Additional Cases Preliminaries:

CASE TITLE: PANFILO M. LACSON vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 128096,
January 20, 1999

DOCTRINE:
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that
definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has
jurisdiction over the case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined ny the allegations in the complaint or information, not by the evidence presented by
the parties at trial.

FACTS
On May 18, 1995, eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang,
reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in
Metro Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Queszon City by elements of the
Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief Superintendent
Jewel Canson of the PNP. ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic
Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco
Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by
petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led
by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC)
headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of CIC, that what actually
transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot out
between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Desierto formed
a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Blancaflor, to
investigate the incident. This panel absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers
allegedly involved in the incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police
operation. However, a reviewboard modified the panel’s finding and recommended the
indictment for multiple murder against 26 respondents, including petitioners. All the accused
filed seperate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under
the amended information, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
pursuant to Section 2 of RA 7975. The said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
cases where one or more of the “principal accused” are government officials with Salary Grade
27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. The highest
ranking principal accused in the informtion has the rank of only Chief Inspector and none has
the equivalent of at least SG 27. The Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and
ordered that the cases be transferred to Quezon City RTC.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for reconsideration insisting that the cases should
remain with the Sandiganbayan because RA 8249 (An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan) was approved into law. The petitioners now questioned the constitutionality
of the new law and the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over their cases.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has the exclusive original jurisdiction of the criminal cases
against petitioners

RULING
To fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) RA 3019 as amended (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) RA 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the RPC (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A
issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items a, b, c, and e is
a public offocial or employee holding any positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and
the offense committed is in relation to the office. The governing provision on the jurisdictional
offense is paragraph b, Section 4 of RA 8249. This paragraph pertains to other offenses or
felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public official or
employees mentioned. Section 4 does not make any reference to the criminal participation of the
accused public officer, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by
the the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as
police officers.
For failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and therefore be within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to
transfer Criminal Case Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the RTC of Quezon City
which has exclusive original jurisdiction over said cases.
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EVELYN V. RODRIGUEZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR No. 141710, 2004-03-03

Facts:
acting upon an information that rampant illegal logging activities have been going on in
different areas of Taytay, Palawan, a joint team composed of the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB), the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO), the Philippine National Police (PNP) Tiniguiban Command, the
Bantay Palawan, and the Philippine Marines confiscated freshly cut/processed ipil lumber at
Sitio Maypa, Barangay Pancol, Taytay.
The cutting and sawing of the lumber, which were alleged... to have been done under the
supervision of Pancol Barangay Captain Pedro Samaniego upon orders of herein petitioner
Mayor Evelyn Rodriguez and Association of Barangay Captains President Roberto Rodriguez,
were without proper permit or license.
Due to the unavailability of trucks to haul all the lumber to Puerto Princesa for safekeeping,
some were hauled inside the Rural Agriculture Center (RAC) Compound of Taytay
Barangay Captain Rodriguez appeared at the RAC Compound demanding the release of the
lumber by presenting a letter-request addressed to the CENRO to salvage old cut timber, duly
indorsed by Mayor Rodriguez.  As the request did not bear the approval of... the CENRO, it was
denied.
On October 5, 1997, Pancol Barangay Captain Pedro Samaniego and the other herein petitioner,
Igang Barangay Captain Andres Abonita, Jr., went to the RAC Compound upon orders of
Mayor Rodriguez to haul the lumber to the Municipal Hall, but the officer-in-charge refused to
release... the same without the advice of EIIB authorities.  On even date,... acting upon the
orders of Mayor Rodriguez, Barangay Captain Abonita returned to the RAC Compound
accompanied by two fully armed policemen who then and there forcibly took possession,
hauled, and transferred the... lumber to the Municipal Hall of Taytay.
Enrique A. Cuyos, Sr. of the EIIB, Region IV-A, Palawan filed complaints for robbery... and
violation of Section 1(b), P.D. No. 1829[5] (DECREE PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF
APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL
OFFENDERS) against petitioners Mayor Rodriguez and Barangay Captain Abonita before the
Provincial Prosecution Office of Palawan.
By Resolution[6] of February 18, 1997, the Deputized Ombudsman Investigator recommended
the filing of an information against petitioners for violation of Section 1(b), P.D. No. 1829,[7]
and the forwarding of the records of... the case to the Office of the Ombudsman-Luzon for
review and further proceedings, petitioner Mayor Rodriguez being a public officer and the
charge against her being work-connected.
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Luzon... resolved... for violation of Section 1(b) P.D.
1829 on December 8, 1998... against petitioners before the Sandiganbayan
A warrant of arrest... est[10] was accordingly issued against petitioners
Before the 1st Division of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner Mayor Rodriguez voluntarily
surrendered and posted a cash bond on January 4,... 1999,[11] as did Barangay Captain Abonita
on January 29, 1999.[12]... on January 17, 2000, the Sandiganbayan issued in open court the
assailed separate orders denying petitioners' motion to quash the second amended information,
[26] denying the motion to defer... arraignment,[27] and entering a plea of "not guilty" for both
accused[28] herein petitioners, which orders petitioners allege have been rendered with grave
abuse of discretion.
Petitioners argue that the pendency of the preliminary investigation of the case which dragged
for almost three years is unreasonable or unjustifiable and violates their constitutional rights as
accused to due process,... Petitioners additionally question the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, they arguing that they are not tasked with the enforcement and implementation
of P.D. No. 705 (REVISED FORESTRY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES) as neither of them are
law enforcement officers or prosecutors but... are mere executive officials of their respective
local government units with entirely different official functions and, as such, the accusation
against them is not in relation to their office.[
Issues:
the pendency of the preliminary investigation of the case which dragged for almost three years
is unreasonable or unjustifiable and violates their constitutional rights as accused to due
process,... Petitioners thus conclude that the Sandiganbayan has... no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case,
Ruling:
The petition fails.
From the records of the case at bar, it is gathered that the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan took
only three months, from November 7, 1996 to February 18, 1997, to come up with its resolution
finding probable cause against petitioners.  The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon took... eight
months to review the case and come up with the joint review action on October 19, 1998.  On
the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman acted on the case for around two months.
Considering that the records were passed upon by three offices, the period of preliminary...
investigation, which did not exceed two years, cannot be deemed to have violated petitioners'
constitutionally guaranteed rights to procedural due process and to a speedy disposition of
cases.
As Ty-Dazo v. Sandiganbayan[37] instructs:
The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated
only when the proceedings [are] attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
when the unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or... when without
cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having
his case tried.  In the determination of whether or not the right has been violated, the factors that
maybe considered and balanced are: the length of the delay,... the reasons for such delay, the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient.  In the
application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular
regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each... case.
The rule is well settled that the right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy
trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delay.
At all events, Republic Act 8249, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, provides that
as long as one (or more) of the accused is an official of the executive branch occupying position
otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989,[45] the Sandiganbayan exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction over offenses or felonies committed by public officials whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and... employees in relation to
their office.
In Montilla v. Hilario[48], this Court laid down the principle that for an offense to be committed
in relation to the office, the relation between the crime and the office must be direct and not
accidental, in that in the legal sense, the offense can... not exist without the office.
As an exception to Montilla, this Court, in People v. Montejo,[50] held that although public
office is not an element of an offense charged, as long as the offense charged in the information
is intimatelyconnected with the office and is... alleged to have been perpetrated while the
accused was in theperformance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there
being no personal motive tocommit the crime and had the accused would not have committed it
had he not held the... aforesaidoffice,[51] the accused is held to have been indicted for "an
offense committed in relation" to his office.
In the present case, public office is not an essential element of the offense of obstruction of
justice under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. The circumstances surrounding the commission of the
offense alleged to have been committed by petitioner Rodriguez are such, however, that the...
offense may not have been committed had said petitioner not held the office of the mayor. As
found during the preliminary investigation, petitioner Rodriguez, in the course of her duty as
Mayor, who is tasked to exercise general and operational control and supervision over the...
local police forces[54], used her influence, authority and office to call and command members
of the municipal police of Taytay to haul and transfer the lumber which was still subject of an
investigation for violation of P.D. 705.
What determines the jurisdiction of a court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from
the allegations in the information[59]. The averment in the information that petitioner
Rodriguez, as municipal mayor, took advantage of her office and caused... the hauling of the
lumber to the municipal hall to obstruct the investigation of the case for violation of P.D. 705
effectively vested jurisdiction over the offense on the Sandiganbayan.
There being no flaw or infirmity then in the amended information, respondent Sandiganbayan
did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the order of January 17, 2000, denying petitioners' motion to quash.
The orders of the Sandiganbayan denying the motion to defer arraignment and entering a plea of
not guilty for petitioners in light of their refusal to plead were accordingly rendered without any
grave abuse of discretion.

CRISOSTOMO v. SANDIGANBAYAN [GR NO. 152398] Case digest

Facts:
Crisostomo, a member of the Philippine National Police and a jail guard at the Solano
Municipal Jail was charged with the murder of Renato Suba, a detention prisoner at the Solano
Municipal Jail. he Information alleged that Crisostomo conspired with his co-accused, Dela
Cruz; Calingayan and others all inmates at the Solano Municipal Jail, in murdering Renato.
The defense adduced that Renato (deceased) hung himself in his detention cell.  Sandiganbayan
find the Petitioner guilty for the crime of murder because Crisostomo as jail guard was in such a
position that he could have seen or heard the killing.
 
Issue:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Crisostomo for the crime even there is no
direct evidence that will show the participation of Crisostomo on the alleged crime.
 
Held:
Yes.
 
Ratio:
In this case, the prosecution had the burden to prove first, the conspiracy to murder Renato, and
second, Crisostomo's complicity in the conspiracy. The prosecution must prove that Renato's
death was not the result of suicide but was produced by a deliberate intent to kill him with the
attendant circumstances that would qualify the killing to murder. Since Crisostomo had no
direct hand in the killing of Renato, the conviction could only be sustained if the murder was
carried out through a conspiracy between Crisostomo and his co-accused, the inmates. It must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt that Crisostomo's action and inaction were all part of a
scheme to murder Renato.
The "deafening silence" of all of the accused does not necessarily point to a conspiracy. In the
first place, not all of the accused remained silent. Calingayan put himself on the witness stand.
Calingayan further claimed that the Solano police investigated him and his handwritten
statements were taken the morning following Renato's death. Secondly, an accused has the
constitutional right to remain silent and to be exempt from being compelled to be a witness
against himself.
CASE TITLE: SANCHEZ vs. DEMETRIOU, G.R. Nos. 111771-77, November 9, 1993

DOCTRINE:
A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which
existing laws prescribe a simple punishment for various offenses.
FACTS
The petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven separate homicides are
absurd because the two victims in these cases could not have died seven times. This argument
was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General in this wise: Thus, where there are two or more
offenders who commit rape, the homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape,
must be deemed as a constituent of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore,
there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed.

In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to the
highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of the rape, loses its
character as an independent offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a
qualifying circumstance. However, by fiction of law, it is merged with rape to constitute a
constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with homicide with a specific penalty
which is in the highest degree, i.e., death (reduced to reclusion perpetua with the suspension of
the application of the death penalty by the Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether or not the seven informations charging seven separate homicides are absurd because
the two victims in these cases could not have died seven times.
RULING
It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that:
Section 13. Duplicity of offense. —A complaint or information must charge but one offense,
except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a simple punishment for various
offenses.
Rape with homicide comes within the exception under RA. 2632 and R.A. 4111, amending the
Revised Penal Code. The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape
committed by him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged
with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one
rape. In other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times,
with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other six.
Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and
later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The
separate informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is
complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan
Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven
accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.

Case Digest: LUDWIG H. ADAZA v. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al.

       Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) of 1st District of Zamboanga del
Norte awarded to Parents and Teachers Association (PTA)of Manawan National High School
(MNHS) a contract for the construction of a school building at an agreed consideration of
P111,319.50. Upon the completion of the project, PTA failed to receive the last installment
payment amounting to P20,847.17.
        PTA president Felix Mejorda (Mejorda) was informed by Hazel Peñaranda,
DPWH Cashier, that the check for P20,847.17 had been released to Ludwig H. Adaza (Adaza).
        Subsequently, Mejorda found out that acknowledging receipt of the check bears his name
and signature which was not his. He likewise noticed that Adaza‘s signature was affixed on the
voucher. During that time, Adaza was municipal mayor of Jose Dalman. Upon examination of
DBP Check issued to payee, Mejorada noticed that there were two signatures at the dorsal
portion of it, his forged signature and another which he found to be that of Aristela Adaza
(Aristela), wife of Adaza.
   The Office of the Ombudsman filed two Informations against Adaza. The Sadiganbayan
found Adaza guilty of the offense charged. It thereafter issued a Bench Warrant of Arrest.
Hence, the filing of this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the falsification case against Adaza which
was not in relation to his position as municipal mayor
HELD:
In the instant case, there is no showing that the alleged falsification was committed by the
accused, if at all, as a consequence of, and while they were discharging, official functions. The
information does not allege that there was an intimate connection between the discharge of
official duties and the commission of the offense.
Clearly therefore, as the alleged falsification was not an offense committed in relation to the
office of the accused, it did not come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It follows
that all its acts in the instant case are null and void ab initio.
Organo v. Sandiganbayan September 9, 1999
Lilia B. Organo,petitioner The Sandiganbayan and the People of
thePhilippines,respondents Villarama, Jr.
 
FACTS:
 
In 1996, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan against Lilia Organo for the crime of
plunder asit was alleged that she and some other government officials stole
₱ 193 million from the government.
 
Organo filed a motion to quash alleging that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8249 which provides that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over government employees who do not belong to Salary Grade 27. Organo was able to prove
that her position in the Bureau of Internal Revenue does not belong to Salary Grade 27.
 
 The Sandiganbayan denied her motion. It insisted that under the Plunder Law (Republic Act
No. 7080, as amended), the Sandiganbayan was vested with the jurisdiction over plunder cases
and since RA 8249 is a general law and that RA 7080 is a special law, RA 7080 should prevail.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan can try plunder cases where the accused is below
Salary Grade 27.

NO
 HELD:
 The Plunder Law itself provides:
 
Until otherwise provided by law, all pro-sections under this Act shall be within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
 
 The Sandiganbayan only had provisional jurisdiction over all plunder cases. In 1997, when RA
8249 was passed which further defined the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, there is already
no question as to whichplunder cases are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The said law finally prescribedthat the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over government
employees which are below Salary Grade 27.RA 8249 is a special law the intention of which
was to declog the dockets of the Sandiganbayan. As such,the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over Organo. The case should be filed in the appropriate court.
 
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.
 
 This latest enactment collated the provisions on the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. It is a special law enacted to declog the Sandiganbayan of “small fry” cases. In
an unusual manner, the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court was made to
depend not on the penalty imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but
on the rank and salary grade of accused government officials and employees.
 
However, the crime of “plunder” defined in Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic
Act No.
7659, was provisionally placed within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan “until otherwise
provided bylaw.” Republic Act No. 8429, enacted on February 5, 1997 is the special law that
provided for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan “otherwise” than that prescribed in Republic
Act No. 7080.
  
Consequently, we rule that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of plunder
unless
committed by public officials and employees occupying the positions with Salary Grade “27” or
higher,
G.R. No. 133535 Organo v. Sandiganbayan September 9, 1999 under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.In ruling
in favor of its jurisdiction, even though none of the accused occupied positions with Salary
Grade27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, entitling petitioner to
the relief prayed for.

 
PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 147706-07
 
FACTS
Two separate informations
[1]
 for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, otherwise known as
 
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, were filed with the Sandiganbayan on November17,
1999 against Efren L. Alas. The charges emanated from the alleged anomalous advertising
contracts entered into by Alas, in his capacity as President and Chief Operating Officer of the
Philippine Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), with Bagong Buhay Publishing Company which
purportedly caused damage and prejudice to the government.
2.
October 30, 2002, Alas filed a motion to quash the informations for lack of jurisdiction,which
motion was vehemently opposed by the prosecution.

 After considering the arguments of both parties, the respondent court ruled that PPSB wasa

private corporation and that its officers, particularly herein respondent Alas, did not fallunder
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.

Petitioner’s contentions:
 
PPSB was a government-owned or controlled corporation as the term was defined
underSection 2(13) of the Administrative Code of 1987. Likewise, in further defining
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, RA 8249 did not make a distinction as to
 the manner ofcreation of the government-owned or controlled corporations for their
officers to fall underits jurisdiction. Hence, being President and Chief Operating Officer
of the PPSB at the timeof commission of the crimes charged, respondent Alas came under
the jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan.

ISSUE/S
I. Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the officers in government-owned orcontroll
ed corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code - YES
RATIO
Section 2(13) of EO 292  defines government-owned or controlled corporations as follows:(13)
government owned or controlled corporations refer to any agency organized as a stock ornon-
stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the government directly or indirectly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations to the
extent of at least 51% of its capital stock: provided, that government owned or controlled
corporations maybe further categorized by the department of the budget, the civil service
commission and the commission on audit for the purpose of the exercise and discharge of their
respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.From the
foregoing, PPSB fits the bill as a government-owned or controlled corporation, and organized
and incorporated under the Corporation Code as a subsidiary of the Philippine Postal
Corporation (PHILPOST). More than 99% of the authorized capital stock of PPSB belongs to
the government while the rest is nominally held by its incorporators who are/were themselves
officers of PHILPOST. The creation of PPSB was expressly sanctioned by Section 32 of RA
7354,otherwise known as the Postal Service Act of 1992, for purposes of, among others, to
encourage and promote the virtue of thrift and the habit of savings among the general public,
especially the youth and the marginalized sector in the countryside xxx and to facilitate postal
service by receiving collections and making payments, including postal money orders.The
legislature, in mandating the inclusion of presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, has
consistently refrained from making any distinction with respect to the manner of their
creation.The deliberate omission, in our view, clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to
include the presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of both types
of corporations within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan whenever they are involved in
graft and corruption. Had it been otherwise, it could have simply made the necessary distinction.
But it did not. It is a basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish.Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos.Concerned officers of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether created
by special law or formed under the Corporation Code, come under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan for purposes of the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.Otherwise, as we emphasized therein, a major policy of Government, which is to eradicate,
or at the very least minimize, the graft and corruption that has permeated the fabric of the public
service like a malignant social cancer, would be seriously undermined.

RULING
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
resolution dated February 15, 2001 of the respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
 
Notes
Sandiganbayan decision in dismissing the complaint:
The records disclosed that while Philippine Postal Savings Bank is a subsidiary of the
Philippine Postal Corporation which is a government owned corporation, the same is not created
by a special law. It was organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code. The purpose
for which said entity is formed was primarily for business, xxx. Obviously, it is not involved in
the performance of a particular function in the exercise of government power.
Cases on Rule 110

1. G. R no. L-42925, January 31, 1977

PEOPLE VS GALANO APPEAL BY CERTIORARI INTERRUPTION OF
PRESCRIPTION, SEC. 1, RULE 110 PARTIES GREGORIO SANTOS; ACCUSED
JUANITO LIMBO; COMPLAINANT HON. JUDGE RICARDO GALANO; COURT
DECISION ASSAILED

FACTS: -

In 1962, a criminal complaint for estafa was filed in Batangas by Limbo against Gregorio
Santos for the latter’s misappropriation of the sum representing the net proceeds of 272
booklets of sweepstakes tickets that complainant entrusted to the accused. He was
arrested; he posted bail; and was even arraigned but he jumped bail on 1964. As a result,
his case was archived. 9 years later he was rearrested. He filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of territorial jurisdiction, the crime allegedly was committed in Manila and not in
Batangas. The case in Batangas was dismissed. A year after, a case was filed in Manila.
Hence, Limbo filed this complaint before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S :
The filing of the case before the MTC of Batangas validly interrupted the period of
prescription

RULING

The case filed in Batangas, having been dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction has
never interrupted the prescriptive period, the same being void ab initio WON the
prescriptive period was interrupted? The petition was granted, the order of the respondent
judge is set aside, and the case was directed for further proceedings Art. 91 of the RPC
provides that the prescriptive period of crimes be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information and shall commence to run again when the proceedings
terminate and without the accused being convicted or acquitted or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him. The court is aware of the two conflicting
doctrine underlying the interruption of prescriptive period; one for the filing of the
complaint with the municipal judge whether for preliminary investigation or examination;
and the other for filing a case for the determination of the actual merits of the case. The
Court, citing Olarte, said that the true doctrine is that the filing of the complaint in the
Municipal Trial Court, even if it be for preliminary investigation or examination, should
and does interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the
court where the complaint was filed turns out to have no jurisdiction over the case.
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court is determined in criminal cases by the
allegations or the complaint in the information and not by the result of proof.
 2. Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim (G.R. No. 168662)

Facts:

Petitioner Sanrio Company, a Japanese corporation, is the copyright owner of various animated
characters sold locally by its exclusive distributor, Gift Gate Incorporated, which allowed local entities
to manufacture petitioner’s products. A search warrant was issued against respondent Lim alleged to
be selling imitations of petitioner’s products. Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint for copyright
infringement with the Task-Force on Anti-Intellectual Property Piracy (TAPP) of the DOJ. Respondent
asserted that he obtained his merchandise from petitioner’s authorized manufacturers. The complaint
was dismissed. CA affirmed and further held that the offense had already prescribed.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the action had prescribed.

(2) Whether or not there is copyright infringement.

Ruling:

(1) NO. Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the prescriptive period for violation of special laws starts
on the day such offense was committed and is interrupted by the institution of proceedings against
respondent (i.e., the accused). Petitioner in this instance filed its complaint-affidavit 1 year, 10 months
and 4 days after the NBI searched respondent’s premises and seized Sanrio merchandise therefrom.
Although no information was immediately filed in court, respondent’s alleged violation had not yet
prescribed. In the recent case of Brillantes v. Court of Appeals, we affirmed that the filing of the
complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation interrupts the period of prescription of criminal
responsibility. Thus, the prescriptive period for the prosecution of the alleged violation of the IPC was
tolled by petitioner’s timely filing of the complaint-affidavit before the TAPP.

(2) NO. To be criminally liable for violation of Section 217.3 of the IPC, the following requisites must
be present:

1. possession of the infringing copy and

2. knowledge or suspicion that the copy is an infringement of the genuine article.

The prosecutors in this case consistently found that no probable cause existed against respondent for
violation of the IPC. The TAPP found that: Evidence on record would show that respondent bought his
merchandise from legitimate sources. While it appears that some of the items seized during the
search are not among those products which [GGI] authorized these establishments to produce, the
fact remains that respondent bought these from the above cited legitimate sources. At this juncture, it
bears stressing that respondent relied on the representations of these manufacturers and distributors
that the items they sold were genuine. As such, it is not incumbent upon respondent to verify from
these sources what items [GGI] only authorized them to produce. Thus, as far as respondent is
concerned, the items in his possession are not infringing copies of the original [petitioner’s] products.

3. G.R. No. 152662                                June 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN

FACTS:
Virginia Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 against the
respondent, Pangilinan on September 16, 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
On December 5, 1997, a civil case was commenced by Pangilinan against Malolos for accounting, recovery of
commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance before the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela City.
Five days thereafter or on December 10, 1997, Pangilinan filed a “Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground
of Prejudicial Question” before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the
civil action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The City Prosecutor approved the petition upon the
recommendation of the assistant City Prosecutor on March 2, 1998.
Malolos appealed the decision of the City Prosecutor to the Department of Justice. On January 5, 1999, reversed
the resolution of the City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of informations on violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.22.
Said cases were filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City on November 18, 1999.
Pangilinan filed an “Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest”
before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City.  She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of
prescription.

ISSUE:
                        Whether or not prescription has set in.

HELD:
                        No, the action has not prescribed.
            Act No. 3326 entitled “An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin,” as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22
cases. Appositely, the law reads: 
SECTION 1.  Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules:  (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than
one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2.  Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to
run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not
more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the
aforecited law.  The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings
against the guilty person.

4. Zaldivia v Reyes G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 277

Facts: A complaint was filed before the fiscal’s office constituting an offense in violation of a city ordinance. The fiscal did
not file the complaint before the court immediately but instead filed it 3 months later. The defendant’s counsel filed a
motion to quash on ground that the action to file the complaint has prescribed. The fiscal contends that the filing of the
complaint before his office already interrupts the prescription period.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of information/complaint before the fiscal office constituting a violation against a special
law/ordinance interrupts prescription.

Held: The mere filing of complaint to the fiscal’s office does not interrupt the running of prescription on offenses
punishable by a special law. The complaint should have been filed within a reasonable time before the court. It is only
then that the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted.

**Act 3326 is the governing law on prescription of crimes punishable by a special law which states that prescription is
only interrupted upon judicial proceeding.

5. Jadewell Parking vs. Lidua

FACTS:

Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized
to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-
2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle
immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.

Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru its General Manager Norma Tan and
Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-
complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John
Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a
Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was
then illegally parked and unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp
belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal is
P26,250.00. The fines of P500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of P500.00 were
also not paid by the respondents herein.

Jadewell filed two cases against respondents for Robbery it was filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. A preliminary investigation took place on May 28,
2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell president,
Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave
Coercion.

On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
Baguio City dated July 25, 2003.

Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino
filed on January 20, 2004 a Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation[8] on February 2, 2004.

In an Order[10] dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to
Quash and dismissed the cases. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27,
2004 responding to the February 10, 2004 Order.

Respondents argued that in Zaldivia v. Reyes held that the proceedings mentioned in Section
2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings. Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held
that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial
proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date of the commission of
the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July 7, 2003. Since the
Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003, the respondent
judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the cases.

The RTC of Baguio City, Branch 7 favored the respondents. In a Decision dated April 20,
2005, the RTC of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari.

Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
Regional Trial Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.

ISSUE:

Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003
tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents
Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."

HELD:

The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the
procedural rules governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription
period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period
for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any
other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may
not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.

In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo, this Court defined the parameters of prescription: In resolving
the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the
period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to
run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.

With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for
the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.

The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the
petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the
prescription period.

As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information
tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The
respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes. In Zaldivia v.
Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts
and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The
Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.

Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be
filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed
commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a
preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.

Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the
prescription period.

Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003,
the period had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when
he ordered the dismissal of the case against respondents. According to the Department of
Justice National Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors, an Information is defined under
Part I, Section 5 as: SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing
charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor, and filed with the court. The
information need not be placed under oath by the prosecutor signing the same.

6. Republic versus Cojuangco

Facts:
On April 25, 1977 respondents... incorporated the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM)[1] with an
authorized capital stock of P100 million divided into one million... shares with a par value of P100 per
share. The incorporators subscribed to 200,000 shares worth P20 million and paid P5 million.
On September 26, 1978 UNICOM amended its capitalization
On August 29, 1979 the Board of Directors of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)... approved
Resolution 247-79 authorizing UCPB, the Administrator of the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CII
Fund), to invest not more than P500 million from the fund in the equity of UNICOM for the benefit of... the
coconut farmers.
On September 4, 1979 UNICOM increased its authorized capital stock to 10 million shares without par
value. The Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock stated that the incorporators held one million shares
without par value and that UCPB subscribed to 4 million shares worth P495... million.
On September 18, 1979 a new set of UNICOM directors,... approved another amendment to UNICOM's
capitalization. This increased its authorized capital stock to one billion shares
About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a complaint for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019[6] against respondents, the 1979 members of the
UCPB board of directors, before the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The OSG alleged that UCPB's investment in UNICOM was
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government since UNICOM had a capitalization of only P5
million and it had no track record of operation. In the process of conversion to... voting common shares,
the government's P495 million investment was reduced by P95 million which was credited to UNICOM's
incorporators. The PCGG subsequently referred the complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman
About nine years later or on March 15, 1999 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) issued a
Memorandum,[8] stating that although it found sufficient basis to indict respondents for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019, the action has already... prescribed.
the Office of the Ombudsman approved the OSP's recommendation for dismissal of the complaint. It
additionally ruled that UCPB's subscription to the shares of stock of UNICOM on September 18, 1979 was
the proper point... at which the prescription of the action began to run since respondents' act of investing
into UNICOM was consummated on that date. It could not be said that the investment was a continuing
act. The giving of undue benefit to the incorporators prescribed 10 years later on
September 18, 1989. Notably, when the crime was committed in 1979 the prescriptive period for it had not
yet been amended. The original provision of Section 11 of R.A. 3019 provided for prescription of 10 years.
Thus, the OSG filed its complaint out of time.
Issues:
whether or not respondents' alleged violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 already prescribed.

Ruling:
As to the main issue, petitioner maintains that, although the charge against respondents was for violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, its prosecution relates to its efforts to recover the ill-gotten
wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos and of his family... and cronies. Section 15, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution provides that the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees is not barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
But the Court has already settled in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto[14] that Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of
ill-gotten wealth, not to criminal... cases such as the complaint against respondents in OMB-0-90-2810.
Thus, the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth
contemplated in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution may be barred by prescription.
Now R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year prescriptive period should be computed in accordance
with Section 2 of Act 3326,[18] which provides:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and... punishment
In the prosecution of cases of behest loans, the Court reckoned the prescriptive period from the discovery
of such loans. The reason for this is that the government, as aggrieved party, could not have known that
those loans existed when they were made. Both parties to such loans... supposedly conspired to
perpetrate fraud against the government. They could only have been discovered after the 1986 EDSA
Revolution when the people ousted President Marcos from office. And, prior to that date, no person would
have dared question the legality or propriety of the... loans.
Those circumstances do not obtain in this case. For one thing, what is questioned here is not the grant of
behest loans that, by their nature, could be concealed from the public eye by the simple expedient of
suppressing their documentations.
Indeed, the OSG made no allegation that respondent members of the board of directors of UCPB
connived with UNICOM to suppress public knowledge of the investment.
The OSG makes no allegation that the SEC denied public access to UCPB's investment in UNICOM
during martial law at the President's or anyone else's instance. Indeed, no accusation of this kind has ever
been hurled at the SEC with reference to corporate transactions of whatever... kind during martial law
since even that regime had a stake in keeping intact the integrity of the SEC as an instrumentality of
investments in the Philippines.
And, granted that the feint-hearted might not have the courage to question the UCPB investment into
UNICOM during martial law, the second element that the action could not have been instituted during the
10-year period because of martial law does not apply to this case. The last... day for filing the action was,
at the latest, on February 8, 1990, about four years after martial law ended. Petitioner had known of the
investment it now questions for a sufficiently long time yet it let those four years of the remaining period of
prescription run its course... before bringing the proper action.
Prescription of actions is a valued rule in all civilized states from the beginning of organized society. It is a
rule of fairness since, without it, the plaintiff can postpone the filing of his action to the point of depriving
the defendant, through the passage of time, of... access to defense witnesses who would have died or left
to live elsewhere, or to documents that would have been discarded or could no longer be located.
Moreover, the memories of witnesses are eroded by time. There is an absolute need in the interest of
fairness to bar actions that have taken the plaintiffs too long to file in court.

7.
Facts:

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) charged respondents Rogelio
Reynado and Jose
Adrandea with the crime of estafa under Art. 315 parag. 1(b) of the RPC. It was alleged tha
t the special
audit conducted on the cash and lending operations of its Port Area branch
uncovered
anomalous/fraudulent transactions perpetrated by respondents in connivance with client
Universal
Converter Philippines, Inc. (Universal); that respondents we
re the only voting members of the branch’s
credit committee authorized to extend credit accommodation to clients up to P200,000.00;
that through
the so
-
called Bills Purchase Transaction, Universal, which has a paid
-
up capital of only P125,000.00 and
actual
maintaining balance of P5,000.00, was able to make withdrawals totaling P81,652,000.00
against
uncleared regional checks deposited in its account at petitioner’s Port Area branch; that,
consequently,
Universal was able to utilize petitioner’s funds even b
efore the seven
-
day clearing period for regional
checks expired; that Universal’s withdrawals against uncleared regional check deposits were
without
prior approval of petitioner’s head office; that the uncleared checks were later dishonored by
the drawee
b
ank for the reason "Account Closed"; and, that respondents acted with fraud, deceit,
and abuse of
confidence.

Respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions with Universal and claimed
that they
only intended to help the Port Area branch
solicit and increase its deposit accounts and daily
transactions.

Meanwhile, Metrobank and Universal entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement
whereby the latter
acknowledged its indebtedness to the former in the total amount of P50,990,976.27 and
undertoo
k to pay
the same in bi
-
monthly amortizations of P300,000.00 as covered by postdated checks, "plus balloon
payment of the remaining principal balance and interest and other charges, if any.”

After preliminary investigation, prosecutor Edad found petitione
r’s evidence insufficient to hold
respondents liable for estafa. According to her, the execution of the Debt Settlement
Agreement puts
Metrobank in estoppel to argue that the liability is criminal. Since the agreement was made
even before
the filing of thi
s case, the relations between the parties have change[d], novation has set in and
prevented the incipience of any criminal liability on the part of respondents. Thus, the
dismissal of the
case is recommended.

Likewise, the DOJ dismissed the petition averr
ing that no estafa exists in the instant case as it was not
clearly shown how respondents misappropriated the P53,873,500.00. Moreover, fraud is
not present
considering that the Executive Committee and the Credit Committee of Metrobank were duly
notified o
f
these transactions which they approved. Also, no damage was caused as Metrobank agreed
to settle
with Universal.

MR was filed by petitioner which was denied. Aggrieved, it went to the CA to file for
certiorari and
mandamus. CA affirmed the twin resoluti
ons of the DOJ Sec, and accordingly, just as Universal cannot
be held responsible under the bills purchase transactions on account of novation, private
respondents,
who acted in complicity with the former, cannot be made liable [for] the same transactions.
And since the
dismissal of the complaint is founded on legal ground, respondents may not be compelled by
mandamus
to file an information in court. Although, the OSG, in sharing the views of petitioner contended
that failure
to implead other responsible in
dividuals in the complaint does not warrant its dismissal, suggesting that
the proper remedy is to cause their inclusion in the information, nevertheless, CA
disposed of the
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prosecutor Edad committed grave abuse of discretion.

Yes.
Held
:
Determination of the probable cause, a function belonging to the public prosecutor; judicial
review allowed where it has been clearly established that the prosecutor committed
grave abuse of discretion.In a preliminary investigation,
a public prosecutor determines whether a crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof.The Secretary of Justice, however,
may review or modify the resolution of the prosecutor.
A close scrutiny of the
substance of Prosecutor Edads Resolution dated July 10, 1997 readily reveals that were it not
for the Debt Settlement Agreement, there was indeed probable cause to indict
respondents for the crime
charged.
From her own assessment of the Complaint-Affidavit of petitioners auditor, her preliminary
finding is that Ordinarily, the offense of estafa has been sufficiently established.
Interestingly, she suddenly changed tack and declared that the agreement altered the
relation of the parties and that novation hadset in preventing the incipience of
any criminal liability on respondents. In light of the jurisprudence herein earlier discussed, the
prosecutor should not have gone that far and executed an apparent somersault.
Compounding further the error, the DOJ in dismissing petitioners petition, ruled out estafa
contrary to the findings of the prosecutor.The findings of the Secretary of Justice in sustaining
the dismissal of the Complaint are matters of defense best left to the trial courts deliberation
and contemplation after conducting the trial of the criminal case.To emphasize, a
preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is not
a part of the trial.A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties evidence is no
t required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.A finding of probable cause
does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure
a conviction.It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged.In the case at bar, as analyzed by the prosecutor, a
primafaciecase of estafa exists against respondents.As perused by her, the facts as
presented in the Complaint-Affidavit of the auditor are reasonable enough to excite her
belief that respondents are guilty of the crime complained of.In Andres v. Justice Secretary
Cuevas we had occasion to rule that the presence or absence of the el
ements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense
that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.Thus confronted with the issue
on whether the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion in disposing of the case of petitioner, given the sufficiency of evidence on hand,
we do not hesitate to rule in the affirmative.We have previously ruled that grave abuse of
discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates and contravenes the Constitution,
the law or existing jurisprudence.

8. G.R NO.178607
December 5, 2012
Fact:
The petitioner is the president of a local manning agency, while the Private
respondents are some of the listed incorporators of another local manning
agency. The petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City
Prosecutor against the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal
recruitment. The petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely represented their
stockholdings in TMSI’s articles of incorporation to secure a license to operate as
a recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA).The 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an
information for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment against the
respondents. The City Prosecutor approved his recommendation and filed the
corresponding criminal information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Respondent Alamil moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of Judge
Capco-Umali, for being biased or partial. Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited
herself from the case and did not resolve respondent Alamil’s motion for
reconsideration and the petitioner’s motion to expunge. The case was later re-
raffled presided by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon who granted respondent Alamil’s
motion for reconsideration. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing
the existence of probable cause to prosecute the respondents and that
respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any relief from the RTC. The RTC
denied the petitioner’s notice of appeal since the petitioner filed it without the
conformity of the Solicitor General, who is mandated to represent the People of
the Philippines in criminal actions appealed to the CA. Thus, the RTC ordered the
notice of appeal expunged from the records. The CA affirmed the resolution of
the RTC.

Issue:
Whether the Petitioner has the legal personality to file the petition on behalf of
the People of the Philippines.

Held:
No, It is well-settled that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest[,]” “who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Interest
means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved.34 By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or
consequential interest. When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in
interest, the suit is dismissible. Procedural law basically mandates that “[a]ll
criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of a public prosecutor.”37 In appeals of criminal
cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the
People, pursuant to Administrative Code with provides The Office of the Solicitor
General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers.

9.G.R No.1243912 G.R No.124391

People v. Yparraguirre
Facts:
•                Accused-appellant Crispin Yparraguirre was charged with the crime of rape.
•                The prosecution established that Rosita Bacaling was a housemaid of appellant and his wife; that on or
about 7:00 in the evening of July 6, 1990 at the spouses' room in Panabo, Davao, Rosita was cooking porridge for the
spouses' two children, one aged four years old and the other nine months old.  Accused-appellant arrived from work
and found the two children asleep.  He approached Rosita and gave her a small white envelope said to contain
medicine for her skin disease.  Rosita was afflicted with rashes on her thighs and stomach which she allegedly
contracted from one of the children.
•                Rosita opened the envelope and counted fifteen (15) tablets inside.  As instructed by appellant, Rosita took
all the tablets.  A few minutes later, she felt weak and fell down.  Suddenly, she realized that appellant was dragging
her to the spouses' bed.  She tried to get up but appellant pushed her down the bed and pointed a hunting knife at her
neck.  He ordered Rosita not to move or he would kill her. 
•                Then he removed her clothes and went on top of her.  He kissed her face, breasts, stomach and private
parts and then entered her.  Rosita cried out in pain but appellant continued entering her.  After satisfying his lust,
appellant pulled out and punched Rosita in the stomach.  She lost consciousness.
•                A few minutes later, Rosita woke up and saw blood in her private parts.  She wiped the blood and changed
her clothes.  Seeing her awake, appellant threatened to kill her should she report the incident to her
parents.  Appellant then left the house.
•                Rosita did not say a word about the incident.  She continued serving the Yparraguirres for one month before
leaving them to return to her mother's house in Barrio YYY.  Her mother found Rosita in a state of shock.  She could not
eat nor talk, neither could she perform ordinary daily functions such as dressing herself.  In short, Rosita became
helpless.  She was brought to the Municipal Health Officer by her mother for examination. 
•                On August 22, 1990, the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Imelda T. Bendijo, interviewed the girl and found her
unresponsive and unable to talk.  She conducted a physical examination and also found that:
-- normal vagina with old laceration found at 2:00 [position]; hymen not intact;
Internal examination -- admits one finger;
Advised for pregnancy test and for consultation by [sic] psychiatrist.
x x x."
•                Upon the Municipal Health Officer's advice, Rosita was confined at the Davao City Mental Hospital for
observation and treatment.  After a week of treatment, Rosita began to talk and revealed that she was raped by
appellant.
•                Accused-appellant pled not guilty to the crime charged.  He claimed that on the night of the alleged rape
he was selling fish at the public market.  Allegedly, he was at the market at 4:00 in the morning, and worked straight
until 8:00 in the evening.  He never left the fish stall until after 8:00 in the evening because of his many customers.
•                The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.  It also ordered
him to indemnify Rosita P50,000.00 as moral damages and pay P5,000.00 as attorney's fees,

Issues:
WON the court erred in holding Yparraguirre guilty solely on the basis of Rosita’s testimony
NO.
•                The appeal has no merit.  After reviewing the records, we find that the prosecution evidence, which rests
mainly on the testimony of Rosita, is credible, reliable and trustworthy. Rosita testified in a straightforward,
spontaneous and candid manner and never wavered even on cross-examination and rebuttal.  The inconsistencies in her
testimony are minor which tend to buttress, rather than weaken, the conclusion that her testimony was not contrived.
•                The question of whether Rosita contracted the skin disease from the children of appellant is not
important.  The undisputed fact is that she was afflicted with the disease and that appellant gave her tablets for
treatment of the disease.  Appellant's allegation that Rosita should have fallen asleep for hours after ingesting the
tablets is speculative.  There is no evidence that the tablets were sleeping tablets.  They, however, weakened Rosita
and prevented her from making any resistance to appellant's lewd acts.  The delay in filing the complaint does not in
any way affect Rosita's credibility. She was afraid of appellant's threat to her life.   The complaint was filed three
months after Rosita told her mother of the incident, and three months is not too long a period to file a complaint for
rape.
•                Rosita was a seventeen-year old barrio lass and a high school dropout.  She was also the breadwinner of the
family. It is hard to believe that Rosita would fabricate a story of defloration, open herself to public trial and place her
family, who depended on her, in a very humiliating and compromising situation for no reason at all. Rosita suffered
psychologically from the incident. Before the rape, she had been working for the Yparraguirres for two months and the
spouses actually found her to be a good worker. When Rosita returned to her family, however, she lost her speech and
could not perform ordinary daily functions that she had to seek psychiatric treatment.  Indeed, Rosita's psychological
condition could not have been the product of ill-motive and fabrication.
WON the court erred in holding that witness Mary Ann Yparraguirre went to the mother of the accused to negotiate for
the dropping of the case.
•                NO
•                Anent the second assigned error, there is evidence that after Rosita revealed the rape to her mother,
appellant's wife, Mary Ann Yparraguirre, offered the victim's mother, Merlyn Bacaling, fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00) to dissuade her from filing the complaint.  When Merlyn refused, Mary Ann increased the offer to twenty-
five thousand pesos (P25,000.00).  Still Merlyn refused to accept it.[16] As pointed out by appellant, no criminal
complaint had been filed at the time the compromise offer was made. Nevertheless, the rape incident was already
known to appellant's wife.  Mary Ann herself testified that Merlyn told her about it on November 3, 1990, the day when
Mary Ann first offered the money.
•                An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can be
received in evidence against the offeror. What is required is that after committing the crime, the accused or his
representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved.
•                The positive identification of accused-appellant as the rapist prevails over his defense of alibi. It was not
physically impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the crime.  The public market was merely a ten-minute
walk from their rented room and during work breaks, appellant would sometimes go home to bring food to his children.

10.

G.R. No. 80116

June 30, 1989

FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married to private respondent
Erich Geiling (Geiling), a German national, in Germany. Geiling obtained a divorce in a
German court on the ground of failure of marriage.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for
adultery against petitioner alleging that, she had an affair with two different men while their
marriage subsisted.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction to try
and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de
officio, since the complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having
obtained a final divorce decree prior to the filing of the criminal complaint. However, the said
motion was denied by the respondent judge.
Hence, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her
motion to quash.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an alien spouse has legal standing to file a complaint for adultery after obtaining
a divorce decree

HELD:
No, an alien spouse has no legal standing to file a complaint for adultery after obtaining a
divorce decree.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except
upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant
of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator
must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the
criminal action. Hence, after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the
right to institute proceedings against the offenders. Where, however, proceedings have been
properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the
prosecution of the criminal proceedings.

In the present case, the fact that Geiling obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Therefore, Geiling, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case.