Does Conflict Beget Conflict Explaining Recurring Civil War

Does Conflict Beget Conflict?
Explaining Recurring Civil War

Author(s): Barbara F. Walter
Source: Journal of Peace Research , May, 2004, Vol. 41, No. 3 (May, 2004), pp. 371-388
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4149750
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fmll**nBllJ ? 2004
vol. 41
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DOI 10. 1177/0022343304043775 ISSN 0022-3433
Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining

Recurring Civil War*
BARBARA F. WALTER
Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of

California, San Diego
This article attempts to explain why some countries experience civil wars while others do not.
that renewed war is likely to have less to do with the attributes of a previous war, as many p
argued, than with current incentives individual citizens have to rejoin a rebel group. Civil
have little chance to get off the ground unless individual farmers, shopkeepers, and potent
choose to enlist in the rebel armies that are necessary to pursue a war, and enlistment is only
be attractive when two conditions hold. The first is a situation of individual hardship or s
satisfaction with one's current situation. The second is the absence of any nonviolent means fo
An analysis of all civil wars ending between 1945 and 1996 suggests that a higher quality o
greater access to political participation have a significant negative effect on the likelihood
war. Countries that provide higher levels of economic well-being to their citizenry and cre
political system are less likely to experience multiple civil wars regardless of what happened in
conflict.
Introduction repeatedly over time.1 Empirically, however,

we know that most civil wars are not
Civil wars create what has been called a
destined to repeat themselves. Between 1945
conflict trap (see Collier & Sambanis, 2002).
and 1996, only 36% of civil wars were
Societies that have experienced one civil war
followed by an additional war.2 Single civil
are significantly more likely to experience a
wars, like those that broke out in Argentina,
second or third war than are societies with no
Greece, and Costa Rica, are more the norm.
prior history of violence. Indonesia, Iraq,
Given this variation, what explains why some
Burundi, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Iran, for
countries experience recurring civil war while
example, have all experienced recurring civil
others do not?
wars where violence broke out not once, but
What little has been written about civil
* The author wishes to thank the members of the World I Across cases, there was no consistent pattern in the timing
Bank's project on 'The Economics of Civil War, Crime and of renewed war. Countries experienced renewed civil war
Violence', Elizabeth Stanley-Mitchell, Zoltan Hajnal, and as soon as two years after one war ended, as was the case
four anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments. in Iran, and as long as 33 years later, as was the case in Iraq.
This study received funding from 'The Economics of The median duration of peace in conflicts that occurred
Political Violence' project directed by the World Bank between 1945 and 1996 was 14 years. Thus, even a decade
Research Group. The data used in this research and an of peace was no guarantee that a country would not experi-
appendix (see note 10) are available at http://www- ence civil war again.
irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-walter-data.php. Correspon- 2 Of the 58 cases of civil war that ended between 1945 and
dence: [email protected]. 1996, 22 experienced renewed war.
371

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372 journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 41 / number 3 / may 2004
war recurrence has tended to focus on the political participation have a significant
effect on the likelihood of renewed war,
characteristics or attributes of the previous
war to explain why a second or third war regardless of what has already happened in a
might occur (see Licklider, 1995; Doyle &previous conflict. Countries whose citizens
Sambanis, 2000; and Hartzell, Hoddie & enjoy high levels of economic well-being and
Rothchild, 2001). In this view, earlier wars have access to a more open political system
set the stage for conflicts that occur in later are significantly less likely to experience
years because the original grievances were multiple civil wars than autocratic countries
not resolved, because violence exacerbated with low levels of individual welfare. Other
ethnic divisions making coexistence difficult, factors such as the duration of war and the
because war ended in unstable compromise willingness of a government to partition
settlements, or because the human costs of territory also had a significant effect on
war created psychological barriers to whether another war surfaces, but these
building peace. effects matter only for certain types of
In what follows, I argue that none of these renewed war. This suggests that war is
factors will lead to a second or third war in unlikely to resurface unless individual
the absence of strong economic and political citizens have pressing personal reasons for
incentives for the average citizen to fight. A enlisting in a rebel organization.
distinguishing feature of civil wars is the
need for rebel leaders to recruit sufficient
Explaining Recurring Civil War
soldiers to man a rebel army. Civil wars will
have little chance to get off the ground unless Current explanations for repeat war tend to
individual farmers, shopkeepers, and fall into one of three camps: (1) those that
workers voluntarily choose to enlist in the focus on why the original war began, (2)
armies that are necessary to pursue war, and those that focus on how the original war was
it is the underlying political and economic fought, and (3) those that focus on how the
conditions that make enlistment attractive original war ended.
that are likely to drive a second or third civil
war (as well as the initial war). Only if we Why the Original War Began
identify these micro-level motives for recruit- Scholars of civil war have long argued that
ment can we begin to explain why civil wars some types of disputes are more difficult to
arise in some countries and not others, and reconcile than others and thus more likely to
why individuals who were once willing to lead to repeat confrontations. Civil wars that
join an army may or may not be willing to are fought between competing identity
join again.3 groups are believed to be particularly
An analysis of every country year in every intractable since, as Gurr (2000: 66) has
country experiencing a civil war between observed, 'cultural identities - those based
1945 and 1996 suggests that basic living on common descent, experience, language,
conditions and the average person's access to and belief - tend to be stronger and more
enduring than most civic and associational
3 I am not the first person to identify rebel recruitment as identities'. Moreover, once war breaks out,
an important factor in civil war. Elbadawi (2001), Collier
ethnic identities and hatreds tend to become
& Hoeffler (2001), and Fearon & Laitin (2003) have all
identified the differential ability to recruit as a possible cemented in ways that make cooperation and
cause of war, and Gates (2002) has argued that rebel reten-
coexistence between the groups even more
tion is a key variable in the duration of civil war. In
addition, for a classic argument on the importance of rebel difficult, and these are the wars that are likely
recruitment, see Mao (1967). to recur over time (see Rothchild & Groth,

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Barbara E Walter EXPLAINING RECURRING CIVIL WAR 373
1995; and Kaufmann, 1996, 1998). The true, then parties involved in more costly
recurring conflict in the Balkans, as well as wars should be more eager to restart their
the repeated violence between groups such as conflict than if they had faced fewer costs
the Hutus and Tutsis, Turks and Armenians, and sustained less suffering.
Jews and Arabs are often identified as Costly wars, however, could have the
examples of this. opposite effect. Countries that have experi-
Rebel demands are also thought to affect enced a particularly devastating civil war may
the likelihood of repeat conflict. Rebels who be less vulnerable to a second or third war
seek extreme objectives such as the elimi- because supplies have been exhausted,
nation of an incumbent regime or the revol- soldiers fatigued, or popular support used up
utionary overthrow of an entrenched (Rosen, 1972). In this case, wars are less
political, economic, or social system have likely to recur because the resources and
defined the conflict in a way that makes a resolve needed to launch additional wars are
stable long-term settlement less likely. Not lacking.
only do extreme demands tend to lock Finally, the length of a conflict may also
parties into positions that lead to bargaining provide important information about the
deadlocks, but public statements seeking government's relative strength and their own
extreme goals also raise expectations in the chances of winning a war. Smith & Stam
minds of supporters that these goals are (2002: 7), for example, have argued that
attainable, making compromise more diffi- 'wars that end quickly, leaving one or both
cult. Wars might end temporarily, but will sides still quite uncertain about the true
re-emerge as soon as one or both sides have balance of power, are much more likely to
regrouped sufficiently to seek a more satisfy- reopen than those wars that end not only
ing solution. with agreement about the balance of power
but also little doubt about the certainty of
How the Original War Was Fought that agreement'. Long wars, therefore, act as
A second set of arguments focuses on the an important information source, with more
costs of a previous war to determine whether accurate information helping to prevent
combatants are likely to return to the battle- renewed conflict in the future.
field. Three mechanisms in particular are
purported to make war more or less likely in How the Original War Ended
the aftermath of especially costly fighting: Other scholars point to how the original war
the desire for retribution, combat weariness, ended to predict whether it will start again,
and increased information about combatant and three arguments tend to be made. The
capabilities. In a preliminary study of first focuses on the degree to which combat-
violence in civil wars, Kalyvas (2000) found ants are able to reconcile the main grievances
that 'personal vengeance was a recurrent driving the war. Governments that are
motive' for participation in war. Wars that willing to address and settle key rebel griev-
inflict high costs on combatants and their ances are believed to have a higher chance of
supporters could exacerbate animosity avoiding renewed violence than governments
between them and create a strong desire for that leave important issues unanswered.5
retribution even after the war ends.4 If this is Once the main motivation driving a rebel
movement has been addressed, the organiz-
4These more violent wars may also indicate a greater ation should dissipate, and wars should end.
willingness (or tolerance) on both sides to pay the costs of
war. Divisions in these wars may be so intense that they are 5 For arguments that focus on grievances as a main cause
unlikely to subside even well into the future. of war, see Gurr (1971) and Tilly (1978).

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The second argument focuses on a war's should be a greater number of challenges and
outcome to determine whether it will recur. more war.
Wars that end in a decisive military victory
for one side are believed to be less likely to
resume for one of two reasons. The first hasArgument
to do with information. Decisive outcomes In what follows, I argue that factor
may impart more information about the to rebel recruitment will be at least as
victor's relative strength than those that end important in determining where war will
in some type of compromise settlement. In recur as factors associated with a previous
this case, potential challengers know they will war. The argument rests on the simple obser-
face a relatively strong and resolute victor if vation that for civil wars to resume, hundreds
they choose to act, and may be deterred from or thousands of individual citizens must
rebelling as a result. A decisive victory may actively choose to re-enlist with a rebel
also deter additional challenges for a second organization. Rebel leaders do not have the
reason. In civil wars, the victorious party luxury to call on a standing army or forcibly
almost always gains full control over the conscript citizens should grievances or
instruments of state, allowing it to consoli- opportunities for rebellions arise. Instead,
date power in the aftermath of war (Zartman, they must recruit and remobilize soldiers for
1989, 1995; Wagner, 1993, 1994). This con- each individual campaign. This places the
solidation is likely to increase its strength onus for renewed war on ordinary people
relative to other groups in society, increasing and the trade-offs they must make for
costs of rebelling and encouraging potential returning to war or staying at peace, and
opponents to remain quiet. If the decision to their decision to enlist or not enlist is likely
rise up rests on the expected costs and to be based on very personal cost calcu-
benefits of fighting a particular opponent, lations. The attributes of a previous war may
then decisive victories that allow large power matter, but civilians are not going to trans-
asymmetries to be institutionalized should be form themselves from shopkeepers back into
followed by fewer additional wars. soldiers unless the conditions that exist at any
A third argument focuses on the geo- given point in time encourage this transform-
graphic distribution of the combatants at the ation.
end of the war, and two opposing predictions Enlistment, therefore, is likely to become
are made. Kaufmann (1996, 1998) has attractive when two conditions hold. The
argued that conflicts that leave the combat- first and most important is a situation of
ants physically separated are less likely to individual hardship or severe dissatisfaction
restart. This is because groups divided into with one's current situation. The status quo
separate homogeneous regions have less must be perceived to be worse than the possi-
reason to fear a surprise attack, and fewer bility of death in combat, a condition I call
incentives to launch a pre-emptive attack of 'misery'. The second is the absence of any
their own. Walter (2004), however, argues nonviolent means for change. Violence must
that partition should have the opposite be perceived as the only available tool for the
effect, where a division of territory is likely average citizen to improve his or her situ-
to trigger additional wars rather than peace. ation, a condition which can be termed 'lack
In this case, partition serves to signal to other of voice'. Because rebel recruitment is vital to
ethnic groups that the government is concil- the emergence of war, countries with high
iatory and will likely acquiesce to their own levels of individual hardship and restricted
demands for greater self-rule. The result outlets for nonviolent change should be

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economic
more likely to experience recurring civil war, growth (Ross, 2003). The same
individuals who had been willing to fight
regardless of what happened in the past.6
The fact that soldiers must be recruited
with GAM for independence from Jakarta
for each distinct conflict does not mean that 1976 and 1979 were no longer
between
different individuals fight each war.willing
If theto fight once their economic situation
had improved,
theory is correct, the soldier who enlists in and conflict dissipated even
though
one war is likely to be the same soldier who the movement's main objective
enlists again and again. This is because(independence)
enlist- had not been met. Enlist-
ment is likely to come disproportionately
ment significantly dropped even though no
from poor sectors of society and thoseconcessions
sectors had been made to the separatists.
As living standards improve, the incentives to
who feel particularly marginalized politically.
In addition, individuals who were once risk one's life to change the status quo
soldiers are arguably more likely to rejoin decreases, even if grievances and animosity
rebel groups because they know the organiz- remain.
ation, the organization knows them, and I should emphasize that the focus on indi-
because they may have problems reintegrat- vidual incentives for enlistment does not
ing into society. The fact that personal mean that it is the only factor necessary for
motives for joining may be connected to a a civil war to resume. For a civil war to occur,
previous experience with fighting does not intergroup antagonisms and grievances must
reduce the importance of current incentives exist, leaders must emerge to coordinate and
to enlist. States with higher living standards manage recruitment, and resources and
and those with more open, competitive supplies must be available to support the
political systems should still be able to escape movement over time.7 In addition, there is
this conflict trap simply by reducing the more to the incentive structure of individuals
incentives for these individuals to fight. than just declining standards of living and
Focusing on the immediate incentives for access to political participation. An indi-
enlistment, therefore, helps explain why vidual's willingness to enlist in a rebel
individuals who were once willing to join a organization is likely to also be affected by
rebel army are then unwilling to join again. his or her propensity to accept risk, as well as
Individuals will have few incentives to enlist his or her political preferences and opinions.
once their living standards have reached the Civil wars will not emerge simply because
point where the potential net benefits from individual citizens wish to improve their
fighting no longer exceed the status quo. A standard of living and have no political
particularly clear example of this relationship means to do so; a life of poverty in a one-
can be found in Indonesia. Aceh's rebel party state does not guarantee that a civil war
will erupt. This article seeks only to show
organization, known as GAM, had a difficult
time recruiting members between 1976 andthat citizen participation is an important and
understudied factor in the ability of these
1989 owing in part to increased individual
income levels, increased GDP, and rapid
movements to get off the ground.
6 Collier & Hoeffler (2002) were the first to argue that the
opportunity costs for potential recruits were likely to be a 7 Kuran (1989), for example, has shown how collective
main determinant in the outbreak of civil war. My action problems can hinder the outbreak of rebellion.
argument is different as it maintains that individuals are Collier has focused more closely on the financial incentives
driven to join rebellions as a means to improve extremely of rebellion, where the existence of lootable commodities
low standards of living, not to obtain profit. In my can help encourage rebellion. For discussions on other
interpretation, individuals are motivated by desperation, issues necessary to recruit and sustain rebel organizations,
not greed. see especially Gates (2002) and Collier & Hoeffler (2001).

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Research Methodology from the factors that lead a new set of com-
batants to initiate a new war, I created two
The aim of this article is to present and test a
additional variables, Repeat War and New
theory of civil war recurrence that highlights
War. A war was coded as a Repeat War if it
the importance of individual incentives to
was fought by the same combatants for the
fight. It is, in other words, an attempt to
same goals as the original war and met all the
incorporate the calculations of the average
coding criteria outlined above. Of the 58 civil
rebel recruit into our understanding of civil
wars in the dataset, 14 ultimately resulted in
war onset. To be included in the analysis, a
repeat wars. In these 14 cases, combatants
country had to experience a civil war that
ended between 1946 and 1996 as based on stopped fighting and often signed detailed
agreements that outlined the transition to
the coding criteria proposed by the Correlates
peace and the new form of government only
of War (CoW) project.8 To be coded as a civil
to go back to war at a later point in time. A
war in the Correlates of War dataset, cases had
number of countries such as Burma and Iraq,
to involve at least 1,000 battle deaths within
however, experienced multiple unrelated
a given year for the domestic part of the war.
wars. The last dependent variable, New War,
Competing theories were then tested using a
was thus coded 1 for any year in which a sub-
cross-sectional time-series format with annual
sequent war between new combatants broke
observations in each country as the unit of out and 0 otherwise. Of the 58 cases of civil
analysis. Based on this format and these
war that ended between 1946 and 1996, 8
criteria, a dataset of 1,151 country-years was
were followed by new wars.
created.9 The Appendix lists the 58 conflicts
from which these country years were drawn.10
Measuring the Independent Variables
To determine if the issues driving the initial
Measuring the Dependent Variables
war affected the likelihood of subsequent
In order to see which of the theories pre-wars, two different variables were included in
sented above help predict the conditions
the analysis. First, if the combatants broke
under which countries will experience recur-
down along ethnic lines, or a faction defined
ring civil war, I created three dependent vari-
itself as a separate ethnic group, it was coded
ables. A binary variable, Subsequent War, was
as an Ethnic Civil War, all other wars were
first fashioned to examine the general causes
coded as non-ethnic.12 Second, the demands
of any kind of subsequent conflict. It was
of the rebels in the original war were also
coded 1 for the year in which a renewed war
recorded to determine what effect they had
broke out regardless of who the combatants on the likelihood of additional wars. If the
were and what their goals were, and 0 for all
rebels initiated the war to obtain anything
other country-years." Since it is possible that
the factors that lead the same set of combat- less than total control over the government
(i.e. political reform, land reform, territorial
ants to restart a war may be very different
autonomy, etc.) the war was coded as involv-
8 For greater elaboration, see Small & Singer (1982). ing Non- Total Goals. 1These conflicts were
' Country-years with an ongoing war were dropped and
are not included in the dataset.
10 The Appendix is available at http://www- 12 Cases were coded based on information obtained from
irps.ucsd.edu/irps/faculty/bfwalter/data.html. Keesing's Contemporary Archives and individual case
" This information was obtained from the Correlates ofhistories.
War dataset, and Walter (2002); see http://www-13 Cases were coded based on the stated aims of the rebels
irps.ucsd.edu/irps/faculty/bfwalter/data.html. More in- at the beginning of the conflict rather than the stated goals
depth details regarding the coding rules for the dependent of the government, since it is the rebels who almost always
variable, as well as for the independent variables, are alsoinitiate a war and are therefore likely to define its par-
available on this website, as well as on the website ofameters. Keesing's Contemporary Archives and individual
Journal of Peace Research. case histories were once again used as sources.

134.102.48.240 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 11:49:17 UTC
Barbara F. Walter EXPLAINING RECURRING CIVIL WAR 377
expected to have a lower rate of recurrence 1.25 million deaths.16 The second, a measure
than those fought in pursuit of more of the Duration of War, varied from a low of
absolute goals. All other wars were coded as one week to a high of 396 months. Both
having Total Goals.14 One potential problem measures were obtained from the Correlates
with coding rebel goals based on the stated of War dataset. The third criterion, Displaced
aims of the movement is that leaders may People, was obtained from Sambanis (2000)
strategically misrepresent their aims in order and measured the number of people dis-
to obtain a better settlement down the road. placed both internally and externally due to
In this case, leaders may publicly demand the war. All three of these variables were log-
more extreme concessions from the govern- transformed.17
ment, only to reduce these demands in give- The final set of variables focused on
and-take negotiations later on. While factors associated with the resolution or
strategic misrepresentation almost certainly outcome of the original war. One logic
occurs, there remains considerable variation suggests that if grievances surrounding the
in the range of rebel demands across cases. In earlier war are resolved, renewed war should
fact, rebel movements publicly sought be less likely. Two measures were used in an
limited aims in almost half of all civil wars attempt to isolate the effect of grievance res-
fought between 1946 and 1996.15 If the olution on war recurrence. The first, Griev-
theory is valid, we should still observe vari- ance Settled, was a dummy variable
ation in the outbreak of renewed war constructed from a variety of sources includ-
between those cases where the rebels ing Keesing's Contemporary Archives, the Ini-
demanded total versus non-total goals. tiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity,
the African Centre for the Constructive Res-
The second set of independent variables
focused on the impact of war costsolution
on of Disputes, and individual case
histories.
renewed war. High costs were expected to This variable was coded 1 if the
terms of a treaty addressed and resolved the
have at least one of three effects. First, they
could create a desire for revenge. Second,
main rebel grievances that were stated at the
beginning of the war, and 0 otherwise.
they could increase war fatigue. Third, they
Grievances were considered settled if a final
could provide important information about
peace treaty included provisions that
the likely outcome of a future war. To engage
specifically addressed these issues, or if the
each of these possibilities, three variables
were included in the analysis. The first, rebels
the won a decisive military victory and
number of War-Related Deaths that took were therefore able to unilaterally implement
place during a war, was measured as a con- these changes on their own.
tinuous variable that ranged from a low of Another potentially relevant factor associ-
1,000 battle deaths, to a high of more than ated with the outcome of the original war is
the decisiveness of victory. Wars that ended
with one side dominating the other were
14 In addition to this dummy variable, two additional presumed to leave little opportunity or
measures of goals were analyzed that differentiated between incentive for the weaker side to renew the
different levels of rebel aims. These measures included an
indicator of territorial goals (coded 1 if the rebels sought
greater territorial autonomy/separation, 0 otherwise), and 16 It should be emphasized that accurate counts of war-
a categorical indicator of goals (coded 1 if the war was related deaths are notoriously difficult to obtain. Many
fought over political reform, 2 if over territorial autonomy deaths go unreported, while others are either under- or
or separation, 3 if over full control of the government, and over-reported for strategic reasons. For a detailed dis-
4 for social revolution). No significant differences to the cussion of how the CoW project attempted to correct this
substantive results emerged. problem, see Small & Singer (1982: 70-77).
15 Rebel demands were limited in 26 of 58 civil wars (45% 17 Alternate analyses with these three variables not log-
of the cases). transformed led to identical conclusions.

134.102.48.240 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 11:49:17 UTC
in each year. Since each of these variables was

war. Thus, each regression includes a dummy
highly
variable indicating whether the war ended in correlated, they were not included
simultaneously
a Decisive Victory (for either side) or not.18 in the model and were
instead used in alternate analyses. I also
The second measure attempted to address
tested the effects of a scale that combined
the notion that settlements based on some
form of Partition between or among the infant mortality, life expectancy, and adult
combatants would be more likely to bring
illiteracy. Data on each of these measures was
peace. Here I used the definition first pre- obtained from the Socio-Economic Data
Division of the World Bank's International
sented by Sambanis (2000) where partition
is defined as a war outcome that involves
Economics Department.
both border adjustment and demographic The second factor that should affect indi-
vidual citizens' decision to re-enlist (and thus
changes. Wars are coded 1 if an event of par-
tition is observed, 0 otherwise. One the likelihood of renewed war) is political
openness. Countries with few nonviolent
problem, however, exists with coding parti-
outlets for citizens to seek governmental
tion this way. Civil wars that end in partition
could not, by these coding rules, experiencereform should be more susceptible to
a second civil war, since any additional warrenewed war than those with more open
between the two combatants would be systems. Three alternate measures were
defined as an interstate war. To account for tested to see if 'voice' had any effect on
this problem, all cases of war betweenrenewed war: (1) an overall Democracy/Autoc-
previous combatants were included in theracy scale from the Polity III dataset; (2) a
dataset, even if partition had occurred.19 measure of Executive Constraints on a govern-
Finally, to address the idea that thement's executive branch - also from Polity
economic and political conditions on the III; and (3) a measure of Political Openness
ground at any given point in time are likely published by Freedom House (also known as
to affect the ability of rebel leaders to recruit the Gastil Index). Since all three measures
soldiers, I include two sets of factors. Thewere highly correlated and because the
first addresses quality of life issues. Several Democracy/Autocracy score was available for
different measures were used to test whetheralmost all of the cases, only this score was
living standards influence the likelihood of used in the final analysis.
renewed war. In the main analysis that Finally, three additional variables were
follows, I include a measure of the Infantincorporated in the model as controls. A
Mortality Rate (deaths per 1,000) in eachmeasure of the ethnic heterogeneity from the
country in each year. To test for the robust-Vanhanen (1999) dataset was included in the
ness of this theory, I substituted measures for model to see if countries with greater racial,
Life Expectancy (measured at birth), thereligious, and linguistic divisions were prone
percent of Adult Illiteracy, and Real to a greater number of conflicts.20 A second
GDP/capita - all measured in each countrycontrol variable was included to account for
a finding by Fearon & Laitin (2003) that the
I8 In an alternate test. decisive victories by the government
were distinguished from decisive victories for the number of civil wars per year has increased
rebels.
over
These tests indicate that the effects of a decisive victory are the last fifty years. In order to address
the same regardless of who wins. Source: Sambanis (2000),
this increase over time, I included a variable
Variable OUTCOME2. Note this dataset is posted on the
World Bank website: http://econ.worldbank.org/view.
php?topic= 19&type= 18&id= 13218. 20 In alternate tests, a different measure of diversity within
a nation - the commonly used Ethnolinguistic Fractional-
19 Only one case, Croatia and former Yugoslavia, suffered
from this problem. It was included in the dataset as ization
a Index (ELF index) - was included. The results
separate observation. remained the same.

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Barbara F Walter EXPLAINING RECURRING CIVIL WAR 379
indicating the year under observation. fourth conflict.24 This findings mirrors
Finally, in line with Beck, Katz & Tucker findings by Mason & Fett (1996) and
(1998), I included both a count of the Sambanis (2000) that longer wars are less
number of years from the end of the original likely to recur. This relationship suggests that
conflict, peace years, and a natural cubic longer wars may be deterring additional chal-
spline of peace years in order to assess how lenges either because resources and support
war recurrence is related to the duration of have been depleted or because better infor-
postwar peace.21 mation on relative capabilities and resolve is
available to potential combatants. Additional
tests would be required to determine which
Findings
of these two mechanisms is actually at play.
Why do some countries experience recurring Partition was also highly significant.25
civil war while others do not? Model 1 in Governments that had agreed to partition
Table I shows the results of a logit regression their country as a result of one war were
with Subsequent War as the dependent significantly more likely to face additional
variable.22 It tests a series of factors related to wars. This finding stands in contrast to pre-
the original war and another series of measures dictions made by Kaufmann that partition
related to current living conditions to see how promotes long-term peace, but is compatible
each affects the propensity for any type of civil with Walter's (2004) expectation that parti-
war to occur in any given year after combat- tion would encourage copy-cat movements.
ants have agreed to end the previous civil war. Government concessions over territory in
Two conclusions can be drawn from this one case appear to encourage additional chal-
analysis.23 First, civil war recurrence is lengers to initiate their own demands.26
related to some of the characteristics of a In contrast, all of the other factors related
previous war. Two factors (duration and par- to the original war appear to have little effect
tition) had a significant effect on whether a on the re-emergence of violence. Wars fought
given country experienced multiple civil for total goals, or between different ethnic
wars. In the first case, longer and presumably groups27 were no more likely to recur than
more costly wars reduced the likelihood that wars fought over less demanding issues, or
a country would face a second, third, or between the same ethnic group. Finally, the
costs incurred during a previous war
21 A comparison of the fit of the model with the splines
and one without indicated that the war recurrence was
non-linearly related to peace duration and thus that the 24 In a related study on the duration of peace, Fortna
splines should be included. All splines in the subsequent (2002) found that longer wars brought longer periods of
tables allowed for four knots, placed at 5, 9, 16, and 26 postwar peace, and Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild (2001)
years of peace. The number of knots and several different found that longer wars were more likely to lead to longer
knot placements were tested to try to determine the best periods of peace ifa war ended in a negotiated settlement.
fit. I also repeated the analysis using two different specifi- Doyle & Sambanis (2000), however, found only weak
cations (one with temporal dummy variables for each peace support for the hypothesis that longer wars deter future
year included and one with only the continuous peace years conflict, and Dubey (2002) found no relationship at all.
variable included) and found that they led to identical sub- 25 Sambanis (2000) had similar findings in a study of the
stantive findings. effect of partition on ethnic war recurrence. In a study of
22 The regressions use Huber/White standard errors with ethnic civil wars since 1944, he found that partition in
clustering by country to take into account the non-inde- these cases was positively correlated with war recurrence.
pendence of multiple cases from the same country. 26 In an unrelated project, Walter (2004) has demonstrated
23 In alternate analyses, I employed the same independent that governments appear to take this into account when
variables using a standard survival model to predict the determining what concessions, if any, to make.
number of peace years after each civil war. As expected, the 27 Although Collier & Hoeffler (2001) found that coun-
conclusions were identical (Beck, Katz & Tucker, 1998). tries in which the largest ethnic group constitutes 45-90%
The same sets of factors that lead to recurring civil war are of the population are significantly more likely to experience
related to the duration of post-conflict peace. civil war.

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(measured in terms of battle deaths) had no The second important conclusion to

real effect on the likelihood that another war emerge from Model 1 is that current living
would occur.28 Since the different measures conditions do play a significant role in
of costs are related and at least somewhat cor-whether additional civil wars occur. Higher
related, I reran the analysis with each separ- infant mortality rates in the years after the
ately. I also created an additional variable, end of the first war are positively and signifi-
war intensity, which was battle deathscantly related to renewed war.32 This lends
divided by war duration. Only duration was support to the idea that individuals choose
significantly related to future conflict in any to re-enlist with rebel organizations when
of these different specifications. This conditions at home are dire.
supports the interpretation that duration A lack of democracy or voice, at least as
serves an important information-revealing measured here, did not appear to be closely
role in civil war. linked to the renewal of conflict. As we will
Similarly, other than the effects of parti- see later, however, when the non-linear
tion, there was no clear relationship between effects of democracy are assessed, ties
how a war ended and subsequent war.29 Wars between democracy and subsequent conflict
in which the main grievances remained unre- do emerge.
solved were no more prone to repeat them- Since it is difficult to interpret the magni-
selves than those that did not. Whether a tude of these effects from the logit regression
previous war ended with a decisive victory shown above, Table II converts the signifi-
also had little impact on the likelihood of cant coefficients from Model 1 into pre-
renewed violence.30 It is interesting to note, dicted probabilities. In each case, all of the
however, that a change in the balance of other variables are held constant at values for
power between the two combatants over a hypothetical median case.33
time may have a significant effect on the Table II indicates that all three factors
outbreak of renewed violence that is not highlighted can greatly increase or decrease
captured in this static measure of thethe likelihood of subsequent war. Countries
outcome of a civil war.31 with a high infant mortality rate (measured
28 Sambanis (2000) and Doyle & Sambanis (2000) both as the 75th percentile) more than triple the
found a significant and positive relationship between the odds that war will recur in any given year,
human costs of war and war recurrence.
compared to countries with a low infant
29 Again, since the different measures of war outcome are
correlated, I reran the analysis with each measure separately mortality rate (measured as the 25th per-
but found that this made no difference to the results.
centile). Countries that fight long wars are
30 Doyle & Sambanis (2000) had a similar finding in their
over five times less likely to return to war in
study of factors related to peacebuilding in the aftermath
of civil war. They found that a decisive military victory for a given year than countries that fight short
either side was completely unrelated to whether war civil wars. And governments that end one
recurred. Licklider (1995), Dubey (2002), and Fortna
(2002), however, found that civil wars that ended in a
military victory were significantly less likely to be followed 32 Elbadawi & Sambanis (2002) had similar findings.
by additional wars than wars that did not. Using a cross-sectional time-series dataset with five-year
31 In an interesting study of interstate wars. Werner (1999) frequency covering the period 1960-99, they found that
found that a change in the relative power of the belliger- greater economic development reduces the risk of the
ents in the aftermath of war was more likely to lead to initial onset of civil war.
recurring war than a decisive military victory. This is 3 The values for this median case are: ethnicity (0), extent
because the increasingly stronger party to a conflict has of goals (.66), logged battle deaths per 1,000 (2.44), logged
incentives to renegotiate the terms of the previous peace displaced persons (7.33), grievances settled (0), decisive
settlement in its favor as its power increases. This relation- victory (1), ethnic heterogeneity (43.7), year (1980), and
ship is not captured in my model, although the logic of the peace years (16). These probabilities are calculated using a
underlying argument should hold equally well in the case simulation procedure developed by King, Tomz & Wit-
of recurring civil war. tenberg (2000).

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Table I. Determinants of Subsequent Civil War
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Characteristics of previous war

Underlying issues:
Ethnic conflict .16 (.68) -.15 (.69) .28 (.89) .17 (.66)
Total goals -1.36 (.74) -1.50 (.80) -1.33 (.95) -1.26 (.76)
Costs of war:
Battle deaths/1,000b .12 (.16) .08 (.15) .10 (.21) .05 (.17)
Duration of warb -.46 (.17) -.46 (.17)** -.64 (.23)** -.42 (.18)*
Displaced personsb .04 (.05) .03 (.05) .10 (.07) .06 (.05)
War resolution:
Decisive victory (1 - yes) -.93 (.78) -.99 (.80) -1.04 (.88) -.86 (.77)
Grievances settled (1 - yes) .23 (.69) .32 (.67) .75 (.87) .19 (.69)
Partition 2.08 (.94)* 2.27 (.93)* 1.87(1.31) 2.02 (.99)*
Living conditions
Infant mortalitya .02 (.01)** - - .017 (.007)**
Life expectancya - -.10 (.04)**
Illiteracya - - .037 (.019)*
Level of democracya .04 (.05) .04
Change in infant mortalitya - - - .054 (.024)*
Change in democracya - - - .06 (.07)
Controls:
Ethnic heterogeneity -.002 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.009 (.01) .001 (.01)
Year .02 (.03) .02 (.03) .04 (.03) .02 (.03)
Peace years -.72 (.34)* -.72 (.34)* -.60 (.39) -.67 (.36)
Spline (1) 1.05 (.58) 1.05 (.58) .81 (.71) .44 (.73)
Spline (2) 1.27 (.51) 1.27 (.51)* 1.06 (.58) 1.21 (.54)*
Spline (3) .57 (.33) .59 (.34) .50 (.39) .54 (.36)
Spline (4) .63 (.37) .63 (.37) .49 (.42) .51 (.38)
Constant -5.64 (2.01) 2.06 (2.87) -5.96 (2.47) -3.10 (2.36)
N (war occurrences) 22 22 21 22
N 1,073 1,061 999 1,008
a Lagged one year; b Logged.

Logistic regression. Figures are coeffici
* p <.05; **p <.01.
Stata VII was used to generate the stati
civil war via means that the odds of eventually returning

partition increas
the odds to war are much
that they will face higher.34
challenge.
Readers should also not be misled by the
low percentages in Table II. Even though, in
any given year, the probability of returning to
34 Thus even though, on average, across the 58 countries
war is small, these probabilities cumulate
in the dataset there is only a 1.8 probability of returning
over time. Thus, even a small increase in the to war in any given year, 21 of them (36%) eventually face
renewed conflict.
probability of going to war in a given year

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Table II. Probability of a Subsequent War What is less clear at this point is whether
citizens care more about the change in their
Probability of
Variable subsequent war living standards over time or whether
absolute living standards mattered more
Infant mortality when determining whether to rebel. Model
Low (41/1,000) 0.5 4 in Table I tackles this question. Although
High (116/1,000) 1.7 the small number of cases and a fair degree
Change in probability 1.2
of collinearity make it extremely difficult to
Duration logged
Short (0) 2.7 adjudicate between the two different
Long (3.99) 0.5 accounts, the results suggest that individuals
Change in probability -2.2 respond both to absolute quality of life and
Partition to changes over time in quality of life. A
No 0.8
measure of change in infant mortality in the
Yes 7.7
preceding two years is significantly related to
Change in probability 6.9 the onset of subsequent war. In particular,
countries that experience relatively
Probabilities are calculated varying particular independent sharp
variables from the 25th to 75th percentiles while holding
increases in infant mortality are more prone
other variables at values constant at a hypothetical median
case using a simulation procedure developed by King,to renewed war.36 These results suggest that
Tomz & Wittenberg (2000). individuals turn to violence because their
overall quality of life is low and also, poten-
tially, because they believe conditions are
Robustness Checks declining rather than improving.
It remains unclear, however, which of the Finally, it is worth noting that only one of
theindifferent measures of democracy tested in
quality-of-life measures are more critical
Table I had a significant relationship to war
the decision to fight, since only infant mor-
tality is included in Model 1. Models 2 recurrence.
and Later, I attempt to assess more
3 in Table I address this issue by lookingcarefully
at when democracy may be related to
war recurrence.
the effects of life expectancy and adult illit-
eracy on the likelihood of subsequent war.
What becomes clear when each of these vari-
Resuming Old Wars vs. Starting New
Wars
ables is included in a separate analysis is that
a wide variety of quality-of-life measures are additional refinement of the analys
An
sented in Table I is necessary. Countrie
significantly related to war recurrence. Life
expectancy and adult illiteracy are both experience multiple civil wars do not
significant or nearly significant (p = .055 experience
for the same type of war. One
illiteracy) when substituted for infant mor-argue that the conditions that lead to
wars are likely to be different from tho
tality in the basic model. This suggests that
higher levels of individual well-being, lead to brand new civil wars. Table III
however measured, reduce the odds of
36 This relationship between worsening conditions and
additional civil wars.35 subsequent war continues to hold if one focuses on changes
in life expectancy or changes in adult illiteracy. It also holds
if one focuses on changes in the last five years rather than
35 Alternate tests suggested that wealth, (GDP per capita),
had a similar if more muted effect on the likelihoodinof the last two years. It does not, however, hold if one looks
renewed war. As GDP was unavailable for about half of atthethe rate of change between the current country-year and
country years, it was not included in the final model.theAfirst year after the original war, making one less confi-
combined index of infant mortality, life expectancy,dent
and about the robustness of this finding. In all of these
different
illiteracy also had a significant and pronounced effect on specifications, absolute conditions retain their
the odds of returning to war. significance.

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Table III. Determinants of Subsequent Civil War: Non-Linear Effects of Democracy
All subsequent wars Repeat war New war
Characteristics of previous war

Underlying issues:
Ethnic conflict .24 (.64) .69 (.67) -2.64 (1.63)
Total goals -1.73 (.78)* -1.685 (.945) -1.78 (1.49)
Costs of war:
Battle deaths/1,000b .12 (.17) -.10 (.26) .55 (.35)
Duration of war b -.440 (.176)* -.29 (.23) -1.09 (.49)*
Displaced persons b .04 (.05) .12 (.07) .01 (.12)
War resolution:
Decisive victory (1 - yes) -1.10 (.87) -1.48 (1.04) #
Grievances settled (1 - yes) .32 (.62) .50 (.43) -2.49 (1.83)
Partition 1.91 (.91)* .61 (1.26) 6.15 (2.44)*
Living conditions
Infant mortalitya .018 (.006)** .017 (.008)* .031 (.016)
Clear democracy -2.058 (1.139) -1.32 (1.24) #
Clear autocracy -1.00 (.565) -.78 (.74) -1.65 (1.07)
Controls:
Ethnic heterogeneity -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01) .004 (.024)

Year .02 (.03) .01 (.04) .07 (.07)
Peace years -.73 (.33)* -.721 (.407) .55 (.67)
Spline (1) 1.16 (.57)* 1.215 (.686) -1.33 (1.06)
Spline (2) 1.31 (.51)* 1.28 (.618)* -.01 (.70)
Spline (3) .59 (.33) .689 (.406) -.87 (.70)
Spline (4) .71 (.37) .33 (.71) -.28 (.68)
Constant -4.86 (2.07)* -5.91 (2.73)* -8.75 (4.29)*
N (war occurrences) 22 14 8
N 1,127 1127 846
a Lagged one year; b Logged.

Logistic regression. Figures are
* p <.05; **p < .01.
# Predicts outcome perfectly;
combatants
explicitly to go back to war are fairly
distinguis
different kinds of wars. In the second similar to the factors that lead new combat-
column, I look at the factors that predict
ants to start a war. In particular, 'misery' or
Repeat Wars, where the conflict is between quality of life is a critical factor in both types
of war. Basic living conditions were related
the original combatants over essentially the
both to whether new combatants initiated
same sets of issues, and in the third column,
I focus on New Wars, where the subsequent violent civil conflict and to whether the same
combatants returned to war. Countries with
conflict is between a different set of combat-
ants from the original war.37 low rates of infant mortality were markedly
The results in Table III suggest that forless likely to have civil war re-emerge. The
same results were obtained when life
the most part the factors that lead the same
expectancy and adult illiteracy were inde-
37Given the small number of new wars (8), it is particu-
pendently
larly difficult to model their causes, so the results in Table
substituted for infant mortality.
III should be read with some caution. The results in Table III do, however, hint

134.102.48.240 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 11:49:17 UTC
at some interesting and potentially import- between democracy and violence may be
ant differences between the factors that cause more complex than the simple linear
the two types of war. Surprisingly, there is measure I have used to this point. Hegre et
little to no relationship between factors al. (2001) and Muller & Weede (1990) both
related to the old war and the repetition of argue that the relationship between demo-
that same war. The goals of the original com- cratic openness and violent conflict may be
batants, their ethnicity, the costs of the somewhat U-shaped, with clear democracies
previous war (both duration and battle and clear autocracies less likely to experience
deaths), and the degree to which rebel griev- violent internal conflict than those in the
ances were settled appear to have little effect middle. In Table III, I also test this proposi-
on the re-emergence of that war. Thus, the tion against the three dependent variables
attributes of a previous war do not appear to (Subsequent Wars, Repeat Wars, and New
doom combatants to enter a cycle of repeated Wars). In each case, I include dummy vari-
violence. However, some of the features of ables for clear democracies and clear autoc-
the previous war appear to be related to the racies and leave the third category,
onset of a new civil war. Specifically, parti- semi-democracies, as the excluded compari-
tion and duration were significantly related son group.38
to the onset of a new civil war. At first glance, The results are not consistent across all
this finding might appear peculiar. If types of wars, but there is, nevertheless, a
anything, the attributes of a previous war clear indication that true democracies are less
should be related to a repetition of the same likely to experience renewed civil war than
war, not a new one. This finding, however, is semi-democracies.39 When all types of sub-
consistent with theories that focus on the sequent conflict are considered, as in the first
effects of uncertainty on war initiation. Long column, the differences between democra-
wars and wars in which the government is cies and semi-democracies are not quite
willing to part with land reveal important significant (p = .07) but the effects are large.
private information about a government's In the median case, true democracies have
willingness to fight, and its willingness to less than a half a percent chance of ending in
make concessions over territory. Thus, while conflict in a given year compared to almost
short wars certainly have their merits, and a two and a half percent chance for semi-
partition has been advocated as a means to democracies. There appears to be no
prevent additional wars, both appear to have relationship between the level of democracy
the undesirable effect of triggering additional and the case of repeat wars, but democracy
wars.
powerfully predicts the initiation of new
wars. In fact, across the entire dataset, a new
civil war is never initiated in a true democ-
Contrasting Democracies, Autocracies,
and Semi-Democracies racy and thus the variable itself has to be
Earlier in the article, I argued that regime dropped from the model in the third column
type should affect the average person's (see also Dubey, 2002). The effects for
decision to enlist in a rebel army or not.
Individuals should be more willing to initiate 38 True democracies score a 6 or above on the democ-
racy-autonomy CoW scale, true autocracies score a -6 or
violent challenges in countries where there
below score, and semi-democracies are everything in
are few opportunities for citizens to influencebetween.
the actions of government. The results to this39 In an alternate specification, I included both a lagged
democracy score and a squared democracy term and found
point have not supported this prediction. that the results were consistent with the results presented
in Table III.
One explanation is that the relationship

134.102.48.240 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 11:49:17 UTC
autocracy are not quite as clear. In two of the explanation that stresses the role individual
three cases, the sign on the autocracy citizens play in deciding whether to join a
coefficient is in the expected direction rebel army, thus allowing a civil war to get
(negative) and approaching standard signifi- under way. Citizens whose quality of life
cance levels. remains at a critically low level and who are
Other studies have found an inverted U- given little or no additional access to central
shaped relationship between the degree of decisionmaking should be much more likely
democracy and the initiation of civil war, but to re-enlist in a rebel organization than those
their interpretations are different. Fearon & citizens whose welfare has improved, or who
Laitin (2003) argue that this relationship have the ability to participate in a competi-
exists because anocracies (or semi-democra- tive political process.
cies) are weak regimes that lack the resources The empirical findings presented in the
necessary to repress or crush potential rebel article support the idea that living conditions
movements. Hegre et al. (2001) make the that favor individual enlistment in rebel
related argument that the most autocratic armies - namely low quality of life and
regimes can repress dissent better than insti- barriers to political participation - can help
tutions that mix democratic and autocratic predict which countries will continue to
features. Although it is unclear whichexperience civil war and which will not. The
mechanism is at work, the fact that onlylikelihood of returning to war was both a
mature democracies are able to avoid repeat function of the basic well-being of the
civil wars indicates that the ability of indi-country's population and the accessibility of
viduals to participate in government could government decisionmaking to the average
play an important role in their decision to citizen.
support rebel movements or not. The analysis, however, also showed that
Thus, it may be that liberal democracies two factors associated with an earlier war do
are really the only types of regimes that canappear to encourage new combatants to
truly insulate themselves from violent initiate their own war. Governments that
internal challenges. This suggests that citizensfought a short war against one set of chal-
who are able to express their preferenceslengers and governments that ended a
about alternative policies and leaders, who areprevious war in partition were significantly
guaranteed civil liberties in their daily livesmore likely to face a violent challenge from
and in acts of political participation, are less a new rebel group. This supports the idea
likely to become soldiers.40 Offering citizensthat the outcome and duration of an earlier
a real outlet for their concerns and having awar can play an important signaling role to
government that is open to democratic other challengers in their decision to act or
change considerably reduces the likelihood ofremain at peace. One war does appear to
provide important information to other
a civil war, whether or not a country had
already experienced a previous war. potential combatants about the potential
costs and outcome of their own contest.
Conclusion The next and potentially more difficult

question is how to get leaders from these
This article attempts to explain why some
war-torn countries to open up their political
countries seem to be able to escape the
systems and improve the individual welfare
conflict trap and others not. It offers an of their people when it is not always in their
40 Elbadawi (2001) found similar evidence for poverty and immediate interests to give up power or
the risk of war, and political rights and the risk of war. redistribute resources. Simply informing

134.102.48.240 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 11:49:17 UTC
Burnside, Craig & David Dollar, 2002. 'Aid,

them that they are likely to faced renewed
Policies and Growth', unpublished paper,
war if they do not act may be one important
step. Some preliminary analysis on Macroeconomics
the and Growth Group, World
Bank.
current dataset also suggests that various
Collier, Paul & Anke Hoeffler, 2001. 'Greed and
types of outside intervention, in particular
Grievance in Civil War', unpublished paper,
outside economic aid and third-party inter-
World Bank, October (http://econ.
vention, can have a positive effect worldbank.org/programs/conflict/topic/1319
on
political openness and democratization.
0/library/doc?id = 12205).
Countries that receive a high percentage of Paul & Anke Hoeffler, 2002. 'Aid, Policy
Collier,
their GNP in the form of outside economic
and Peace: Reducing the Risks of Civil
aid and countries that enjoy third-party Conflict', Defence and Peace Economics 13(6):
security guarantees in the aftermath of one 435-450.
war appeared to be more likely to see Collier, Paul & Nicholas Sambanis, 2002.
improvements in democratization. This 'Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda',
finding is supported by Doyle & Sambanis Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(1): 3-12.
(2000: 795), who found that democratiz- Doyle, Michael W. & Nicholas Sambanis, 2000.
'International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical
ation is more likely in the aftermath of civil
and Quantitative Analysis', American Political
war 'when UN peace operations and sub- Science Review 94(4): 779-801.
stantial financial assistance are available'. It is
Dubey, Amitabh, 2002. 'Domestic Institutions
less clear what factors encourage positive and the Duration of Civil War Settlements',
economic growth and improved individual unpublished paper, Columbia University,
welfare over time. Despite substantial March.
research on this latter set of questions, con- Elbadawi, Ibrahim A., 2001. 'Civil Wars and
siderable disagreement still exists.41 Ulti- Poverty: The Role of External Interventions,
mately, if these questions can be resolved and Political Rights and Economic Growth',
leaders are willing to implement strategies unpublished paper, World Bank, March
(http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/conflict
that will improve individual living con-
/library/doc?id = 13208).
ditions and expand democracy, the conflict
Elbadawi, Ibrahim & Nicholas Sambanis, 2002.
trap may be broken.
'How Much War Will We See? Explaining the
Prevalence of Civil War', Journal of Conflict
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Zartman, I. William, ed., 1995. Elusive Peace: BARBARA E WALTER, b. 1964, PhD in
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DC: Brookings. 1994); Associate Professor, Graduate School
of International Relations and Pacific Studies,
University of California, San Diego (1996- ).
Current main interest: bargaining failures in
war. Most recent book: Committing to Peace:
The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Prince-
ton University Press, 2002).

134.102.48.240 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 11:49:17 UTC

Does Conflict Beget Conflict Explaining Recurring Civil War

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Explaining Recurring Civil War

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