitute a precedent as far as the remaining interned
Polish soldiers were concerned.115 Despite Nowacki winning the court case, the
Swedes initially rejected his application.116 It was only in April 1944 that the later
co-author of the book Land without Quisling was released, granted a resident
status and a work permit.117
The crew of the Halifax aircraft, which was on its way back from the
special mission over the territory of Poland, composed of Colonel Roman
Rudkowski, Lieutenant Tadeusz Jasiński, Lieutenant Stanisław Król, Sergeant
Franciszek Sobkowiak, Sergeant Walenty Wasilewski, Sergeant Józef
Chodyra, Sergeant Rudolf Mol and Sergeant Jerzy Sołtysiak, was forced to
make an emergency landing on 8 November 1941 near to the city of Tomelilla
—
113
PISM, A XII, 4/176, letter by Polish naval expert of the Polish Legation in Stockholm
Commodore E. Pławski to the Polish Navy Command (KMW), 11 XII 1942.
114
Ibidem, letter by Polish Military Attaché to Stockholm Major F. Brzeskwiński to Ministry
of Military Affairs (MSWojsk), 11 XII 1942.
115
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 22, vol. 1110, pro memoria, 12 II 1943.
116
PISM, A XII, 4/76, letter by director of the Main Evacuation Facility (Kierownicza
Placówka Ewakuacyjna) Major F. Brzeskwiński to head of the General Organisational Office
of the Ministry of National Defence, 26 II 1943. Nowacki was able, based on the officer’s
word of honour, to periodically leave internment and stay in Stockholm, visit the interned
Polish seamen and teach them foreign languages and economy. See: T. Nowakowski,
Polak…, p. 281.
117
G. Andolf, ‘Militära interneringar i Sverige under de första krigsåren’ [in:] Vind-
kantring…, pp. 193–194.
541
to the north east of Ystad. Attaché Brzeskwiński, as usual, made efforts to

have the crew released from internment.118 The VI Division of the Staff of
Commander-in-Chief put pressure on the British authorities to evacuate the
pilots from Sweden.119 Rudkowski was released towards the end of November,
whereas the rest of the crew had to wait until the beginning of January 1942.120
On the morning of 27 April 1942, another emergency landing was per-
formed due to an engine failure in southern Sweden not far from Ystad by the
Polish bomber plane Wellington, which was on its way back from the Rostock
bombing. The entire crew composed of Lieutenant Czech Nowacki, Ensign
Witold Bohuszewicz, Lieutenant Bernard Budnik, Seargant Zdzisław
Taczalski, Platoon Bolesław Bestecki and Sergeant Krzysztof Grabowski sur-
vived and as per orders, destroyed the aircraft before the Swedish soldiers
arrived. On the same day, an official of the Polish consulate in Malmö,
Franciszek Mejor, and British Consul Castleton set off to Ystad to meet the
crew of the bomber.121 It transpired that three officers were accommodated in
the Continental hotel, and three non-commissioned officers in military bar-
racks. Vicar Daniel Cederberg, who had previously worked in the Swedish
Seamen’s Home in Gdynia, would also travel to meet the crew. Cederberg
supplied the Polish pilots with books in English and item for shaving. He also
contacted a Polish lector at Lund University, Zygmunt Łakociński, and en-
couraged him pay the pilots a visit.122 Łakociński brought books in Polish.
Cederberg was clearly trying to make the best possible impression. The pilots
highlighted his helpfulness. In a conversation with Mejor, the vicar admitted
that his former statements about the situation in Gdynia, unfavourable for
Poles, ‘could be used by the German propaganda.’ Although, as it was reported
by Cederberg, the Swedes were bearing a grudge towards the Polish pilots for
destroying their machine, Łakociński highlighted in his report that the crew
was surprised by the kindness expressed by the Swedish side, ‘[The non-com-
missioned officers] were healthy and happy, and they repeatedly emphasised
—
118
PISM, Lot, A V, 1/43, letter by Polish Military Attaché to Stockholm Major F.
Brzeskwiński to head of the Staff of Commander-in-Chief, 8 V 1942.
119
PISM, A XII, 4/140, letter by head of the Division I of the Staff of Commander-in-Chief
Colonel K. Glabisz to Polish Military Attaché to Stockholm Major F. Brzeskwiński, London,
19 XII 1941; Note by Colonel K. Glabisz to head of the Division VI of the Staff of
Commander-in-Chief Colonel J. Smoleński, 19 XII 1941.
120
B. Widfeldt, R. Wegmann, Nödlandning…, p. 31; G. Andolf, ‘Militära interneringar i
Sverige under de första krigsåren’ [in:] Vindkantring…, p. 214.
121
PISM, Lot, A V 1/43, letter by F. Mejor to the Polish Envoy to Stockholm, G. Potworowski,
Malmö, 28 IV 1942.
122
PISM, Lot, A V 143, report by Z. Łakociński, Lund, 13 V 1942. The document was published
by E.S. Kruszewski in Rocznik Instytutu Polsko-Skandynawskiego 2000–2001, pp. 29–32.
542
the warm reception they were offered by all the Swedes. I purposefully asked
about this matter, considering that the soldiers could include the Swedish
Nazis. But nobody noticed any of them.’ When it came to the officers:
The general conversation was conducted in English and I may gladly say that
the relations between the Poles and the Swedes were exceptionally cordial in
all the cases. This was especially striking as I was familiar with many rumours
about the Swedish officer corps. Our officers also told me that they never
expected to be welcomed so warmly, and at the end of the day-long stay they
also noticed no trace of aversion that could spring from the possible pro-Nazi
orientation of any of the officers. […] In Sweden they received everything they
needed, and they liked the Swedish food far better than the English. […] As I
was saying my goodbye, they were all about to go for a walk together (the hotel
is in the city centre).123
Mejor’s attitude about the Swedish sincerity was more reserved. He found it
to be the Swedes’ technique for gather necessary information. It did not
escape his attention when two Swedish officers kept asking Polish pilots
about the technical details of the destroyed bomber. Mejor emphasized in his
report that although the Poles ‘realized right away what was going on and
responded evasively,’ he also pointed out, ‘It would be desirable that prior to
their departure from England the Polish pilots be reminded that in neutral
states, where they are warmly welcomed, they should be cautious with their
comments.’124 Nowacki’s crew was interned in a camp in Främby near
Falun.125 Łakociński predicted that the pilots would be released quickly from
internment just like the crew, who had landed in Sweden in November 1941
and returned home a long time before. However, this time the Polish pilots
remained in Sweden slightly longer. It was possible to establish that Nowacki
and Bohuszewicz were released as late as on 15 February 1943 (they left
—
123
Ibidem.
124
PISM, Lot, A V 1/43, letter by F. Mejor to the Polish Envoy to Stockholm, G. Potworowski,
Malmö, 28 IV 1942.
125
B. Widfeldt, R. Wegmann, Nödlandning…, pp. 33–34. Łakociński mentioned in his report
that the pilots were accommodated in the nearby guesthouse in Korsnäs. See also the recol-
lections from the ill-fated flight: Cz. Nowacki, ‘Śmierć dla U’ [in:] Czyż mogli dać więcej.
Dzieje 13 Promocji Szkoły Podchorążych Lotnictwa w Dęblinie, material collected by A. Dreja,
prepared for printing by K. Łukaszewicz-Preihs, J. Preihs, London 1989, pp. 181–184.
543
Sweden on 21 February).126 Bestecki returned to Great Britain on 31 March;

and Taczalski together with Grabowski, on 3 April 1943.127
It is also interesting to note that Lieutenant Czech Nowacki force-landed in
Sweden for the second time and was placed in the same camp.128 His liberator
(besides Nowacki, the crew composed of pilot Bronisław Hułas, navigator
Mieczysław Malinowski, radiotelegraph operator Bolesław Woźniak, plane
mechanic Witold Ruciński and gunners Stefan Miniakowski and Józef Dubiel)
on 10 October 1943, on his return from a secret mission to Poland, had to land
near Varberg in southern Sweden. Nowacki was the only Polish pilot to be
interned twice in Sweden and one of two Allied pilots, except for an American,
Lieutenant Leander Page.129 According to Attaché Brzeskwiński, Nowacki and
his crew enjoyed complete freedom. They were not guarded and they did not
complain about the accommodation or food. The pilots were granted a small
monthly remuneration and civilian clothing from the Legation of Great
Britain.130 In December of 1943, the Allies’ register contained the names of
seven Polish pilots interned in Sweden.131 Lieutenant Nowacki and five mem-
bers of his crew left Sweden between 11 and 17 June 1944, and two others
(Miniakowski and Ruciński) followed by 9 September 1944.132 According to the
pilot release records of 1944, this group included twenty Poles. At the outset of
1945, there were no interned Polish pilots in Sweden.133
—
126
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 22, vol. 1110, note regarding the Polish air force
soldiers interned in Sweden, See: Czyż mogli…, p. 342. Nowacki wanted to steal one of the
Swedish aircraft and escape internment as quickly as possible to Great Britain. The Swedish
pilots were so sociable that they even showed him how to operate their Junkers aircraft. The
escape was prevented due to the absolute ban from the representatives of both Polish and
British diplomatic mission. They claimed that the chances for such an action were slim, and
the escape attempt would only toughen the regime of the Swedes and make it worse for other
interned soldiers (based on the conversation between the author and Cz. Nowacki, 18 XII
2000).
127
PISM, MAR, A V 1/43, letter by Platoon B. Bestecki to the Commissariat Department, 11
V 1943.
128
PISM, Lot, A IV I/37/15, record book: Second Lieutenant Nowacki Czech.
129
B. Widfeldt, R. Wegmann, Nödlandning…, pp. 54, 87.
130
PISM, Lot, A V, 1/43, letter by the Polish Military Attaché to Stockholm, Major F.
Brzeskwiński, to the head of the Intelligence Division of the Staff of Commander-in-Chief,
20 X 1943.
131
RA, UD 1920 års dossiersystem, HP 22, vol. 1110, telegram by Maycock to the Ministry
of Aviation, 16 XII 1943.
132
B. Widfeldt, R. Wegmann, Nödlandning…, p. 50.
133
G. Andolf, ‘Interneringen av britter och tyskar 1943–1944’ [in:] Vårstormar…, pp. 235–
236.
544
Another case was Sergeant Tadeusz Miecznik, who made an emergency

landing in Denmark on 17 September 1943, during which four crew mem-
bers died and one died later from their wounds. Two others, including
Miecznik, ended up in a German prison. Due to leg and arm injuries,
Miecznik was taken to hospital from where, with the help of Danish staff, he
managed to escape on 1 November. Several days later he reached Sweden by
boat. Following a routine interrogation, during which the Polish pilot
provided information on the course of flight training, the tactics of American
aviation and the conducted operations, Miecznik was sent to Great Britain
on 24 January 1944.134
Another Polish pilot would reach Sweden through Denmark. The crew of
a Lancaster bomber, together with pilot Wasik was shot at by a German
fighter aircraft on 30 August 1944 while heading towards the city of Szczecin.
The bomber exploded and only Wasik survived. With the help of the Polish
resistance movement, on 9 September he made it to Sweden, and two weeks
later found himself in Great Britain.135 On 30 August, another Polish Lan-
caster bomber from the Bomber Squadron No. 300 commanded by pilot
Jones (according to Swedish documentation) landed in Sweden.136 Its entire
crew survived and, following a stay at an internment camp, they returned to
Great Britain.
Release from internment was the subject of frequent discussions in UD, as
the Hague Convention of 1907 completely ignored the pilots, leaving a lot of
room for interpretation of the regulations applying to soldiers and seamen.
In general, the Swedes adopted the principle of compensation. An equal
number of pilots were to be released on both sides of the conflict. When it
transpired that the number of Allied pilots who found themselves Sweden
was greater than that of pilots from other countries, the Swedes, without pas-
sing on the news to the Germans, began to release groups of 10 pilots for
every German machine that was forced to make an emergency landing in
Sweden and yet, after repairs, resumed its flight.137 The principle was also
applied that pilots who broke through into Sweden, following their escape
from prison or occupied territories, were released as civilians.
—
134
B. Widfeldt, R. Wegmann, Nödlandning…, p. 47; A. Bielnicki, ‘Lotnicy polscy w Danii w
latach drugiej wojny światowej’, Zeszyty Historyczne (Paris) 1981, iss. 56, pp. 201–203.
135
A. Bielnicki, Lotnicy…, pp. 203–205.
136
B. Widfeldt, R. Wegmann, Nödlandning…, p. 102.
137
G. Andolf, ‘Interneringen av britter och tyskar 1943–1944’ [in:] Vårstormar…, pp. 224–225.
545
Soldiers of the 1940 Norwegian Campaign

The case of twelve privates from the Polish Independent Highland Rifle
Brigade (Samodzielna Brygada Strzelców Podhalańskich) was unique. They
crossed the Norwegian–Swedish border in May 1940. Initially, they were
interned, but soon the Polish officers who contacted them informed the
Swedish authorities that they were ‘deserters, Jews and Ukrainians.’138 The
commandant of the camp advised his superiors to release the men to main-
tain camp discipline, and because the Polish Legation would not take res-
ponsibility for them.139 The group of twelve was released in line with the rules
applying to soldiers who had fought in the Norwegian Campaign, regardless
of their nationality.140 Eventually, ten of the twelve returned to occupied
Poland and two wanted to travel to Great Britain and join the Polish army.
At the time, they were found employment by the Swedish authorities, and
most probably due to this they remained in Sweden.
This was a small group of approximately 4800 soldiers, mostly Norwegi-
ans, but also Britons and Germans, and one Portuguese, who were mostly
interned due to the military actions which took place in Norway in the spring
of 1940. For the Swedish authorities, it was important to unload such a large
group of interned soldiers, which is why, as part of the agreements with the
sides of the conflict, they were gradually released.
—
138
RA, mf. F 035-3-32252, copy of pro memoria.
139
G. Andolf, ‘Militära interneringar i Sverige under de första krigsåren’ [in:] Vind-
kantring…, pp. 199–200.
140
PISM, A XII, 22/36, letter by the deputy head of the Division II of the Staff of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-Colonel S. Gano, to the head of the Staff of the Commander-
in-Chief, London, 20 IX 1940.
546
Conclusion
Polish–Swedish relations during the Second World War is clearly divided

into several stages. Following Hitler’s aggression of September 1939, Sweden
attempted, based on its experiences from the First World War, to maintain
strict neutrality and to manoeuvre between the warring parties. At the begin-
ning of the war, Poland became the main theatre of military operations, that
is why Polish affairs were to a large extent dealt with by both the Swedish
government and society. It should be noted that this was the period of the
peak of a versatile interest in Poland, the course of the military campaign was
described in Swedish newspapers in detail until the final Polish defeat.
Comments were devoted to the Soviet aggression on September 17 and its
consequences.
In 1939, the Swedish diplomacy fulfilled its obligations in representing
Polish interests in Germany in line with the agreement of August 1939. After
November, it suspended this mission under pressure from the Germans.
Sweden began implementing a strategy of flexible neutrality. Swedish foreign
policy was an unemotional policy of adaptation to the circumstances, which
were coming into existence because of developments in the war. Its principal
target was to prevent potential aggressors from occupying Sweden. As a
result, the Swedes succumbed to the political and economic demands of
Germany. At the time, Polish–Swedish relations were virtually limited to the
meetings between Envoy Gustaw Potworowski and the heads of the Swedish
diplomacy, whose purpose was to settle current affairs.
Following the Battle of Stalingrad, the Swedes gradually started meeting
the expectations of the Allies. In 1943, they abandoned the policy of conces-
sions towards Hitler and established a closer cooperation with Great Britain
and the USA. The relations with the Polish government in exile improved
only slightly. From the autumn of 1939 until the breakthrough in the war, the
Swedes avoided, in favour of the Allies, official contact with the Polish
government due to the Germans. From 1943 onwards, in relation to the con-
fidential relations with the diplomats of other countries, the Swedish
authorities started to treat political targets increasingly irreverently. What
became noticeable about the Swedish policy was the fear about the domin-
ance of the Soviet Union in the Baltic Sea region, whilst the Swedes were
trying to maintain the best possible relations with Moscow. Poland could
547
only be an obstacle for maintaining such relations. Regarding this, Stockholm

quickly accepted the Soviet interpretations of the Katyń Massacre, the
Polish–Soviet dispute over the border, and eventually the conflict around
creating a new political representation of the Polish nation in Moscow in
opposition to the Polish government in exile. And, therefore, the propagand-
ist campaigns conducted by the Polish Legation in Stockholm were fruitless.
Planned for raising compassion or even mercy for the Polish nation, they did
not support the political actions. In this context the picture of Polish–
Swedish relations during the war can be treated as bringing sometimes new
views on the policy of Sweden in 1939–45.
Satirical pieces of literature from during the war stigmatized the cynicism
of the heads of the Swedish diplomacy. Staffan Tjerneld wrote a text for a
variety show staged in the Nya Teatern, where pointed out to the government
that they were yielding to the political situation and were always ‘true friends
of those who are on top.’1 Towards the close of the war, the best solution was
rapprochement with Moscow. In the opinion of the Polish Naval Attaché to
Stockholm, Commander Marian Wolbek, what was again given priority was
‘cold calculation: how to struggle out of the difficult situation risking the least
and achieving the greatest benefits.’2
The visit of Jan Kwapiński, Minister of Industry, Trade and Shipping, to
Stockholm in April and May of 1943, and establishing direct relations with
the social democrats who occupied the highest state positions (headed by
Prime Minister Hansson), were not enough to overcome the Swedish fears
about becoming involved with a partner whose relations with the Soviet
Union were gradually worsening. This clearly shows that the issue of the
Katyń Massacre (revealed in April 1943) was among other things a break-
through in the Swedish–Polish relations. On taking a clear look on the
development of the situation in Europe, it shows that the Swedes predicted
quite early that the Polish government would never return to its homeland.
In fact, they initiated the talks with the Polish Legation about coal import
from Poland after the conclusion of military operations, but, as it turned out,
—
1
2
PISM, MAR, A V 9/2, report by the Polish Naval Attaché to Stockholm, Commander M.
Wolbek to the head of the Intelligence Division of the Staff of Commander-in-Chief, 4 XI
1943. The methods of the Swedish diplomats were bluntly described in the summer of 1942
by the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rolf Witting. He stated: ‘in order to understand
the Swedish policy one needs not to be a professor in oceanography but a professor in patho-
logical anatomy’ (quoted after W. M. Carlgren, Svensk utrikespolitik…). The reason for this
view was most probably his disappointment with the excessively weak, in his opinion,
Swedish support of Finland on the international arena.
548
CONCLUSION
they did this only to use the negotiations to gather precious knowledge about
the intentions of the Allies on the issue of the neutral states’ supplies and
plans for the post-war reconstruction conducted by international organisa-
tions appointed for this purpose. Initially, it seemed that it would be precisely
on the grounds of the renewal of economic relations that the common
interests would be defined. However, when a suitable occasion came along,
the Swedes changed their conversation partner and, in the fall of 1944,
established relations with the representation of the PKWN in Moscow.
The Swedes did not accept the Polish arguments, both regarding the
eastern and to the western border. They adopted a similar position to those
western opinion journalists who maintained that Poland most naturally com-
prised of Warsaw and its surroundings, but further there lied ‘only doubts.’
It is worth noting that in the last years of the war, 1944 and 1945, Poland
again started to appear on the front pages of Swedish newspapers. Despite
the substantial efforts of the press attaché’s office in Stockholm, many
Swedish opinion journalists agreed with the slogans of the Soviet propaganda
that the Eastern Borderlands were mostly inhabited by a non-Polish popu-
lation and relating to this there were no grounds for them to be included in
the Polish Republic. Towards the end of the war, the pro-German attitude
was still very strong, but not associated with Nazism and close to the views of
the supporters of European balance. The plans to award Poland with the
entire territory of Silesia and Pomerania did not gain much support in
Sweden and were perceived as hotbeds of new conflicts in the future.
However, towards the end of the war Poland could count on relatively
extensive humanitarian aid, which, treated as an instrument of foreign policy,
in the case of Poland was a gesture of good will at the outset of economic
negotiations and a sign of acceptance for the deal created by Stalin in Central
Europe. What was surely of great importance for making this decision was
the tragedy of the Warsaw Rising. The Polish government in exile continued
its efforts to prevent the neutral states from treating the Polish issue as closed.
The aid campaign organized by the Swedish society for the citizens of
Warsaw was a sign of support for the Polish aspirations for independence.
The Polish diplomats residing in Stockholm evaluated the position of
Sweden with understanding. They did not excessively condemn the submis-
siveness towards Germany. With a far greater disappointment they reacted
to the opportunism towards the Soviet Union. What was noticeable in this
context were the interesting opinions about the Swedish policy in the Polish
press in exile. In 1939–43, the policy of neutrality was criticised, as it was
549
associated with supporting Hitler’s aggression, and in 1944–45 there ap-

peared acceptance for the cautiousness in the relations with the Soviet Union
and the willingness to remain outside the Allied camp until the conclusion of
the war. Thanks to the reports about the transports of Swedish humanitarian
aid to the Polish territory and about good living conditions of the Poles, both
the refugees and the interned, in Sweden, a positive picture of this country
was consolidated in the minds of the Polish readership (although the descrip-
tions of the Swedish prosperity could evoke mixed feelings).3
The Swedish politicians were, in general, unlikely to show their sentiments
towards Poland. What needs to be emphasized is that the diplomats who had
contacts with Poland looked on it favourably before the war. Not only were
head of the Press department at Utrikesdepartementet Sven Grafström and
Secretary-General Erik Boheman well oriented in the complex subject of
Poland’s relations with its neighbours, but they also understood the motives
behind the actions of the government in exile. However, in general it would
be difficult to speak of a Polish lobby in Sweden. One such small group was
composed of several members of the diplomatic elite and discreetly operating
industrialists. The Polish resistance movement collaborated with the Swedish
industrialists who represented their own companies in Poland under the
German occupation. Sven Norrman and Gösta Gustafsson, especially, con-
tributed a great deal as couriers for the Polish Underground State and the
Home Army. Many years later they never boasted about their activity in
favour of Poland. Fears that the documentation would fall in to the hands of
unauthorized persons were too strong.
For one thing, there was Polish heroism and dreams of independence
because of the sacrifice and battle for a just cause, and for another, the Swedish
opportunism and striving to reach compromise as a method of surviving the
turmoil of war. According to the historian A. W. Johansson, compromise, also
in the relations with other countries, was inseparably and naturally connected
with the style of policy conducted by Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson. It is
hard to evaluate this policy unequivocally, as its characteristic features were
delay tactics, timidity and the anti-heroic attitude of an observer, whereas in
reality it was prudent manoeuvring between the mutually exclusive aspirations
—
3
Of interest was that the Polish or Swedish press recorded only three examples of the Polish–
Swedish brotherhood of arms. A Swedish sailor’s accidental participation in the defence of
Gdynia in September 1939, a Swedish Royal Air Force pilot’s control of a bomber carrying
Polish crew and a Swedish construction company representative’s joining Polish air force
following the trauma he had suffered during an inspection of the occupied territories (M.S.,
‘Szwed z Oświęcimia’, Dziennik Żołnierza Armii Polskiej na Wschodzie, 6 VIII 1944). To be
honest, it is not certain whether any of the above examples is authentic.
550
CONCLUSION
of the powers.4 Using the term proposed by an American researcher Herbert R.

Reginbogin: What was the Swedish face of neutrality as for the Polish matter
during the war? The attitude towards the Polish matter is characterised by
political pragmatism which is best described by Östen Unden, who held the
office of the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs before and after the war, and
government counsellor during the Second World War: ‘small countries, just
like ours, can seldom influence the course of events. Such countries also cannot
help others in the event of war.’5 In this way the Swedish political elites denied
all accusations of unethical conduct and absolved themselves from their lack of
sense of responsibility for the situation in the Baltic Sea region. The newest
interpretation of the policy of Sweden was proposed by Klas Åmark: “The
negotiating policy also meant that the Swedish government accepted that the
great powers had the right to make claims on Sweden and to start negotiations
about these claims. The Swedish negotiators and the Swedish government
understood negotiating was a risky business that involved unpleasant com-
promises, but it became the foremost method for the small state to protect itself
against open violence and war”.6
Sweden was not a strategic partner for Poland, and for Sweden relations
with Poland were obviously subordinate to the relations with great powers.
The course of military operations determined Sweden’s role as an evacuation
destination, a shelter for refugees, an important junction of communication
with the occupied territories and, most notably, as a country that was not
affected by the military operations. In the face of the looming downfall of the
Third Reich, Sweden was considered a suitable partner in the process of eco-
nomic restoration of Poland. In the eyes of Sweden, Poland was one of many
Central European problems, which were to be followed carefully but not
engaged in. As early as in the interwar period, it became clear that Swedish
horizons of political thinking (despite the country’s considerable engagement
in the activity of the League of Nations) was limited to the Nordic States and,
to a much narrower extent, the Baltic States, except Lithuania. During the
Second World War, nothing changed in this respect. Consequently, the scope
of shared Polish–Swedish interests could not be particularly broad. What was
most noticeable were the issues of economic cooperation, or rather perspec-
—
4
5
Quoted after: P. Andrzejewski, ‘Szwedzka neutralność – wizerunek poprzez Bałtyk’ [in:]
Svea. Ze studiów nad szwedzką nauką i kulturą, ed. B. Andrzejewski, Poznań 1990, p. 133.
6
Åmark K., Sweden. Negotiated neutrality, [in:] R. Bosworth, J. Maiolo (eds.), Cambridge
History of the Second World War, vol. 2: Politics and Ideology, Cambridge 2015, p. 373.
551
tives of its renewal after the war. Political relations were practically non-exis-
tent. During the initial months of the war, Swedish diplomacy focused on
representing Polish interests in Germany. Later, the Swedes observed
Poland’s fate closely and speculated about its future. Some degree of anxiety,
but also opportunism, accompanied the observations of the initial phase of
Soviet dominance of the Baltic Sea. Counting on satisfying Sweden’s own
interests, Swedish newspapers willingly repeated the slogan ‘Vad angår oss
polska affärer?’, which translates to ‘Why should we care about Polish affairs?’
The Poles were expecting that their sovereignty would be defended and
their territorial integrity maintained. Nevertheless, it turned out that such ef-
forts were not among the priorities of European powers. The sacrifice made
in combat with Germany was of little avail and political objectives of Poland,
devoid of effective instruments of implementation, continued to remain
merely a dream. No military attack was launched on Sweden and it main-
tained a consistent opportunistic policy of concessions towards the claims of
the fighting powers, while preserving its main goal of non-involvement in the
war. A part of this opportunistic strategy was diminishing the significance of
Polish interests in the sphere of Swedish policy.
The lack of choices available to Poland ought to be noted. It was continu-
ously faced with faits accomplis. Sweden, though, had a certain amount of
room for manoeuvre in the diplomatic maze during the Second World War.
Its concessions related to a sense of threat and limitation of sovereignty, but
they were short-term in character and did not question Sweden’s territorial
integrity.
552
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Protokół obrad KC PPR w maju 1945 roku, oprac. A. Kochański, Warszawa 1992
(Dokumenty do dziejów PRL, p. 1).
Sprawa polska w czasie drugiej wojny światowej na arenie międzynarodowej. Zbiór
dokumentów, S. Stanisławska (ed.), Warsaw 1965.
Svensk utrikespolitik under andra världskriget. Statsrådstal, riksdagsdebatter och
kommunikéer, R. Lundström (ed.), S. Dahl, Stockholm 1946.
2. Diaries and memoirs

Assarsson V., I skuggan av Stalin, Stockholm 1963.
Bernadotte F., Människor jag mött, Stockholm 1947.
Bernadotte F., Slutet. Mina humanitära förhandlingar i Tyskland våren 1945 och
deras politiska följder, Stockholm 1945.
Boheman E., På vakt. Från attaché till sändebud. Minnesanteckningar, Stockholm
1963.
556
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Boheman E., På vakt. Kabinettssekreterare under andra världskriget, Stockholm 1964.

Churchill W. S., The Second World War, vol. 1: The Gathering Storm, London 1985.
Churchill W. S, The Second World War, vol. 2: Their finest hour, London 1985
Dahlerus B., Sista försöket. London–Berlin sommaren 1939, Stockholm 1945.
Denham H., Inside the Nazi Ring. A Naval Attaché in Sweden 1940–1945, London
1984.
Diariusz i teki Jana Szembeka (1935–1945), t. 4, oprac. J. Zaranski, London 1972.
Dzienniki czynności Prezydenta RP Władysława Raczkiewicza 1939–1947, t. 1: 1939–
1942, t. 2: 1943–1947, oprac. J. Piotrowski, Wrocław 2004.
Erlander T., 1901–1939, Stockholm 1972.
Erlander T., 1940–1949, Stockholm 1973.
Fredborg A., Bakom stålvallen. Som svensk korrespondent i Berlin 1941–43, Stock-
holm 1943.
Frykman S., Röda korsexpeditionen till Tyskland, Stockholm 1945.
Gistedt E., Från operett till tragedi, Stockholm 1946.
Goebbels J., Tagebücher 1924–1945, R. G. Reuth (ed.), t. 5: 1943–1945, München–
Zürich 2000.
Gottfarb I., Den livsfarliga glömskan, Stockholm 2006.
Grafström S., Anteckningar 1938–1944, S. Ekman (ed.), Stockholm 1989.
Grafström S., Anteckningar 1945–1954, S. Ekman (ed.), Stockholm 1989.
Hägglöf G., Möte med Europa. Paris–London–Moskva–Genève–Berlin 1926–1940,
Stockholm 1971.
Henderson N., Failure of a Mission. Berlin 1937–1939, New York 1940.
Jędrychowski S., Przedstawicielstwo PKWN w Moskwie, Warszawa 1987.
Jones R. V., Most Secret War, Chatham 1997.
Kersten F., Samtal med Himmler. Minnen från Tredje Riket 1939–1945, Stockholm
1947.
Kochanowicz T., Na wojennej emigracji. Wspomnienia z lat 1942–1944, wyd. 2, War-
saw 1979.
Kollontai A., Diplomaticeskie dnevniki 1922–1940, vol. 2, Moscow 2001.
Kwapiński J., 1939–1945 (kartki z pamiętnika), London 1947.
Lipski J., Diplomat in Berlin 1933–1939. Papers and Memoirs of Jozef Lipski, Ambas-
sador of Poland, W. Jędrzejewicz (ed.), New York–London 1968.
Macmillan H., The Blast of War 1939–1945, London 1967.
Mannerheim C. G., Minnen, vol. 1–2, Stockholm 1951–52.
Masur N., En jude talar med Himmler, Stockholm 1945.
Mikołajczyk S., Polska zgwałcona, Warsaw 2005.
Mitkiewicz L., Wspomnienia kowienskie 1938–1939, Warsaw–Wrocław 1989.
Müllern G., Det har inte stått i tidningen. En svensk utlandsjournalists minnen från
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Nagórski Z., Wojna w Londynie, Paryż 1966.
Nahlik S. E., Przesiane przez pamięć, vol. 2, Kraków 2002.
Nowak J. [Jezioranski Z.], Kurier z Warszawy, Kraków 1989.
Osóbka-Morawski E., Dziennik polityczny 1943–1948, Gdańsk 1981.
557
Pański J., Wachta lewej burty, Gdynia 1965.

Pański J., Związek Patriotów Polskich w Szwecji, “Z pola walki” 1964, nr 4.
Potworowski T., Zapiski do pamiętnika: Sztokholm, wrzesień–grudzień 1939, “Acta
Sueco-Polonica” 2003–2005, nr 12–13.
Pragier A., Czas przeszły dokonany, London 1966.
Raczyński E., W sojuszniczym Londynie. Dziennik ambasadora Edwarda Raczyń-
skiego 1939–1945, wyd. 3, London 1997.
Romanowski B., Torpeda w celu! Wspomnienia ze służby na okrętach podwodnych
1939–1945, Gdańsk 1997.
Rudnicka-Jaroszynska L., Mitt möte med Röda armén, Malmö 1943.
Sapieha V., Mitt liv i Polen, Stockholm 1941.
[Schellenberg W.], The labyrinth. Memoirs of Walter Schellenberg, Hitler’s chief of
counterintelligence, 2000.
Schimitzek S., Na krawędzi Europy. Wspomnienia portugalskie 1939–1946, Warsaw
1970.
Skandynawia w oczach Polaków. Antologia, wybór, oprac. i wstep Z. Ciesielski,
Gdańsk 1974.
Sloma W., En polsk ubåtsman i Mariefred, Nyköping 2006.
Sokolnicki H., In the service of Poland: memoirs of diplomatic and social life, chiefly
before and during World War II, in Poland, the USSR and Scandinavia, Helsinki
1973.
Sokolnicki M., Ankarski dziennik, London 1974.
Sokolnicki M., Dziennik ankarski 1939–1943, London 1965.
Szembek J., Diariusz wrzesień – grudzień 1939, oprac. B. Grzeloński, Warsaw 1989.
Tennant P., Vid sidan av kriget. Diplomat i Sverige 1939–1945, Stockholm 1989.
Wachowiak S., Czasy, które przeżyłem, Warsaw 1991.
Westman K. G., Politiska anteckningar september 1939–mars 1943, W. M. Carlgren
(ed.), Stockholm 1981.
Westrup Z. P., Jag har varit i Arkadien, Stockholm 1975.
Winiewicz J., Co pamiętam z długiej drogi życia, Poznań 1985.
af Wirsén E., Minnen från fred och krig, Stockholm 1942.
af Wirsén E., Från Balkan till Berlin, Stockholm 1943.
Wrzesień 1939 r. w relacjach dyplomatów: Józefa Becka, Jana Szembeka, Anthon’yego
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Wysocki A., Na placówce dyplomatycznej w Sztokholmie 1924–1928. Wspomnienia,
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Zabiełło S., Na posterunku we Francji, Warsaw 1967.
Zagórski W., Wolność w niewoli, London 1971.
558
BIBLIOGRAPHY
3. Newspapers 1939–1945
Swedish:
Affärsvärlden
Aftonbladet
Aftontidningen
Arbetaren
Arbetet
Barometern
Dagens Nyheter
Dagsposten
Expressen
Falu-Kuriren
Folkets Dagblad
Gefle Dagblad
Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning
Göteborgs Morgonpost
Göteborgs Posten
Göteborgs Tidningen
Gotlänningen
Hufvudstadsbladet
Jönköpings-Posten
Kalmar Läns Tidning
Karlshamns Allehanda
Mellanfolkligt Samarbete
Mellersta Skåne
Morgon-Tidningen
Nerikes Allehanda
Norrbottens-Kuriren
Norrköpings Tidningar
Nu
Ny Dag
Ny Tid
Nya Dagligt Allehanda
Örebro-Kuriren
Östgöta Correspondenten
Reformatorn
Skånska Socialdemokraten
Skaraborgaren
Social-Demokraten
Stockholms-Tidningen
Svensk Tidskrift
Svenska Dagbladet
559
Svenska Morgonbladet
Svensk underbefälstidning
Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten
Trots Allt!
Upsala Nya Tidning
Västernorrlands Allehanda
Vestmanlands Läns Tidning
Ystads Allehanda
Polish (if not specified – London):

Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza
Dziennik Polski
Dziennik Żołnierza APW (Middle East, Italy)
Dziennik Żołnierza
Myśl Polska
Nowa Polska
Orzeł Biały (USSR, Middle East, Italy, Great Britain)
Przedświt
Polska Walcząca
Robotnik Polski w Wielkiej Brytanii
Wiadomości Polskie
Wieści Polskie (Hungary)
4. Publications from the years 1939–1945

Almstedt G., Dagligt liv i Polen, Ängleholm 1944.
Almstedt G., Johnson E., Warszawa!, Stockholm 1944.
Bagiński H., Wolność Polski na morzu, Kirkcaldy 1942.
Binental L., Chopin. Hans liv och konst, Stockholm 1940.
Curie E., Min mor Marie Sklodowska-Curie, Stockholm 1941.
Detta hände i Europa. Härtagna länder 1938–1941, Stockholm 1945.
En polsk svart bok om den tyska „nyordningen” i Polen, Stockholm 1942.
ESWU [Adamek S.], Folkens frihetskamp. Det nya världkriget, Stockholm 1940.
Hansson P. A., Vår neutralitetspolitik, Stockholm 1942.
Hedlund-Nyström T., Polens fjärde delning. Dess förhistoria och fullbordan, Malmö
1940.
Höglund Z., Alliansen Hitler–Stalin, Stockholm 1939.
Justus, Hur det skedde! Från Versailles till i dag, Stockholm 1940.
Kända svenskar om Polen, Stockholm 1944.
Karski J., Den hemliga staten, Stockholm 1945.
Kentrschynskyj A., Sanningen om Ukraina, Helsingfors 1943.
Lundberg G., Missnöjets missionärer. En vidräkning med de kommunistiska sabo-
törerna, Stockholm 1940.
560
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Nerman T., Sverige i beredskap, Stockholm 1942.

Norwid S. T., Landet utan Quisling, Stockholm 1944.
Olberg P., Polens öde. Ett europeiskt kardinalproblem, Stockholm 1944.
Pitjeta V., Om Västukraina och Västvitryssland, Stockholm 1945.
Polens martyrium. Förhållanden under tyska ockupationen belysta av Polska informa-
tionsministeriet, Stockholm 1942.
Emitjov W., Ett land försvann. Ödesveckor i Polen, Stockholm 1939. Szende S., Den
siste juden från Polen, Stockholm 1944.
Thulstrup Å., Den polska-ryska konflikten, Stockholm 1944.
Vougt A., Ur svensk synvinkel. Inlägg i den utrikespolitiska debatten, Malmö 1943.
Vysocki A., Ett polskt levnadsöde, Stockholm 1944.
Walterson J., Öster om Bug. Fakta kring de östpolska problemen, Stockholm 1944.
4. Books and articles

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Agrell W., Fred och fruktan. Sveriges säkerhetspolitiska historia 1918–2000, Lund
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Åmark K., Att bo granne med ondskan. Sveriges förhållande till nazismen, Nazitysk-
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Åmark K., Makt eller moral. Svensk offentlig debatt om internationell politik och
svensk utrikes och försvarspolitik 1938–1939, Stockholm 1973.
Åmark K., Sweden. Negotiated neutrality, [in:] R. Bosworth, J. Maiolo (eds.), Cam-
bridge History of the Second World War, vol. 2: Politics and Ideology, Cambridge
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Bartoszewicz H., Polityka Związku Sowieckiego wobec państw Europy Środkowo-
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Batowski H., Agonia pokoju i początek wojny (sierpień–wrzesień 1939), wyd. 3,
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Batowski H., Rok 1940 w dyplomacji europejskiej, Poznań 1981.
Batowski H., Walka dyplomacji niemieckiej przeciw Polsce 1939–1945, Kraków–
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Batowski H., Z dziejów dyplomacji polskiej na obczyźnie (wrzesień 1939 – lipiec 1941),
Kraków 1984.
Berge A., Flyktingpolitik i stormakts skugga. Sverige och de sovjetryska flyktingarna
under andra världskriget, Uppsala 1992.
Berner Ö., Svensk grannlandspolitik över seklen – exemplet Polen [w:] Utrikes ärenden.
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Biegański W., Juchniewicz M., Okęcki S., Polacy w ruchu oporu narodów Europy
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Bielnicki A., Lotnicy polscy w Danii w latach drugiej wojny światowej, “Zeszyty
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561
Björkman L., Säkerhetstjänstens egen berättelse om spionjakten krigsåren 1939–1942.

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Björkman L., Sverige inför Operation Barbarossa. Svensk neutralitetspolitik 1940–
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Boëthius M.-P., Heder och samvete. Sverige och andra världskriget, Stockholm 2001.
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Bogusławski A., Pod Gwiazdą Polarną. Polacy w Finlandii 1939–1941, Warszawa–
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Chrzanowski B., Organizacja sieci przerzutów droga morską z Polski do Szwecji w latach
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Ciećwierz M., Próby neutralizacji propagandy antypolskiej na Zachodzie w latach
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Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak E., Polska siła robocza w Organizacji Todta w Norwegii i
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Dębski S., Między Berlinem a Moskwą. Stosunki niemiecko-sowieckie 1939–1941,
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Duraczyński E., Generał Iwanow zaprasza: przywódcy podziemnego państwa polski-
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570
Index
Adamek, Stanisław 106, 215, 308, 354 Banach I. 140

Adamkiewicz, Włodzimierz 89, 90, 91 Banaczyk, Władysław 494
Adlercreutz, Carlos 48, 154 Bandura, Aleksy 272, 276, 281
Ahnlund, Nils 259, 304 Beck, Józef 11, 12, 13, 23, 30, 31, 72, 173
Åkerberg, Harald 309 Beck-Friis, Hans 78
Åkerrén, Bengt 74, 75 Beck-Friis, Johan 56, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83,
Aleksandr I, Romanov 305 341–342, 477
Allen, Edmund 52 Beer, Henrik 498, 510–511
Almstedt, Gunnar 263–264, 289, 291–292 Belfrage, Leif 386
Alter, Wiktor 212–213, 232 Bellman, Carl Michael 292
Altonen, Alexi 132 Below, Carl von 148, 455
Åman, Walter 232 Bentzler, Axel 381
Anders, Władysław 225 Berent 84
Anderson, Ivar 105, 224 Bergelin, Sune 45, 46, 47, 49, 66
Andersson, Carl-Albert 309 Bergenström, Carl 480
Andersson, Kurt 194, 271, 300 Berglind, Nils 186
Andolf, Göran 123, 516, 533, 536, 541– Bergström, Algot 402
542, 544–546 Berling, Zygmunt 195, 252, 275, 320
Arbin, Axel von 182, 381 Berman, Jakub 357–358
Arborén, Olof Carl 154 Bernadotte, Estelle 479
Arciszewski, Tomasz 307, 310–312, 314, Bernadotte, Folke 319, 332–333, 467–468,
333, 335, 345, 354, 467–468 479, 496–498, 504, 510, 534
Armfelt, Józefa, 255, 347 Berson, Jan Otmar 43, 118, 151, 177
Arrhén, Erik 128, 197, 304 Bertoni, Karol 382
Arski, Stefan, see Salman Artur Bertram, Hans 108
Assarsson, Vilhelm 78, 112, 161, 216, 218– Bestecki, Bolesław 542–543
219, 230, 252, 329 Bick, Józef 286
Åström, Sverker 216–218, 324, 510–511 Biegański, W. 465
Atlee, Clement 200 Biernacki, 435
Axell, Harald 185, 293, 323, 381–382, 394, Bierut, Bolesław 443
498, 506
Birnbaum, Immanuel 259
Babiński, Wacław 236, 403, 490, 493–494
Björklid, Erland 180
Baliński, Antoni 157
Björklund, 339
Baliński, Stanisław 301
Blanck, Sigma 293, 490, 498
571
Bogomolov, Aleksandr 242 Cederschiöld, Gunnar 46

Bogs, Alexander 43, 126 Cedro, Mieczysław Zygmunt 516
Boheman, Erik 11–13, 23, 26, 34, 56, 116– Chabasiński, Wojciech 319, 337–338, 427,
117, 123, 125, 129, 133, 135, 137, 139, 435, 441–443, 505
140–145, 156–158, 164, 166, 168–170, Chamberlain, Neville 33
172, 187, 196, 229–230, 249–250, 279,
Charles, Prince 474, 484, 499–500, 503
332, 338, 341–342, 364, 370, 416, 423,
479, 483, 528, 550 Charles, Edward, Prince 484
Böhm, Wilhelm 233 Chodyra, Józef 541
Bohuszewicz, Witold 542–543 Chopin, Fryderyk 302
Bolander, Gunnar 373, 376, 379, 381–383 Chrzanowski, Bogdan 14, 456–457
Bolander, Knud 158, 183 Churchill, Winston 114, 127, 161, 247,
261, 317, 342
Böök, Fredrik 134
Ciechanowiecka, Mary (Maria) 322, 502
Bór-Komorowski, Tadeusz 287, 298, 306,
315, 345 Ciechanowski, Jan 78, 79, 89, 90, 112
Borejsza, Jerzy 282 Cienciała, Andrzej 174, 175
Borśniowski, Tadeusz 281 Ciołkosz, Adam 17, 131, 132, 201, 256–
257, 306–308, 336, 456–457
Brandt, Willy 232
Clerk-Kerr, Alan 356, 439
Branting, Hjalmar 279
Cnut 259
Bratt, Karl-Axel 51, 62, 63, 68
Colliers, Laurence 117, 517
Brolin 418
Coote, E. O. 187
Broniewski, Władysław 181
Cripps, Stafford 141,
Brzeskwiński, Feliks 95, 122, 129–131,
135, 140, 145, 149, 154, 158, 159, 165, Croneborg, Adolf 31, 317
223, 227, 263, 316, 328, 461, 463–464, Cross, Cecil 443
515, 520, 536, 541–542, 544 Crutzesco, Georges 94
Brzeskwiński, G. 316 Cullberg, J. 475
Budnik, Bernard 542 Curzon, Georg 215
Burckhardt, Carl 31 Cybulski, Julian 419
Burg, von der 527 Czapiński, Kazimierz 132
Bylund 418 Czyszkowski, Witold 414, 421, 426–427
Calisendorf 418 Dahlerus, Birger 32, 33, 34, 95, 96, 127
Campbell 531 Dahn, Waldemar 323, 394
Camps, W. A. 490 Dalen, G. 380
Carter, R. H. 517 Danielsson, O. 531
Casparsson, Ragnar 132, 309 Dankwort, Werner 217
Castleton 542 Dardel, Gustaf von 58
Catherine, Jagiellon 202 Davis, Malcolm 478
Ceceniowski, Eligiusz 536
Cederberg, Daniel 293, 542
572
INDEX
Denham, Henry 250, 340, 517, 528, 530, Eugen, Prince 291
537 Facht, Stig 102
Dekanozov, Vladimir 432, 505 Fahlander, Nils 194
Dix 83 Fernström, Nils 381
Dmowski, Roman 102 Fierlinger, Zdeňek 251
Döbeln, G. von 532 Finkelstein, Leon 349
Dreja, Alojzy 543 Folejewski, Zbigniew 109, 279, 308
Drobner, Bolesław 504 Folkman, Adolf 263
Dubiel, Józef 544 Foot, Dingle 423
Dubois, Stanisław 488 Forbes 33
Dyrssen 529 Forsberg, K. 378
Edberg, Rolf 294 Forshell, Anders 24
Eden, Anthony 12, 145, 161, 192–193, 228, Forster, Albert 31, 96
230, 236, 317, 332
Frank, Hans 110, 500
Edgren, Folke 315
Frankowski, Antoni 465
Egeland, Leif 249–250
Frankowski, Feliks 255
Ehrenburg, Ilja 162
Fredborg, Arvid 247, 392
Ehrenpreis, Wiktor 461
Frösell, G. 352
Ehrensvärd, Albert 103
Gano, Stanisław 230, 246, 277–284, 286,
Ehrlich, Henryk 212–213, 232 321–323, 339, 546
Eidem, Erling 55, 56 Garter, John see Meurling, Per 64–65
Ekeberg, Lars Birger 411, 510 Gaulle, Charles de 326, 340, 356
Ekman, C. 480 Geer, Jacob de 104, 223–225, 266
Ekstrand, Einar 320 Geibel, Paul Otto 502
Enander, Bo 352, 491 George VI, Windsor 127
Enell, Harald 24 Geppert, Tadeusz 367, 460
Eng, Brynolf 16, 344, 348, 356–358, 432– Gibson, George 152
437, 439, 441–444
Gie, Stephanus F. N. 228–229, 249
Engblom, G. 190
Gilewicz, Wacław 137, 186
Engels, Friedrich 67
Ginsbert, Julian 173
Englicht, Józef 28
Giron, Marc 131, 527–530, 538
Engzell, Gösta 458, 460, 470, 477
Gistedt-Kiltynowicz, Elna 295–297
Eriksson, Denise 443
Glabisz, Kazimierz 542
Eriksson, Herman 236, 397
Głębocki, J. 369
Erlander, Tage 40, 45, 102
Goebbels, Joseph 55, 103, 106, 219–220,
Errko, Eljas 26, 99 249, 355
Esklung, Allan 424 Gołuchowski, Andrzej 286
Essén, Rütger 226, 312 Gorączko, E. 444
573
Göransson, Tord Ernst 416, 436 Gwiazdoski, Tadeusz 442

Göring, Hermann 32, 33, 34, 95, 96, 113, Gyllenkrok, Axel 44, 45, 65, 66
127 Gyllenram, R. 81
Górka, Olgierd 151–152 Haakon VII 121
Górniak, Franciszek 281 Hácha, Emil 104
Górski, Alfons 536 Hagberg, Knut 207–208, 294
Grabowski, Krzysztof 542–543 Häggberg, Sigge 163, 381
Grabowski, Władysław 456 Hägglöf, Gunnar 36, 41, 62, 99, 128, 196,
Graczyk, Franciszek 535 244, 363–366, 376, 388, 396–399, 408–
Gradowska 87 409, 416, 427
Grafström, Erik 411–412, 429, 444 Hägglöf, Ingemar 250–252, 267–268, 337–
338, 344–345
Grafström Sven 30, 31, 32, 72, 73, 91, 107,
116, 118, 133, 136, 154, 162, 163, 177, Hahnewald, Edgar 232
189, 193, 197, 213, 229–230, 245, 317– Halifax, Edward 33, 47
318, 329, 333, 358–359, 376–379, 475, Hallström, P. 482
480, 550
Halmstedt 382
Graliński, Zygmunt 111
Hansen, Laurits 152
Granath, Axel 450–451
Hansson, Margit 181
Granholm, A. 400
Hansson, Per Albin 23, 27, 30, 32–33, 35–
Greiser, Arthur 97 36, 39–41, 100, 114, 119, 122, 124, 139,
Grochowski, Aleksander 519 146, 150, 152, 171, 194, 196–197, 217,
Grosfeld, Ludwik 466, 487–488 231, 234–236, 238, 242–243, 250, 333–
335, 436, 466, 495, 548, 550
Grounes 418
Hansteen, Viggo 153
Grynberg, Judyta 480
Hedin, Göran 55, 98
Grzegorzewski, Edward 504
Hedin, Sven 96, 134, 242
Guarnaschelli, Giovanni Battista 340
Hedlund-Nyström, Torun 106
Guldbrandsen, Jörgen N. 202
Hedström, Karl Olof 102, 103
Gummerus, Herman 221
Hellqvist, Sven 16, 476, 498–503, 505
Gunnarsson, Gunnar 181, 294, 310
Hellstedt 418
Günther, Christian 115–116, 118–119,
121, 123–124, 129, 139–140, 142, 147, Hellstedt, Svante 185, 186
154–156, 159, 162, 164, 166, 167, 168, Henderson, Neville 34
178, 186, 188–189, 192–194, 196, 216, Hennings, Einar 93, 94
218, 228, 251, 258, 315, 319, 337, 340,
Hercen, Aleksandr 305
346, 355, 357–358, 370, 415, 433, 443,
463, 485, 504–505 Herslow, Carl 55, 66, 87, 162, 381, 384,
480
Günther-Schwarzburg, Władysław 342
Hesselgren, Kerstin 295
Gustafsson, Gösta 185, 550
Himmler, Heinrich 467
Gustaf V 28, 35, 39, 40, 123, 124, 127, 140,
144, 168, 189, 291, 318, 468, 500, 515 Hins Jan 273
574
INDEX
Hippler Fritz 108 Jeka, Augustyn 273

Hirsch Oscar 436 Jensen, Johannes V. 193
Hitler, Adolf 23, 25–28, 30–31, 36, 39, 47, Jereczek, Edmund 540
57, 59–61, 63–64, 68–70, 82, 96, 99, Jöback, Inger Bagger 498
101, 103, 106–107, 114, 121, 127, 130,
Jobs, Anders 74
134, 136, 142, 155, 160, 207, 213, 220,
222–223, 235, 248, 253, 263, 257, 303, Johansson, Albin 237, 309
391, 449, 464, 467, 531, 547, 550 Johansson, Birger 78, 85, 87, 186, 481
Hofbauer, Josef 258–259 John III, Sobieski 173
Höglund, Zeth 59, 64, 101, 102, 107, 132, Johnson, Herschel 149
456 Johnson, Eyvind 291–293
Höjer, Torvald 123, 192, 212, 224 Jones 545
Holger, Hans Eric 41 Jones, R. V. 250
Holmberg, N. 64 Josephson, Gunnar 323
Holmström, Brita 498 Juhlin-Dannfelt, Curt 24, 25, 47, 51, 52,
Hornborg, Eirik 221 55, 68, 97, 98,
Huber, Max 97 Jung, Helge 325
Hudson, Robert S. 363 Juryś, Roman 282
Hułas, Bronisław 544 Kallio, Kyösti 100
Hultström, J. 171 Karlmark, Erik 217
Hüttner, J. 479 Karlsson, E. 27, 65
Ihre, Nils Edvard 376–377, 384–386 Karnicki, Borys 521
Imhof 384 Karniol, Maurycy 131–133, 138, 153, 161,
Ironside, Edmund 106 188, 190, 194, 198–199, 201, 203, 208,
210, 212, 231, 234–236–240, 248–249,
Jacobson 418
256–257, 262, 265–266, 268–269, 277–
Jacobsson, Emil (Jc) 314, 329, 352 278, 287, 290–291, 304–309, 315–316,
Jacynicz, Konstanty 457 321, 324, 331, 333–336, 336, 350–352,
Jäderlund, Christer 57, 220 355, 455–457, 467, 487
Jakerle, Jiří 232, 241 Karski, Jan 33, 352
Jałowiecka, Halina 85, 87 Kellgren, Henry 227
Jałowiecki, Bogdan 76 Kemp-Welch, Anthony 19
Janecki, P. 173 Kennan, George 342
Jansson, Karl-Erik 456–457 Kentrschynskyj, Bohdan 253–255
Jarczyk, Mira 480 Ker, Alan 517
Järte, Otto 212, 224, 392 Kindgren 337–338
Jasiński, Tadeusz 541 Kleen, Willi 169
Jażdżewski, Antoni 154 Klemming, G. 395
Jędrychowski, Stefan 275, 286, 318–320, Kling, Carl 484
324, 427, 504, 506 Klintberg, C.-H. af 262
575
Koc, Adam 368 Kutschera, Franz 262

Kocan, Stanisław 487, 508 Kuusinen, Otto 270, 303
Koht, Halvdan 26, 121 Kuźniarz, T. 414, 442
Kollat, Feliks 367, 460 Kwapiński, Jan 15, 17, 184, 231–242, 311,
Kollberg 418 333, 354, 391–392, 395–397, 404, 409,
421, 427–428, 497, 536–537, 548
Kollontai, Aleksandra 26, 119, 141, 149,
162, 249, 280, 355, 506 Kyling, Folke 150
Komierowski 468 Lagerberg, Joen 30, 31, 32, 71, 72, 73, 81,
95, 111, 129, 185, 376, 459–460, 479,
Konopczyński, Władysław 477
482
Kopański, Stanisław 175
Lambert 516
Kopeć, Norbert 281
Lamming, G. N. 234, 338
Korniyczuk, Oleksandr 230
Lancaster, O. 158
Korsak 536
Landin, Sven 71
Korsak, Konrad 79
Larsson, Sam 150
Korytowski, Karol 172, 175, 522
Lascelles D. W. 517
Kot, Stanisław 112, 211, 216
Lauer Halina 461
Kowalewski, Przemysław 188, 321, 395,
Laurin E. 478
403, 460, 484, 487, 489, 498
Laval, Erik de 28, 29, 30, 82, 87, 185, 186
Kowalik, Karol 535
Leche Löfgren, Mia 200, 498–499
Kowalski, Konstanty 536
Leifland, L. 247
Kowalski, Włodzimierz T. 319
Leijonhufvud Erik 496–497, 510
Kozłowski, Kazimierz 286
Lenin, Vladimir 59, 67, 305
Kożuchowski, Józef 410, 415, 418, 422,
424, 426, 429 Lewandowski, Jerzy 455
Kralisz, Andrzej 454 Lie, Trygve 250
Krawczyk, Bogusław 522 Lieberman, Herman 133, 456
Kreuger, Ivar 42 Lindberg 322
Kreuger, Torsten 42 Lindberg, August 25, 132, 231, 236, 309
Król, Stanisław 541 Lindberg, Hugo 540
Krupski 531 Linde, Gunvor 274
Kruszyński, Janusz 480 Lindén, Oscar 376
Krzysztoporski (family) 479 Linderot, Sven 37
Kučera, Vladimír 138 Lindh, Nils 300–301, 304–305
Kuczynski, Boguslav 197 Lindquist, E. 290
Kulak, Teresa 19, 131 Lindquist, Karl 37
Kumlin, Ragnar 153, 160, 173, 188, 192, Lindskog, Claes 266–267, 295
195–196, 204, 388 Lindström, Claes 525, 529–531
Kuncewiczowa, Maria 181 Lindström, Rickard 26, 131, 138, 231, 295,
308
576
INDEX
Lipkowski, Zygfryd 463 Mallet Victor 117, 119, 133, 144, 149, 180,
Lipski, Józef 33, 34, 76, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 192–193, 229–230, 247, 250, 337–338,
87, 89, 340, 437, 440, 528
Lisiecki, A. 324 Mandel, Leon 281
Lisiński, Michał 308 Mannerheim, Carl Gustaf von 115, 518
Litauer, Stefan 431 Manuilsky, Dmitriy 37
Litwiński, L. 374 Marecki, Andrzej 228
Ljundberg, Ruben 339, 434–435 Martinson, Harry 294
Ljungdahl, Karl-Gustaf 399, 435, 440, 443 Marx, Karl 59, 67
Lorenc, Austin 273 Masiak, Jan 321
Lubomirski, Stefan 88, 89, 90 Mathiessen, Herman 401
Lubomirski, Zdzisław 475 Matuszewski, Ignacy 172
Lundberg, Gunnar 109, 131, 132 Maycock, R. B. 544
Lundberg, Knud 31, 77, 96, 97, 377, 457, Mayski, Ivan 146, 155, 216, 225
459 Męczyński, Tadeusz 536
Lundqvist, M. 276 Megerle, Karl 136
Łakociński, Zygmunt 109, 468, 542–543 Mejor, Franciszek 542–543
Łątkiewicz, Bronisław 516 Mellenthin, von 68
Łoś, Władysław 518 Melnyk, Andrij 254
Łossowski, Piotr 11 Mendelsohn, Bolesław 461
Łowczyński, Kajetan 275 Merdinger, Zbigniew 479, 497
Lozowski, Solomon 58, 387 Meurling, Per 64, 354–355
Łubieński, Ludwik 31 Mickiewicz, Adam 302
Łukasiewicz, Juliusz 173, 368 Miecznik, Tadeusz 545
Łychowski, Tadeusz 410, 426 Mikołajczyk, Stanisław 183–184, 187, 200,
Machiavelli, Niccolò 59 247, 257, 265, 268–271, 301, 309, 315–
317, 332–333, 343–344, 416, 423, 432,
Maciejewski, Roman 177
466
MacInnes, Helen 309
Milczarek, Stanisław 283
Macmillan, Harold 116
Milisiewicz, Jerzy 536
Madajewski, Walenty 378
Minc, Hilary 432, 435, 444
Magnuson 418
Miniakowski, Stefan 544
Magnusson 418
Mitcheson, Jack 486
Maleszka, Franciszek 78, 79, 84, 85
Mitkiewicz, Leon 135, 145, 149
Malinowski, Mieczysław 544
Modig, Einar 111
Malinowski, Władysław 461
Modzelewski, Zygmunt 274, 336–337,
Mallet, Philip 19 343–344, 348, 357, 359, 432–435, 441–
442
Mohr, Hanna 281
577
Molander, Hilding 73, 87, 381–383, 385, Ohde, Thorsten 237

478 Ohlin, Bertil 197, 433, 440–441
Möller, Gustav 132, 165, 190, 231, 334, 457 Olberg, Paul 107, 132, 133, 302–304
Möller, Yngve 100, 171, 172 Oleynikov 277
Molotov, Vyacheslav 37, 58, 127, 224, 272, Olivecrona, Karl 134
318, 433, 443
Olsson, S. 182
Monson, Edmund 42, 47,
Olszowski, Tadeusz 405, 416
Montagu-Pollock, William H. 113, 149,
Orlik-Rückemann, Wilhelm 454
236
Örne, Anders 169
Możdżeński, Leonard 367
Osóbka-Morawski, Edward 285, 298, 313,
Müllern, Gunnar 109, 110, 312–313, 330
322, 331, 348, 357
Munch, Peter 26
Ostrowski, A. 320
Munthe, Gustaf 295
Oterdahl, Jeanna 291, 295, 301
Myrdal, Alva 295, 510
Otmar-Berson, Jan see Berson, Jan Otmar
Myrdal, Robert 258
Oxenstierna, Johan Gabriel 534
Nagórski, Zygmunt 72, 73
Paderewski, Ignacy 148
Nahlik, Stanisław Edward 112
Page, Leander 544
Nerman, Ture 106, 178, 208, 295, 455
Palmén, Janina 473
Neuman, Władysław 95
Palmstierna, Carl 177
Nial, Håkan 90, 91, 536–538
Pański, Jerzy (a seaman) 272–286, 320–
Nieduszyński, T. 498 324, 338–340, 348, 423–424, 431, 439,
Niedziałkowski, Mieczysław 132, 138, 232, 454, 506–508
237 Pański, Jerzy (literary critic) 282
Nilsson, Dr 402 Papuga, Jan 273
Nilsson, Torsten 71, 132, 231, 238, 309 Parker, Ralph 329–330
Nordwall, Ulf 496, 509 Patejeruk, Sergiusz 273
Norlander, Helge 369, 373, 396–397, 404, Patek, Wiesław 141, 258, 321, 470
418
Paul I, Romanov 305
Norrman, Sven 163, 185, 187, 295, 310,
Paul, Ernst 236
379, 381, 383, 392, 417, 433, 475–476,
481, 550 Pauli, Ivan 183
Norwid-Neugebauer, Mieczysław 175 Pawliszyn, Henryk 264
Nowacki (seaman) 534 Penny, Martin 177
Nowacki, Czech 542–544 Persson, G. 154
Nowacki (-Norwid), Tadeusz 96, 173, 263, Persson, Gösta 102
310, 352, 392, 540–541 Persson, Per 300
Nowak-Jeziorański, Jan 152, 462 Petander, Karl 168,
Nybom, Thorsten 104, 121, 214, 225 Petelenz, Czesław 514–515
Nylander, Lennart 452, 460
578
INDEX
Petersén, Carl 56, 77, 80, 82, 84, 87, 379, Potworowski, Tomasz 15, 18, 23, 43
476 Pragier, Adam 173, 303
Pfleging, Ernst 263 Prigonikier, Ludwik 286
Piątkowski, Henryk 328 Prottas, Raja 273
Pierkiel, Franciszek 286 Prus-Bar, Lucjan 465
Pihl, Gunnar Thorstenson 202, 346 Pruszyński Ksawery 181
Pilch, Tadeusz 91, 146, 188, 190–193, 195– Prytz, Björn 94, 112, 218, 228–229, 317,
196, 199, 203–204, 236–237, 241, 261, 332, 345–346, 400, 427
315–316, 320–321, 332, 350–351, 369–
Przepiórczyński, Michał 455
370, 372, 375–376, 380, 388–389, 394–
396, 398, 401–411, 415–417, 422–430, Przybyszewski, Józef 288
439, 465, 483–484, 486–487, 489, 490, Przybyszewski-Westrup, Zenon 36, 112,
494–495, 500, 508–511, 514, 537–538 148, 475
Piłsudski, Józef 68, 102 Quisling, Vidkun 104, 235, 269, 330–331
Piskor, Aleksander 352 Raab 418
Pistel, Hugo 522 Rabanowski, Jan 319
Pitjeta, Vladimir 305–306 Racięski, Z. 130
Plater-Ankarhall, Ludwika 207, 255, Raczkiewicz, Władysław 95, 144, 168, 188,
Pławski, Eugeniusz 156, 160–161, 194, 240, 468, 480
465, 532–534, 539, 541 Raczyński, Edward 71, 94, 112, 154, 172,
Pławski, Witold 465 183, 189, 205, 317, 375, 484, 497
Podjazd-Morgenstern, Tadeusz 156, 160, Radziwiłł, Władysław 373
371, 515, 518–531 Ramstedt, Maria 482
Poland, John R. 516, 519 Rappaport, Edmund 353
Pomian-Hajdukiewicz, Alf de 101, 179, Rappaport, Leon 237
212, 481 Rataj, Maciej 138
Post, Eric von 11, 80, 81, 91, 97, 162, 163, Ravendale, Christian M. 406, 409
270, 318–319, 459, 477
Raykowski, J. 182
Potemkin, Vladimir 58
Razin, Vasiliy 279–281, 322, 324
Potocki, Władysław 367, 373, 460
Rekner, Jerzy 521
Potworowska, Magdalena 473
Remarque, Erich Maria 45
Potworowski, Gustaw 23, 28, 31–32, 43,
77, 79–87, 90, 95, 99, 101, 108–109, Requel, Astrid 510
111–112, 116, 118–119, 124–126, 128– Reuterswärd, Gustaf 43
130, 133–145, 147, 149–151, 153–160, Reybekiel, Wacław 182
162, 164–172, 177–179, 182–183, 185–
Ribbentrop, Joachim von 58, 69, 127, 224,
189, 195, 198–199, 206, 229, 365–366,
272, 467
368–374, 380, 388, 454–455, 458, 460,
463–464, 466, 473–474, 480–485, 487, Richert, Arvid 31, 58, 73, 77, 80–87, 95, 97,
513–514, 547, 524, 526, 528–530, 533, 113, 118, 163–164, 185, 218, 228, 457,
536, 542–543 476–477, 479, 500–501
Potworowski, Tadeusz 182, 465 Roberts, Frank K. 157
579
Rods, A. 182 Scott, John 353

Romanowski, Bolesław 520, 532 Segerstedt, Torgny 104, 208, 224, 290, 295
Romdahl, Axel L. 294 Selter, Kaarel 69
Romer, Adam 174, 413 Semenov, Vladimir 277
Romer, Tadeusz 195–196, 216–217, 244– Semitjov, Wladimir (Volodja) 53, 54, 55,
245, 275, 466, 497, 537 103, 182
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano 228, 247 Shapiro, H. 298
Rosen, Adolf von 87, 480 Shirk, Elliot M. 344–345
Rosenström, M. 276 Sikorski, Władysław 95, 114–115, 144–
Rowecki-Grot, Stefan 187, 306 146, 155, 161–162, 167, 183–184, 187,
190, 193, 201, 205, 208, 214, 216, 219–
Ruciński, Witold 544
220, 225, 228, 230, 247, 481, 515, 524–
Rudberg, Gunnar 479 525
Rudkowski, Roman 541–542 Silfverskiöld, Per Olof 73, 381, 425
Rudnicka-Jaroszynska, Letta 107, 108 Sillanpää, Frans Eemil 111
Rudnicki, Tadeusz 115, 137 Silverstolpe, Gunnar Westin 220–221
Rügheimer, Gunnar 492–493 Siwik, Mateusz 481
Rundström, E. 378 Sjögren, Otto 109
Sadowski, Kazimierz 535 Skarżyński, Bolesław 109, 126, 202, 308,
Sahlin, Stig 99, 359, 415, 429, 510 310, 484
Salamon, Władysław 519, 527–528 Sköld, Per Edvin 24, 128, 135, 150, 171
Salman, Artur (Stefan Arski) 456, 461 Skórzewski, (family) 468
Sandler, Rickard 12, 23, 25, 26, 28, 32, 36, Skrzeszewski, Stanisław 504
41, 57, 58, 82, 94, 95, 98, 99, 100, 118, Skrzypek, Edward 455
130, 171, 178, 363, 454–455, 457, 476,
Słoma, Władysław 532
515
Słowacki, Juliusz 302
Sapieha, Adam 482
Smoleński, Józef 542
Sapieha, Princess 468
Smoluchowski, (family) 479
Sapieha, Virgilia 197
Sobkowiak, Franciszek 541
Saradjoglu, Sükrü 69
Söderblom, Nathan
Sarnek, F. 381
Söderblom, Staffan 31, 58, 73, 78, 94–95,
Saryusz-Zaleski, Borys 414, 442
97, 147–148, 153, 163–164, 185, 193,
Sawczuk 281 217–218, 228, 242, 249, 252, 270, 293,
Scharfstein, I. 481 317–319, 335–337, 342–344, 348–349,
Scheynius, Ignaz 257 356–357, 359, 423, 427, 431–433, 435,
455, 480, 504–505, 529
Schreiber 154
Sohlman, Rolf 315, 329, 357–358, 397–
Schück 323 398, 411, 415–418, 427, 430, 432, 441–
Schulenburg 121 443, 510
Schulz, Karin 208 Sokal, Franciszek 480
580
INDEX
Sokolnicki, Henryk 90, 91, 92, 142, 188– Ström, Ture 418, 440, 443
189, 193–196, 206, 231–232, 236, 242– Stroński, Stanisław 105, 152, 157, 183–184
245, 253–255, 258, 260, 263, 267, 275,
Suvorow, Aleksandr 66
277–278, 281, 286, 308–309, 315–316,
321, 328, 331–333, 338–339, 344–345, Svahnström, Bertil 38, 69, 70, 110
351, 356, 358, 375–376, 392, 394–395, Szembek, Jan 23, 32, 71, 72, 367
397–398, 401–403, 408–410, 412–413, Szende, Stefan 208, 262–263
415–423, 436–437, 439–440, 463, 465–
470, 487, 489–494, 497–499, 501, 506, Shkwarcew, Aleksander 58
508, 510, 535, 537–539 Szymaniak, Witold 194–195
Sokolnicki, Michał 12, 41, 111, 112, 124 Szymański, Antoni 25
Sołtysiak, Jerzy 541 Szymański, Józef 110
Sommerfeld, E. 481 Śmigły-Rydz, Edward 49, 94
Sommerstein, Emil 323 Świętochowski, Henryk 286
Sörmann, Py 202 Świrski, Jerzy 154, 175, 371, 514–515, 517–
Sosnkowski, Kazimierz 140, 261, 282, 288 518, 520–527, 529–530, 533–536, 538,
541
Spała, Feliks 281
Taczalski, Zdzisław 542–543
Spellman, Francis 214
Tarczyński, Mieczysław 536
Stalin, Josef 26, 27, 28, 31, 57, 58, 60, 61,
63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70, 99, 100, 101, 107, Tarnow, Fritz 232
130, 190, 192, 205, 208, 213, 217–219, Tarnowska, Marianna 480
224, 228, 235, 249, 251, 266–269, 274, Tarnowski, Adam 91, 92, 332–333, 356,
302–303, 315–319, 333, 342, 346–347, 358, 466, 507–508, 538–539
353
Taub, Walter 282
Stańczyk, Jan 113, 133, 173, 403, 456, 489–
Tchórznicki, Konstanty 501, 503
490
Tennant, Peter 108, 123, 211, 245, 392
Starzewski, Jan 174,
Thorburn 290, 300
Steinberg, Mila 479
Thörnell, Olof 124, 131, 140,
Stenbom, Adolf 132
Thugutt, Mieczysław 179–180, 183–184,
Stiernstedt, Erik 473–476, 478–482, 498–
186–188, 206, 236, 241, 246, 382, 462–
499, 502
463
Stiernstedt, Georg 101
Thugutt, Stanisław 237
Stiernstedt, Marika 202, 208, 261–262,
Thulstrup, Åke 302
291, 295, 309–311, 322–323, 498, 504–
507 Tigerstedt, Örnulf 220
Stoklasa, Tadeusz 517, 538 Tilea, Viorel Virgil 173
Strasburger, Henryk 173, 388 Tillge-Rasmussen, Sven 57
Strasser, Otto 47 Tingsten, Herbert 105
Strawiński, Konstanty 504–505 Tito-Broz, Josip 326
Strindberg, Axel 295 Tjerneld, Staffan 548
Ström, Fredrik 156, 355 Tokarz, Tadeusz 147
Topolski 435
581
Torelius, Gösta 54, 65 Wallquist, Einar 461

Torén, Carl Axel 129 Walter, J. H. 340
Tranmæl, Martin 132, 152, 232 Walterson, John 211–212, 259–260, 289,
Trębicki, Stefan 263, 308, 352 302–305
Tremtiaczy, Iwan 275–276, 281, 321 Wangel, C.-A. 516
Trolle, Carl Harald 473–474, 478 Wanner, Ch. 478
Trypućko, Jerzy 109 Warchałowski, Jerzy 76, 85
Tunberg, Sven 183 Wasik 545
Tworowski 84 Wasilewska, Wanda 195, 262, 268
Undén, Östen 135, 155, 172, 178, 551 Wasilewski, Walenty 541
Undén, Torsten 94 Weibull, John 380
Unger, Stig 479 Wengelin, Ragnar Victor 315
Unrug, Józef 536 Westman, Karl Gustaf 31, 82, 178, 458
Urbański, Edmund 39 Westring, Claes 476–477
Valentin, Hugo 199 Wettergren, Erik 294
Vanni, Mario 264–265, 289 Weygand, Maurice 41
Vendel, Karl Yngve 163 Weytko, Józef 490
Vesterlund, Ivar 299 Wickman, Johannes 26, 27, 208, 210, 225,
248–249, 300, 341
Vetrov, Mihail 277
Wickstrøm, Rolf 153
Viklund, Daniel 183, 219–220, 271
Widell, C. G. 400, 429
Vinell, T. 418, 482
Wied, Victor zu 115, 126
Vingqvist-Jelnicka, Margit 73, 502
Wierzbowska, Maria 488
Vougt, Allan 127, 131, 213, 238, 307, 309,
315, 331 Wierzyński, Kazimierz 181
Vrang, Carl Vilhelm Birger 27 Wifstrand, Naima 295
Vuori, Eero 132, 152 Wigforss, Ernst 393, 493, 495
Vyshinsky, Andrey 433, 443 Wilgress, Leolyn Dana 251
Vysocki, Adolf 197 Wilkinson, Peter A. 187
Wachenfelt, Miles von 479 Winiarska, Klotylda 87, 459
Walden, Rudolf 115 Winiarski, Witold 76
Waldenström, Arne 443 Winiewicz, Józef 207
Waligórski 84 Winther, Wilhelm 57, 58, 78, 98, 387
Wallén, C. E. 402 Wirsén, Einar af 109
Wallenberg, Jacob 373, 376 Witting, Rolf 548
Wallenberg, Marcus 383 Wittlin, Józef 111
Wallenberg, Raoul 355 Wittmann, Klaus 374
Wallengren, C. 473 Woermann, Ernst 80
Wallin, Emil 457 Wojciechowski, B. 455
582
INDEX
Wojciechowski, Zbigniew 100, 513

Wolbek, Marian 194, 267, 392, 534–536,
548
Woźniak, Bolesław 544
Wyglądacz, Brunon 456
Wysocki, Alfred 42
Żaba, Norbert 18, 152, 155, 157, 160, 179–
181, 183–184, 193–194, 196, 200–203,
206–213, 223–226, 229, 231, 236, 240–
244, 246, 248–249, 252–255, 257–258,
260–264, 266–267, 287–288, 290–292,
297–302, 309–312, 330–331, 340–341,
346–347, 351–355, 392, 395, 431, 461–
463, 465, 492, 495
Zabiełło, Stanisław 113
Zahorska, Ewa 491–492
Zajączkowski, Stanisław 535
Zaleski, August 81, 85, 111, 112, 113, 140,
145, 154, 241, 524, 526
Załuski, K. 497
Zarański, Józef 23
Żebrowski, Michał 521
Żeligowski, Lucjan 255
Zethelius, P. 385–386
Zieliński, Tadeusz 479
Ziembicki, Ludwik 516
Żukowski, Borys 424, 506
Żymierski, Michał 267, 298, 313
583
584
Södertörn Academic Studies
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Ostseeraum unter sich. Vorurteile, Klischees und Stereotypen in Texten,
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2. Jan Ekecrantz & Kerstin Olofsson (eds.), Russian Reports: Studies in
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3. Kekke Stadin (ed.), Society, Towns and Masculinity: Aspects on Early
Modern Society in the Baltic Area, 2000.
4. Bernd Henningsen et al. (eds.), Die Inszenierte Stadt. Zur Praxis und
Theorie kultureller Konstruktionen, 2001.
5. Michal Bron (ed.), Jews and Christians in Dialogue, ii: Identity, Tolerance,
Understanding, 2001
6. Frank-Michael Kirsch et al. (eds.), Nachbarn im Ostseeraum übwer
einander. Wandel der Bilder, Vorurteile und Stereotypen?, 2001.
7. Birgitta Almgren, Illusion und Wirklichkeit. Individuelle und kollektive
Denkmusterin nationalsozialistischer Kulturpolitik und Germanistik in
Schweden 1928–1945, 2001.
8. Denny Vågerö (ed.), The Unknown Sorokin: His Life in Russia and the
Essay on Suicide, 2002.
9. Kerstin W. Shands (ed.), Collusion and Resistance: Women Writing in
English, 2002.
10. Elfar Loftsson & Yonhyok Choe (eds.), Political Representation and
Participation in Transitional Democracies: Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania, 2003.
11. Birgitta Almgren (eds.), Bilder des Nordens in der Germanistik 1929–
1945: Wissenschaftliche Integrität oder politische Anpassung?, 2002.
12. Christine Frisch, Von Powerfrauen und Superweibern: Frauenpopulär-
literatur der 90er Jahre in Deutschland und Schweden, 2003.
13. Hans Ruin & Nicholas Smith (eds.), Hermeneutik och tradition.
Gadamer och den grekiska filosofin, 2003.
14. Mikael Lönnborg et al. (eds.), Money and Finance in Transition:
Research in Contemporary and Historical Finance, 2003.
15. Kerstin Shands et al. (eds.), Notions of America: Swedish Perspectives,
2004.
16. Karl-Olov Arnstberg & Thomas Borén (eds.), Everyday Economy in
Russia, Poland and Latvia, 2003.
17. Johan Rönnby (ed.), By the Water. Archeological Perspectives on Human
Strategies around the Baltic Sea, 2003.
18. Baiba Metuzale-Kangere (ed.), The Ethnic Dimension in Politics and
Culture in the Baltic Countries 1920–1945, 2004.
19. Ulla Birgegård & Irina Sandomirskaja (eds.), In Search of an Order:
Mutual Representations in Sweden and Russia during the Early Age of
Reason, 2004.
20. Ebba Witt-Brattström (ed.), The New Woman and the Aesthetic
Opening: Unlocking Gender in Twentieth-Century Texts, 2004.
21. Michael Karlsson, Transnational Relations in the Baltic Sea Region,
2004.
22. Ali Hajighasemi, The Transformation of the Swedish Welfare System:
Fact or Fiction? Globalisation, Institutions and Welfare State Change in
a Social Democratic Regime, 2004.
23. Erik A. Borg (ed.), Globalization, Nations and Markets: Challenging Issues
in Current Research on Globalization, 2005.
24. Stina Bengtsson & Lars Lundgren, The Don Quixote of Youth Culture:
Media Use and Cultural Preferences Among Students in Estonia and
Sweden, 2005.
25. Hans Ruin, Kommentar till Heideggers Varat och tiden, 2005.
26. Ludmila Ferm, Variativnoe bespredložnoe glagolʹnoe upravlenie v
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government in eighteenth-century Russian], 2005.
27. Christine Frisch, Modernes Aschenputtel und Anti-James-Bond: Gender-
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28. Ursula Naeve-Bucher, Die Neue Frau tanzt: Die Rolle der tanzenden
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35. Patrik Åker, Symboliska platser i kunskapssamhället: Internet, högre
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The course of military operations determined Sweden’s role in Polish
policy as an evacuation destination, a shelter for refugees, an important
junction for communication with the Polish occupied territories and
as a suitable partner in the process of the future economic restoration
of Poland.
Dreamers & Opportunists is based on a vast range of sources from

Polish, Swedish, and British archives, the Swedish press and the Polish
exile press providing a coherent picture of Polish–Swedish relations
during the Second World War. It brings new dimensions in a debate
concerning Swedish policy during the period.
Paweł Jaworski (born 1971), professor in contemporary history at the

University of Wrocław. The author of many publications on Polish–
Scandinavian relations in 20th century and the history of East-Central
Europe.
Södertörn University | www.sh.se/publications | [email protected]

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DREAM

Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)

First published 2009 by Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Poland

Translation: Katarzyna Hussar

Cover: Jonathan Robson (Illustration by Paweł Jaworski)

Printed by Elanders, Stockholm 2019

Södertörn Academic Studies 73

AAN Archiwum Akt Nowych

(Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service)

SISU Studentförbundet för internationellt

of Foreign Affairs from 1938, a guardian of his ‘Final Report’ manuscript,

In April 1939, the Polish Envoy to Stockholm, Gustaw Potworowski.1

unavoidable.20 According to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the

To name an example, de Laval presented the situation of France in 1870. In

Following the reports of the Swedish Chargé d’affaires to Warsaw Sven

from the Polish border, which was additionally reassuring.30 Meanwhile,

war, Sandler ‘brushed it off by talking in general terms, making everything

According to Boheman, Dahlerus was ‘daring and utterly naive in his

On 9 September, the Berlin correspondent of Svenska Dagbladet, Bertil

published a suggestive and original satirical drawing (Illustration 1, previous

announced in September 1939 was an expression of our practical actions,

supported the position of the government: ‘Even though everyone enjoys

was transmitted perfectly. As a result, there appeared many more German

Reports from the front

He maintained that the Polish–German war would be a good opportunity for

the Soviet offensive of 1920 was stopped on the outskirts of Warsaw. A

The picture of total war

civilians had died as a consequence of the bombardments of the Polish cities

discipline and bravery.89 Contrary views were also published. A commentator

The attack from the East

On 16 September, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten broke the news about

We know sufficiently much to understand that the crossing of the borders

Illustration 3: ‘Hela skillnaden’ [‘The

A characteristic drawing equating Stalin with Hitler was published in Nya

Illustration 4: ‘Kombination’ [‘Combina-

According to the commentator for Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfarts-Tidning,

from the Soviet Union.124 Meanwhile, a commentator of Nya Dagligt Alle-

locations.’133 On 21 September Karl-Axel Bratt stated in Dagens Nyheter: ‘the

deported and forced hundreds of thousands of them to slavish labour in

In the commentaries of syndicalist journalists, Stalin was depicted as being

people.’143 This version was consequently presented in successive publications

The final phase of the campaign

An opinion journalist for Social-Demokraten claimed that the Russian

the joint German–Soviet protectorate.165 News that Stalin wanted to scoop up

The Berlin correspondent for Svenska Dagbladet, Bertil Svahnström, wrote

The fate of Swedish diplomats in Warsaw

after the bombardment of Zalishchyky, crossed the border in to Romania on

Representation of Polish interests by Sweden in Germany

Initially, the role of head of the reactivated B Division was passed on to

were protected by no one.201 Nevertheless, the authorities in Moscow refused to

fulfilled by the Legation of the Kingdom of Sweden should therefore no

Following consultations on 29 November with the headquarters of the

cases were to be concluded with relevant reports, although Potworowski per-

When in December 1939 Potworowski held a meeting with Beck-Friis, he

interests in Germany, we have managed to maintain contacts both within the

protection over the Polish citizens in Germany, which is also confirmed by

- to waive the mandate of protection in relation to the Polish govern-

country, to exercise the protection – according to the rules of inter-