Domingo VS Ca

[G.R. No.
112371. October 7, 1998.]
AIDA DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

AUDIT, respondent.
SYLLABUS
2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; NO NEED FOR

INTERPRETATION WHEN LAW SPEAKS IN CLEAR AND CATEGORICAL
LANGUAGE. — It is an elementary rule that when the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no need, in the absence of legislative intent to
the contrary, for an interpretation. Words and phrases used in a statute should
be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.
3. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the case under consideration, it must
be noted that the provisions of law referred to in the General Appropriations
Acts of 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991, utilized the word "assigned" and not
"used." Webster's Dictionary defines the word "assign" as "to transfer
(property) to another in trust." Had legislative intent been that government
officials issued an official vehicle could still collect transportation allowance if
they do not actually use subject vehicle, the word "use" instead of "assign"
should have been employed.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J : p
This is an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court seeking to nullify Decision No. 93-3081 of respondent Commission on
Audit.
The antecedent facts that matter are, as follows:
On March 23, 1987, petitioner Aida Domingo was appointed by the
President as Regional Director, Region V of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development, and she assumed office as such. LLpr
Several government vehicles were thereafter endorsed to her office for

the use of the personnel of the entire Region V of DSWD including a Toyota
Land Cruiser Jeep, a Kaiser Cargo Truck, a Trailer Jeep, a Willy's Army
Rebuilt Jeep, and a Nissan Double Cab.
On November 14, 1989, Regional Auditor Manuel Cañares sent a
communication to the petitioner informing her that post-audit reports on the
DSWD Regional Office disbursement accounts showed that officials provided
with government vehicles were still collecting transportation allowances. The
said Auditor then requested the petitioner, in her capacity as Regional
Director, to instruct all persons concerned to cease from collecting the
transportation allowances in question. cdphil
However, despite the assignment to her of a vehicle for her official use,
the petitioner asserted entitlement to a commutable transportation allowance
and collected a total amount of P48,600.00 as transportation allowance for the
period from July 1, 1988 to December 31, 1990.
Petitioner asked for reconsideration of the auditor's directive;
contending that she should only be disallowed to claim transportation
allowance on the days she actually used a government vehicle. According to
petitioner, she already refunded P1,600.00 for the thirty two (32) days she
actually utilized a government vehicle.
But on May 18, 1990, the auditor denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, and issued to petitioner CSB No. 92-003-101, dated July 8,
1992, with the following notation:
A special audit of your TA account was disallowed in accordance
with COA Decision No. 1745 dated February 26, 1991 by the
Commission proper less payment made under OR No 7714009 dated
December 6, 1990- P1,600.00."
On August 8, 1992, the petitioner appealed the auditor's action to the
Commission on Audit, which handed down its decision of August 25, 1993,
finding petitioner's appeal devoid of merit. dctai
Respondent Commission based its aforesaid decision on an earlier

COA decision No. 1745, dated February 26, 1991, wherein it was held that a
government official assigned a vehicle for his/her official use, is not entitled to
collect transportation allowance whether or not he/she actually used such
vehicle.
Undaunted, petitioner found her way to this court via the present
petition, posing the issue of whether or not a commutable transportation
allowance may still be claimed by a government official provided with a
government vehicle, for the days the official did not actually use the
vehicle.
The provision of law in point is found in Section 28 of Republic Act
6688, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1989, to wit:
Section 28. Representation and Transportation Allowances.
— . . . "The transportation allowance herein authorized shall not be
granted to officials who are assigned a government vehicle or use
government motor transportation, except as may be approved by the
President of the Philippines. Unless otherwise provided by law, no
amount appropriated in this Act shall be used to pay for representation
and/or transportation allowances, whether commutable or reimbursable,
which exceed the rates authorized under this Section. Previous
administrative authorization not consistent with the rates and conditions
herein specified shall no longer be valid and payment shall not be
allowed. LexLib
The General Appropriations Acts of 1988, 1990 and 1991 provide:

The transportation allowance herein authorized shall not be
granted to officials who are assigned a government vehicle or use a
government motor transportation, except as may be approved by the
President of the Philippines." (GAA 1988)
government transportation, except as may be approved by the President
of the Philippines " (GAA 1990)
government motor transportation." (GAA 1991)
The aforesaid provision in the General Appropriations Law is based
on Presidential Decree 733 and Commission on Audit Circular No. 75-6 dated
November 7, 1975, regulating the use of government vehicles, aircrafts and
watercrafts. Portion of said circular, reads:
"VI. Prohibition Against Use of Government Vehicles by Officials
provided with transportation allowance. — "No official who has been
furnished motor corporation allowance by any government corporations
or other office shall be allowed to use motor vehicle transportation
operated and maintained from funds appropriated in the abovecited
Decree. (Sec. 14, P.D. 733)."
In the case of Bustamante vs. Commissioner on Audit, 216 SCRA 134,
decided by this Court on November 27, 1992, COA also disallowed the claim
for transportation allowance of the legal counsel of National Power
Corporation because he was already issued a government vehicle. Involving
the circular aforementioned and almost the same facts as in this case, it was
therein held that COA. Circular No. 75-6 is categorical in prohibiting the use of
government vehicles by officials receiving transportation allowance and in
stressing that the use of government motor vehicle and claim for
transportation allowance are mutually exclusive and incompatible. cda
The issue need no longer be belabored for no less than this Court ruled
in the aforesaid case that a government official, to whom a motor vehicle has
been assigned, cannot, at the same time claim transportation allowance.
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that when the law speaks in clear
and categorical language, there is no need, in the absence of legislative intent
to the contrary, for any interpretation. Words and phrases used in a statute
should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. 1
In the case under consideration, it must be noted that the provisions of
law referred to in the General Appropriations Acts of 1988, 1989, 1990 and
1991, utilized the word "assigned" and not "used". Webster's Dictionary
defines the word "assign" as "to transfer (property) to another in trust". Had
legislative intent been that government officials issued an official vehicle could
still collect transportation allowance if they do not actually use subject vehicle,
the word "use" instead of "assign" should have been employed.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there are two
instances when transportation allowance cannot be granted to a government
official, as when a government official is assigned a vehicle, and when a
government official uses government transportation facilities. It is undeniable
that several government vehicles were issued to the Regional Office of DSWD
in Region V. That the vehicles thereat were issued not to petitioner herself, as
Regional Director, but to the Regional Office itself, is of no moment. What is
important and decisive is that such vehicles were intended primarily for the
official use of subject office and its officials and employees. As maintained by
the Solicitor General, whether or not the herein petitioner used the vehicle
assigned to her office, is not an issue, as it is undeniable that she could have
used the said vehicle whenever she wanted to since it was assigned to her
office.
llcd
In the case Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 147, it was held that
there is a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never
intended by a legislative measure and a construction of which the statute is
fairly susceptible is favored which will avoid objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. It is abundantly clear
that the evil sought to be remedied by the legislative prohibition is the
collection of additional transportation allowance despite the availability of free
transportation supplied by a government motor vehicle assigned to the office.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Commission on Audit is
hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Domingo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 112371, [October 7, 1998], 357
|||
PHIL 842-849)

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[G.R. No.

112371. October 7, 1998.]

AIDA DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; NO NEED FOR

This is an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Several government vehicles were thereafter endorsed to her office for

Respondent Commission based its aforesaid decision on an earlier

The General Appropriations Acts of 1988, 1990 and 1991 provide:

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