REPORT NOVEMBER

432-02 2017

Risk management in geophysical

operations
Supplement to Report 432

share record
Acknowledgements
The International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) Safety
Committee is acknowledged for sponsoring the IOGP Geophysical HSSE
Subcommittee to develop this important industry guidance document
revision. The International Association of Geophysical Contractors
(IAGC) has participated significantly in development of this and prior
versions along with the IOGP.

Photography used with permission courtesy of

Maersk Oil – Photographer Morten Larsen and
©Nikada/iStockphoto (Front cover)
©HHakim/iStockphoto (Back cover

Feedback

IOGP welcomes feedback on our reports: [email protected]

Disclaimer

Whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information
contained in this publication, neither IOGP nor any of its Members past present or
future warrants its accuracy or will, regardless of its or their negligence, assume
liability for any foreseeable or unforeseeable use made thereof, which liability is
hereby excluded. Consequently, such use is at the recipient’s own risk on the basis
that any use by the recipient constitutes agreement to the terms of this disclaimer.
The recipient is obliged to inform any subsequent recipient of such terms.

This publication is made available for information purposes and solely for the private
use of the user. IOGP will not directly or indirectly endorse, approve or accredit the
content of any course, event or otherwise where this publication will be reproduced.

Copyright notice

The contents of these pages are © International Association of Oil & Gas Producers.
Permission is given to reproduce this report in whole or in part provided (i) that
the copyright of IOGP and (ii) the sources are acknowledged. All other rights are
reserved. Any other use requires the prior written permission of IOGP.

These Terms and Conditions shall be governed by and construed in accordance

with the laws of England and Wales. Disputes arising here from shall be exclusively
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales.
 REPORT NOVEMBER
432-02 2017

Risk management in geophysical

operations
Supplement to Report 432

Revision history

VERSION DATE AMENDMENTS

1.0 November 2017 First release

 Risk management in geophysical operations 4

Contents

Risk Management 5
General 5
The concept of Risk and the Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) 5
The Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) for geophysical operations 6
Risk Assessment and Control 7
Timing of Risk Assessment and Control 10
Risk Verification in Geophysical Operations 10

Aide Memoir for Geophysical Risk Assessors 13

Introduction 13
Database size and population 14
Data Analysis: Main accident classification 15
Data Analysis: Finer accident classification 19
Data Analysis: By Activity 29
Data Analysis: By Keyword 32

Glossary 33

Acronyms 36

References 37
 Risk management in geophysical operations 5

Risk Management

General
IOGP Report 510 lists Risk Management as one of the four fundamentals of
a successful HSE-MS. Risk management must be integrated throughout the
management system. It should be present in the cycle of design, development,
implementation, maintenance and continuous improvement. The geophysical
industry has static hazards and risks that are inherent to its assets and operational
activities. While most of the risk cannot be completely eliminated, it needs to be
managed and controlled to a tolerable level of residual risk.

Everyone should be aware of the hazards and risks present in their workplace and
those of their colleagues around them and, importantly, the control measures that
need to be applied to render risk tolerable. Risk needs to be assessed before the
start of a project and risk control measures selected and assessed. This must be
followed up by training and communication to those who may be affected by the
task to be performed. Risk Management (awareness, identification, assessment
and control) is further maintained through a number of processes such as hazard
reporting, Job Safety Analysis (JSA) and a stop work culture (using tools such
as stop and step back, or last minute risk assessments) in case of doubt or new
or unexpected situations. Where exceptions or changes need to be made these
should be controlled by a Management of Change (MoC) process or a new toolbox
meeting, which includes a risk assessment. Certain high-risk activities must be
subject to a Permit to Work (PTW) system, which again includes a risk assessment.

The concept of Risk and the Risk Assessment

Matrix (RAM)
In this document, we will refer to a Hazard as anything which can cause harm or
potential harm. Harm could be caused to people, to the environment, to the assets
or equipment being used, or to the reputation of the company or the industry.
Risk is the product of the potential consequence and the probability of an event
occurring.

To rank the level of Risk the recommended tool is the Risk Assessment Matrix
(see Table 1), which combines a Consequence scale (sometimes ‘Severity’ is
used) and a Probability scale (sometimes ‘Likelihood’ is used). Industry uses a
historical based probability scale, by determining what has happened and how
often it has occurred. It is hoped that the known history will provide a reasonable
approximation of the true Probability. This is acceptable for activities and tasks
conducted frequently.
 Risk management in geophysical operations 6

The Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) for geophysical

operations
An example RAM for the geophysical industry is shown in Table 1. Companies may
adjust some definitions to match their size and activities.

Table 1: Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) for Geophysical Operations

The probability scale has three levels:

• ‘General’, with simple descriptors ranging from Very Unlikely to Very Likely
• ‘Historical’, should be used if sufficient historic data are available,
considering the industry or comparable activities in other industries
• ‘Descriptive’, which can be used in case there would be insufficient data
available, for example with new technology.

For example, Column C considers the probability of occurring on Geophysical and

similar Exploration and Production (E&P) operations. Columns D and E take into
consideration how often things tend to happen in similar Geophysical operations
worldwide.
 Risk management in geophysical operations 7

Companies may construct more detailed severity scales and descriptions related
to their Risk Exposure.

The RAM can be used to assess the qualitative risk of planned future activities as
well as to calculate the potential outcome of actual incidents.

Establishing the consequence or potential consequence is usually straightforward.

However, establishing the probability may be more difficult. For events that have a
low probability of occurrence but a high severity outcome, the IAGC Aide Memoir for
Geophysical Risk Assessors provides historical geophysical industry.

For new tasks or rarely performed ones, there may not be sufficient historical data.
For this, the descriptive scale shown in Table 1 can be used. A new activity should
not be considered zero risk, just because there is no historical record.

Risk Assessment and Control

The process of Risk Assessment and Control consists of a number of steps:
1) Establish the activity, the tasks and the context
2) Identify the hazards
3) Assess the potential consequences
4) Evaluate the probability and plot the risk score
5) Manage the risk with control measures
6) Determine the level of residual risk and confirm tolerability
7) Assess the tolerability of potential escalating factors
8) Risk mitigation and recovery measures.

Step one: Establish the activity, the tasks and the context
The risk produced by a hazard depends on the task and the context in which the
hazard exists. For example, water may be considered a hazard, but in the context
of an office environment it may produce asset damage, but probably will not cause
drowning. Water, in the context of small boat operations, will produce a different
set of potential outcomes which may present more serious consequences, which
will change the risk tolerability. The task and context must be clearly defined for
each hazard.
 Risk management in geophysical operations 8

Step two: Identify the hazards

Within the defined context, the relevant hazards should be identified and
documented in a hazard register. This requires knowledge of the task and is
usually done by a team of experienced people.

Steps three: Assess potential consequences

For an identified hazard, the potential consequences are determined and
documented in the risk register. A hazard can have a consequence in several
categories (e.g. People, Environment, Assets, Reputation − PEAR), and each one
should assessed independently.

Steps four: Evaluate the probability and plot the risk score
For each identified hazard and consequence, the probability of it materializing is
assessed and documented in the risk register.

From the various consequences that may be assessed for each hazard, the highest
risk is documented in the risk register and may be plotted on the RAM. This is the
inherent level of risk prior to control measures being applied (i.e. It is assumed
that IOGP 432 Table 1 and 2 are already applied).

Users should be aware that the historical based RAM scale level has limitations
where the geophysical industry has few exposure hours. For example, chainsaw
tree felling has caused many fatal accidents in geophysical operations and
technically its risk would plot in cell D-4, the same score as vehicle incidents.
However, if the industry would accumulate as many hours in chainsaw tree felling
as it does in vehicle usage; this risk would shift to E-4, with fatalities monthly.

Step five: Manage the risk with control measures

Establish the control measures which must be used to reduce the risk to tolerable
and As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) level. Controls should be selected
using the hierarchy of controls, in order of decreasing effectiveness:
• by appropriate design (e.g. equipment, the survey, etc.).
• eliminate the hazard if safe to do so
• substitute with a lower risk situation
• engineering controls to manage the hazard
• safe working practices and procedures combined with training
• administrative controls such as PTW, authorized personnel only, etc.
• Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). This must always be the last control
system after all others have been put in place.
 Risk management in geophysical operations 9

The design phase is the most effective time to eliminate potential hazards. Often
a combination of these control measures will need to be used. Risk reassessment
should be conducted following application of control measures to evaluate
unintended consequences.

Step six: Determine the level of residual risk and confirm tolerability
With the selected control measures in place assess the residual risks and ensure
that they are tolerable and ALARP. Obtain signed approval and a MOC if the residual
risk falls outside the tolerable region and no further practical measures are feasible.

ALARP is usually defined as the level beyond which further risk reduction would
require disproportionate cost, time or effort. The organization should define
criteria linking the level of risk acceptance to a management level for approval.
The higher the residual risk level, the more senior the risk acceptor should be.

When assessing the residual risk, measures from the top of the hierarchy of
controls may change the task. This can potentially reduce both the consequence
and the probability. Within the context in which the hazard exists, elimination of the
task will change both the consequence and the probability.

It should be noted that controls from the lower end of the hierarchy such as
administrative controls, most often do not alter the potential consequence, only
the probability. For example, seatbelts save lives, but even with seatbelts the result
of a high speed vehicle incident can be fatal.

Step seven: Assess the tolerability of potential escalating factors

Escalating factors, when combined with certain tasks, may increase the probability
of an incident occurring or its consequences. Examples of escalating factors are:
• Working alone
• Working during darkness
• Poor visibility
• Fatigue
• Weather beyond certain limits
• Sea State beyond certain limits.

For the tasks under consideration, the tolerability of escalating factors needs to
be identified and assessed. Escalating factors can change over the time the task is
being conducted, e.g. weather, fatigue. These factors must be monitored while the
tasks are performed. A re-assessment of the risks should be performed frequently.
Usually this assessment is reflected in the procedures for a task and/or a Matrix of
Permitted Operations (MOPO).
 Risk management in geophysical operations 10

Step eight: Risk mitigation and recovery measures

Organizations should be prepared to respond to a breakdown event and when an
incident may have occurred. The goal of the response is to regain control of the
situation and to minimize potential consequences. Emergency response plans
(ERP) should be available to respond to incidents.

Timing of Risk Assessment and Control

Risk assessment should be done at all stages of a project. Before issuing a tender,
the client should assess and disclose the major hazards pertaining to the project
area. This assessment should be conveyed to potential tenderers in the invitation
to tender.

Before a project, crew or vessel is mobilized a full risk assessment should be

done, establishing a project specific risk register. This may take the form of a
permanent risk assessment for intrinsic hazards (static hazards) and should also
include project and dynamic hazards.

The significant risks identified and the related control and mitigation measures
should be discussed with the crew before project start up.

The Project Risk Assessment should be reviewed and updated on a regular basis
(e.g. when incidents occur or as a result of hazard reports or similar inputs).
Additionally, Job Safety Analysis by a competent person should be done on a
regular basis for higher risk tasks to review and improve existing procedures.
Risk assessments should be as part of the Permit to Work (PTW) process
and Management of Change (MOC) and for non-routine operations. All Risk
assessments should be documented and understood by the personnel involved.

Recovery measures and ERPs need to be tested at the start of a project and
regularly throughout the project life cycle.

Risk Verification in Geophysical Operations

A risk verification process should be designed in order to drive continuous
improvement in HSE performance and should be conducted throughout the life
of the project. This will help to ensure that control measures are continually
implemented.

The risk verification process consists of regularly reviewing the project risk
register, prioritizing the risks, and verifying that risk control measures are in place
and functioning as intended, or need to be adjusted. A risk verification schedule
and targets should be developed prior to Mobilization.
 Risk management in geophysical operations 11

Field visits, inspections and conversations with the workforce at the task site
are the most appropriate ways to verify that the risk controls are functioning as
intended. The basic four steps are:
1) Preparation: The Preparation step is a critical part of the process. Risk
verifications should be conducted by a pair of verifiers (observers), ideally
one Client Representative and one Contractor Department Head or
HSE Advisor. The expectation on seismic crews is that Party Managers,
Department Heads, marine crew Masters and Officers and Client
Representatives and staff will conduct risk verifications on a regular basis.

During this stage the observers should prepare by making use of the project
risk register and associated procedures for the specifically identified task.
The observers will review the risk register and task procedure to identify the
risk controls that pertain especially to the task that they plan to observe.
They will verify that these control measures are understood and functioning
as intended.
2) Observation: Prior to interrupting the employees performing the task, the
observers look for indicators that there may be something more to the task
than described in the procedure. The observers make note of any positive
practices and any actions or conditions which may be of concern.
3) Conversation: A debrief with the employees should be held and the
observers should state why they are present. Observers should commence
the conversation with the positive behaviors observed. Conversation with
the employees should then focus on the task procedure, to determine if it
is useful and whether the employees can offer any improvements to the
existing procedure. Then the conversation can proceed to the risk control and
their effectiveness. The most effective conversation will be when there are
follow-on questions about control measures to gain further understanding
from the employees about how well the control measures are working.
4) Action: Following the risk verification, the observers should meet at
a suitable location to provide feedback to one another on the process.
Actions resulting from the conversations should be followed up by the crew
management to ensure the control measures are effective. The observers
should agree on who has the action, and how it will be completed. Actions
are initiated through use of an action point register. Another aspect of the
action step is to follow through within some days with the employees to see
that control measures are still in place.
 Risk management in geophysical operations 12

Recognition and Interventions

The risk verification process will identify the presence or absence of various
control measures according to the hierarchy of controls. It is important for
supervisors to recognize and reinforce positive behaviors through verbal random
HSE safety award presentations.

Where ‘of concern’ acts and conditions are observed, and risk control measures
are not being implemented, intervention should be made. Intervention or a change
in process should be handled formally through the employees’ supervisor unless
the potential for serious or life-threatening consequences exists. In this case the
task should be stopped until a resolution can be found and implemented.

Interventions and actions should be reported to supervisors and client

representatives and tracked through a remedial action tracker. A summary of
the intervention and/or positive recognition should be reported through a risk
verification report.

Reporting
Client and contractor representatives should document the risk verification
through a summary report and maintain an activity log. The activity log should be
distributed to the client and contractor project managers on a regular basis who
should verify the standard and quality of implementation.

Project Managers should use the risk verification reports to reinforce positive
implementation or to identify improvement opportunities. Individuals should
be recognized for making outstanding interventions and for consistent
implementation of the risk verification process.
 Risk management in geophysical operations 13

Aide Memoir for Geophysical

Risk Assessors

Introduction
As discussed above, knowledge of what has happened in the past is essential for
good Risk assessment. For frequent events, such as slips trips and falls, most
companies have experienced enough of such events to have good knowledge of
these. However, for the less frequent, but often more serious events, one needs
to know what has happened in the industry as a whole. Without this one can be
victim of the “Never happened to us syndrome”. To provide this information the
IOGP Geophysical HSE subcommittee and the IAGC have shared information
and assembled the Aide Memoir for Geophysical Risk Assessors (AM), a simple
database of fatal accidents which have happened in Geophysical operations and
similar industry operations (‘Other’). For example, the database contains four
reports on fatal crushing’s by automatic water tight doors on vessels, something
which has not happened on any Geophysical vessel yet, but could easily happen
there too. On the basis of these events in the AM, this Risk can be classified B-4 on
the RAM.

In a later stage, reports of high potential incidents (HiPo’s) which could have
resulted in fatalities, but fortunately did not, have also been added.

The information was assembled using the IOGP annual statistical reports and the
fatal accident reports contained therein, published since 1981. Further information
was provided by the members of IAGC and CAGC. In addition, other sources like
IMCA and STEP Change are monitored. The database consists of a simple Excel
spreadsheet containing summary descriptions of the events and where available,
cross references to IAGC or other alerts containing more elaborate information.
The Aide Memoir and a user manual can be found on the IAGC website. On a
regular basis it is updated as and when new information becomes available.

The Aide Memoir can be used to assess what has happened in the past and to
a degree how often, for the Risks with fatal or multiple fatal Severity on the risk
matrix (Severities 4 and 5). Note however that the Aide Memoir by necessity is
organized by accident type and not by Hazards or Risks but often this conceptual
difference can be ignored.

Some events in the Aide Memoir from long ago may be ignored as since these
happened, industry may have improved its performance. For example, we no
longer transport people standing up in a flatbed truck, which was common
practice in the seventies. Since 2008 there has been no further drowning in the
industry as the essential controls (lifejacket, swim testing and prohibition of
swimming) since then have been rigorously applied in the industry. Drowning
(as defined for the Aide Memoir) can now have its risk downgraded from D-4 to
B-4. But the memory of the many fatalities in the past still serves to highlight the
importance of the controls now considered commonplace (e.g. seat belts, etc.).
 Risk management in geophysical operations 14

Database size and population

Figure 1 below shows the full content of the database in terms of numbers of
events recorded, both in geophysical operations and in similar ‘Other’ operations,
both fatal accidents (‘Actuals’) and HiPo’s.

Figure 2 shows the events on record for geophysical operations, split up as Land,
Marine and Transition Zone (TZ).

60 HiPo
Actual

50

40

30

20

10

0
1968
1970
1972
1975
1977
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

Figure 1: Full content of database by year: Geophysical and Other, Actuals and HiPo’s

100 TZ
Marine
Land
80

60

40

20

0
1968
1970
1972
1975
1977
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

Figure 2: Geophysical, Actuals only, by year, number of fatal accidents

 Risk management in geophysical operations 15

From these graphs it is evident that the data before 1990 is incomplete due to
lack of reporting. After this date, however, the majority of events in geophysical
operations by the IAGC membership are recorded. We cannot claim that the data is
wholly complete, but what is on record is certified to have happened. The number
of actual fatal incidents, as of May 2016, in the database for geophysical operations
is, 304 from Land, 42 from Marine and 32 from TZ for a total 378.

Figure 3 shows the number of actual geophysical fatalities: Land 468, Marine 81,
TZ 38, resulting in a total of 587, a very shocking and sobering number. From 2008
onward the overall trend appears to be downwards and one hopes this will continue.

85
40 TZ
Marine
35 Land

30

25

20

15

10

0
1968
1970
1972
1975
1977
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

Figure 3: Geophysical, Actuals only, by year, number of actual fatalities. Peak in 2007 was
due to a terrorist attack with 74 fatalities

Data Analysis: Main accident classification

Apart from the invaluable information in the individual accident or HiPo (High
Potential) descriptions, classification of incidents allows some enlightening
statistical analysis. The main classification developed for the Aide Memoir consists
of 20 types of accidents. Figures 4 and 5 show the number of events and actual
fatalities per accident class for these 20 incident types. From these graphs, it
is evident what the most frequent types of fatal accidents are in geophysical
operations and which ones have caused the largest numbers of fatalities.
 0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80

0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Ve
Ve
h h ic
ic le
le St
Vi ru
ol ck
en by
ce Dr
St ow
ru ni
ck ng
Dr by Cr
ow us
ni hi
ng ng
Ai
rc
Bo ra
at ft
Ai
rc Bo
ra at
Ex ft Vi
pl ol
os en
io ce
Cr n Ex
us pl
os
hi io
ng n
M M
ed ed
Risk management in geophysical operations

Te ic ic
m al al
pe
ra El
tu Fa
16

re ec
tro l l
cu
El Fa tio
ec ll n
tro An
cu im
tio Te
n m al
pe
An ra
im tu
al re
Su Su
ic ic
M id As id
ot e ph e

Figure 5: Geophysical, Actuals, main classification, number of fatalities

yx

Figure 4: Geophysical, Actuals, main classification, number of incidents

Li or Li ia
gh cy gh tio
tn cl
e tn n
in in
g g
st st
As rik rik
ph e e
yx
ia Fi
tio
n M re
ot
or
cy
TZ

TZ
Fi cl
re e
Land

Land
Marine
Marine
 Risk management in geophysical operations 17

Figure 6 shows the number of actual fatalities (1078 by May 2016) for the entire
database along the same accident classification. Trend is similar, but Aircraft
have gained the first place which reflects the large number of multiple fatalities
with helicopter crashes offshore. There have been several HiPo’s of this nature in
Marine geophysical operations but so far no actual major helicopter crashes. The
risk for geophysical crew change flights is however similar, if not higher (moving
target for landing and fewer navigation aids), than for the whole of the E&P offshore
industry. Once more, we have to look broadly to arrive at a correct risk assessment.

Note, however, that in order to not make the database too large, no attempts have
been made to make the data in this category complete. Events have been selected
for learning value and to show that they have happened, but the information in the
group ‘Other’ cannot be used to estimate frequencies. However, all fatal helicopter
crashes on record in the IOGP reports have been included.

250 Other
Geophysical

200

150

100

50

0
t

n
ng
le

by

at

ll

re

al

re

al

e
n

e
af

rik
nc

cl

id
in

io

tio

tio
Fa
ic

im
ic
Bo

tu
Fi
ni
r

ck

cy

ic
os
sh
h

ed
rc

le

cu

st
ra
ow

An

Su
Ve

or
i
ru

pl
o

u
Ai

yx
M
tro

pe

g
Vi

Cr
Dr

ot
Ex
St

in
ph

m
ec

M
tn
As

Te
El

gh
Li

Figure 6: Geophysical and Other, number of fatalities

Violence takes second place in the number of actual fatalities in geophysical

operations due to one single event in which 74 people lost their lives. Ignoring this
one very serious event, it is about number 7 on the list.

While the predominance of Aircraft and Vehicle incidents was no surprise, the fact
that Drowning is amongst the top five killers was to most people in the Geophysical
industry when the first version of the Aide Memoir was published in 2007. The
same was true for Struck by and Crushing.
 Risk management in geophysical operations 18

As for Drowning, the industry quickly reacted by rigorously applying the necessary
key controls: lifejackets, swim testing and prohibition of (recreational) swimming.

Figure 7 shows the number of drowning events per year in the geophysical
industry. Although there still have been a few HiPo’s, there have been no more
Drownings in the geophysical industry since 2008. This can be attributed to what
the industry has learned from the Aide Memoir and the simultaneous publication
of the IOGP Report 355, Watercraft and Water in Geophysical Operations.

8 HiPo
Actual
7

0
2012
2011
2009
2008
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
1999
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1985
1984
1972
1970
1968

Figure 7: Drowning by year, Geophysical, Actuals and HiPo’s

Note: Figure 7 does not show the years without incidents: 2013, 2014 and 2015.

RAM classification of Drowning as a whole, in the past had to be E-4 (Red), single
fatality yearly or more often. Looking at the past few years since 2008, this can now
be scaled down to D-4 or even B-4 (Orange).
 Risk management in geophysical operations 19

Data Analysis: Finer accident classification

To understand the predominance of Struck By events, we had to dig deeper and
develop a finer accident classification, eventually amounting to 100 sub-types.

Figure 8 shows the Geophysical Struck By events split between the 14 applicable sub
types of the finer classification. Now it is evident that the main culprit is falling trees
and branches, mostly related to chainsaw tree felling. Contrary to Drowning, the
industry has not yet found controls to make this activity less dangerous. Falling objects
in Marine were no surprise and note that IMCA and IADC report a very high incidence
of such dropped objects events in drilling (DROPS), on vessels and in shipyards.

Struck by vehicle relate to vehicle and pedestrian incidents not included in the
main class Vehicle, which has been reserved for incidents where drivers or
passengers were injured (see below).

50 TZ
Marine
Land
40

30

20

10

0
h

e
t
t

ion

ure

or

t
l
se

en
jec

jec

jec
he
kb

ion
icl

an
nc

rat
ves
ns

ipm

ail
uis
eh
ob

ob

ob
Cr
bra

uc

rat

Vib
r te

ef
yv

ng
Str
g

ing

arp
re

qu

pe
e/

llin

Tyr
kb

su

xti
de

go
ge
Fly

Sh
tre

Fa

ee
es
un
uc

tin
in
g

Pr
Str

Fir
tat
pe
llin

Lif
Ro

Ro
Fa

Figure 8: Struck by incidents, finer classification, Geophysical, Actuals and HiPo’s.

Clearly one should not plot ‘Struck By’ as a single risk on the RAM, there are
very different incident scenarios emanating from the finer classification. Falling
tree/Branch should be classified as D-4 at least, happens yearly or more often in
Geophysical operations. But given the low number of exposure hours for chainsaw
tree felling, this should be upgraded to E-4. The other scenarios can be classified
as C-4, Orange, have happened but not yearly.
 Risk management in geophysical operations 20

Figure 9 shows a similar analysis of drowning events. Getting people across bodies
of water (‘River crossing’), falls into water from a river bank etc. and (recreational)
swimming clearly are the main contributors.

One could classify these individually on lower scales of the RAM but this would be
misleading as the scenarios are quite similar and the controls almost identical.
Rather than splitting this up as 8 separate risks each as C-4, up to 2008 the whole
of Drowning should be grouped together as a single risk E-4, Red. With the recent
history without Drownings this can now be downgraded to C-4, or even B-4, both
Orange.

20 TZ
Marine
Land

15

10

0
River Fall into Swimming Sinking / Diving Vehicle in Swimming Collision
crossing water recreational Capsizing water

Figure 9: Drownings analyzed using the finer classification. Geophysical, Actuals and HiPo’s.

Note that the main class Drowning relates to the type of events shown in Figure 9
as an operationally effective classification. As such, most of these events happened
in Land and TZ (Transition Zone) operations.

Events where drowning was no doubt the actual cause of death, such as vessels
sinking, Man Over Board (MOB) from large seagoing vessels, FRC (Fast Rescue
Craft) and Workboat incidents are ranged under the main classification ‘Boat’,
mostly Marine operations. Figure 10 shows the Boat incidents with their finer
classification. Note that a number of offshore suicides were classified in the main
class Suicide, while technically also MOB cases.

Note the numbers of falls with lifeboat (Includes FRC and Workboats).
 Risk management in geophysical operations 21

35 Other
Geophysical
30

25

20

15

10

0
Sinking / MOB Fall with Collision Rope Propeller Boat to Fall into Stranding / Lost
Capsizing life boat under boat water grounding control
tension transfer

Figure 10: Boat incidents by finer classification, Geophysical and Others, Actuals and HiPo’s

Sinking/Capsizing could possibly be classified as D-4 and C-5, Red, the others C-4,
Orange, on the Ram.

Figure 11 shows the Crushing incidents with their finer classification. Crushed by
vehicle again relates to vehicle and pedestrian events, mainly related to reversing, but
also including some cases of people sleeping under vehicles which were driven away.

16 TZ
Marine
14 Land

12

10

0
Crushed Rotating Caught Lifting Rope Vibrator Burried Bulldozer Crane Poorly
by vehicle equipment between operations under secured load
tension

Figure 11: Crushing incidents, Geophysical: Actuals and HiPo’s

 Risk management in geophysical operations 22

Crushing by vehicle (mostly reversing) borders on D-4, Red, and Rotating equipment
also. The others should be classified as C-4 or B-4, Orange, on the RAM.

Figure 12 shows all incidents involving vehicles with their finer classification.
These are assembled from the main categories Vehicle, Struck By, Crushing and
Motorcycle. Roll over and Collision are the most frequent events. Followed by the
vehicle and pedestrian events (Struck by and Crushed by Vehicle). ‘Crash’ are
motorcycle incidents.

40 Other
Geophysical
35

30

25

20

15

10

0
Sk tor
lld t

ng

Fa oug d
on y ve r
St ith cle

by icle

Ve Co le

in n

V, r
ad

ff

Vi er

st ing

ith h

on ert n

tc l

to ce

Fo y

t
ad

ro

a
n

lif
e

vit
e

u
s

i
o

cu Cli
c

Ov tra

m
de

oz

at
ov

i
a
Qu

lo
si

w aki

lo

rk
nt
a
hi
hi

ca
h
ck veh

on Cr

i
br
w
lli

an
ci

co
ve

hi ed
Co she oll

i
in

hi Dus
Bu

r
R

AT

ith
w

in
r
b

th
Lo
cl

cl
w
d

ll
se
hi

e
si
ru

cl
ly

Ve

lli

si
si

or
u

Co

lli
Cr

lli

Ve
Po

Co

Figure 12: All incidents involving vehicles, Geophysical and Other, Actuals and HiPo’s

As discussed before, for Risk Assessment it is considered best to lump most of

these together as a single risk (‘Vehicle in motion’ or ‘High Speed driving’) E-4,
Red, on the RAM. Some specific scenarios such as All-Terrain Vehicles (ATV)/Quad,
Vehicle through Ice (B or D-4, Orange) can be addressed individually as requiring
specific context and controls.

Figures 13 and 14 show the number of aircraft incidents and actual fatalities. As
discussed earlier, the offshore helicopter crashes are very prominent. However,
in terms of number of incidents, Land seismic helicopter usage, in particular
with external loads are by far the most frequent helicopter events in Geophysical
Operations, with roughly one fatal crash per year (single fatalities).
 Risk management in geophysical operations 23

60 TZ – Geophysical
Marine – Other
Marine – Geophysical
50
Land – Other
Land – Geophysical
40

30

20

10

0
Helicopter crash Helicopter rotor Fixed wing crash Terrorist Fall from helicopter

Figure 13: Aircraft accidents number of events, Geophysical and Other, Actual and HiPo’s

180 TZ – Geophysical
Marine – Other
160
Marine – Geophysical
Land – Other
140
Land – Geophysical
120

100

80

60

40

20

Helicopter crash Fixed wing crash Helicopter rotor Fall from helicopter Terrorist

Figure 14: Aircraft accidents number of fatalities, Geophysical and Other (222)

As discussed above, it is recommended to classify Land seismic helicopter support

as E-4, single fatality yearly in Geophysical operations. Offshore helicopter crew
change relates to a multiple fatality scenario, Severity 5. Technically this has not
happened in Geophysical operations, but it has in similar E&P operations so it
should be classified at least C-5, Red.
 Risk management in geophysical operations 24

The following Figures 15 – 23 show the finer classification for Electrocution,

Violence, Animal, Asphyxiation, Explosion, Fall, Fire, Medical and Temperature. All
of these rank in the B-4 or C-4, Orange, risk levels on the RAM.

20 Marine
Land

15

10

0
Overhead Work on live Poor Accidental Faulty Buried Fall from
power line installation grounding contact wiring power cable height

Figure 15: Electrocution, finer classification, Geophysical and Other, Actuals and HiPo’s

Note the predominance of Overhead Powerlines!

18 TZ
Marine
16
Land

14

12

10

0
Terrorist Armed Violence Piracy Agresssion Theft Firearm
robbers amongst accident
personnel

Figure 16: Violence, Geophysical and Other, Actual and HiPo’s.

Note that ‘Terrorist’ being on the increase now borders on an E-4, yearly single fatality
Red risk, in particular for the specific risk regions affected by this problem (context).
 Risk management in geophysical operations 25

8 Marine
Land
7

0
Bee attack Snake bite Bear attack Accidental contact

Figure 17: Animal: Geophysical and Others, Actuals and HiPo’s. Accidental contact was
with Irukandji Jellyfish (‘Other’)

8 Other
Geophysical
7

0
Carbon monoxide Confined space entry O2 Deficient atmosphere H2S

Figure 18: Asphyxiation, Geophysical and Other, Actuals and HiPo’s

Note that IMCA reports a very large number of confined space entry fatalities, with
about two rescuers dead for each initial entrant dying. So far, no confined space
entry fatalities in Geophysics in terms of asphyxiation, but one involving a fire
resulting in very serious injuries (see below). The carbon monoxide cases related
to poorly installed heaters or water heaters with the exhaust gases not being
evacuated to the outside of the rented buildings.
 Risk management in geophysical operations 26

16 Other
Geophysical
14

12

10

0
UXO / ERW Explosives Combustible Pressure Fire Lithium Firearm Bulldozer
gas vessel extinguisher batteries accident

Figure 19: Explosion, Geophysical and Other, Actuals and HiPo’s

Note ‘Struck by’ pressure vessel and fire extinguisher events have been included
for completeness sake, as these can be classified both as Explosion incidents and
Struck By incidents.

The bulldozer hit a gas pipeline and caused a massive explosion and fire.

UXO (Un-eXploded Ordnance) numbers do not warrant a D-4 Red classification

worldwide, but in context it might be wise to classify this risk as D-4, Red, in areas
with a high density UXO, especially if this includes modern plastic products that
are difficult to detect.
 Risk management in geophysical operations 27

40 Other
Geophysical
35

30

25

20

15

10

0
Fall from height Fall with Fall in Fall at Cliff Fall into cavity
life boat steep terrain same level

Figure 20: Fall, Geophysical and Other, Actuals and HiPo’s. Note the numbers of falls with
lifeboats

While normally Fall in steep terrain should be classified as C-4, single fatality
“has happened in Geophysical operations”, Orange, in the context of mountainous
terrain one might consider classifying this risk as D-4, Red.

Note there have been fatal falls at the same level i.e. from very limited height!
Falls into water have been classified as Drowning or Boat.

4 Other
Geophysical

0
l

s
l

ct

se

es

y
te
e

uc

tr
ga
rie
fir

m
Fu

ta

m
ho
Ho

en
od
Ca

on

tte
sh

le

fu
re

pr

e
ib
lc
Bu

ba

xic

ac
su

st

le
ta

sp
m

to
bu
es

ib
en

iu

st
ng
Pr

ed
d

th

bu
Co
ci

in
di
Li
Ac

m
el

nf
W

Co

Co

Figure 21: Fire, Geophysical and Other, Actuals and HiPo’s.

 Risk management in geophysical operations 28

10 Other
Geophysical
9

0
Intoxication Malaria Poisoning Heart Attack Illness Asbestos Welding toxic
fumes

Figure 22: Medical, Geophysical and Other, Actuals and HiPo’s.

Note that heart attacks are only reported in case they are related to the task
performed, i.e. accidental rather than natural death.

10 Other
Geophysical
9

0
Heat Cold Fall in steep terrain

Figure 23: Temperature, Geophysical and Other, Actuals and HiPo’s

The fall in steep terrain report was about a geologist who got disoriented due to heat
and de-hydration and in this condition left the planned route and fell off a 40 m cliff.
 Risk management in geophysical operations 29

Data Analysis: By Activity

The events in the Aide Memoir have also been classified along the activity in which
they took place.

The below Figures 24 and 25 show the split by activity for Land and Marine.

Airgun handling
Travel
Training / emergency drill
Streamer handling
Transit, port, mooring
Other support vessels operations
Workshops, engine rooms
Fueling, bunkering operations
Small boat operations
Transport - Water
Equipment maintenance - Heavy
Recording operations
Explosives handling
Specialized operations
Crane / lifting operations
Office & warehouse operations
Shooting operations
Vibrator operations
Off-duty / recreation activity
Spread lay out and pick up, recording
Equipment maintenance - Light
Drilling operations
Transport - Air
Camp / catering / galley
Other - Not classified elsewhere
Line preparation, clearing, surveying, clean up
Transport - Land

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180

Figure 24: Incidents by type of activity, Land, Actuals and HiPo’s

 Risk management in geophysical operations 30

Off-duty / recreation activity

Navigation
Spread lay out and pick up, recording
Shooting operations
Transport - Land
Equipment recovery
Towing operations
Shipyard, dry dock
Recording operations
Mooring, tie up operations
Transport - Air
Equipment maintenance - Heavy
Training / emergency drill
Specialized operations
Small boat operations
Fueling, bunkering operations
Transport - Water
Transit, port, mooring
Streamer handling
Workshops, engine rooms
Other - Not classified elsewhere
Airgun handling
Crane / lifting operations
Other support vessels operations
Equipment maintenance - Light
Workboat, FRC, offshore pers. tfr.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Figure 25: Incidents by type of activity, Marine, Actuals and HiPo’s

Figure 26 shows finer classification for the activity ‘Workboat, FRC and Offshore
Personnel Transfer’ in terms of numbers of events. Figure 27 shows the same but
now in terms of actual number of fatalities. Note the predominance of Helicopter
events!
 He

0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
He lic
lic op
op ter
ter cr
cr Sin as
as kin h
h g/
Sin Ca
kin ps
g/ izi
Fa ng
Ca ll
ps wi
th
izi
ng life
bo
He at
lic
op
Pr ter
op ro
ell to r
r e
Bo
at Co
to Bo llis
bo at ion
at to
tra bo
ns at
fer tra
Ro ns

Actual and HiPo’s, Geophysical and Other

He pe fer
lic un
Risk management in geophysical operations

op de
ter rt
ro en
to sio
r Co n
31

m
bu
sti
ble
Sw ga
im s
m
ing
Pr
op
ell
Co
m Ca e r
bu ug
sti ht
be

Figure 27: Same as above, but now the number of actual fatalities
ble
ga tw
s ee
n
Sw
im
Co m
ing
llis
ion Lo
st
Ro co
pe n tro
un
de l
r ten
Other

sio
n MO
B
Figure 26: Activity: Workboat, FRC and Offshore Personnel Transfer, number of incidents
Geophysical
 Risk management in geophysical operations 32

Data Analysis: By Keyword

For each event, up to three keywords can be entered in the Aide Memoir database
spreadsheet. This facilitates searching for specific events (e.g. events involving a
knife). But statistical analysis of the occurrence of certain keywords also provides
useful information, in particular in terms of how often an escalating factor was
considered to have played a role. The graphs below show a selection of keywords,
and the frequency with which they have been used. Note that some keywords may
occur in more than one list.

8 HiPo
7 Actual
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
d le ue t r s o n ss
oa ab m ig gh de t on ug di tio ce
f r ving Un swi
t Ni un en n g ent dr ra ec Ac
f
O ri Fa g m i
k ip l
nd e
/
Inf
d kin uip or la on ed
to
or eq W equ ph riz
e o ho f o
20 W li v c o th
Al e au
Us Un
15

10

0
in gh
t
re
d ac st pt ow gl
e
ke
t
ok
e ed E
de
d di
o
ar
d g
ra Ni Ti ev Du m Sn ct PP tin
Te
r
ed te an jac m ra d lin ra l izz es
at Ice d
lif
e S st a r B No B t
M e Bl
in Di d as
cu No an og
30 s st
Re Su
b N
25
20
15
10
5
0
e t t r l y t t
on el ion cke he ho ion ere
d
ilit men tc
h
in
g
ion ren ca
p ed ice gine
Al atb e ct ja e at l co i z at f f s ib t s wi test cat u r p o od dev n
i l
se
pr
ot lif
e W A
ob
il e
o v i
re
a 's s un C
Bu
m F ty ee
No nc Low al t an o ga fe gl
l l No m a m - s a in
fa De sis
t ic m N Co
m et d S
No ed ad m le
Re t m De H el ab
i s
ec D
rr
co
In

Figure 28: Number of events with specifically noted escalating factors (Keywords 1, 2, 3)

Prominent: Alone; Terrain; No: seatbelt/lifeline/lifejacket; fatigue/tired; night and

alcohol (last three in two keyword lists).

Also note the number of fatal incidents during medevac, three of which were
helicopter crashes at night!
 Risk management in geophysical operations 33

Glossary

Below are terms defined for use in this document. The reader should also be
aware of additional terms already defined in the Glossary sections in Reports 510,
423 and 432 for completeness.

Term Definition

Activity Set The activities which make up the sum-total of

geophysical operations that results in specific,
measurable outputs.
Activity Specific A singular broad term which describes a phase
of geophysical operations or a support activity
to support geophysical operations, e.g. Project
scouting; personnel logistics; line positioning and
opening; equipment logistics; receiver and energy
sources; recording, project remediation.
Barrier A risk control that seeks to prevent unintended
events from occurring or prevent escalation of
events into incidents with harmful consequences.
Breakdown Event The point where control is lost and there are
consequences or potential consequences.
Consequence A quantitative or qualitative measure of an adverse
or beneficial outcome from an activity. The effect
or potential effect of a Breakdown Event on People,
Environment, Assets or Reputation (PEAR).
Consequence − Severity The numeric value assigned to a consequence
(used in the RAM).
Hazard A source of potential harm or a situation with the
potential to cause harm or loss.
Hazard − Dynamic The hazards that are not task or activity based, for
example weather, terrain, seasons, security.
Hazard − Static The hazards that always exist for a specific
geophysical task.
Hazard Register (not risk) A document showing the activity and the tasks
associated with the activity and the hazards
associated with the task. Typically will be
generated at the inception of the project before
tendering.
 Risk management in geophysical operations 34

Term Definition

Hierarchy of Control A set of measures which may modify the task, the
hazard and the associated risk to a tolerable level.
Usually the hierarchy is applied by considering the
most effective measures down to least effective.
The most effective measures modify the task. The
least effective try to modify the consequences and
therefore the severity.
Probability The chance of a specific event or outcome
measured by the ratio of specific events or
outcomes to the total number of possible events
or outcomes. Quantitative probability is expressed
as a number between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating
an impossible event, and 1 indicating the outcome
is certain. For Geophysical Operations probability
is described in Qualitative terms and is shown on
the RAM in three categories General, Historical
and Descriptive. This probability ranges from ‘A’
through ‘E’ with ‘A’ being ‘Very Unlikely’ to ‘E’ –
Very Likely.
Recovery Measures What will be done, after losing control, to ensure
that the task is again under control.
Risk − Mitigation Measures implemented to mitigate the
consequences of a breakdown event.
Risk − Prevention Measures implemented to control potential risks
prior to a breakdown event.
Risk − Qualitative A risk score derived from experiences or
Assessment knowledge. A qualitative risk assessment is not
based on rigorous numerical data.
Risk − Reassessment An iterative process whereby a Risk Reassessment
is conducted after mitigation or control measured
are applied. This is done in order to evaluate any
unexpected consequences from the actions taken.
 Risk management in geophysical operations 35

Term Definition

Risk Register A document showing the activity and the tasks

associated with the activity, the hazards associated
with the task and the risk associated with the
hazard. The risk register will show Dynamic, Crew
based and Project specific hazards. Typically,
the hazard register will describe the mitigation
measures to be applied and contain a ‘pre’ and
‘post’ mitigation risk score.
Risk − Residual The risk remaining after risk treatment or control
measures have been applied.
Risk − Score The product of Probability and Severity taken from
the RAM, e.g. D3.
Risk − Tolerable By definition, exposure to intolerable risk (as
defined on each Company’s RAM) has to cease
until controls to reduce the level to tolerable are
introduced.
Risk − Treatment There are four options available – Tolerate, Treat,
Transfer or Terminate.
Task(s) A set of detailed processes for contributing to the
activity which is being conducted.
 Risk management in geophysical operations 36

Acronyms

The following acronyms are used in this document:

Acronym Description

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable

AM Aide Memoir
ATV All-Terrain Vehicle
CAGC Canadian Association of Geophysical Contractors
DROPS DRopped Objects Prevention Scheme
E&P Exploration and Production
FRC Fast Rescue Craft
HiPo High Potential (incident)
HRA Health Risk Assessment
HSE Health, Safety and Environment (but in this document also
includes Security & Social Responsibility)
IAGC International Association of Geophysical Contractors
IADC International Association of Drilling Contractors
IMCA International Marine Contractors Association
JSA Job Safety Analysis
MOB Man Over Board
MOC Management Of Change
MOPO Matrix of Permitted Operations
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
PTW Permit To Work
RAM Risk Assessment Matrix
STEP Change Step Change in Safety
TZ Transition Zone
UXO Un-eXploded Ordnance
 Risk management in geophysical operations 37

References

Aide Memoir for Geophysical Risk Assessors:

http://www.iagc.org/aide-memoir.html

IOGP. Report 355. Watercraft & water in geophysical operations − A guideline to

operations & management. July 2004.

IOGP. Report 423. HSE management – guidelines for working together in a contract
environment. April 2017.

IOGP. Report 432. Managing HSE in a Geophysical Contract. November 2017.

IOGP. Report 510. Operating Management System Framework for controlling risk and
delivering high performance in the oil and gas industry. June 2014.

IOGP. Report 511. OMS in practice – A supplement to Report No. 510. Operating
Management System Framework. June 2014.
 www.iogp.org
Registered Office Brussels Office Houston Office
City Tower Bd du Souverain,165 16225 Park Ten Place
40 Basinghall Street 4th Floor Suite 500
14th Floor B-1160 Brussels Houston, Texas 77084
London EC2V 5DE Belgium United States
United Kingdom
T +44 (0)20 3763 9700 T +32 (0)2 566 9150 T +1 (713) 338 3494
F +44 (0)20 3763 9701 F +32 (0)2 566 9159 [email protected]
[email protected] [email protected]

The geophysical industry has static

hazards and risks that are inherent
to its assets and operational
activities. While most of the risk
cannot be completely eliminated, it
needs to be managed and controlled
to a tolerable level of residual risk.
In this document, we will refer to
a Hazard as anything which can
cause harm or potential harm.
Harm could be caused to people,
to the environment, to the assets
or equipment being used, or to
the reputation of the company or
the industry. Risk is the product of
the potential consequence and the
probability of an event occurring.