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What is a photograph? What is photography?

Article  in  Philosophy of Photography · March 2010

DOI: 10.1386/pop.1.1.9/7

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WHAT IS PHOTOGRAPHY?
endt
oliti-
irl
rn in :lr
:u
¡ll

gates ir
n the it
it
aÍe a
The Ontological Questton ti 'l
term ouesdon-What is Photogra- I
the verY
'.t "nd recurs from
å. t
or of ¡
r

f""" until the advent of i

:isto I

arlse,
"i PhY is a "notation in
'spec- camera shutter opens
;inat nt of the camera' Pene-
ren to ce.1 HenrY Fox
Talbot'
I uses otograPhY, also known
ntrast albotYPe" at this time'
r here in thå titl" of his book'
;: directed our aftendon to
of the pr
uishes
shows the'question of a
come methods of image
nature now
oi""rr"i" talents and aptitudes'
Len by general de
term "nature" serves f"tUo' as a
ate of
the image. Predictablv åïîili:ï:'.î'Jf;:
explicate photograp and his
the human agent
t'naturert' but
word
presentation of photo
without human inter
work features in this
agent.4 He sought inst
possessing a certain impact'
ï:.î,ä"åfrffi moves the emphasi' r'o'n ih" owners of the
Talbot's d","'iptioï "*lf
'ii,f

ans or p, do.,ä'lîå ï
t*, ;;þ*:iF Îram'iar
m' "T¡:'ff
rorms or image:
ä:i,
me o

iîî.îj ï:iÏffir"Tl'oiäi" ;;-;h;

rz Civil lmagination

production, which assumed a singular author.s His position was, hbwever,

misunderstood, as if all that was at stake in his discussion was a technol-
ogy that seems to act in its own right. His opponents differed from one
another yet shared a common motivation: to undermine the assumption
that the "pencil" could direct itself. There were those who saw photogra-
phy as an unreliable medium and the photographer as constantly
manipulating reality through the photograph so as to reflect his or her
biased point of view. On the other hand, there were others, eager to
preserve the photographer's prestige, who insisted that its unique contri-
bution-its artistry-did not result from the technical activation of the
apparâtus. l7hile the debate raged, a growing number of enthusiasts and
technicians of photography continued to make use of photography as
photographers, as photographed persons, and as spectators of different
fields of knowledge and action. Until the shift occasioned by the develop-
ment of visual culture as an academic discipline during the last two decades
of the twentieth century, however, the contributions of such amateurs
were not deemed wofthy of investigation, nor of conceptualization as an
integral part of the practice of photography.
Talbot's stance, which undermined the status of the author of the
'What
photograph, eventually lost its advocates. was left of this position in
a debate that slowly receded was Talbot's emphasis on technology. Certain
adherents of Talbot's position investigated the technology in their own
right, but they did not present the technology of photography as function-
ing autonomously, seeing it instead as a form of technology operated by
the photographer. The distance between the two opposing forms of objec-
tion to Talbot's position diminished until they could no longer be termed
oppositional at all. Thus, for approximately 150 years, photography was
conceptualized from the perspective of the individual positioned behind
the lens-the one who sees the world, shapes it into a photograph of his
own creation, and displays it to others. Paradoxically, something of the
position that Talbot originally represented, devoid of defenders for a long
period of time, emerged in the form of a kind of primitive poetic residue
distilled from the arguments of his opponents, as in Roland Barthes' cele-
brated notion of the "punctum," for instance. Barthes sought to use the
notion of the punctum to undermine the centrality of the singular photog-
rapher, the uncontested ruler of what Barthes terms the "studium" of the
photograph, where the punctum figures as a kind of residue neglected by
the photographer.
The emaciation of the ontological perspective latent in the title of
Talbot's book and the narrowing of his argument by his opponents' or
those who pretended to ârgue with it so as to make it encompass merely
 What ls Photography? rt
Í, those aspects of photography that rendered it an autonomous technology,
t- enabled, in turn, the emergence of a no less reductive position-one center-
LE
ing this time around the subject who commands the technology of
n photography like clay in the hands of the pomer. Research into the tech-
nology of photography saw the ontology of photography in this light,
Y whereas research into photographic oeuvres and their creators, modeled
r on the familiar protocols of art or the history of arr, took the place of the
) 'S7hat
political question: characterizes rhe new relations that emerge
between people through the mediation of photography? In both instances,
)
from the moment that photography began to be diffused in the world, it
t
was seen as a discrete technology possessing a clear purpose-the produc-
tion of images-and it was delineated as a circumscribed technology
whose field of acdon is subjugated to the activating gesture of its users.

These were the conventional boundaries within which it was possible to

think about photography until the end of the twentieth century: a rechnol-
ogy for the production of images operated by a singular subject-technician,
creator or manipulator.6 Admittedly, the fact that photography deviated
from its predecessors wàs not overlooked: this is precisely what is central
to Talbot's position-that which is positioned in front of the lens "was
there" and is inscribed in and of itself on a surface coated with some kind
of chemical. But very few thinkers exploited the radicalism of the insight
or dared to think through the tradition of image production in a critical
fashion. Among them, we may number \Talter Benjamin, who associated
photography with forms of mechanical reproduction rarher than with
drawing and who described the shift entailed in the perceptual system by
the advent of photography. Another voice in this trajectory is that of
Thierry de Duve whose discussion of the tube of industrial paint surpris-
ingly links painting to the tradition of technology, and sees ir from this
industrial perspective as the forerunner of photography. But even rhese
dissident thinkers were not fully able to undermine rhe productive/
creative framework that continued to organize thought concerning
photography.
It is difficult, perhaps eùen incorrect, to point to a specific moment or
event responsible for overturning the canonical framework of the discourse
of photography. But it is easy to point ro a series of actions that demon-
strate that this framework has recently been ruptured, allowing new
questions such as "What is a photograph? " to surface and to elicit answers.
Tens of exhibitions, Internet forums, conferences and journals have, over
the last twenty years, celebrated photography as a phenomenon of plural-
ity, deterritorialization and decentralization. Photographic archives that
 14 Civil lmaSination

had been collecting dust for years in psychiatric hospitals, priscins, srare
and municipal institutions, hospitals, interrogation facilities, family collec-
tions or police files, unremarked upon by scholars of photography, as well
as the notion and institution of the archive itself instantaneously became
a privileged object for research and public exhibition.i rhe wealth and
vaiety contained in these collections transformed the canonical discourse
on photography, a discourse that had emerged in the shadow of the
discourse of art that consecrated sovereign creators and that considered
photography from the perspective of its creators alone. In the wake of this
shift, the perspective associated with the discourse of art was transfo¡med
into merely one possible point of enrry inro the study of photography, and
a particularly limited one ar that. It is only fair to point out that the limita-
tions with which I am concerned here characterize a certain type of
discourse about photography, rather than the practice of photography
itself, whose acrual activities deviated markedly from the rarefied practice
conceptualized and presented as the corpus of photography; iust as what
was photographed always exceeded the constructs that sought to contain
them as the object of reference. The many users of photography, only a
small portion of whom operared under the patronage of the canonical
discourse on photography, never ceased inventing new forms of being
with others through photography. After the shift in photographic interest,
some commentators began to address the emergence of such practices,
although for the most parr their output still tended to remain derivative of
the products they investigated, that is to say, bound to the particular
photographs accumulated. The photographs themselves continued to set
the boundaries of the discussion of photography and allowed for the pres-
ervation ofthe causal connections between the action ofphotography and
the photograph. In other words, photography remained conditional on
the existence of the photograph. For my own part, I would like to base
myself on the unprecedented wealth of photographs that emerged into
view once the boundaries of the discourse on photography had been
ruptured, in order ro demonstrare thât the ontology of photography is,
fundamentally, political.
As I have already stared, until the shift of boundaries outlined above,
photography was conceptualized as a technology that allowed for the
inscription of an image in light, while at the same rime, rhe very technol-
ogy itself was assumed to remain transparent without leaving its imprint
on the final product. The coherence of such a description requires thar
photography be placed at the service of two masters-rhe photographer
who employs it and the photograph that is the end goal of his aciviry,
while all other traces are eliminated from the final product. 'when these
 What ls Photography? r j

ffaces persisted as visible imprint, nevertheless, their sheer presence was

enough to disqualify the photograph or the photographer. Few practition-
ers in the past sought to foreground such traces, but early examples of
such foregrounding do exist. In recent decades, ever since technological
mediation began to become visible, it was no longer possible to conceive
of the technology as external and separate from the product that produced
it. It was now â relatively short path to the recognition that the technology
of photography is not iust operated by people but that it also operates
upon them. The camera \Mas no longer iust seen as a tool in the hands of
its user, but as an object that creates powerful forms of commotion and
communion. The camera generates events other than the photographs
anticipated as coming into being through its mediation, and the latter are
not necessarily subject to the full control of the agent who holds the
camera. The properties and nature of the camera could now suddenly
emerge into public view, and it rapidly became apparent that the camera
possesses itsown character and drives. The camera might, at times' appear
to be obedient, but it is also capable of being cunning, seductive, concilia-
tory, vengeful or friendly. It can be woefully unarmed with information,
can magnify the achievements of amateurs, and can destroy the work of

Lemon cameras, negative 4x5 Bfùü, 5x4 box, perforated black cardboard.
Photograph by Aim Deüelle Lüski. Tel Aviv Museum Collection, 1977
 r6 Civil lmag¡nation

Photograph produced bv remon camera (concave),

negarive 4x5 BAV. photograph
by Aïm Deüetle Lt¡ski. Tel A"i" M;;;;;
ðJl'täon, rszz

I
 What ls Photography? 17

,1
I

/,. ,l
a, Ð, ,l
/ rrñn i,
tl
I

il

il
Irì
iÌ
It
Ï
;!
Photograph produced bv.Lemon camera (convex),
negarive 4x5 B/W. photograph li'
by Aim Deüelle Ltiski. Têl Aviu Muserm
ò"lià.ìil", rsZz rf
.l

for other possibilities ro emerge that have .ì

phy i
from its inception, such as those intimated Ì

Nature. The pencil (read ,,camera") of natu

t of ':

:1
i-l
ned
differently-not as a device that wrote itself by itself, ii
nor even as one 'llt
il
wielded by the aurhor who used it to produce
pictu.e, of other people.
Rather, the pencil of nature could be ,..n
u, an inscribing machine that
transforms the encounter that comes into
being around ii,in.r"gr, it and
by means of its mediation, into a special form
of encounter between
participants r¡'here none of them possesses
a sovereign status. In this
encounrer' in a structured fashion and despite
the threaåf disr,rption, the
pencil of nature, for the most part, p.od.r..s
a visual protocol iåmu.r. to
the complete domination of a.ry on, of
the participants in the encounter
and to their possible claim for sovereignty.
It is precisely this understand_
ing that I would like to extrapolate fro- Tulbott
.,otro., of the ,.pencil of
nature:' working in its own right. Human subjects,
o..upyi.,g diffe¡ent
roles in rhe evenr of photography, do play
one or another part in it, but
the encounrer between them isìeve.
.niir.ly in the sole .o.,trol of any one
of them: no one is the sole signatory ,o ,h. event
of pfroag;phy. f.,
seeking thus ro revise the rotion of photography,
it is clear that an
 r8 Civil lmag¡nation

ontological investigation of pho

technology of the camera alone.
tion of the ,,final,, product creat

and which has gravely circumscrib

to phy.

ca, :iiilJii,l.ï[:i,'".,îîJ;i,ï';ffåi]î;
which human beings exist_look,

f,'lí?ì;_ïJï,':iåiïî.*î
se.
I
Ir is, rarher, to derineate rr,. p.riÏl"i:iiåffj;ii:r"'I:ili:';i!;r:
mean.an ontology of a certain form
of huã", f.i"g-Ç¡il-others in
which the came¡a or the photograph
are implicated. Neither the camera
nor the photograph are sufficient to allow
us to answer the question,
"'søhat is photography," but without
describing them as part of the politi_
cal ontology I am setting forth, it
wilr be difficult for us to reach ¡easonable I
conclusions.
j
(
The Camera (

(
The camera is a relatively smal
which is visible through a lens i
out saying rhat until the inven
c
screen, we were unable fully to percei
camera was in use, not to mention i
could merely invest the camera with I
such a capacity.røhen .we
encountef S
the camera, it is enough for it to be .aised,
o, ,o t. ;"il; i" cerrain h
position in order to signal th " It.
tioning itself carves up space
camera and the one standing
of obse¡ving us, but it also
aware of it. The camera can always
r ì

ing us and of inscribing that which j

photographing or without so much .l
^
camera usually serves an individual.
å
situations where it no longer srands
f
 What ls Photography? 19

cafnerâs, intersects them, acts upon them and is acted upon by them.'What
is ar stake in this context is a physical intersection, if often also an imagi-
nary one, which occurs in real time but may also occur after the fact in
cases where we identify places and people in photographs whom we recog-
níze to have been in the same sPace as ourselves, sometimes even at the
same time, together with or alongside still more individuals wielding
cameras.
The number of cameras in circulation in the world is growing ceaselessly
while the number of people not exposed to their presence is steadily dimin-
ishing. Even if the distribution of cameras is not constant from one
geographical area to another, and even if there are zones' like disaster zones
for instance, where the subjects of disaster are sentenced to be photographed
rather than to photograph themselves, the omnipresence of the camera is a
growing potential. The increased number of cameras together with their
increased potential presence all over enables the camera to operate' âs it
were, even when it is not physically present, by virtue of the doubt that
exists with respect to its overt or covert presence' its capacities for inscrip-
tion and surveillance. There are no accurate estimates concerning the density
of the distribution of cameras in various sites nor concerning their effects
when they are trained upon us or, conversely, concerning their influence
when they are not in use. But it is easy to surmise that these influences are
just as considerable in their effect as is the formal productive capacity of the
camera) that is to say, the capacity to produce pictures. One of the most
obvious of these effects is the camera's ability to create a commotion in an
environment merely by being there-the camera can draw certain happen-
ings to itself as if with a magnet, or even bring them into being, while it can
t:

also distance events, disrupt them or prevent them from occurring' The I

camefa has the capacity through its sheer presence to set all of these effects
in motion without even taking a single shot. Nor are such influences contin-
gent on the actual pictures produced. We mostly encounter cameras in a
state of temporary rest. But even when we see them in action, we seldom
have the ability to track the images that they produce, with the exception of
the one or two cameras we might own or which might belong to our rela-
tives. In this respect, despite the growth in the diffusion of cameras, most of
us do not have the privilege of seeing the images they produce. Conversely,
the majority of the many photographs we see every day appear devoid of
any connection to the camera that might have photographed them. In most
câses, we âre not the photographed persons in these photographs and are
consequently not perturbed by the possibility of their circulation. But in
places where people are irredeemably exposed to the practice of photogra-
phy, such as disaster zones, the photographs that are not on show are
 . . i\i..
.!Ì\.j-
. .::l
i.;' :,'." .r''
'r!\,' r"î

Civil lmagination

generally of the people who live in that location.

For many such individuals,
this is the very essence of photography. The camera is
a toor that promises
a picture that they will never see. Thus for instance, the
woman in the
picture who stands outside her home because it has
bee. destroyed is
exposed to two cameras at least: one that has produced
the image that we
observe and another that we can see to be in the possession
of ih, female
photographer standing roward the right-hand side
of the frame. we can
assume that the woman whose house has been destroyed
surmises that she
and her ruined house have been.photographed but she
will probably never
see the image that results. From her perspective as a participant
in the event
of photography, the act of photogtaphy cannot be summ
a photo-
graph. Photography might rarher consisr for her in ^r¡t"d,in
something like the
presence of the camera in front of her, in her face as it were, durin"g the time
of her emergency. 'sØe, observing her photograph, aftest ro
the fãct that a
photograph arose from this encounter-here she is
in front of us-but the¡e
is another camera in front of us as well, whose products
we do not see, and
which we might perhaps never see, like the woman in
the photograph. It is
possible that nobody will see them, just as it is possibre^thar
wielded by the woman who appears in the fra-e ãid nor
rî.."-.r"
rake any shors ar
all. Her location in a disaster zone norwithstanding, it is
not inconceivable
that the mere fact of the photographer's presence there
is sufficient-even if
her camera remains barren of images.

Jerusalem. Phorograph by Anne paq. Activestills.org, 2007

 What ls Photography? 2r

In other words, the event that the câmera sets in motion does not neces-
sarily result in a photograph. IØhen it does so, the events unfolding in the
wake of the photograph will, for the most part, take place in another loca-
tion altogether. By virtue of the photographs, or sometimes by virtue of
rheir absence, different people will congregate in their wake than those
who met in the immediate vicinity of the camera. Both sets of participants
will seek to observe the photograph even as it, or the sheer fact of its exist-
ence, ineluctably affects them all.
This being the case, in order to understand the question "SØhat is
photography" under the conditions outlined here in brief, I seek to
differentiate between the euent of photography and the photographed
euent that the photographer seeks to capture in his frame (I will elabo-
rate on these terms in greater detail below). Both the camera and the
event that it catalyzes are, f.or the most parr, restricted by the skilled
gazeof. the spectator in order to see the "thing itself," that is to say,
that which will become the photographed event. But the rendering
marginal of the event of photography, displays of indifference roward
it or even the attempt to ignore it altogether, can never obliterate its
existence or the traces that this event which occurs between the various
partners of the act of photography leaves on the photographed frame,
especially when the camerâ present on site was actually set to work. In
other cases where something or someone else stands explicitly in the
path of the agent who wields the camera (that is to say, the photogra-
pher or someone who has commissioned the photographer), so as to
prevent the photographer from framing the shot as he or she desires, it
is much easier to use the photograph to decipher the event of photog-
raphy and to perceive the presence of the camera within the
photographed event. Photographs that foreground precisely a "disrup-
tion" of this sort have become increasingly common over the course of
the last two decades. The traces to which I have been referring, which
are not the stated goal of the act of photography, are regulated within
the schema of the frame, blunting their presence and allowing the
photographed event to be foregrounded as one that has already been
concluded. The construction of the event of photography as prior and
external to the spectator is not just a technological effect of the type
that Aïm Deüelle Lüski terms "the mono-focal camera" in his discus-
sion of photography.s Nor is this â necessary effect of such
mono-focalism. Rather it is the outcome of a form of discourse whose
logic of sovereignty and creativity predispose it to position the photo-
graph as the sole outcome and vanishing point of any discussion of
photography.
zz Civil lmagination

Biddu checkpoint' Photograph by Miki Kratsman' 2002

Not all the participants in rhe event of photography play a role within
it in the same fashion. Many are not even aware of its existence' not to
mention the temporality of its unfolding. Similarly, not all of its partici-
pants are able-or are permitted-to view the product that is the outcome
ãf ,h. .u.rrr, when indeed there is such an outcome. Moreovêr, those who
are permitted to view the final product are not necessarily permitted
to'use
it in the same \May. In this context, I would like to make a bold claim,
however, and to argue that, in the contemporary era' when the meáns
of
photography are in the reach of so many, photography always consti$tes
i potintùl euent,even in cases where the camera is invisible or when it is
,rå, pr.r"rr, at all. The absence of a camera in the freld of vision of those
pr.r..r, does not evacuare the possibility of its being there-secreted invis-
ibly in the hands of one of the participants perhaps, or installed permanently
as is the case with surveillance camerâs. In some cases, it is not
even neces-
sary for the camera to be present in order for it to influence people and to
org nirc the relations betw.en them. The event of photography thus
co-rrtains within itself the potentially penetrating effect of the camera, that
svisis¡¡" of
is ro sây, the possibility of our being locate¿ -ñn the range ef
cameÍathat might påtentially ,..árd a photograph of us. It is a possibil-
^ity that may welfbe ãxperienced differently by the various pârticipants as
or
irritating, ileas.rrable, threatening, invasive, repressive, conciliatory
even reassuring'
 What ls Photography? 21

The PhotograPh
The photograph is usually thought of as the final product of an event.e In
contradistinction to this common assumption, I see the photograph-or
the knowledge that a photograph has been produced-as an additional
factor in the unfolding of the event of photography (not of the photo-
graphed event). The encounter with the photograph continues the event of
photography that happened elsewhere. IØhen an interrogator in an inter-
rogation cell tells a detainee that he has a photograph showing the detainee
in such or such a situation, the interrogator does not necessarily reveal the
photograph to the detainee-if it exists at all. He conducts himself as
someone who simply derives his authority from the prior event of photog-
raphy, which happened elsewhere and which he merely continues. In fact,
however, he generates this event in order to put pressure on the prisoner.lo
In such a case, the event of photography can be said to take place in the
absence of both camera and photograph. It occurs as the outcome of the
interrogator's statement that he possesses a photograph. The fact that the
majority of people photographed under such conditions never see photo-
graphs of the event of photography in which they participated, on the one
hand; and that most spectators, on the other hand, routinely view photo-
graphs taken during the course of an event in which they did not participate,
creates the conditions under which the mere possibility of the existence of
a photograph of us taken without our knowledge might come to affect us
with as much potency as if we had encountered the photograph itself. The
fact that participants may not observe the photograph in which they
played a role does not annul the event of photography nor does it annul
the possibility that this event might continue to be played out in ânother
time and place in a manner that is not contingent upon them at all.
The photograph, as I will demonstrate at length in the second chapter of
this book, has become institutionalized in discourse through its identification
with the photographer, as his or her property, and as the point of origin of
the discussion of photography. As a result of this, when the photographer
refuses to share a photograph with the public, or when a photograph is not
available for other reasons, no discussion of photography is forthcoming.
The inaccessibility of the photograph, which might result from the fact that
no shots were taken at all, or from the possibility that the holder of the
photograph derives pleasure, power or capital from the monopoly that he
possesses in relation to it, effectively eliminates the very possibility of discuss-
ing the event of photography. This privilege that accrues to the photograph,
which has made it a precondition for any discussion of photography, imposes
z4 Civil lmagination

aformofsovereigntyontheeventofphotographythatisessendâllyforeign
thatcontradictunityandcentralizationandthatdeterritorializevariousthe
sovereignty is based on two principles:
to
.,to foi- of testimony that pertains solely
" if
front of the lens so as to say "This is X"' as
the
it were possible to cut the event ge
o; and
aphy with
identifrcation of ownership of the
ownership of the photograph as
possessed

mine who' what' how' when and if at all the

with the
even if
event of s to unfold' Yet it must be stated that

this sove to dominate photography' it always remains

circumscribed, limited, and temporar ,
to the new
The reconstruction of the ontolog
we suspend
boundaries within which I delineate
patterns of photographic use as they have br
ed over the
of photography._The separa-
course of the years as constituting the essence
ontologY of the
tion between rhe ontology of photography and the
¡ one possible outcome
photograph allows us to see
can hold the evidence
;;;õ.,ï.rs of the event of itional sources for its
of other participants in this event t
prisoners photographed during
reconstruction. Without the testimony of
of non-citizens whose
the course of detentiot', or without ihe testimony
li security services to blackmail them'
ruit them as so-called "collaborators"'
e event of photography in which they
haveparticipatedisslenderifnotnon-existent.Thisisaconsequenceofthe
fact that photographs taken during the course
of any given event' if they
existatall,areusuallyheldbythesecurityforcesandareremovedfromthe
grasp of other participants in the event
The photograPh is a Platform uPo
between those present in the situation o
the particiPants are Present b
ently, as a result of being ove
of these traces are neither Pla
tograPh in other words' is never

:'JîJlïi.,*:::;:"i':"ili!l;
photograPher' câmera, and Photog
such relations nor do they necessar
powerful figure Present in the aren
 What ls Photography? 25

ates the PhotograPh from all other

w, and renders it a Powerful and
political existence of human beings'
. But, marvelous as this seems' most
Ph the status of document-some-
text out of which I write' They argue
es they author-theY do not see the
esearch. Until recently, the question
ommunify of scholars writing about
random' biased-
thought. The photograph is pârtial' fallacious'
''ìolitical attached to
ffiT;;. "rt; ; f.* äf ,rt. appellations that of the act of contemplating
have become

nhorosraphs and that ond"rpin túe renunciation

trear-
i;;.ï:"rrexts where photographs are the subiect of more_active
archives and museums for instance'

",îå.',',i::î.o"'#f;i:';t;::*l
ematic semiotic codes evident in the
or instance' or
tagging that is so characteristic of
devoted to the
"a new residential ^Íea'" Thus far
onsible for the
role of viewing in the event of photo
pectator is one
unfiniÃed nature of this eve
"1*"y, ven moment, whether or not she is

;#ï:ä":"ä:,ï,'li ;::: "å1 :i:

neous conceptualization of photogra-
phyintermsofsealingoffacertaininstantframedbythephotographer
who observ., it iho *itnt'ses it from the outside' of freezing this
"nJ
instantorsealingitindeathbeforesharingitwiththosewhoobservehisor
testimotty of the photographer
her testimony. n,rt , fhotograph is never the
the photographed event, contin-
alone, and the evenr åf phoiogi"phy, unlike
otht' considerations' The preservation of rigid
ues to exist despit. "ï
binariesbetween"inside"and"outside,"intermswherethatwhichcanbe
seen is that which was present before
the lens at the moment of the capture
of a shot that has no*it"" inscribed as a photograph presented in turn to
the scrutiny of spectatorsexternal to the evãnt, represents a misunderstand-
alike'.The event of
ing of both photog,"phy and of-the photograph
caught in the anticipa-
photography i, ,r"u.i outt' tt can only be suspended'
actualization: an encounter
tion of the next encounter that will allow for its
thatmightallowacertainspectatortoremarkontheexcessorlackinscribed
,in the photograph.o t re-articulate every detail including those that
"' glossy emulsion of the photograph'
some believe to b. fi*ed in place by the
 Civil lmagination

The Event of Photography

what, then, is photography? Photography is an event. \Øhat kind of event

temporality-it is made up of an infinite series of encounters. The event of

photography has two different modalities of eventness-the first occurs in
ielation to the camera or in relation to its hypothetical presence while the
second occurs in relation to the photograph or in relation to the latter's
hypothetical existence. For the most
different places at different times such
not noted nor is the necessity of its r
The multiplicity of events with which \Me are concerned as well as the
separateness of their unfolding render linear sequentiality between the
event surrounding the camera on the one hand, and the event surrounding
the photograph on the other, into merely one possible relation between
them. The connection between the two is closer to the connection between
two constituents of a mathematical equation where one side of the formula
cannot resolve the other without establishing the numerical value that will
'We
concretize the equivalence between them. encounter one of another of
the constituent events of the event of photography without necessarily
encountering them in chronological order.'Whatever the case, the moment
we attempt to unravel the connection befween them, we immediately
become aware of the hidden variables in the equation. As is the case with
the mathematical formula, it is possible to reconstruct some of these
hidden variables based on what is given on one side of the equation, but it
lr

iii
{r'
lr

li

mistaken understanding of the act of photography and the power rela-

tions it subsumes. There are circumstances, however, where the oversight
 What ls Photography? 27

the camera, the photograph, or their hypothetical existence, inscribe a

I certain inalienable point of view in ârenas where people encounter one
f another-one that cannot be expunged. Such a point of view is very
E particular: it is other, foreign, opaque' a point of view that nobody can
identify with, embody, merge wirh, or become its ally. This point of view
:
persists in its sustained opacity, threatening to inscribe the event somehow'
às well as to exhibit the resultant inscription, including the inscription of
that which is irreducible to the individual point of view of any of the
pâfticipants. \íhat is at stake is not a point of view that can be assimilated
lo sovereign or regulating source possessed of omniscience and capable
"ny
of extending its reach to that which, or those who, threaten its power and
unity. On the contrary, this point of view cannot be appropriated. It can
be assimilated neither to ownership nor to domination. It evades all forms
of sovereignty such that no one cân argue that it belongs to him or that she
embodies it; just âs no one can fully obliterate or efase it completely and
for all time and by so doing, impose upon others longstanding relations of
repression and domination, or reified contractual relations. Rather such
relations have the po\Mer to be inscribed in the event of photography as
well as in the conditions that organize or prevent free access to the photo-
graph and to the opportunity of "solving" the equation and reconstructing
'S7ith
its constituents. the assistance of the spectator, the point of view
under consideration here permits the event of photography to be preserved
as one bearing the potential for permanent renewal that undermines any
arrempt to terminate it or to proclaim that it has reached its end. The
notion of a closure is overthrown thanks to the agency of the spectatof,
and its groundlessness is revealed, while the spectator, for her part, partic-
ipates in realizing the potential inherent in the act of photography, capable
of complete or partial concretization at any given moment, at any instant
and on the part of anyone, such that the potential of which I am speaking
cân never be fully extinguished or fully realized.
The political ontology of photography, as I have interpreted it here,
obliges us to rethink the discourse of photography as it has been institu-
tionalized since its inception, and obliges us also to rethink the manner in
which it is entrapped in the hegemonic opposition between the aesthetic
and the political-one maintained not only by the discourse of att but also
by political discourse itself, as we shall see in the discussion that follows.
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