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MACARIOLA v. ASUNCION

FACTS: On August 6, 1968, petitioner, Bernadita Macariola charged respondent Judge

Elias Asuncion of CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of CA, with “acts unbecoming of a
judge” when the latter purchased a property which was previously the subject of
litigation on which he rendered the decision. Respondent and his wife were also
members of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. to which their shares
and interests in said property were conveyed. According to the petitioner, respondent
allegedly violated Article 1491 (5) of the New Civil Code and Article 14 (1) and (5) of
Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Sec. 12 XVIII of the
Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of Canons of Judicial Ethics.

ISSUE:
Is Article 14 of the Code of Commerce still in force?

HELD:
Article 14 partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship
between the government and certain public officers and employees like justices and
judges. Said provision must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there
is a change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign are automatically
abrogated. As such, Article 14 is not in force. The respondent is not found to have
violated the articles invoked by the petitioner but he was advised by the Court to be
more discreet in his private and business activities.

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS

FACTS:  Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-
violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has
signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering
the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward,
has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. Marcos filed for a
petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel
documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from
returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without
due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right
to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a
court order. 
ISSUE:  Whether or not, in the exercise of executive power, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. 

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HELD: Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in
the President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by “executive
power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President,
i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to
execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII
secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined &
exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include
the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people,
promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual
powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is
not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers
on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace
during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.  

AMELITO R. MUTUC vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special
civil action against the respondent COMELEC when the latter informed him through a telegram that
his certificate of candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited from using jingles in his
mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The petitioner accorded the order to
be violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its prohibition on the
premise that the Constitutional Convention act provided that it is unlawful for the candidates “to
purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as
pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas,
shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” COMELEC
contended that the jingle or the recorded or taped voice of the singer used by petitioner was a
tangible propaganda material and was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the
COMELEC.

HELD:

The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of
the same kind or class as those specifically referred to”. The COMELEC’s contention that a

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candidate’s jingle form part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase “and the like”, could not
merit the court’s approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was
contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

De Leon vs. Esguerra

FACTS:
In the May 17, 1982 Barangay elections, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected
Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, et al., as Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. On February 9, 1987, petitioner
Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but
signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987
designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was “by authority
of the Minister of Local Government.”

Also on February 8, 1987, Esguerra signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1,

1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, et al., as members of the Barangay
Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.

Petitioners maintain that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, Esguerra no
longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

However, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution,

which provided:

SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February
25, 1986.

ISSUE:
Whether the designation of the respondents to replace petitioners was validly
made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987.

HELD:
NO. While February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one year deadline under the

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Provisional Constitution, the same must be deemed to have been overtaken by

Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading: ―This Constitution shall
take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date,
the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having
become inoperative, Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution could not
be relied on by the respondent OIC Governor. The memorandum dated February 8,
1987 by the respondent OIC Governor could no longer have any legal force and
effect.

The act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. The canvass of the votes
thereafter is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the
date of the plebiscite, and the proclamation of the President is merely the official
confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in
adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite.

Francisco, Jr. vs. House of

Representatives, et al.
Facts:

On 2 June 2003, Former Pres. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint

against C.J. Davide, Jr., among others.* The House Committee on
Justice voted to dismiss the complaint on 22 Oct 2003 for being
insufficient in substance. The Committee Report to that effect has not
been sent to the House in plenary. The following day and just nearly
five months since the filing of the first complaint, a second
impeachment complaint** was filed by respondents house
representatives. Thus arose the instant petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus against the respondents House of
Representatives, et. al., (the House) most of which contend that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates Sec. 3(5), Art. XI of the Const. which provides: “No
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impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official

more than once within a period of one year.” The House argues: the
one year bar could not have been violated as the first impeachment
complaint has not been initiated. Sec. 3(1) of the same is clear in that it
is the House, as a collective body, which has “the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment.” “Initiate” could not possibly mean
“to file” because filing can, as Sec. 3 of the same provides, only be
accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for
impeachment by any member of the House; or (2) by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of
all the members of the House.*** Since the House, as a collective
body, has yet to act on the first impeachment complaint, the first
complaint could not have been “initiated”.

Issue:

Is the second impeachment complaint barred under Section 3(5) of

Art. XI of the Const.?

Held:

Yes. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly

revealed that the framers intended “initiation” to start with the filing of
the complaint.**** The vote of one-third of the House in a resolution
of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings
which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint. [Thus,
under the one year bar on initiating impeachment proceedings,] no
second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action [within one year from filing of the first
verified impeachment complaint]. To the argument that only the
House as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Sec.
3(1) of Art. XI of the Const. says “The House x x x shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment,” this is a

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misreading and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula

singulis by equating “impeachment cases” with “impeachment
proceeding.”*****,******

CIR vs. Campos Rueda

FACTS:
This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda, administrator of
the estate of the deceased Doña Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, from
the decision of the respondent Collector of Internal Revenue, assessing against and
demanding from the former the sumP161,874.95 as deficiency state and
inheritance taxes, including interests and penalties, on the transfer of intangible
personal properties situated in the Philippines and belonging to said Maria de la
Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira. Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira
(Maria Cerdeira for short) is a Spanish national, because of her marriage to a
Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to her death
on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise she left, among others, intangible
personal properties in the Philippines.” Then came this portion: “On September 29,
1955, petitioner filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all the
properties of the late Maria Cerdeira. On the same date, respondent, pending
investigation, issued an assessment for estate and inheritance taxes which tax
liabilities were paid by petitioner.

On November 17, 1955, an amended return was filed …where intangible personal
properties with were claimed as exempted from taxes. On November 23, 1955,
respondent, pending investigation, issued another assessment for estate and
inheritance taxes. In a letter, dated January 11, 1956, respondent denied the
request for exemption on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Hence, respondent demanded
the payment OF deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including ad valorem
penalties, surcharges, interests and compromise penalties . . . . In a letter dated
February 8, 1956, and received by respondent on the following day, petitioner
requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax
exemption of the intangible personal properties and the imposition of the 25% and
5% ad valorem penalties. However, respondent denied this request, in his letter
dated May 5, 1956 . . . and received by petitioner on May 21, 1956. Respondent
premised the denial because there was no reciprocity [with Tangier, which was
moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country. Consequently, respondent
demanded the payment of deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including

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surcharges, interests and compromise penalties

ISSUE:
Is Tangier a foreign country?

HELD:
Yes. It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a
state, it is required in line with Pound’s formulation that it be a politically organized
sovereign community independent of outside control bound by ties of nationhood,
legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under
a regime of law. 9 It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed
as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence
to exact obedience its commands. It has been referred to as a body politic
organized by common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to
promote the general welfare. Correctly has it been described by Esmein as “the
juridical personification of the nation.” This is to view it in the light its historical
development. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite
territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign
will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international
personality. Laski could speak of it then as a territorial society divided into
government and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all
other institutions. McIver similarly would point to the power entrusted to its
government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to
enter into international relations. With the latter requisites satisfied, international law does
not exact independence as a condition of statehood. So Hyde did opine.
Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality
petitioner has not successfully made out a case. It bears repeating that four days
after the filing of this petition on January 6, 1958 in Collector of Internal Revenue v.
De Lara, it was specifically held by us: “Considering the State of California as a
foreign country in relation to section 122 of our Tax Code we believe and hold, as
did the Tax Court, that the Ancillary Administrator is entitled to exemption from the
inheritance tax on the intangible personal property found in the Philippines.” There
can be no doubt that California as a state in the American Union was lacking in the
alleged requisite of international personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a
foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code.

De Leon vs. Esguerra

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FACTS:
In the May 17, 1982 Barangay elections, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected
Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, et al., as Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. On February 9, 1987, petitioner
Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but
signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987
designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was “by authority
of the Minister of Local Government.”

Also on February 8, 1987, Esguerra signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1,

1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, et al., as members of the Barangay
Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.

Petitioners maintain that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, Esguerra no
longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

However, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution,

which provided:

SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February
25, 1986.

ISSUE:
Whether the designation of the respondents to replace petitioners was validly
made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987.

HELD:
NO. While February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one year deadline under the
Provisional Constitution, the same must be deemed to have been overtaken by
Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading: ―This Constitution shall
take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date,
the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having
become inoperative, Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution could not

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be relied on by the respondent OIC Governor. The memorandum dated February 8,

1987 by the respondent OIC Governor could no longer have any legal force and
effect.

The act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. The canvass of the votes
thereafter is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the
date of the plebiscite, and the proclamation of the President is merely the official
confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in
adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite.

Fontanilla vs. Maliaman

FACTS:

On August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pick-up owned and operated by respondent
National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then
driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver,
bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and
Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of
the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the
San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the
Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.
Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at
the time of the accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for
employment as such regular driver of respondent after having passed the written and
oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of vehicles given by National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) authorities.

Spouses Fontanilla instituted a civil case against respondent NIA for damages in
connection with the death of their son resulting from the aforestated accident.

ISSUE:

Whether or not NIA, a government corporation, be held liable for the damages caused
by the negligent acts of its driver.

HELD:

YES. The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising

proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. It is a government
corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it
is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable for
the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-

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employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary
employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages.

WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ET. AL vs.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

FACTS:
Petitioner Reagan, a civilian employee of an American corporation
providing technical assistance to the US Air Force in the Philippines,
questioned the payment of the income tax assessed on him by
respondent CIR on an amount realized by him on a sale of his
automobile to a member of the US Marine Corps, the transaction
having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. It is his
contention, that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside
Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to
tax. He seeks that an amount of P2,979.00 as the income tax paid by
him be refunded.

ISSUE: WON the Clark Field Air Base is a foreign property therefore
excluded from the power of Philippine taxation.

HELD: NO.
By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine
Government merely consents that the United States exercise
jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter
of comity, courtesy, or expediency over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over
offenses committed therein. This provision is not and can not on
principle or authority be construed as a limitation upon the rights of
the Philippine Government.

The State is not precluded from allowing another power to participate

in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its
territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become
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impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native

soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be
diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under
lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases
agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.