Critical Autobiography A New Genre

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Journal of Aesthetics & Culture

ISSN: (Print) 2000-4214 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/zjac20

Critical autobiography: a new genre?

Laura Di Summa-Knoop

To cite this article: Laura Di Summa-Knoop (2017) Critical autobiography: a new genre?, Journal
of Aesthetics & Culture, 9:1, 1358047, DOI: 10.1080/20004214.2017.1358047

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/20004214.2017.1358047

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JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS & CULTURE, 2017
VOL. 9, 1358047
https://doi.org/10.1080/20004214.2017.1358047

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Critical autobiography: a new genre?


Laura Di Summa-Knoop
Philosophy Department, Fairfield University, New York, NY, USA

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Memoir, a genre that dates back, arguably, to Augustine’s Confessions, if not even earlier, is Critical autobiography;
today enjoying enormous critical as well as popular success. In this essay, I discuss what I see genre theory; fiction/
as the most recent ramification of memoir, namely the development of a distinguishable new nonfiction; narrative
subgenre which I will call “critical autobiography.” Stemming from the long and complex
tradition of literary memoirs, the critical autobiography flirts closely with fiction and literary
criticism while challenging some of the structural and aesthetic features that characterize
more traditional autobiographical works. In the course of this paper, I consider such chal-
lenges and their impact on the nature and classification of memoir. Grounding my analysis in
genre theory (as opposed to strictly intentionalist classificatory strategies), I outline and
defend three contra-standard features of the critical autobiography: critical autobiographies
problematize the idea of an authentic confession, they refrain from causal narrative connec-
tions, and, lastly, they further contribute to the discussion on the nature of the self by
providing a perhaps more scattered, but nonetheless compelling picture of what a contem-
porary autobiographical self may actually be.

Introduction stars, etc. who have tried their hands at it. Recent
publications reflect an interest in autobiography and
Autobiographies, or, as it is today more popular,
its inherent multiplicity. James Olney’s masterfully
memoirs,1 have gone, in the past two decades or so,
written Memory & Narrative: The Wave of Life-
through a complete make over. Memoir, in fact, is
Writing (Olney 1998) outlines the history of autobio-
nothing short of a phenomenon. What is, to wit,
graphy as the weaving of both narrative and identity;
phenomenal about memoir is how prismatic it is,
Ben Yagoda (2009), while also adhering to an histor-
how prone to morphing, to play, crisscross, and per-
ical approach (albeit less rigorous), focuses more on
haps even violate the boundaries and definitions that
the problem of authenticity in memoir and on how
philosophy and literary criticism have, throughout
the notion of truth has often been jeopardized. On a
the centuries, attached to different genres—in fiction
similar note, the New York Public Library organized,
and nonfiction alike.
in 1986, a series of talks entitled “The Arts and Craft
Even if we agree in identifying, as its origin,
of Memoir,” talks that were later collected in a pub-
St. Augustine’s Confessions (1998) (and we do not
lication edited by William Zinsser and entitled, sig-
have to), even if we concede that some of the first
nificantly Inventing the Truth (Zinsser 1998). More
complications emerged with Rousseau (1953) and
recently, two collections of essays have explored two
that the first breaches to the authenticity and overall
fundamental issues in the analysis of memoir. The
confessional intent of memoir can be said to derive
first, edited by Christopher Cowley (2015), looks at
from the introduction of a “secular” dimension to
the intersection between philosophy and autobiogra-
what was instead its religious beginning, even if,
phy and at the idea, briefly mentioned above, of
lastly, we see memoir shaking in front of the loss of
autobiography as a form of philosophy; the second,
a coherent sense of identity in writers such as Samuel
edited by Zachary Leader (2015), is more wider in
Beckett (1984) and the postmodern movement that
scope and explores the multiple ways in which auto-
will later ensue, we are still left with a variety of
biographies are created, thus tracing their evolution
questions on what memoir is, on its ontology.2
not only in history, as in the previous examples, but
For memoir, to start with, is both a literary genre
from the perspective of what it means to write an
and a philosophical tool, a way of actively “doing
autobiography, to be an autobiographer.
philosophy;” it is, additionally, of special interest for
The list can go on to include more books, jour-
psychologists and psychoanalysts,3 not to mention its
nals, and literary magazines, but even just a super-
popularity among both elite writers and the virtually
ficial look at the chapters of each of these volumes
interminable sequence of politicians, athletes, music

CONTACT Laura Di Summa-Knoop [email protected] Fairfield University, New York, NY, USA
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
2 L. DI SUMMA-KNOOP

will reveal a number of overlapping concerns and classification of memoir or, more modestly, of
questions. Specifically, and focusing more narrowly, acknowledging the development of a new subgenre,
but not exclusively, on philosophical analyses of what I am tentatively calling “critical-autobiography”.
memoir, there are three crucial issues to consider.
The first is whether memoir belongs entirely to
Memoir: classification and clarification
nonfiction, or whether fiction might have, to
some extent, “contaminated” it. The second is It is not uncommon, when engaging in the study of
related to the notion of narrative and to what memoir, to inquire over its epistemic status and over
may count as the structural conditions leading to its relation to the notion of truth. Some of the most
an autobiographical narrative (if, and I must here widely known contributions to the analysis of mem-
add a disclaimer, we can legitimately talk about oir confirm this hypothesis. Philippe Lejeune, before
memoir as truly being a narrative). Lastly, there is his most recent turn to the analysis of diaries, had
the problem of personal identity and the related famously, but also, as we shall see, contentiously,
question of what counts as a self: what is an auto- argued4 that memoirs require a pacte autobiographi-
biographical self? Are we autobiographical selves? que (Lejeune 1989), a contract that the reader estab-
Can autobiographies truly reveal something more lishes with the memoirist. Such a pact allows the
about who we are? reader to identify what, in the text, is associated
In my essay, I will focus primarily on the first with the pronoun “I” with the name and last name
question, on what, from now on, I will refer to as printed on the cover, while also tacitly conceding that
the “question of classification.” When compared the reader will act as a confidant who, despite the
to the other two questions my choice of concen- silence to which readers are confined, is nonetheless
trating on classification might strike some, and asked to believe in the events narrated, to identify the
especially the trained analytic philosopher, as a portrait conveyed by the memoirist as authentic, and
bit odd or, at least, as a non-particularly interest- to eventually judge its content. Autobiographies ask
ing one. After all, Gricean models, which domi- their readers to engage in a specific “mode of read-
nate the analytic tradition, are tremendously ing,” one that, to reiterate the points above, combines
efficient at drawing boundaries between fiction the reader’s role as a believer with her ability to
and nonfiction, thus leaving us with a very limited empathize, sympathize, but also to judge and ques-
number of paradoxical cases (if any). And yet, tion the content of an autobiography.
Gricean definitions, or what I will refer to as And question we did. While the origin of memoir,
“strong classificatory” accounts also suffer a dra- at least if we see in Augustine’s work the beginning of
matic shortcoming: they cannot account for the this genre, is closely tied to the notion of truth and to
fluidity and experimental courage that so many the importance of confession, later autobiographical
works of fiction and nonfiction have shown. We works have amply shown how fragile the idea that
might be able, in other words, to use a Gricean memoir, a subjective narrative, could convey objec-
paradigm to establish whether a partially ambigu- tive and verifiable truths actually was. Rousseau’s
ous work should be classified as fiction or nonfic- autobiographies, the Confessions, the Dialogues, and
tion (take, for instance, Georges Perec’s [1975] W the Reveries are often seen as the first breach into the
or Pessoa’s The Book of Disquiet [1984]), but we reliability of memoir. Matching three forms of
have no means to explain why a growing number expression, respectively, narration, dialogue, and
of works is playing “on the edge” of this bound- meditative sketches, the three works introduce us to
ary. Even more specifically, they cannot explain the complexity of remembering and of the difficulties
the centrality of this voluntary ambiguity in inherent to the “act” of autobiography—to its crea-
terms of the structure of these works, their aes- tion. Rousseau’s alternates a linear narrative, a dia-
thetic features, and, lastly, their reception and lectical phase in which he compares and contrasts his
appraisal. own voices,5 and a meditative one where a “finally
A not too masterful investigation into recent pub- alone” man is brought back to the idyllic state of
lications confirms this intuition. Authors such as nature that characterizes Rousseau’s political philoso-
Sheila Heti, Maggie Nelson, Ben Lerner, Helen phy. This terrific rhetorical exercise, however, is
McDonald, and others all seem to have added to hardly for the purpose of objective truth. Rousseau’s
their artistic agenda the necessity to critically ques- frequent alterations of facts and the ways in which he
tion the fiction/nonfiction divide in life-writing. This mediates between those facts and his and the reader’s
essay stems from an observation of their techniques evaluation of them lead to a compulsory narrative
and aesthetic devices with the scope of showing how that, if not entirely fictional, is most surely not as
their efforts have not only substantially challenged crystalline as the one composed by Augustine.
and altered a more traditional conception of memoir, Rousseau’s example is indicative of the risk, in auto-
but also highlighted the need of rethinking the biographies, of outright inventions, if not lies. Popular
JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS & CULTURE 3

cases such as James Frey’s A Million Little Pieces (2003), have been sitting on the floor, pacifier in my mouth,
which became the object of public outrage and televised little more than eighteen months old, concerned,
apologies, are exemplary of how sensitive the issue of without even realizing that I was, with recording
what I was seeing in some part of my small brain
reliability is when dealing with autobiography. To lie in so that, a whole lifetime later, I could describe it to
an autobiography is to break the autobiographical pact you, dear reader. That, then, is my earliest memory.
mentioned above; it is to break what it means to write And it may well be false. (Saramago 2011, 110)
and read an autobiographical work.
Yet, to simply condemn every evasion from an Are Saramago’s memories false? Is Rousseau a liar?
objective rendition of facts as a lie or to go as far as And, to return to our initial point, can an autobio-
to see them as fictional is not the correct solution. For graphy and the confession it entails be comparable, in
not only not all alterations and not all distortions virtue of these ambiguities, to a work of fiction? Has
qualify as lies, they are often precisely what make our autobiographical pact been shattered and
autobiography interesting. replaced with the make-believe activity associated
It is not my goal here to do justice to this latter claim, with fictional works?
but it may suffice to emphasize how despite the possi- All these questions are related to what in my
bility of relying on alternative sources, autobiographies introduction I referred to as the “question of classifi-
are heavily dependent on the autobiographer’s very cation,” namely the question of whether a specific
ability to remember. And yet, remembering, Antonio genre, and, in our case, memoir, can be classified as
Damasio (1999), Joseph LeDoux (1996), and many a work of fiction or as a work of nonfiction.
others after them have amply demonstrated, is not a In the analytic tradition, accounts dealing with the
matter of simple recollection. Memories change over fiction/nonfiction distinction typically stem from a
time, and memorization is prone to subjective remodel- rejection of the postmodern collapse of fiction and
ing. At times remodeling can be a form of protection; nonfiction defended by Roland Barthes (1977),
we tend, for instance, to remove or mitigate painful Hayden White (1970, 1980, 1981), and others. To
memories from the past to the point to which we such accounts, scholars such as Gregory Currie
might even deny having lived through them. Other (1985), Kendall Walton (1990), and Noël Carroll
times, the alteration of memories is dictated by the (2003, 193–224) have responded by focusing on the
need of “making sense” of what happened; we need, in nature of illocutionary acts in everyday language—
other words, to connect our memories into a whole, to which they frame in Gricean terms—and on the
spell out their connections, whether etiological or of adjustments necessary in order to apply such a
other nature, and to establish a narrative that abets model to the case of fictional and nonfictional
our perception, whether diachronic or episodic,6 of life. works. It is not my goal to provide a fine-grained
Memoirists are not only familiar with this aspect of review of all these accounts; suffice it to say, that they
memory; they have embraced it as one of the distinguish- typically rely on both authorial intention and on the
ing features of what it means to engage in autobiography. ability of readers (or audiences in general) to receive,
A significant example is José Saramago’s childhood understand, and respond to such intentions. Gregory
memoir, Small Memories. In a particularly moving pas- Currie’s account, for example, frames the author of
sage, Saramago recalls the death of his younger brother, fiction as expressing the intention that the audiences
Francisco. When Francisco died, the author was barely will make-believe the text, while understands nonfic-
two years old, an age that simply impedes the possibility tional works as mandating us to believe that what is
of clear recollection. And yet, his description of the event communicated is real and therefore qualifies as a
is clear, detailed, and beautifully crafted. In a clever “true” belief—or at least as a belief that is truly held
stylistic move, Saramago turns here to the reader and by the author. Interestingly for our purposes, Currie
anticipates her worry: how can this be true? Are these also digresses on the advantages of his position in
memories false? I will let Saramago respond: presumably difficult cases such invented, and yet,
highly realistic or verisimilar autobiographies.
I don’t really believe in so-called false memories, I Martin Amis’ The House of Meetings (2007),
think the difference between those and the memories Salman Rushdie’s Midnight Children (1981), and
we consider certain and solid is merely a question of
Ohran Pamuk’s My Name is Red (2001), to only
confidence, the confidence that we place in the
incorrigible vagueness we call certainty. Is the one mention a few, are all examples of highly realistic
memory I have of Francisco false? Perhaps, but I autobiographical stories that might strike the unin-
have spent the last eighty-three years believing it to formed reader as works of nonfiction: after all, there
be true. (Saramago 2011, 109) are no structural differences that we can eyeball and
the content is as realistic as any nonfictional work.
And again:
But classificatory accounts can be of help. For the
As Francisco’s brother, I would have been unable to distinction between fiction and nonfiction is not
help the daring mountaineer had he fallen. I must taken to depend on the relative reliability of content;
4 L. DI SUMMA-KNOOP

it is instead ascribed to the relational properties that creature. It is one part grief memoir, one part guide
connect the content to the way it is received. The to raptors, and one part biography of T.H. White
distinction between a fictional memoir and an actual […]. (Schulz 2015)
memoir is then that in the former there is no inten- Ben Lerner, interviewed by The Believer on his book
tion of preserving what Currie calls an “information Leaving the Atocha Station (2011) (and, as those who
preserving chain,” i.e. there is no desire to relate the read the book would likely agree, the same applies to
events back to what truly happened and is known his most recent book 10:04 [Lerner 2014]) seems to
about the real world. A realistic memoir, deprived of further acknowledge such complexity when discuss-
the intention of portraying something true about the ing the relation between fact and fiction in his work:
author is therefore comparable to a work of fiction,
no matter how plausible the narrative may sound. By Part of what impoverishes discussions about fact and
fiction is that they tend to forget the degree to which
the same token, a memoir that includes unlikely what doesn’t [emphasis in the text] happen is also
events—such as the example I took from Saramago’s caught up in our experience. I think you can write
childhood memoir—remains a memoir in virtue of autobiographically from experiences you didn’t have,
its intention to authentically7 characterize the author. because the experiences you don’t have are experi-
Is this solution acceptable and exhaustive? And, enced negatively in the experiences you do. (Lin 2016)
more importantly for our purposes, is it enough to Other examples, such as the work of Miranda July,
classify the “new wave” of autobiographies that I have Teju Cole, and, Maggie Nelson’s autobiographies
introduced at the end of my introduction as distinc- could easily be added to the list. These works share
tively nonfictional, or fictional, works? a nuanced and critical relation with memoir and with
There are, broadly, two ways of responding to the tension between the nonfictional writing com-
“intentionalist” strategies such as the one outlined manded by autobiography and the fictional universe
by Currie. The first, which, however, I will only —whether in poetic or prosaic form. More formally,
briefly mention here, is to contest the importance as we will see in the next section, they are character-
and value given to the role of intention in matters ized by a number of “contra-standard” features,
of classification, but also, as Berys Gaut has shown, namely features that run against a more traditional
in matters of interpretation (Gaut 1993, 597–609). conception of what a genre, and in this case memoir,
A second strategy, on which I will focus more is taken to be. Such features, which stem from a
closely, is to question whether classificatory reflection on the fiction/nonfiction divide, but also,
accounts can truly exhaust the discussion ensuing and importantly, on other aspects of autobiography
from the debate on the fiction/nonfiction divide, (such as its structural narrative conditions and its
and this largely regardless of our willingness to relation to the portrayal of identity) have the ability,
accept their tenets. Specifically, proponents of this which distinguishes contra-features, to alter the con-
latter strategy, point at the inability of classificatory ditions of a genre and to inspire, as I believe to be the
accounts to explain how a given classification can case of the examples listed, the creation of a new
affect the reader’s understanding and evaluation of literary subgenre. To clarify and further explain the
a work. I will refer to this latter approach as a presence and significance of contra-standard features
“clarificationist” rather than as a “classificatory” in the works considered, I will introduce, at the
one in virtue of its ability to clarify the status of beginning of the next section, a different approach
fictional and nonfictional works when dealing with to the debate on the nature of fiction and nonfiction,
matters of interpretation and assessment. namely, genre theory. It is within this framework that
Clarificationist strategies can, I believe, help us I will then develop my analysis of the last, or more
better understand the impact of the new wave of recent, movement in the history of memoir.
autobiographies that I have introduced earlier, and
this because, despite their differences, all these works
consciously avoid being segregated into a tight classi- Genre theory
fication. Sheila Heti’s How Should a Person Be? (2012)
In this section, I will concentrate on genre theory as
for instance, declares itself to be a novel, but one that
presented by Stacie Friend (2012, 179–209) and on the
adheres perfectly to the author’s life, from the inclu-
concept, within her theory, of contra-standard features.
sion of her actual circle of friends, to personal emails,
Developed largely in opposition to the classifica-
etc. Other examples are just as significant. Reviewing
tory accounts mentioned in the previous section,
Helen McDonald’s H is for Hawk (2014) for The
Friend’s theory aims at providing a response not
New Yorker, Kathryn Schulz praises the book:
only to the criteria determining membership in either
Had there be an award for the best new book that fiction or nonfiction, but also at exploring the effects
defies every genre, I imagine it would have won that, that such a classification has on the readers, and,
too. […] H is for Hawk is an improbable and hybrid more broadly, on the complex web of publishing
JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS & CULTURE 5

houses, literary criticism, scholarly articles, etc. that drumbeats are contra-standard for minuets; stream
surrounds each work. of consciousness narration is contra-standard for
To accomplish her task, Friend’s account dispenses science textbooks. Variable features are those that
can differ between works in a category without bear-
of the rigid conditions that Gricean and, generally, ing on classification. Color and composition are vari-
intentionalist accounts endorse and rephrases the able for painting; the degree of detail in describing
question of fiction and nonfiction in light of the characters is variable for the novel. (Friend 2012)
more fluid distinctions that characterize different gen-
res. In this sense, fiction and nonfiction are seen as While standard features are what we normally expect
broader categories within which we can identify and from a genre, contra-standard features are both unu-
observe the multiple ramifications that follow when sual and challenging. And yet, contra-standard fea-
considering the number, and variety, of literary genres. tures are also the propelling force leading to what
It is hard not to see the advantages of this approach. may become permanent changes within a genre.
The way genres change overtime, morphing and evolving Contra-standard features, can act, to muse, as the
in their form, structure, and style, but also the shifts in avant-garde: their initial impact is perceived as dif-
the way in which audiences understand and enjoy each ferent, even odd, but they may, with time, be
genre are both good reasons to choose genre theory over absorbed into a genre, thus altering what were pre-
classificatory strategies. For genre theory, unlike its oppo- viously taken to be the standard features of a genre.
nent, relies on a broader and more malleable contextu- This is not, one must add, the only way in which the
alist view where features such as writing style, the social standard features of a genre can change, but it is
and historical milieu of a work, its publishing history, nonetheless a plausible hypothesis8 and one that, I
what kind of readers it targeted, etc. are all taken into believe, is largely confirmed by recent movements
consideration when examining both a work’s belonging and shifts in memoir.
to a given genre and its appreciation and appraisal. Considerations on genre theory’s potential in
Additionally, such features are not to be taken as essential monitoring changes within a genre and what said
or necessary conditions: the presence, or absence, of one with respect to contra-standard features offer us a
of more features is not likely to strongly affect the inclu- promising strategy for the analysis of recent move-
sion of a given work into a genre, thus providing even ments in memoir. For such movements—and
more flexibility of classification. changes—are likely to result from the emergence of
Now if we briefly recall what said, at the beginning contra-standard features and from their resulting
of this essay, about the prismatic history of memoir, incorporation into a genre. Memoir is changing, to
genre theory, so construed, strikes as a more than put it differently, because some of its standard fea-
reasonable approach. tures are being questioned. But what are the standard
First of all, to frame the discussion within genre theory features that are undergoing such a transformation?
allows us to expand the boundaries of our analysis to a This is not, alas, an easy question to answer, and
wider range of theories—philosophical and literary—on yet, the history of memoir does point us to a number
the nature of autobiographical writing. For it is undeni- of features that, albeit speculatively, do seem to char-
able that autobiography, despite its most immediate acterize this genre—features that may not count as
belonging to the “super-genre” of nonfiction, has long necessary conditions for the inclusion into a genre,
been flirting with fictional narratives, a fact that has but that are nonetheless typically invoked when dis-
captured the interest of writers and scholars, from cussing memoir by critics and writers alike.
Serge Doubrovsky’s introduction of the notion of auto- It is helpful, to then respond to the question above,
fiction—which sees autobiography and fiction as inter- to look back at what discussed in relation to
twined and contributing to each other—to Paul de Man’s Augustine and to reflect on memoir’s origin. What
altogether independent conclusions in his pivotal essay characterizes the origin of memoir, what urged its
“Autobiography as De-Facement” (de Man 1979). emergence, is the desire to confess, to present a
The richly woven texture of works and scholarly con- truthful picture of the memoirist. More than the
tributions is also crucial in the identification and estab- simple recounting of the events of a life, the begin-
lishment, supported by advocates of genre theory, of ning of memoir coincides with the idea that we can
memoir’s standard, contra-standard, and variable fea- communicate something more: our inner conscious-
tures. Such distinctions, originally outlined by Kendall ness. Confession, for Augustine, was seen as way to
Walton (1970), have been further developed by Friend: disclose identity, a feature that Georg Misch (1951),
in what is still one of the fundamental sources in
…standard if the possession of that feature places or autobiographical studies, made central to his analysis.
tends to place the work in a particular category: flat- Linking memoir to Wilhelm Dilthey’s philosophical
ness is standard for painting; an obvious-but-innocent account on the nature of history, Misch endorses the
suspect is standard for whodunits. A feature is contra-
standard if possession of that feature excludes or tends claim according to which in autobiography “the sub-
to exclude the work from a category. Heavy ject inquiring is also the object inquired into” (8),
6 L. DI SUMMA-KNOOP

thus framing memoir as the combination of life the construction of a diachronic narrative is at the
experiences and self-revelation. basis of our ability to self-evaluate ourselves according
But if confession and the idea of portraying who to what she summarizes as being the “four features” of
we really are is central to autobiography, so is the fact identity, namely, moral responsibility, self-interested
that such a confession must have a receiver. As I have concern, compensation, and survival.
briefly mentioned at the beginning of the previous It is precisely the emphasis given to self-evaluation
section, autobiographies are based on a pact that and moral evaluation that links the narrativist view with
establishes a tightly knit I/You relation between the memoir. For memoirs, as seen, are confessions and
author and the audience. This relation has enormous confessions can hardly avoid being connected to
influence on how autobiographies are written and moral features. Memoirs that deal with moral develop-
perceived and it is at the basis of memoir’s undeni- ment and moral assessment are some of the most pop-
able power to draw emotions and entice both ular—battling drug or alcohol abuse, sentimental and
empathic and sympathetic responses. For memoir, family relationships, mourning, etc. are among the most
as its commercial success also suggests, is a highly common themes explored by memoirists—indepen-
“democratic” genre. The stories told in memoirs are dently of their literary caliber. Finding the narrative
not only—at least we assume—real; they are, for the that underlines our lives is then equivalent, in these
most part, relatable. In fact, not only are they relata- memoirs, to finding moral closure; it is what we need
ble, they are often our stories, accounts of experiences to ascertain who we have become and to further assess
we may have had. But what we might also arguably —and often accept—each step, each chapter of life.
share with the memoirist is the idea that a successful I have thus isolated three, largely intertwined,
grasp and assessment of life may depend on our standard features of memoir. The first is that mem-
ability to weave its most relevant moments together oirs are related to the notion of confession, that such
in a narrative form. And this is, in fact, one of the a confession is supposed to be authentic, and that,
distinguishing traits of this genre, or, at least, one that most importantly, it is delivered under a “pact:” a
is commonly defended. The idea, in a nutshell, is that tacit agreement which connects the author and the
memoirs qualify as narratives and that it is the very reader more deeply than in other genres. This con-
ability to structure life according to meaningful nar- nection is also behind memoir’s unique ability to
rative connections—as opposed to a haphazard jux- trigger empathic and sympathetic responses: we feel
taposition of events—that encourages the belief that for the memoirist, but we also, in virtue of the simple
we may be, cognitively, narrative beings or, as it is fact of “sharing” a life, feel with and as the memoirist.
often argued, “narrative selves.” We have, it follows, The second and third features described above
two separate, and yet intertwined concepts. The first further qualify the confessional nature of memoir by
is the notion of narrative and of what constitutes an suggesting that the events of life should be weaved
autobiographical narrative. The second is the notion together in a narrative structure involving relevant cau-
of the “narrative self.” It is not my goal to fully do sal connections and a sense of closure that is often
justice to both notions, but a few considerations—and coupled with a feeling of emotional resolution.
clarifications—can nonetheless be made. Additionally, it is held that it is specifically the ability
In reference to narrative it will suffice to see mem- to narrate a life according to such a structure that
oirs as adhering, broadly, to the structural analysis of allows for a better disclosure of identity, one leading
narrative presented by Noël Carroll (2007), a struc- to a deeper understanding of who we are and of our
ture based on the importance of causal connections status as moral agents. Memoirs, in other words, stem
and on the achievement of closure, or of a “sense of from and depend on, cognitively, the fact that we are,
an ending.” The memoirist wishes, if we follow this by nature, “narrative selves.” But is this the whole story?
intuition, to find coherent and cohesive connections
linking the events of a life, connections that could
Contra-standard features: tracing the
further deliver the idea that something has been
emergence of the critical autobiography
learned, that a portion of life has reached its conclu-
sion, and it is, in this sense, significant in its own. In the first section of this essay, I introduced some of
The presence of a narrative structure—even one as the questions stemming from the discussion on the
skeletal as the one presented above—is also a required boundary between fiction and nonfiction in memoir. I
component for the notion of narrative self. Broadly, considered, in this respect, both classificatory and clar-
the idea behind the notion of a narrative self is that the ificationist solutions and argued that, as much as clas-
delineation of identity depends upon our ability to see sificatory solutions can be helpful in securing the
our lives as unfolding stories. Support to this view has nonfictional status of memoir, they nonetheless tend
come, to different degrees, from both scientists9 and to overlook the importance of more nuanced features
philosophers among which, prominently, is Marya such as stylistic choices, intentional ambiguities, and
Schechtman’s “narrative self-constitution view” where the numerous strategies adopted by writers to reflect
JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS & CULTURE 7

and challenge the tradition, features to which genre should) be fictionalized; it is, instead, on the ability
theory gives instead more ample attention. It is in light of critical autobiographies to structurally and evalua-
of this latter approach that, in the previous section, I tively assess stylistic and conceptual changes in the
tentatively outlined what may be taken as some of the history and development of autobiography. The
leading standard features of memoir, features that intention, in other words, is not simply to investigate
qualify the structure of this genre, the intentions and whether autobiographies utilize fiction or adhere
motivations behind its creation and reception. exclusively to nonfiction. It is to identify, within
In this last section, I will contend that, however literature, a philosophical and literary debate on
solid, the standard features of memoir described what autobiography is today and on its ability to
above might be undergoing a certain shift, a shift reflect on its past: from the importance given to the
that is observable in a consistent number of recent reliability of the autobiographical pact that charac-
autobiographical works which I have been referring terizes its origin, to the postmodern blurring of fic-
to as the “last wave” of memoir. tion and nonfiction and the ensuing criticism of
One of the distinguishing characteristics of these autobiography that we find in critics such as de Man.
works, as seen earlier, is their ability to flirt with the The discussion launched by “critical autobiogra-
boundary between fiction and nonfiction and to purpo- phies” is inspired by the complex history—literary
sely make us reflect on its relevance; we have, in this and well as critical—of the autobiography. Not
respect, an array of solutions, from works that by down- every work, needless to say, will focus on the same
playing nonfiction in favor of a more distinctively fic- issues, nor do all critical autobiographies express a
tional vibe, such as Ben Lerner’s novels, to works that similar disillusionment toward the possibility of the
combine a more strict sense of nonfictionality with intri- autobiographical pact; what they do share, however,
cate and eclectic stylistic construal, such as Maggie is a strong critical awareness of what the past of
Nelson’s The Argonauts (2015), to, of course, works autobiography is and an interest in the novel direc-
that are happy to acknowledge and deflect compartmen- tions that this genre can take.
talization, as Sheila Heti’s How Should a Person Be? Specifically, as I suggested earlier, it is possible to
And yet, I maintain, our relative decisiveness in provide an overview of the positions and issues intro-
confining these works to fiction or to nonfiction is duced by critical autobiographies by looking at the ways
less urgent than an analysis of the extent to which in which they are jeopardizing the standard features
these works may be contributing to the shaping of listed in the previous section: critical autobiographies
what memoir is and will become—they may be alert- are challenging the confessional nature of autobiogra-
ing us that memoir is, in fact, ready for an update. phies, they are questioning the need for a causal narra-
It is important, in this respect, to point to an tive structure that is capable of achieving emotional
important difference between the kind of criticism closure, and, lastly, they are rethinking the analogy
and analysis presented in this essay and the numer- between the memoirist and the narrative self, introdu-
ous other attempts at questioning, and even challen- cing alternative ways of conceiving the bond between
ging, what I have, in the previous section, defined as identity and life writing.
the standard features of autobiography. The desire to Confession, and with it the importance, in auto-
re-discuss the boundaries of autobiographies (and, biography, of delivering an authentic portrayal of the
more broadly, of fiction and nonfiction) is not new autobiographer, is the first narrative mechanism to
and it is a central feature of postmodern criticism. have lost its allure.10
Hayden White’s claim according to which all his- Historically, the confessional need and the consequent
tories are fictions, Christian Metz’s work on the nat- confessional bond, or pact, that is so central to standard
ure of documentaries, and Paul de Man’s critical autobiographies was first questioned by Paul de Man
assessment of the autobiographical pact all share a through his idea of “autobiography as de-facement,”
certain skepticism toward the establishment of a dras- where de Man used Wordsworth’s Prelude to show
tic boundary between fiction and nonfiction while both how autobiography escapes rigid definitions and
exploring the complexity—psychological and phe- how it is unable to achieve closure. As he claims:
nomenological—that their connection implies.
Yet, as mentioned, the angle of my analysis is The interest of autobiography, then, is not that it
somewhat different. For while the emphasis in reveals reliable self-knowledge—it does not—but that
it demonstrates in a striking way the impossibility of
accounts defending autofiction—despite being quite closure and of totalization (that is the impossibility of
varied—tend to focus on the reasons why fiction and coming into being) of all textual systems made up of
nonfiction cannot be separated, mine is less con- tropological substitutions. (de Man 1979)
cerned with the need of combining the two than
with a reflection on the implications of such a need. The idea that autobiography “deprives and disfigures to
My focus is not, in other words, or definitely not the precise extent that it restores” (de Man 1979, 930),
only, on the extent to which a life story can (or certainly affected future generations of autobiographers
8 L. DI SUMMA-KNOOP

(leading, perhaps, to an increased interest in autofic- Lerner’s personal life11—offer a further, arguably
tion) and it would not be mistaken to continue to trace more critical, perspective on the possibility of confes-
its influence to the new wave of autobiographies that I sion. To a large extent, one is even tempted to see in
am considering here. And yet, there are a few important them a prototype for what we may call the “new
specifications to be added. The first is that, while de memoirist,” the memoirist of today, a memoirist
Man’s account had a strong influence on European that has internalized the conflicts within this genre
literature and on authors abiding to a postmodern and that is condemned—not unironically—to carry
stylistic canon, it barely touched the growing number their burden.
of autobiographies, commercial and not, that dominate Both characters are writers, but they hardly ever
today’s publishing industry. In fact, one may speculate write. Mostly, they question their own writing with a
that autobiography has seen a resurgence, especially in mixture of anxiety, regret, and insecurity; what they
the USA, precisely because it promises authenticity question is, more often than not, how their writing
(whether it ultimately delivers it or not). Writing an could possibly have affected their lives—its function
autobiography has become a testament of integrity, the in making us who we are and, consequently, in dis-
willing disclosure of the autobiographer’s intimate iden- playing our identity. Writing makes them live in a
tity. Best-selling autobiographies remain, in this sense, galvanized version of the impostor syndrome where
quite attached to the idea of an autobiographical pact, a they question both their ability to write—to express
pact that is taken seriously by both autobiographers and something—and the responses triggered by their
readers and that is crucial to how they are received and work. While almost nostalgically lamenting the reve-
assessed. latory sentences crafted by “standard” memoirists, the
But even when we look at the recent movement words of Lerner’s characters are there to hide, com-
within autobiography I am describing in this essay— plicate, and question.
which calls, almost inevitably, for a more sophisti- And, I must add, they complicate beautifully. For
cated reader—the impact of ideas such as the impos- the voice and prose chosen by these new authors is a
sibility of closure is different from what it had been refreshing mix of genres kept together by an impress-
when first expressed by de Man. The idea, to put it ive while inventive control of form. In this respect
quite simply, has aged. Skilled writers such as Heti, too, new autobiographies have been groundbreaking.
Nelson, and Lerner are well aware of the rhetorical For not only, as seen, they more liberally traffic in the
power of postmodern literature and criticism, and grey area where fiction and nonfiction tentatively
yet, they have absorbed and tempered its conclusions. cooperate, they have also begun to question narrative
Heti’s How Should a Person Be? A Novel from Life is, conventions.
in a way, an illustration and a parody of this attitude. As much as narrative has not been completely
In How Should a Person Be? the fact that autobiogra- abolished, it is most definitely looser, often refraining
phy “deprives and disfigures to the extent that it from explicit causal connections and from the need to
restores” is made into a dull fact of life. Heti indulges find emotional and moral closure. Maggie Nelson’s
in factual, detailed, but most often terribly mundane The Argonauts which chronicles her relationship with
accounts of her personal life while invoking the status the artist Harry Dodge, is a stellar example of mem-
of a novel. The lack of an actual direction or engaging oir’s departure from standard narrative conventions.
narrative arch finds its justification in the boldness of Nelson’s memoir breaks the page in detached
the only narrative question considered: “how should paragraphs which alternate rather brilliant literary
a person be?” a question that, to no surprise, has no and philosophical criticism with tassels of poetry;
answer. There is not much more to life than a series her life does not come in a story, it comes in flashes
of vignettes, of unaccomplished, unending scenarios of brilliance, with a style and pulse that has nothing
—they are real, or at least they feel real, but what in of the more relatable, intimate, and (polished) quoti-
the end is real is their being experiments: amusing dian effortless tone that more traditional memoirists
experiments at being a person. often adopt. It is interesting, in this respect, to see
When confronted with Heti’s character (named, of what Nelson herself has to say about autobiography:
course, Sheila) we cannot avoid the feeling of being in
I haven’t really thought this through (in homage to
front of an unfinished, patchy self. It is, additionally,
Wang?), but when I think about my more “personal”
tremendously hard to feel for her. “Sheila” is unable writing, I keep seeing that old Atari game, Breakout.
to find her own, complete self, but she is also unable I see the game’s plain, flat cursor sliding around on
(and it is hard not to see this as a conscious stylistic the bottom of the screen, popping the little black dot
choice) to share and expose her own emotions, to back onto the thick bank of rainbow above. Each
allow the reader to become invested in her. The time the dot hits the bank, it eats away a chunk of
color, until eventually it has eaten away enough of
reader is, instead, left at bay. the bank to “break out.” The breakout is a thrill
The characters of Ben Lerner’s Leaving the Atocha because of all the triangulation, all the monotony,
Station and 10:04—two novels that closely follow all the effort, all the obstruction, all the shapes and
JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS & CULTURE 9

sounds that were its predecessor. I need those accommodating positions such as the one held by
colored bricks to chip away at, because the eating Peter Goldie (2003, 301–319; 2012) who argues that
into them makes form. And then I need the occa- a narrative attitude toward the events of our lives,
sional jailbreak, my hypomanic dot riding the sky [my
emphasis]. (Nelson 2015, 61) despite helpful, need not correspond to the notion of
a narrative self. Yet, the most direct attack against the
Nelson compares life writing to a game, an old one; notion of the narrative self, and the one I am mainly
one that is repetitive, but nonetheless quite absorbing. interested in here, has been launched by Galen
Also, a game you play alone. But she is not satisfied Strawson (2005).
with the comparison: while creating a life narrative is Strawson defends the idea of what, in a recent
a way of “chipping at” colored bricks, it is also the article, he named the “unstoried” life (Strawson
place where she can let her “hypomanic dot” surge. It 2015). Not only does he believe that narratives are
is here that Nelson, the poet, walks in, here that her not necessary for identity, he also contends that they
acute criticism blends with life, and there, arguably, are unrelated to our ability to hold and express moral
that her variation on narrative is formed. values, and, lastly, that the tendency to see our lives as
In MacDonald’s H is for Hawk, the idea of life as narratives is not, as the “narrativists” argue, a wide-
a single story that unfolds is instead broken into spread cognitive mechanism. His suggestion is to see
three alternating sections—thus multiplying narra- us as episodic selves or SESMENTS (Strawson 1999,
tive possibilities. We have a section dedicated to 99–135) (subject of experience that is a single mental
her own life: her coping with the death of her thing), namely as subjects that gain, as he claims, “self
father while training her hawk, Mabel, a section knowledge in bits and pieces” (Strawson 2015).
dedicated to a partial, and deeply felt, biography of I think there is some plausibility to Strawson’s
T.H. White, who, in addition to the Arthurian hypothesis and the works I have been analyzing seem
novels also wrote about training a hawk, and, lastly, to confirm his intuition. The protagonists of the works
passages on the very art of hawking that somehow mentioned hardly depend, for their moral make up on
manage to mesmerize birders and non-birders a diachronic, tightly knit, and tidily organized series of
alike. While this work remains closer to traditional events. Events instead count as episodes, significant, at
autobiographies, it still seems to deny the idea least frequently, on their own. The new memoirists
according to which one, and only one narrative, are, I believe, critically looking at a tradition that
can be chosen over the others. None of three por- wanted memoir to become the vehicle of identity, the
tions seems to take precedence: they are episodes of locus on intimacy, but that has also begun to acknowl-
equal importance, they all retain their energy and edge a sense of disillusionment, a certain lack of faith
pathos. Reading the book everything feels tremen- in the promises given by life-writing. They are also
dously connected, crafted with precisions, but there direct witnesses to the boom that memoir has experi-
is no explicit causal chain of events. Or, better, enced in the past two decades and that has put this
there is no mandated causal chain. If present, con- genre under the spotlight, transforming it into a lit-
nections are for the reader to be found at the erary, but also social aggregator seducing more readers
intersection of each strand; they need to be than any other form of nonfiction.
searched for patiently, and they need, quite directly, We are in front of memoirists who are not only
to be recognized as tentative. among the most interesting rising voices in contem-
But not only are causal connections to be questioned; porary literature, they are also exceptional media and
equally debatable is the appropriateness of a given style social analysts: there is much more to their works than
or genre, a point that, we have seen, is observable in the intention of putting autobiographical memories
both Nelson and MacDonald’s works. For perhaps, one and experiences at the forefront of their literary ambi-
is brought to conclude, there is no true form to tell a life: tions. Their “confessions” (together with their tacit
there is no available narrative. acknowledgment that confession may not be possible)
This last assertion, the idea that there might not are not shocking for what they reveal—or at least not
be, after all, a narrative underlying our life and our only—they are shocking because they have created,
conception of identity runs counter to the notion of through their re-elaboration of topoi within the tradi-
the “narrative self” I have briefly described in the tion, both literary and critical, of autobiography, a new
previous section. But in what sense is this notion literary playground of new styles and trends.
being questioned? What they had to do, and what they did and are
It is helpful, in this regard to acknowledge that the doing, is to rethink what memoir had to offer and
notion of the narrative self is not, and I believe specifically, I believe, the three “standard features” I
correctly, universally accepted. It is worth mention- have isolated: the idea of an authentic confession,
ing, for example, Peter Lamarque’s (2007) argument weaved in a coherent narrative that while purging
against the plausibility of treating our lives as stories the author of her at times unspeakable secrets was
akin to the ones of fictional characters, or more also delivering an almost perfect picture of her
10 L. DI SUMMA-KNOOP

identity. It is because of this critical stance developed To respond to this objection, it is important to
through the introduction of contra features that we recall what was emphasized earlier in this article,
can see in this new wave a new subgenre, what I namely that the actual “percentage” of fictional or
would like to call “Critical Autobiography.” nonfictional element is far less important than their
critical stance toward recurring themes in the autobio-
graphical tradition. Specifically, the works mentioned,
An objection and a specification
share a preoccupation with how contemporary identi-
In this concluding section, I will consider two objec- ties may get to express themselves, a preoccupation
tions against my argument for the development, in the that is literary and stylistic—as shown in my discus-
past decade or so, of the “Critical Autobiography” and sion of narrative and narrative techniques—as well as
further clarify its status as a new subgenre by adding a it is sociological and psychological. The authors men-
few brief considerations on its reception and appraisal. tioned are divided between the tradition of confession
The first objection, quite simply, is that works akin and the postmodern dismantling of authenticity that
to the ones described can be found in the history of followed, but they are also embedded in a world that
autobiography. The presence of such works would sacrifices coherent narrative arcs for the more careless,
then invalidate the claim according to which the cri- however addictive, fractionation of language into
tical autobiography would represent a new subgenre. chats, text messages, and emails.
That works exhibiting contra-standard features, It may seem, to this extent, that critical autobiogra-
and in particular the ones outlined in the previous phies may share a boundary with autofictions, and yet,
section, have already emerged in the past is abso- there are important differences. To begin with, some of
lutely true. Paul Auster, for example, is famous for the works mentioned, such as Maggie Nelson’s The
often shaping the contours of his novels around his Argonauts, are decidedly nonfictional, thus con-
personal life. Yet, this is not a problem if seen sciously—even somewhat polemically—distancing
within the theoretical boundaries I have chosen, themselves from fictionalization attempts. But even
namely, genre theory. For, on the one hand, as when fictionalization is indeed present, as in the case
seen, features are not to be taken as necessary con- of Lerner’s work, the definition of autofiction is not
ditions: the presence or absence of one does not perfectly fitting. For autofictions, as Serge
automatically determine whether a work belongs to Doubrovsky’s had originally remarked, are not only
a genre or another. On the other hand, isolated based on strictly real events, they have the intention of
examples do not qualify as genres. In order for a communicating a certain truth about the emotional and
genre (or subgenre) to be regarded as such we need personal identity of the subject described.12
to be able to identify several works exhibiting the There is, in other words, a stronger adherence
same features, or, to use the expression adopted in what is to be taken as the inner nature, psychological
this essay, a wave. Furthermore, not only do we and ontological, of the author. Now, as much as this
need a relevant number of works sharing similar can be disputed, I do not take Lerner’s work to be
features, we also need a certain milieu. The recent attempts at a deeper discovery of Lerner’s identity; in
revamped attention toward autobiography is largely fact, I believe that would be an overstatement.
unprecedented, and so is the interest in the relation For one of the features of these works is that their
between autobiography and other genres. It follows characters (and authors and protagonists) question
that despite the presence, in the history of autobio- the possibility of such an intimate emotional scrutiny.
graphy, of works with similar contra-standard fea- So while autofiction most definitely counts as a
tures, they are both not enough to qualify as a challenge to autobiographical practices, it is not iden-
separate genre and, additionally, they were not—at tical to what I have been describing in this essay.
the time of their publication—surrounded by the While critical autobiographers are definitely aware
same critical and creative environment that distin- of it, they are also departing from it, thus introducing
guishes memoir today. new strands to the discussion on autobiography.
A second objection may however, more radically, It is worth, to conclude, to mention one last point, a
question the fact that the works mentioned in this point related to appraisal and assessment of these works.
essay, despite being innovative, may be representative More traditional examples of memoir strongly
of a change in literary fictions and not, strictly, in engage their readers by eliciting both sympathetic
autobiography. and empathic responses; they fulfill the promise—
This is an important objection, and one that implied by the autobiographical pact—of an intimate
should be taken seriously. What gives support to connection between the memoirist and the reader.
this objection is that some of the works mentioned But what about “critical autobiographies”? What
in this essay, such as Lerner’s work, as ultimately kind of connection are we to establish with the
fictional, thus not sharing the nonfictional intent author? Do we feel for them at all? And if we do
that characterizes autobiographies. not, what is their power?
JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS & CULTURE 11

My response to these questions is simply to admit 6. There is an ongoing debate on whether we perceive
that, unlike most works in the autobiographical tradi- ourselves as diachronic or episodic beings. I will
tion, critical autobiographies are not, for the most part, return on it in the concluding section of this article.
7. “Authentic” unlike “true” is not easily confused with
designed for triggering strong sympathetic or empathic an epistemic notion of true where a true assertion is
responses. In fact, it is not uncommon to find some of seen as stemming from a true and justified beliefs.
the protagonists somewhat unnerving; their lives, albeit An authentic statement might not be objectively
involving mundane routines we may easily share, do true, but it can, as in the case of Saramago’s memoir,
not unweave according to the emotional patterns that be subjectively true and significant.
8. Truman Capote’s invention of the “nonfiction
characterize standard autobiographies. Their episodic
novel” is a frequently used example of how contra-
nature and the lack of strong causal connections make it standard features can change a genre and even lead
hard for the reader to truly develop a curiosity for their to the emergence of a new genre. A more recent
lives and we are hardly motivated to feel for them or example could be the use, championed by David
with them. And yet, we remain curious. For engage- Foster Wallace, of copious footnotes in fictional
ment, in these works, is based less on emotional identi- essays and novels.
9. For instance, the ability to weave life narratives has
fication (broadly construed) than it is on a cognitive been seen as an evolutionary advantageous tool by
understanding of the difficulties that can emerge when psychologists such as Dan Hutto who has further
stretching the boundaries of a genre: when life-writing shown how such a skill can foster the development
is scrutinized not for its power to reveal, but for its of reason and social skills.
ambiguity, for its lack of clear coordinates to follow. 10. It is important to specify that an agreement, or a pact,
can also be associated with a work of autofiction; as
Critical autobiographies are, allow me to say,
Lily Tuck, the author of The Double Life of Liliane,
somewhat brainy: they assert a life while analyzing an autofiction, has noticed: “…the author of autofic-
it according to a multiplicity of standards, one of tion tends to be both the narrator and the central
them being an actual reflection on the literary effec- character in his or her story, uses his or her real
tiveness of memoirs. But readers, at least those who name, describes daily life often inventing or modify-
seek this kind of works, are ready to accept the ing certain facts, and does so in search not only for
truth and justice but for the self” Tuck (2015).
challenge. After all, the works mentioned in this 11. It may be possible to regard Lerner’s novels as
article have been honored with tremendous critical autofictions. However, to my knowledge, despite
and public acclaim, a success that, arguably, is due to being well versed in literary criticism, Lerner has
both their mastery and to their ability to capture the never referred to his work as autofictions.
readers’ needs and imagination, to captivate their 12. An interesting discussion on the emotional nature of
autofictions and on their adherence to the real life of
attention despite the overwhelming number of auto-
an autobiographer can be found in Catherine
biographies that are published each year. Cusset’s “The Limits of Autofiction” (2012).
I have often, in this article, referred to the figure of
the memoirist and to the problematic nature of the pact
that readers are “signing” with her. In light of what Disclosure statement
discussed, we can now also suggest, that, in addition No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
to the innovations brought by memoirists, we may also
be observing a change in the mode in which readers are
approaching autobiographies. Genres are determined Notes on contributor
by a number of contextual features, one of them being Laura T. Di Summa-Knoop is an Assistant Professor of the
the way a work is received and appraised: could this lead Practice at Fairfield University. Her research interests
to a new autobiographical pact? include narrative theory, philosophy of film, and issues
related to the cognitive analysis of visual arts. Her work
has been published in a number of peer-reviewed journals
Notes such as Contemporary Aesthetics, Aesthetics and
Phenomenology, Film and Philosophy, The Journal of
1. The two terms, “autobiography” and “memoir” will Somaesthetics, and The Philosophical Forum. She has
be used interchangeably. been the Managing Editor of The Philosophical Forum
2. I am here relying on James Olney’s analysis of the since 2010.
three main historical phases of memoir.
3. See, for instance, the work of Laura Marcus (2014). For
a literary take on the topic see Hustvedt (2009). T. References
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