June 2021

Perspective
EXPERT INSIGHTS ON A TIMELY POLICY ISSUE

TIMOTHY R. HEATH

U.S. Strategic Competition

with China
A RAND Research Primer

F
or the first time since contending with the Soviet Union in the Cold War, the United States
faces the prospect of a long-term competition with a near-peer great power: the People’s
Republic of China.1 China’s economy has become the second-largest in the world, and
its companies compete with U.S. counterparts for markets and resources. The People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) has become the “pacing threat” to U.S. military operations in Asia, and
China’s diplomatic influence rivals that of the United States in many parts of the world. The nar-
rowing gap in national strength has coincided with an intensification of bilateral disputes over
trade, technology transfer, cyber espionage, human rights, and other issues. Even the shared
threat of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has proved an occasion for the two sides to
trade accusations and compete for influence.2 Tensions have grown around smoldering hot-spot
issues, such as Taiwan and the East and South China Seas.
This rapid unraveling of the U.S.-China relationship—which had been widely viewed as
stable and mutually profitable despite long-standing disputes—has unsettled global politics.
Although both capitals appear committed to peacefully resolving their differences, the intensify-
ing acrimony and distrust have raised fears among many observers that the two countries could
be headed toward confrontation. C O R P O R AT I O N
 U.S. policymakers continue to grapple with how best weakness limited its ability to challenge U.S. leadership
to manage a strategic challenge that is strikingly differ- beyond its immediate periphery.
ent from those of the past half century. Unlike the Soviet RAND Corporation research over the past few years
Union, China is a formidable challenger that has remained sheds light on many aspects of the enormously complex
a top trading partner despite disputes over tariffs and and important U.S.-China strategic competition. This
other issues. China and the United States also occasionally Perspective reviews more than 60 RAND reports on
cooperate on shared concerns, such as maritime piracy and relevant topics, primarily from the past five years and
research for the COVID-19 pandemic, albeit, perhaps, on extending to the middle of 2020. It covers various issues
a primarily nongovernment basis.3 Moreover, today’s com- pertaining to the competition, including China’s strategic
petition occurs against a backdrop of persistently sluggish goals and priorities, the policies and measures through
growth in the world economy, a fragmenting international which China attempts to fulfill these goals, how China’s
order, and significant domestic challenges within both actions affect U.S. strategic interests, and what additional
China and the United States. steps might further protect U.S. interests. This review also
These unusual features of the contemporary situation encompasses studies that take a broader view of the com-
limit the applicability of lessons that can be applied from petitive international environment and consider how the
past strategic competitions. In the intensely ideological competition might differ from U.S. strategic competition
1950s and 1960s, for example, an immensely prosperous with Russia. This review excluded tactical-level studies that
and confident United States feuded with an impoverished, offer detailed comparisons of U.S. and Chinese military
fervently Maoist China primarily over developments in capabilities or examine the value of specific assets or sys-
East Asia. Although the two occasionally clashed in violent, tems under certain warfighting conditions.
large-scale wars, as happened in the Korean War, China’s This review first highlights major findings across the
RAND studies, then discusses key themes that RAND
researchers have found particularly relevant in the context
of U.S.-China strategic competition. A concluding section
Abbreviations
outlines topics for additional research that could further
A2/AD anti-access/area denial inform the work of strategy and policy development.
ADIZ Air Defense Identification Zone

AI artificial intelligence
Major Findings
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
Using various methodological approaches and theoretical
COVID-19 coronavirus disease 2019 perspectives, the RAND studies have coalesced around a
PLA People’s Liberation Army set of seven relatively consistent findings:

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 1. the high stakes in the United States’ most important
competition
2. the central roles of economics, diplomacy, and The significance of
technology
3. the fact that the United States has the upper hand the U.S. competition
in comprehensive national power, but China is nar-
rowing the gap with China has been
4. the perilous erosion of the U.S. security position in
Asia as a result of PLA advances
emphatically underscored
5. the growing uncertainty, but still low risk, of a cata-
strophic U.S.-China war
in RAND research.
6. the potential key statecraft challenge of managing
alliances and partnerships son, the authors characterized Russia, widely regarded as
7. the intensifying struggle through measures other the United States’ second most-important competitor, as
than war. more akin to that of a “rogue” state capable of disruption
and subversion but not seriously contesting the position of
the United States as a global leader.4
High Stakes in United States’ Most A 2018 RAND report by Michael J. Mazarr, Timothy R.
Important Competition Heath, and Astrid Stuth Cevallos similarly examined
The significance of the U.S. competition with China has the implications for global peace from the deepening
been emphatically underscored in RAND research. Various U.S.-China competition for influence within the interna-
past studies have concluded that the outcome of the com- tional order. As that report noted, “Whether a growing
petition could affect the economic prospects for the United competition for influence and leadership with the United
States and also carry profound implications for the future States in shaping the terms of the international order esca-
of the international order and prospects for international lates into dynamics that become destructive of that order
peace and stability. As one 2019 study by James Dobbins, remains to be determined.”5
Howard J. Shatz, and Ali Wyne put it, “China is a peer Other studies have likewise highlighted the signifi-
competitor that wants to shape an international order cance of the U.S.-China competition for shaping the evolu-
that it can aspire to dominate.” Noting the possibility that tion of the international system. A 2019 RAND study by
Beijing might shape an international order to its economic Michael J. Mazarr and his colleagues characterized the
benefit and to the detriment of U.S. economic prospects, current era as one featuring “an overarching competition
the report described China as posing a “less immediate with China, with secondary, largely regional contestations
threat, but a much greater long-term threat.” By compari- with other actors, including Russia.”6 The study called the

3
U.S.-China contest “decisive” for the overall character of RAND researchers have paid particular attention to
international competition.7 China’s economic prowess and its willingness to exert dip-
lomatic influence to strengthen its position. The 2019 report
led by Dobbins concluded as follows: “It is geoeconomics,
Central Roles of Economics, Diplomacy,
rather than geopolitics, in which the contest for world lead-
and Technology ership will play out.” Specifically, “The principal Chinese
RAND researchers have stressed the centrality of econom- challenge is not that it will impose authoritarian govern-
ics, technology, and diplomacy in the current contest—in ments on its trading partners but that, over time, it will skew
contrast to the importance of ideology and conflict along global standards for trade and investment in its favor to the
China’s periphery during the Cold War. The 2019 study led disadvantage of its competitors.”10 A 2020 study by Shatz
by Mazarr charted the possible trajectory of the competi- similarly noted China’s willingness to use economic tools to
tion, based on patterns from historical rivalries and theo- compete in the security and geopolitical domains.11
retical analysis. The study concluded that the competition RAND researchers have also focused on the country’s
will not determine the survival of nations or systems but ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a massive trade
rather their “relative strength and success.” Accordingly, and infrastructure endeavor aimed at integrating the
major investments and national strategies will likely economies of Asia and Europe. A 2018 study led by Hui Lu
be focused on “dominating certain industries, attract- concluded that improvements in infrastructure and con-
ing investment, making innovative breakthroughs, and nectivity along the BRI routes could increase the total trade
enhancing domestic growth rates and social prosperity.”8 volumes within and beyond the BRI regions (such as the
The 2019 study led by Dobbins similarly emphasized the European Union), attract foreign direct investment, speed
centrality of diplomacy, industry, trade, innovation, and up the industrialization process, enable more-efficient
leadership in international organizations in the U.S.-China production networks, and facilitate regional integration.12
competition.9 A 2020 study led by Andrew Scobell went further, noting

RAND researchers have stressed the centrality of

economics, technology, and diplomacy in the current
contest—in contrast to the importance of ideology and
conflict along China’s periphery during the Cold War.
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the importance of China’s economic prospects for competi-
tion with the United States and outlining different possible
future trajectories of the U.S.-China relationship: one of RAND researchers
“parallel partners” (in which the two grow in parallel), one
of “colliding competitors” (featuring conflict), and one of have begun to examine
“diverging directions” (in which China becomes distracted
by domestic woes).13 particular technological
With respect to technology, RAND researchers have
emphasized the importance of leadership in the devel-
sectors to investigate how
opment and manufacturing of advanced technologies.
Technological leadership could not only enable rapid eco-
much of a threat China’s
nomic growth but also allow a country’s military to gain an
edge on the battlefield.14
pursuit of technological
RAND researchers have begun to examine particular advantage poses to U.S.
technological sectors to investigate how much of a threat
China’s pursuit of technological advantage poses to U.S. industry.
industry. For example, a 2017 study led by Chad J. R.
Ohlandt judged that China’s unambiguous policy drives “a
an advantage over the United States in the area of big data
whole-of-government effort to develop a globally competi-
sets but that the United States has retained a modest lead
tive aviation industry.” The study detected “few technology-
in AI technology development because of its substantial
transfer concerns” for the sector, noting that Chinese invest-
advantage in the advanced semiconductor sector.17 A 2020
ments have been limited to “companies with technologies
study led by Derek Grossman echoed the conclusion about
not particularly relevant to commercial or military aircraft.”
big data analytics, noting that Beijing has a whole-of-
Nonetheless, the study recommended that export controls
government strategy for applying the technology.18
remain in place, given China’s “aggressive aviation industrial
policies” and clear intent to compete in the sector.15
Forrest E. Morgan led a 2020 study on the mili- The United States Has Upper Hand in
tary application of artificial intelligence (AI). The study Comprehensive National Power; China
assessed China’s development of military technologies Narrowing the Gap
with AI and warned that relevant technologies raised ethi-
cal, operational, and strategic risks.16 Rand Waltzman RAND studies generally characterize the United States as
and other RAND researchers, who examined the state of retaining considerable advantages diplomatically, economi-
U.S.-China competition in AI, concluded that China has cally, technologically, and militarily. However, a consensus

5
RAND studies have recognized enduring U.S. strengths
in its alliances and partnerships around the world. . . . At
the same time, studies have noted China’s regional gains
in economic and diplomatic influence.
in the research is that China continues to narrow the gap At the same time, studies have noted China’s regional
in comprehensive national power. The 2018 Hui Lu study gains in economic and diplomatic influence. A 2020 study
on China and the international order indicated that China led by Bonny Lin concluded that countries in Asia regarded
seeks to renovate, rather than overthrow, the existing China as having more economic influence, although less
U.S.-led order; however, the report noted that China’s long- diplomatic and military influence, than the United States.22
term ambitions remain less clear.19 The 2018 Hui Lu study on China and the international
RAND studies have recognized enduring U.S. order observed that China “as an increasingly powerful
strengths in its alliances and partnerships around the nation has also demonstrated a willingness to challenge
world. A 2019 study led by Scott W. Harold drew attention and revise aspects of the existing order.”23
to the strong support for U.S. leadership in Asia. The study RAND researchers have compared China’s deepening
also described how Asian countries have increased their relationships with Southeast Asia, Central and South Asia,
defense cooperation with other regional powers, includ- and Oceania. A 2019 study led by Scobell found that Beijing
ing those not allied with the United States (such as India, had prioritized, from among all developing countries,
Indonesia, and Vietnam). The report concluded that per- those of Southeast Asia and had increased its influence
ceptions of a potential threat from a rising China provided in that region accordingly.24 A 2014 study by Scobell, Ely
a major impetus to increased regional security coopera- Ratner, and Michael Beckley examined the implications of
tion.20 RAND researchers have also examined how U.S. China’s deepening involvement in Central and South Asia.
allies and partners can collaborate to compete with China’s One conclusion from that study was that, although weak
efforts to lead the Asia-Pacific region. RAND has published then, China’s influence would grow in coming years.25
several conference volumes on regional perspectives on the Derek Grossman led a team that researched U.S.-China
Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, with contributions competition in the U.S.-allied Freely Associated States in
from scholars in the United States, Japan Australia, India, the Pacific. That 2019 study called the islands a “power
and other nations.21

6
projection superhighway” and detailed China’s growing hypothesis that anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabili-
diplomatic and economic influence in the islands.26 ties pose a threat to U.S. force projection. According to
China has also narrowed the gap in influence in multi- the study, the threat posed by these systems is “growing
lateral organizations, such as the United Nations and other more severe in critical regions,” and the threat is “likely to
international institutions.27 China’s influence on multilat- increase in significant ways over time.”31
eral trade regimes also has expanded, as Shatz noted in a The narrowing gap in military power occurs at a
2016 study.28 RAND researchers have also noted the way time of constrained U.S. resources. A 2020 study led by
in which Chinese economic statecraft has resulted in stra- Timothy M. Bonds warned of “significant gaps” in the
tegic advantage. A 2013 study, led by Richard Silberglitt, ability of the United States and its allies to deter and defeat
on the competition for critical materials noted that China aggression that could threaten national interests.32 RAND
had become the controlling producer of 11 raw and semi- researchers have investigated the mismatch between global
finished materials “critical to U.S. manufacturing.”29 threats and the U.S. military resources to address them.
A 2015 study led by David Ochmanek warned of a “secu-
rity deficit,” concluding that “currently projected levels of
Perilous Erosion of the U.S. Security
defense spending are insufficient to meet the demands of
Position in Asia an ambitious national security strategy.” Consequently,
RAND studies have drawn attention to the erosion of the the United States will “require substantial and sustained
U.S. security position in the Asia-Pacific region, owing to investments in a wide range of programs and initiatives”
the rapid advances in the PLA’s capabilities. A 2015 report to adequately address the “disparate challenges faced by
led by Eric Heginbotham concluded that the “the net
change in capabilities is moving in favor of China.” It noted
that some aspects of Chinese military modernization, such
as improvements to PLA ballistic missiles, fighter aircraft,
and attack submarines, have come “extraordinarily quickly China has also narrowed
by any reasonable historical standard.” It noted, however,
that the PLA’s ability to influence events and win battles the gap in influence in
“diminishes rapidly beyond the unrefueled range of jet
fighters and diesel submarines.”30 multilateral organizations,
The challenge posed by China’s counterintervention
capabilities has been flagged in other RAND research.
such as the United
A 2017 study edited by Duncan Long, Terrence K. Kelly,
and David C. Gompert outlined several major conflict
Nations and other
scenarios involving China and the United States to test the international institutions.
7
 that a U.S.-China war had remained “unlikely.” The study
upheld that judgment but acknowledged that the “margin
RAND researchers have of confidence is somewhat lower than it was six years ago.”
To explain why, the study cited a weakening conviction
noted how the intensifying that the United States would “avoid unnecessary provoca-
tions” and “retain the capacity to deter Chinese behavior.”35
rivalry between China and RAND research on the possibilities of a military clash
has concluded that escalation of any such event may prove
the United States has difficult to control. A 2016 RAND study by Gompert,
exacerbated tensions over Cevallos, and Cristina L. Garafola concluded that a
U.S.-China war not only carried a high risk of escalation
such flash points as Taiwan but would likely engulf much of the Western Pacific.36
The 2017 study from Long, Kelly, and Gompert warned
and the South China Sea, that U.S. military strikes against the PLA’s counterinter-
vention capabilities on China’s homeland could trigger a
even if the overall risk of war nuclear war. Likewise, a U.S. reliance on extensive con-
ventional strikes against China’s homeland as part of a
remains low. Taiwan-related conflict “could lead to conflict escalation
and, in some cases, increased risk of nuclear war.”37
Although conflict between the two great powers is
the United States.”33 Likewise, Shatz and Nathan Chandler
regarded as unlikely, RAND researchers have investigated
concluded that the United States and its allies may face
potential pathways toward such a conflict in hopes of
growing challenges to maintain their defense industries
better managing the risks. Noting that a dramatic shift in
if defense budgets decline, especially if China’s defense
the global distribution of power could increase the risk of
budget continues to rise concurrently.34
conflict, according to numerous theories of great power
war, researchers have developed ways to measure com-
Growing Uncertainty, but Still Low Risk, of prehensive national power. A 2020 study by Jacob L. Heim
Catastrophic U.S.-China War and Benjamin M. Miller proposed a metric that incorporated
measures of a country’s military, economic, technological,
RAND researchers have noted how the intensifying rivalry
political, and demographic strength. Using this metric, the
between China and the United States has exacerbated
authors found a narrowing gap in comprehensive national
tensions over such flash points as Taiwan and the South
power between China and the United States. Although the
China Sea, even if the overall risk of war remains low. A
authors did not detect a significant risk of warfare in the near
2017 study led by James Dobbins reviewed a 2011 judgment

8
term, they did offer several scenarios involving trends that
could either raise or lower the risk in coming years, depend-
ing on changes in the balance of power.38 A 2020 study by The nature of the contest
Heath and Matthew Lane proposed ways to formulate more
rigorously designed scenarios involving U.S.-China conflict. suggests that potential
Drawing from scientific findings about the causes of war, the
study highlighted factors—such as rapid changes in the bal- military flash points will
ance of power, serial militarized crises, arms-racing behavior,
and the onset of acute threat perceptions—that could indicate
center on issues related to
an elevated risk of conflict.39
As tensions intensify and distrust deepens, the risk of
U.S. allies and partners in
a miscalculation or misjudgment in a crisis or confronta-
tion grows. To better gauge the risks of misjudgment and
Asia.
misperceptions, RAND researchers investigated historical
precedents of disastrous military decisions. One study by minate the threat that China’s military power poses to U.S.
Gompert, Hans Binnendijk, and Lin revealed a common allies and partners and to improve their readiness.
theme in past strategic blunders: a tendency by individu- Regarding Taiwan, RAND researchers have ana-
als and institutions to rely on simplified representations lyzed various aspects of the island’s defenses and weighed
of reality, or “cognitive models.” According to the authors, options for the island to improve its air defenses. A 2016
“the more these models diverge from objective reality, the study by Michael J. Lustombo, David R. Frelinger, James
more decisionmakers are prone to blunder, including on Williams, and Barry Wilson concluded that investments
matters of war and peace.” The authors noted that leaders in mobile and short-range air defense missiles could sig-
and staffs with great confidence in their cognitive models nificantly improve air defense capabilities.41 A 2017 study
“tend to dismiss or discount new information that would by Ian Easton, Mark Stokes, Cortez A. Cooper, and Arthur
threaten—and improve—those models.”40 Chan concluded that the current approach to Taiwan’s
reserve force training may be appropriate for many non-
combat support personnel in the system, but it might prove
Potential Key Statecraft Challenge of inadequate for maintaining the readiness of units respon-
Managing Alliances and Partnerships sible for facing an all-out Chinese invasion.42 Beyond
The nature of the contest suggests that potential military assessing the requirements to deter major attacks, RAND
flash points will center on issues related to U.S. allies and researchers also have studied more-subtle efforts to coerce
partners in Asia. RAND has carried out research to illu- the island. An analysis of China’s bomber flights around
Taiwan, for example, suggests that the flights are designed,

9
Given the potentially catastrophic risks and costs of
conventional war between China and the United States,
RAND researchers have generally concluded that both
countries face a growing incentive to employ measures
other than war to advance their interests.
in part, to apply psychological coercion on Taipei. Regarding disputes in the South China Sea, RAND
According to a 2018 study by Derek Grossman, Nathan researchers have developed scenario analyses of conflict
Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Logan Ma, and Michael S. Chase, situations in both Taiwan and the South China Sea to
the flights also allow the PLA Air Force to send deterrence better understand how China could employ counterinter-
signals, train air crews, and promote patriotic propaganda vention capabilities against U.S. forces. 46 RAND research-
to domestic audiences.43 ers also examined China’s 2013 announcement of the Air
RAND researchers have worked with international Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea
researchers to explore some of the challenges posed by for insight into the potential issuance of an ADIZ in the
China to Japan and other partner nations. In 2017, RAND South China Sea. The researchers, Burke and Cevallos,
published a series of papers from a conference, held with concluded that China had strong incentives to avoid declar-
Japanese scholars, focusing on U.S. and Japanese coopera- ing a similar ADIZ in the South China Sea.47
tion against Chinese coercion in the maritime, cyber, and
space domains. The authors recommended strategies to
Intensifying Struggle Through Measures
impose costs and deny Chinese gains through “gray zone”
tactics in the maritime domain, to harden critical cyber Short of War
infrastructure, and to impose costs on and deter Chinese Given the potentially catastrophic risks and costs of con-
cyber coercion.44 In 2018, a RAND team led by Edmund J. ventional war between China and the United States, RAND
Burke studied China’s and Japan’s military aviation patrols researchers have generally concluded that both countries
near the Senkaku Islands and warned that the pace of activ- face a growing incentive to employ measures other than
ity risked eroding the combat readiness of Japanese Air Self war to advance their interests. RAND researchers have
Defense Force aviation units.45 accordingly carried out research on “measures short of

10
war” and related concepts, such as “hybrid war” and gray is unlikely, the U.S. military could find itself responding
zone tactics. A 2016 study by Ben Connable, Jason H. to situations short of war involving Russian and Chinese
Campbell, and Dan Madden pointed out that such tactics military forces in that area.51
are not new but have become increasingly effective against RAND researchers have pointed out that the escala-
the United States due to its attachment to “outdated” para- tion thresholds of measures short of war remain poorly
digms of linear escalation compounded by the difficulties understood. A 2019 study led by Lyle J. Morris on China’s
of addressing diverse challenges simultaneously world- use of gray zone tactics—i.e., activities to alter the status
wide.48 A 2020 study by Morgan and Raphael S. Cohen quo through coercive military or political means below a
similarly concluded that China would likely continue to threshold that would elicit a military response—warned
rely on gray zone tactics as a preferred means of achieving that the “greatest danger” in the future may be when
its objectives in a manner that minimizes military risk.49 China’s “impulse to achieve aggressive gains short of major
Also in 2020, RAND released a series of reports on the war is married to dramatically improved means of doing
future of warfare through 2030. These studies examined so.”52 To help U.S. policymakers manage such risks, RAND
economic, geopolitical, military, and other trends that researchers have begun to propose ways that the United
could bear on the prospects of international peace and States could respond to China’s gray zone operations. In
war, including between the United States and China. Led 2019, for example, Morris authored a report outlining pos-
by Cohen, the studies highlighted counterterrorism, gray sible response options for pre-crisis and crisis situations
zone conflicts, asymmetric fights, and high-end fights involving China’s efforts to seize Scarborough Shoal.53
as four archetypes of future conflict.50 A report by Shira RAND researchers also have investigated potential
Efron, Kurt Klein, and Cohen on the environmental and U.S. options for using nonwar methods to manage provoca-
geographic drivers of conflict concluded that China’s pres- tive behavior from China. A 2016 study by Gompert and
ence in the Arctic would likely increase as maritime access Binnendijk noted that U.S. “power to coerce is increasing
through that area grows. Although full-fledged conflict even as the utility of U.S. offensive military force is dimin-

Although full-fledged conflict is unlikely, the U.S. military

could find itself responding to situations short of war
involving Russian and Chinese military forces in [the
Arctic].
11
ishing.” The study singled out financial sanctions, support 3. China’s ambitious military modernization
for nonviolent political opposition, and offensive cyber 4. a need to bolster the U.S. security position
operations as the “most cost-effective” nonmilitary coercive 5. an intensifying information, cyber, and space
policy instruments available to the United States. However, competition
the study noted that financial sanctions against China would 6. the importance of cooperation amid competition.
be “complex, difficult to implement and maintain, and peril-
ous for the world economy.” The study also deemed support
for democratic opposition as unlikely to work against China. Competition for Regional Leadership
Regarding potential offensive cyber operations against A 2020 study led by Lin compared U.S. and Chinese influ-
China, the study cautioned that the “risks and costs of retali- ence in the Indo-Pacific region. The study concluded that
ation and escalation are considerable.”54 Southeast Asian countries ranked economic development
over security concerns and felt more threatened by China’s
economic influence than by its military threats. The study
Major Themes also concluded that regional countries shared more interests
Beyond the individual findings, RAND research on stra- with the United States than with China, but preferred not to
tegic competition with China points to six broader themes choose between the two.55 A 2016 study by Heath, Kristen
about what this dynamic means for the United States: Gunness, and Cooper examined how China’s strategic ambi-
1. the competition for regional leadership tions required some form of primacy in Asia.56 Similarly,
2. the competition for global influence a 2015 study led by Ochmanek identified the pursuit of
regional leadership as a key strategic driver underpinning
the military competition between China and the United
States.57 The aforementioned 2018 study on China and the
international order similarly concluded that China’s “deter-
Researchers also have mination to become Asia’s paramount power will unavoid-
ably entail an intensifying competition for influence with the
investigated potential U.S. United States.” The study judged that China’s effort to “shape
Asia’s economic and security order is likely to be the most
options for using nonwar contentious part of its foreign policy in the future.”58 What
China might seek in terms of “primacy” remains in debate,
methods to manage but, at the very least, RAND researchers have determined
provocative behavior from that Beijing seeks a greater role in deciding issues of regional
politics, economics, and security affairs.
China.
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 A 2018 study on China’s relationship with BRI countries
listed the “pivotal” partner countries within Asia, Africa,
and Latin America that Beijing appears to have identified Experts have also pointed
as critical to its ambitions. The authors judged that Beijing
had five important partners—specifically, Russia, Pakistan, to a sharpening contest
Iran, South Africa, and Venezuela. The study also noted that
China had multiple pivotal partners in Southeast Asia.59 over the role of democratic
ideals in international
Competition for Global Influence
RAND researchers have generally concluded that the
norms and rules.
U.S.-China competition extends well beyond the Asia-Pacific
region. A 2019 study characterized China’s support for the to isolate Taiwan diplomatically in Latin America and the
existing order as “conditional,” judging that China will sup- Caribbean. The study lauded the effectiveness of Taiwan’s
port the existing international order so long as China can aid and assistance programs, especially when they can
ensure changes to accommodate its preferences.60 RAND be integrated more explicitly into broader diplomatic
researchers also have examined the interaction between relationships.63
Chinese efforts to selectively revise elements of the interna- Although the competition for ideas and values may
tional order and the U.S. response to such efforts. The 2019 be less intense than in the Cold War, a study by Stephen
study led by Mazarr and Blake underscored that the “hinge Watts, Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Benjamin N. Harris, and
point” of the competition will be the “relationship between Clint Reach described how the United States and China
the architect of the rules-based order”—i.e., the United compete for influence in shaping international norms and
States—and the “leading revisionist peer competitor that is values in the information domain.64 Experts have also
involved in the most specific disputes”—i.e., China.61 pointed to a sharpening contest over the role of democratic
In terms of geopolitics, RAND studies have empha- ideals in international norms and rules. A 2019 report
sized both the competition for diplomatic partners around noted that Beijing’s opposition to liberal democratic values
the world and the battle for ideas and influence over global and human rights remained key friction points between
norms and values. The researchers have noted how a the countries, as did the competition to shape global trade
global network of alliances and partnerships confers on and technology norms and standards.65
the United States a tremendous source of strength in the RAND researchers have examined how the contest
global competition for influence62—and how that strength for influence may be playing out in regions outside Asia.
could also be extended to partners. For instance, a 2019 A 2014 study by Scobell and Alireza Nader on China’s
study by Harold, Morris, and Ma examined China’s efforts relationship with the Middle East judged Beijing’s domi-

13
 would step up competition for commercial opportunities in
Africa.68 A 2015 study by Lloyd Thrall similarly noted that
A 2015 study similarly the “United States and China share a fundamental interest
in the stability of Africa,” but that their “interests diverge
noted that the “United most seriously over the role of foreign powers in support-
ing good governance and human rights norms in Africa,”
States and China share a particularly regarding pariah states.69

fundamental interest in the

China’s Ambitious Military Modernization
stability of Africa.” Another theme in RAND research on China centers on
Beijing’s ambitious military modernization. A 2019 study
nance of the region to be unlikely, even as regional tensions by Jeffrey Engstrom outlined the PLA’s emerging doc-
with the United States increase, because of Beijing’s fear trine of “systems confrontation,” which the study called
of becoming embroiled in regional tensions and conflict. the PLA’s “theory of victory.” The language of “systems
The study also saw “no signs that Beijing is committed to confrontation” pervades “virtually every aspect of the
building an alliance with Tehran,” despite signs of warm- PLA’s approach to training, organizing, and equipping for
ing ties.66 A 2019 study led by Efron on China’s relationship modern warfare.”70 A report by Burke, Gunness, Cooper,
with Israel noted expanding cooperation in diplomacy, and Mark Cozad on key operational concepts of the PLA
trade, investment, construction, educational partnerships, described three interrelated concepts: war control, the
and scientific collaboration. The study recommended that changing dynamics of war, and target-centric warfare.71
the United States work closely with Israel to “deconflict, RAND researchers also have examined the PLA’s
shape, and advance a mutually agreed upon China-related evolving nuclear deterrence policy. A 2017 study led by
agenda.”67 Heginbotham found considerable consistency in China’s
RAND researchers also have studied China’s growing approach to nuclear deterrence, but also concluded that
relationship with Africa. A 2014 study by Larry Hanauer China may be “moving toward a more calculated strat-
and Morris noted that, at least at that time, Africans egy of assured retaliation.” The authors suggested that
“overwhelmingly” viewed China’s engagement with the China may develop some limited counterforce capabili-
continent positively (though this may be changing in ty.72 In 2016, a study by Chase and Chan described how
some ways). They concluded that China’s engagement on PLA thinkers had begun to articulate a new approach to
the continent “does not fundamentally undermine U.S. strategic deterrence, featuring a “multidimensional set of
economic and political goals on the continent.” However, military and nonmilitary capabilities.” The report explored
Hanauer and Morris anticipated that the two countries how PLA writings regarded the coordinated employment

14
of nuclear, space, cyber, and conventional weapons as
“essential components of a credible strategic deterrent.”73
As China continues to modernize its nuclear forces amid As China continues to
a deepening competition with the United States, issues of
arms control and the management of threats in the nuclear, modernize its nuclear
space, and cyber domains will likely grow in importance.
Other RAND researchers have examined the PLA forces amid a deepening
Strategic Support Force, PLA overseas operations, PLA
potential contingencies, and developments in the PLA
competition with the
Air Force, improvements to each of which has resulted in
a cumulatively more-capable military competitor to the
United States, issues
United States in Asia.74 RAND researchers have also ana-
lyzed the PLA’s development of unmanned systems, with
of arms control and the
a 2015 study led by Chase assessing China’s research and management of threats in
development of unmanned air, surface, and underwater
vehicles. The authors noted that intelligence, surveillance, the nuclear, space, and
and reconnaissance remain a “primary focus of Chinese
industries” for unmanned platforms. In addition, however, cyber domains will likely
China may become a significant proliferator of such sys-
tems, because it seeks “exports of unmanned systems as a grow in importance.
profitable way of improving its position in the global arms
market” and as a means of “strengthening its diplomatic given resource and other limitations. Rather, Beijing would
and security ties with recipient countries.”75 likely find it more appealing to protect interests abroad by
Although the PLA has made considerable progress, using an “overlapping mixture of People’s Liberation Army
RAND researchers also have analyzed the military’s per- troops, paramilitary forces, civilian contractors, and local
sistent liabilities. A 2015 study noted various shortfalls: security forces provided by nations hosting major Chinese
organizational features incompatible with the military’s assets.”77
aspirations, corruption, quality control issues in the
defense industry, and shortcomings in training and combat
support functions.76 China also continues to face con- A Need to Bolster the U.S. Military Position
straints on its ability to field military forces beyond Asia. China’s military modernization signals the need for new
A 2018 study by Heath questioned whether China would concepts, technologies, and approaches to bolster the
seek to imitate the U.S. approach to power projection, U.S. security position in Asia.78 A 2017 study led by John

15
Gordon IV concluded that the U.S. Army would require Intensifying Information, Cyber, and Space
longer-range artillery systems and anti-ship capabilities Competition
for most conceivable conflict scenarios involving China.79
RAND researchers also have studied how the United RAND researchers have explored how the U.S.-China com-
States might collaborate with allies and partners to employ petition could intensify in cyberspace. A 2018 study led by
land-based A2/AD systems. A 2019 study led by Bonds Christopher Paul concluded that the electronic information
determined that land-based A2/AD systems would shift environment had become “more complicated, more exten-
the burden of deterrence onto the shoulders of allies and sive, more ubiquitous, and more important to the out-
partners—and that this shift could provide an effective comes of military operations than ever before.” The study
deterrent against Chinese aggression.80 In light of the noted that such countries as China have advantages in the
PLA’s growing inventory of ballistic and cruise missiles, domain, owing in part to a “focus on maintaining the sup-
a 2016 study by Heim on the U.S. commitment to the port of domestic audiences by any means necessary,” “a
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty found that the lack of compunction about falsehood or manipulation,”
United States should examine the benefits and risks of and the reliance on “censorship and information control.”82
adding conventional land-based theater ballistic missiles to A 2019 Mazarr study warned that the effectiveness and
the U.S. force structure.81 reach of such efforts to “gain competitive advantage by
manipulating political, social, and economic conditions
in target countries by various informational means” could
“vastly increase” over time, owing to persistent vulnerabili-
ties in America’s open society, China’s hostile intentions,
and the increasing capability of relevant technologies.83
RAND researchers also have studied China’s social media
China’s military to better understand the perspectives of its citizens. A
study by Douglas Yeung and Cevallos found variations in
modernization signals the how Chinese-language users of social media on the Twitter

need for new concepts, and Weibo platforms regarded controversies, such as food
safety.84
technologies, and A 2019 study by Quentin E. Hodgson, Logan Ma,
Krystyna Marcinek, and Karen Schwindt found that,
approaches to bolster the although state-backed Chinese actors preferred to use
cyber operations for espionage purposes, those actors
U.S. security position in had also engaged in cyber coercion against neighboring
states, most notably against South Korea in response to the
Asia.
16
deployment of a Theater High Altitude Area Defense mis- A 2018 study recommended that the United States “use
sile system in 2016. Despite the low success rate of cyber expanded cooperation” to stabilize the international order
coercion operations, the authors concluded that China and to constrain China’s ambitions.90
would likely increase its use of these efforts because of their RAND researchers also have examined more-specific
deniability and relatively low cost.85 The risks of cyberwar topics that underscore the need for collaboration. Jennifer
have spurred research into the possibilities for negotiat- Bouey has analyzed the possibilities for scientific coopera-
ing cyberspace norms and agreements. A 2016 study by tion between the United States and China against common
Harold, Martin C. Libicki, and Cevallos suggested that health threats, including pandemics.91 A 2017 study led
shared concerns about the vulnerability of critical infra- by Richard H. Speier highlighted the perils of hypersonic
structure could provide a foundation for talks on norms for weapons and the need to control the dissemination of
cyber espionage and targeting.86 weapons capable of striking vast distances with minimal
The competition in space is also likely to inten- warning. Among its recommendations, the study proposed
sify. A 2017 report by Kevin L. Pollpeter, Chase, and that the United States and China cooperate to establish a
Heginbotham noted how China has already increased its multilateral export control regime with the participation of
capacity for military space operations through the cre-
ation of a Strategic Support Force.87 RAND teams have
researched how the United States also might increase its
capacity for military space operations. A 2020 study led by
Michael Spirtas analyzed how the U.S. Space Force could Although competition
manage combat missions and support missions.88 RAND
also established a Space Enterprise Initiative in 2020 to
between China and the
serve as a one-stop shop for space research and related
activities.89
United States will likely
tighten in coming years,
Cooperation Required Amid Competition
strong incentives will
Although competition between China and the United
States will likely tighten in coming years, strong incentives remain for the world’s two
will remain for the world’s two most powerful nations to
cooperate on shared concerns. The U.S.-China rivalry’s most powerful nations
unusual features, including economic interdependence
and mutual vulnerability to shared threats, have raised to cooperate on shared
the imperative to cooperate even as the two sides compete.
concerns.
17
 • In the technology competition, the United States
should track developments in individual fields
In the technology and sectors and build a prospectus for examining
China’s system for generating innovation.95
competition, the United • U.S. policy should focus on understanding and
supporting important partner nations—such as
States should track Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam—whenever
their efforts to develop ties with other Indo-Pacific
developments in individual nations can be additive to U.S. aims of building
fields and sectors and partner capacity.96
• In the competition for AI, the United States should
build a prospectus for manage expectations by developing and maintain-
ing a forward-looking AI roadmap, highlight-
examining China’s system ing realistic goals for Department of Defense AI
employment for the near (one to two years), middle
for generating innovation. (three to five years) and far (six to ten years) terms.97
• On nuclear deterrence issues, the United States and
China should deepen their dialogue on strategic
other nations capable of producing the weapons.92 Cortney
issues to better understand where restraint might
Weinbaum led a 2019 study that explored the possibilities
have the greatest positive impact.98
for building ethical norms in scientific research involving
China and the United States.93 RAND researchers also have
examined possible modes of cooperation with China to
manage the security challenges posed by North Korea.94
Conclusion: Areas for Further
Research
The complexity of a strategic competition between two
Recommendations countries that remain key trading partners and occasion-
The RAND reports also featured policy recommendations ally cooperate against shared threats suggests the need for
on how best to respond to these issues. These recommen- a sophisticated and careful strategy to navigate potential
dations span issues of technology competition, diplomacy, perils and protect U.S. interests. RAND studies, thus far,
deterrence, and many others. Just a few of the recommen- indicate six important topics for further research that
dations found in the reports include the following: could further inform the work of strategy and policy
development:

18
 1. ways to improve coordination across domains, The United States also retains an impressive array of allies
levels, alliances, and partnerships and partners while China’s coalition of partners remains
2. the best ways to compete relatively limited. Despite the U.S. advantages, the studies
3. measures other than war underscore the severity of the challenge facing the United
4. technological aspects of the competition States. U.S. alliances and partnerships are less cohesive
5. mechanisms of cooperation amid the competition than before; and the international order is more frag-
6. geopolitical opportunities. mented. A slow-growing economy and competing domestic
First, RAND studies emphasize the multidomain and demands constrain defense spending. By all measures, the
multilevel nature of the competition. China and the United relative U.S. advantage in national power ebbs as China
States compete across economic, security, technological, grows more quickly. Future research could explore ways in
and political domains. The competition is unfolding simul- which the United States could best position itself to compete.
taneously at the regional and global levels. Finding ways to Recent studies have highlighted the challenge of balancing
improve coordination across U.S. domains, across regional security concerns with the needs of an advanced economy
and global levels, and across alliances and partnerships will and liberal democratic values. The potential devastation of
likely remain a critical challenge for U.S. policymakers. cyberattacks, the vulnerability of financial systems, and the
Second, RAND research has consistently highlighted deepening concern about technology transfers and espio-
enduring U.S. strengths, including the strength of the nage provide compelling incentives to increase security
domestic economy, a global network of alliances and part- across many domains. Finding ways to manage the threats
nerships, a proven ability to innovate, and the world’s most while upholding the freedoms and rights of American citi-
powerful military. The openness of the U.S. economy and zens will also remain an important task for policymakers.
the size of the domestic market remain important assets.

The complexity of a strategic competition between

two countries that remain key trading partners and
occasionally cooperate against shared threats suggests
the need for a sophisticated and careful strategy to
navigate potential perils and protect U.S. interests.
19
 Third, RAND research has highlighted the growing tion could prove an important determinant in the outcome
importance of paramilitary, proxy, and nonmilitary assets of the competition.
in the U.S.-China competition. Both sides face growing Fifth, RAND researchers have noted that the U.S. com-
incentives to deploy a variety of military and nonmili- petition with China occurs simultaneously with impera-
tary forces in confrontations below the threshold of war, tives to cooperate. Both China and the United States face
whether called “measures other than war,” “gray zone the international challenges of pandemics, global terror
tactics,” or “hybrid war.” Such methods could be useful for groups, mass migration, and the effects of climate change.
protecting U.S. interests, blunting threats from China, and Yet, as the example of the COVID-19 pandemic has shown,
incrementally securing advantages in the greater competi- the competitive impulse can undermine cooperation on
tion for influence and leadership. Yet the escalation risk of shared concerns. Additional research could be helpful in
any incident involving such forces remains poorly under- building mechanisms of cooperation while sustaining the
stood. Given the stakes, a stronger understanding of how competition.
U.S. decisionmakers should employ measures other than war Sixth, and finally, RAND research has underscored the
to protect U.S. interests remains imperative. importance of other countries in what appears on the sur-
Fourth, the importance of technology in the compe- face to be a U.S.-China competition. Other nations, espe-
tition also has gained considerable attention in RAND cially in the Asia-Pacific region, play important roles in
research. The competition for technological leadership setting the terms of the competition. The shifting struggle
not only offers the potential prizes of economic gain and for geopolitical advantage raises the risks of miscalculation
corporate profits but also carries strong implications for and of potential crises in countries partnered with either
military modernization. Advanced technologies could the United States or China. The contest for advantage is
dramatically reshape how wars are fought and confer a also reshaping multilateral institutions, resulting in politi-
significant advantage on the side that masters the tech- cization and polarization within organizations. A stronger
nologies. Technological advances will also factor into grasp of how the U.S.-China contest is reshaping interna-
how societies interact with their governments—and the tional politics and opening new opportunities will likely
risks posed by increasingly sophisticated digital media remain a topic of critical importance for U.S. decisionmakers
manipulated by foreign governments. A potential digital in coming years.
divide pitting U.S.-led technological ecosystems against Were these understudied questions to receive more
Chinese-led ones also could profoundly affect the global attention, they could lead to new or improved ways for the
economy. Successful competition in scientific fields car- United States to reassure other countries in the Asia-Pacific
ries important implications for domestic policies, such as region, mitigate China’s ability to do harm, and strengthen
those that incentivize global talent to study and work in the its own position in the competition.
United States. Insights into how the U.S. government can
effectively manage the technological aspect of the competi-

20
 16 Forrest E. Morgan, Benjamin Boudreaux, Andrew J. Lohn, Mark
Notes Ashby, Christian Curriden, Kelly Klima, and Derek Grossman, Military
1 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of Applications of Artificial Intelligence: Ethical Concerns in an Uncertain
America, Washington, D.C.: December 18, 2017. World, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-3139-1-AF, 2020.
2 Franco Ordoñez, “U.S., China Accuse Each Other of Mishandling 17 Rand Waltzman, Lillian Ablon, Christian Curriden, Gavin S.
COVID-19,” NPR Morning Edition, March 23, 2020. Hartnett, Maynard A. Holliday, Logan Ma, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew
3 Scobell, and Danielle C. Tarraf, Maintaining the Competitive Advantage
Katrina Manson and Sun Yu, “US and Chinese Researchers Team Up
in Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning, Santa Monica, Calif.:
for Hunt into Covid Origins,” Financial Times, April 26, 2020.
RAND Corporation, RR-A200-1, 2020.
4 James Dobbins, Howard J. Shatz, and Ali Wyne, Russia Is a Rogue,
18 Derek Grossman, Christian Curriden, Logan Ma, Lindsey Polley,
Not a Peer; China Is a Peer, Not a Rogue, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND
J. D. Williams, and Cortez A. Cooper III, Chinese Views of Big Data
Corporation, PE-310-A, 2019, p. 2.
Analytics, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-A176-1, 2020.
5 Michael J. Mazarr, Timothy R. Heath, and Astrid Stuth Cevallos, 19 Mazarr, Heath, and Cevallos, 2018b, p. x.
China and the International Order, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corpo-
ration, RR-2423-OSD, 2018, p. x. 20 Scott W. Harold, Derek Grossman, Brian Harding, Jeffrey W.

6 Michael J. Mazarr, Jonathan Blake, Abigail Casey, Tim McDonald, Hornung, Gregory Poling, Jeffrey Smith, and Meagan L. Smith, The
Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation, Santa Monica, Calif.:
Stephanie Pezard, and Michael Spirtas, Understanding the Emerging Era
RAND Corporation, RR-3125-MCF, 2019.
of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives,
Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2726-AF, 2018a, p. 18. 21 Scott W. Harold, Tanvi Madan, and Natalie Sambhi, U.S.-Japan
7 Alliance Conference: Regional Perspectives on the Quadrilateral Dialogue
Mazarr et al., 2018a, p. 33.
and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Study Overview and Conclusions,
8 Mazarr, Blake, et al., 2018a, pp. 32, 35. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, CF-414-GOJ, 2020.
9 22 Bonny Lin, Michael S. Chase, Jonah Blank, Cortez A. Cooper III,
Dobbins, Shatz, and Wyne, 2019, p. 2.
Derek Grossman, Scott W. Harold, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Lyle J. Mor-
10 Dobbins, Shatz, and Wyne, 2019, p. 12. ris, Logan Ma, Paul Orner, Alice Shih, and Soo Kim, Regional Responses
11 Howard J. Shatz, Economic Competition in the 21st Century, Santa to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific: Study Overview and Con-
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-4188-AF, 2020. clusions, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-4412-AF, 2020a.
12 23 Mazarr, Heath, and Cevallos, 2018, p. ix.
Hui Lu, Charlene Rohr, Marco Hafner, and Anna Knack, China
Belt and Road Initiative: Measuring the Impact of Improving Transporta- 24 Andrew Scobell, Bonny Lin, Howard J. Shatz, Michael Johnson, Larry
tion Connectivity on Trade in the Region, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Hanauer, Michael S. Chase, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Ivan W. Rasmussen,
Corporation, RR-2625-RC, 2018. Arthur Chan, Aaron Strong, Eric Warner, and Logan Ma, At the Dawn
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Lilly, Chad J. R. Ohlandt, Eric Warner, and J. D. Williams, China’s RAND Corporation, RR-2273-A, 2018.
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Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2798-A, 2020, pp. x–xi. egy Toward South and Central Asia: An Empty Fortress, Santa Monica,
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15 26 Derek Grossman, Michael S. Chase, Gerard Finin, Wallace Gregson,
Chad J. R. Ohlandt, Lyle J. Morris, Julia A. Thompson, Arthur
Chan, and Andrew Scobell, Chinese Investment in U.S. Aviation, Santa Jeffrey W. Hornung, Logan Ma, Jordan R. Reimer, and Alice Shih,
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1755-USCC, 2017, pp. 84–88. America’s Pacific Island Allies: The Freely Associated States and Chinese

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 36 David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, and Cristina L. Garafola,
Influence, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2973-OSD,
2019. War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable, Santa Monica,
27
Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1140-A, 2016.
Mazarr, Heath, and Cevallos, 2018, p. xi.
37 Long, Kelly, and Gompert, 2017, p. xxv.
28 Howard J. Shatz, U.S. International Economic Strategy in a Turbulent
38 Jacob L. Heim and Benjamin M. Miller, Measuring Power, Power
World, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1521-RC, 2016.
29
Cycles, and the Risk of Great-Power War in the 21st Century, Santa
Richard Silberglitt, James T. Bartis, Brian G. Chow, David L. An, Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2989-RC, 2020.
and Kyle Brady, Critical Materials: Present Danger to U.S. Manufactur-
39 Timothy R. Heath and Matthew Lane, Science-Based Scenario
ing, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-133-NIC, 2013, p. xi.
30 Eric Heginbotham, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L.
Design: A Proposed Method to Support Political-Strategic Analysis, Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2833-OSD, 2019.
Heim, Jeff Hagan, Sheng Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki, Paul
40 David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk, and Bonny Lin, Blind-
DeLuca, David A. Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle
Brady, and Lyle J. Morris, The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, ers, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn, Santa
Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power 1996–2017, Santa Monica, Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-768-RC, 2014, p. xv.
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Boston, Cristina L. Garafola, John Gordon IV, Sonni Efron, Paul S. 43 Derek Grossman, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Logan Ma, and
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Michael S. Chase, China’s Long-Range Bomber Flights: Drivers and
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44 Scott W. Harold, Yoshiaki Nakagawa, Junichi Fukuda, John A.
33 David Ochmanek, Andrew R. Hoehn, James T. Quinlivan, Seth G.
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Jones, and Edward L. Warner, America’s Security Deficit: Addressing the
Alliance and Deterring Gray Zone Coercion in the Maritime, Cyber, and
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34 Howard J. Shatz and Nathan Chandler, Global Economic Trends and
45 Edmund J. Burke, Timothy R. Heath, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Logan
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Ma, Lyle J. Morris, and Michael S. Chase, China’s Military Activities in
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35 James Dobbins, Andrew Scobell, Edmund J. Burke, David C.
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2017, p. 2. Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2055-AF, 2017.

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48 Ben Connable, Jason H. Campbell, and Dan Madden, Stretching and Denial Threats Is Desirable and Feasible, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND
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Are Eroding American Influence Using Time-Tested Measures Short of 58
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50 62 Scobell, Lin, et al., 2018.
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ard J. Shatz, and Yuliya Shokh, The Future of Warfare in 2030: Project Efforts to Isolate Taiwan Diplomatically in Latin America and the Carib-
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64 Stephen Watts, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Benjamin N. Har-
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52 Lyle J. Morris, Michael J. Mazarr, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Stepha-
nie Pezard, Anika Binnendijk, and Marta Kepe, Gaining Competitive 66 Andrew Scobell and Alireza Nader, China in the Middle East: The
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53 Lyle J. Morris, A U.S. Option Playbook for Contingency Planning to 67 Shira Efron, Howard J. Shatz, Arthur Chan, Emily Haskel, Lyle J.
Reclaim Scarborough Shoal, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, Morris, and Andrew Scobell, The Evolving Israel-China Relationship,
PE-335-RC, 2019. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-2641-RC, 2019, p. ii.
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Countering Adversaries Without Going to War, Santa Monica, Calif.: Drivers, Reactions, and Implications for U.S. Policy, Santa Monica, Calif.:
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55 Bonny Lin, Michael S. Chase, Jonah Blank, Cortez A. Cooper III, 69 Lloyd Thrall, China’s Expanding African Relations: Implications for
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ris, Logan Ma, Paul Orner, Alice Shih, and Soo Kim, U.S. Versus Chinese 905-A, 2015, p. 80.
Powers of Persuasion: Does the United States or China Have More Influ- 70 Jeffrey Engstrom, Systems Confrontation and System Destruction
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tion, RB-10137-AF, 2020b.
ern Warfare, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1708-OSD,
56 Timothy R. Heath, Kristen Gunness, and Cortez A. Cooper, The 2018, p. 1.
PLA and China’s Rejuvenation: National Security and Military Strategies, 71 Edmund J. Burke, Kristen Gunness, Cortez A. Cooper III, and Mark
Deterrence Concepts, and Combat Capabilities, Santa Monica, Calif.:
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57 David Ochmanek, Sustaining U.S. Leadership in the Asia-Pacific
Region: Why a Strategy of Direct Defense Against Antiaccess and Area

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About This Perspective Funding
This research primer presents key findings and themes from past RAND Funding for this research was made possible by the Office of the
Corporation research on the strategic competition between China and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force
the United States. This review of RAND reports, mostly from the past Development in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
five years, highlights seven major findings: (1) China is the United States’
most important strategic competitor; (2) economics, diplomacy, and National Security Research Division
technology play central roles in the competition; (3) China is narrow-
This research was sponsored by the International Security and Defense
ing the gap in national power; (4) the U.S. security position in Asia is
Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD).
eroding; (5) the risk of a catastrophic U.S.-China war is low; (6) a key
NSRD conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of
challenge will be to manage U.S. alliances and partnerships; and (7) the
Defense, the U.S. Intelligence Community, the U.S. State Department,
struggle is intensifying through measures other than war.
allied foreign governments, and foundations.
The findings and themes suggest several topics for further research,
For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense
such as ways to improve coordination across domains, levels, alli-
Policy Center, see www.rand.org/nsrd/isdp or contact the director
ances, and partnerships; the best ways to compete, including the role
(contact information is provided on the webpage).
of measures other than war; technological aspects of the competi-
tion; measures of cooperation amid the competition; and geopolitical
opportunities. About the Author
Timothy R. Heath is a senior international and defense researcher
This primer was completed in fall 2020 and reflects the findings of
at the RAND Corporation, where his primary research areas include
RAND research completed and published by summer 2020.
Chinese political-military strategy and other Asian military, strategic,
The author would like to thank the sponsor, the Department of Defense and political topics. He has an M.A. in Asian Studies from George
Office of the Undersecretary for Policy, Office of Strategy and Force Washington University and a B.A. in Philosophy from the College of
Development, and, in particular, Michael Donofrio. In addition, the William and Mary.
author would like to thank Christine Wormuth, Michael McNerney, and
Michael Spirtas at RAND for their assistance with the project. The
author is also grateful to Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Michael S.
Chase, Cristina L. Garafola, and Bonny Lin for their very helpful reviews
of earlier drafts of this Perspective.

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