THIRD DIVISION
 
 
LEAH PALMA, G.R. No. 165273
Petitioner,  
  Present:
   
  CORONA, J., Chairperson,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
  NACHURA,
  PERALTA, and
  MENDOZA, JJ.
HON. DANILO P. GALVEZ, in his  
capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE of  
the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF Promulgated:
ILOILO CITY, BRANCH 24; and  
PSYCHE ELENA AGUDO, March 10, 2010
Respondents.
 
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 
 
DECISION
 
 
PERALTA, J.:
 
 
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
are the Orders dated May 7, 2004[1] and July 21, 2004[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of IloiloCity, Branch 24, granting the motion to dismiss filed
by private respondent Psyche Elena Agudo and denying reconsideration
thereof, respectively.
 
 
On July 28, 2003, petitioner Leah Palma filed with the RTC an action for
damages against the Philippine Heart Center (PHC), Dr. Danilo Giron and
Dr. Bernadette O. Cruz, alleging that the defendants committed professional
fault, negligence and omission for having removed her right ovary against
her will, and losing the same and the tissues extracted from her during the
surgery; and that although the specimens were subsequently found,
petitioner was doubtful and uncertain that the same was hers as the label
therein pertained that of somebody else. Defendants filed their respective
Answers. Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to Admit
Amended Complaint, praying for the inclusion of additional defendants who
were all nurses at the PHC, namely, Karla Reyes, Myra Mangaser and herein
private respondent Agudo. Thus, summons were subsequently issued to
them.
On February 17, 2004, the RTC's process server submitted his return of
summons stating that the alias summons, together with a copy of the
amended complaint and its annexes, were served upon private respondent
thru her husband Alfredo Agudo, who received and signed the same as
private respondent was out of the country.[3]
On March 1, 2004, counsel of private respondent filed a Notice of
Appearance and a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer[4] stating
that he was just engaged by private respondent's husband as she was out of
the country and the Answer was already due.
 
On March 15, 2004, private respondent's counsel filed a Motion for Another
Extension of Time to File Answer,[5] and stating that while the draft answer
was already finished, the same would be sent to private respondent for her
clarification/verification before the Philippine Consulate in Ireland; thus, the
counsel prayed for another 20 days to file the Answer.
On March 30, 2004, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss[6] on the
ground that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her as she was not
properly served with summons, since she was temporarily out of the
country; that service of summons on her should conform to Section 16, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner filed her Opposition[7] to the motion to
dismiss, arguing that a substituted service of summons on private
respondent's husband was valid and binding on her; that service of summons
under Section 16, Rule 14 was not exclusive and may be effected by other
modes of service, i.e., by personal or substituted service. Private respondent
filed a Comment[8] on petitioner's Opposition, and petitioner filed a
Reply[9] thereto.
On May 7, 2004, the RTC issued its assailed Order granting private
respondent's motion to dismiss. It found that while the summons was served
at private respondent's house and received by respondent's husband, such
service did not qualify as a valid service of summons on her as she was out
of the country at the time the summons was served, thus, she was not
personally served a summons; and even granting that she knew that a
complaint was filed against her, nevertheless, the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person as she was not validly served with summons;
that substituted service could not be resorted to since it was established that
private respondent was out of the country, thus, Section 16, Rule 14
provides for the service of summons on her by publication.
 
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in its
Order dated July 21, 2004.
Petitioner is now before us alleging that the public respondent committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
he ruled that:
 
I. Substituted service of summons upon private respondent, a
defendant residing in the Philippines but temporarily outside the country is
invalid;
II. Section 16, Rule 14, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure limits
the mode of service of summons upon a defendant residing in the
Philippines, but temporarily outside the country, exclusively to
extraterritorial service of summons under section 15 of the same rule;
 
III. In not ruling that by filing two (2) motions for extension of
time to file Answer, private respondent had voluntarily submitted herself
to the jurisdiction of respondent court, pursuant to Section 20, Rule 14 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, hence, equivalent to having been
served with summons;
 
IV. The cases cited in his challenged Order of May 7, 2004
constitute stare decisis despite his own admission that the factual
landscape in those decided cases are entirely different from those in this
case.[10]
 
Petitioner claims that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in
ruling that Section 16, Rule 14, limits the service of summons upon
the defendant-resident who is temporarily out of the country exclusively by
means of extraterritorial service, i.e., by personal service or by publication,
pursuant to Section 15 of the same Rule. Petitioner further argues that in
filing two motions for extension of time to file answer, private respondent
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
In her Comment, private respondent claims that petitioner's certiorari under
Rule 65 is not the proper remedy but a petition for review under Rule 45,
since the RTC ruling cannot be considered as having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion; that the petition was not properly verified because while
the verification was dated September 15, 2004, the petition was dated
September 30, 2004. She insists that since she was out of the country at the
time the service of summons was made, such service should be governed by
Section 16, in relation to Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court; that
there was no voluntary appearance on her part when her counsel filed two
motions for extension of time to file answer, since she filed her motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction within the period provided
under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
In her Reply, petitioner claims that the draft of the petition and the
verification and certification against forum shopping were sent to her for her
signature earlier than the date of the finalized petition, since the petition
could not be filed without her signed verification. Petitioner avers that when
private respondent filed her two motions for extension of time to file answer,
no special appearance was made to challenge the validity of the service of
summons on her.
The parties subsequently filed their respective memoranda as required.

We shall first resolve the procedural issues raised by private respondent.

Private respondent's claim that the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a
wrong remedy thus the petition should be dismissed, is not persuasive. A
petition for certiorari is proper when any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy at law.[11] There is grave abuse of discretion when public respondent
acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to
be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
 
Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that an appeal
may be taken only from a final order that completely disposes of the
case; that no appeal may be taken from (a) an order denying a motion for
new trial or reconsideration; (b) an order denying a petition for relief or any
similar motion seeking relief from judgment; (c) an interlocutory order; (d)
an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; (e) an order denying a motion
to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground
of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (f) an
order of execution; (g) a judgment or final order for or against one or
more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-
claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending,
unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; or (h) an order dismissing an
action without prejudice. In all the above instances where the judgment or
final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
In this case, the RTC Order granting the motion to dismiss filed by
private respondent is a final order because it terminates the proceedings
against her, but it falls within exception (g) of the Rule since the case
involves several defendants, and the complaint for damages against these
defendants is still pending.[12] Since there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in law, the remedy of a special civil action
for certiorari is proper as there is a need to promptly relieve the aggrieved
party from the injurious effects of the acts of an inferior court or tribunal.[13]
Anent private respondent's allegation that the petition was not
properly verified, we find the same to be devoid of merit. The purpose of
requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations of the
petition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct, not merely
speculative.[14] In this instance, petitioner attached a verification to her
petition although dated earlier than the filing of her petition. Petitioner
explains that since a draft of the petition and the verification were earlier
sent to her in New York for her signature, the verification was earlier dated
than the petition for certiorari filed with us. We accept such
explanation. While Section 1, Rule 65 requires that the petition
for certiorari be verified, this is not an absolute necessity where the material
facts alleged are a matter of record and the questions raised are mainly of
law.[15] In this case, the issue raised is purely of law.
 
Now on the merits, the issue for resolution is whether there was a valid
service of summons on private respondent.
In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant either by the service of summons or by the latters voluntary
appearance and submission to the authority of the former.[16] Private
respondent was a Filipino resident who was temporarily out of
the Philippines at the time of the service of summons; thus, service of
summons on her is governed by Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
 
Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. When an action is
commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within
the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may,by leave of
court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding
section. (Emphasis supplied)
 
 
The preceding section referred to in the above provision is Section 15,
which speaks of extraterritorial service, thus:
 
 
SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. ─ When the defendant does not
reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal
status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property
within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or
the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines,
service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by
personal service as under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order,
in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other
manner the court may deem sufficient.  Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after
notice, within which the defendant must answer.
 
 The RTC found that since private respondent was abroad at the time
of the service of summons, she was a resident who was temporarily out of
the country; thus, service of summons may be made only by publication.
 
We do not agree.
In Montefalcon v. Vasquez,[17] we said that because Section 16 of Rule
14 uses the words may and also, it is not mandatory. Other methods of
service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the
serving officer on a defendant-resident who is temporarily out of
the Philippines. Thus, if a resident defendant is temporarily out of the
country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1)
substituted service set forth in section 7 ( formerly Section 8), Rule 14; (2)
personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by
publication, also with leave of court; or (4) in any other manner the court
may deem sufficient.[18]
 
 
In Montalban v. Maximo,[19] we held that substituted service of
summons under the present Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a
suit in personam against residents of the Philippines temporarily absent
therefrom is the normal method of service of summons that will confer
jurisdiction on the court over such defendant. In the same case, we
expounded on the rationale in providing for substituted service as the normal
mode of service for residents temporarily out of the Philippines.
 
x x x A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of
residence, a dwelling where he lives, a local base, so to speak, to which any
inquiry about him may be directed and where he is bound to return. Where
one temporarily absents himself, he leaves his affairs in the hands of one
who may be reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to do all that
is necessary to protect his interests; and to communicate with him from
time to time any incident of importance that may affect him or his business
or his affairs. It is usual for such a man to leave at his home or with his
business associates information as to where he may be contacted in the
event a question that affects him crops up. If he does not do what is
expected of him, and a case comes up in court against him, he cannot just
raise his voice and say that he is not subject to the processes of our courts. 
He cannot stop a suit from being filed against him upon a claim that he
cannot be summoned at his dwelling house or residence or his office or
regular place of business.
 
Not that he cannot be reached within a reasonable time to enable
him to contest a suit against him. There are now advanced facilities of
communication. Long distance telephone calls and cablegrams make it
easy for one he left behind to communicate with him.[20]
 
 
 Considering that private respondent was temporarily out of the
country, the summons and complaint may be validly served on her through
substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which
reads:
 
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant
cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at
the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

 
We have held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where
the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is
made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time.[21] It
is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be
left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the
defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as
important as the issue of due process as that of jurisdiction.[22]
 
Section 7 also designates the persons with whom copies of the process may
be left. The rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists
between the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and,
therefore, assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant or
in some way give him notice thereof.[23]
In this case, the Sheriff's Return stated that private respondent was out of the
country; thus, the service of summons was made at her residence with her
husband, Alfredo P. Agudo, acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo was
presumably of suitable age and discretion, who was residing in that place
and, therefore, was competent to receive the summons on private
respondent's behalf.
Notably, private respondent makes no issue as to the fact that the place
where the summons was served was her residence, though she was
temporarily out of the country at that time, and that Alfredo is her husband.
In fact, in the notice of appearance and motion for extension of time to file
answer submitted by private respondent's counsel, he confirmed the Sheriff's
Return by stating that private respondent was out of the country and that his
service was engaged by respondent's husband. In his motion for another
extension of time to file answer, private respondent's counsel stated that a
draft of the answer had already been prepared, which would be submitted to
private respondent, who was in Ireland for her clarification and/or
verification before the Philippine Consulate there. These statements
establish the fact that private respondent had knowledge of the case filed
against her, and that her husband had told her about the case as Alfredo even
engaged the services of her counsel.
In addition, we agree with petitioner that the RTC had indeed acquired
jurisdiction over the person of private respondent when the latter's counsel
entered his appearance on private respondent's behalf, without qualification
and without questioning the propriety of the service of summons, and even
filed two Motions for Extension of Time to File Answer. In effect, private
respondent, through counsel, had already invoked the RTCs jurisdiction over
her person by praying that the motions for extension of time to file answer
be granted. We have held that the filing of motions seeking affirmative
relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with
motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.[24] When private respondent earlier invoked the
jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief in her motions for
additional time to file answer, she voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of
the RTC and is thereby estopped from asserting otherwise.[25]
Considering the foregoing, we find that the RTC committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Orders.
 
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated May 7,
2004 and July 21, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch
24, are hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is DIRECTED to file her
Answer within the reglementary period from receipt of this decision.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
 
 
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 
 
 
   
    
   
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
   
 
 
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
 
 
ATTESTATION
 
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
 
 
 
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
 
 
CERTIFICATION
 
 
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
 
 
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
 Penned by Judge Danilo P. Galvez; rollo, pp. 27-28.
[2]
 Id. at 30.
[3]
 Rollo, p. 144.
[4]
 Id. at 146-147.
[5]
 Id. at 148-149.
[6]
 Id. at 150-154.
[7]
 Id. at 155-158.
[8]
 Id. at 159-163.
[9]
 Id. at 164-168.
[10]
 Id. at 8-9.
[11]
 Rules of Court, Rule 65, Sec. 1.
[12]
 See Jan-Dec Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146818, February 6, 2006, 481
SCRA 556, 565-566.
[13]
 See People's Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc.) v. Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment, G.R. No. 179652, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 724, 760.
[14]
 Sari Sari Group of Companies, Inc. v, Piglas Kamao (Sari Sari Chapter), G.R. No. 164624, August 11,
2008, 561 SCRA 569, 579, citing Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, 433 SCRA
455, 463 (2004).
[15]
 Herrera, Vol. 1, p. 718 (2007), citing 42 Am. Jur., Sec. 42, p. 177.
[16]
 Oaminal v. Castillo, 459 Phil. 542 (2003).
[17]
 G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 513, 522.
[18]
 See Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128803, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 539, 553
(1998).
[19]
 No. L-22997, March 15, 1968, 22 SCRA 1070.
[20]
 Id. at 1079-1080.
[21]
 Keister v. Navarro, No. L-29067, May 31, 1977, 77 SCRA 209, 215.
[22]
 Id.
[23]
 Id. at 216.
[24]
 HongKong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited v. Catalan, 483 Phil. 525 (2004); Orosa v.
Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 67 (1996).
[25]
 Id.