PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.

Criminal Law; Actions; Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon.—Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.”
Same;  Same;  The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source
of survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be obligation other than delict.—Corollarily, the claim for civil liability
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the
civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a)

______________

* EN BANC.

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240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED

People vs. Bayotas

Law; b) Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) x x x x x x x x x; e) Quasi-delicts.

Same; Same; Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.—Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator
or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
Same; Same; Private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file the separate civil action by prescription.—Finally, the private
offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.

Same; Same; Death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,
rape.—Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the
civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Br. 16.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape
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People vs. Bayotas

and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his
conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20,
1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to
Bayotas’ civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil
liability as 1a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of  People v.
Sendaydiego   insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on
which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the
accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. 2
In support of his
position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in  People v. Castillo and Ocfemia   which held that the civil
obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die
before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil
liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed therein was
phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of
the alleged crime?
 It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:

__________________
1 Nos. L-33252, L-33253 and L-33254, 81 SCRA 120.
2 No. 22211-R, November 4, 1959, 56 O.G. No. 23, p. 4045.

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242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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“Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:
‘ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.—Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment;’ With reference to Castillo’s criminal liability, there is no question.
The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term ‘final judgment.’ Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an
interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from
Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:

‘La responsabilidad penal se extingue.

1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia
firme.’
x x x      x x x      x x x
The code of 1870 x x x it will be observed employs the term ‘sentencia firme.’ What is ‘sentencia firme’ under the old statute? XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica
Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:
‘SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella
dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos al efecto.’

‘Sentencia firme’ really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon
puts it, the crime is confirmed—‘en condena determinada;’ or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes—‘una verdad legal.’
Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, ‘no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de
ninguna clase.’ And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, ‘there cannot be any

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People vs. Bayotas

determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists,’ for the simple reason that ‘there is no
party defendant.’ (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code,
Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)

The legal import of the term ‘final judgment’ is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the
term ‘final judgment’ in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states
that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final ‘after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or
totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal.’
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed
in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said
that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is
not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover ‘both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case.’ People vs. Yusico
(November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234,
236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as ‘the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might be
found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability.’ I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo’s criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of
that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the
anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof—criminal liability—does not exist.
And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, ‘no party can be found and held
criminally liable in a civil suit,’ which solely would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding.”
3
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case  was adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the

_____________
3 Supra.

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244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Bayotas
4 5 6
Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al.,  People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al.  and People of the Philippines v. Satorre  by
dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
“The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the
pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised
Penal Code; Reyes’ Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ocfemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case
against him should be dismissed.”
7
On the other hand, this Court in8 the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar  and Lamberto Torrijos v.
The Honorable Court of Appeals  ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of
one accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim
therefor against his estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to
final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:

“We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950
(Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil
Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.

__________________
4 L-30612, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 523.
5 No. L-28397, June 17, 1976, 71 SCRA 273.
6 No. L-26282, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 439.
7 No. L-24098, November 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 970.
8 No. L-40336, October 24, 1975, 67 SCRA 394.

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People vs. Bayotas

‘ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evi-dence.’

Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala’s civil action for damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal
action still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be
enforced separately.”

In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:

“x x x      x x x      x x x
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil
liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal

responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final
judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself
but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Italics ours)
x x x      x x x      x x x.”

In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace
its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property
subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: “Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished
his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human relations remains.”
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his
criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following ratiocination: Since
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246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Bayotas
9
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court  requires the dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose death occurred
prior to the final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may
continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such
case, explained this tribunal, “the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the
legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants.”
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of the civil
liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim
for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal10action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al.  departed from this long-established principle of law. In this case,
accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego’s death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego’s appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability.
His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal
action already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over
the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego’s conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the
purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:

_________________
 9 “Section 21. Where claim does not survive.—When the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in

the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules.”
10 Supra.

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People vs. Bayotas

“The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment
was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification
and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation
in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action
(People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed
to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the
action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs.
Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is
concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province of
Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable,
in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code x x x and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten
(10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent’s heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed
judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is
concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).”
11
Succeeding cases  raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they

_________________
11 People v. Badeo, G.R. No. 72990, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 122; Petralba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81337, August 16,

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248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Bayotas

were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex
delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A reexamination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to
the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal
action can proceed irrespective of the latter’s extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to
Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
“When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted
during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.”

Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of
authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused’s civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes
during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that

___________________

1991, 200 SCRA 644; Dumlao v. Court of Appeals, No. L-51625, October 5, 1988, 166 SCRA 269; Rufo Mauricio Construction v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
No. L-75357, November 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 712; People v. Salcedo, No. L-48642, June 22, 1987, 151 SCRA 220; People v. Pancho, No. L-32507, November 4,
1986, 145 SCRA 323; People v. Navoa, No. L-67966, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 410; People v. Asibar, No. L-37255, October 23, 1982, 117 SCRA 856; People v.
Tirol, No. L-30538, January 31, 1981, 102 SCRA 558; and People v. Llamoso, No. L-24866, July 13, 1979, 91 SCRA 364.

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which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg
the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused during
appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability  ex
delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear
on this matter:
“Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.—Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
x x x      x x x      x x x.”

However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto
to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no
criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one
which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action12
to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not
even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings.   One would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a
transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto,the same has perforce to be determined in the
criminal action, rooted as it is in the court’s

_________________
12 Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion observed that:
“x x x this provision contemplates prosecution of the civil liability arising from a criminal offense without the need of any criminal proceeding to prove the commission of the crime
as such, that is without having to prove the criminal liability of the defendant so long as his act causing damage or prejudice to the offended party is proven by preponderance of
evidence.”

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People vs. Bayotas

pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides that “every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.” In such cases, extinction of the
criminal action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability.
Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition
precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-
appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon
facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be
declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of
the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The
Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article
30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an
independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.

Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding.
Thus, it was held in the main decision:
“Sendaydiego’s appeal will
13
be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his
estate would be liable.”

In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether
Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidence adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged.
Thus, it

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13 Supra, p. 134.

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upheld Sendaydiego’s conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30
was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego’s civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already
extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego’s civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal. Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing
Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in
Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his
conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court’s conclusion:
“ ‘When the action is for the recovery of money’ ‘and the defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed
to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided’ in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the
action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.”

Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this course taken
in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
“x x x      x x x      x x x.
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section 21, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had
already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to
exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement,
which has been followed in the Court’s judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set

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People vs. Bayotas

aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable. Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions.
There is neither authority nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of
criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the
death of the offender. x x x.”

Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be
categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased
accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86
involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was14held liable for Sendaydiego’s civil liability. “What are contemplated
in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86,   are contractual15 money claims while the claims involved in civil
liability ex delictomay include even the restitution of personal or real property.”

_________________
14 SEC. 5.  Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions.—All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract,

express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth
as counter-claims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or
prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of
presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is
rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented
directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
15 As explained by J. Regalado in the deliberation of this case.

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Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses,
expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money
claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil
action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it
to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of
the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil 16liability ex delicto  desires to recover damages
from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111  (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as

__________________
16  SECTION 1.  Institute of criminal and civil actions.—When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly

instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the
accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees

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254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Bayotas

amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation.
The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in
17
an injury to person
or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator  of the estate of the
accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:

“SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator.—No action upon a claim for the recovery of
money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or
an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and  actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against him.”
18
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala   where we held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an
independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the
estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for
funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or
implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to  purely personal obligations  other than those which have their
source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against
the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for
trial.

__________________
17 Justice Regalado cited the Court’s ruling in Belamala that since the damages sought, as a result of the felony committed amounts to injury to person or

property, real or personal, the civil liability to be recovered must be claimed against the executor/administrator and not against the estate.
18 Ibid.

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VOL. 236, SEPTEMBER 2, 1994 255

People vs. Bayotas

the Rules of Court.

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil liability directlyarising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.”
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
19
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated
on a source of obligation other than delict.  Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
20
a) Law
b) Contracts

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19 Justice Vitug who holds a similar view stated: “The civil liability may still be pursued in a separate civil action but it must be predicated on a source of

obligation other than delict, except when by statutory provision an independent civil action is authorized such as, to exemplify, in the instance enumerated in
Article 33 of the Civil Code.” Justice Regalado stressed that:

“Conversely, such civil liability is not extinguished and survives the deceased offender where it also arises simultaneously from or exists as a consequence or by reason of a contract,
as in Torrijos; or from law, as stated in Torrijos and in the concurring opinion in Sendaydiego, such as in reference to the Civil Code; or from a quasi-contract; or is authorized by
law to be pursued in an independent civil action, as in Belamala. Indeed, without these exceptions, it would be unfair and inequitable to deprive the victim of his property or
recovery of damages therefor, as would have been the fate of the second vendee in Torrijos or the provincial government in Sendaydiego.”
20 See Articles 19, 20, 21, 31, 32, 33, 34, 2176 of the Civil Code; see related provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, particularly Sec. 1, Rule
111.

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256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Bayotas

c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x      x x x      x x x
e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only
by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/ administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in
cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil21liability is deemed interrupted
during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 22
1155 of the Civil Code, that should
thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and
the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without
qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

          Narvasa  (C.J.),  Feliciano,  Padilla,  Bidin,  Regalado,  Davide,

Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
     Cruz, J., On leave.

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 21 ART. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and

when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.

22 As explained by J. Vitug in the deliberation of this case.

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Republic vs. Court of Appeals

Appeal dismissed.

Note.—e outcome or result of the criminal case whether an acquittal or conviction is inconsequential and will be of no moment
in a civil action for damages based on Article 33 of the Civil Code. (Diong Bi Chu vs. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 554 [1990])