Mapping Financial Flows of Industrial Agriculture in Africa (2020)

Mapping Financial Flows of Industrial
Agriculture in Africa

Prepared by
Joeva Rock and Alex Park

November 2018
(revised July 2020)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1
Global food production is at an all time high. However, as the climate becomes increasingly erratic
and the major agribusiness companies consolidate, leaders in global politics, business, and finance,
are seeking new markets for capital and growth. For many of them, the African continent is,
2
according to The Economist, the “final frontier.”

Since the early 2000s, major philanthropic organizations, financial institutions, and government
agencies have sought to transform African markets and farms into high-yielding commercial
enterprises. Under what is being called a “new” African Green Revolution, proponents seek to
convince farmers to adopt high-yielding seeds, agrichemicals, and cash crops; consolidate small
farms into larger operations; produce for regional and international markets; and to prioritize those
markets over the demands of their localities.

To undertake this so-called revolution, key donors such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
(BMGF), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the World Bank Group have
at various times partnered with some of US’ largest businesses and financial institutions --
Monsanto, JP Morgan Chase, and Walmart, to name a few -- promising market reforms and access
for their benefit.

However, these relationships and activities are not so straightforward. They’re often complex and
obscured by intermediary organizations, loosely regulated private equity funds, and thick
bureaucratic paperwork.

This report seeks to fill in some of the existing gaps of an already well-researched phenomenon.
Through archival research, data scraping and analysis, participant observation, discourse analysis, and
desk review we found:

1. The Food Price Crisis of 2007 was not the impetus for rich-world governments and
philanthropies to initiate the African Green Revolution, but the crisis served as a
humanitarian justification for an effort to expand private investment for its own sake.
2. Though USAID and BMGF publicly showcase their investments in African agriculture less
than they did in the past, both organizations have been investing at levels similar to or higher
than 2010. Both organizations continue to funnel large amounts of funding to US-based
organizations, institutions, and businesses at work on the African continent.
3. Private equity is increasingly becoming the vehicle through which both private and public
investors are channeling funds to African agriculture. PE funds focused exclusively on food
and agriculture -- some of which are pursuing vertical integration strategies -- are particularly
reliant on government investment through DFIs.
1
Pimbert, Michel P. and Nina Isabella Moeller (2018) Absent Agroecology Aid: On UK Agricultural Development Assistance
Since 2010. Sustainability 10(505): 1-10.
2
The Economist (2007) The Final Frontier. https://www.economist.com/news/2007/06/07/the-final-frontier.
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4. The US government, especially USAID and country-level embassies, at times intercede on
behalf of multinational companies to persuade African governments to create “enabling
environments” for business.
5. The same funders who back research and design of GM and hybrid seeds are those who
back the laws that regulate plant breeding and technology.
6. While the pace of land grabs has slowed since 2012, land acquisition remains a useful
strategy for part of expanding existing agricultural investments. Aid agency and
philanthropic efforts to make land more readable to investors will help make these
investments easier.
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Joeva Rock is an anthropologist and lecturer at the University of California, Berkeley.

Alex Park is an investigative reporter and researcher based in Oakland, California. His coverage of
large philanthropies, agriculture, and foreign direct investment in Africa has been featured in Mother
Jones, HuffPost, The Correspondent (Netherlands), The Africa Report, Africa Is a Country, and other
publications.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 4
TABLE OF CONTENTS 5
LIST OF ACRONYMS 7
CHAPTER 1: PROJECT OVERVIEW 9

(1.1) Project Overview 9
(1.2) Research Methodology 9
(1.3) Abbreviated Literature Review 10
CHAPTER 2: Understanding the Financing of the African Green Revolution 15

(2.1) Major types of financial flows 15
(2.2) Tracking the Early History of AGR 17
(2.3) Making Sense of BMGF and USAID flows 25
CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF PRIVATE EQUITY 32

(3.1) Understanding private equity 32
(3.2) Determining a focus within African PE 34
(3.3) Types of funds: the means by which PE invests money 42
(3.4) Other types of F&A funds 50
(3.5) The future of private equity in African food and agriculture 52
CHAPTER 4: MAPPING INPUTS (REGULATION, POLICY AND NETWORKS) 55

(4.1) Hybrid Maize 55
(4.2) Biotechnology and Biosafety 61
(4.3) Cornell Alliance for Science 68
(4.4) Fertilizer 73
(4.5) Conclusion 74
CHAPTER 5: EARLY US AGR PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 76

(5.1) USAID and Land O’Lakes in Kenya 76
(5.2) USAID and PepsiCo in Ethiopia 78
(5.3) USAID and Walmart in East Africa 82
(5.4) Conclusion 86
CHAPTER 6: THE ROLE OF LARGE-SCALE LAND DEALS IN THE AFRICAN GREEN

REVOLUTION 87
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(6.1) The state of land grabs today 87
(6.2) Are large farms even useful? 87
(6.3) Models of large farms in AGR 88
(6.4) The local dimension 89
(6.5) Land tenure and land grabs 90
(6.6) Looking ahead 93
CHAPTER 7: THE FUTURE OF THE AFRICAN GREEN REVOLUTION 94

(7.1) Report from AGRF 2018 94
(7.2) AfDB’s Savannah Plan 98
(7.3) Futures and Exits 100
(7.4) Conclusion 103
APPENDICES 105
APPENDIX 1: Data Scrape Methodology 106
APPENDIX 2: Mapping Biotech/Biosafety Across Africa 108
APPENDIX 3: Report from Rwandan Farmers’ group 123

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS*
APPENDIX 4: Documents Obtained through FOIA and Public Records Requests
APPENDIX 5: USAID, USDA, & BMGF Data Set
APPENDIX 6: USAID Disbursements Related to Fertilizer
APPENDIX 7: Cornell Alliance for Science Database
**These files are available upon request.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS
AAPRESID Argentinian Association of Zero-tillage Practitioners
AATF African Agricultural Technology Foundation
ABNE African Biosafety Network of Expertise
ABSP African Biosafety Support Program
ADVANCE Agricultural Development and Value Chain Enhancement
AFAP African Fertilizer and Agribusiness Partnership
AfCFTA African Continental Free Trade Agreement
AfDB African Development Bank
AGR African Green Revolution
AGRA Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
AGRF African Green Revolution Forum
AMSAP Advanced Maize Seed Adoption Program
AU African Union
AUM Assets Under Management
BMGF Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
BUILD Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (Act) (US)
CAADP Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program
CAS Cornell Alliance for Science
CAMPO Brazilian Agricultural Corporation
CDC CDC (formerly the Commonwealth Development Corporation) (UK)
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CFT Confined Field Trial
CIP Country Investment Plan
CIMMYT International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center
CNFA Cultivating New Frontiers in Agriculture
(formerly Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs)
CORAF/WECARD West and Central African Council for Agricultural Research and Development
CRISPR Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats
DCA (USAID) Development Credit Authority
DFC Development Finance Corporation (US)
DFI Development Finance Institution
DFID Department for International Development (UK)
EATA Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EMPEA Emerging Markets Private Equity Association
ESAFF East and Southern African Small Scale Farmers’ Forum
ESG Environmental, Social, Governance
F&A Food & Agriculture
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
FOIA Freedom of Information Act (US)
G8 Group of Eight
G8NAFSN Group of Eight New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition
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GAO Government Accountability Office (US)
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GHFSI Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative
GMO Genetically Modified Organism
IEHA (President’s) Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (US)
IFC International Finance Corporation
IFDC International Fertilizer Development Center
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISAAA International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications
ISU Iowa State University
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
KARI Kenya Agricultural Research Institute
KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Germany)
MCC Millenium Challenge Corporation (US)
MDG Millenium Development Goal
MFAN Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MSU Michigan State University
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OFAB Open Forum for Agricultural Biotechnology
OPIC Overseas Private Investment Corporation (US)
PBS Program for Biosafety Systems
PE Private Equity
PPP Public-Private Partnership
SAZAPIP Savannah Zone Agricultural Productivity Project
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
TASI Transformation of the African Savannah Initiative
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Program
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
USDA-FAS United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service
USG United States Government
USRTK US Right to Know
UTIMCO University of Texas Investment Management Company
WASA West African Seed Alliance
WASP West African Seed Program
WEF World Economic Forum
WFP World Food Program

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CHAPTER 1: PROJECT OVERVIEW
(1.1) Project Overview
This report details findings from an eight month research project that sought to map the types and
means of financial flows supporting the executive of an African Green Revolution (AGR). Research
for this report was carried out between March - December 2018. Research findings were
subsequently revised in November 2019 and May 2020.

The authors prioritized areas of research based on gaps in both academic and civil society literature
as well as consultations with African and allied civil society organizations. The findings here by no
means present a complete picture of the actors and institutions supporting industrial shifts within
African agriculture. Where appropriate, we have noted areas for future research within individual
chapters, as well as the conclusion.

In this first chapter, we outline our methodology and literature review. In the subsequent chapter, we
tell the longer story of how the AGR came to be. Chapters 3-6 map different types of capital and
political flows, and Chapter 7 concludes with major findings and thoughts regarding future research.

(1.2) Research Methodology
The first step in developing our research methodology was to identify the gaps in previous research.
To do so, we 1) reviewed and analyzed publicly available reports and policy briefs from organizations
working in the field of African agriculture, such as the Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa, and
2) used JStor, Academic Search Premier, and other academic databases to conduct a scholarly
literature review (see Ch. 1.3) of industrial agriculture in Africa with specific focus on donors,
corporate partners, funding networks, and influencing mechanisms.

From these gaps, we set four research objectives, each with its own unique methodology.

1) Map and analyze partnerships between philanthropy organizations, bilateral donors,
corporate actors, and the intermediaries they finance.
To discern the ways in which actors form networks and partnerships to support industrial
agriculture in Africa, we used five major research strategies. First, we reviewed already-completed
academic and civil society studies of partnerships. Second, using findings from the literature review
and consultations, we identified key actors, influencers and assessed their relative
power/decision-making authority in comparison to others. Third, we attended the annual meeting of
the Sustainable Agriculture and Food Systems Funders to better assess giving trends. Fourth, we
collected and analyzed publicly available financial statements of key organizations, such as the US
Agency for International Development. Fifth, we conducted a data scrape of grant databases of the
BMGF, USAID, and USDA. For methodological specifics of the data scrape, please see Appendix 1.

2) Map and analyze the nature of technical and financial activities and interventions
across key African Green Revolution actors.
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For this objective, we focused our research in key three areas: 1) inputs, input subsidies and the
intermediary groups that promote them; 2) outgrower/nucleus models, and; 3) biotechnology and
biosafety. To do so, we relied on four research strategies. First, we submitted public record requests
to identify and research details of public-private partnerships (PPPs) between US agencies and
private corporations. Second, we accessed publicly available information, including grant and
organizational reports from US agencies, philanthropic organizations and private industry, and news
articles from US, European, and African media outlets to better understand US-supported
agricultural PPPs in Africa. Third, we investigated the Cornell Alliance for Science through
organizational reports, social media posts and publicity materials. Finally, we attended the African
3
Green Revolution Forum in Kigali, Rwanda to assess current and future trends of key donors.

3) Map and analyze policy reform efforts in the fields of seed, fertilizer, biosafety and
intellectual property.
Four research strategies supported this objective. First, we investigated USAID-backed seed
liberalization projects through grants databases (searching for both qualitative and quantitative
reporting), organizational reports and publicity material. Second, we collected and analyzed reports
from AATF, ABNE, and OFAB to map biosafety legislation across the continent. Third, we
submitted public records requests to Michigan State University to better understand their role in
creating ABNE. Finally, we queried the Data Scrape spreadsheet for key terms, including “biosafety,”
“IPR,” and “policy,” to map financial commitments to policy reforms.

4) Investigate and map private channels of investment into food and agriculture.
Our final research objective focused on the role of private equity in African agriculture. Here, we
relied on a dataset we purchased from Preqin, an industry-leader in private equity data collection.
Please see Chapter 3.2 for a detailed discussion.

(1.3) Abbreviated Literature Review
4
Global food production is at an all time high. However, as the climate becomes increasingly erratic
and the major agribusiness companies continue to consolidate, world leaders, both political and
financial, are seeking new markets for capital and growth. The African continent is, according to the
5
Economist, the “final frontier” of economic investment. In 2006, the Rockefeller Foundation, Bill
& Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) and Kofi Annan announced the creation of the Alliance for a
Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) to spur what they called a “uniquely” African Green Revolution
to increase agricultural yields and further integrate African farmers into global food ways (see Chapter
6
2 for an extensive history of the AGR).

Over the past decade, the banner of the “African Green Revolution” (AGR) has grown to include
private investors, bilateral donors, philanthropy organizations, banks and African institutions that
3
Please see Ch. 7 for a report back from the African Green Revolution Forum.
4
Pimbert, Michel P. and Nina Isabella Moeller (2018) Absent Agroecology Aid: On UK Agricultural Development Assistance
Since 2010. Sustainability 10(505): 1-10.
5
The Economist (2007) The Final Frontier. https://www.economist.com/news/2007/06/07/the-final-frontier.
6
BMGF (nd) Alliance for a Green Revolution. Website profile,
https://www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work/Resources/Grantee-Profiles/Grantee-Profile-Alliance-for-a-Green-R
evolution-in-Africa-AGRA.
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7
seek to industrialize African agriculture. Though AGR promoters have different visions, their core
goal is to move African agriculture from a small scale activity primarily serving localized
communities to an agribusiness venture serving regional and international markets. To achieve this
transition, many actors advocate for a mass exit from the sector (see Chapter 7) to clear land for
8
larger, more technologically advanced, commercial operations.

For proponents of the AGR, shifting African agriculture from a “lifestyle” to a “business” generally
entails: encouraging farmers to purchase hybrid and genetically modified seeds, chemical inputs,
including fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides; integrating African farmers into regional and
international markets for both agricultural inputs and crops vis-à-vis partnerships with corporate
agribusiness giants such as DuPont Pioneer, Monsanto/Bayer and Syngenta; and the creation of
value chains within a country often centered around three commercial crops – soy, maize (corn) and
9
rice.

To attract investors, AGR proponents characterize investing in Africa as both a humanitarian and
profitable venture. “Come for the food security, but stay for the economic opportunity,” Dr. Agnes
Kalibata, the president of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), wrote to investors
10
in 2017.

Donors and projects operating under the AGR base their interventions on the premise that it is
better for farmers to grow non-staple crops (such as soy) for the market rather than staples for the
11
home and village. Given the setbacks of the first Green Revolution, the emergence of land grabs
12
across Africa, and the track record of partnerships between US agencies and problematic
13
corporations, some critics have called the confluence of these actors a “monopoly machine at
14
work.”

The Long Green Revolution
Raj Patel argues that the AGR should be understood as a “long duree,” an extension of the first
15
Green Revolution of the 1950s and 60s. It was during that prior iteration that private and public
organizations -- namely the Rockefeller Foundation, the US government, and newly established
international agricultural research centers -- directed massive amounts of funding into breeding
7
The Oakland Institute (2016) The Unholy Alliance: Five Western Donors Shape a Pro-Corporate Agenda for African Agriculture.
Report.
8
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (2017) Strategy Overview for 2017-2021: Inclusive Agricultural Transformation in
Africa. Report, https://agra.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/AGRA-Corporate-Strategy-Doc-3.-2.pdf.
9
Moseley, William, Matthew Schnurr and Rachel Bezner Kerr (2015) Interrogating the Technocratic (Neoliberal) Agenda for
Agricultural Development and Hunger Alleviation in Africa. African Geographical Review 34(1): 1-7.
10
Kalibata, Agnes (2017) “In Africa, Expecting More From Agriculture Than Food Security.” AGRA. Blog post,
https://agra.org/harvest/march-2017-edition#in-africa-expecting-more-from-agriculture-than-food-security-dr-kalibatas
-post-for-the-global-food-f.
11
Patel, Raj (2013) The Long Green Revolution. The Journal of Peasant Studies 40(1): 1-63.
12
Mpofu, Elizabeth (2016) We Are Organized and We Know What We Want, Says Leader of Global Movement of Peasant Farmers.
Thousand Currents, February 8, https://thousandcurrents.org/we-are-organized-and-we-know-what-we-want/.
13
Park, Alex (2014) Walmart Sets its Sights on Africa – With Uncle Sam’s Help. Mother Jones, August 7,
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/08/usaid-walmart-africa-food-chain-supermarket/.
14
GRAIN (2018) Under the Cover of Philanthropy: a Monopoly Machine at Work. Report.
15
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improved wheat and maize varieties, and circulated those new seeds throughout Asia and Latin
America. These efforts, Perkins (1997) argues, were driven by racialized anxieties that independent
and growing Asian and Latino populations would turn violent, migrate, and possibly challenge US
16
and European hegemony.

The legacies of the first Green Revolution remain contested along predictable lines. Proponents cite
global yield increases in maize and wheat to argue that the Green Revolution increased food
17
production, decreased hunger, and ultimately, saved lives. Critics contend that the increased use of
agrichemicals and hybrid seeds resulted in a loss of biodiversity, knowledge and agricultural
18
autonomy.

Ultimately, these core concerns underline present debates around the AGR. Distinct modes of
capital -- the combination of public and private funding and partnerships -- at the intersections of
humanitarian discourses about a “hungry” and “needy” Africa create a general air of
philanthrocapitalism, the idea that intentional spending can advance both philanthropic and capitalist
19
goals. Business with a humanitarian bent is not necessarily a new concept, but it is one exacerbated
under late neoliberal capitalism, where individuals -- not systems -- are held responsible for
structural failures which keep them trapped in poverty and hunger.

However, it is exactly the systems that AGR proponents seek to utilize -- global finance, US
hegemony, and the capitalist order -- that created contemporary realities. Moseley et al. (2016)
describe how World Bank and IMF-mandated reforms of the 1980s brought African “food
self-sufficiency... to a crashing halt:”

The World Bank’s (1981) ‘Berg Report’ stressed rolling back state involvement in development in
African countries and giving wider responsibilities to the private sector. Structural adjustment
throughout the 1980s and 1990s led to significant retrenchments in agricultural extension and
agricultural research (Carney, 2008). As such, there was a dramatic reduction in public development
investment in and focus on African agriculture, with a shift away from food crops ... [to] investment in
20
cash crops for export.

Today, AGR efforts promote a mix of cash and food crops, depending on the donor and country.
However, one thing is clear: whatever the farmer is growing, they must buy approved inputs from
21
approved agro-dealers working with approved national and international companies. Seeds are an
integral part of this equation. To facilitate the use of improved -- hybrid and genetically modified --
16
Perkins, John H. (1997) Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat, Genes, and the Cold War. New York: Oxford University
Press.
17
Collier, Paul (2009) Africa’s Organic Peasantry: Beyond Romanticism. Harvard International Review 31(2): 62-65.
18
González, Roberto J. (2001) Zapotec Science: Farming and Food in the Northern Sierra of Oaxaca. Austin: University of Texas
Press.
19
Thompson, Carol B. (2014) Philanthrocapitalism: Appropriation of Africa's Genetic Wealth. Review of African Political
Economy 41(141): 389-405.
20
Moseley, William, Matthew Schnurr and Rachel Bezner Kerr (2015) Interrogating the Technocratic (Neoliberal) Agenda for
Agricultural Development and Hunger Alleviation in Africa. African Geographical Review 34(1): 1-7. Pg. 3.
21
ACBIO (2016) Green Revolution Dead-End in Malawi: Two Case Studies— AGRA’s Pigeon Pea Project and Malawi’s
Agro-Dealer Strengthening Programme. Report,
https://www.acbio.org.za/sites/default/files/2016/06/Chinsinga-Report-ACBio-2016-06.pdf.
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22
seeds, donors have lobbied for policy change around the continent, harmonizing seed and trade
23
laws in West Africa and intellectual property right laws at the continental level.

In Burkina Faso, for example, Monsanto received a five year authorization to commercialize their bt
cotton after the US ambassador intervened. (Originally, the Burkinabe government only granted
24
authorization for a year.) Similarly, “in 2005, the [US] embassy in South Africa informed Monsanto
and Pioneer about two recently vacated positions in the government’s biotech regulatory agency,
25
suggesting the companies could advance ‘qualified applicants’ to fill the position’.”

Activists and scholars alike have expressed concern about the waves of patent laws across the
African continent that have coincided with the consolidation of global agribusiness players. The
creation of the African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF), an organization founded by
private foundations and industry, is one entity that has come under scrutiny which we discuss later in
26 27
this report (see Chapter 3). While some scholars contend that Africans are against patenting,
others demonstrate the complex relationships African activists and scientists have with patenting
28
regimes.

The question of whether African farmers will adopt genetically modified seeds remains to be seen as
few countries have commercialized GM seeds to date.29 Moreover, if previous research on hybrid
and non-hybrid seeds is any indication, decades of research have shown that African farmers
30
overwhelmingly prefer seeds that are cheap, predictable, and bred for their specific environments.
31
Hybrid and GM seeds rarely check all these boxes.

Mapping
22
GRAIN and AFSA (2015) Land and Seed Laws Under Attack: Who is Pushing Changes in Africa? Report.
23
AFSA (2017) Resisting Corporate Takeover of African Seed Systems and Building Farmer Managed Seed Systems for Food Sovereignty
in Africa. Report,
http://afsafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/SEED-POLICY-ENG-ONLINE-SINGLE-PAGES.pdf.
24
Food and Water Watch (2013) Biotech Ambassadors: How the U.S. State Department Promotes the Seed Industry’s Global Agenda.
Report,
https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/sites/default/files/Biotech%20Ambassadors%20Report%20May%202013.pdf.
Pg. 9.
25
Ibid.
26
Schurman, Rachel (2016) Building an Alliance for Biotechnology in Africa. Journal of Agrarian Change: 1-18.
27
Thompson, Carol B. (2014) Philanthrocapitalism: Appropriation of Africa's Genetic Wealth. Review of African Political
Economy 41(141): 389-405.
28
Rock, Joeva (2018) ‘We are not starving’: Challenging Genetically Modified Seeds and Development in Ghana. Culture, Agriculture,
Food and Environment. https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/cuag.12147.
29
Rock, Joeva and Rachel Schurman (2020) The Complex Choreography of Agricultural Biotechnology in Africa. African Affairs
(forthcoming).
30
Ragasa, Catherine, et al. (2013) Patterns of Adoption of Improved Maize Technologies in Ghana. International Food Policy
Research Institute. Working Paper 36.
31
Nyantakyi-Frimpong, Hanson and Rachel Bezner Kerr (2015) A Political Ecology of High-Input Agriculture in Northern
Ghana. African Geographical Review 34(1): 13-35.
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Many scholars and organizations have mapped funding sources for these projects operating under
32 33
the AGR. Organizational studies by Schnurr and Gore (2015), Dowd-Uribe and Schnurr (2016),
and Rock and Schurman (2020) demonstrate the complex relationship building (and breaking) that is
part and parcel of private companies working to commercialize GM crops with African scientists.
Meanwhile, reports from GRAIN demonstrate the mechanisms used by global and urban elites to
34 35 36 37
facilitate land grabs, while ACBIO, AFSA, and the Oakland Institute have tracked the various
actors that lobby for seed and land policy reform.

Much remains to be known about the structure of AGR flows, backroom deals, and types of
financing circulating international and African markets. For instance, while many reports discuss
some organizations involved in GMO lobbying, few dig into their background. Moreover, while
GRAIN and others discuss the role of private equity in African agriculture, a more comprehensive
picture is needed. This report attempts to fill in some of the gaps.
32
Schnurr, Matthew A. and Christopher Gore (2015) Getting to the ‘Yes’: Governing Genetically Modified Crops in Uganda.
Journal of International Development 27: 55-72.
33
Dowd-Uribe, Brian and Matthew A. Schnurr (2016) Briefing: Burkina Faso’s Reversal on Genetically Modified Cotton and the
Implications for Africa. African Affairs 115 (458): 161-172.
34
GRAIN (2018) Failed Farmland Deals: A Growing Legacy of Disaster and Pain. Report,
https://www.grain.org/article/entries/5958-failed-farmland-deals-a-growing-legacy-of-disaster-and-pain.pdf.
35
ACBIO (2018) Status Report on the SADC, COMESA and EAC Harmonised Seed Trade Regulations: Where Does This Leave
the Regions' Smallholder Farmers? Report,
https://www.acbio.org.za/sites/default/files/documents/Harmonisation_report.pdf.
36
AFSA (2017) Resisting corporate takeover of African seed systems and building farmer managed seed systems for food sovereignty in
Africa. Report,
https://afsafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/SEED-POLICY-ENG-ONLINE-SINGLE-PAGES.pdf.
37
The Oakland Institute (2010) (Mis)Investment in Agriculture: The Role of the International Finance Corporation in the Global
Land Grab. Report, .
https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/misinvestment_web.pdf.
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CHAPTER 2: Understanding the Financing of the African
Green Revolution
Introduction
Since it began in earnest about twelve years ago, the African Green Revolution (AGR) has been a
capital-intensive project, financed by private investors, philanthropies, and government development
agencies. Often, these flows of capital overlap. In this chapter, we’ll provide a basic framework for
understanding some of the major sources of AGR financing and how they interact with each other.
We’ll then look at the early history of the AGR, when the project was predominantly supported by
Western development agencies and philanthropies, with the intent of establishing an “enabling
environment” for private finance. By considering its history, we’ll debunk a common claim about the
AGR: that it was spurred by the Food Price Crisis (2007-2008). Instead, as we show through
narrative and quantitative data, efforts to industrialize African agriculture took off in the early 2000s.
The food crisis provided a more public, and urgent, platform to magnify these efforts.

(2.1) Major types of financial flows

Philanthropic Capital
Philanthropies constitute a major source of AGR financing. The Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation (BMGF) is the source of the largest philanthropic capital flows into African
agriculture. The Rockefeller Foundation, which had led the original Green Revolution and has
taken a supporting role in the current one, is another significant source of capital.

Philanthropies, and non-profit groups registered in the United States more generally, are required by
38
law to report their grants in tax returns, which are publicly available. BMGF also makes available a
database of its grants on its website, making it possible to track where their money is going. (See Ch.
2.3 for our findings from the BMGF grant database.) Philanthropies tend to justify their
expenditures in humanitarian terms, though staff at these organizations often use business
terminology to describe their support. Often they refer to grants as “investments” and describe the
resulting benefits as a “return,” despite no expectation of repayment or financial appreciation.

Within a project, philanthropies typically take a management role. Accordingly, much of their money
goes through development contractors to implement projects.

Government Aid
Our research was mainly concerned with financial flows emanating from the US, and thus, our
findings on government aid are mainly limited to US agencies (see Methodology for justification and
a discussion on the limitations this poses).

38
Non-profit tax returns, called “IRS Form 990s” for past years are freely available on several different online services,
such as GuideStar (www.guidestar.org). New users will need to create a free account to access tax returns.
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The US Agency for International Development (USAID) is historically the leading government
aid agency promoting the AGR. USAID is also the designated lead organization for Feed the Future
activities. Within the US government, two other organizations are also notable for their AGR
activities. The Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is an agency with a mandate that is
similar to USAID but with a comparably small budget. The US Department of Agriculture
(USDA) is another organization. In Africa, USDA also has dedicated staff and contractors who
implement programs which often resemble and even overlap with USAID programs. These
programs are managed by the Foreign Agricultural Service (USDA-FAS). Though all of these
agencies have had staff of their own in Africa since well before the AGR period, US development
agencies, like philanthropies, have often taken more of a management role, outsourcing
implementation to development contractors. Like philanthropies, US aid agencies also contribute to
policy-shaping efforts, often by financing independent groups that can influence legislatures and
public opinion. (See Ch. 4).

Outside the US government, a number of Western governments maintain their own development
agencies, such as Japan’s Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Britain’s Department
for International Development (DFID), and Germany’s Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
(KfW), also known as the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.

State & Multilateral Development Bank Financing
State and multilateral development banks, also known as development finance institutions, or DFIs,
are government agencies which distribute loans, typically at interest rates lower than commercial
banks, to public and private entities in developing countries to spur economic activity. Who a state
DFI lends to depends on its mandate, however state DFIs typically loan to private entities in ways
that align with their government-owner’s development agenda. Two examples which are especially
relevant to AGR include the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and Britain’s
CDC (formerly the Commonwealth Development Corporation, and, before that, the Colonial
Development Corporation). Nordic countries also have a number of DFIs which have committed
money to food and agriculture in Africa, including Norway’s Norfund, and Finland’s Finnfund.

While European Banks have been able to take an equity stake in the companies they invest in, OPIC
has not been able to. However, with the passage of the BUILD Act in 2018, OPIC merged with
USAID’s Development Credit Authority (DCA), forming a new agency, the US International
Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) in 2020. This new agency is able to take equity stakes
in companies.

Multilateral DFIs generally commit funds to developing country governments. However some, such
as the African Development Bank (AfDB), also invest directly in private sector entities. The
International Finance Corporation (IFC), an institution of the World Bank Group, lends to
private sector entities exclusively.

Private Equity
Private equity (PE) is a type of investment vehicle where different people pool their money, and
typically money from outside investors, to buy stakes in certain assets, usually companies, and apply
their business expertise to make the asset appreciate. PE funds generate profit by selling their assets
16 of 124

after they appreciate, but they can also make money through the business activities of their
investments.

Since 2006, Africa has seen a number of PE funds with a dedicated interest in food and agriculture,
however most PE funds invested in African food and agriculture have stakes in other, unrelated
sectors as well. DFIs often direct money through these funds to support agricultural projects. We
discuss various aspects of PE, including DFI involvement, extensively in Chapter 5.

Global Companies
The final type of funding towards industrial agriculture comes from private companies. Funding
might be direct spending -- such as setting up operations in a country -- or as part of a bilateral
agreement with a development organization, an African scientific council, or some other entity that
enters into a public private partnership agreement. For instance, in Chapter 3 we discuss how the US
government partnered with DuPont-Pioneer in Ethiopia and how Monsanto (now Bayer) works
with African scientific councils across the continent to jointly develop genetically modified crops. At
times, global companies have also partnered with aid organizations on AGR projects (see Ch. 5).

(2.2) Tracking the Early History of AGR
While accounts of the African Green Revolution typically trace its origins back to the World Food
39
Price Crisis of 2007-2008, several of the pillars which would support it later on were created a few
years earlier. In fact, even as some of the actors who would cite the 2007-2008 Food Price Crisis as
the impetus for their involvement had made substantial contributions in the sector before then.

In January 2002, the first group of African governments signed the Comprehensive African
Agricultural Development Plan (CAADP) compact. CAADP presented a framework for African
governments to transform the agricultural sectors in their countries from one primarily oriented
toward subsistence and which contributed little to economic growth at the national level into one
that more closely resembled an industry: growing crops to be sold in regional and international
markets. By June 2012, 30 African countries had signed their own compacts, each tailored to their
particular agricultural economies. CAADP compacts continue to guide agricultural development
today.

Reading the CAADP compacts, one sees the same themes articulated from as far back as 2002, well
before an “African Green Revolution” became a foreign policy priority in the United States or
Europe. For at least that long, the agenda of agricultural reform in Africa has been as much about
leveraging agriculture to foster a transformational change within African economies as it is about
feeding the hungry, conflating GDP growth with reductions in poverty and malnutrition. In its
CAADP compact, the Nigerian government said it “sees a private sector-led growth [sic] … as a key
element of its strategy to achieve faster, broad based growth in order to realize the Millenium
Development Goal (MDG) of reducing poverty and nutrition and the vision of becoming one of the
39
United Nations (2008) At High-level Segment of Commission on Sustainable Development, Secretary-General Calls
For ‘Second Green Revolution’ to Feed Burgeoning World Population. Press Release. May 14,
https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/envdev984.doc.htm ; Jarvis, Andrew (2009) Food Security: Putting Food on Plates.
Chatham House https://reliefweb.int/report/world/food-security-putting-food-plates
17 of 124

40
top 20 economies by 2020.” Similarly, Kenya’s CAADP compact describes that country’s
agriculture program as part of a larger effort “to transform Kenya into a newly-industrialized,
41
middle-income country … by 2030.”

In 2003, at its annual meeting in Maputo, national leaders of African Union (AU) member
countries signed the “Maputo Declaration,” committing each country to allocate at least 10 percent
of their budget to agricultural development within five years, in line with the existing CAADP
42
declarations. In 2004, Kofi Annan would popularize a name for the new cause. At a conference in
Ethiopia, he said, “Let us generate a uniquely African Green Revolution – a revolution that is long
43
overdue.” The phrase caught on. In 2006, at the African Fertilizer Summit in Abuja, African
leaders signed another agreement, pledging to increase the average amount of fertilizer used in their
countries from 8 to at least 50 kilograms per hectare by 2015 “to achieve the African Green
44
Revolution.”

The independence of Western involvement
Though African governments had some of their own ambitions, the United States’ and other
governments’ early forays into African agriculture were characterized by a favor for technological
solutions (see Chapter 3), and a general lack of support despite some earlier commitments.

In 2000, the governments of 189 countries, including every member of the Group of Eight (G8),
had signed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The eighth goal on the MDG list called
for new “partnerships” -- in this case, between poor and wealthy countries -- to end poverty by
2015. Agreeing to it, wealthy countries promised to increase their overseas aid allocations to reduce
45
poverty in the least developed countries in the world, especially in Africa. While wealthy countries
mostly failed to make a substantial increase to their aid allocations over the next decade, various
celebrity agitators, such as Bono and Jeffrey Sachs, cited the MDGs to rally support for agricultural
development in Africa, arguing that agricultural development would be the fastest way to alleviate
poverty, and that the MDGs obligated rich countries to commit more funds to the sector. Sachs, in
46
particular, also advocated for greater cooperation with the private sector.

At the G8 Summit in September 2005, Gleneagles, Scotland, member states agreed to support
CAADP, but critics argued their commitments were insubstantial. The United States, for instance,
40
(Nigeria) Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (2009) Nigeria ECOWAP/CAADP Compact. Policy
Document. http://docplayer.net/3156195-Nigeria-ecowap-caadp-compact.html
41
Government of Kenya (2010) The Kenya CAADP Compact. Policy Document.
http://gafspfund.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/8.%20Kenya_CAADP%20compact.pdf
42
AU (2003) AU 2003 Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security. Policy Document.
http://www.nepad.org/resource/au-2003-maputo-declaration-agriculture-and-food-security
43
IFDC (nd) Africa Fertilizer Summit. Website, https://ifdc.org/africa-fertilizer-summit/
44
NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (2006) Abuja Declaration. Policy Document.
https://africafertilizer.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Seventh-Progress-Report-on-the-Abuja-Declaration-on-Fertili
zers-for-an-African-Green-Revolution.pdf
45
UN (2000) List of Millennium Development Goals, and Goal 8 Targets and Indicators. Policy Document.
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/mdg_gap/mdg8_targets.pdf
46
Stewart, Heather. (2012) Celebrity Economist Bids to Head World Bank. The Guardian. March 3,
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/mar/04/jeffrey-sachs-beat-world-poverty
18 of 124

pledged $200 million annually to help African governments implement their CAADP plans and align
47
IEHA to CAADP. In a cable from a CAADP meeting in Kigali, State Department officials added
48
that USAID’s staff in Africa would also likely help governments shape their CAADP plans.

Despite the meek commitment by Western governments, Western companies who would supply the
inputs for the AGR remained interested. Recognizing the growing market for fertilizer in Africa,
Norwegian fertilizer giant Yara organized the first ever African Green Revolution Conference in
Oslo in 2006 -- the first iteration of what would eventually become the African Green Revolution
Forum (AGRF).

With African governments wanting to buy inputs, and Western producers wanting to sell them, the
AGR was only missing an underwriter.

That need was an opportunity for the BMGF. In 2006, BMGF launched its agriculture program,
hiring, in the words of University of Minnesota professor Rachel Schurman, “a cadre of
49
high-achieving, successful professionals,” to run it. Many of the top people in the agriculture
program had previously worked in the corporate sector, with a particularly large subset coming from
the management consulting field. “Coming from such backgrounds imbued the program’s early
50
leadership with a strong business orientation,” Schurman writes.

In September 2006, BMGF joined Rockefeller to launch the Alliance for a Green Revolution in
51
Africa (AGRA). BMGF contributed $625 million as of June 2018, or about 16 percent of all the
foundation's grant money toward AGR projects, making AGRA easily the largest single destination
for BMGF’s African agricultural support (see Fig. 2.2).

In its early years, AGRA filled a financing gap in Africa, underwriting the cost of inputs for the
African governments that wanted to purchase fertilizer and seeds to increase production yields. But
in 2007, the World Food Price Crisis moved African agricultural development to the fore of the
Western development agenda, bringing in new actors who had previously waited on the sidelines.

The Food Price Crisis takes hold
Around the time World Food Prices peaked in January 2008, many of the components of what
would characterize AGR were already in place. Incidentally, BMGF funded a World Economic
Forum (WEF) report, which WEF released in time for that month in time for its annual meeting
that year in Davos, Switzerland, on African agriculture. The report, titled “The Business Role in
Achieving a Green Revolution in Africa,” was written with advice from Unilever. It called on “global
47
Wikileaks (2007) Cable, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07NAIROBI1709_a.html
48
Ibid.
49
Schurman, Rachel (2018) Micro(Soft) Managing a ‘Green Revolution’ For Africa: The New Donor Culture and International
Agricultural Development. World Development 112: 180-192.
50
Ibid.
51
Vidal, John. (2016) Are Gates and Rockefeller Using Their Influence to Set Agendas in Poor States? The Guardian.
January 15,
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jan/15/bill-gates-rockefeller-influence-agenda-poor-nations-b
ig-pharma-gm-hunger
19 of 124

businesses” to join African governments and businesses and “global philanthropies” to train local
52
farmers to grow “high-value crops.”

Speaking at WEF, Bill Gates also promoted a new concept he called “creative capitalism.” Gates
defined the concept as encouraging global businesses to chase a selfish desire to look good in the
public eye by involving themselves in some of the world’s most pressing problems, just as they
53
chased a selfish desire for profits. With the world economy slowing and global businesses
becoming increasingly interested in the so-called “emerging” or “frontier” markets, the message was
attractive to the crowd of business and government leaders. At WEF, BMGF also announced $306
million for programs, including a sizeable grant to AGRA.

In the wake of the Food Price Crisis, a few US officials also articulated a new security dimension to
agricultural development. Testifying before the US Senate in favor of expanding the budgets for the
State Department and USAID in March 2008, retired Marine Corps general Anthony Zinni argued
that global security depended on developing the economies of poor countries. “We know that the
‘enemies’ in the world today are actually conditions: poverty, infectious disease, political turmoil and
54
corruption, environmental and energy challenges,” he said. Similarly, at a hearing of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on the Crisis, Sen. Robert P. Casey of Pennsylvania warned that
55
countries where hunger was endemic could become “breeding grounds for terrorism.”

While the emphasis on security was new to the AGR, invoking the threat of instability is common
throughout industrial agricultural discourse. Proponents of the first Green Revolution would stoke
fears of hungry masses becoming communists, as proponents of AGR have argued that hungry
56
masses will be more prone to allying with terrorist groups.

A New Vision for USAID
Coming up on the end of his second term in office with extraordinarily low approval ratings,
President Bush was in no position to expand the programs he had initiated into a comprehensive
program for agricultural development in Africa. Influential Americans looking to make agriculture a
new priority within the US government turned their attention to the next president.

In June 2008, a new group with a membership of 16 influential Americans called the Modernizing
Foreign Assistance Network (MFAN) released its first report, called “New Day, New Way: US
52
World Economic Forum (2008) The Business Role in Achieving a Green Revolution in Africa. Report.
http://www.wageningenportals.nl/sites/default/files/resource/business_role_in_achieving_a_green_revolution_for_afr
ica.pdf
53
Gates, Bill (2008) Bill Gates - 2008 World Economic Forum - Creative Capitalism. Speech,
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/media-center/speeches/2008/01/bill-gates-2008-world-economic-forum
54
Atwood, Brian, et al. (2008) Arrested Development: Making Foreign Aid a More Effective Tool. Foreign Affairs
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2008-11-01/arrested-development.
55
Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Responding to the Global Food Price Crisis, 110th Cong., 2nd
sess., May 14, 2008.
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg47118/pdf/CHRG-110shrg47118.pdf (Senator Bob Casey said at that
hearing, “increasingly we all understand that this is about security or insecurity in these countries that could be breeding
grounds for terrorism or at least the increase of terrorism.”)
56
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Foreign Assistance in the 21st Century,” which called on the still-undecided next president to elevate
international development to a foreign policy priority. The report called on the US government to
“rationalize organizational structures” and “partner with others to produce results” -- a broad
57
recommendation which could be interpreted in part as a call for greater private sector cooperation.
Echoing the security-development connection some military leaders had already made, MFAN
further argued that a “a high performing U.S. government civilian development corps would be “an
58
essential complement to a high-performing military force.”

Though MFAN was small and unknown outside of Washington, it had a powerful ally in the ONE
59
Campaign, which endorsed the report wholesale soon after its release.

ONE brought some political heft and wider support to what had until then been a policy document
for a niche audience. ONE had been launched in 2004 to generate public support and pressure
leaders in the rich world to commit more support to international development. According to
60
BMGF, the idea for ONE emerged from a series of conversations between Bono and Bill Gates.
From the beginning, BMGF was also ONE’s largest contributor, having given the organization $3
61
million at the end of 2004. (As of October 2018, BMGF’s support to ONE totaled more than $135
62
million.) With thousands of energetic members on college campuses around the US and a cadre of
high-profile supporters, ONE was a noticeable presence in the 2008 presidential election campaign,
and the organization frequently prodded the public and candidates to support agriculture in poor
63
countries.

By the time he assumed office in January 2009, President Obama was already vested in a program of
agricultural development in Africa. In his inaugural address, he said, “to the people of poor nations,
we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish
64
starved bodies and feed hungry minds.” At the G8 summit in L’Aquila, Italy that June, Obama
committed $3.5 billion to agricultural projects in support of African CAADP compacts and asked
57
MFAN (2015) New Day, New Way: US Foreign Assistance for the 21st Century. Website,
http://modernizeaid.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/New-Day-New-Way-U.S-Foreign-Assistance-for-the-21st-Cent
ury.pdf
58
Ibid.
59
ONE (2008) ONE Calls for a 21st Century U.S. Aid System. Press Release. June 12,
https://www.one.org/us/press/one-calls-for-21st-century-u-s-aid-system/
60
BMGF (nd) How We Work: ONE. Website,
https://www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work/Resources/Grantee-Profiles/Grantee-Profile-ONE.
61
ONE (2004) ONE Receives $3 Million from Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Press Release. December 4,
https://www.one.org/us/press/one-receives-3-million-from-bill-melinda-gates-foundation/.
62
BMGF (nd) Grantee Profile: ONE. Website,
https://www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work/Resources/Grantee-Profiles/Grantee-Profile-ONE.
63
Alarkson, Walter (2008) Cindy McCain and Michelle Obama Lend Voices to Anti-Poverty Ad. The Hill. August 21,
https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/other/42976-cindy-mccain-and-michelle-obama-lend-voices-to-ant
i-poverty-ad; ONE (2008) Nearly 1,000 Iowans Will Caucus for ONE Today, Highlighting Candidates’ Plans to Address Global
Poverty and Disease. Press Release. January 3,
https://www.one.org/us/press/nearly-1000-iowans-will-caucus-for-one-today-highlighting-candidates-plans-to-address-
global-poverty-and-disease/.
64
The White House (2009) President Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address. Speech.
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/01/21/president-barack-obamas-inaugural-address.
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his peers to join the effort. The new effort, later called the US Global Hunger and Food Security
65
Initiative (GHFSI), was eventually renamed Feed the Future.

New Vision, New Leadership
One of the changes US development reform advocates had most wanted was greater independence
for USAID. A more independent agency, under the leadership of a bold leader, they reasoned, could
66
shape US foreign policy instead of being a subject of it. Under president Obama, the reformers got
their bold leader. In January 2010, Obama appointed Raj Shah -- previously the head of the
67
agriculture program at BMGF, and one of the principal founders of AGRA -- to lead USAID. Shah
recruited another BMGF alum, Tjada McKenna, who had previously served as an executive in the
foundation’s agriculture program, to oversee the new initiative. Though Feed the Future was a
68
multi-agency initiative, under Shah, USAID quickly established itself as its lead agency.

From the start, Shah made it clear he wanted to involve the private sector in any agricultural
development plans. Announcing the premier of Feed the Future in May 2010 at an event hosted by
the Chicago Council, Shah invited people from the food and agriculture lobbies to make their
positions known to his agency: “If you’re from the private sector, tell us what countries and donors
can do to reduce constraints on business operations,” he said. “And please explore with us whether
69
our tools to encourage investment … would help you make the commitment to invest …”

In the field, personnel from USAID and other agencies went to work developing new agricultural
development plans, called “country investment plans” (CIP) for the 19 selected countries around the
70
world, including countries in Africa. Typically without visiting the rural areas which would be the
eventual site of any agricultural project, the teams met with government officials and businesspeople
71
in African capitals.

To avoid the kind of redundancies that often plague development programs, USAID personnel were
72
instructed to write CIPs to be complementary to CAADP plans. But whereas CAADP plans had a
broad perspective on a number of aspects of agricultural change, CIP had a narrower purpose, with
73
a focus on making agriculture in each country more attractive to private-sector investment.

65
Obama’s pledge was not the only AGR news to come out of L’Aquila. At the same meeting, Japan’s Prime Minister
Taro Aso and Brazil’s president Lula Da Silva agreed to join their governments in “promoting the agricultural
development of Mozambique.” It was the start of a cooperative relationship that would eventually lead to ProSAVANA.
66
Atwood, et al. (2008) Arrested Development.
67
Matz, Marshall. (2017) Shah to Lead Rockefeller Foundation: Implications for Global Food Security. AGRA. February 23,
https://agra.org/news/shah-to-lead-rockefeller-foundation-implications-for-global-food-security/
68
US Government Accountability Office (2013) Global Food Security: USAID Is Improving Coordination but Needs to Require
Systematic Assessments of Country-Level Risks. Report (GAO-13-809).
https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657911.pdf; see also Wikileaks (2010) Cable,
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10ACCRA149_a.html.
69
Shah, Rajiv (2010) Remarks by Dr. Rajiv Shah, Administrator. USAID. Speech.
http://web.archive.org/web/20100525073353/http://www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2010/sp100520.html .
70
GAO-13-809, p.24
71
GAO-13-809, p.30
72
GAO-13-809, p.25
73
GAO-13-809
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Following USAID’s lead, other agencies from other countries also embraced the new private-sector
emphasis. In September 2010, USAID joined aid agencies from across Europe and Japan, including
several G8 countries, to sign a “Bilateral Donors’ Statement” on the private-sector cooperation in
developmental aid.

“Rather than viewing the private sector merely as resource providers, we choose to recognize the
private sector as equal partners around key development issues and will enter into partnerships with local and
international companies of various sizes,” it read. “We aim to collaborate with companies that focus not
only on profit margin, but also on social and environmental impact, and whose work harmonizes
74
with our developmental goals” (Emphasis in original.)

Shah’s USAID also aligned itself more closely with AGRA. By 2010, the agency was aligning its
75
projects with the group in some Feed the Future countries. In 2011, AGRA listed USAID as a
“donor” for the first time in its annual report, with a contribution of $5.2 million -- more than
76
BMGF had given that year. As AGRA stated in its annual report, AGRA was “increasingly
becoming the partner of choice for many donors and development organizations,” at a time when
77
agricultural development was becoming a development priority for many of them. Today, AGRA
78
lists USAID as a “funding partner”.

Corporate partnership goes global
In 2011, just as wealthy countries deepened their commitment to the AGR, the AfDB released a
report finding that about a third (34 percent) of Africans belonged to the middle class -- almost 350
79
million people, larger than the entire population of the United States. The new figures became the
starting point for a number of articles in the business and development press about a “rising”
80
African middle class. Business publications in particular seized the hour to tout the emergent
African consumer as the driving force of the region’s economy, with a growing appetite for packaged
81
and processed food and drinks.

74
“Bilateral donors’ statement in support of private sector partnerships for development”, September 22 2010, United
Nations
https://www.enterprise-development.org/wp-content/uploads/Joint-Donor-Statement-1.pdf
75
AGRA (2010) Driving Real Change: AGRA in 2010. Annual Report.
https://agra.org/AGRAOld/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/agra-annual-report-2010.pdf.
76
AGRA (2011) AGRA in 2011: Investing in Sustainable Agricultural Growth: A Five Year Status Report. Annual report.
https://agra.org/AGRAOld/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/agra-annual-report-2011.pdf. Pg. 32.
77
Ibid.
78
AGRA (nd) Funding Partners. Website, https://agra.org/funding-partners/.
79
Ncube, Mthuli, et al, (2011) The Middle of the Pyramid: Dynamics of the Middle Class in Africa. AfDB. Report,
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid_
The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid.pdf.
80
The Economist (2011) The Hopeful Continent: Africa Rising. The Economist. December 3,
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2011/12/03/africa-rising; Smith, David. (2011) One in Three Africans is Now Middle
Class, Report Finds. The Guardian. May 5,
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2011/may/05/one-three-africans-middle-class.
81
Wonacott, Peter (2011) A New Class of Consumers Grows in Africa, The Wall Street Journal. May 2, 2011
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703703304576296663397991894.
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Rich-world governments and philanthropies were well poised to fold this newly-discovered African
consumer into their development plans. In 2012, the G8 joined its wealthiest member on the AGR
train, launching the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, with the aim of increasing
public expenditures to increase private investment in food and agriculture. Along with rich-world
and African governments, private sector companies, both African and international, were invited to
write “letters of intent” describing how they would invest in Africa in such a way as to meet the
82
development goals of their host country.

The emphasis on private-sector cooperation had already gone well beyond agriculture at this point,
and by 2015, when UN member states realized meeting the MDGs by the original deadline would be
impossible, and meeting them at any time would require substantially more investment that they had
originally anticipated, their new approach to alleviating hunger and poverty would register an even
83
deeper commitment to corporate partnership than before. As a guide to business partly written by
the UN Global Compact described the opportunity for business, “the SDGs aim to redirect global
public and private investment flows towards the challenges they represent. In doing so they define
84
growing markets for companies that can deliver innovative solutions and transformative change.”
Whatever agricultural development in Africa would become, it would look for the private sector as a
partner.

Conclusion
While accounts of AGR have widely focused on the global Food Price Crisis of 2007-2008 as the
spark that initiated the surge in capital investments into agriculture, the momentum was building for
some time before that. This distinction is important when considering not just the history, but the
future of this phenomenon, as it speaks to the motivation of some of its key proponents. AGR did
not begin as a rescue job for a continent in distress, an effort to “fix” African agriculture once and
for all by providing it with the technology, expertise, and financing that it had lacked until then after
the Crisis had revealed its essential flaws. Rather, the Crisis provided an urgency for a campaign to
expose African agriculture to private investment that was already underway.

In the ensuing years, however, the AGR’s relief mission has moved to the side in favor of a broader
mission of “modernization,” which proponents have described as a purpose in and of itself, bringing
with it all the positive benefits that the original mission of bringing relief to a continent in crisis was
supposed to. That private investors, seeing a benefit to their own interests, have chosen to help this
project along should not be cause for alarm, but a sign that the whole thing is working as intended.

82
New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (nd) About: Partners. Website (archived January 9, 2015),
http://web.archive.org/web/20150109163402/http://new-alliance.org:80/partners; New Alliance for Food Security and
Nutrition (nd) About: Commitments. Website (archived January 9, 2015)
http://web.archive.org/web/20150108202840/http://new-alliance.org:80/commitments.; (In January 2015, the New
Alliance claimed “Nearly 180 private sector companies, two-thirds of which are based in Africa …”)
83
Abshagen, Marie-Luise, et al. (2018) Hijacking the SDGs? The Private Sector and Sustainable Development Goals. Brot für die
Welt, German NGO Forum on Environment and Development, German NGO Forum on Environment and
Development, Global Policy Forum, Bischöfliches Hilfswerk,
https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPFEurope/Hijacking_the_SDGs.pdf. Pg. 8.
84
GRI et al. (20150 SDG Compass: The Guide For Business Action on the SDGs (2015) Report,
https://sdgcompass.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/019104_SDG_Compass_Guide_2015.pdf.
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This shift in how proponents talk about the AGR is representative of a larger change in discourse on
the rich world’s interactions with poor countries, where making the poor world safe for capitalism is
conflated with humanitarian benefits.

As AGR has faded into the background of public discourse, the purely humanitarian mission its
proponents once touted is becoming less of the central justification of the project. At the same time,
as Africa has fallen off as an attractive investment destination, PPPs have featured less prominently
in AGR efforts. However, the mission will likely remain the same as it did before the crisis as it did
after: to modernize African agriculture to the point that it becomes a minor component of African
economies.

(2.3) Making Sense of BMGF and USAID flows
Years after the AGR began, a number of government, multilateral, and philanthropic entities have
contributed their resources to the cause. However, the two entities which launched the effort in the
United States-- BMGF and USAID-- remain among the project’s largest underwriters. By tracking
their contributions over time, we can better understand how the AGR began and where it is heading.

To assess funding trends of the BMGF and USAID -- two of the largest donors of the AGR -- we
ran a scrape of their agricultural grants databases from 2013-June 2018 (see Ch. 1 for methodology). In
total, our data accounts for $4 billion in expenditures from USAID, $3.8 billion from BMGF, and
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$42 million from USDA during this time. Our analysis of the data reveals some interesting trends
and may shed light on future trends.

AGR developmental financing was underway before the Food Price Crisis
As the world food price crisis took off in 2007, BMGF had already established itself as a leader in
agricultural development financing. In fact, while the food price crisis may have been a catalyst for
agricultural investments and AGR efforts more generally, its efforts to transform African agriculture
were already underway well before the crisis began. This fact is all the more apparent when looking
at BMGF’s grants database for grants distributed immediately before and after the Crisis.

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The majority (530 out of 660) entries listed in the USDA database do not list a dollar amount. This figure is only for
the 130 entries which did list a dollar amount.
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Figure 2.1 BMGF Grants for African Agriculture by Month

Data source: BMGF (not adjusted)

The above chart considers only the beginning of BMGF’s agricultural grants through the aftermath
of the Food Price Crisis. In the second half of 2006, BMGF made three grants in excess of $10
million, including its $96 million ($121 million, adjusted) grant to AGRA in December 2006.

Two other notable grants from this period include the $14 million ($17.8 million) to International
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Development Enterprises, a group which promotes “business solutions to poverty,” in November
2006 “to increase access of smallholder farmers to improved crop varieties using a variety of
production and distribution strategies.” BMGF also provided $12 million ($15 million) to the Asian
Vegetable Research and Development Center in Tainan, Taiwan “to increase vegetable production,
marketing and consumption and foster rural development in order to improve the health of
vulnerable groups, in particular poor women and children in sub-Saharan Africa.”

As these grants indicate, BMGF was financing some massive interventions in African agriculture
well before the food price crisis.

BMGF’s funding led USAID early on
BMGF began funding agricultural projects in 2003, but it increased spending in this area in 2006
with the launch of its agricultural program under Raj Shah’s leadership, and then even more in 2007
through 2009. In these early days before the Food Price Crisis, it would be fair to say the BMGF was
the primary AGR underwriter outside Africa, as its grants far exceeded USAID disbursements
during these years. (Table 2.1, larger figures each year are in bold.)

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International Development Enterprises (undated) home page, https://www.ideglobal.org/
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Table 2.1 USAID and BMGF African Agriculture Support by Year

Year BMGF Grants USAID Disbursements

2003 $25,000,000 $85,539,370
2004 $0 $108,964,929
2005 $6,000,000 $108,022,596
2006 $129,688,403 $103,723,556
2007 $479,919,571 $89,131,857
2008 $376,987,879 $103,407,385
2009 $319,158,890 $101,698,527
2010 $144,172,801 $174,889,664
2011 $365,891,429 $259,752,121
2012 $298,686,497 $325,681,575
2013 $316,750,031 $381,398,386
2014 $400,523,654 $416,524,911
2015 $333,126,580 $542,389,302
2016 $244,125,601 $551,959,133
2017 $394,657,792 $500,010,141
2018 $48,961,094 $219,011,631
TOTAL $4,277,103,398 $4,156,111,834
Data source: USAID/BMGF (not adjusted)

From 2007 to 2010, BMGF grants steadily declined while, in 2010, after Shah left BMGF to become
USAID Administrator, USAID’s disbursements to agricultural projects in Africa increased steadily.
From 2010 to 2014, BMGF and USAID’s financial expenditures towards African agriculture rose
steadily and in lockstep, with the exception of another BMGF surge in 2011.

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Figure 2.2 Money Contributed to African Agriculture (2003-2017)


The project that BMGF started, USAID took up as more funding came online. Beginning in 2010,
USAID’s expenditures rose -- even as BMGF’s grants fell -- before reaching a peak in 2015 and
2016. Given the typically slow realization times for federal financing, we do not interpret the slow
rise in USAID disbursements to reflect a change in the level of interest, either in Congress, the
Obama Administration, or the Agency. Rather, the slow uptake was likely due to the delayed effect
of a large amount of promised funding coming related to Feed the Future becoming available
and/or being disbursed to recipients.

It is important to note that the financial flows recorded in the BMGF and USAID databases are not
exactly the same. While BMGF only records “grants”, or money it gave to outside organizations,
USAID records “expenditures”, including money that it spent internally. There are also differences
in how the two organizations spend money. While the total funds committed to African agriculture
are similar, BMGF contributed to a smaller number of groups, representing a greater concentration
of money within a chosen portfolio.

BMGF and USAID have also contributed to some of the same organizations. In total, we identified
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35 organizations which had received money from both organizations. For most (25) of those
groups, BMGF was the larger sponsor, with contributions that greatly outsize USAID’s. Table 2.2
shows the ten largest recipients of combined BMGF and USAID support, with the larger figure for
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We excluded recipients for which the total amount for one organization was a negative value.
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each in bold. (See Supporting Documents for a complete list of organizations which have received
money from both USAID and BMGF.)

Table 2.2 Organizations which received both BMGF and USAID support
USAID recipient BMGF USAID
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Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa $625,804,913 $1,315,706
International Food Policy Research Institute $159,264,978 $21,553,273
African Agricultural Technology Foundation $143,106,305 $3,923,000
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture $118,455,733 $2,528,641
Catholic Relief Services $26,875,891 $88,454,323
Michigan State University $47,854,609 $64,983,383
Technoserve $87,269,951 $23,218,957
Cornell University $91,944,189 $14,411,897
International Fertilizer Development Center $25,000 $102,388,886
Mercy Corps $1,400,000 $76,278,747

The rise of the “value chain” at USAID
Looking only at USAID, we can see how the major focus of the agency’s work in African agriculture
has shifted over time. While expenditures with the term “rural incomes” accounted for more than a
third of all expenditures going to African agriculture in 2005, by 2010, the year Feed the Future
came online, the phrase had essentially vanished from the agency’s lexicon. In its place, USAID
began using the term “value chain” -- a term which had only been associated with any expenditures
since 2005 (Fig. 2.3). Even as USAID’s total expenditures in African agriculture increased steadily
through 2016, allowing for greater diversity in the agency’s agenda, spending with a “value chain”
component accounted for near or above 20 percent of expenditures some years.

Figure 2.3 USAID Expenditures by Keyword, as a Percent of Total Africa Agriculture Expenditures (2003-2018)
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According to AGRA’s 2011 annual report, USAID contributed $3.2 million, however, this contribution was not
recorded in the database, so we can’t compare it with the figure that was recorded.
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Data source: USAID

This difference is rhetorical, but it represents an important shift at USAID. The term “value chain”
was coined by a business school professor to describe how industrial processes generate wealth for a
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company and society at large. The fact that USAID began associating this term with more than a
quarter of its expenditures in African agriculture in 2010 suggests that both the agency’s leadership,
and its rank and file, had by then adopted a change to USAID’s purpose in African agriculture. The
priority was no longer about developing agriculture for the benefit of rural areas, but leveraging
agriculture to develop national economies.

We can see the difference more closely when looking at different USAID projects which employed
these terms. Below is the description for a “rural incomes” project in Mozambique which began in
2007.

The Agriculture Research Competitive Grants Project (COMPETE) developed a
competitive grants system that contributed to strengthening the capacity of the Government
of Mozambique’s agricultural research system and to cost-effectively promote the adoption
of improved agricultural technologies. The project contributed to the country’s poverty
reduction plan and USAID/Mozambique Strategic Objective 6: Increase in Rural
Incomes Sustained, which supported the U.S. Presidential Initiative to End Hunger in
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Africa.

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Harvard Business School professor Michael Porter coined the term and popularized it in his book Competitive Advantage
Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance (1985).
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Spreadsheet: > “Data Scrape” > “USAID”
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By contrast, a description for a “value chain” project in Zambia, called LEAD, that began in 2011
demonstrates a more robust business vocabulary, and an emphasis on enhancing the private sector
more generally.

LEAD was initially designed to catalyze the transformation of Uganda’s agricultural
economy by facilitating competitiveness in select agricultural value chains… LEAD
activities focus on private sector agro-input suppliers and commodity buyers to generate
sustainable benefits for large numbers of smallholder farmers through better, more
business-oriented relations with farmers as their customers and suppliers… Coupled with
the facilitative value-chain approach, LEAD employs an adaptive planning process … This
built-in learning process allows for quick incorporation of new information and
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opportunities, which leads to improved project performance and results.

Even though COMPETE and LEAD had a similar mission -- to develop African agriculture -- they
suggest a different approach. While both projects discuss benefits for small farmers, LEAD stresses
that any benefits to farmers will come through a profit-driven system which the project is helping to
create. The LEAD description also demonstrates a business language in describing the internal
workings of the project -- “adaptive planning process,” “new information and opportunities,”
“improved project performance and results.”

Also in 2008-2009, we can see expenditures associated with the word “policy” or “policies” also
rose, after having nearly disappeared in 2005-2007. Expenditures with the word “seed” in their
descriptions began to rise in 2008. However total expenditures with either of these phrases in their
descriptions were small compared to “value chain” expenditures.

By following BMGF and USAID expenditures related to African agriculture, we can see the US
government agency became the lead American underwriter for a project that had been initiated by a
philanthropy. While USAID had supported agriculture projects in Africa in the past, by following
BMGF’s effort to adopt a continent-wide effort, the agency also adopted a new mission: leveraging
agriculture to develop national economies.

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Spreadsheet: “Data Scrape” > “USAID”
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CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF PRIVATE EQUITY

(3.1) Understanding private equity
Private equity (PE) is an investment vehicle wherein a group of people pool their own money and,
typically, money from outside investors in dedicated accounts, called “funds,” to buy stakes in
companies with growth potential. Through their ownership stake, private equity firms are able to
exert influence over the company, applying their knowledge of business, the field it operates in, and
their personal connections in financial markets to reform the business and accelerate its growth. As
the business grows, the value of the fund’s share increases, to the point that the firm can recoup its
expenses and make a profit through a sale -- a transaction called an “exit.” The hands-on approach
that PE typically involves, and the emphasis on long-term profit realization, makes it distinct from
other investment vehicles, such as hedge funds, which typically have a shorter-term outlook and
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have a less direct involvement in their investees’ reform.

Figure 3.1 Number of Food & Agriculture Funds by Strategy Category and Vintage Year

Data source: Preqin

The rise of private equity in African food and agriculture
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Though fewer in number than PE funds, there are some hedge funds with an interest in African agriculture. The firm
Altima Partners has three -- Altima One World Agriculture Fund Limited, Altima One World Agriculture Fund
LP, and Altima One World Agriculture Master Fund.
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In recent years, private equity has become one of the primary vehicles for channeling both public
and private capital into food and agriculture-related projects in Africa. As you can see in Figure 3.1,
the number of funds with at least some investments in food and agriculture reaching a “vintage,” or
the investment stage of its life cycle, rose substantially in 2006, again in 2009, and stayed high for the
ensuing years before exploding earlier this year.

One reason for the uptick around 2009 may be that an international interest in farmland investments
that had begun with the 2007 Food Price Crisis was just then registering in the form of new funds.
But it also follows a global surge in private capital over the past twenty years. Starting in the late
1990s, US regulators eased limits on private companies’ fundraising capabilities, making it easier for
them to draw capital from large institutional investors, such as foundations, insurance companies,
and pensions. Prior to these reforms, a company generally had to become public and submit to the
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accompanying disclosure process to accept investments from institutional investors. When, after
the 2008 financial crash, the US Federal Reserve initiated a policy of “Quantitative Easing,” the
interest rates on bonds -- typically the bedrock of many institutional investors’ portfolios -- fell
substantially. Accordingly, investors turned to “alternative classes” to stash their money, including
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PE funds.

The most obvious result of these changes has been a huge increase in the amount of money under
private control. In 2000, private assets under management (AUM) were estimated to be less than $1
95 96
trillion. By 2017, that figure had increased to $5 trillion. Industries that can effectively attract and
channel that money into appreciating assets have reaped the benefits, thrusting “alternative classes”
into the mainstream of world finance. In 2016, 58 percent of institutional investors were invested in
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PE -- three percent more than were invested in hedge funds. The private investment boom shows
no signs of stopping: as private capital has surged, publicly traded capital has fallen, making private
investment not just an attractive option but, increasingly, a necessary component for institutional
98
investors. At least in the near term, PE funds will likely continue to have a large pool of investors
to draw from.

The transformative role of PE in African food & agriculture
While in the Global North, PE managers are primarily concerned with increasing the exchange value
of the assets under their control, in Africa, PE managers first have to convert those assets --
93
Partnoy, Frank (2018) The Death of the IPO. The Atlantic. November 2018,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/private-inequity/570808/.
94
EMPEA (2014) Pension Funds and Private Equity: Unlocking Africa’s Potential. Report.
https://www.empea.org/app/uploads/2017/06/Pension-Funds-and-Private-Equity_Unlocking-Africas-Potential_2014_
Final.pdf. Pg. 6. (“In a global low-interest rate environment, institutions over-weighted to treasury bonds or fixed income
struggle with the question of how to produce the minimum returns necessary to cover liabilities … Private equity is
helping these institutions bridge the gap.” )
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Elvin, Christopher (2016) Private Equity Update. Preqin. Report,
https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/qm/pdf/preqin-private-equity-update-kpmg-pe-forum.pdf.
96
McKinsey & Company ( 2018) The Rise and Rise of Private Markets. Website,
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/industries/private%20equity%20and%20principal%20investors/our%
20insights/the%20rise%20and%20rise%20of%20private%20equity/the-rise-and-rise-of-private-markets-mckinsey-global
-private-markets-review-2018.ashx
97
Elvin (2016) Private Equity.
98
Partnoy (2018) Death of the IPO.
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including both companies and natural resources -- into tradable assets in the first place. PE
managers in the United States and the United Kingdom benefit from economies that are highly
financialized already: the business people they work with at the companies under their control are
well versed in financial terminology and often value their business above all for how much money it
99
generates for investors, rather than the quality of the goods and services it provides. In Africa, PE
managers are engaged in a process of acculturation. In a manner similar to how development
contractors speak of changing farmers’ “mindsets” and “attitudes” to compel them to think of
agriculture “as a business,” in PE industry publications, PE managers speak of a need for African
business owners to think of their companies as financial assets that can be bought and sold. As Papa
Ndiaye, CEO of AFIG Funds explained to the Emerging Markets Private Equity Association
(EMPEA) in 2017,

[C]aptains of industry are not seeing their companies with the steely-eyed, detached look of an asset
owner. Emotional attachment, particularly in the frontier markets of Africa, has been an
impediment to private equity, period. [Business owners] personally identify with the company and
develop emotional thinking— “I’m selling my company”— as opposed to strategic thinking: “I am
selling an asset that I have matured in order to continue to maximize my return on investment.”
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Severing that emotional attachment will be a factor in the maturation of the market.

PE managers often say they are “active” investors, shaping businesses to meet their expectations. In
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Africa, they are also shaping how entrepreneurs think of businesses in the first place.

(3.2) Determining a focus within African PE
We based most of our research on PE in Africa on a dataset from Preqin, an industry resource that
is often quoted in trade publications on the subject. The dataset includes information on a vast array
of funds that have invested in Africa, the sources of capital which back them, and the assets they
have acquired. Preqin has built its database through public records requests to public pension fund
managers and other public information sources, and from information volunteered from the PE
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firms themselves.

In the universe of funds invested in Africa, funds invested in food and agriculture are very much in
the minority. Fortunately, since every fund listed in the dataset is tagged with an “industry focus”
listing areas of investment, separating funds with a food and/or agriculture focus was simple.

99
For a good account of how American business became a subset of the finance industry, see Rana Foroohar’s Makers
and Takers: How Wall Street Destroyed Main Street (2017), alternatively called Makers and Takers: the Rise of Finance and the Fall
of American Business; Thomas Frank’s Listen, Liberal: Or Whatever Happened to the Party of the People? (2017), Andy Stern and
Lee Kravitz’s Raising the Floor: How a Universal Basic Income Can Renew Our Economy and Rebuild the American Dream (2016);
and Duff McDonald’s The Golden Passport: Harvard Business School, the Limits of Capitalism, and the Moral Failure of the MBA
Elite (2017).
100
EMPEA (2017) Views from the Field: Control Investments in Sub-Saharan Africa. Report,
https://www.empea.org/app/uploads/2017/05/VFTF-SubSaharanAfrica_WEB.pdf
101
Acculturation has a lot to do with how America became financialized as well, it would seem. As McDonald writes in
The Golden Passport, “when students enter business school, they believe that the purpose of a corporation is to produce
goods and services for the benefit of society. When they graduate, they believe that it is to maximize shareholder value.”
102
Preqin (2017) Preqin Private Capital Performance Data Guide. Report,
http://docs.preqin.com/reports/Preqin-Private-Capital-Performance-Data-Guide.pdf. Pg. 4.
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Parsing Food & Agriculture funds
Out of 851 funds with investments in Africa that Preqin included in our dataset, 217 (25 percent)
were either tagged with an “industry focus” of food, agriculture, or beverages, or which made an
investment in one of those categories. We have termed this group “F&A funds.”

Within that group, parsing funds which were only invested in food and/or agriculture, or where food
and/or agriculture was an overarching theme, required a fund-by-fund analysis. While some funds
invested in areas that appeared entirely outside the food and agriculture realm, such as aerospace and
mining, many F&A funds were tagged with an industry focus such as “logistics,” “transportation,”
or “financial services.” Since agriculture touches all of these categories and others, we anticipated
that, in many cases, what appeared to be a highly diversified fund could actually be a specialized one
with complimentary investments related to the sector.

To make these distinctions, we divided the group into three strategy categories: Funds which were
only invested in food and agriculture we have called “F&A-exclusive funds.” Funds which were
invested in multiple areas, but exhibited an overall food and agriculture theme to their portfolios we
have called “F&A-dominant funds.” Finally, funds which were only partly invested in food and/or
agriculture we have called “F&A-partial funds.” Partial funds were the largest category by number,
followed by exclusive funds, and dominant funds. (See ch. 5.4 for more details on each of these
strategy categories.)

Table 3.1 F&A Funds by Strategy Category

Category Funds of Total
Partial 171 78%
Dominant 13 6%
Exclusive 33 15%

Data source: Preqin

Limitations to the dataset
Unfortunately, understanding exactly how much money flows through PE funds is impossible. In
many ways, PE remains an opaque sector of the global economy, one of the larger pillars of the
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so-called “shadow banking system.” Though Preqin is the industry leader in collecting data on PE,
its dataset has limitations which makes answering some of our most basic questions difficult. Basic
numbers, like how much money a fund accumulated before closing (its “final size” in industry
parlance), are not always available. Moreover, through our own, independent research, we were able
to identify some relevant PE funds which were not captured in the dataset. We have included these
funds in a list in the Supporting Documents folder.

103
Martin, Michelle (2012) Q&A - What is Shadow Banking and Why Does it Matter? Reuters. February 7,
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-shadow-banking-qa/qa-what-is-shadow-banking-and-why-does-it-matter-idUKTR
E81611Q20120207
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The lack of transparency extends to where the funds disperse their money. Most of the deals Preqin
tracked do not come with a dollar amount, and others identify a PE firm but not the fund through
which it moved the capital.

(3.2.1) Commitments I: Why it’s hard to figure out where PE gets the money
Since PE firms are not required to identify investors to its funds, and investors are not required to
identify themselves, data surrounding who contributes to PE funds and how much they contribute is
especially difficult to track.

While Preqin identified 665 outside investments, or “commitments” to F&A funds, it was only able
to assign a dollar amount to 220 (33 percent) of them. Preqin lists 19 types of investors, including
hedge funds, endowments, and sovereign wealth funds, invested in F&A funds. But for all but two
of those categories, the majority of commitments are listed without a dollar amount. Moreover, as
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Preqin readily acknowledges, some commitments are not listed at all.

We have no idea how many commitments are unlisted, but undoubtedly, a large share of the total go
untracked. Out of 217 F&A funds, the dataset only listed any commitments, at any level of detail, for
105
130 (60 percent). For these reasons, it is difficult to answer questions like what proportion of a
fund’s total capital comes from a particular investor.

Moreover, since Preqin can only track capital commitments on the side of the fund, and not the
106
outside investor, the dataset has no record of when outside investors made a commitment. Our
insights into fund commitments are akin to opening a stranger’s pantry: we see what commitments a
fund has stocked, but we can only guess when it received them. Accordingly, it’s very difficult to
track trends in financing by investor category with the dataset.

However, when comparing F&A funds to the broader category of PE invested in Africa, we were
able to make some useful inferences, particularly concerning the involvement of government-run
development finance institutions.

(3.3.2) Commitments II: The Role of Development Finance Institutions in F&A funds
Capital from state and multilateral development finance institutions (DFIs) appears to be a bedrock
F&A funds, regardless of type: In all, we identified 65 state and multilateral DFIs investing in F&A
funds, including OPIC, CDC, AfDB, IFC, and many other smaller ones from the Europe and the
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One area that is particularly difficult to track, for researchers and regulators alike, are family offices. A growing sector
of the world financial system, family offices manage investments for a single family, or a group of families. To have a
single-family office, a family is generally required to have around $250 million in assets, but the details therein are murky.
Even the number of family offices around the world is the subject of speculation. Recent estimates put the total number
of offices at around 10,000, with the amount of wealth under their control in the neighborhood of $4 trillion. (For more
information, see https://irei.com/publications/article/rise-family-offices-10-fold-growth-less-decade/) For our dataset,
Preqin was able to identify two commitments from family offices to F&A funds, but it is likely there are more that it was
not able to track. (Source: personal communication with Preqin account manager.)
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Out of all 843 funds, the dataset only identified any commitments for 489 (58 percent).
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While the “Commitments” sheet does have a column for “Date Reported,” all the dates are in 2016 or later, even for
funds which closed well before then. Accordingly, we consider these numbers useless for our purposes.
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Middle East. According to our analysis, funds with either a partial, dominant, or dedicated F&A
strategy rely more on DFI financing than PE funds across strategy categories invested in Africa. To
perform this analysis, we limited our analysis to funds which reached a vintage since 2006 (the year
the first F&A exclusive funds reached a vintage) and for which the dataset listed any commitment.
These conditions limited our analysis to 401 funds total, including 118 F&A funds. We found that
F&A funds in every strategy category were more likely to have received DFI support than all funds
across categories.

Figure 3.2 Number of Funds Receiving DFI Support by Strategy Category (2006-2018)

Data source: Preqin

Similarly, we found that DFI financing constituted a larger share of the overall pool of resources of
F&A funds than non-F&A funds. Looking only at those commitments for which Preqin was able to assign a
dollar amount, we found DFI capital made up a proportionally larger share of known commitments in
F&A funds. While DFI commitments constituted only about a third of known commitments to all
funds, DFI support made up at least half of known commitments in every F&A fund strategy
category.

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Preqin did not classify DFIs, so we added this classification independently. Preqin variously lists DFIs as “banks,”
“investment companies,” and “government agencies.” Since a very small number of PE commitments were also made by
government development agencies, we also included those in our list for the purposes of this report.
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Figure 3.3 Sources of Known Support by Strategy Category (2006-2018 Vintage)

Data source: Preqin

It is entirely possible that these figures overstate the involvement of DFI in PE in Africa: Preqin was
able to track a larger share of commitments from DFIs than from some other investor categories.
However, since the proportion of commitments Preqin logged was similar across investor categories
for both F&A and non-F&A funds, the difference in proportion suggests that F&A funds are more
reliant on DFI support than non-F&A funds.

The significance of DFI involvement in F&A funds
The lopsided involvement of DFIs in F&A funds is significant for several reasons. One, it indicates
that many -- in fact, most -- of this type of private investment vehicles advancing AGR depend on
public development investment. Secondly, it speaks to the long-term nature of these investments, as
DFIs typically maintain a long-term outlook in their investment decisions -- one of the stronger
appeals for PE firms, particularly ones investing in inherently risky areas where managers need time
to introduce reforms, such as agriculture.

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Apart from providing some bedrock capital, DFI investment can also help PE funds attract other
sources of capital, as these investments serve as a kind of social and environmental certification for
PE funds. European and American DFIs generally conduct a “due diligence” process on prospective
investments to ensure they meet certain environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria. In
this way, a DFI’s commitment is a signal to other investors -- including other DFIs -- that a fund is
environmentally and socially sound, and will not exacerbate existing corruption problems. With a
number of investors desiring a “responsible,” “impact,” or “social” angle to their portfolios, the de
facto ESG certification that DFIs provide can be a major benefit to PE firms, leading to a multiplier
effect wherein a single DFI commitment encourages other capital inflows.

From the perspective of DFIs, PE funds also serve a useful purpose in supporting AGR. Whereas
DFI managers often have a multi-region portfolio and work out of a Western capital, PE managers
typically have a narrower focus and live and work in a major city in Africa, like Lagos, Nairobi,
Johannesburg, or Cairo. PE managers have a local knowledge, and by committing money to their
funds, DFI managers can leverage that knowledge to support their own ends. PE managers may also
have connections to regional capital markets which they can utilize to bring in additional resources.

DFI involvement in F&A dominant and exclusive funds
Within F&A funds, dominant and exclusive funds, which have strategies entirely based around food
and agriculture appear the most likely to have received DFI support. DFI capital at these funds also
appears to constitute a larger share of their total capital base. As Stuart Bradley, a senior partner at
Phatista Group said in a 2015 report on PE in agribusiness in developing countries, DFI money
has distinguished this specialized group from other, more established funds invested in food and
agriculture.

As the investment strategies of European … DFIs have evolved—along with their heightened
interest in Africa and growing concerns over food security—a gap in the market has emerged for
development equity specialists like Phatisa. The larger private equity managers have traditionally
focused on generalist funds and are less interested in specialist food and agriculture. As a result,
development equity managers have created a niche for themselves by combining commercial
capital with U.S./European… DFIs and the African development banks, all of which are
focused on industry growth, job creation, entrepreneurship, and improving environmental and social
108
governance.

Our findings match Bradley’s narrative about the emergence of these highly specialized funds. Two
of the largest DFIs, OPIC and CDC, began investing in F&A partial funds in 1994 and 1996, and
109
they continued to support these funds over the following years. The first F&A dominant and F&A
exclusive funds vintaged in 2006, around the time Western governments began to finalize their AGR
financing schemes and programs. In other words, DFI support for these funds is not incidental. It’s
through their support that these funds exist in the first place.

(3.3.3) Commitments III: Where the rest of the money comes from
108
Aulisi, Andrew, et al. (2015) Private Equity and Emerging Markets Agribusiness: Building Value Through Sustainability. Credit
Suisse, CDC, EMPEA, IFC, World Wildlife Fund for Nature,
https://newgenerationplantations.org/multimedia/file/6ca1e8d8-f98a-11e4-91a6-005056986313. Pg. 11.
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Preqin dataset
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Apart from DFIs, funds with a partial or dedicated F&A focus receive capital investments from a
variety of sources. Some sources are commercial banks, insurance companies, and pensions.

Commercial Banks
While commercial banks have been involved in African agriculture, particularly in South Africa, our
dataset registered few commitments by commercial banks into F&A funds. While the dataset lists a
number of banks, most of these are FDIs. One exception is JP Morgan Chase, which committed
an $8 million loan through its Social Finance unit to Pearl Capital Partners’ African Agricultural
Capital Fund (AACF) in 2011. In that case, JP Morgan Chase also benefited from a 50 percent
110
loan guarantee from USAID’s DCA.

In a statement, Shah explained the logic behind the agency’s assistance. “Investors increasingly see
the promise of Africa’s agriculture sector, but the transaction risks are often perceived to be too
high,” he said. DCA would help to “lower the investment hurdles for private partners that want to
invest with us.” Peter Scher, JP Morgan’s head of corporate responsibility, said the collaboration was
111
a “landmark effort.”

Insurance Companies
Insurance companies appear to provide a significant amount of African capital for F&A funds. Most
of the insurance commitments recorded in the dataset originate from African firms, including
Zimbabwe’s Zimre Holdings and South Africa’s Sanlam Life Insurance. Non-African insurance
companies which have invested in these funds include Transamerica of the United States and CNP
Assurances of France.

Pensions
Pension funds often invest in PE funds because pension funds’ tendency to favor long-term returns
112
and stability over short term gain fits with typical PE investment strategies. The dataset lists a
number of pension funds invested in F&A funds, a large number of which are public funds for
state-level employees in the United States. Public pension funds in Missouri, Illinois, New York,
New Jersey, California, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Hawaii, Florida, New Mexico, New Jersey,
Wisconsin, South Dakota, Connecticut, Nebraska, and Washington State have all invested in F&A
funds. One fund -- TPG’s Rise Fund, a highly diversified fund with investments in agriculture, as
well as health care, education, and other areas -- has attracted commitments from eight state and
local US public pension funds. In Europe, most public pension fund commitments tracked in the
spreadsheet originate from Denmark, and sometimes follow DFI investments from that country.
110
Rockefeller Foundation (2011) USAID, Foundations Capitalize New Equity Fund for East African Agribusinesses.
Philanthropy News Digest. September 30,
https://philanthropynewsdigest.org/news/usaid-foundations-capitalize-new-equity-fund-for-east-african-agribusinesses.
111
JP Morgan Chase & Co. (2011) USAID and Impact Investors Capitalize New Equity Fund for East African Agribusinesses.
Press Release,
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/0x0x503668/9ac4c15d-1797-4ffe-baff-ca357520ee14/JPM_News_2011
_9_28_Current.pdf (USAID and JP Morgan Chase’s involvement with Pearl Capital is also discussed in the Oakland
Institute report “Irresponsible Investment,”
https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/OI_Report_Irresponsible_Investment.pdf)
112
Jankovic, Marta (2017) Why Long Term Investors are Investing in Private Equity. Invest Europe: Opinion. October 30
https://www.investeurope.eu/news-opinion/opinion/blog/2017/why-long-term-investors-are-investing-in-pe/.
40 of 124

Looking ahead, African pension funds may provide a substantial share of local capital for PE funds.
Within the last decade, Nigeria and South Africa changed their pension regulations to accommodate
PE investment, specifically. Since 2011, South Africa has allowed pension funds to commit up to ten
percent of their AUM to PE. Since 2010, Nigeria has allowed pension funds to commit up to 5
percent of AUM to PE, with a requirement that 75 percent of that capital be invested within Nigeria,
potentially creating a multi-billion dollar capital pool for the exclusive benefit of PE funds with a
113
dedicated focus in Nigeria. In other countries, such as Botswana and Kenya, where pension fund
commitment to PE is allowed but more loosely regulated, pension fund managers are directing more
114
capital to PE, according to a 2014 industry report. In the future, the reports’ authors state, African
115
pension funds commitments to private equity may be essential to “unlocking Africa’s potential.”

Just in the last few months, Fanisi Capital, a Kenyan PE firm, has benefited from an influx from
local pension funds. In September, Fanisi was in the closing fundraising stages for its Fanisi Capital
Fund II, which will invest in “high growth consumer sectors,” including agriculture. Speaking to
Business Today, Fanisi’s CEO, Ayisi Makatiani, said more than 40 percent of the fund’s capital thus far
116
had come from local sources, including twelve pension funds.

Endowments
While the involvement of university endowments in PE in Africa has been previously recognized by
117
the Oakland Institute’s report on the firm Emergent Asset Management, our dataset records
university endowment commitments to only a few F&A funds. The University of Texas Investment
Management Company (UTIMC) made two commitments of $100 million to Helios Investors II
and Helios Investors III funds. The University of Colorado Foundation also made a commitment
for an amount not listed in our dataset to Helios Investors II. The Helios funds were exclusively
invested in Africa but highly diversified, with investments in telecoms, healthcare, infrastructure, and
other areas, along with agriculture. UTIMC also invested $75 million in Black River Food Fund 2,
which has invested in food and agriculture in emerging markets around the world, including in
Africa.

Actis’ Actis Emerging Markets 3 has seen an especially large influx of endowment money, with
the endowments of Colorado College, Swarthmore, Whitman, and the Universities of Colorado,
Texas, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Denver all having committed money. Actis Emerging Markets 3 is
113
The Commonwealth, et al, “Pension Funds”, p.3 (Nigerian pensions held around $25 billion in 2013, according to
Nigeria’s National Pension Commission, up from $7 billion in 2008.)
114
The Commonwealth, et al, “Pension Funds”, p.14
115
For precedent, the report suggests African pension funds look to Latin America’s pension funds, which were the first
in the developing world to invest in PE. The first Latin American country to allow for investment in PE, the report
notes, was Chile, following a system-wide reform in 1980 (during the Pinochet era of economic reform at every level of
the economy).
116
BT Correspondent (2018) Fanisi Capital Invests Sh400m in Second School. Business Today. September 13,
https://businesstoday.co.ke/fanisi-capital-invests-sh400m-second-school/ (This announcement was made after we
received the dataset from Preqin. None of these commitments were recorded in our dataset.)
117
Oakland Institute (2011) Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa. Policy Brief.
https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/OI_EAM_Brief_1.pdf
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also highly diversified, with investments spread around the world. Our data set only accounts for one
F&A investment this fund made.

(3.3) Types of funds: the means by which PE invests money
PE funds tend to follow a single type of financing which corresponds to the life stage of the targeted
companies. These broadly fall into 19 categories, according to Preqin’s taxonomy. Of these, the most
common F&A funds generally belong to the following six:

Early Stage funds invest in emergent companies that are only starting to take form. Within the Early
Stage category, Preqin recognizes two subtypes. Seed funds back companies still in or just graduating
from the idea stage. Start-Up funds invest in companies that have formalized themselves but have
not yet reached a commercial stage. These funds support new companies with product development
and marketing. Venture (typically referred to as “venture capital”) funds support companies that are
still new and have a high-growth potential.

Growth funds -- the largest category by far, accounting for 88 of the 217 funds -- tend to buy large,
but not majority, stakes in companies that have a track record for generating profits but which still
have substantial growth potential. These funds usually reform the company using their own money
and without adding debt to the company’s balance sheet. Buyout funds similarly invest in established
companies, but are more likely to add debt to the company.

Balanced funds invest in every stage of a company’s life, including its early and growth stages. Finally,
Natural Resources funds invest in companies with rights to a valuable natural resource, such as a mine,
or farm land. (We discuss F&A natural resources funds in funds in more detail in Ch. 5.6.)

While we identified F&A funds in every category, 177 (81 percent) of the 217 funds fell into these
six categories.

Diverse portfolios: F&A-partial funds
F&A-partial funds are the largest category of F&A funds, with 171 out of 217 funds belonging to
this category. In these funds, food and agriculture investments sit alongside several other focus areas
which may be profitable but totally unrelated to food or agriculture, like mining, oil & gas, media, or
housing. Diversity gives a fund stability, which makes it appealing to outside investors whose primary
interest is in seeing a return, not development.

Funds in this category often promote themselves as helping investors bank on Africa’s status as a
rising frontier economy by placing their money in companies which represent a cross-section of the
continent’s fastest-growing industries, including but not limited to food and agriculture. Often, the
backing firms describe any development outcomes stemming from their investments as a positive
side effect of a primarily profit-generating activity, though not necessarily a primary objective for the
fund. As an example, this is how one such firm, CardinalStone Capital Advisers (CCA), a firm
based in Lagos and focused on Nigeria, describes itself:

At CCA, we seek to invest in high potential SMEs [small and medium enterprises] that can be
nurtured to becoming segment champions in sectors that we deem strategic to the development of the
local Nigerian and regional West African economies. Our mission is to become the most sought after
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investment partner, for the most discerning investors and business owners in the markets where we
operate. We pursue this mission by combining a proprietary investment strategy, developed through
unrivalled market insights, with a thematic and resourceful approach to investment execution and
portfolio company support. Our objective, on every investment, is to create lasting value and
118
success for our investor and investee partners alike.

Other examples of funds in this category include, Development Partners International’s African
Development Partners II, a growth fund, and Acorn Private Equity’s Acorn General Fund I,
which is oriented to late-stage development.

Since 1994, F&A-partial funds have invested $1.7 billion in projects in F&A projects in Africa that
119
Preqin was able to track. Generally, they do not invest in companies whose primary business is
crop production, instead dealing with companies at the downstream side of agricultural processes,
such as processors and retailers. These target companies more closely resemble other industrial
producers and are more easily integrated with financial markets.

On average, F&A-partial funds are also the most highly capitalized F&A funds. Our dataset only
lists the final size for 117 of the 171 funds in this category. Of those funds, the average final size was
$289 million. By comparison, the average final size of all 606 funds invested in Africa for which
120
Preqin could provide a figure was slightly lower, at $250 million. The difference suggests that
some of the larger PE funds at work in Africa may have branched out into food and agriculture
because their capital resources are large enough that they can tolerate the additional risk such funds
are likely to entail.

A narrower focus: F&A-dominant funds
F&A-dominant funds do not invest exclusively in companies whose primary business is F&A, but
their funds still exhibit an F&A theme. Funds in this category typically exhibit two forms: in some
cases, the fund is a generalized rural development fund, with a portfolio broadly concerned with
financial access, microfinance, and electrical power, along with food and agriculture. Firms backing
these funds typically emphasize an ESG benefit to prospective investors. The other type of fund in
the “dominant” category is one that invests in some companies with a dedicated F&A focus, as well
as others which are not themselves F&A companies, but whose activities compliment the fund’s
F&A investments. In total, we identified 13 F&A-dominant funds. Of the eight funds for which the
dataset included a final size, the average capitalization was $65.9 million. Preqin was able to account
for $91.4 million dispensed through these funds to F&A projects since 2006.

To take one example, 8 Miles’ buyout-oriented 8 Miles Fund I invested capital from DFIs and
private groups with a “social investing” bent in seven companies. Four of these companies (Awash
Wine Share, Beloxxi, Biyinzika Poultry, and Verde Beef) are primarily food processors. But the other
companies are also very much entwined with the sector: Ethiopia’s Eleni & Associates is primarily
118
CCA (nd) About Us. Website, http://www.cardinalstonepe.com/.
119
Preqin dataset
120
Preqin dataset
43 of 124

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concerned with developing African commodity exchanges, while Uganda’s Orient Bank lends to a
122
variety of SMEs, including agriculture companies and retailers.

Eagle Chemicals -- an Egyptian polymer and resin manufacturer -- is perhaps the least invested in
food and agriculture, but as 8 Miles notes on its website, the company produces chemicals for food
123
packaging.

ManoCap’s Sierra Fund, a venture fund invested exclusively in Sierra Leone, has followed a similar
strategy. While it has a stake in Sierra Leone’s largest seafood company, it has also acquired shares in
several other companies that directly relate to it, including a company that makes ice for seafood, a
logistics company that specializes in transporting and storing seafood, and a mobile payments
124
company.

Staying on the farm: F&A-exclusive funds
In total, we identified 33 funds with an exclusive F&A focus, what we have called “F&A-exclusive
funds.” These funds are invested entirely in companies that are primarily involved in food and/or
agriculture, most, though not all of which, either grow or process crops. Preqin was able to track
125
only $45.9 million that moved through these funds to projects in Africa since 2006.

Funds that are wholly invested in F&A are typically smaller than partial F&A funds. The dataset lists
a final size for 19 out of 33 funds in this category. Within that group, the average final size was $160
million. Most hold stakes in farming companies, but they may also own stakes in businesses
representing other stages within a related agricultural process as well. (See 3.3.2 for more on vertical
integration.)

As their investments tend to involve sourcing raw materials, and thus “provide opportunities” for
small farmers, backing firms typically promote these funds as having a strong ESG orientation. Not
coincidentally, many of them also enjoy support from DFIs and foundations, and showcase these
commitments as evidence of their social and environmental stewardship. (See Ch. 3.3.2 for more on
DFI support among F&A funds.)

121
8 Miles (nd) Our Investments: Eleni. Website, https://8miles.com/our-investments/eleni.
122
According to its annual report, about 15 percent of advances Oriental paid in 2017 went to agricultural businesses:
https://www.orient-bank.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/OBL-ANNUAL_REPORT_2017_FINAL_revision.pdf
123
8 Miles (nd) Our Investments: Eagle Chemicals Group. Website,
https://8miles.com/our-investments/eagle-chemicals-group.
124
CDC (nd) Sierra Investment Fund. Website,
https://www.cdcgroup.com/en/our-investments/fund/sierra-investment-fund/
125
Preqin dataset
44 of 124

Injaro’s growth fund Injaro Agricultural Capital Holdings, for instance applied commitments
from AGRA and the Soros Economic Development Fund to acquire stakes in five companies in
West Africa involved in seed and livestock production and agricultural retail.

Other examples of F&A-exclusive funds include Africera’s Africera Partners Fund, Quantum
Global Group’s QG Africa Agriculture fund, Pearl Capital’s African Agriculture Capital Fund, and
Phatista’s Phatista Food Fund II.

(3.3.1) Deals I: Where PE puts the money
By number of investments, PE is overwhelmingly concentrated in the “value addition” side of food
and agriculture -- that is, in processing and distribution, rather than in production of raw materials.
This distinction is especially true for F&A-partial funds.

The dataset registers two types of investments on part of PE funds: buyout, where a fund acquires a
stake in an established company, and venture, where the fund puts money in a new company. The
dataset lists 199 buyout and 75 venture deals where the company’s “primary industry” was listed as
126
food, agriculture, or beverages. In these cases, the fund still retains a stake in the company. Often,
a single company is listed in multiple deals, as different funds buy and sell shares to each other.

Separately, the dataset also lists buyout and venture exits, where the fund has sold its stake. In total,
the dataset accounts for 34 buyout exits and 4 venture exits.

Our dataset registers deals in buyout deals in 29 countries, and buyout exits in 13. More than a third
of all buyout deals occurred in South Africa; the next six countries nearly accounted for another
third (Table 3.2; see the “Deals by Country by Year” spreadsheet, included separately, for a complete
list of the number of deals by year and by country).

Table 3.2 Top Seven Countries for Buyout Deals and Exits

Country Buyout Deals Buyout Exits
South Africa 73 12
Egypt 13 5
Nigeria 13 1
Ethiopia 12 0
Ivory Coast 10 4
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Or listed as “Food & Ag.” for venture deals and exits. These classifications include beverages. See Spreadsheet “F&A
buyout deals” in the dataset for the complete list.
45 of 124

Kenya 10 1
Tanzania 7 2
Data source: Preqin
As venture deals and exits are less common, the dataset lists deals in only 22 countries for these
types of transactions. While there is some overlap between countries with the highest concentrations
of buyout and venture deals, venture deals are even more concentrated in a few countries, with the
top six countries accounting for 72 percent of the total.

Table 3.3 Top Seven Countries for Venture Deals and Exits

Country Venture Deals Venture Exits
Kenya 18 0
Uganda 8 0
South Africa 8 2
Egypt 6 0
Rwanda 5 0
Ethiopia 5 0
Zambia 4 0
Data source: Preqin

F&A investments on the rise
Looking at deals since 1994, when the first F&A deal was made, we found that the number of deals
involving food, agriculture, and beverage companies has increased over time. Over that period, F&A
investments saw two surges, one in 2007, when most F&A investments were concentrated on the
food side of food and agriculture, and then another, much larger one in 2012, when agriculture deals
took up the largest share (Fig. 3.4).

Figure 3.4 Buyout Deals by Year and Industry (1994-2018)
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Data source: Preqin

The 2012 boom appears to have been the first in a trend, with every year since having seen more
total deals than every year prior to 2012. It is possible the sudden rise in deals in 2012, which was
concentrated in agricultural companies, was related to the emergence of the New Alliance for Food
Security and Nutrition that year, which was specifically intended to spur private investment in this
area.

One explanation we can eliminate for the 2012 boom is that F&A deals simply rose in tandem with
other areas of PE investment in Africa. As a proportion of all buyout deals, F&A buyout deals have
increased steadily since 2006 (Fig. 3.5). In 2017, F&A buyouts nearly matched 2012 as a proportion
of all buyouts, accounting for 18.75 percent of all deals recorded that year.

Figure 3.5 F&A Buyout Deals as a Proportion of All Buyout Deals (2006-2017)
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Data source: Preqin

(3.3.2) Deals II: Vertical integration involving crop production
Just as PE firms concerned with acquiring companies aim to transform them into tradable assets,
PE firms active in agricultural production are similarly transforming the assets under their control --
agricultural land and the labor that works it -- into financially productive entities that can be read by
investors and traded on financial markets.

In all, we identified 21 companies which were the subject of a buyout or venture deal where “crop
production” was listed as one of the company’s sub-industries. 18 different firms were involved in
these deals. Independently, we were able to find 15 additional funds invested in crop production
which were not captured in the Preqin dataset.

Growing crops is typically one of the lowest-margin sub-sectors of an agriculture production system.
Unsurprisingly, funds that invest in crop production often invest in other, related sub-sectors, either
through its farm business or through another investment. These investments work together to fulfill
a broader strategy, within which crop production is only one stage of a vertically integrated process.

Methods of vertical integration
The most direct way that a PE fund can achieve vertical integration is by acquiring a company that
has already integrated several stages of an agricultural process within itself and expanding it.
127
Industry reports suggest African agricultural companies are already consolidating. Typically, these
127
Aulisi, “Private Equity”, p.11. (As Neethling says of Africa, “One of the big trends in the region has been
consolidation.”)
48 of 124

mergers are happening without any urging from PE managers, but the trend is making food and
agriculture much more attractive for PE investment. As the previously mentioned 2015 industry
report notes, “the consolidation of highly fragmented primary production operations in a number of
regions [including, but not limited to Africa] could attract greater PE investment in the sector,
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particularly in plays to achieve vertical integration.”

Speaking specifically about Africa for that same report, Carl Neethling, Chief Investment Officer for
Acorn Private Equity, said “One of the big trends in the region has been consolidation. The sector
needs a few highly sophisticated farmers to achieve scale and thus become more attractive to private
129
equity.”

A recent example of this investment strategy at work comes from Rwanda. In 2013, Fanisi Capital’s
130
Fanisi Venture Capital Fund acquired a stake in ProDev Group Holdings, which already had
two subsidiaries involved in separate stages of maize farming and marketing. The first, ProDev
Rwanda, handles, dries, and stores maize; the second, Minimex, sells branded maize to the general
131
public, and maize products to animal feed processors and brewers. Typical of F&A funds, Fanisi’s
132
fund also benefited from DFI support. With investment from Fanisi, ProDev was able to expand
133
its storage capacity and build a new plant to process bran for cattle feed.

Another way that PE firms achieve vertical integration is by acquiring stakes in multiple businesses
in physical proximity of each other and at different stages of an agricultural process, integrating them
through common ownership, if they were not already integrated through business relationships. The
F&A-dominant funds 8 Miles Fund and Sierra Fund both offer examples of this strategy at work
(see Ch. 5.4).

Finally, a firm may acquire a farm -- or, in rare cases, build one itself, a so-called “greenfield” project
134
-- and then build additional, supporting businesses around it. One example of a firm which has
pursued this strategy is SilverStreet Capital. Through its Silverlands Fund, SilverStreet channeled
capital from DFIs, including OPIC, CDC, and the Danish International Investments Fund, two
128
Aulisi (2015) Private Equity. Pg. 12
129
Aulisi (2015) Private Equity. Pg. 11
130
Preqin dataset
131
Fanisi (nd) Fanisi Investments in Prodev Group. Website, http://www.fanisi.com/index.php/index/portfolio#1.
132
Preqin dataset
133
Gachiri, John (2013) Fanisi Capital Injects Sh251m in Second Rwandese Firm. Business Daily. May 8,
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/markets/Fanisi-Capital-injects-Sh251m-in-second-Rwandese-firm/539552-184646
8-11j0ll8z/index.html.
134
“Greenfield” is a general term for building a commercial site on previously uncommercialized land.
49 of 124

Danish pension funds, and the Multilateral Insurance Guarantee Agency, into a group of large farms
in five countries in Southern and East Africa.

After establishing large-scale farms, SilverStreet added other, integrated businesses. In its Zambia
operation, for instance, SilverStreet began with a beef ranch, but, according to its website, it has
since begun constructing feedlots and a processing facility to capture more of the ultimate value of
135
its steers. As part of its “community engagement” efforts, SilverStreet has also added facilities in
surrounding areas for local farmers to disinfect their own cows. SilverStreet describes these facilities
as both a charitable cause -- helping small farmers -- and a benefit to its own bottom line: with a
healthier cow population, small farmers “will provide the business with a regular, healthy source of
136
cattle into the feed-lots.”

Considering the lengths some firms like SilverStreet and 8 Miles go to vertically integrate a particular
agricultural process, it is worth wondering whether the end-goal is really an exit at all. For virtually
the entire history of PE in Africa, exits have been happening at a much lower rate than deals, a fact
137
demonstrated by our dataset and discussed in industry documents as well. In that environment, it
is worth considering whether managers at these firms see exits as the end goal, a possibility, or
merely a backup plan to a more immediate strategy of holding onto their investments and expanding
them for profit.

(3.4) Other types of F&A funds
While F&A funds generally resemble other PE funds not invested in the sector in that they are
primarily involved with buying, reforming, and selling companies, a few F&A funds operate outside
this mode of business, instead taking a more hands-on approach to the underlying natural resource
base of an agricultural economy.

Purpose built: natural resources funds in F&A
Most of the funds we invested in crop production were not built specifically to acquire agricultural
land. However, eight funds listed in the dataset were also listed as “natural resources” funds, a term
Preqin uses to distinguish funds which are primarily invested in appreciating natural resources. Most
of these funds are F&A-exclusive funds. Within that group, natural resources funds are a minority.

135
SilverStreet Capital (nd) Silverlands Ranching. Website,
https://www.silverstreetcapital.com/investments/silverlands-ranching-limited.
136
Ibid.
137
See for instance Aulisi, Andrew, et al. (2015) Private Equity and Emerging Markets Agribusiness: Building Value Through
Sustainability. Credit Suisse, CDC, EMPEA, IFC, WWF,
50 of 124

Some examples include Silverlands Fund (see ch. 3.3.2), IFU’s Danish Agribusiness Fund,
OMIGSA Alternative Investments’ Nigerian Agriculture Fund, and Voxtra’s Voxtra East
Africa Fund. Typically, the firms backing these funds (like other funds investing in Africa) take an
active role managing these assets, adding infrastructure to increase their financial value.

Timber and Agriculture - a relationship in PE?
Timber funds are listed as a separate fund type in Preqin’s taxonomy, like growth or venture funds.
Among all funds invested in Africa tracked in our dataset, 21 fell into this category, so it was natural
to wonder if some of these funds had also invested in agriculture, since forest land cleared for
timber is often converted to agriculture. Of the 21 timber funds, only one, Moringa Fund was also
listed as having an F&A focus. Another eleven F&A funds occupied a different fund category, but
are listed in our dataset as having a focus in both timber and agriculture (see Table 3.4).

Table 3.4 F&A Funds with a Focus in Timber and Agriculture

Name Manager Type
Africa Joint Investment Fund Qalaa Holdings Buyout
Agri-Vie Fund Exeo Capital Buyout
Agri-Vie Fund II Exeo Capital Expansion / Late Stage
Agricultural Rural Impulse Fund Incofin Investment Mgmt. Venture Debt
Catalyst Fund I Catalyst Principal Partners Expansion / Late Stage
Fusion African Access Fund Fusion Capital Growth
Lereko Metier Capital Growth Fund Metier Growth
Metier Capital Growth Fund II Metier Growth
Moringa Fund Moringa Partnership Timber
Park Street Capital Natural Resource Fund VI Park Street Capital Fund of Funds
Truestone Impact Fund Truestone Impact Investment Mgmt. Growth
Voxtra East Africa Agribusiness Fund Voxtra Natural Resources

Data source: Preqin

Discerning whether there is a connection between these funds agricultural and timber investments is
difficult. Several of these funds are highly diversified. Fusion African Access, for instance, invests
in retail, pharmaceuticals, and even software, along with timber and agriculture. Other funds, such as
Truestone Impact, have invested in Asia and Africa. Moringa Fund has invested in Latin America
and sub-Saharan Africa.

Some funds have a narrower focus on a particular geography and industry, which would suggest a
relationship between these investments is or was at least more plausible. It is worth noting that four
of these funds have some variation of the word “agriculture” in their names, making the apparent
presence of timber in their portfolios especially curious. To take one example, Voxtra East Africa
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Agribusiness, which closed at the end of 2013, only invested in agriculture and timber in East and
Southern Africa. However, our dataset does not list any of the funds deals or exits. An archived
138
version of Voxtra’s website from 2013 does not list any timber investments. As of this writing,
139
Voxtra’s did not list any past or present timber investments on its website.

(3.5) The future of private equity in African food and agriculture
Investing in agriculture is, in many ways, still a process of making a natural resource legible to the
world of finance, turning land into an asset, and crops into financial products whose movements can
be recorded in a spreadsheet. For now, this process is largely being managed by highly-specialized,
dedicated firms willing and interested to devote the time and expertise required to make African
agricultural resources legible to the financial world. As the food processing sector in Africa already
has a number of factories and other established companies, it is already more accessible to generalist
investors with large pools of capital. While the generalists mostly represent the PE world, that could
change.

As PE firms continue to turn investments in food and agriculture into vertically integrated systems
of production and distribution, we may see specialists branch into other fields, pushing portfolio
companies in the financial services or technology sectors, for instance, into agriculture. Similarly, if
the generalists begin to see African agriculture as a less risky proposition, they may seek to acquire
those funds, or acquire the same expertise to chart a path in agriculture on their own. These
possibilities are not mutually exclusive, and either way would see a greater involvement by investors
in the rural life of some parts of Africa.

The precedent of other regions
As they expand their reach, PE may also draw from the experience of poor countries elsewhere in
the world where the agricultural sectors are more accommodating to outside investment, such as
South Africa and Latin America.

Any kind of agricultural investment in South Africa necessarily makes use of legal structures unique
to that country stemming from apartheid and subsequent land reform efforts. Despite these unique
traits, PE managers are recognizing similarities between their experience in South Africa and the rest
of the continent and looking for ways to apply their knowledge to the rest of the continent. As Ward
Anseeuw et al. wrote in one 2012 paper, as investors have become interested in African agriculture
140
more generally, South Africa has emerged as “a favorable platform for financial experimentation.”

South Africa’s Musa Group is a case in point. The firm opened for business in 1995 and has spent
most of its history investing in its home country. But recently, Musa has branched into other
Southern and East African countries, opening dedicated funds for Botswana, Namibia, and
Tanzania. As executives from Musa Group, said recently of these three countries, “they have similar
138
Voxtra (nd) Portfolio. Website (archived July 29, 2013),
http://web.archive.org/web/20130729064153/http://voxtra.org/portfolio.
139
Voxtra (nd) Portfolio.
140
Anseeuw, Ward, et al. (2012) New Models of Production and Investment in South Africa. Études Furales. Report,
https://www.cairn-int.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=E_ETRU_190_0147.
52 of 124

development challenges to South Africa, so we felt we could successfully apply the expertise we had
141
gained from investing in South Africa.”

Not all the northward movement is motivated by the “carrot” of opportunity, however. As South
African food markets become more crowded -- not just with domestic production, but also with
imports -- both the country’s investors and agricultural companies are being pushed to find other
opportunities elsewhere. “In a way many South African companies haven’t been forced to look at
opportunities in the rest of the continent,” Willem Meyers of Zeder Investments, a South African
agricultural conglomerate, said in 2012. “There are still good investment opportunities in South
142
Africa, although they are getting fewer.” (We discuss Zeder more in Ch. 6.5.)

If South Africa is precedent, it could mean agricultural finance in Africa could evolve beyond the
realm of specialized firms to attract the involvement of mainline institutional investors, such as
commercial banks. Commercial banks may acquire PE firms, or start new ones of their own. But
they may also chart a path that is distinct but benefits from norms and standards shaped in large
part due to PE’s involvement in the sector. In 2012, Anseeuw, et al, noted that several South African
banks, including ABSA, Standard Bank, and Rand Merchant Bank Limited, had already adopted
a strategy of “directing primary production” without owning land. At the time, about 30 to 40
143
percent of the South African cereal crop was produced in this manner every year, they say.

Main line investors like these could also be an avenue for international investors still attempting to
secure a foothold in African agriculture. South Africa’s Standard Bank, for instance, is 20 percent
144
owned by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, a state-owned bank.

Latin America has been another source of inspiration for some AGR financiers. In communicating
its Transformation of the African Savannah Project to the world, AfDB leaders have explicitly, and
favorably, compared economic and ecological conditions in some parts of Africa to those of Brazil.
Given these comparisons, it is worth noting that a few F&A exclusive funds we examined, such as
AlphaMundi Group’s Prometheus fund, responsAbility’s responsAbility Agriculture I, SLP
fund, and Proterra Investment Partners’ Black River Food Fund II, have simultaneously
145
invested in Africa and Latin America.

The enabling environment
No matter how well capitalized or how sophisticated, however, there are limits to what money and
expertise can achieve on their own. Particularly in agriculture, investors still need an “enabling
environment” to reduce the risks of their business ventures. But many of the steps to making rural
141
AVCA (2016) AVCA Member Profile: Musa Group. Fact Sheet,
https://www.avca-africa.org/media/1514/avca-member-interview-musa-group_final.pdf.
142
Maritz, Jaco (2012) ‘A really big opportunity.’ Inside PSG’s $46 million Zambian Farming Deal. How We Made It in Africa.
July 6, https://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/a-really-big-opportunity-inside-psgs-46m-zambian-farming-deal/18022/.
143
Anseeuw, Ward, et al. (2012) New Models.
144
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (2007) ICBC Buys up 20pc of Standard Bank (South Africa). Press Release.
October 25,
http://www.icbc-ltd.com/icbcltd/about%20us/news/ICBC%20Buys%20up%2020pc%20of%20Standard%20Bank%20
(South%20Africa).htm.
145
Preqin dataset
53 of 124

Africa safe for global finance -- making laws more accommodating to new technologies, expanding
land tenure, and mapping soil conditions, building rural roads, etc. -- are still costly, time-consuming,
and cannot generate profit on their own. For that reason, how, and to what degree, larger investors,
including financiers and multinational food and agriculture companies, become involved will likely
depend on the success of the aid agencies, philanthropies, and African governments in making rural
Africa safe for global capitalism on their behalf.
54 of 124

CHAPTER 4: MAPPING INPUTS (REGULATION,
POLICY AND NETWORKS)
Introduction
“What needs to happen now is for the government to continue withdrawing from the seed sector in favor of the private
146
sector.”

Just three mega-companies -- Bayer (which recently acquired Monsanto), Dow-DuPont, and soon,
147
Syngenta-ChemChina -- “[control] 70% of the agrochemical industry.” Across Africa, AGR
donors have partnered with these companies to facilitate market for, and purchase of, hybrid and
genetically modified seeds and inorganic fertilizer. However, these proponents cite two core barriers
to increasing use of these technologies:

1) Geographic and political chokepoints: industrial agricultural proponents have long
complained that strong government regulations, heavily taxed points of entry and
insufficient road networks have stiffened the distribution of both imported and locally
produced inputs.
2) Slow farmer adoption: Historically, farmers across sub-Saharan Africa have been wary of
adopting costly inputs, including seeds and agrichemicals, due to previous poor experiences
148
and high costs.

AGR proponents have taken many steps to counter these barriers. Some, such as the Alliance for a
Green Revolution in Africa, work with input suppliers to subsidize seeds and chemicals, hoping a
low cost will persuade farmers to use. Others, such as USAID, lobby African governments to ease
restrictions and pass laws that allow foreign agribusiness firms to operate in these countries.

In this chapter, we map half a dozen major projects that fall under US efforts to increase use of
hybrid maize, genetically modified seeds, and chemical fertilizer across Africa. We have also included
country-specific maps of biosafety and biotechnology highlights in Appendix 2.

(4.1) Hybrid Maize
Hybrids “are created by crossing, or breeding, two different ... parent lines with desired
149
characteristics to combine into a hybrid.” They are considered to be more precise and uniform
146
USAID (2002) Request for West Africa Seed Program. Call for Proposals. Pg. 51-52.
147
Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society (2018) The Era of Corporate Consolidation and the End of Competition
Bayer-Monsanto, Dow-DuPont, and ChemChina-Syngenta. Research Brief,
https://haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/haas_institute_shahidi-_era_of_corporate_consolidation_end_of_c
ompetition_publish.pdf.
148
Nyantakyi-Frimpong, Hanson and Rachel Bezner Kerr (2015) A Political Ecology of High-Input Agriculture in Northern
Ghana. African Geographical Review 34(1): 13-35.
149
DuPont (nd) The Science Behind Hybrids. Website,
.http://www.dupont.com/corporate-functions/our-approach/global-challenges/food/articles/science-behind-maize-hy
brids.html
55 of 124

than open-pollinated varieties of seeds, but also often require more inputs -- such as fertilizer and
water -- and thus come at a higher cost to farmers.

Due to both their supposed uniformity and cost, major AGR proponents, especially the USG,
consider hybrids a concise way to both increase farmer yields and incentivize private companies to
invest on the continent. This is especially true with hybrid maize varieties.

In this section, we highlight four key hybrid maize projects. These are select case studies and by no
means an extensive list.

West African Seed Alliance and West African Seed Program
The West African Seed Alliance (WASA) and West African Seed Program (WASP) are two programs
headed by USAID that operate within ECOWAS countries. A key focus of these programs was to
increase the availability and adoption of hybrid maize seed across West Africa. According to project
documents, USAID emphasized hybrids for their supposed high yields, profitability and
non-competition from public African breeders (described below). Prior to WASA, a majority of
plant breeding in West Africa was located within state research councils, and mainly produced
non-hybrid seed. There was little foreign, private sector involvement in seed markets. WASA and
WASP sought to majorly shift the sector away from public breeding and towards private supply.

We analyzed WASA and WASP through publicly available documents as well as a 300-page
collection of documents made available to us by an outside researcher.

Table 4.1 West African Seed Alliance and Program
150
WASA (2006-2011) WASP (2012-2017)
Total Funding $13.5 million $9 million
Funded By USAID + others USAID
Facilitated By USAID USAID
Implemented By AGRA, CNFA, ISU CORAF/WECARD
Private Partners DuPont Pioneer + Monsanto n/a

In total, our mapping demonstrates how WASA and WASP have:

1) reformed, and in one case drafted new seed laws in five West Africa countries to make it
easier for foreign companies to enter the seed sector;
2) used these laws to attractUS companies, including Monsanto and DuPont Pioneer, to
select West African countries;
3) in some cases, introduced hybrid seeds to West African countries for the first time.

150
USAID (nd) West Africa Seed Alliance. Website,
https://partnerships.usaid.gov/partnership/west-africa-seed-alliance-wasa.
56 of 124

Importantly, the project was driven by -- and contributed to -- USAID’s “strategy for sustainability”:
151
“to gradually turn over as much of the seed production business as possible to the private sector.”

Project planners at USAID celebrated progress toward achieving this goal. In Mali, they wrote, “the
government is now totally out of the business of producing foundation seed, having turned it
152
entirely over to the private sector.” Officials were pleased that foreign companies were entering
the region. In a call for proposals to lead WASP, officials wrote:

Only recently have international seed companies shown interest in investing in West Africa, in part
because of the West Africa Seed Alliance (WASA) and also because of the 2009 ECOWAS seed regulation
which makes cross-border seed sales in West Africa possible, greatly expanding the potential market
for any given seed. [DuPont] Pioneer already has a representative in Ghana, AgriServ, to test and
produce hybrid maize seed locally. The company has started growing maize year-round under
irrigation to supply fresh maize in the Accra urban area. Monsanto likewise has a West Africa
153
representative, Kemseed in Dakar, Senegal, testing and marketing its varieties. (emphasis added)

Policy liberalization under WASA/WASP stood to benefit private companies, not public plant
breeders. In project planning documents, USAID acknowledges that hybrid seeds are dominated by
international seed companies and largely out of reach of African breeders:

The reasons for the scarcity of breeder seed are numerous. Government plant breeders working at
their respective national research institutes lack a) technical capacity to produce such seed, b)
sufficient government funding to carry out their trials, and c) access to hybrids (due to lack of connections
154
to international seed companies). (emphasis added)

While project documents indicate planners were pleased with progress, there were also some
setbacks. WASA took years to get off the ground, and made overall less progress than desired. And
among Africans, planners wrote, there was concern that WASA was “too American, dominated by
USAID and US seed companies and that any future alliance should be African led,” and that it
155
“need[ed] to be African led if it is to be sustainable.”

However, policies implemented under WASA/WASP have had lasting implications. As we discuss
below, in some countries, hybrid seeds were introduced with mixed results.

151
USAID (2002) Request for West Africa Seed Program. Call for Proposals. Pg. 55.
152
Ibid. Pg. 38-9.
153
Ibid. Pg. 38.
154
Ibid. Pg. 39.
155
Ibid. Pg. 45.
57 of 124

Figure 4.1 West Africa Seed Alliance Timeline

Advanced Maize Seed Adoption Program
The Advanced Maize Seed Adoption Program (AMSAP; 2013-2018) was a keystone Feed the
Future/New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition initiative, and a public private partnership
between DuPont Pioneer (itself a subsidiary of the chemical giant DuPont), USAID, and the
governments of Ethiopia and Ghana. In both countries the project was facilitated by ACDI/VOCA,
a Washington, DC based development contractor.

The project was first initiated in Ethiopia, where DuPont Pioneer wanted to increase its share of the
156
seed market. When project negotiations began in 2012, Ethiopian government officials resisted
for two key reasons. First, they worried state producers of hybrid seeds would not be able to
compete with DuPont Pioneer’s products. Second, they were skeptical of DuPont Pioneer’s ability to
build equitable agricultural development in country:

The Ethiopian government did not immediately buy into the partnership vision. In initial discussions,
[the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture] expressed concerns about supporting DuPont, a for-profit
player, seeking to further their own business interests. Historically, Ethiopia had taken a state-led
approach to food security and development, and questioned the intention and sustainability of private
157
sector investment.

During project negotiations, the Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency (EATA) intervened.

(4.1.1) The Significance of EATA
EATA is a government agency tasked with facilitating a transformation of the sector to facilitate
158
Ethiopia’s transition to middle-income status. Apart from this wide-ranging mandate, EATA is
also noteworthy in the wider context of a continent-wide transformation because of the involvement
of BMGF. According to its website, EATA was born out of a meeting between then-Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi and Melinda Gates in 2009, in which Zenawi “asked for the Foundation’s support in
identifying an innovative way to catalyze not only the growth but of the transformation of Ethiopia’s
156
USAID (2017). Private Sector Partnerships in Agricultural Value Chains. Report,
https://www.agrilinks.org/sites/default/files/20170911_isp_partnerships_guide_-_vf_clean.pdf. Pg. 21.
157
Ibid. Pg. 53.
158
EATA (nd) Mandate. Website, http://www.ata.gov.et/about-ata/atas-role/.
58 of 124

159
agriculture sector” (emphasis added). Since its formation in December 2010, BMGF has also
contributed $16.8 million directly to EATA, and $37 million to outside groups, including UNDP,
160
Synergos Institute, IFPRI, and Oxfam, for dedicated projects in support of the agency. Speaking
at AGRF 2018, James Nyoro, a former adviser to the president of Kenya who later took a position
161 162
at BMGF, said that while at BMGF, “the EATA was always our star.”

EATA was legislated into existence by parliament in December 2010, and reports to a separate
Agricultural Transformation Council which was created by the same law. The Council is chaired by
the Prime Minister, with the Minister of Agriculture serving as Deputy Chairperson. Ministers from
other agencies and regional bodies serve as the Council’s members at the discretion of the Prime
163
Minister. The EATA CEO serves as the Council’s Secretary.

The CEO’s office is another point of connection between BMGF and EATA. Before joining the
Ethiopian government, Khalid Bomba, the current CEO of EATA, was a Senior Program Officer in
164
BMGF’s agriculture program.

In the wider context of AGR, EATA is also significant in that it showcases a tendency on part of
many of the agencies backing AGR to favor strong central governments. Officially, EATA can only
165
conduct studies and offer recommendations. But through the Council, it can make those
recommendations to the other organs of government, such as the ministries of trade or finance, with
backing from the highest authority in the country. As Nyoro said in his AGRF comments, the
agricultural sector is necessarily dependent on the will of other ministries who can build roads and
provide financing, among other tasks. Drawing from his own experience in government, he said
Kenya was highly decentralized, which made implementing a national plan difficult. But what made
EATA unique was that it could ask any other agency relevant to its mission “what are you doing to
facilitate an agricultural transformation?” This arrangement ensured that other ministries were
accountable to EATA’s vision. It also streamlined the process of an agricultural transformation. With
a vision in place, Nyoro said, other ministries within the Ethiopian government could make
166
commitments.

EATA demonstrated its capacity to set the agricultural agenda in Ethiopia during the 2012
discussions surrounding DuPont.

(4.1.2) From Ethiopia to Ghana: AMSAP on the Move
159
Ibid.
160
Data Scrape Database (BMGF)
161
Mathenge, Oliver (2015) Ruto’s Former Adviser Nyoro Lands New Job. The Star. May 4,
https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2015/05/04/rutos-former-adviser-nyoro-lands-new-job_c1129021.
162
AGRF conference notes
163
Federal Republic of Ethiopia (2011) Federal Negarit Gazeta. Government Document,
https://chilot.me/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/reg-no-198-2010-agricultural-transformation-agency-establishment.pd.
164
EATA (nd) Khalid Bomba. Website, http://www.ata.gov.et/team_bio/khalid-bomba/.
165
Federal Republic of Ethiopia (2011) Federal Negarit Gazeta.
166
AGRF conference notes
59 of 124

Eventually, thanks to the intervention of EATA and the persuasion of USAID, the government of
Ethiopia agreed to sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 2013 with DuPont Pioneer to
carry out the AMSAP. DuPont Pioneer was free to begin business in Ethiopia.

In official documents, USAID, DuPont Pioneer and ACDI/VOCA deemed the project a success, so
much so that President Obama later visited the project site during an official visit to Ethiopia in
167 168
2015. US officials considered the following to be major accomplishments:

169
1. DuPont Pioneer built a seed conditioning plant and storage facility in Addis Ababa
170
2. DuPont Pioneer’s “market share” and influence in the region increased
3. The Government of Ethiopia became less skeptical of, and more friendly to, the private
171
sector
4. The program supposedly reached a quarter of a million farmers, increasing yields and
172
incomes

Encouraged by successes in Ethiopia, in 2014, officials at USAID, DuPont Pioneer and
ACDI/VOCA decided to implement a similar project in Ghana, where the West African Seed
Alliance had recently concluded its work. Thanks to the WASA project, the government of Ghana
had passed the Plant and Fertilizer Act (2010). The new law amended previous law that now allowed
173
private sector actors to breed foundation seed, a task formerly held exclusively by state scientists.
The Act allowed for DuPont Pioneer to operate within Ghana and commercialize hybrid maize for
174
the first time.

However, the paper trail in Ghana ends shortly after the project begins in 2014. Few updates and
news articles are available online. A dissertation by a German PhD student suggests the project may
have collapsed as the government of Ghana demanded that DuPont Pioneer build a seed facility in
175
Ghana. We’ve requested records from USAID to better understand what happened, but at the
time of writing, have yet to hear back.

167
DuPont (2015) U.S. President Learns About Food and Nutrition Security Innovations in Ethiopia. July 15,
http://foodsecurity.dupont.com/2015/07/28/u-s-president-learns-about-dupont-food-and-nutrition-security-innovatio
ns-in-ethiopia/.
168
It is unclear what the government of Ethiopia thinks of the outcomes and we could not find any independent
verification or study of the program.
169
USAID (nd) A New Alliance Partnership with DuPont Pioneer. Website,
https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/photo-gallery/new-alliance-partnership-dupont-pioneer
170
USAID (2017) Private Sector Partnerships in Agriculture Value Chains: Building Effective Relationships to Sustain Results. Report,
https://www.agrilinks.org/sites/default/files/20170911_isp_partnerships_guide_-_vf_clean.pdf. Pg. 59.
171
Ibid. Pg. 59-60.
172
Ibid. Pg. 59.
173
Rock, Joeva (2018) Complex Mediascapes, Complex Realities: Critically Engaging with Biotechnology Debates in Ghana. Global
Bioethics 29(1): 55-64.
174
USAID (2012). Request for Applications: West Africa Seed Program. Pg. 44.
175
Marston, Jasmin (2017) Aid and Agriculture: a Constructivist Approach to a Political Economy Analysis of Sustainable Agriculture
in Ghana. PhD Dissertation. Pg. 316-7.
https://freidok.uni-freiburg.de/fedora/objects/freidok:16032/datastreams/FILE1/content.
60 of 124

A final note of interest: in both Ethiopia and Ghana, DuPont Pioneer partnered with 4-H, an
176
American-based youth agricultural organization to help facilitate the program. Details are blurry,
but a 2014 article in Mother Jones details how DuPont and 4-H collaborated to circulate hybrid maize
seeds to student groups in hopes that parents would become interested in later purchasing the seeds.
177
It’s unclear what happened to the program.

Further scrutiny is needed to understand why the Ghanaian project failed, but for now, it appears
DuPont Pioneer was displeased with government demands, preferring the hands-off approach of the
Ethiopian government. The Ghanaian story -- though incomplete -- underscores the inherently
unsustainable nature of such projects. Foreign private partners hold the technology, expertise, and
above all, influence. Without them, projects, like AMSAP in Ghana, risk collapse. Such is the design
of biotechnology projects across Africa.

(4.2) Biotechnology and Biosafety
In the early 2000s, the Rockefeller Foundation and some US government agencies sought to advance
a biotechnology program tailored to African agriculture.

According to Schurman (2016), in 2001, the Meridian Institute, working under the direction of the
Rockefeller Foundation, convened a meeting with officials from some of the leading seed
technology companies -- including DowAgro, Monsanto, Dupont-Pioneer, Syngenta, and
Aventis -- at the Arrowwood Resort in Westchester County, New York, to discuss ways to bring
178
patented biotechnology to Africa. At the time, most industry leaders saw little market opportunity
on the African continent, convinced that smallholder, resource-poor farmers would not have the
purchasing power to make the endeavor worthwhile. However, agribusiness firms, especially
Monsanto, were facing massive public relations backlashes worldwide, and sought to reform their
image by taking on a project that appeared humanitarian. Industry leaders approached the
Rockefeller Foundation and agreed to lease proprietary technology while the Rockefeller Foundation
agreed to create an “African” broker to protect that intellectual property, negotiate contracts with
industry and African research councils, and oversee research. The African Agricultural
Technology Foundation was thus born (2003). USAID and the BMGF would later join as key
funders.

With the rising interest in African agricultural development, the US government also recognized a
chance to bring biotechnology to Africa. In July 2002, the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) hosted a summit in Rome to consider the global efforts to reduce hunger
around the world to date, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the World Food Summit, which
it had also hosted. According to a leaked US State Department cable, the event had a “special focus
on Africa” and was well attended by delegations from African governments, some of whom
179
expressed concerns over sustainability of public private biotechnology partnerships.
176
National 4-H Council (2016) 4-H Partnerships in Africa. Fact Sheet,
https://4-h.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/4-H-Partnerships-in-Africa_Progress-Report.pdf.
177
Butler, Kiera (2014) How America’s Favorite Baby-Goat Club Is Helping Big Ag Take Over Farming in Africa. Mother Jones,
https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/11/4h-africa-farming-dupont-hybrid-seeds/.
178
Sir Gordon Conway, a famed Green Revolution proponent, was president of the Rockefeller Foundation at the time.
179
Wikileaks (2002) Cable, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/02ROME3214_a.html.
61 of 124

The Rome event marked the start of a US-led effort to bring biotechnology to Africa which
continues today. At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in August 2002, President Bush
announced the President’s Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA), with the declared goal of
reducing hunger in Africa by half by 2015. IEHA would later fund two of the United States
government’s primary vehicles for supporting biotechnology support in Africa, the Program on
Biosafety Systems (PBS) and the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project (ABSP).

Today, GMOs -- mainly bt cotton -- are commercialized in five African countries. Another eight
countries are conducting field trials for more than a dozen types of GM crops. Most of these trials
180
are being conducted as public private partnerships and facilitated by AATF.

This section maps the history of biotechnology and biosafety on the African continent and the
major players who aid its development. Our major finding is that the same handful of donors who fund
research and design of genetically modified crops fund the development of biosafety regulation and agencies, lobby for
policy change, and fund media campaigns to build public consensus and pressure African governments to adopt these
technologies.

The Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project (I & II)
In 1991, USAID founded the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project (ABSP), which ran until
2003 under the leadership of Judith Chambers, who, for some of that time also served as the
181
Director of International Government Affairs at Monsanto (1997-2002) .

The first GM food commercialized in the US, the Flavr Savr tomato, hit US shelves in 1994. At that
time, ABSP I and their subcontractors -- Monsanto and the Kenyan Agricultural Research Institute
-- had already begun to develop virus resistant sweet potato. Project officials hoped the project
would help both US partners and developing nations to better underst how to develop and utilize
182
GM technology.

The project was unsuccessful: “At the end of the ABSP project in June 2003, that is after almost 12
years and investment in the order of $13 million, no technology developed under ABSP [had]
183
completed the product development phase.” However, a report by GRAIN notes that while
product development may have failed, ABSP succeeded in forging partnerships between US
companies and African scientists, establishing necessary legal instruments, and building momentum
for GM crops in Africa:

Most importantly, the project served as a vehicle for driving forward a regulatory framework
conducive to GM crops. And this is where USAID is making its mark - getting Southern countries to
180
For a more complete list of the various public private partnerships supporting GMOs in Africa, please see Chambers
et al. (2014).
181
ABSP also ran in Indonesia and Egypt, but this report will just consider Kenya.
182
Brenner, Carliene (2004) Telling Transgenic Technology Tales: Lessons from the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project (ABSP)
Experience. The International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications. Report,
http://www.isaaa.org/Resources/Publications/briefs/31/download/isaaa-brief-31-2004.pdf. Pg. iv.
183
Ibid. Pg. xiv.
62 of 124

set up the regulatory frameworks and the technical capacity that US corporations require to build-up
184
global markets for their GM crops.

Reflecting on the failed experiences of ABSP, the International Service for the Acquisition of
Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA) -- an industry-backed organization -- suggested: “If there is no
obvious potential market demand, transitional diffusion mechanisms ... might be facilitated by
185
‘technology brokers’, such as the [ISAAA and AATF] , or by ‘product champions’”. At the time
ISAAA published this brief (in 2004), AATF was only a year old, but their efforts to combat the lack
of market demand were already well underway.

The African Agricultural Technology Foundation
The African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF) is a broker organization created by
industry officials and private foundations (see history above). It is based in Nairobi, Kenya and has
186
501(c)(3) tax exempt status in the United States.

AATF’s largest donors are the BMGF, USAID, and the Rockefeller Foundation. AATF acts as a
broker between agribusiness companies and African scientists to facilitate “donated” genetic
material for development of both hybrid and genetically modified seeds. Industry heads were
originally reticent to enter African markets, which they believed offered little opportunity for profit
and limited regulation. In other words, it was risky. To lessen the risk, AATF “protects technology
donors from liability through indemnification provisions and warranty disclaimers in agreements and
by conducting a comprehensive risk analysis for each project” (quoted in Schurman 2016: 452).

AATF argues that it works with private-sector companies, such as Monsanto (and now presumably
Bayer), to provide patented technologies “royalty free.” However, multiple reports have suggested
these efforts were materially beneficial in other ways, primarily as a public relations move. Shand
(2010) writes:

To gain desperately needed moral legitimacy, Gene Giants like Monsanto, BASF, Syngenta and
DuPont are forging high-profile partnerships with public sector institutions that aim to deliver
proprietary technologies to resource-poor farmers – especially in sub Saharan Africa. The
public/private partnerships are hosted by a growing web of South-based non-profit institutions that
exist primarily to facilitate and promote the introduction of genetically engineered crops. The
immediate impact of these partnerships is to enhance the public image of Gene Giants that are
donating royalty-free genes to needy farmers. But the longer-term goal is to create the ‘enabling
environments’ (biosafety regulations, intellectual property laws, positive media coverage to promote
public acceptance) that will support the market introduction of genetically engineered crops and
187
related technologies.
184
GRAIN (2005) USAID: Making the world hungry for GM crops. Report,
https://www.grain.org/article/entries/21-usaid-making-the-world-hungry-for-gm-crops.
185
Brenner, Carliene (2004) Telling Transgenic Technology Tales: Lessons from the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project (ABSP)
Experience. The International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications. Report,
http://www.isaaa.org/Resources/Publications/briefs/31/download/isaaa-brief-31-2004.pdf. Pg. xvii-xviii.
186
Kyetere, Denis (2013) AATF: A Decade of Enduring Partnerships in Technology Access and Delivery. PowerPoint
Presentation,
https://www.slideshare.net/FARA-AFRICA/fara-ga-july-2013-ed-presentation-at-aatf-side-event. Slide 10.
187
Shand, Hope (2010) Patent Grab Threatens Biodiversity and Food Sovereignty in Africa. IPS,
http://www.ips-dc.org/patent_grab_threatens_biodiversity_and_food_sovereignty_in_africa/.
63 of 124

Though AATF describes contributions from its private sector partners as a “donation”, Schurman
(2016) notes that the correct term is actually “license”: industry partners write licenses for the use of
188
their genetic material to maintain strict control of its use. We were unable to obtain licensing
agreements between industry partners and AATF to review.

Key to the majority of AATF’s project are industry donors who receive subsidies to enter markets in
the form of risk reduction and AATF facilitation of policy lobbying and network building. AATF’s
189
keystone projects are listed below:

Table 4.2 Select AATF Projects
Project Industry Partner Trait Status
Banana Bacterial Wilt Academica Sinica BBW resistance Field Trials: Kenya and Uganda
(BBW)-resistant Banana
190

191
Bt Cowpea Monsanto Pod Borer resistant Field Trials: Burkina Faso, Ghana
and Nigeria
192 193
NEWEST Rice Arcadia Biosciences Nitrogen use efficiency, Suspended
water efficiency, salt
tolerance
NUE Rice Arcadia Biosciences Nitrogen use efficiency Field Trials: Ghana, Nigeria and
Uganda
194
StrigAway Maize BASF Herbicide resistance Commercialized: Kenya and
Tanzania

Field Trials: Uganda and Ethiopia
195

Water Efficient Maize for Monsanto Water efficiency Commercialized: Kenya,
188
Schurman, Rachel (2016) Building an Alliance for Biotechnology in Africa. Journal of Agrarian Change: 1-18.
189
For a country by country breakdown of GM crops under field trial and commercialization, please see Table 1 in
AATF (2018): 4-5.
190
AATF (nd) Improvement of Banana for Resistance to Banana Bacterial Wilt Disease in Africa. Fact Sheet,
https://www.aatf-africa.org/userfiles/Banana-brief.pdf.
191
AATF (nd) Pod Borer Resistant Cowpea. Website, https://cowpea.aatf-africa.org/
192
AATF (nd) NEWEST. Website,https://newest.aatf-africa.org/
193
According to a 2010 report, “BASF’s venture capital fund has invested in [Arcadia Biosciences] since 2005.” Shand,
Hope (2010) Patent Grab Threatens Biodiversity and Food Sovereignty in Africa. IPS,
http://www.ips-dc.org/patent_grab_threatens_biodiversity_and_food_sovereignty_in_africa/.
194
FAO (2013) Agribusiness Public-Private Partnerships – A country report of Kenya. Case studies,
http://www.fao.org/docrep/field/009/ar848e/ar848e07.pdf.
195
AATF (nd) Striga and the IR Maize: Frequently Asked Questions. Fact Sheet,
https://www.aatf-africa.org/userfiles/Striga-FAQ.pdf.
64 of 124

196
Africa Mozambique, South Africa,
197
Tanzania and Uganda

One of AATF’s most productive projects so far has been the Water Efficient Maize for Africa
project, which began with a single trait (water efficiency) but has since grown to include insect
resistance. The project has thus been renamed the TELA Maize Project, and in total, has “bred 104
198
conventional hybrids and five GM hybrids.” Key partners on the project include Monsanto (and
presumably now Bayer), who provides license for the genetic material; USAID and BMGF, who
provide funding; and the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT). A recent
article in the Cornell Chronicle pointed to two Cornell connections with TELA: both CIMMYT’s
199
project manager for the project and and AATF’s manager for the project are Cornell alumni.

Biosafety
A key challenge of testing and commercializing GM crops is establishing necessary regulatory law.
To assist these efforts, AATF created the Open Forum for Agricultural Biotechnology (OFAB)
in 2006. OFAB assists with building enabling policy environments by establishing country chapters,
training government officials and journalists, and lobbying for biosafety laws.

OFAB has been successful in these endeavors. Writing on their 10-year anniversary, Dr. Denis
Kyetere, the Executive Director of AATF, wrote, “We now have 21 countries in Africa with
200
Biosafety Laws compared to less than five before 2006.”

OFAB receives funding through AATF as well as separate grants from AfricaBio, an
industry-backed organization, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Program for Biosafety Systems
(US), the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), USAID, and the
201
US Department of Agriculture (USDA).

OFAB has worked with at least six African countries to adopt and or modify biosafety laws (the laws
which regulate GMOs in country), though this number might be closer to 21. Included in Appendix 2
of this report are maps of OFAB activity by country to demonstrate the interconnectedness of US lobbying and
“demand” for biotechnology on the continent. This document was too large to include in the body of the
report (please see Appendix 2).

202
Table 4.3 OFAB Outreach by Country
196
For a full list of WEMA products available for licensing, see:
https://wema.aatf-africa.org/stewardship/products-commercialisation-and-licensing-program
197
Monsanto (nd) Water Efficient Maize for Africa. Website,
https://monsanto.com/company/outreach/water-efficient-maize-africa/.
198
Conrow, Joan (2018) Cornellians use their education to serve fellow Africans. Cornell Chronicle. October 18,
https://cals.cornell.edu/news/cornellians-use-their-education-serve-fellow-africans/.
199
Ibid.
200
OFAB (2017) A Decade of Success: 2006-2016. Report,
https://aatf-africa.org/files/files/publications/OFAB-Success-Story1.pdf. Pg. iii.
201
https://aatf-africa.org/files/files/publications/OFAB-Success-Story1.pdf.
202
Ibid.
65 of 124

Biosafety policy IP Rights policy Government trainings and Media/Journalist
lobbying lobbying Seeing-is-believing trips Workshops
203
Ethiopia; Ghana; Kenya; Ghana Ghana; Kenya; Nigeria; Ethiopia; Ghana;
Nigeria; Tanzania; Uganda Tanzania; Uganda Kenya; Nigeria;
Tanzania; Uganda

Donor interest in increasing funding to communication and lobbying outfits such as OFAB and PBS
ought to be understood in the context of continent-wide activism surrounding GMOs. In South
Africa, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda, activists have waged public campaigns demanding that
national governments reject GM seeds, handouts to multinational companies, and pass legislation
that protects farmers’ rights to save, trade and sell seeds. In Uganda, activists have successfully
stalled biosafety legislation, to the point that, at the time of writing, Uganda was conducting
confined field trials of GM crops without a biosafety law in place.

Understanding biosafety laws better requires knowing the African Biosafety Network of Experts.

African Biosafety Network of Expertise
The African Biosafety Network of Expertise (ABNE) is a continental biosafety regulator housed
at the African Union. ABNE grew out of a grant from the BMGF to Michigan State University
204
(MSU). Lawrence Kent, a former USAID official and former Director of International Programs
205
at the Danforth Plant Science Center, was the BMGF official who oversaw the project.

ABNE launched in 2010. It was created to act as a continental guide for all issues pertaining to
biosafety and assist African countries to establish biosafety regulations. Today, it serves as an
206
excellent resource on tracking GMOs and biosafety laws by country.
207
Table 4.4 MSU Grants Received from BMGF to Implement ABNE I&II
ABNE I (2007-2010) ABNE II (2009-2014)
Grant Amount $1,498,485 $10,440,439
Purpose “This project took the first steps to “This project seeks to strengthen regulatory systems in
create the African Biosafety Network of Africa that ensure the safe use and management of
Expertise by training its staff, agricultural biotechnology to increase productivity and
establishing its website, and consulting livelihoods while protecting human health and the
203
Okoth, Suleiman (2017) OFAB Ghana Meets Select Committees of Parliament. AATF. Website. August 25,
https://aatfnews.aatf-africa.org/?p=942.
204
BMGF (nd) Impatient Optimists: Lawrence Kent. Website,
https://www.impatientoptimists.org/Authors/K/Lawrence-Kent.
205
A non-profit research institute located in St. Louis that began with a financial and land gift from Monsanto.
206
NEPAD (2017) ABNE in Africa. Map, http://nepad-abne.net/contry_report/.
207
In 2014, the year ABNE II closed, MSU received a $12,224,712 grant from the BMGF “to help African governments
build functional regulatory systems for biotech crops, helping them to make science-based decisions that enhance
agricultural productivity while protecting human health and the environment.” It unclear whether this funding was for
further ABNE support or another project
(https://www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work/Quick-Links/Grants-Database/Grants/2014/08/OPPGD1406).
66 of 124

with regulators throughout Africa about environment. The network trains, educates, and
208
their information and training needs.” provides information to regulators from all over
209
Africa.”

ABNE has three “nodes”, offices: Burkina Faso (with tax-exempt status), Senegal and Uganda. Staff
at ABNE travel to support biosafety authorities and officials in select African countries to assist
writing laws and in some cases, provide direct oversight on reviewing GMO applications for
approval. For instance, ABNE spent a week in May 2014 with officials in Ghana reviewing an
application from Monsanto requesting permission to conduct confined field trials of bt cotton
210
in-country.

211
In their own words, ABNE has facilitated: 1) the review of biosafety applications in Ghana for
confined field trials of GE rice, cowpea cassava and multi-location trials of GE cotton; 2) the
development and passage of an improved biosafety policy in Burkina Faso through technical
consultations; 3) the adoption of workable regulations for regulatory decision-making in Nigeria,
and; 4) the training of lawyers and legal advisors from eight countries in Africa focusing on science
and regulations of biotechnology.

Though a key component of sound regulation is neutrality, documents obtained from Michigan State
University (MSU) reveal that MSU officials envisioned “the ABNE network [to] play a key role in
212
advocacy focusing on biosafety and safe applications of biotechnology” (author added emphasis).
Thus, ABNE was created not simply to serve as a biosafety regulator, but also as a promoter of the
technology.

Thus, the ABNE is another example of how public and private funding has aided international seed
companies’ entrance into African markets by fostering enabling policies in those countries.

Program for Biosafety Systems
The Program for Biosafety Systems (PBS) was established in 2006 under the President’s Initiative
to End Hunger in Africa. PBS is funded by USAID, managed by the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI), and operates in African and Asian countries. This section will consider
its presence on the African continent.

Similar to OFAB and AATF, PBS acts as an intermediary between donors (in this case, the US
government) and African governments. PBS’ main focus is to build demand, acceptance and
enabling regulatory policy to facilitate GMO research, commercialization, and adoption. And similar
208
BMGF (2011) Agricultural Development: Grant Overview. Fact Sheet,
https://docs.gatesfoundation.org/documents/agricultural-development-grant-overview.pdf. Pg. 21.
209
Ibid.
210
MSUF057018. Pg. 40.
211
List adapted from: https://www.canr.msu.edu/cgc/projects/african_biosafety_network_of_expertise
212
MSUF057018. Pg. 117.
67 of 124

to OFAB, PBS has both a central home (IFPRI) and also conducts country-specific outreach in
213
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Mali, Nigeria, South Africa,Uganda, and Tanzania.

Some partnerships are more solidified than others. For instance, PBS has a country chapter in
Ghana, which works regularly with OFAB, AATF, and the Cornell Alliance for Science (see section 4.3)
214
to train journalists and government officials, lobby for policy change, and appear in media outlets.
According to both publicly available documents and others obtained through a FOIA request to
USAID, in Kenya, PBS lobbied government to adopt biosafety law, sponsored government officials
on a “fact-finding” mission to the Philippines, and “supported a KARI-led task force on bt cotton
215
commercialization.” US-supported lobbying efforts were successful: in 2018, the National
Environment Management Agency granted permission for Indian firm Mahyco to begin bt cotton
216
field trials and distribute bt cotton seeds on behalf of Monsanto.

More could be known about PBS. Their website, managed by IFPRI, has been offline for months.
There is little documentation on their activities across time and in various regions. But they are
certainly a vehicle through which the US government promotes biotechnology.

(4.3) Cornell Alliance for Science
The Cornell Alliance for Science (CAS) is a multi-million dollar initiative at Cornell University in
Ithaca, New York. It was founded in 2014 by Dr. Sarah Evanega with a $5.6 million dollar grant
217
from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. They receive a majority of their funding from the
BMGF and other sources include USDA, individuals, and small foundations, including the Cornell
218
Sathguru Foundation For Development, which lists Bayer as a partner.

CAS describes itself as a “global agricultural communications platform” and works to build
consensus around biotechnology (mainly genetically modified crops) and the benefits and safety of
219
their use. In an early interview, Dr. Evanega described the goal of the Alliance as:

213
IFPRI (2007) Program for Biosafety Systems. Fact Sheet,
http://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/125269/filename/125270.pdf.
214
Rock, Joeva (2018) Complex Mediascapes, Complex Realities: Critically Engaging with Biotechnology Debates in Ghana. Global
Bioethics 29(1): 55-64.
215
USAID Kenya (2013) Program for Biosafety Systems. Fact Sheet,
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Program%20for%20Biosafety%20Systems%20FACT%20
SHEET.April%202013.pdf; USAID F-00145-18.
216
Andae, Gerald (2018) Indian Company Gets the Nod to Import GMO Cotton Seeds. The Business Daily. July 10,
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/economy/Indian-company-gets-the-nod-to-import-GMO-cotton-seeds/3946234-
4656626-yo3k2k/index.html
217
Shackford, Stacey (2014) New Cornell Alliance for Science Gets $5.6 million Grant. Cornell Chronicle. August 21,
http://news.cornell.edu/stories/2014/08/new-cornell-alliance-science-gets-56-million-grant
218
Full list of donors: BMGF, USDA, American Endowment Foundation, Winkler Family Foundation, Ian Gazard, John
Hilliard, The Triad Foundation, John Crary, Peter Davies, Larry P. Walker, Fred Behringer, Blue Mountain Capital, Jessica
Anson, Sarah Butcher, Cornell Sathguru Foundation For Development, William Thompson
219
https://twitter.com/scienceally
68 of 124

Our goal is to depolarize the GMO debate and engage with potential partners who may share
common values around poverty reduction and sustainable agriculture, but may not be well informed
220
about the potential biotechnology has for solving major agricultural challenges.

Though CAS is relatively new to the biotech game, they have spread globally at considerable speed,
thanks in part to their training programs. CAS’ core activities are three-fold: training “allies” in
communications; building a global network of those allies; and developing a media portfolio for ally
221
use. Generally, CAS conducts two types of trainings: short courses (based both in the US and on
the African continent) and the Global Leadership Fellowship, their keystone training program.

According to a PowerPoint presentation posted online, CAS has three core strategies:

1. “Establishing a global network of partners who share the mission of solving complex
global issues by leveraging biotechnology
2. “Training with a purpose so that partners are well equipped with the tools to
advocate for access to biotechnology
3. “Shifting the narrative to a message framework that targets misinformation and lays
222
out a clear and concise argument in support of biotechnology”

Thus, in their own words, “depolarizing” requires global acceptance and adoption of biotechnology,
mainly crops edited by genetic modification and/or gene editing.

Trainings and the Global Fellows Program
CAS conducts trainings in the US and Africa. Trainings vary in size, audience, and length. CAS
provides little reporting on its activities at these events, but social media postings from participants
offers some insights. For instance, Mark Lynas traveled to Tanzania, where GMOs are under trial
but not commercialized, in October 2018 to participate in a CAS-sponsored workshop for members
of the media. He described his work, and the state of GMOs in Tanzania, in a October 15 tweet:

I’m in Tanzania, on a @ScienceAlly training course helping local journalists better understand biotech.
Important issue because local staple crops are being devastated by drought, disease and pests. Biotech
can help but it is blocked by anti-GMO activism & politics so we really need the President [of
Tanzania] to allow farmers to grow improved crops with drought tolerance and pest resistance. This is
what it looks like when they grow the old varieties with no resilience... And the latest news is even
worse. I’m hearing that the organic sector and NGOs have lobbied the President to keep GMOs
banned. They talk darkly about ‘contamination’ and threaten that lost organic exports to Europe and
223
Russia will cost $millions.

Lynas’s tweet hits many of CAS’ core talking points:
220
Shackford, Stacey (2014) New Cornell Alliance for Science Gets $5.6 million Grant. Cornell Chronicle. August 21,
http://news.cornell.edu/stories/2014/08/new-cornell-alliance-science-gets-56-million-grant
221
Alliance for Science (nd) About. Website, https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/about/
222
Evanega, Sarah (2016) Building Partnerships, Empowering Champions: the Cornell Alliance for Science. Presentation at the FAO.
February 17,
https://www.slideshare.net/ExternalEvents/building-partnerships-empowering-champions-the-example-of-the-cornell-a
lliance-for-science.
223
Lynas, Mark (2018) Tweet, https://twitter.com/mark_lynas/status/1051758791535017985.
69 of 124

1. That the organic industry is unsustainable
2. That Europeans are blocking GMOs in Africa
3. That there are no legitimate questions to raise about GMO efficacy
4. That commercialization is not moving fast enough (evidenced by Lynas’ description of
224
GMOs in Tanzania as “banned,” when really there are two field trials currently underway.)

To assist with trainings and communications development, CAS regularly hires 270 Strategies, a
campaign strategy firm founded by former Obama administration officials. Ties to Obama’s
campaign appealed to CAS, explained Dr. Evanega,

Most of the members of their team cut their teeth on the Obama campaigns for the presidency... They
are extremely effective at communicating how to build grassroots movements by engaging and
225
mobilizing volunteers and empowering networks of supporters.

226
CAS and 270 Strategies have partnered in Nairobi (Biotechnology Leadership Course, April 2015),
227
Tanzania (Strategic Planning and Grassroots Mobilization, April 2016), Hawaii (Strategic Planning
228
and Grassroots Mobilization, December 2016), and Ithaca, New York (Speaking Science, July
229
2018).

CAS’ most comprehensive activity is their Global Fellowship program. Over six weeks, fellows are
hosted at Cornell University, where they attend lectures, take part in communications trainings, go
on field trips, and produce articles and videos for CAS’ website. CAS has hosted three cohorts of
Global Fellows in 2015, 2016 and 2018.

When CAS began in 2014, their first cohort of Global Fellows were truly global in focus, hailing
from 10 countries across the Americas, Africa, and Asia (see Appendix 7 for full list). However, this
focus began to change soon after. The 2018 Global Fellows cohort was comprised almost entirely of
African nationals.

Table 4.5 Global Fellows by Nationality (Region)
Region 2015 2016 2018 2019 Total
Africa 11 14 25 20 70
Americas 4 11 0 3 18
224
Msuya, Elias (2018) Food Security Fears Mount As Debate On GMOs Rages. The Citizen. March 8,
https://allafrica.com/stories/201803080462.html.
225
CAS (2015) April Public Sector News. Website. May 1,
https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/blog/2015/05/april-public-sector-news-2015/.
226
ISAAA (2015) Knowledge that Transforms: Celebrating 20 years of Commercialization of Biotech/GM Crops. Annual Report,
http://africenter.isaaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/AfriCenter-2015-Annual-Report-FINAL.pdf.
227
Ojo, Olawale (2016) Learning Route: Africa Leadership Course on Biotechnology. June 21,
https://medium.com/@olawaleojo/learning-route-africa-leadership-course-on-biotechnology-44a97908335a.
228
Conrow, Joan (2016) Hawaii Joins Alliance for Science Global Network. CAS. Website,
https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/blog/2016/12/hawaii-joins-alliance-for-science-global-network/.
229
McCandless, Linda (2018) Workshop Trains Plant Scientists To Communicate Science. Cornell Chronicle. June 21,
http://news.cornell.edu/stories/2018/07/workshop-trains-plant-scientists-communicate-science.
70 of 124

Asia 9 3 4 7 23
Europe -- -- -- 1 1
Total 24 28 29 31 112 total

fellows

The shift towards Africa came at a time when CAS had solidified partnerships with other major
actors in the African biotechnology realm, including OFAB and PBS.

As the CAS has focused its scope on the African continent, it has also expanded its reach. In
November 2018, the 2018 Global Fellows cohort visited Washington, DC at the end of their
230 231
fellowship where they met with members of Congress and spoke at the World Bank.

One goal of the program is for “science allies” to return to their home institutions and interact with
the public, presumably to build demand and public acceptance around GMOs. In the attached
spreadsheet, we have mapped Global Fellows in the news, including country-specific and
international news outlets (Appendix 7).

Country Chapters
In addition to hosting fellows at Cornell, CAS has facilitated “Alliance for Science” country chapters
across Africa. While we do not have access to financials or other organizational reports for these
chapters, through Google searches and social media analysis, we do know some of the activities
country chapters have carried out.

For instance, in both 2017 and 2018, CAS-organized “March for Science” delegations in Kenya,
Nigeria, Ghana, and Uganda, evidenced by posters carried and shirts worn by marchers. CAS was
232
potentially involved with organizing marches in South Africa, Malawi, and Mozambique as well.

In addition to providing materials (and presumably funding) for marches, CAS organized a global
media campaign to highlight these marches on their website, African news outlets and international
233 234
media outlets, including The Guardian and Public Radio International.

People and Partnerships
230
Evanega, Sarah (2018) Tweet. November 15, https://twitter.com/Sarah_Evanega/status/1063178253316354056.
231
Gazard, Ian (2018) Tweet. November 15, https://twitter.com/IGazard/status/1063133897519702016.
232
Gakpo, Joseph Opoku (2018) Why Africa Will “March for Science.” CAS. April 12,
https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/blog/2018/04/africa-will-march-science/
233
Lynas, Mark (2017) Science to Take to the Streets in Global March for Truth. The Guardian. April 18,
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/apr/18/scientists-take-streets-global-march-truth.
234
Carolyn, Beeler (2017) Why Is The World Marching For Science? It's Local Issues, Like Budgets, Education And Food Security.
PRI. April 21,
https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-04-21/why-world-marching-science-its-local-issues-budgets-education-and-food-secu
rity
71 of 124

CAS lists 22 staff members, including Dr. Evanega (Director) and Joan Conrow (Visiting Fellow and
Managing Editor; known for her writing on GMO debates in Hawaii). Until recently, Mark Lynas
was also listed as a Visiting Fellow, but as of October 2018, he is no longer listed.

In October 2018, US Right to Know (USRTK) called CAS “a PR campaign for the agrichemical
235
industry,” and said that Dr. Evanega and other CAS fellows have ties to leading industry firms.
While we were unable to find industry ties directly to CAS as an organization, USRTK’s findings
that individuals affiliated with CAS have industry ties is noteworthy, though not surprising given the
regular overlap of agribusiness industry and academia. Additionally, we noted a number of
organizational partnerships both in the US and on the African continent that suggest CAS is a major
actor in building consensus around GMOs worldwide.

● In November 2018, CAS sent a delegation to the United Nations Biodiversity Conference in
236 237
Egypt to oppose a moratorium on gene drives.
● On October 16, 2018, CAS co-hosted a happy hour on the sidelines of the World Food
Prize.
● On November 17, 2015, CAS hosted an event titled 25 Stories at the United Nations in New
York City, where Global Fellows shared Ted Talk-style presentations on why they support
biotechnology. Speakers made emotional appeals, positioning themselves and other
“pro-GMO” supporters as being isolated outsiders and warriors fighting a misinformed
238
public. UN Ambassadors from Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, and Uganda also spoke at the
event.

CAS’ partnerships with influential global institutions, including the BMGF, United Nations, World
Food Program, theUSDA, and OFAB are a significant aspect of their influence portfolio. Of the
mapping we completed, we believe CAS’ partnership with OFAB to be of utmost importance.

Partnership with OFAB
CAS’ partnership with OFAB is significant because OFAB provides access to country-level and
regional actors in government, the two organizations share funders (e.g. the BMGF and USDA), are
able to combine funds, and build on their collective experience in communications.

239
In 2016, CAS and OFAB held a joint-training in Tanzania for 40 African participants. That same
year, 10 OFAB officers were Global Fellows. After the completion of the fellowship, AATF reported
235
Malkan, Stacey (2018) Cornell Alliance for Science is a PR Campaign for the Agrichemical Industry. US Right to Know.
October 7,
https://usrtk.org/our-investigations/cornell-alliance-for-science-is-a-pr-campaign-for-the-agrichemical-industry/
236
Orozco, Paolo (2018) Alliance Sending Delegation to UN Biodiversity Conference. Alliance for Science. November 8,
https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/blog/2018/11/alliance-sending-delegation-un-biodiversity-conference/.
237
Opuku, Joseph (2018) Africa Kicks Against Proposed Gene Drive Moratorium at UN Biodiversity Conference. Alliance for
Science. November 20,
https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/blog/2018/11/africa-kicks-proposed-gene-drive-moratorium-un-biodiversity-conf
erence/.
238
A video of the full event can be found here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ieHvu2KUwPc
239
AATF (2016) Towards Adoption: Farmers Assess Livelihood: Transforming Technologies. Annual Report,
https://aatf-africa.org/files/files/publications/AATF_AReport_2016.pdf
72 of 124

that, “all the graduates are now lead probiotech advocates in their countries in partnership with
240
OFAB.”

In a recent example of CAS and OFAB’s partnership, Calvin Gwabara, a 2018 Global Fellow from
241
Tanzania, won OFAB’s Journalist of the Year award. Dr. Evanega attended the award ceremony in
242
Burkina Faso.

Future Research
Future research into CAS and their activities would be useful in better understanding its actual
influence on the continent. One area of investigation could be further mapping CAS’s potential
involvement in policy debates and lobbying around the African continent, including, but not limited
243
to coordinating lobbying efforts for the Plant Breeders Bill in Ghana andthe Biosafety Policy in
244
Uganda.

(4.4) Fertilizer
Fertilizer is the cornerstone of industrial farming, and proponents have rallied to persuade African
farmers to radically increase use across the continent, where to date fertilizer use has remained
relatively low. While many camps agree that African farmers ought to increase use, there is
disagreement over how to best facilitate increased adoption.

In 2006, African heads of state signed the Abuja Declaration, “resolve[ing] to increase the level of use
of fertilizer from the current average of 8 kilograms per hectare to an average of at least 50
245
kilograms per hectare by 2015” to “[achieve] the African Green Revolution.”

Historically, African governments have favored fertilizer subsidies. But as ACBIO and others have
shown, subsidies have come at a monumental cost with little to show. ACBIO reports that “by 2011,
ten African countries had spent about US$1billion on [fertilizer subsidy] programmes, close to 30%
246
of their agricultural budgets.”

Major donors and private sector actors stand mostly opposed to fertilizer subsidies, arguing that they
favor a handful of producers, stifle competition, and restrict the market from growing.

240
Ibid. Pg. 14.
241
Evanga, Sarah (2018) Tweet, https://twitter.com/sarah_evanega/status/1040552018870456325?s=11
242
Joan, Conrow (2018) Cornell Alliance For Science Fellow Wins Top Africa Media Award. Cornell CALS. September 19,
https://cals.cornell.edu/news/cornell-alliance-science-fellow-wins-top-africa-media-award/.
243
Ghana News Agency (2016) Group Petitions Parliament Over Plant Breeders Bill. May 30,
https://www.ghananewsagency.org/science/group-petitions-parliament-on-plant-breeders-bill--104292
244
John, Agaba (2018) Farmers, Scientists Wait in Suspense for Uganda GMO Bill to Become Law. CAS. October 10,
https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/blog/2018/10/farmers-scientists-wait-suspense-uganda-gmo-bill-become-law/
245
AFDB (nd) Abuja Declaration. Policy,
https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/african-fertilizer-financing-mechanism/abuja-decla
ration/
246
ACBIO (2016) Farm Input Subsidy Programs (FISP): A Benefit for, or the Betrayal of, SADC’s Small-Scale Farmers? Report. Pg.
4.
73 of 124

One major actor working to increase farmer use and create a competitive sector through “liberalizing
247
private distribution of fertilizer” is the African Fertilizer and Agribusiness Partnership (AFAP).

The African Fertilizer and Agribusiness Partnership
AFAP was created by the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) in 2012. They receive
248
funding from AGRA and other donors, including the Open Society Institute.

249
AFAP was originally launched in countries which they describe as the “gateways into Africa” --
250
Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania -- and have since expanded to 11 countries. According to their
251
website, AFAP’s stated areas of focus are:

1. Capacity development for agro-dealer hubs
2. Technical Advisory
3. Value Chain Management
4. Policy Design and Implementation
5. Fertilizer and Agribusiness Platform Management

Their programs are designed specifically to be “private-sector led” so that “companies [may] take
252
charge of the development agenda.” A key component of AFAP’s purpose is to reduce risk for
fertilizer companies who seek to enter African markets. As ACBIO writes AFAP does “this by
providing credit guarantees to agribusinesses engaged in the fertiliser trade in select African
countries[,] essentially ... using agricultural development funds to subsidise ... multinational fertiliser
253
companies.”

AFAP is just one actor working in the fertilizer sector, which admittedly will not be covered in its
entirety in this report. Through our database, we identified 128 USAID projects involving fertilizer
since 2003, including 112 costing more than $100,000. We have included these lists in the
Supporting Documents folder (Appendix 6).

(4.5) Conclusion
Between policy changes spearheaded under WASA, PBS and OFAB, US taxpayer dollars have gone
towards creating enabling policy environments in half a dozen African countries for US companies,
mainly Monsanto and DuPont Pioneer, to operate. With Monsanto’s recent acquisition by Bayer, it is
247
AFAP (2013) Recommendations to the African Union Commission, Regional Economic Communities, and Country Decision-Makers
from an Expert Technical Convening, Addis Ababa,December 5-7.
https://www.agrilinks.org/sites/default/files/resource/files/Document%201%20DAtwood%20post%20Summary%20
Note.pdf. Pg. 2.
248
AFAP (nd) About Us. Website, http://www.afap-partnership.org/about-us-2/
249
Incubate Video Productions (2016) The African Fertilizer and Agribusiness Partnership. YouTube,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=3&v=wgN0_Qdw9WM.
250
AFAP (nd) Where We Work. Website, http://www.afap-partnership.org/about-us-2/where-we-work/r
251
AFAP (nd) About Us. Website, http://www.afap-partnership.org/about-us-2/
252
Incubate Video Productions (2016) The African Fertilizer and Agribusiness Partnership. YouTube,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=3&v=wgN0_Qdw9WM.
253
ACBIO (2014) The African Fertilizer and Agribusiness Partnership: The ‘Missing Link’ in Africa’s Green Revolution? Report,
https://acbio.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/acbio-AFAP-report.pdf. Pg. 4.
74 of 124

unclear what relationship the USG and BMGF will now have with Bayer. USG funds are almost
always reserved for American companies; Bayer is German.

Pesticides were not covered in the scope of our research, but we highly recommend Pesticide Action
Network Africa’s website. They’ve published extensive details on pesticide use, pesticide companies,
254 255
and country-level analysis (mainly in French).

254
Pesticide Action Network Africa (nd) Liste des pays de l'Afrique de l'Ouest. Website,
http://www.pan-afrique.org/en/menu.php?page=p_listepays.
255
Pesticide Action Network Africa (nd) Publications. Website, http://www.pan-afrique.org/en/menu.php?page=p_pub.
75 of 124

CHAPTER 5: EARLY US AGR PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS
Introduction
Early on in the US government’s AGR efforts, US proponents advocated for a greater emphasis on
public-private partnerships (PPPs), where government agencies would combine their programs with
those of food and agriculture companies, including large multinationals, to develop African
agriculture. These partnerships became a central feature of the US government’s early AGR efforts,
as USAID promised in the 2010 “Bilateral Donors’ Statement” which it signed with European and
Japanese aid agencies (see Ch. 2.1). Since Shah’s departure, USAID’s leadership has emphasized PPP’s
less than it did under his leadership, embracing a vision of total private sector involvement (see
Chapter 7). However, by looking at a few of these early projects, we can see how the US government
sought to include large companies in its efforts to develop an “enabling environment” for industrial
agriculture and how AGR strategies have evolved into their current form.

(5.1) USAID and Land O’Lakes in Kenya
Even before the launch of Feed the Future, the milk producer Land O’Lakes worked with USAID
on an ambitious project of agricultural change in Africa. The project was significant for being one of
the first agricultural development PPPs in Africa during an era at USAID that was largely defined by
them. The project also demonstrated some of the perils of conflating benefits for farmers and large
investors -- perils which USAID would mostly ignore into the future.

At the time that Western governments launched AGR efforts, the Kenyan dairy sector was
dominated by small “informal” farmers and traders who sold raw milk, typically carried from farm
to town via a network of bicycles. The entire sector provided income to 625,000 people and made
256
the country self-sufficient in a popular agricultural product. Local, large milk producers, working
with European aid organizations had been trying to give large, high-technology producers an upper
hand for years, but successive efforts had generally failed to carve out anything more than a niche
market for the factory milk. But with the resurgence of agricultural development in Africa,
“modernizing” Kenyan dairy saw new life as another facet of the larger, continent-wide project of
agricultural transformation.

In 2008, USAID awarded a $9 million contract to Land O’Lakes development arm to modernize the
Kenyan dairy industry. Between 2008 and 2013, Land O’Lakes trained farmers in feed formulation
and “productivity-enhancing technologies” like artificial insemination. In all, Land O’Lakes said it
257
trained 155,000 farmers. As a USAID report evaluation stated, the project was “entirely aligned”
256
Muriuki, H.G. (2003) Milk and Dairy Products, Post-harvest Losses and Food Safety in Sub-Saharan Africa and the
Near East: A Review of the Small Scale Dairy Sector - Kenya. FAO Prevention of Food Losses Programme. Report.
Pg.37.
257
Land O’Lakes (2013) USAID Kenya Dairy Sector Competitiveness Program: Impact Report. Report,
https://www.landolakes.org/getattachment/Resources/Publications/Kenya-Dairy-Sector-Competitiveness-Program-Im
pact/Kenya-Dairy-Sector-Competitiveness-Program-Impact-Report.pdf.
76 of 124

with the Kenyan government’s development priorities, since it had previously identified dairy as one
258
of its priority areas for agricultural development.

The USAID-funded program expanded some of the work of an earlier, USDA-FAS-funded program
in Kenya, which Land O’Lakes had also managed. At a 2008 congressional hearing, Michael Yost,
then USDA-FAS’s administrator, described the program as “coaching” for Kenya’s “budding dairy
industry.” Through it and other agricultural development programs around the world, he said, “we
can build an infrastructure in these countries that can participate in world trade, [and] bring their
259
agricultural economies into the 21st century.”

The safety angle
To help justify these interventions, USAID and Land O’Lakes claimed unprocessed milk was unsafe.
As GRAIN details in its 2011 report, “The great milk robbery,” in 2003, the Kenya Dairy Board
joined large milk producers, including Land O’Lakes, to launch a campaign to enforce stricter safety
standards for milk products. The campaigners argued that milk produced on small farms and sold by
informal traders, which accounted for most milk sold in the country, carried a greater risk of disease
than milk processed in factories. However, a study commissioned by “farmers, vendors, researchers
260
and concerned citizens” found that processed milk was realistically no safer than raw milk. The
reason was that people who bought raw milk overwhelmingly boiled it before serving, eliminating
261
virtually any disease -- a fact which the FAO also recognized in a later report on the sector.

The timing of the campaign was significant. Just one year before, in 2002, Kenya had suffered a milk
glut, causing prices to fall for both small and large producers. With an industry still feeling the pinch
of the glut, industry observers suggested large milk processors were pressing the safety issue to give
themselves an advantage over small-scale milk producers. If the government created a certification
standard which only large-scale producers could realistically meet, it would effectively leave them as
262
the only legal milk producers and sellers in Kenya.

258
Easterling, Tom, and M’Boyi, Felix (2013) “Final Performance Evaluation of the Kenya Dairy Sector Competitiveness
Program”, USAID, p5
https://beamexchange.org/uploads/filer_public/6e/0a/6e0a48f1-1a27-4960-9c7c-9d1568c59d18/kenya_dairy_sector_e
vidence.pdf
259
Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, Subcommittee on Speciality Crops, Rural Development and Foreign
Agriculture, Hearing to Review Efforts to Deliver International Food Aid and Provide Foreign Agricultural Development Assistance,
110th Cong., 2nd sess., July 16, 2008.
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg51037/html/CHRG-110hhrg51037.htm
260
GRAIN (2011) The Great Milk Robbery: How Corporations are Stealing Livelihoods and a Vital Source of Nutrition From the
Poor. Report,
https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4259-the-great-milk-robbery-how-corporations-are-stealing-livelihoods-and-a-vita
l-source-of-nutrition-from-the-poor.
261
Muriuki, H.G. (2011) Dairy Reports: Dairy Development in Kenya. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations. Report, http://www.fao.org/3/a-al745e.pdf.
262
Kwayera, Juma (2002) Clean vs ‘Dirty’ Milk or Big Business vs Small Farmers. The East African. December 22,
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/2560-242076-uuvr1g/index.html. The situation is not dissimilar from Milton
Friedman’s description of medical licensing organizations, which he claimed only existed to give doctors a monopoly on
medical services and keep prices high. For more on that, see Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom (1962).
77 of 124

By 2008, USAID included the safety issue in its project, claiming the poor quality of Kenyan dairy
had been a “barrier to entry into regional export markets and presents significant risks to consumer
263
safety on the consumer front.” To increase the amount of bulk milk adhering to quality standards,
264
Land O’Lakes provided for training for farmers in milk “hygiene and handling techniques.”

Though a safety certification standard would have created a costly barrier to legal milk processing,
the USAID program was described as helping even small dairy farmers to meet that standard. But to
do that, farmers had to adopt technology, either at their own expense or with a loan. The program
arranged a system where farmers could use money from their milk sales to get expensive equipment,
like cooling tanks. The program’s clients “understood that they absorbed the cost for any services
265
they desired,” according to a subsequent report.

Over the following years, Kenya did increase dairy production. According to Land O’Lakes, farmers
266
involved with the project increased their production by an average of 9.85 liters per cow. (A
267
separate survey found that participants had, on average, 4.5 cows in their herd. ) But the desired
268
export markets never materialized. In 2013, Kenya experienced another milk glut. In response, the
Kenyan Dairy Board banned the sale of unprocessed milk. In a notice explaining the ban, the Board
said sales of raw milk during the glut “has become a deterrent to the orderly development of the
269
dairy industry and poses considerable risks to consumer safety.”

(5.2) USAID and PepsiCo in Ethiopia
In 2011, with Feed the Future underway, USAID joined PepsiCo to launch a project showcasing the
PPP concept. The idea was to train small farmers in the Shewa and Gondar provinces of Ethiopia to
270
grow chickpeas for PepsiCo supply chains. Though the project, called EthioPEA, collapsed after a
year, it stands out for several reasons. Apart from being an early test case of an AGR PPP with a
multinational company, EthioPEA was also an early collaboration between a US organization and
Ethiopia’s Agricultural Transformation Agency (EATA; see Ch. 4 for more on the agency).

According to Derek Yach, PepsiCo’s senior VP for Global Health and Agriculture Policy, the
impetus for the project came from then-Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who wanted more
food aid destined for the Horn of Africa to be sourced from local crops. Later, at a WEF event in
Dubai, Nancy Roman, who headed public policy and private partnerships at the World Food
Program (WFP) spoke with Yach about a possible collaboration. WFP had successfully deployed a
chickpea-based product to flooded regions of Pakistan and wanted to bring the same product to the
263
Kenya Dairy Sector Competitiveness Program (nd) About Us. Website (archived July 14, 2013),
https://web.archive.org/web/20130714050616/http://www.kdairyscp.co.ke/section.asp?ID=17.
264
Land O’Lakes, “USAID Kenya Dairy Sector”
265
Ibid.
266
Ibid. Pg.12.
267
Ibid. Pg.30.
268
Park, Alex (2013) Why Is the Obama Administration Suddenly so Interested in African Farms? Mother Jones. June 28,
https://www.motherjones.com/food/2013/06/explainer-us-governments-push-bring-big-ag-africa/.
269
Business Daily (2013) Regulator Bans Milk Hawking as Shortage Persists. January 29,
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Regulator-bans-milk-hawking-as-shortage-persists/-/539552/1679012/-/fpe8m2/
-/index.html.
270
USAID, “F-00105-18 MOU-2, Signed May 9, 2012” (PepsiCo) (2012), released through a FOIA request to USAID.
78 of 124

Horn of Africa, Roman said, but it lacked the capacity to do scale production to meet the need. If
PepsiCo could apply its own knowledge to the region, Roman suggested, WFP might have the
supply base it needed.

Yach, and other PepsiCo executives, were interested. But beyond making it look like a responsible
corporation, the partnership also gave PepsiCo the chance to use food aid to vet the tastes for some
of its future customers in Africa. Tara Acharya, a PepsiCo senior director, explained the connection
at an event at the Center for Strategic & International Studies in Washington, DC:

[PepsiCo CEO] Indra Nooyi has said, in many external fora, that, at its heart, PepsiCo is really an
agricultural company…We do have very close relationships with our contract farmers. And
furthermore, we have a very deep interest in expanding our offerings to consumers in Sub-Saharan
Africa. And the opportunity, then, to work with the World Food Program was particularly intriguing
and exciting for our senior leadership, and particularly for visionary leaders like Indra Nooyi …
because it offers us the opportunity to then reach beyond the one billion consumers that we already
do reach, today, in the world, and start exploring how we can bring better, more nutritious products to
271
consumers in Sub-Saharan Africa.

PepsiCo’s people had the technical expertise to increase a farmer’s chickpea yields, but they also
knew they lacked an understanding of the unique qualities of small-scale farming in Ethiopia, and
272
access to the country’s government. To get around that problem, PepsiCo approached USAID.

At the WEF in January 2011, PepsiCo, USAID, and the WFP signed a four-page Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) broadly defining their common interest in the project. No Ethiopian agency
was a signer to the document.

In that MOU, which we obtained through a FOIA request to USAID, the agency describes its own
method and purpose for stimulating agricultural investment. “Using development aid as a catalyst to
drive private sector investment, USAID is building strategic alliances with the private sector that speak to
their core business interests, while at the same time addressing USAID’s development objectives,”
the document reads. “Through these ‘win-win’ partnerships,’ USAID seeks to advance sustainable,
private-sector led growth in emerging markets, critical to reducing poverty, fighting hunger and improving
273
nutrition”(emphasis added).

The details of the project and the responsibilities of each party were hashed out later. USAID’s role
was clear: to train farmers to adhere to PepsiCo’s standards. PepsiCo, meanwhile, would do what it
always did: purchase large amounts of crops for processed foods -- in particular, a nutritional paste
271
Center for Strategic & International Studies (2012) PepsiCo WFP: A Public-Private Partnership to Transform Nutrition across
Africa. YouTube (video posted January 20), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MX1M9d9d3iY. (Side note: the official
name of the event was the “Chevron Forum on Development”.)
272
Siraj Fite, Tofik (undated) “PepsiCo: Partnering with international development organizations to scale up chickpea
production and fight malnutrition in Ethiopia”, UNDP, p.10
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/Partnerships/Private%20Sector/AFIMcases/UNDP%20
GIM%20Case%20Study%20PepsiCo%20Final.pdf
273
USAID, “MOU-1 USAID World Food Programme and PepsiCo _Redacted” (PepsiCo) (2011) Released under a
FOIA request and appeal to USAID.
79 of 124

274
that it could sell to WFP in foil bags, and hummus under the Sabra Brand. Both these products
require large amounts of chickpeas. In their public remarks, US officials said PepsiCo would source
275
“at least” ten percent of its global demand for chickpeas from Ethiopia.

As its details were hashed out, EthioPEA became one of the showcase projects of Feed the Future.
276
In public remarks, Raj Shah and Vice President Joe Biden talked about both the proximate
277
benefits of the project, and the viability of private-sector led development. PepsiCo officials also
cited the project as evidence of corporate stewardship at a time that it was rebranding itself as a
company that produced healthy packaged food, along with junk food like potato chips and cheetos.
“This is truly a great example of what we at PepsiCo call ‘Performance with Purpose,’ Yach told
USAID’s Frontlines magazine. “The project will create new markets for products and increase yields
for farmers while allowing PepsiCo to create healthier, locally sourced foods and beverages that
278
benefit the whole community while driving long-term growth for the company.”

As his government became involved, Prime Minister Meles also cited the project as evidence of his
279
country’s agricultural transformation. Speaking at the Grow Africa Forum in Addis Ababa in
2012, Meles said helping small farmers and encouraging private sector investment were the two
280
pillars of Ethiopia’s “agricultural transformation program.”

“The large private sector and the smallholder farmers can move not only in parallel, but can intersect
where it makes sense,” he said. “The large private sector can add value, and create opportunities for
281
the small scale farmer.” PepsiCo’s involvement was useful to this plan because it could add value
to a crop commonly grown in some parts of Ethiopia.

At that same event, the signers of the first EthioPEA MOU joined three agencies of the Ethiopian
government, including its newly formed EATA, to sign a second MOU detailing the intentions of all
parties involved.

The export angle
To hear its proponents describe it, EthioPEA would be a classic “win-win” for farmers and PepsiCo.
Small farmers would enjoy reliable income as producers for a global supply chain, PepsiCo would
274
USAID, “MOU-2” (PepsiCo) (Note: PepsiCo jointly owned Sabra with the Strauss Group, an Israeli conglomerate.)
275
Biden, Joe (2011) Remarks by the Vice President at the World Food Program USA Leadership Award Ceremony. The American
Presidency Project at UC Santa Barbara. Speech, October 24,
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-vice-president-the-world-food-program-usa-leadership-award
-ceremony
276
US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on International Development Priorities in the Fiscal Year
2013 Budget, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., March 6, 2012
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76687/pdf/CHRG-112shrg76687.pdf
277
Biden, Joe (2011) Remarks.
278
USAID (2011) Pepsi and Chickpeas: an Interview with Derek Yach. Frontlines. Publication,
https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/news-information/frontlines/50-years-and-food-security/pepsi-and-chickpeas-interview-d
erek-yach.
279
Grow Africa is a project of WEF, NEPAD, and the AU.
280
World Economic Forum (2012) Africa 2012 - Grow Africa: Transforming African Agriculture. YouTube video (posted May
11), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=grHKzPNAaCM.
281
World Economic Forum (2012) Africa 2012.
80 of 124

gain a reliable source for an essential raw material, and, eating PepsiCo products, hungry people in
the Horn of Africa would become less hungry and consume more nutritious food. But based on the
second MOU, we know that as EthioPEA’s details became more concrete, PepsiCo made clear that it
was primarily interested in exporting chickpeas.

According to the second MOU, after PepsiCo completed field trials, a PepsiCo team would weigh
the potential for sourcing chickpeas from Ethiopia on a larger scale, summarizing their findings in a
282
“business case.”

The business case would “assess/confirm the viability of chickpea small-holder farming in Ethiopia”
and consider any opportunities on the “global chickpea market … with a view to creating benefits to
farmers and other stakeholders in Ethiopia.” Moreover, it reads, “the business case would focus on
the potential for Ethiopia to increase chickpea exports to large importers, such as India, Pakistan, and
283
Bangladesh” (emphasis added.).

After it finished the business plan, PepsiCo planned to provide “advisory assistance” to the group of
organizations involved with EthioPEA to scale the project and pass on any knowledge accumulated
during their involvement to the other participants, according to the second MOU. PepsiCo, it added,
“may also consider sourcing chickpeas from Ethiopia.” But whether PepsiCo ultimately chose to buy
chickpeas from Ethiopian small farmers would depend on its own assessment of the “quality” of the
284
crop, and its price compared to other suppliers it already worked with.

Moreover, according to the MOU, the mere possibility of PepsiCo buying chickpeas from Ethiopian
small farmers was predicated on a particular theory of change: that they could produce enough to
meet PepsiCo’s demand with irrigation (provided by the Ethiopian government), “improved seed
varieties and quality” (provided by USAID), and by adopting “best practices” (as articulated by
PepsiCo).

Where the Ethiopian government stood on the export matter is harder to discern. Along with
providing crops for food aid, Yach said Meles had wanted to “build his country’s export market.”285
But the parts of the second MOU which lay out the intentions of the three Ethiopian agencies who
also signed it -- health, agriculture, and the EATA -- say nothing about exports. Rather, they talk
about expanding their agricultural development plans to include a focus on chickpeas, improving the
value chain for the crop, building infrastructure to support farmers, and vetting PepsiCo’s chickpea
products for its health and nutrition programs.

Ultimately, the project failed. According to a letter from USAID in response to one of our FOIA
requests, PepsiCo pulled out “not long after the memorandum of understanding was signed,” before,
286
even, it could write a business plan. The agency did not say why PepsiCo withdrew, but reading the
282
USAID, “MOU-2” (PepsiCo)
283
284
285
USAID (2011) Pepsi and Chickpeas: an Interview with Derek Yach
286
USAID, “FOIA F-00143-18, Final Response”
81 of 124

MOUs, we can infer the company determined the project could not meet its commercial interests
through the project.

In sum, USAID attempted to organize an enabling environment for PepsiCo in Ethiopia, on the
premise that PepsiCo’s investment would alleviate poverty and hunger in the country if not the
region. Ethiopia, simultaneously, adjusted its own development plans to match PepsiCo’s potential
investment. In turn, PepsiCo conducted its own research on the feasibility of the project, but made
no promises, and withdrew quickly after the project started moving. What interest PepsiCo did show
early on was largely tied to a desire to export Ethiopian chickpeas to the Indian subcontinent.

(5.3) USAID and Walmart in East Africa
A few years after EthioPEA launched, USAID finalized another PPP with another global company
involved in African agriculture: Walmart. Announced in 2014, project proponents said it would
relieve rural hunger in the region the same way that EthioPEA was supposed to in Ethiopia -- by
providing inputs, training, market opportunities and therefore income to small farmers who could
use the additional money to buy their way out of hunger.

As with EthioPEA, proponents of the Walmart collaboration claimed the product of the project
would also serve to relieve hunger. But whereas EthioPEA’s chosen product was an undifferentiated
single crop, and its market channels were exports and food aid, the products of the Walmart project’s
goods were high-value, perishable fruits and vegetables intended for discerning urban customers in
Africa. It is for this reason that the Walmart project demonstrates an evolution in AGR thinking, by
making the demand of African urban consumers one of the driving forces for agricultural change in
Africa. The Walmart experience also shows how public relations liability could prompt a corporation
to move into sponsoring AGR programs, like training small farmers.

Enter Massmart
In September 2010, Walmart made its first offer for a controlling share of the South African retailer
Massmart for $4.2 billion, signaling to the world that it wanted to become a leading retailer in Africa.
287
At the time, the company had stores in fourteen countries in Africa, mostly in South Africa. But in
South Africa, the deal was controversial. Local manufacturers and food producers feared that once
under the ownership of a global behemoth, the new entity would buy more goods from suppliers in
other parts of the world, driving down prices in South Africa.

When considering whether to allow the merger, South Africa’s Competition Tribunal weighed these
concerns, ultimately deciding that a new super-entity would not cause unfair competition. But, in
allowing the merger, the Tribunal also ruled the new company would had to start a program “aimed
exclusively at the development of South African suppliers” costing 100 million South African Rand
288
over three years (about $7 million at the time ) and “establish a training programme to train local
287
Clifford, Stephanie (2010) Wal-Mart Bids for Massmart to Expand Into Africa. The New York Times. September 27,
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/business/global/28walmart.html.
288
Historical conversion rate calculated via X-Rates, “Historic Lookup”. Calculated on November 4, 2018.
https://www.x-rates.com/historical/?from=ZAR&amount=1&date=2018-11-04
82 of 124

289
South African suppliers on how to do business” with it. One month later, in May 2011, Walmart
290
finalized its deal with Massmart (though for substantially less money than its original offer).

Under Walmart’s control, Massmart honored its agreement, eventually using its development fund to
create a training program where large farms trained small farmers in their orbit to grow crops to fit
Massmart’s standards. Through the fund, Massmart also provided zero-interest loans to farmers to
291
buy inputs, including seed and fertilizer.

These programs would be part of a larger strategy by Walmart. Not long after acquiring Massmart,
in October 2010, Walmart released a list of “Global Sustainable Development Goals,” which said the
company planned to sell “$1 billion in food sourced from one million small and medium farmers” in
292
emerging markets by the end of 2015. (The inclusion of “medium farmers” in this statement is
worth noting, as the difference between small and medium land holdings is often a key distinction
between subsistence farmers and the “investor farmer” class that has emerged in Africa in recent
years. See Ch. 6.4 for more on investor farmers.) Walmart also said it would train a million “farmers
293
and farm workers … in such areas as crop selection and sustainable farming practices.”

USAID was, by this time, already considering how it might work with Walmart. According to a case
study written for Walmart by the University of Michigan’s Ted London and Colm Fay, many USAID
staff were skeptical of Walmart’s intentions. But as they began to collaborate more, a number of
USAID personnel began to see that Walmart could be useful to its ends, just as Walmart managers
believed the agency could be helpful for its own purposes. The change was part of a wider
reimagining of PPPs at the agency at this time. As London and Fay put it, “rather than focusing on
how much corporate money it could raise, USAID began to think more broadly about how it could
294
use its partners’ other assets to gain access and influence.”

With those goals in place, Central America became one of the first testing grounds for Walmart to
collaborate with a new, re-imagined USAID. In 2011, USAID and Walmart formed an alliance with
two NGOs in Guatemala to train farmers in the country. As one USAID document stated, the
alliance worked by “promoting growth of an entrepreneurial agriculture sector through increasing access
295
to more profitable markets,” and increasing farmers’ productivity (emphasis added). Farmers
would learn to “diversify from traditional subsistence crops to more market-oriented production,
289
Wal-Mart and Massmart appeal and review judgment, Competition Appeal Court of S. Africa, 110/CAC/Jul11 &
111/CAC/Jul11 (2012)
https://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Wal-Mart-and-Massmart-decision/110111CACJun11-Walmart-judgment.p
df. Pg.4.
290
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, April 30 2011 10-Q, (filed June 3, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/104169/000119312511158587/d10q.htm
291
Bizcommunity (2013) Ezemvelo farming initiative rolls out to four provinces. Article. September 4,
http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/183/99575.html
292
Walmart (2010) Walmart Unveils Global Sustainable Agriculture Goals. Press Release. October 14,
https://news.walmart.com/news-archive/2010/10/14/walmart-unveils-global-sustainable-agriculture-goals.
293
Walmart (2010) Walmart Unveils.
294
London, Ted and Fay, Colm (2015) Walmart and USAID: The Evolution of a Global Cross-Sector Partnership. WDI
Publishing. July 31, https://wdi.umich.edu/wp-content/uploads/WalmartCase_WDI-1430438P.pdf. Pg. 12.
295
USAID (2009) Building Alliances Series: Agriculture. Report,
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1880/Agriculture_Guide.pdf.
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based on expected consumer demand,” and to meet “retail standards” concerning “packaging, color,
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smell, taste, size, quality, and variety.” The Guatemalan NGOs would train farmers, USAID would
oversee the project and provide loan guarantees to a local bank through its Development Credit
Authority (DCA), and Walmart would provide a market and the standards to which farmers would
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adhere. The Walmart Foundation would oversee the project. To avoid accusations that Walmart
was purely interested in serving itself under the auspices of a development program, the Foundation
and its partner NGOs ensured that farmers grew crops for multiple buyers, and allowed farmers to
298
make their own decisions.

The Guatemala project provided some of the lessons learned for collaboration between Walmart
and a re-imagined USAID in Africa. But it struggled, in part because Walmart’s business interests
conflicted with USAID’s desires to maximize its poverty impact. According to the aforementioned
case study, USAID wanted the project to benefit some of the poorest small farmers in the country,
who tended to be scattered in remote areas. Moreover, the project failed to “diversify” these farmers’
production away from staple crops. Unable to reconcile Walmart’s business needs with USAID’s
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objectives, Walmart left the project after a year.

Walmart would only continue to align itself with AGR proponents, even hiring some to leadership
positions. In October 2011, Walmart announced it had hired Sylvia Mathews Burwell, at the time,
300
president of global development at BMGF, to head the Walmart Foundation. London and Fay’s
case study describes the role of the Walmart Foundation this way:

… Walmart observed that sometimes market forces alone were not sufficient to address situations
that required significant social change, particularly in emerging markets. In these cases, the Foundation
was an important resource for addressing broader social objectives. The Foundation could make
philanthropic investments in, for example, stimulating innovation, building capacity, or overcoming
301
barriers, thus creating an environment for long-term, market-based solutions.

In her new role, Burwell was charged with guiding Walmart’s “social, environmental and economic
opportunity efforts in Africa.” Though hardly profit-generating on their own, these initiatives would
302
still serve Walmart’s business.

USAID plays guide in East Africa
According to London and Fay, Walmart’s leadership’s thinking about development was undergoing a
transition in 2011. Instead of expending money to get “one-off ” projects off the ground, only to
296
Ibid.
297
Ibid.
298
London and Fay (2015) Walmart and USAID. Pg. 12.
299
Ibid. Pg. 13.
300
After her time at Walmart, President Obama would appoint Burwell to head up the Department of Health and
Human Services, which itself managed a number of other federal agencies, including the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention.
301
302
WalMart (2011) Walmart Foundation Names New President. Press Release. October 14,
https://corporate.walmart.com/_news_/news-archive/2011/10/14/walmart-foundation-names-new-president.
84 of 124

watch the benefits disappear as farmers ceased being Walmart suppliers once the funding went dry, it
wanted its development resources to foster a longer-lasting relationship. As London and Fay write,

Scale was the driving factor in the evolution of the partnership between Walmart and USAID. [Beth]
Keck [a Walmart executive in charge of sustainable agriculture] realized that, to reach scale, Walmart
needed to look beyond supporting the development of individual projects. Instead it would have to
develop a portfolio of partnerships that could leverage the success of existing well-designed
projects. By extending these existing projects, Walmart could cost-effectively achieve a high level of
303
impact in a short amount of time.

In September 2013, Raj Shah went to Walmart headquarters in Arkansas to sign an MOU, broadly
linking the ambitions of Walmart, the Walmart Foundation, and USAID. In line with Keck’s new
thinking, the document said USAID would help Walmart and its foundation “identify existing
304
USAID projects that closely align with the Participants’ shared goals.”

Shah was characteristically enthusiastic about every aspect of the agreement. “We want to bring
Walmart’s core capabilities in philanthropy and business to every part of the world to transform the
face of hunger and poverty,” he said in a speech in Arkansas on the day of the signing. “As the world
305
has grown more interconnected, this is the face of development.”

One year later, the Walmart Foundation announced a $3 million commitment to train small farmers
in three African countries -- Kenya, Zambia, and Rwanda. The initiative would expand three projects
already launched by USAID and implemented by various NGOs, providing training, inputs, and
financial services to 75,000 small farmers just in Rwanda. (By the time it finished, Global
Communities, the project implementer in Rwanda said they had reached 50,000 farmers with the
306
Walmart Foundation’s support. ) The Walmart Foundation offered more money to reach more
farmers and expand the scope of the project, and, ostensibly, provide a market for farmers who
307
could meet their standards. Better yet, since these projects were already established, USAID had
308
already covered the costs of getting them off the ground.

At Walmart, these projects coincided with a more aggressive strategy in Africa. With Walmart at its
helm, Massmart planned a massive expansion in Africa with an emphasis on expanding the “fresh
309
food” side of the business. USAID was ready to help.

But despite the USAID’s considerable investment and assistance, Walmart struggled to find success
in Africa. In 2016, rumors were circulating in the business press that Walmart was looking to undo
its Massmart purchase. Five years after buying it, the company wasn’t delivering the returns Walmart
303
304
USAID, “F-00146-18 ES Responsive Docs Final2” (2013), p. 2. Released through a FOIA request to USAID.
305
University of Arkansas News (2013) Shah Discusses Goal to End Extreme Poverty. Press Release,
https://news.uark.edu/articles/21963/shah-discusses-goal-to-end-extreme-poverty.
306
“Rwanda”, Global Communities, https://www.globalcommunities.org/rwanda
307
308
Ibid.
309
Bonorchis, Renee (2011) Wal-Mart’s Massmart to Buy Fruitspot as it Expands Food Offering. Bloomberg. July 11,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-07-12/wal-mart-s-massmart-to-buy-south-africa-s-fruitspot-to-boost-
food-offering.
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had wanted, or expected: South Africa’s economy was in a rut, and the rest of the continent was
failing to make up for its losses in Massmart’s homebase. Walmart never parted with Massmart,
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probably because it couldn’t find a buyer as multinational corporate interest in Africa was fading.

(5.4) Conclusion
With Raj Shah leading USAID, PPPs with name-brand global companies were a signature feature of
US agricultural development programs around the world, particularly in Africa. By making African
agriculture in Africa more accommodating to investment from these companies, the idea went, the
US government could direct private-sector resources into development projects.

Since Raj Shah’s departure from USAID in 2013, the agency’s leadership has been less vocal about
partnering with name-brand global companies like Land O’Lakes, PepsiCo, and Walmart to advance
its agricultural development agenda. In hindsight, the boom in PPPs with global companies during
the Shah era may not have resulted from a shift in strategy at USAID but from an upsurge in
excitement around Africa and other “emerging markets” in the fallout of the global economic crisis
(see Ch. 2.1). Likewise, the lack of brand-name PPPs today may only reflect a diminished excitement
about Africa in the boardrooms of Western countries. A year after Walmart was reportedly looking
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to sell Massmart, British investment bank Barclays plc sold its Africa business at a loss.

Still, the excitement around PPPs at USAID prior to the upsurge of Afro-pessimism reveals several
important facts about how USAID has positioned itself alongside businesses in its AGR efforts. As
the above examples show, USAID’s role as a corporate partner drew on the expertise of its staff, its
connections with development contractors, its financial resources, and the diplomatic connections it
derived from its legitimacy as a US government agency. Whether or not a name-brand multinational
company knocks on its door looking for a partnership, it can -- and does -- utilize all those assets to
create an enabling environment for business in Africa.

310
Tshandu, Palesa Vuyolwethu (2015) Finding a buyer may be toughest task for Walmart. Sunday Times. June 5,
https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/business/2016-06-05-finding-a-buyer-may-be-toughest-task-for-walmart/.
311
Arnold, Martin (2017) Barclays Cuts Stake in African Operations Further Than Expected. Financial Times. June 1,
https://www.ft.com/content/6dd04296-469b-11e7-8519-9f94ee97d996.
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CHAPTER 6: THE ROLE OF LARGE-SCALE LAND
DEALS IN THE AFRICAN GREEN REVOLUTION

(6.1) The state of land grabs today
Land grabbing leapt into the collective consciousness of international activists and researchers in
2008, when The Financial Times broke news of a deal wherein the government of Madagascar planned
to lease an area equivalent to half the size of Belgium to the South Korean conglomerate Daewoo
312
for commodity crop production. Since then, numerous other large-scale deals involving the
transfer of land to foreign investors have been made public, often by members of the research
313
consortium.

314
But, as GRAIN noted in a 2016 report, the pace of these land grabs has slowed since about 2012.
In light of that news, it is worth considering other trends in land acquisition in Africa.

(6.2) Are large farms even useful?
While large-scale land acquisitions represent a critical aspect of the AGR story since 2006, they also
go to the heart of one of its central conflicts. Despite an interest in large-scale land acquisitions on
part of investors in the early days of the AGR, some of the lead aid agencies and philanthropies
backing AGR programs -- particularly USAID and BMGF -- have moved in a seemingly opposite
direction, taking an approach to agricultural development that explicitly places small farmers at the
315
center of attention.

While these groups frequently describe their small-farmer focus in purely altruistic terms, policies
favoring small farmers have some purely economic justification as well. In a 2011 World Bank paper,
Klaus Klesinger of the World Bank and Derek Byerlee of IFPRI compared the historical benefits of
large and small farms and found that large farms have been predominantly less successful on a range
316
of measures, including productivity and poverty alleviation. As the duo wrote, there are three
major reasons that small, family-operated farms continue to dominate the agricultural sector in
countries around the world. First, as the profit earners in the operation, a family that owns its own
farm is more likely to work hard than wage workers whose earnings will be more or less the same
312
Junga-a, Song and Oliver, Christian (2008) Daewoo to Cultivate Madagascar Land for Free. Financial Times. November 19,
https://www.ft.com/content/6e894c6a-b65c-11dd-89dd-0000779fd18c.
313
See Table 1.2 for a list of research consortium reports on land grabs
314
GRAIN (2016) The Global Farmland Grab in 2016: How Big, How Bad? Report,
https://www.grain.org/article/entries/5492-the-global-farmland-grab-in-2016-how-big-how-bad
315
BMGF (nd) What We Do - Agricultural Development: Strategy Overview. Website,
https://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Growth-and-Opportunity/Agricultural-Development; USAID
(nd) What We Do - Agriculture and Food Security. Website,
https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/agriculture-and-food-security.
316
Deininger, Klaus and Byerlee, Derek (2011) The Rise of Large Farms in Land Abundant Countries: Do They Have a Future?
World Bank https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-5588. A version of this paper under a different
title is freely available, here:
http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/cega_events/30/AfDR_Deininger--Byerlee_Large-Farm-Small-Farm-Debate_P-S.pdf.
87 of 124

regardless of the farm’s performance. Secondly, family farmers tend to have a deep knowledge of the
landscape which they can adapt to changes in the weather and the market. Finally, family farmers can
adjust their labor rapidly depending on the needs of the farm, and allocate it to tasks other than
growing crops as needed.

Speaking at AGRF 2018, Francisco Santos, CEO of JFS Holdings, a Mozambican conglomerate
with a large agribusiness division, countered a perception that what was likely a commonly held
perception in the audience when he said that human labor remained cheaper and more efficient way
of performing most agricultural tasks than mechanization in much of Africa, including Mozambique.

Yet for agricultural investors, both foreign and domestic, a large farm on a unified area has an
undeniable appeal. A large farm under the control of a single operator is more easily subjected to
mechanization, and input standardization, all of which helps maintain a consistency of product that
is advantageous when selling undifferentiated crops. We might read some recent agricultural
endeavors in Africa that take place over a large area as attempts to make large farms profitable, in
part by separating their advantages from some of the risks they historically entail.

(6.3) Models of large farms in AGR
Many large-scale projects involve “outgrower” or “contract” schemes. In these projects, an operator
distributes inputs to a group of independent small farmers, at times numbering in the thousands.
The farmers then use those inputs to grow a particular crop and bring it back to the operator. One
company that has utilized this model is Nigeria’s Valentine Farms. Valentine began in 2009, four
years after the government of Kwara State in Northern Nigeria offered 1,000 hectare (HA) plots to
exiled Zimbabwean farmers willing to develop the land. Four Zimbabweans each claimed their own
plot and combined their assets into a poultry company, Valentine Farms. The company’s holdings
317
have since grown to 5,000 HA, a size equivalent to 57 percent of Manhattan.

In 2015, the South African poultry conglomerate Country Bird Holdings (CBH) acquired the
318
company. That year, Valentine and CBH introduced an outgrower scheme to train “assist and
develop indigenous farmers with commercial farming techniques” and provide Valentine’s feed mill
319
with corn and soy, according to CBH As Kevin James, CBH’s executive director, said shortly
before the acquisition was finalized, “We are empowering a lot of the farmers there … [W]e give
320
them soyabean seed for them to grow and supply back to us.”

However, for an investor to benefit an outgrower scheme, it does not necessarily have to own all the
land from which it sources it crops. In some cases, such as SilverStreet’s projects in Tanzania and
Zambia, an investor has built a processing facility to absorb a large amount of certain crops and then
321
launched an outgrower scheme in surrounding areas (See Ch. 3.3.2 for more on SilverStreet).
317
CBH (nd) Our Subsidiaries.Website, http://cbh.co.za/our-subsidiaries/.
318
Ibid.
319
Ibid.
320
O’Hanlon, John (nd) Country Bird Holdings (CBH). Business Excellence. Website,
https://www.bus-ex.com/article/country-bird-holdings-cbh.
321
SilverStreet Capital (nd) Silverlands Tanzania. Website,
https://www.silverstreetcapital.com/investments/silverlands-tanzania-limited.
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Another way that investors limit exposure to the risks associated with a large agricultural operation is
by owning the land but leasing it to a separate operator. The South African PE firm FutureGrowth
has three dedicated agricultural funds invested in farmland. These funds own eight farms in South
322
Africa, which grows fruit and produces wine for supermarket retailers. The fund leases each farm
to a separate operator, providing a reliable stream of income for the fund independent of the farm’s
performance. The fund also pays for farm infrastructure upgrades, and, at times, the acquisition of
323
adjacent land, increasing the farm’s value and ensuring the fund will realize a profit when it sells it.

(6.4) The local dimension
Despite the attention paid to large, foreign-led land acquisitions, however, the enclosure of Africa’s
commons that has accompanied AGR has been driven in large part by African investors acquiring
medium sized plots. As a group of researchers led by MSU’s Thomas Jayne wrote in a 2016 paper,
affluent Africans have been acquiring land at a high rate since 2000, and the trend accelerated with
324
the 2007-2008 world Food Price Crisis (see Ch. 2.1). For these investors, the preferred acquisition is
around 5-100 HA.

The largest group of investors have been urban residents who derived their wealth through a means
other than agriculture, many of whom work in government. A second group that has invested
heavily in land is made of rural elites who were born into relative affluence and may be related to
local tribal leaders. In Zambia, Malawi, and Kenya, these investors accounted for 95 percent of
medium-scale farms. Small farmers who had managed to expand their operations beyond 5 HA only
325
accounted for five percent of the medium-scale farms.

As Jayne et al. write, the rise of African “investor farmers” pose a familiar array of threats to rural
livelihoods, especially for the poorest farmers in densely populated areas. Unable to expand their
holdings, small farmers may turn to ecologically destructive modes of intensification to survive, such
as “elimination of fallows… soil mining, reduced crop rotations due to pressures to produce enough
326
staple maize each year, and other forms of land degradation.” “Investor farmers” may also use
their connections in government to take a more assertive role in local agricultural organizations and
327
direct policies and resources to benefit their interests over those of small farmers.

But while some AGR proponents may say the emergence of medium-scale farms is a necessary and
ultimately positive stage in an agricultural transformation, Jayne, et al., argue that medium-scale
farms are actually associated with lower productivity per unit of land. Investors are acquiring plots,
but often leaving large sections of them to grow over with weeds. “In sum, it is still unclear how
322
FutureGrowth Asset Management (nd) FutureGrowth Agri-Farm Investments. Website,
http://www.futuregrowth.co.za/media/2120/futuregrowth-agri-farm-investments.pdf.
323
FutureGrowth Asset Management (nd) Institutional Funds. Website,
http://www.futuregrowth.co.za/our-investments/institutional-funds/developmental/agri-funds/.
324
Jayne, Thomas S, et al. ( 2016) Africa’s Changing Farmland Ownership: The Rise of the Emergent Investor Farmer. Feed the
Future Innovation Lab for Food Security Policy. Report,
https://www.canr.msu.edu/fsp/publications/research-papers/FSP%20Research%20Paper%2015.pdf.
325
Jayne, et al. “Africa’s Changing Farmland”, p.10
326
327
89 of 124

much of the medium-scale expansion is associated with productive versus speculative investment
328
aims,” they write.

(6.5) Land tenure and land grabs
One reason that large-scale investors have struggled in Africa is that most countries on the continent
lack an easy means of registering land rights to make land transfer easier. As one PE industry report
notes, the presence of freehold titled land has made many Latin American countries appealing to
agricultural investors in a way that most of Africa is not. As the report notes, freehold titled land
“makes it easier to pursue primary production opportunities and can facilitate an agribusiness firm’s
329
ability to achieve scale and vertical integration.”

It is worth noting, however, that some countries in Africa that may be an exception to the rule have
largely retained a colonial legacy of large-holder farming. Zambia, for instance, has kept and even
expanded a colonial holdover system of “land blocks,” setting aside multi-thousand HA expanses
near road infrastructure for investors. As a result, Zambia has seen an influx of investors willing to
utilize a large area over the past fifteen years, including SilverStreet and Chayton, a PE fund-turned
330
subsidiary of the publicly traded South African conglomerate Zeder Investments. (Zeder is itself
a subsidiary of South Africa’s PSG Group.) A description of the farm block Chayton’s farm, called
Agrivision Africa, sits on even reads like an account of a British colonial outpost. According to one
account, the block “comprises a community of farmers with a country club offering golf, tennis and
331
cricket facilities.”

In most African countries, however, designated farm blocks, or even formalized land tenure, are the
kinds of mechanisms for land acquisition that investors might like, but do not have. For that reason,
whoever acquires land for investment purposes in Africa in the future may benefit from recent
efforts by AGR proponents to make African agricultural land rights both more formal and more
comprehensible to outsiders.

Even before the Feed the Future, MCC and USAID were carrying out projects in some African
countries to register farmland and assign tenure certification to the farmers who utilized it. One of
the official justifications for these projects is that land tenure can protect farmers against land grabs.
But by creating a written, legal framework for land use rights in countries where those rights are
often complicated, disputed, and highly localized, land tenure projects have also made investments in
land more feasible.

In explaining land tenure projects, USAID has hardly distanced itself from the possibility that land
tenure could make foreign investment easier. In fact, the person leading the effort embraced it. In a
328
Ibid.
329
Aulisi, Andrew, et al. (2015) Private Equity and Emerging Markets Agribusiness: Building Value Through Sustainability. Credit
Suisse, CDC, EMPEA, IFC, World Wildlife Fund for Nature,
330
Herre, Roman (2013) Fast Track Agribusiness Expansion, Land Grabs and the Role of European Private and Public Financing in
Zambia: A Right to Food Perspective. Hands off the Land Alliance. Report,
https://www.fian.org/fileadmin/media/publications_2015/Reports_and_Guidlines/13_12_FIAN_Zambia_EN.PDF.
Pg.12-13.
331
Maritz, Jaco (2012) ‘A Really Big Opportunity.’
90 of 124

segment on a USAID podcast in 2012, Gregory Myers, the agency’s then-Division Chief for Land
Tenure and Property Rights, argued that land tenure could ensure small farmers’ rights during what
could be a “highly transformative” period of development by foreign investors with “good
intentions.” The segment adopted a format common to public radio, switching between Myers’ own
voice and the voice of host Kelly Ramundo paraphrasing him. To start, Ramundo paraphrases Myers
recounting the fallout from the Global Food Price Crisis, and the start of the wave of land grabs in
Africa.

RAMUNDO: Myers says that some [investors] were looking to make a profit with no regard
for who owned the land. But other investors came to deals with good intentions. And
then found themselves in a bind.

MYERS: Because they go to a country like Ethiopia, or Tanzania, or Madagascar, or
Mozambique, or Ghana, and they say, ‘we would like to invest in agriculture and we would
like to lease land, et cetera.’ And the government of that country says, ‘yes, we own the land,
and here’s free land that you can invest in.’ They may not realize that they in fact are actually
in a – in a – in a process of dispossessing people from their land rights.

RAMUNDO: But that’s not the only issue at play. We live on a hungry planet. Between
800 million and a billion people go to bed hungry every night. Clearly, he says we have to do
something to promote agriculture. But that means there has to be investment in agriculture.
So, while these investments in farmland – whether they’re speculative or good investments
or not, those investments are, to a certain extent, still very important, because the
public sector doesn’t have the money that it’s going to require to be able to improve
agricultural productivity to meet the needs of – the food security needs of the future.

So, if you need the private sector to tackle the growing food needs of a growing population,
the question becomes: do you bring responsible private sector investment into this equation?

MYERS: The only way that’s going to happen sustainably and in a way that’s not going to
lead to a lot of violence or conflict is that we’re going to have to address the issue of
property rights. So what we would do is, we would first try to find a way to secure the
rights of the resources that people in these countries have, and then to find a way to link
them to these private sector investors in ways that would be very profitable for those small
holders.

RAMUNDO: That strategy is at the heart of the U.S. Government’s flagship food security
program, called Feed the Future:

MYERS: On one hand, encouraging [the] private sector, and on the other hand, supporting
smallholder farmers. So while this issue around land-grabbing is highly controversial,
it could also potentially be highly transformative, depending on the way in which it
332
happens.
332
USAID (2017) Changing the World, One Property Right at a Time. Frontlines. Report,
https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/frontlines/podcasts/changing-world-one-property-right-time-0. (The audio
for this segment is available on YouTube at “Changing the World One Property Right at a Time -- A USAID podcast”,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kMfCXoHG1Lg)
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Through the USAID disbursements database, we identified 34 projects with the term “land tenure”
333
in their descriptions from 2009-2018, in Ethiopia, South Sudan , Tanzania, Senegal, Zambia, and
the West Africa region. We have included the list in the Supporting Documents folder.

ProSAVANA’s land tenure connection
At this point, it’s worth considering how one of these projects worked in practice. In 2008, MCC
initiated a $39.1 million “land tenure services project” in Mozambique, one of a number such
projects in countries around the world where MCC had determined that “land and property rights
334
systems were … key constraints to growth and poverty reduction.”

As MCC later described it, the Mozambique project included “registration of communal and
individual land rights and investments,” and the “development of a national land information
335
system,” among other components. MCC was careful to note that its project was intended to
benefit small farmers. In a report on its global efforts, it added that the project had created a Land
Policy Forum in Mozambique to give citizens a place to learn about and comment on changes to the
336
country’s land laws.

But if small farmers benefited from the MCC project, they weren’t the only ones. When civil society
groups were leaked a copy of the “Master Plan” for the joint Brazilian, Japanese, and Mozambican
agriculture project ProSAVANA in 2013, one of the most shocking details concerned the provision
of land tenure to small farmers who would be caught up in the massive project. According to the
plan, farmers willing to cooperate with the plan would be entitled to a “DUAT,” -- a form of title for
their land which would delineate the bounds of their parcel. As GRAIN wrote in a report on the
leaked master document, the DUAT plan was plainly an attempt to make land easier for investors to
map out and acquire:

It is clear to us that the real objective behind these efforts to push farmers into intensive
cultivation is to privatise the land and make it more available to outside investors. Relegating
farmers to a fixed parcel is a way to mark off lands more clearly for investors and to make it
possible for provincial governments to establish the land banks (state land earmarked for
commercial use by private investors) that the plan calls for. It also allows investors to bypass
negotiations with communities to access lands. The Land Registration of the Small Scale and
Medium Scale Farmers component of the Master Plan clearly states that its objective is to
“facilitate the identification of areas for the promotion of agriculture by large
farmers, private companies and medium scale farmers.” It is also described as a means
to “create an environment of cooperation and integration between the small scale farm and
337
new investors.”

333
Listed as “Sudan (former)” in the database
334
MCC Property Rights and Land Policy Practice Group (2012) Property Rights and Land Policy. Report,
https://assets.mcc.gov/content/uploads/2017/05/paper-20120011069-principles-property_rights_and_land_policy_1_
2.pdf. Pg. 3.
335
Ibid. Pg. 33.
336
Ibid. Pg. 17.
337
Justiça Ambiental! (2013) Leaked ProSAVANA Master Plan Confirms Worst Fears. GRAIN. Report,
https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4703-leaked-prosavana-master-plan-confirms-worst-fears.
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ProSAVANA’s DUAT program was central to the success of the entire project, the first step in
bringing agricultural land into the fold of the project’s investors and resulting intensification. But,
according to the Master Plan, ProSAVANA had inherited the program from somewhere else. The
DUAT program, it said, would begin on 20,000 HA in four project sites, each determined “by the
338
experience of MCA project.”

“MCA,” the Master Plan added, was already wrapping up its project of registering DUATs for small
farmers. The part of the registration project which ProSAVANA’s people would have to do on their
own “is expected to be implemented smoothly by using knowhow and human resource accumulated
339
through the MCA project.” Elsewhere in the Master Plan, we learn that “MCA” means “Millenium
Challenge Account,” the partnership between MCC and the Mozambican government, and the
340
“MCA project” was the land tenure program it launched in 2008.

Among other lessons, the ProSAVANA examples underscores another fact made in this report but
which bears repeating here, that, far from being a bystander to a process of “development” carried
out by foreign powers, African governments are frequently willing partners in AGR programs. Land
tenure programs speak to the heart of their involvement, and their interest in participating: processes
of mapping, demarcation, and registration that make it possible for foreign investors to reimagine a
savannah as a site for large-scale agriculture also create inroads for the host government to assert
itself.

(6.6) Looking ahead
At least in the near term, large scale projects may not represent the future for agriculture in Africa.
341
After years of trying to make them work, many, including ProSAVANA, have floundered. But as
the appeal of large farms remains for investors, we might expect investors to look for other ways to
maximize the benefits of large farms while minimizing their risks through systems of control that are
still being developed around the continent. As an often low-margin sector, food and agriculture has
often rewarded entrepreneurs who exploited new methods of passing on risk to someone else while
keeping most of the benefits for themselves. Two examples of practices which have are now used
around the world include the contract system of poultry production pioneered in the United States
342 343
by Tyson Foods, and franchising, which was pioneered by McDonald’s. Similarly, investors in
Africa may yet invent new ways to capture the benefit and separate the risk from a system of
production even from a system of production like smallholder commodity farming. When they do,
others will no doubt replicate the model far and wide.
338
ProSAVANA (2013) Pro Savana Pd Report No 2 Qi Ps Eng 1. Published by GRAIN,
https://www.grain.org/attachments/2747/download. Pg. 5.
339
Ibid.
340
Ibid. Pg. 56-7.
341
GRAIN (2018) Failed Farmland Deals: A Growing Legacy of Disaster and Pain. Report,
https://www.grain.org/article/entries/5958-failed-farmland-deals-a-growing-legacy-of-disaster-and-pain.
342
For a thorough discussion of how Tyson pioneered this model, see Christopher Leonard’s The Meat Racket: The Secret
Takeover of America’s Food Business (2015).
343
Eric Schlosser’s classic, Fast Food Nation: The Dark Side of the All-American Meal (2001), offers a lengthy discussion of
franchising in fast food.
93 of 124

CHAPTER 7: THE FUTURE OF THE AFRICAN
GREEN REVOLUTION
Introduction
The previous chapters outlined some of the major trends in the financial and political efforts to
build a new African Green Revolution. However, as we discussed in our methodology section, our
report is by no means comprehensive in scope. To do so would be an enormous, multi-year
undertaking. With that in mind, in this concluding chapter we offer thoughts on the future of
agricultural investment in Africa.

We’ve divided the chapter into four parts.

First, we share a report from the 2018 African Green Revolution Forum in Kigali, Rwanda that
provides a fascinating look at the different paths major donors and African governments are
charting and how, at times, they come into conflict with one another. Second, we analyze recent
policy documents from USAID and USG to muse on their future strategies, with special emphasis
on the theory of the agricultural exit, or the idea that a majority of African farmers must exit the
sector in order for significant transformation to take place. Our choice to focus here on the USG
was based on document and policy availability; similar strategies from actors such as the BMGF do
not exist within the public realm and thus are difficult to assess. Next, we examine the African
Development Bank’s lofty goal of re-creating a Brazilian-style agro-industrial model in savannah
landscapes of Africa. Finally, we conclude by summarizing where the African Green Revolution has
been and where it’s going.

(7.1) Report from AGRF 2018
As part of our research, Alex Park was able to attend the 2018 African Green Revolution Forum
(AGRF) from September 5 through 8 in Kigali, Rwanda. The event allowed us to hear the latest
rhetoric on AGR first hand, and better grasp some of the major trends to look out for. In Rwanda,
Alex was also able to meet with a local farmers group to discuss some of the major challenges their
constituents are currently facing.

AGRF has been hosted every year in various cities in Africa by AGRA since 2010. From 2006 to
2009, the event was called the African Green Revolution Conference (AGRC), and was hosted by Yara
International, the fertilizer company, in Oslo (see Ch. 2.1). Since its inception, the event has been a
gathering place for some of the major financiers, academics, businesspeople, government officials,
philanthropies, and development contractors advancing the AGR. Some of the major themes that
came up during the conference included:

Urgency
Frequently, speakers said that governments, philanthropies, aid agencies, and other AGR proponents
were not doing enough. While some metrics concerning nutrition and productivity were moving in
the right direction, they were not improving fast enough. Multiple speakers said that farmers needed
to radically improve their technology if a number of one or several of the various crises -- a climate
94 of 124

crisis that would hamper food productivity, a malthusian productivity ceiling, getting left behind by a
rapidly changing world economy -- would undo any progress to date. This position was echoed by
high ranking officials such as Raj Shah (discussion below) and Dr. Agnes Kalibata, president of the
344
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa.

“Agriculture as a business”
Few speakers used the term “food security,” and even some of those who did used it dismissively.
For instance James Nyoro (see Ch. 4.1.1) said that “food security” was the mistaken goal for AGR
efforts, because agriculture was really a business whose purpose was to generate income, not food. A
number of speakers used the phrase “agriculture as a business” to describe how all people involved
in the sector should think of it. The axiom is hardly unique to AGRF: it’s one widely invoked in
development circles when describing a change of mentality surrounding agriculture which AGR
345
proponents often consider a prerequisite for any kind of agricultural change.

“Agricultural transformation”
Another phrase that came up frequently was “agricultural transformation.” When speakers explained
what they meant by this term, it became clear they meant leveraging agriculture to facilitate a
transition into an industrial economy. Setting the mood, one of the first speakers of the conference
was John Mellor, whose 1995 book Agriculture on the Road to Industrialization was apparently popular
346
among some African leaders, including Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi. Mellor told the audience that as a
nation’s agricultural productivity increases, agriculture takes up a smaller role in the overall economy,
as other sectors develop and become more important -- an idea which several speakers invoked
favorably in later days. In an opening essay for the “Africa Agriculture Status Report 2018” that
accompanied the conference, Mellor elaborated on this idea of agricultural transformation. “It is
much more than feeding people,” he wrote.

Unfortunately, much of the foreign aid community is also deficient in this knowledge with
consequently impaired impact. They often see agriculture as simply meeting the need for food for a
growing population. That simple need can be met by imports, but the full range of effects of an
347
agricultural transformation cannot be met in this way.

Consumer-Driven Change
Many speakers said African farmers should aspire to primarily service the wants and needs of urban
consumers, as urban consumers are driving greater demand for processed and “high-value” foods.
As Fokko Wientjes, VP for Emerging Markets and Food Systems Transformation for DSM, a
Dutch vitamin maker with a production base in Rwanda, said farmers should stop thinking “farm to
fork” and start thinking “fork to farm.” In other words, he explained, farmers should identify the
needs of urban consumers and cater to them, instead of the other way around. During his keynote
344
http://venturesafrica.com/african-green-revolution-forum-2018/
345
Rock, Joeva (2018) ‘We are not starving’: Challenging Genetically Modified Seeds and Development in Ghana. Culture,
Agriculture, Food and Environment.
https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/cuag.12147
346
Mellor, John (2018) Protected: 2018 Africa Agriculture Status Report - AGRA. Report,
https://mafiadoc.com/protected-2018-africa-agriculture-status-report-agra_5bba8f20097c476b7b8b471d.html.
347
Ibid.
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address, Raj Shah similarly spoke of how developing “consumer-oriented businesses” should be the
348
desired goal of any agricultural transformation plans.

Technology
Many speakers commented that farming should be understood to be not just capital intensive, but
technology intensive as well. Accordingly, they said, agriculture should be led, if not dominated, by
tech-savvy, entrepreneurial young people. As Jennifer Blanke, Vice President for Agriculture, Human
and Social Development at AfDB said, “We have to change the way we talk about” agriculture. She
elaborated, “This is not your grandfather’s farming. It’s not someone cutting grass with their hands.
349
It’s someone behind a computer piloting a fleet of drones.”

Raj Shah, now president of the Rockefeller Foundation, espoused a similar vision, wherein “a farmer
can use her smartphone to take a photo of a diseased leaf on a banana tree, send it over SMS to an
expert-based artificial intelligence system, and in return, get a precise recommendation for how to
350
treat the disease with particular inputs even delivered to her by drone.”

Regional Integration
A number of businesspeople spoke of their frustration over an inability to trade with neighboring
countries. They and others said Africa needed greater regional integration to build regional blocks.
Part of the appeal would be to connect farms in the rural area of one country to the urban centers of
another. Creating such transnational rural-urban linkages would facilitate transnational supply chains
that could produce processed foods that compete on international markets. A panel of heads of state
and government from Rwanda, Zambia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, and Gabon at the end of the
conference universally praised the recent African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA),
which had been signed in Kigali earlier that year.

Selling Without Traders
A number of speakers spoke of a need for new ways to pay farmers. As several speakers described
the problem, farmers and urban retailers were connected by an overly convoluted chain of traders,
each adding transactional costs and raising the cost of agricultural products. The solution, a number
of them said, was technological: connecting farmers and retailers through other, more innovative
systems involving mobile phones, blockchains, cloud-based computing, etc. Grant Brooke, CEO of
Twiga Foods, spoke to represent one of these new technological middle men. Twiga relays price
information to farmers so they know when to sell and where to market their crops and helps them
to arrange transportation. Twiga is one of a number of “agritech” and “fintech” companies offering
real-time information to farmers which have sprouted up around Africa in recent years, often riding
a wave of venture capital. (See Ch. 5 for more on private equity and venture capital.)
348
AGRF Forum (2018) The Great Debate.YouTube video (streamed live on September 7),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GN6JULmLty4&t=129s (Shah’s address was one of only a few at AGRF that was
recorded and later uploaded to YouTube.)
349
The official’s comments echo those of Akinwumi Adesina, President of the African Development Bank: JoyBusiness
(2018) AfDB’s Adesina Call for Emerging Agric Technologies to Optimize Farmers’ Output. MyJoyOnline. August 13,
https://www.myjoyonline.com/business/2018/August-13th/afdbs-adesina-call-for-emerging-agric-technologies-to-opti
mize-farmers-output.php.
350
AGRF Forum (2018) The Great Debate.
96 of 124

As Brooke described the problem Twiga was addressing, urban food distribution was a “fragmented,
distributed system” that involved too many people. It was “no way to feed the people who will be a
majority by 2025 -- urban, African residents.”

Asked whether Twiga had encountered any resistance from traders, Brooke said the traders were not
well organized enough to stop them. “Because the market was so disintegrated, we didn’t have any
unions tackling us,” he said. Twiga “didn’t have the problem Uber had,” by which he meant butting
heads with taxi unions. He added that when Twiga entered new markets, it sometimes went with
government officials, which gave the company more legitimacy than it might have had otherwise. He
added that farmers were often happy to find a way to circumvent traders.

Financing Without Banks
Many businesspeople expressed dissatisfaction with local banks. The consensus was largely that the
banks were uncertain how to value their assets and were unwilling to extend loans without high rates
of collateral and interest rates. An exchange between Eric Kaduru -- a speaker and a young Ugandan
advertising professional who left that job to start a passion fruit business -- and an audience member
is illustrative. When the questioner suggested to Kaduru that he was taking foreign money by relying
on a venture capital group, Kaduru bristled. When he started the business, he said, he had gone to a
bank to ask for money, but found the terms to be unfavorable. When a venture capital firm offered
him money on favorable terms, he gladly accepted the offer, as he expected any entrepreneur in the
same position would have done. Speaking on a separate panel, an official representing Kenya’s KCB
Bank added the bank had begun hiring staff agronomists to better assess prospective investees.

In some on-stage discussions about financing, speakers suggested the emergent systems for paying
farmers could, at some point, also finance the expansion plans of agricultural entrepreneurs. Peter
Veal, head of business development for Africa and the Middle East for Syngenta, framed this
possibility as a threat to banks. “Unless banks give services to agriculture, they will be leapfrogged by
technology ... Twiga will come up with an algorithm that will get lending right,” he said.

“Strong Leadership”
The official theme of this year’s conference was the role of the state -- itself a noteworthy shift from
prior years, when AGR proponents emphasized the technological dimension of agricultural change.
A number of speakers said government leaders had a role in defining a vision for agricultural
transformation and coordinating various organs of government in support of it. A number of
speakers used the phrase “strong” or “visionary leadership” to describe the kind of management
style best suited to this cause. The two examples they most often cited to show how strong
leadership could positively influence agricultural change were Ethiopia, with special praise heaped
onto that country’s Agricultural Transformation Agency (EATA; see Ch. 4.1.1) and Rwanda. The
governments in both these countries are characterized by authoritarianism. The number of times
speakers favorably referenced either country is too many to count. Tony Blair, representing the Tony
Blair Institute for Global Change, which was a co-sponsor of the conference, added in his speech
that when political leaders find they cannot work within the system in place, they have to find ways
to go around it.

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Supporting vs. dismantling rural livelihoods
There was an latent tension between some delegates, such as Raj Shah, who explicitly advocated for
African countries to depopulate rural areas, and others, such as Shenggen Fan, the Director General
of IFPRI, who cautioned against any efforts to dramatically rural populations. In his speech, Shah
commented that an eight-percent drop in people employed in agriculture across Africa over the last
fifteen years was not fast enough, and that, at such a rate, achieving agricultural employment rates
similar to other, developed countries would take another 90 years (see section 7.3). Speaking on a
separate panel, Fan discussed his experience growing up in rural Taiwan, then returning years later to
find that many of the people who had once lived there had left for the city. Africa, he said, should
avoid a similar fate by making rural livelihoods more possible.

Similarly, Leonard Mizzi, head of the European Commission’s food security and rural
development unit, said attendees should work to make rural livelihoods more livable as “we would
like to avoid a mass migration to the megacities.” That a representative of the European Union
government would say this is especially pertinent given fears about African migration into Europe at
the EU.

Another way to look at the difference was that some delegates wanted to help farmers where they
were and others wanted to help them through some macroeconomic magic, by leveraging agriculture
to generate income, diversifying the economy, and creating jobs in other, urban sectors. But on both
sides of the argument, the prescription was generally the same -- more inputs, more market access,
more finance, more infrastructure for more rural-urban linkages, etc.

(7.2) AfDB’s Savannah Plan
As AGR matures and becomes a standard component of the institutions of development in Africa,
its proponents have demonstrated bolder ambitions for agricultural transformation than they did at
the beginning of this continental project. Among the largest projects currently underway is AfDB’s
Transformation of the African Savannah Initiative (TASI), which, if successful, will help to
convert savannah ecologies in eight countries (Ghana, Guinea, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
the Central African Republic, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, and Mozambique) to feed and corresponding
livestock production. TASI would bring in more infrastructure and technology in particular regions
351
of these countries to orient them more to the production of particular crops and related processes.

One of the first stages of this endeavor, a pilot project called the Savannah Zone Agricultural
Productivity Project (SAZAPIP), will soon be underway in Northern Ghana. Since the details of
this project have already been released, looking at SAZAPIP gives us some insights into what the
rest of the project may look like. SAZAPIP will attempt to address every aspect of poultry feed
352
production, from seed manufacturing and distribution, to training farmers to grow feed crops.

The choice of Northern Ghana as the first front of this continental project is unsurprising. These
days, the sub region is awash with development contractors attempting to spur agricultural change,
351
AfDB, “Transformation of the African Savannah Initiative (TASI)”,
https://www.afdb.org/en/2017-world-food-prize-week/events/transformation-of-the-african-savannah-initiative-tasi/
352
AfDB, “Ghana - Savannah Zone Agricultural Productivity Improvement Project”,
http://projectsportal.afdb.org/dataportal/VProject/show/P-GH-AAZ-001
98 of 124

often using a similar toolkit. Since 2014, for instance, USAID has funded the ADVANCE II
project, managed by ACDI/VOCA, which has deployed seeds and tractors to small farmers with the
intent of including them in the “value chain” for poultry. USDA sponsors a similar program,
managed by the development arm of the American Soybean Association, as part of its own initiative
to develop the Ghanaian poultry sector. Like those programs, SAZAPIP is supposed to involve
small farmers in the production of feed crops, ostensibly for the mutual benefit of the farmers
353
themselves and the Ghanaian poultry industry.

However, SAZAPIP differs from other aid agency and philanthropy-funded soy value chain projects
in Northern Ghana in some important ways, which indicate that it may represent a new phase in
AGR. One is that the program will involve a substantial infrastructure component; as part of the
program, AfDB will apply some of its own characteristic approach to development to the underlying
economies of certain crops, financing the rehabilitation of existing rural roads, warehouses, seed
processing facilities, and irrigation canals.

Secondly, SAZAPIP is only intended to be one aspect of a larger initiative, which, if carried out to its
intended stage, will involve similar projects in seven other countries. The emphasis on scale reveals
another factor which distinguishes SAZAPIP from other programs of soy production in the region:
a desire to turn African savannas into a base of production for commodity crops for export markets.
This desire is especially clear in AfDB officials’ admiring comments about the Brazilian grassland,
the Cerrado, whose rapid conversion to soy production over the last three decades they describe as a
model for TASIP. When he announced the project at a symposium following the World Food Prize
ceremony in Des Moines, Iowa, where he was named a 2017 World Food Prize Laureate, AfDB
President Akinwumi Adesina said that “Africa’s savannas are not that different from those of Brazil.”
(“Savannas of Brazil” is a term for the Cerrado.)

“Indeed,” he added, “they are better than the savannas of Brazil, because their soils are not acidic
and therefore do not need liming which had to be done at massive scales in Brazil. Yet, while the
354
savannas of Brazil feed the world, those of Africa cannot even feed the farmers there.”

AfDB’s admiration for the South American experience goes beyond rhetoric. To advance TASIP, it
has courted two South American institutions which were involved in that continent’s agricultural
transformation, the Brazilian Agricultural Corporation (CAMPO) and the (AAPRESID) to
355
discuss ways to increase technology adaptation and private sector investment in African savannas.
As Jennifer Blanke, Vice President for Agriculture, Human and Social Development at AfDB,
explained in a post for the Brazil Africa Institute, a Brazilian thinktank in Fortaleza, AfDB officials
353
AfDB, “Ghana - Savannah Zone”
354
AfDB (2017) Remarks Delivered by Dr. Akinwumi Adesina, World Food Prize Laureate 2017 and President of the African
Development Bank. Speech given at the Special Event on ‘Transforming the African Savannah Initiative’, World Food
Prize. October 18, 2017, Des Moines, Iowa,
https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/remarks-delivered-by-dr-akinwumi-adesina-world-food-prize-laureate-2017-
and-president-of-the-african-development-bank-at-the-special-event-on-transforming-the-african-savannah-initiative-wor
ld-food-prize-october-18-2017-des-moines-iowa-usa-17449/.
355
GRAIN had requested that we look at the arrival of China and Brazil in AGR, a phenomenon sometimes described as
part of a larger phenomenon often called “south-south cooperation.”
99 of 124

intend to leverage these relationships to attract investment from Brazilian and Argentinian
356
companies.

As we might expect, AfDB appears aware that a massive transformation of African grasslands will
have some serious negative consequences. In its appraisal for SAZAPIP, AfDB lists ten categories of
negative impacts. Some of the consequences it acknowledges are at least possible include “loss of
vegetation and habitat fragmentation due to site clearing,” “degradation of water resources,” and
357
“increased land conflicts.” However, AfDB says these effects can be “readily managed” through
various measures, such as using environmentally sound agricultural technology, and training AfDB
and Ghanaian government staff to better monitor the project’s environmental impact at its various
358
sites.

Looking seriously at the Brazilian precedent, however, the negative consequences of a mass adoption
of soy production is not so easy to write off. While it rapidly increased export earnings, the South
American soy boom also led to massive consolidation of small farms, displacement of farmers, and,
359
as a result, persistent rural poverty. In the still expanding frontier of Brazilian production, in the
Cerrado, soy production has accompanied massive environmental degradation, including soil erosion
that currently threatens not just the underlying ecology of the Cerrado, but the neighboring Amazon
360
biome, not to mention future soy production.

The South American precedent is one reason many development professionals, including some
involved with US government-sponsored soy value chain projects in Africa, doubt that widespread
361
smallholder soy production for global markets is realistic, or even possible. However, in its
embrace of the South American experience as a model to follow, AfDB, at least, is perhaps willing to
accept what many people working in development today have previously acknowledged but have
been less willing to admit publicly: that AGR is primarily about leveraging agriculture to develop
national economies, and that small farmers are, at best, a means to that end or, at worst, an obstacle
to it.

(7.3) Futures and Exits
US Government
356
Blanke, Jennifer and Fregene, Martin (2017) Bright Prospects for Agricultural Cooperation Between Africa and Brazil. Medium
/ Brazil Africa Institute. July 25,
https://medium.com/atlantico-online/bright-prospects-for-agricultural-cooperation-between-brazil-and-africa-ab898c2e
193e
357
AfDB (2017) Savannah Zone Agricultural Productivity Improvement Project. Report,
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Ghana_-_Savannah_Zone_Agric
ultural_Productivity_Improvement_Project.pdf. Pg. 12.
358
Ibid.
359
See Cassel, Amanda and Patel, Raj (2003) Policy Brief #8: Agricultural Trade Liberalization and Brazil’s Rural Poor:
Consolidating Inequality. Food First. Report,
https://foodfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/PB8-Brazils-Rural-Poor-Consolidating-Inequality_Cassel-and-Patel
_Aug2003.pdf.
360
Park, Alex (2015) Where the Grass is Greener. Medium/Orb Media
https://medium.com/one-world-one-story/where-the-grass-is-greener-99734d385d12.
361
Park, Alex. Forthcoming.
100 of 124

Beginning under the Obama administration and continuing in the current Trump administration, the
US government, especially USAID, seeks to exit the sector as a service provider but remain as a
facilitator for private investment. A number of US officials have said they hope this transition will
accomplish two goals: first, bolster markets for US goods and companies abroad, and two, work as a
soft power mechanism, improving livelihoods and thus supposedly lessening migration and insurgency
362
risks.

Published in September 2016, the US Government Global Food Security Strategy FY 2017-2021 describes
its goal as: “empowering the private sector, including small- scale producers, to innovate and invest
363
in agricultural value chain development, allows for U.S. Government exit”.

However, withdrawing from service provision does not mean the US government seeks to leave the
sector all together. Instead, USAID and Feed the Future are being transformed into vehicles to
364
explicitly advance US economic and political interests abroad. For instance, a video uploaded to
YouTube by USAID in early 2018 entitled USAID Transforms describes USAID’s mission as
“Supporting US national security; Demonstrating American generosity; Opening markets for
365
American commerce.”

A report published in July 2018 on Feed the Future echoes these goals, and cites Feed the Future as
an important way to protect American interests and promote American business abroad:

● “By lifting smallholder farmers out of poverty and fueling growing middle classes in
countries where we work, Feed the Future helps US businesses compete in new markets, and
increases demand for US innovations. This work protects American interests, and
366
strengthens our influence in rapidly transforming regions and emerging economies.
● “Feed the Future Innovation Labs also test US-designed technologies in the field and
provide valuable feedback to US businesses about what works best, so American companies
367
can adapt their products to both international and domestic customers.”

However, a 2018 assessment by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found that
while Feed the Future Ghana’s work was helpful for US companies -- citing Hershey’s, John Deere
and Cargill as “gaining traction in the agricultural sector” -- results had been less promising for
Ghanaian farmers:

Food security approaches that strengthen value chains and agricultural systems are critically important
in expanding economic opportunity for many, but their benefits do not necessarily trickle down—at least not
362
Feed the Future (2018) A Decade of Progress. Report,
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1867/2018-ftf-snaphot.pdf. Pg. 4.
363
USG (2016) US Government Global Food Security Strategy FY 2017-2021. Policy,
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1867/USG-Global-Food-Security-Strategy-2016.pdf. Pg. 43.
364
Though these goals have always underlined US development aid, under the Trump administration US officials are
more brazenly talking about them.
365
USAID (2018) USAID Transforms. YouTube,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=72&v=B1OmknzNE7A.
366
Feed the Future (2018) A Decade of Progress. Pg. 1.
367
Ibid. Pg. 11.
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immediately—to communities that lack resources required for market engagement, nor are they sufficient
368
in maximizing nutrition outcomes. (Emphasis added)

CSIS’s assessment highlights the fact that benefits derived from value-chain programs don’t trickle
down to the average farmer. Without denouncing the framework all together, CSIS suggests that
some do stand to benefit, presumably those with an excess of land, access to credit, and
market-oriented planning. In other words, successful value chain-centered development requires a
majority of farmers to leave the agricultural sector all together. This theory is known as the
agricultural exit, a theory of change endorsed by the World Bank Group, Rockefeller Foundation (see
previous discussion), AGRA, and various US government agencies. Mention of the theory can be
found throughout US government texts, though not always explicitly.

For instance, AGRA’s 2017-2021 Strategy envisions a future wherein

over time, African nations will follow the pattern of economic transformations elsewhere: a more
productive, more profitable agricultural sector that diversifies and, eventually, shrinks. As fewer farmers grow more
food, others will leave their farms to create a thriving rural economy that moves beyond primary
production to add value to harvests. Eventually, some people will leave the rural sector altogether and
369
contribute to growth and innovation in other sectors. (Emphasis added)

Or, consider the following from the 2016 US Government Global Food Security Strategy:

Our efforts to strengthen agriculture and food systems that sustainably reduce poverty are primarily
predicated on building strong private sector-led value chains. However, the ultra-poor, landless, and
others may face constraints to engaging in these value chains due to a lack of assets or ability to
manage the risks inherent in these systems. We therefore need to complement our value chain
development activities with additional approaches to support various pathways out of poverty
including outside of agriculture, reflecting the diversity of opportunities and constraints people face.
370
Different contexts may require one or more approaches.

Reflecting on a career spent advancing the AGR in philanthropy and government, Raj Shah claimed
that Africa suffered from an abundance of farmers. “A uniquely African agricultural revolution was
meant to beat hunger by making food more available and accessible. But this revolution was also
meant to create a diversified, modern economy where food production no longer dominated how
nations deployed a majority of their labor” he said at the AGRF in Kigali.371

Shah called a continent-wide decline in agricultural employment from 65 to 57 percent since 2003
“real progress.” However, he added “the eight-point drop in fifteen years in the share of labor
employed in agriculture is simply too small to celebrate.”
368
Cooke, Jennifer G. (2018) Feed the Future in Ghana: Promising Progress, Choices Ahead. Center for Strategic and
International Studies. Report,
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180531_Cooke_FeedFutureGhana_Web.pdf ?kGjNgDHR
.Q14DlUcPP0DGCeHCKsgETkr. Pg. 3-4.
369
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (2017) Strategy Overview for 2017-2021: Inclusive Agricultural Transformation in
Africa. Report, https://agra.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/AGRA-Corporate-Strategy-Doc-3.-2.pdf. P. 14.
370
USG (2016) US Government Global Food Security Strategy FY 2017-2021. Policy,
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1867/USG-Global-Food-Security-Strategy-2016.pdf. Pg. 5.
371
AGRF Forum (2018) The Great Debate.
102 of 124

If we understand US government policy toward African agriculture being driven by a desire to help
US business interests abroad, and if those policies are backed by a desire for agricultural
consolidation and diminishing importance of the sector within the overall economy, then it stands to
reason that consolidation and exiting are thought to be best for US interests and expansion, not
necessarily domestic growth in Africa. Herein lies a major problem with development aid and
programming based on US interests: it links the growth -- and success -- of nations to the growth
and success of the American private sector.

USAID’s Journey to Self-Reliance Roadmap, a series of country by country metrics published in 2018,
confirms this hypothesis. Journey is an interactive database that supposedly measures countries’
372
reliance on US aid and its “commitment” and “capacity” to be self-reliant without aid. The metrics
that make up country “roadmaps” are derived from various sources, including the World Bank’s
373
Doing Business rankings and the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom. The Oakland
Institute has led a multiyear campaign against the Doing Business rankings, arguing that they value
374
the interests of global elites over those of the poor. The Heritage Foundation’s rankings take a
similar approach.

(7.4) Conclusion
Financing for industrial agriculture in Africa is constantly changing and in flux, requiring vigilance to
track flows. The data in this report by no means present a holistic understanding of the African
Green Revolution. Instead, through case studies, historical narrative and quantitative data, we sought
to show the various ways in which public, private and philanthropic funding go towards, intersect,
and diverge on the African continent.

There are reasons to suspect the AGR may fail before it ever begins. There is plenty of evidence that
donors and practitioners are becoming fatigued after years of slow growth, continent-wide activism,
and corporate frustration. AGRA’s 2018 annual report, released on the first day of the AGRF in
Kigali, is dark in tone, warning that without significant investments from African governments, a
revolution will not be possible.

Moreover, the companies who provide the corporate backing for certain value chain projects (e.g.
PepsiCo in Ethiopia) and technologies (e.g. GM seeds) have, in some cases, abandoned projects.
Unhappy with a loss in investment, US agencies and their affiliates, including the Cornell Alliance
for Science, are ramping up pressure on African governments to commercialize GM seeds fast.
Much of this delay is due to African activism as well as the time needed to set up laborious
technologies and institutions to support them.

The AGR is meant to be triggered not by African farmers but by global business. USAID’s new
Journey to Self-Reliance can be read, in part, as an exit plan for an agency that would prefer to be an
372
USAID (nd) The Journey to Self-Reliance. Website, https://www.usaid.gov/selfreliance.
373
Grumbach, Jacob M. and Rock, Joeva. Don’t Turn Foreign Aid Over to the Heritage Foundation. Foreign Policy in Focus.
December 20, https://fpif.org/dont-turn-foreign-aid-over-to-the-heritage-foundation/.
374
The Oakland Institute (2018) It Is Time to End the Business Rankings of the World Bank. Website. January 26,
https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/it-time-end-business-rankings-world-bank.
103 of 124

375
intermediary for US business (as it does under Feed the Future) than a service provider. The
interest in private equity by both private and public funders can also be understood in this light.
But even in retreat, the US government’s efforts in African agriculture might be understood at least
partly as geopolitical gamesmanship. With Chinese actors deepening their presence in African
capitals, countering their influence has become one the most important, and perhaps the single most
important strategic objective of US foreign policy in Africa. As the US seeks any kind of advantage
over Chinese actors, agriculture is one area where it has an advantage. Chinese involvement in the
sector in Africa is rising but remains limited.

In sum, this report attempted to fill some gaps of knowledge pertaining to the complex funding
flows that go towards the industrialization of African agriculture. While no means complete, our
major findings are as follows:

1. The Food Price Crisis of 2007 was not the impetus for rich-world governments and
philanthropies to initiate the African Green Revolution, but the crisis served as a
humanitarian justification for an effort to expand private investment for its own sake.
2. Though USAID and BMGF publicly showcase their investments in African agriculture less
than they did in the past, both organizations have been investing at levels similar to or higher
than 2010. Both organizations continue to funnel large amounts of funding to US-based
organizations, institutions, and businesses at work on the African continent.
3. Private equity is increasingly becoming the vehicle through which both private and public
investors are channeling funds to African agriculture. PE funds focused exclusively on food
and agriculture -- some of which are pursuing vertical integration strategies -- are particularly
reliant on government investment through DFIs.
4. The US government, especially USAID and country-level embassies, at times intercede on
behalf of multinational companies to persuade African governments to create “enabling
environments” for business.
5. The same funders who back research and design of GM and hybrid seeds are those who
back the laws that regulate plant breeding and technology.
6. While the pace of land grabs has slowed since 2012, land acquisition remains a useful
strategy for part of expanding existing agricultural investments. Aid agency and
philanthropic efforts to make land more readable to investors will help make these
investments easier.

375
Grumbach and Rock (2018).
104 of 124

APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1: Data Scrape Methodology
APPENDIX 2: Mapping Biotech/Biosafety Across Africa
APPENDIX 3: Report from Rwandan Farmers’ group

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS*
APPENDIX 4: Documents Obtained through FOIA and Public Records Requests
APPENDIX 5: USAID, USDA, & BMGF Data Set
APPENDIX 6: USAID Disbursements Related to Fertilizer
APPENDIX 7: Cornell Alliance for Science Database

*These files are available upon request.

105 of 124

APPENDIX 1: Data Scrape Methodology

Note: The methodology is written in first person, by the Data Scraper, a PhD student at the
University of Minnesota. He was recommended by an academic colleague.

All grant records were collected from queries to the database websites of the:
● Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation Grants Database:
https://www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work/Quick-Links/Grants-Database
● US Agency for International Development Foreign Aid Explorer:
https://explorer.usaid.gov/query
● US Department of Agriculture Current Research Information System: https://cris.nifa.usda.gov/

In each case, I manually identified CSS fields where relevant data appeared on the site, and then
recorded these fields in an iterative script that could cycle through each field for each record in the
database. I built this script with R, and used a Java application (Selenium) to pass R commands
directly to my browser. This allowed R to read text content in each CSS field, pass it to a designated
spreadsheet, and then navigate to the next URL in sequence. Afterward, I applied formatting rules in
Excel (e.g. to concatenate multi-line addresses within a single record) and manually coded records as
necessary.

Specifics
Gates Foundation (or BMGF): I used a filter built into the Gates website to exclude all grants not
included in the “topic” field "agricultural development”. However, I found that the Gates metadata
for the “regions served” field is often incomplete: there are many grants that mention Africa in their
“purpose” field but lack the appropriate tag “Africa” under “regions served”. To deal with this, I
scraped data for all regions, and then used an Excel filter to remove any grants that did not contain
an explicit reference to any one of the 51 search terms listed on my criteria sheet (you’ll see that
these criteria include any permutations of the words “Africa”, “Sahara”, and 49 African country
names). This process also made it easy to identify grants that were awarded to organizations that, for
example, work on ‘global hunger” or “rice cultivation” on a global scale, but make not a single
mention of Africa or African countries in any field. The total remaining number of grants listed is
602.

USAID: I used a filter built into the USAID website to exclude all grants not included in “regions
served” field under either “Sub-Saharan Africa” or “Middle East and North Africa” AND grants
not included in the “dac category” field “agriculture”. As with the Gates scrape, I grabbed all of
these records and used my criteria sheet to then remove any grants that made not a single mention
of Africa or African countries in any field (in this case, this served the purpose of filtering grantees
in Middle Eastern countries including Yemen, Jordan, Israel, and others). The total remaining
number of grants listed is 8,255.

USDA: Here, I used CRIS’ “professional search” tool with “custom” criteria to conduct the
broadest possible search: I queried records that held the term “Africa” in absolutely any text field,
yielding 1454 results. Again, I scraped all of these and used my criteria sheet to remove any grants
that made absolutely no reference to Africa or African country names in any of the following fields:
106 of 124

title, location, non-technical summary, objectives, approach, or keywords. This brought our results
down to a total of 661 records. In this particular case, I do think that this number may be inflated by “false
positives" and should be reviewed with human eyes. For example, any community garden organization that
mentions serving “refugees from South Sudan” would be present in these data, simply because they
mention the word “Sudan”.**

** We asked the scraper to review and remove these false-positives, which he did.

107 of 124

APPENDIX 2: Mapping Biotech/Biosafety Across Africa

In the pages that follow, we have mapped US public and private funding and lobbying in select
African countries in regards to biotechnology and biosafety. These maps vary in length and detail
and are incomplete. Rather than serve as an ultimate authority, the following pages offer a brief
insight into the various ways in which US actors seek to alter policy, ecological and business
landscapes across the continent. The country maps are meant to serve as a springboard for future
research.

For the purposes of this report, biotechnology refers to genetically modified (GM) crops, while
biosafety refers to legislation and policy pertaining to the commercialization, research, and regulation
of GM products.

Note: for this research we focused mainly on the countries where AATF and OFAB are most active,
and thus, did not include South Africa.

Included Countries:
1. Ethiopia
2. Ghana
3. Kenya
4. Mozambique
5. Nigeria
6. Tanzania
7. Uganda

Ethiopia
2010 With funding from the US Embassy, the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture
and Rural Development holds “National Workshop on Biotechnology” (February 1-3). The
workshop was important for US officials, who felt that Ethiopia’s 2009 biotech law was too
“restrictive.” The day the workshop closes, Voice of America publishes a scathing article on
376 377
Ethiopia’s biosafety law. Other details include:
US involvement: “USAID/Ethiopia worked closely with MoARD officials to craft
the workshop agenda, provided financial support used to secure conference facilities,
and USAID/Ethiopia Advisor Tessa Milofsky presented during the workshop. The
U.S. Embassy funded the participation of international speakers through EEB's
Biotechnology Outreach Program.”

Discontent amongst one high up Ethiopian official: “In the weeks leading up to the
workshop, [State Minister] Dr. Abera had been very proactive in promoting and
organizing the event, and engaged with USAID officials and EconOff to seek input
regarding guest speakers and the workshop's agenda. However, during closing
remarks, Dr. Abera's tone changed completely. He defended the biosafety law,
376
Voice of America (2010) Scientists, Donors Blast Ethiopia’s Biosafety Law. February 3,
https://www.voanews.com/a/scientists-donors-blast-ethiopias-bio-safety-law-83595222/153062.html.
377
Wikileaks (2010) Cable, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10ADDISABABA251_a.html.
108 of 124

ignored issues identified by Ethiopian scientists from EIAR and AAU during the
workshop, and told attendees they should not challenge the legislation until it had
been tested (but did not address challenges participants have already faced as a result
of the law).”

“State Minister Abera offered no insight into his dramatic change of heart during the
workshop. Post assesses he was influenced by politics, rather than science. The
biotechnology workshop generated healthy debate on the 2009 biosafety law and the
future of agriculture development in Ethiopia, but it increasingly appears that
engaging officials at the most senior levels will be necessary to initiate a meaningful
review of the law and its consequences.”
2012 ABNE works with newly established ATA to conduct a biotech “scoping exercise:”
“ABNE, in collaboration with Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA),
conducted a biotechnology/biosafety scoping exercise in Ethiopia (December 2012),
to assess the current regulatory and scientific/technical capacity in biotechnology. At
the request of the Ethiopian Government through ATA, the ABNE Legal Specialist
also reviewed the revised biosafety proclamation and provided feedback and
378
suggestions to bring this proclamation in line with international best practices.”
379
2015 Ethiopian Parliament amends laws, allowing for GMO research
2016 Ethiopian Biotechnology Institute established
380
2018 Ethiopian Biotechnology Institute signs MOU with Beijing Genomics Institute
2018 Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change approves two bt cotton varieties for
381
commercial release (May)
382
2018 Ethiopia grants trials of bt maize

Ghana
2002 National Biosafety Committee established to draft a Biosafety Bill
2004 Biosafety Bill Drafted
2005 Madelyn Spirnak, State Department Senior Advisor for Agricultural
Biotechnology, travels to Accra (June 15-17). She encountered skepticism from Ghanaian
officials. According to a leaked cable:
“State Department Senior Advisor for Agricultural Biotechnology, Madelyn Spirnak,
met June 15-17 in Accra with GoG officials, Parliamentarians, and private sector to
discuss the state of biotech in Ghana. There is some appreciation in Ghana for the
possible benefits of biotech, especially among private research institutions and at the
Environment Ministry, which has the lead on biotech and biosafety issues. However,
378
MSUF057018 Pg. 230
379
Abdu, Brook (2015) Parliament Amends GMO Law to Allow Ethiopian Research Partnerships. Addis Fortune. May 25,
https://addisfortune.net/articles/parliament-amends-gmo-law-to-allow-ethiopian-research-partnerships./
380
Innovators Magazine (2018) New Deal Strengthens Biotech in Africa. February 25,
https://www.innovatorsmag.com/new-deal-strengthens-biotech-in-africa/.
381
USDA FAS (2018) Ethiopia Approves Biotech Cotton. Report,
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Ethiopia%20Approves%20Biotech%20Cotton_Addis%2
0Ababa_Ethiopia_6-13-2018.pdf.
382
ISAAA (2018) Ethiopia Approves Environmental Release of BT Cotton and Grants Special Permit for GM Maize.
http://www.isaaa.org/kc/cropbiotechupdate/article/default.asp?ID=16515
109 of 124

other Ministries -- particularly Agriculture and Trade -- and Parliamentarians
383
expressed reservations or displayed sheer ignorance on the issue.”

“The Agriculture and Trade Ministries were particularly cautious, with Deputy
Ministers from both emphasizing that there is insufficient awareness and has not
been enough debate on potential benefits and risks. Both questioned the safety of
transgenic crops, raised concerns about Ghana becoming dependent on foreign (read
384
U.S.) seed companies, and worried about risking their European export markets.”
385
2011 OFAB chapter established (August 18)
2011 Biosafety Bill passed by Parliament
“Three months after the launch of OFAB-Ghana the Biosafety Bill that had been in
386
and out of Parliament since 2004 was passed into law.”
2013 Ghanaian attorney general introduces the Plant Breeders Bill, an intellectual property rights
instrument, to Parliament
2013 OFAB organized meeting with MPs, OFAB and Mark Lynas to advocate for the Plant
387
Breeders Bill
388
2014 OFAB organized seeing-is-believing tour for farmers to visit NEWEST CFT in Kumasi
2015 National Biosafety Authority inaugurated in February in light of trial over the legality of the
previous National Biosafety Committee as challenged by Food Sovereignty Ghana in the
389
Human Rights Court
2016 OFAB holds “awareness creation in biotechnology and biosafety” workshop for MPs
390
(March 19)
391
2018 OFAB holds communications trainings around the country

Kenya
2002 Drafting of Biosafety policy and law begin
392
2003 Regional East Africa PBS Chapter established
2006 Kenya approves National Biotechnology Development Policy
“That it took four years for the country to approve the Biotechnology Development Policy
and five years to enact the Biosafety Act was not because the government did not see the
urgency in having the instruments in place. Divergent views from various stakeholders risked
383
Wikileaks (2005) Cable. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05ACCRA1435_a.html
384
Ibid.
385
386
Ibid. Pg. 51.
387
Two sources: https://www.slideserve.com/rania/4-th-annual-ofab-review-of-ghana-chapter-activities;
https://www.modernghana.com/news/506789/csir-supports-introduction-of-gm-seeds.html
388
389
Ibid.
390
Ibid.
391
Business Ghana (2018) Repackage Messages on GMOs - Agriculture Director Advised. September 18,
https://www.businessghana.com/site/news/business/172541/Repackage-messages-on-GMO-s-Agriculture-Director-A
dvised.
392
USAID F-00145-18
110 of 124

causing conÁict and scuttling the process. It was simply because of the concerted and
spirited anti-GMO activism that had infiltrated even the policy and law making institutions.”
393

2006 OFAB chapter established (September 26)
394
2007 PBS chapter established in Kenya, housed at IFPRI
2007 PBS provides “technical assistance,” “drafting, reviewing, analyzing” of Biosafety Bill
395
regulations
2007 After returning from seeing is believing tours, legislators meet in Nairobi and “vowed to
396
support the Bill in Parliament”
2007 OFAB held stakeholder meeting to debate the Biosafety Bill:
“over 150 stakeholders drawn from government, scientists, civil society, industry,
farmer organisations including organic groups, the media, regulators and
397
development partners”
2008 OFAB meets (April) with Ms. Rachel Shilbalira, “who had drafted the Biosafety Bill:”
“on the process of enacting a law in Kenya. This was an eye opener and important to
398
the stakeholders as they understood what they had to do to get the Bill passed”
2009 Biosafety Act passed
2011 National Biosafety Authority Board and Secretariat take a PBS-sponsored trip to the
399
Philippines
2012 Cabinet Minister for Health Beth Mugo bans importation of GM food
2012 Program for Biosafety Systems-Kenya, in collaboration with ISAAA and OFAB, publishes a
policy brief “Deficiencies in Study Linking GM Maize to Cancer: Global Scientific
400
Perspectives.”
2015 National Biosafety Authority publishes risk assessment on Monsanto bt maize (MON810),
401
finding it safe “based on data from the USA.”
2016 Study funded by BMGF, AATF and Monsanto find bt maize to be superior to conventional
402
maize
2018 National Environment Management Agency allows bt cotton field trials; grants license to
393
https://aatf-africa.org/files/files/publications/OFAB-Success-Story1.pdf. Pg. 16.
394
USAID F-00145-18
395
Ibid.
396
397
Ibid. Pg. 17.
398
Ibid. Pg. 17.
399
USAID F-00145-18
400
USAID Kenya (2013) Program for Biosafety Systems. Fact Sheet,
https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Program%20for%20Biosafety%20Systems%20FACT
%20SHEET.April%202013.pdf.
401
National Biosafety Authority Kenya (2015) Application for Environmental Release, Cultivation and Placing on the Market of
MON810 Event in Maize Varieties. Risk Assessment Report, http://bch.cbd.int/database/attachment/?id=18024
402
Tefera, Tadela, et al. (2016) Resistance of Bt-maize (MON810) against the stem borers Busseola fusca (Fuller) and Chilo partellus
(Swinhoe) and its yield performance in Kenya. Crop Protection 89: 202-208.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305845687
111 of 124

403
Indian firm Mahyco to distribute seeds on behalf of Monsanto
2018 National Biosafety Authority hosts 7th annual biotechnology conference (Aug 14-17).
404
Sponsors include: PBS, AATF, USDA, DuPont Pioneer, ABNE/NEPAD

Mozambique
405
2004 Hosts the International Conference on Hunger, Food Aid and GMOs
406
2008 USDA/FAS begins outreach in country
2009 US embassy request funding for “biotech outreach strategy fund,” noting that
“misinformation” threatens US interests:
“Misinformation and misperceptions about biotechnology threaten the acceptance
of U.S. agricultural and food products derived from biotechnology in Southern
407
Africa and threaten U.S. producers, access to international markets.”
2012 USDA/FAS join Mozambique’s Inter-Institutional Working Group for Biosafety “to assist
the government in developing a strong regulatory framework for the management of GE
408
crops”
2012 USDA/FAS (Pretoria and Maputo) staff meet with “stakeholders” (April 16-20); report back
409
that bt cotton companies are reticent to enter Mozambique because of liability clauses
“the issue of liability and redress in conducting field trials, where the liability for
damages would be placed on the private partner involved in conducting field trials,
has created a disincentive for seed companies to partner in bt cotton field trials. This
issue has caused multi-national seed companies to be reluctant to assist Mozambique
410
in its efforts to conduct cotton field trials.”
2012 US Embassy funds a Mozambican technician for training at Michigan State U (August 2-10
411

2012 Betty Kipligat (ABNE), funded by US Dept. of State and USDA, holds workshop to
412
facilitate “invitation” for bt cotton field trials (September 3-5)
403
Andae, Gerald (2018) Indian Company Gets the Nod to Import GMO Cotton Seeds. The Business Daily. July 10,
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/economy/Indian-company-gets-the-nod-to-import-GMO-cotton-seeds/3946234-
4656626-yo3k2k/index.html
404
National Biosafety Authority Kenya (2018) Tweet. August 10,
https://twitter.com/BiosafetyKenya/status/1027935020504231937
405
Wikileaks (2005) Cable, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05GABORONE568_a.html.
406
Wikileaks (2009) Cable,https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MAPUTO54_a.html
407
Ibid.
408
USDA FAS (2015) Agricultural Biotechnology Annual: Pretoria and Mozambique. Report,
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Agricultural%20Biotechnology%20Annual_Pretoria_Moz
ambique_7-14-2015.pdf. Pg. 2.
409
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Agricultural%20Biotechnology%20in%20Mozambique_P
retoria_Mozambique_11-1-2013.pdf
410
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Mozambique%20Eager%20for%20Biotech%20Cotton%2
0Field%20Trials_Pretoria_South%20Africa%20-%20Republic%20of_5-3-2012.pdf
411
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Agricultural%20Biotechnology%20in%20Mozambique_P
retoria_Mozambique_11-1-2013.pdf
412
Ibid.
112 of 124

413
2013 US Embassy funds 3 officials to attend biotech conference in Brazil (April 8-13)
2013 International Biotechnology Symposium is held in Maputo. US Embassy funds keynote, Dr.
Karim Maredi of Michigan State University. Dr. Maredi has headed many biotechnology and
biosafety projects on the continent, including the African Biosafety Network of Expertise
414
(May 22-24)
2013 Through the Cochran Fellowship, US Embassy sends two biotech technicians to MSU for
415
training (August 3-10)
2014 US Embassy funds biotech technician to attend bt cotton training at MSU via a Bourloug
416
Fellowship
2015 US Embassy funds biotech technician to attend bt cotton training at MSU via a Bourloug
417
Fellowship
418
2017 WEMA fieldtrials begins (February 18)

Nigeria
2001 Program for Biosafety Systems launches in Nigeria
“Since 2001, the U.S. government (USG) has also supported Nigeria to establish the
Public Biosafety Systems (PBS) guidelines which created provisions for field testing
of GE crops. Since 2005, the PBS has worked in Nigeria to support the development
of draft biosafety policies and laws, and to provide technical training in biosafety
review and regulatory oversight. Nigeria’s Ministry of Environment’s Biosafety Unit
419
is currently leading the drafting of biosafety legislation.”
2001 Federal Executive Council approves National Biotechnology Policy (April)
“Federal Executive Council approves Biosafety guidelines to fast-track and
420
encourage research and development of GMOs”
421
2001 National Biotechnology Development Agency established (November)
2002 Drafting of National Biosafety Framework begins, “in part through USAID funding”
422
(December 2)
2004 USAID launches the West African Biotechnology Network (WABNET) and Nigeria
Agricultural Biotechnology Project (NABP); housed at International Institute for Tropical
Agriculture (IITA):
413
Ibid.
414
Ibid.
415
Ibid.
416
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Biotechnology%20in%20Mozambique_Pretoria_Mozamb
ique_8-26-2014.pdf)
417
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Agricultural%20Biotechnology%20Annual_Pretoria_Moz
ambique_7-14-2015.pdf
418
USDA FAS (2017) Agricultural Biotechnology Annual: Mozambique. Report,
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Agricultural%20Biotechnology%20Annual_Maputo_Moz
ambique_12-11-2017.pdf
419
USDA FAS (2014) Agricultural Biotechnology Annual. Report. [missing link] Pg. 11.
420
421
Ibid.
422
Wikileaks (2009) Cable, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUJA1682_a.html.
113 of 124

“In 2004, agricultural biotechnology in Nigeria received a boost with the
launch of two linked initiatives funded by the USAID. These are the West
African Biotechnology Network (WABNET) and the Nigeria Agricultural
Biotechnology Project (NABP), implemented by CGIAR’s International
Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA), in close collaboration with
Tuskegee University. The NABP was designed to assist Nigeria in building
the framework for decision-making that will facilitate access to the
opportunities biotechnology offers and will ensure the safe and effective
application of this technology to improve agriculture. A key element of the
project is to improve implementation of bio-safety regulations; and, enhance
423
public knowledge and acceptance of biotechnology.”
2004 International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) receives funding from USDA’s
technical assistance program
“Over the last five years, the USDA has helped to fund scientists to work on
424
biotechnology at the IITA, under its technical assistance program.”
2004 Four Nigerian scientists are awarded Cochran Fellowships by the US Embassy/Agricultural
425
Affairs Office
2004 US Post in Nigeria requests funding for three groups of trainings (legislators, journalists and
biotech officials) and a “Seeing is Believing” trip for media to visit the US, including
Monsanto and Danforth Center, Tuskegee University and Cornell. Request notes that
“anti-Western elements may latch onto biotechnology and unnecessarily raise people's fears.”
426
(February)
2005 Program for Biosafety Systems begins to assist Nigeria develop biosafety policies
“Since 2001, the U.S. government (USG) has also supported Nigeria to establish the
Public Biosafety Systems (PBS) guidelines which created provisions for field testing
of GE crops. Since 2005, the PBS has worked in Nigeria to support the development
of draft biosafety policies and laws, and to provide technical training in biosafety
review and regulatory oversight. Nigeria’s Ministry of Environment’s Biosafety Unit
427
is currently leading the drafting of biosafety legislation.”
2006 National Biosafety Policy and draft Biosafety Bill exist
2006 US Consulate in Lagos requests funding for two Seeing is Believing trips for Nigerian
428
journalists and legislators ($35,000, respectfully)
2006 NABP, with funding from USAID, submits CFT application for virus resistant cassava in
April, though it would be three years until the project actually began with funding from
BMGF. It’s unclear what caused the delay.
“The USAID supported Nigeria Agriculture Biotechnology Project implemented by
the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) submitted an application
423
USDA FAS (2009) Agricultural Biotechnology Annual. Report,
http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/AGRICULTURAL%20BIOTECHNOLOGY%20ANNU
AL_Lagos_Nigeria_8-3-2009.pdf. Pg. 10.
424
Ibid.
425
Ibid.
426
427
428
Wikileaks (2006) Cable, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06LAGOS131_a.html.
114 of 124

for a field trial of transgenic, virus resistant cassava (obtained from Danforth Center)
to the National Biosafety Committee (NBC) in April 2004. The NBC met twice on
429
the request but has not granted” approval.
2009 US Embassy (Abuja) requests funding for a US speaker to talk about biotech to encourage
passage of the Biosafety Bill:
“Post proposes a speaker program on biosafety using a U.S. and Nigerian expert to
build support for the passage of the draft Nigerian Biosafety Bill among key
430
Nigerian constituents.”
2009 Nigeria Biosafety Bill introduced to Nigerian National Assembly (February)
2009 OFAB chapter established on April 9 “to manage the unnecessary controversy being
generated on agricultural biotechnology by the anti-GMO movement” and lobby for the
Biosafety Bill, as at the time “there was little indication that it would be completed anywhere
431
in the near future.”
2009 USAID organizes a Seeing is Believing tour for Nigerian legislators to the Philippines
(May)
“a study tour trip was organized by USAID Reforms Project to Philippines GM crop
farms for members of the House Committees on Agriculture, Environment and
Science and Technology. The goal of this trip was to have a practical experience on
GMOs and how they are being regulated as well as the legislation procedure. This
432
trip was very successful.”
2009 AATF and Program for Biosafety Systems (PBS) hold a “risk communication workshop” for
Nigerian, Ghanaian and Burkinabe bt cowpea PIs, officials and stakeholders (June)
“A risk communication workshop organized by Africa Agriculture Technology
Foundation (AATF) and the Program for Biosafety Systems (PBS) was held in June
2009 in Nigeria with the main objective of equipping the principal Investigators
(from Ghana, Burkina Faso and Nigeria), Trial Managers, Government Officials and
Stakeholders on how to communicate about GMOs and risk management to
433
different audiences.”
2009 Program for Biosafety Systems assists Nigerian authorities to review application for bt
cowpea confined field trials (CFT):
“PBS, in collaboration with the AATF worked to facilitate the submission and review
by regulatory authorities of the latter CFT application. It also provided material and
manpower resources that assisted the country establish biosafety institutions and
processes that will guide against the misuse of biotechnology. The support included
providing and supporting capacity for the multi-locational CFT and inspections of
GE crops which aimed at improving the skills and proficiency of Biosafety
429
Ibid.
430
431
https://aatf-africa.org/files/files/publications/OFAB-Success-Story1.pdf. Pg. 31, 35.
432
433
Ibid. Pg. 7.
115 of 124

Regulators on the conduct of CFT inspection for GE crops, particularly on
434
multi-location trials.”
435 436
2009 Nigeria plants bt cowpea, first CFT in Africa (August 25)
2009 US Mission to Nigeria hosts “Gary Blumenthal August 31-September 4 for a successful
biotechnology outreach in Ibadan, Lagos, and Abuja.” Blumenthal met with high level
government officials to lobby for the Biosafety Law, spoke at OFA’s monthly meeting, and
437
gave a presentation at a forum with NGOs and policy makers:
“The Mission used the opportunity of Blumenthal's visit to facilitate a GON
interagency meeting on biotechnology involving the Ministry of
Environment, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of
Agriculture, and the National Biotechnology Development Agency. The
participants formed an Interagency Biosafety Coordinating Committee to
advocate for the passage of the pending legislation.”
2009 USDA GAIN Agricultural Biotechnology Annual report notes concern over Nigeria’s Biosafety
Bill, which GAIN describes as “precautionary” but assures that “Post” (the US embassy)
is working to modify the bill (report published August 6):
“the bill leans heavily on the precautionary approach and requires certification and
mandatory labeling for imports of all products of biotechnology. This could
negatively impact the importation of products derived through agricultural
biotechnology. Post is collaborating with major stakeholders to ensure that these
438
provisions are modified before the bill is passed into law.”

“the current draft bill contains some clauses that could negatively impact the
importation of products derived through agricultural biotechnology. Section 9
(functions of the national biosafety committee) mandates the committee to assess
and recommend approval of applications submitted for the import/export, transfer,
and transit of GMO products. In addition, Part V (Notification and Authorization)
clearly states that importation/exportation and movement of GMO products
requires prior approval from the biosafety agency (when established) or the ministry
of environment. Also, the bill requires mandatory labeling of products derived
439
through agricultural biotechnology.”
2009 USDA GAIN Agricultural Biotechnology Annual notes concern and opposition from Nigerian
wheat producers re: biotech; Nigeria is one of the largest importers of US wheat:
“Wheat importers in Nigeria favor the precautionary approach to biotechnology.
They have learned about bio-engineered food products primarily from the U.S. - EU
debate over biotechnology. Overall, Nigerian wheat importers have expressed the
434
435
AATF (2009) Closer to the Promise: From Lab to Field. Annual Report. https://aatf-africa.org/userfiles/annual2009.pdf.
436
437
438
439
Ibid. Pg. 3.
116 of 124

opinion that the U.S. should not introduce bio-engineered wheat into the market
until all long-term health concerns are resolved. Nigeria is one of the largest export
440
markets for U.S. wheat.”
2009 “Super” vitamin-A fortified Cassava project, funded by the Gates Foundation and developed
441
at the Danforth Center, begins (October)
2010 USDA GAIN report again expresses worry about draft Biosafety Bill, especially the
mandatory labeling requirements, which USDA worries “could affect exports of U.S. food
442
products to Nigeria,” presumably because US products are not necessarily labeled
443
2010 USDA GAIN report requests funding for Nigerian scientists to train at US universities
2011 Biosafety Bill passed by Nigerian Senate after almost 15 years of development (June 1).
OFAB takes credit: “It was not long before efforts by OFAB to influence policy and
regulatory environments started bearing fruit. By 2011, the Bill had already been debated and
444
passed by the National Assembly”
2011 Concerned that mandatory labeling of GM products as per the Biosafety Bill will impact
trade, US Embassy begins conversations with Nigerian officials
“FAS Lagos has opened dialogue with NABDA, NAFDAC and the Ministry of
Environment on the operational guidelines of the law to ensure that the requirement
445
of mandatory labeling does not obstruct free trade.”
2011 CFT of Africa bio-fortified sorghum begins; funded by Gates Foundation and “sponsored”
446
by DuPont Pioneer
2011 US Embassy receives funding to hold two workshops:
“FAS/Lagos has received funding to facilitate two agricultural biotechnology
workshops in collaboration with key Nigerian stakeholders including the Department
of Plant Sciences, ABU Zaria, National Biotech Development Agency and the
International Institute for Tropical Agriculture. One workshop each will be held at
ABU Zaria and IITA in Ibadan. The primary objective of these workshops is to
inform policy makers, regulators, producer groups, and consumers about the
potential role of agricultural biotechnology in addressing food security and climate
440
Ibid. Pg. 9.
441
Ibid. Pg. 3; USDA FAS (2010) Agricultural Biotechnology Annual. Report,
http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Biotechnology%20-%20GE%20Plants%20and%20Animal
s_Lagos_Nigeria_7-15-2010.pdf. Pg. 6.
442
http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Biotechnology%20-%20GE%20Plants%20and%20Animal
s_Lagos_Nigeria_7-15-2010.pdf. Pg. 7.
443
Ibid. Pg. 9.
444
https://aatf-africa.org/files/files/publications/OFAB-Success-Story1.pdf. Pg. 36-7.
445
http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Agricultural%20Biotechnology%20Annual_Lagos_Nigeria
_8-3-2011.pdf. Pg. 7.
446
Ibid. Pg. 2.; USDA FAS (2016) Agricultural Biotechnology Annual. Report,
_11-17-2016.pdf. Pg. 3.
117 of 124

change mitigation. Dr. Claude Fauquet, Director ILTAB, Danforth Plant Science
447
Center will be the international guest speaker at the workshops.”
2011 US officials visit bt cowpea CFT and note that bt cowpea is 95% more effective at
controlling maruca pests than its non-GM counterpart
“FAS Lagos and USAID officials visited the Institute for Agricultural Research
(IAR), Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), Zaria on November 17, 2011 to monitor the
progress of work on the cowpea maruca (insect) resistant confined field trials (CFT).
Preliminary results show that CFT3 is a very successful trial. The proof of the
concept is not in doubt and the data presented showed that the experiment is more
than 95% significant in controlling cowpea pod borer (maruca). The physical and
biological control mechanisms put in place by the institute to mitigate potential
environmental risk conformed to established guidelines. The confined field trial for
448
this event has been successfully concluded.”
449
2012 USDA FAS/Lagos receives approval to fund OFAB
450
2012 USDA GAIN reports “growing interest” in bt cotton
2012 USDA hosts Seeing is Believing tour in USA
“Late 2012, the USDA also sponsored Nigerian journalists, filmmakers, actors and
some related GON policy makers on a familiarization tour of facilities, institutions,
firms, farms, etc. to further expose them to the application of modern agricultural
451
biotechnology in the United States.”
2013 USDA GAIN reports rumors that the Gates Foundation will fund a biotech lab in Nigeria.
452
It is not reported again.
2013 Minister of Agriculture Akinwumi Adesina, who would eventually become the President of
the AfDB, announces Sygenta, Monsanto and DuPont will establish offices in country by
453
2013
454 455
2013 Bio-cassava Plus/Vitamin A cassava project launched (July 31)
2014 USDA GAIN report outlines US support for biotech in Nigeria:
447
_8-3-2011.pdf. Pg. 9.
448
USDA FAS (2012a) Agricultural Biotechnology Annual. Report,
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Agricultural%20Biotechnology%20Annual_Lagos_Nigeri
a_6-19-2012.pdf. Pg. 6.
449
USDA FAS (2012b) Agricultural Biotechnology Annual. Report,
_7-5-2012.pdf. Pg. 9-10.
450
USDA FAS (2012a) Agricultural Biotechnology Annual. Report,
a_6-19-2012.pdf. Pg. 2.
451
452
_9-11-2013.pdf. Pg. 4.
453
Pg. 5.
454
While GM cassava and sorghum projects are annually cited, there is never any update on results of CFTs
455
118 of 124

“The Agricultural Affairs Office (AgLagos) and U.S. Mission Nigeria Biotech
Outreach Program will attempt to support OFAB, organized monthly by NABDA.
U.S. Consulate Lagos and Embassy Abuja will continue to assist NABDA to bolster
OFAB. They will also sponsor national and international experts on biotechnology
to speak on the benefits of biotechnology as a tool for climate change mitigation and
456
for enhancing food security in Nigeria.”
2014 After four years of waiting for the president’s signature, the Biosafety Bill is voided by law
and returns to the Assembly
2014 A public hearing on the Biosafety Bill is held at the National Assembly (October 16)
2014 Nigeria does not have capacity to genetically modify organisms in country; still no word on
the BMGF-funded lab:
“Local research institutions lack capacity in scientific DNA manipulation and
laboratory management. FAS/Lagos will continue to support the strengthening of
457
local capacity if funding becomes available.”
2015 Biosafety Bill is signed into law by President Goodluck Jonathan (April). OFAB takes
credit: “OFAB successfully fast-tracked the passage of the Biosafety Bill at the National
Assembly by contributing towards the country’s informed policy decision-making processes
on matters of agricultural biotechnology through provision of factual, well researched
458
scientific information.”
2015 National Biosafety Management Agency is created
2015 Monsanto receives approval for “commercial release of the bioengineered cotton [before
459
CFTs] and the confined field trial of drought-tolerant corn”
2015 NEWEST rice project begins at the National Cereal Research Institute (October)
2015 “International Biosafety Short Course for Policy and Decision Makers in Ghana and
Nigeria” held in Accra, Ghana, sponsored by the University of Ghana, NEPAD and
460
Michigan State University (July)
461
2016 Multi-locational CFTs for bt cotton begin
462
2017 Second Multi-locational CFTs for bt cotton begin
463
2017 CFT for Super Cassava concludes
464
2017 USDA GAIN reports bt cowpea has 60% resistance to the Maruca podborer
456
a_2-12-2015.pdf.
457
Ibid.
458
459
_11-17-2016.pdf. Pg. 2-3.
460
AGRA Watch (2015) USAID Lobbying for Agribusiness. Blog Post,
https://agrawatch.wordpress.com/2015/08/29/usaid-lobbying-for-agribusiness/.
461
_12-18-2017.pdf. Pg. 3.
462
Ibid.
463
Ibid. Pg. 8.
464
Ibid. Pg. 3.
119 of 124

2018 A five day International Biosafety Training Programme held at Godfrey Okoye University;
hosted by the National Biosafety Management Authority; at least two Michigan State
University profs attend and present (including Prof. Karim Maredia). Donors include PBS,
465
Michigan State and NEAPD
2018 Nigeria approves commercial release of two bt cotton varieties: MRC 7377 BG 11 and
466
MRC7361 BG11

Tanzania
2004 National Biosafety Framework adopted
2009 OFAB chapter established (May 25) with an explicit interest in the country’s biosafety
framework, which OFAB described as “restrictive”:
“When OFAB-Tanzania was launched in 2009, the country had a very restrictive
regulatory framework with literally no research and development on GMOs in the
467
country.”

“The Tanzanian Law adopted in 2009 had a strict liability clause that virtually
prohibited scientists from undertaking any genetic engineering related research and
development. It stated in Part VIII section 56 (1) Any person or his agent who
imports, transits, makes contained or confined use of, releases, carries out any activity
in relation to GMOs or their products, or places on the market a GMO shall be
strictly liable for any direct or indirect harm, injury or loss caused by such GMOs or
their products or by any activity in relation to GMOs. The strict liability shall cover
the whole chain from the applicant (Tanzania Commission for Science and
Technology - COSTECH), the person responsible for the activity, which results in
the damage, injury or loss as well the provider, supplier or developer of the GMOs
468
or their products.”
2010 National Biotechnology Policy adopted
2013 OFAB holds “briefing session by scientists for” the President, Prime Minister and cabinet
469
ministers
2013 President and Prime Minister publically state that Tanzania needs to adopt biotech while
speaking at an “inauguration of the genetic engineering laboratory at the Mikocheni
470
Agricultural Research Institute” (March 19)
2014 OFAB helped establish the Tanzania Agricultural Journalists Forum; currently has over 100
471
members
2014 OFAB leads seeing-is-believing tour to Uganda for 30 “decision makers, legislators, scientists
465
National Biosafety Management Authority Nigeria (2018) Tweet. July 16,
https://twitter.com/BiosafetyNig/status/1018850783306092544.
466
Isamotu, Idowu (2018) Nigerian Government Revives Textile Industries with GM Cottons. Sahel Standard.
http://www.sahelstandard.com/nigerian-government-revives-textile-industries-with-gm-cottons/.
467
468
Ibid. Pg. 39.
469
Ibid.
470
Ibid. Pg. 42.
471
Ibid.
120 of 124

472
and journalists”
“The tour had a profound effect on the delegation. Within six months after the tour,
Tanzania revised and replaced the strict liability clause in the Environment
Management Biosafety Regulations with the fault-based liability. Under the revised
law, anyone claiming compensation for damage would have to prove that whoever
473
introduced the GMOs was actually at fault”
474
2015 Tanzania adopts revised biosafety policy (February); OFAB takes credit
475
2016 Biosafety Authority grants WEMA CFT permit (August)
476
2016 WEMA CFT begins (October 5)
477
2017 Monsanto announces intention to build seed facilities (lab and factory) in Tanzania
2018 Professor Richard Mbunda raises concerns over GMOs and their potential for leading the
478
country into “food colonialism”

Uganda
(The Uganda map is more incomplete than others. We were unable to find USDA FAS reports for
Uganda as we were other countries, making it more difficult to populate data. To establish a more
complete picture, we recommend querying Ugandan news sources.)

479
2007 OFAB chapter established in collaboration with PBS (December)
480
2008 Government approves National Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy (April)
2014 USAID approves a $45,000 grant for IFPRI to advocate for Biosafety Act:
Grant AID-617-IO-13-0000: “The new Feed the Future Uganda Biosafety Activity will build
on the gains made in the recent past to advance progress of the biosafety law in Parliament
and build momentum among farmers and other stakeholders to advocate for biotechnology
in Uganda. The biosafety activity will also build the necessary networks and partnerships
among biotechnology stakeholders. The activity will also strengthen capacity of government
regulatory systems to enforce biosafety and biotechnology development. The overall
objective of this activity is to develop a strong and effective biosafety system supporting
research, development, farmer access, and adoption of appropriate biotechnology products.
Specific objectives include: Strengthening biosafety policy and regulatory systems
implementation;Increasing stakeholder awareness on the role of biotechnology in
agricultural development; and Improving the Government of Uganda's biosafety
management and enforcement capabilities.”
2014 Organized seeing is believing tour to South Africa to “kickstart the Bill process after it
472
Ibid. Pg. 43.
473
Ibid.
474
Ibid. Pg. 41.
475
Ibid.
476
Ibid.
477
Omar, Hazla (2017) Monsanto Targets GMO Seeds Factory. Tanzania Daily News. May 30,
https://allafrica.com/stories/201705300859.html
478
Msuya, Elias (2018) Food Security Fears Mount As Debate On GMOs Rages. The Citizen. March 8,
https://allafrica.com/stories/201803080462.html.
479
480
Ibid.
121 of 124

stalled in Parliament.” Participants included Hon Matia Kassaija, Minister for Planning and
481
official “responsible for the bill”:
“After this tour the minister organised a seminar for parliamentarians to discuss the
way forward for the Bill. The meeting decided that the committee report should be
presented to parliament for consideration. The report was soon presented thereby
sparking off discussions on the Bill that almost led to its passage in to law, but due to
a heavy parliamentary calendar, the Bill was not discussed despite being listed on the
order paper on the last day of parliament. Even so, the Bill was saved so that it did
482
not have to be reintroduced afresh, thanks to intervention by Hon Kassaija.”
2018 USAID sponsors television spot to discuss Biosafety Bill
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jzf3PDb0LPk)
481
Ibid. Pg. 27.
482
Ibid. Pg. 27.
122 of 124

APPENDIX 3: Report from Rwandan Farmers’ group

While in Rwanda, Alex also met with APPPE-Rwanda, a farmers’ organization under the umbrella
of the East and Southern African Small Scale Farmers’ Forum (ESAFF). ESAFF is a
non-profit group registered in Tanzania, but with partner organizations representing their respective
countries in East and Southern Africa.

According to its website, ESAFF is broadly concerned with incorporating the voice of small farmers
483
in Southern and East Africa in democratic institutions. According to its 2015 annual report-- the
most recent available-- the organization and its partners advocate on the CAADP compacts from a
484
food security and food sovereignty perspective. As one of those partners, APPPE-Rwanda claims
a membership of 18,336 farmers in 11 of the country’s 30 districts. About 60 percent of these
farmers are women. However, the organization has been able to do very little work since 2014, since
485
ESAFF, its main source of income, abruptly stopped providing them with money.
APPPE-Rwanda is currently looking for new sources of funding.

Small farmers lacking in Rwandan government plans
Prior to losing its main income source, APPPE-Rwanda provided an extension-like service to small
farmers, teaching them about different seed types, how to consolidate their farms so as to produce
more and more effectively engage agricultural traders, how to get insurance, and other subjects.

However, much of their work involved educating small farmers about the government’s agricultural
plans and how they would affect them. In 2014, the last year it was able to carry out a substantial
effort, APPPE-Rwanda trained farmers in two districts about Rwanda’s agricultural budget, but since
then, they say, they have been unable to communicate with their membership about the agricultural
budget.

The reason this kind of outreach is necessary, they said, is that the government’s agricultural plans
tend to overlook small farmers. The government is generally only interested in larger farms, usually
15 hectares or more. Moreover, the government is currently pursuing a strategy of “regionalization,”
devoting resources to the development of certain crops in certain areas of the country. For instance
in Northern Rwanda, where APPPE-Rwanda’s main office is located, the priority crops are maize,
wheat, and beans. The government will ignore a farmer growing bananas in the North. As they said
repeatedly, the government doesn’t “see” farmers growing crops in regions where it’s not a priority,
and doesn’t “see” small farmers at all.

Moreover, the executive staff said, echoing a familiar complaint about developmental aid, much of
the financial support that comes from USAID, IFAD, the World Bank, and other outside sources
filters through so many government layers that there’s very little left by the time it reaches farmers,
483
http://www.esaff.org/about-esaff/
484
http://esaff.org/images/esaff_annual_report_2015.pdf
485
Where ESAFF receives money from now is not clear. In 2015, ESAFF reported more than 60 percent of its funding
came from the EU government. (The report did not say which institution within the EU). Oxfam-NOVIB, the Dutch
office of the global advocacy organization and the group’s second largest donor, provided another 20 percent.
123 of 124

particularly small farmers. Accordingly, they said, there is a need for an organization (like theirs) that
can work with small farmers more directly.

124 of 124

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Mapping Financial Flows of Industrial

ABOUT THE AUTHORS 4

CHAPTER 1: PROJECT OVERVIEW 9

CHAPTER 2: Understanding the Financing of the African Green Revolution 15

CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF PRIVATE EQUITY 32

CHAPTER 4: MAPPING INPUTS (REGULATION, POLICY AND NETWORKS) 55

CHAPTER 5: EARLY US AGR PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 76

CHAPTER 6: THE ROLE OF LARGE-SCALE LAND DEALS IN THE AFRICAN GREEN

CHAPTER 7: THE FUTURE OF THE AFRICAN GREEN REVOLUTION 94

Year BMGF Grants USAID Disbursements

Category Funds of Total

Partial 171 78%

Dominant 13 6%

Exclusive 33 15%

Country Buyout Deals Buyout Exits

South Africa 73 12

Ivory Coast 10 4

Country Venture Deals Venture Exits

Name Manager Type

Africa Joint Investment Fund Qalaa Holdings Buyout

Agri-Vie Fund Exeo Capital Buyout

Agri-Vie Fund II Exeo Capital Expansion / Late Stage

Agricultural Rural Impulse Fund Incofin Investment Mgmt. Venture Debt

Catalyst Fund I Catalyst Principal Partners Expansion / Late Stage

Fusion African Access Fund Fusion Capital Growth

Lereko Metier Capital Growth Fund Metier Growth

Metier Capital Growth Fund II Metier Growth

Moringa Fund Moringa Partnership Timber

Truestone Impact Fund Truestone Impact Investment Mgmt. Growth

Voxtra East Africa Agribusiness Fund Voxtra Natural Resources

Total Funding $13.5 million $9 million

Funded By USAID + others USAID

Facilitated By USAID USAID

Implemented By AGRA, CNFA, ISU CORAF/WECARD

Private Partners DuPont Pioneer + Monsanto n/a

Water Efficient Maize for Monsanto Water efficiency Commercialized: Kenya,

Grant Amount $1,498,485 $10,440,439

Africa 11 14 25 20 70

Americas 4 11 0 3 18

Europe -- -- -- 1 1

Total 24 28 29 31 112 total

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