UNIT 28 CON1MUNI"FARIANISM AND CIVIC

REPUBLICANISM
Structure
28.1 Introduction
28.2 Communitarianism:An Introduction
28.3 The Value ofComn~unityMembership
28.4 The Cornmunitarian Position on State Neutrality
28.5 Civic Republicanism: An Introduction
28.6 The Idea of Republican Freedom
28.7 Tlie Idea of Republican Government
28.8 Sunimary
28.9 Exercises

28.1 INTRODUCTION
The major concern ofthis unit is to introduce, understand and compare the communitarian and civic
republican perspectives in political theory. These perspectives have gained considerable importance
and acceptance in conteniporasypolitical theo~y.Such importance and acceptance may be explained
on two grounds: firstly, both these perspectives contain diflerent forceful and somewhat valid
critiques ofthe political tradition of liberal itldividualistn- alradition that has occupied a dominant
position in modem political thinking and political practice; and secondly, through their critiques,
these perspectives develop meaningful and seemingly relevant alternative conceptualizations of
such political ideas as fieedon~,justice and the relationship between the citizen and the state.

Since con~munita~~ianism and civic republicanism are essentially critiques o c and present themselves
as alternativesto, liberal individualism, it would be llelpful to begin with an interpretive summary of
the liberal individualist perspective in political theory. It may be mentioned that an elaborate and
thorough treatment oftl~isperspective is given in other units ofthis course. In this unit, our attempt
would be limited to an understandingof so~lieof its main arguments, which would in turn facilitate
our understanding of co~iimu~iitaria~~is~n as well as civic republicanism.

Liberal individualisni is essentially one of tlie nlaliytheories oi'tlie nature ofself, tlie relationship
between the citizen and the state and the propcr scope ofstate activities. Some of its main advocates
include Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith, Jeremy Benfhani, J.S.Mil1, David Ricardo,
I-Ierbert Spencer and inore recently, John Rawls, EA. Wayek and Robert Nozick. Tliese political
thinkers have offered ideas and arguments, which though different and sometimes conflicting,
combine to constitute what is labeled as tlie liberal individualist perspective.

Some ofthe main principles of liberal individualismare universalism, egalitarianism,secularism and

the separation between tlie public and the private. However, what distinguishes this perspective
from many others is its support and advocacy of tlie principle of individualism, T~idividualismis a
principle that recognizes and respects the individual as the pri~naryunit of social and political iheoly
 and explanation. An individual is one who is free, rational and capable ofself-detennination.People
are rational in that they are the bestjudges oftheir interest; they are capable of self-determination
in that they are capable of determining their own conception ofthe good; and are & in that they
possess die ability as well as the right to question their participation in existing social practicesand
opt out ofthem, should these practicesseem no longer worth pursuing. On this account, individuals
possess the ability to detach themselves or step back from any particular social practice and choose
whetherthey want to continue pursuing it or not. The individual, in other words, is prior to and
stands at a distance from hidher cultural and community identities and values. Rawls expresses
this argument in the following phrase: 'the self is prior to the ends, which are affirmedby it'.

Since people are fiee, rational and capable of seif-determination, their interests are better promoted
by letting them choose for themselves what sort of life they want to lead. Individual interests are
harmed by any attempt on the part ofthe state to enforce a particular view ofthe good life. The
primary value in a liberal political order, in other words, is the neutrality ofthe state. A neutral state
may be defined as a state, which does not favour, protect, promote or contrarily discriminate against
or penalize any particular individual conception ofthe good. Rather, such a state provides a neutral
fi-ameworkwithin which different and potentially conflictingconceptionsofthe good can be pursued.
In fact, fiom the liberal individualist standpoint, a free and just state is one which remains neutral
and equally tolerant of the different conceptions ofthe good life held by,its individual citizens,
without promotingor penalizing any of such conceptions.

What then, according to liberal individualisn~,are the legitimate functions ofthe state? In the liberal
individualistic view, people possess natural or pre-political freedom: state is not a natural entity;
rather it is an artificial, but a necessary construct;a necessary evil. Since freedom is natural to the
individual, the function ofthe state should mainly be that ofguaranteeingand protecting individual
freedom. The state, in other words, is a mechanism for safeguarding the personal security and
political rights of citizens,who enter into political life and place themselvesunder external authority
for the limited end of protection against unwarranted interference by others. This idea offreedom
as the absence of interference by others, otherwise known as the negative conception of freedom,
has dominated much ofthe liberal individualisttradition.

The individualist conception ofthe self, tlie idea ofstate neutralityand the idea offreedom as no%-
interference form an important, if not the basic core ofthe political theory of liberal individualism.
While much ofmodern political theory and political practice has been influenced and dominated by
these ideas, they have been met with strong criticism from a number oftheoretical perspectees,
some ofwhich are fascism, sarvodaya, communism and feminism. Two profound critiques ofthe
liberal individualist perspective are found in the communitarian and civic republican perspectives.
ASmentioned above, these perspectives not only criticize the basic premise of liberal individualism,
they also put forward different compellingalternative conceptualizations of the nature of the self,
the relationship between the state and the citizen and the idea of freedom.

28.2 COMMUNITARIANISM: AN INTRODUCTION

The co~n~nunitarianperspective developed and became central to political theory during the 1980s
with the publication ofMichael Sandel's Liberalism andthe Limits ofJustice (1982).In this book,
Sandel develops one ofthe most forcehl critiques of Rawlsianiiberalism, the statement ofwhich is
found in John Rawls's A Theoq)ofJutice(1 971).Other political thinkers who have contributed to
the development of communitarianism,although in different ways are Alisdair MacIntyre, Michael
Walzer, Charles Taylor and Will Ky~nliclta.It is woi-thy of li~entionthat communitarian political
thinkers are deeply inspired by the ideas of Aristotle, Hegel and Rousseau. With the development
ofcom~~~unitwianism, tlie theoly of liberal individualism has found it's most distinctive and rigorous
challenge and critique. 111 factt, this critique has allowed for the development ofwhat is now known
as the 'liberal-comniunitariandebate' - a debate which has continued in one way or the otherto
inform a great deal of the study of political theory.

The debate between individualism and communitarianis~~i centers around the question: is political
reality shaped by the decisions and actions of individuals, defincd as persons standing at adistance
(or separate) ftom community bonds or is it shaped by social beings whose identity and behaviour
is defined by the social gro~~ps/con~munities to which they belong? Should thejust statebe constructed
from the standpoint of how to foster the well being of individuals or should it be constructed from
tlie standpoint of how to realize an ideal comniunity? In other words, is tlie basic unit ofpolitical
analysis the individual orthe community? In sesponding to this question, liberalsand co~nmunitarians
hold different and apparently conflictingpositions. While the liberal individualists, as mentioned in
the brief introduction given above, sees political rcality to be shaped by the decisions and actions of
free and rights-bearing individuals, con~munitariansemphasize the relatioilship between the person
and the comniunityand see this reIationship to be the bedrock ofpolitical theory and practice. The
liberal-communitarian debate is, ~~~~~~efore, essentially a debate between those who favour individual
rights and autonon~yand those who emphasize the b o ~ ~ofcommunity
ds in political life.

Co~nniunitariansare first and foremost concerned with community. Two or more people may be
understood to constitute a con~munitywhen they share acommon conception ofthe good and see,
this good as partly constitutive oftheir identity or selves. Such a "constitutive community"may be
a close fiiendship, family nlationship, neiglibourhoodor even a compreliensivepolitical community.
Comn~unitarinnsinsist that each of us as individuals develop our identity, talents and pursuits in life
mainly in and through the context ofa conirnunity. We are by nature social and cultural beings.
Since the commi~nitydeternines and shapes individual nature, political life must start with a concern
for the community, and not the individual. In other words, tlie locus of philosophical reflection on the
ideal and just state ought to be the coln~iiiinityand not the individual.

Colnmunitarians criticize liberal political theory mainly for being mistakenly and irreparably
individualistic. The liberal conceptions of the sctf and the relationship between the individual
and the state are, tiley argue, inherently flawcd, unduly limited as well as misrepresentative of
the true nature of society. In the communitarian view, it is not enough to think in terms of a
two-level relationship with the individual at one levcl and the state at the other. Groups and
communities occupy an important intermediate positioli between the individual and the state
and should be includcd ainong the kinds of rights and duty bearing units whose inter-
relationships arc explored. By prioritizing the rights and freedom of individuals and by
neglecting the iniportance and contribution of conitnunity membership to social and political
life, liberal 'individualism ignores the extent to which it is the community/culture in which
people live that shape who they are and the values they have. In the sections below, we,examine
the communitarian understanding of the value oi'community membership as well as its position on
the idea of state neutrality.

28.3 THE VALUE OF COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP

A great deal of conimimitarian thought has presented itself in tenns of an espousal of the value and
impostanceof corninunity membership to both peoples'lives in general, and to the decisions they
 ~iial<e
in the political sphere in particular. Such an espousal is made with an explicit reference to arid
a whole rejection oftlie individualistic collception ofthe self. The essence ofthe cornmunitarian
claim is that in defining its as individuals, liberal individ~~alisni
places 11sat a distance, infact detaclies
us from our social ends and conceptiorls ofthe good in a way that siniply fails to correspond to the
way in which we actually relate to these ends. Such a conception of the self, as detached and
separate fioni social ends, is according to cornmunitarians,disputable on two grounds: first, that it
devalues, discounts and downgrades the impot-tanceof cotnlnunitymembership; and second, that it
presents a flawed ilnderstariding oftlie relation between the selfand its ends.

On the first criticism, conirnunitarianisliichallenges liberal individualis~nfor downgradi~igand

discounting the ilnportance ofcommunity. More specifically,they criticize individualism for ignoring
the extent to which it is the society or conimimitywliic!~people live in that shape who they are and
the values they have. For com~iiunitarianism.tlie community is a fundamental and an irreplaceable
ingredient in the good life oftlie person. However resilient and independent people [nay be, liuma~i
existence outside social and community life is tinthinkableas well as ~~ndesirable.People, according
to communitarians, are not Robinson Cr~rsoesable to live in colnplete and permanent isolation:
rather they are constituted and shaped through their membership of particular communities. As
human beings we are essentially members of a family, religion, tribe, race and nation, As such,
rather than being distant koni social and co~nlnunityends and values, we have a history and are
placed/positioned in specific social circumstances. The attachments and the moral engagemen'ts
that derive fiorn sucli cotnmirnity membership determine"who we are" and shape "tlie values we
Iiave". By ignoring tlid i~npo~tance and contributions ofcon~rnunitymembership, liberal individualisln
constructs a conception ofthe self, which isdivorced from the social reality that constitutes it.

On the second criticism, cori~niunitarianismattacks individi~alislnfor holding a mistaken or falsc

understanding ofthe relationship between tlie selfand its ends -one that sees individual ends and
conceptiorls oftlie good to be formed independently and prior to society. As briefly discussed
above, liberal individualisln regards 'tlie selfto be prior to its ends' in the sense that individuals
reserve tlie right lo question, revise and reject tlieir lnost deeply held convictioris about the nature
ofthe good life, ifthese are I'oilnd to be no longer woltli pursuing.

Criticizing the liberal individualist conception oftlie relationship between the selfand its ends,
communitarians ask whether we can really step back from particillar vaiues tliat we Iiavc arid
change them for new ones, or are we rather made the very people tliat we are by tlie values that
we endorse so tliat detachriient is impossible? Hi~nianbeings, they argue, are essentially social
beings. As sucl~,we neither choose nor reject our social and conini~~riity ends and attachments;
rather we discover therii. We are neither fi.ee nor standing at a distance from our social and
coln~nunityends; instead, we find ourselves located/situated in them. For instance, we do not
choose our family, caste or nation; we find o~lrselveslocated in tliern. We then determine our
conception ofthe good and elids given our place, position and situation in a family, religion and
nation. According to co~iiniu~~itarianis~ii we are never free from all social roles and community
identities. Our mem bersliip of social gt.oups and conimunities determine and constitute our identity
and ~uiderstatidingoftlie good life. We cannot always stand back and opt out of social relations and
cornmullity iiiembersliip.Our social relations and roles, or at least sorne must be taken as given. As
Saridel notes 'I can interpret the tileaning of tlie roles I find myself in, but I cannot reject tlie roles
themselves, or t l ~ goals
e internal to them as wol-thless. Since these goals are constitutive of me as
a person, they have to be taken as given in deciding what to do with my life; the question ofgood in
11iylife can only be a question of how best to interpret theis meaning. It lnaltes no sense to say that
they have no val~lefor me, since there is no *me'standing behind them, no self prior to their c11,Is
or constitutive attachments. The self is constituted by and not prior to its ends'.

In this way conimunitaria~isdenounce the aliistorical. asocial and disembodied conception of the
individual self. According to them, this conception overlooks tlie ways in which it is the kind of
society in which people live that atyect thcir understanding, both of themselves and of how they
sho~lldlead their lives. A valuable life, they argue, is one that is filled with c o ~ n n ~ i t ~ n eand
nts
relations: and what makes them co~n~nit is precisely that they are not the sort of things that people
can or ouglit to question every day.

In the communitarian perspective then, to accept the individualistic conception oftlie self is to see
olieself as disembodicd, detaclicd and sharing a vafuntary relationship with one's social ends and
attachments. They oppose this voluntaristic pictitre of'tlie relationsliip between the selfand its ends
for ignoring the extent to which we are embedded or situated and paletiallyconstituted by social
roles and community membership. Sandel criticizes tl~isconception of the self for being
c'~lneti~~~~nbered". A Iternativcly, he advances the notion ot'the "sit~~ated self', the sclf or subject
who is ilivariably a lnernber of a con~rnunityand whose well being rcsts orr tlie good of liis/her
community. For Sandel, as lor other co~nlnu~iifaria~is,the common good oftlie community is prior to
the rights oftlie individuals

28.4 THE CQMMUNlTARlAN POSlTlON ON STATE'NEUTRALITY

An equally important concern ofthe commi~nitaria~i perspective has been to discern the nature atid
legitinlate scope oftlie state. In addressing this concern, col~uiiilnitariansdevelop an understanditig
wliich is different, and in conllict with the doliiinnnt liberal idea of the state. As briefly mentioned
above, liberal individualists identify ajust state as a minimal and neutral politicalauthority, the
fi~nctionsofwhich are liliiited to tlie protection of individual rights and the maintenance of law and
order, The state, rather tlian intel-firingi l l tlic detennination ofthe good, ought to be equally tolerant
ofdiffercnt conceptioiis of the good, witkoirt prolnotilig andlor penalizing any ofsucli conceptions.

In furnishing their understanding ofthe nature of the state, cot~~~liuni~arians

ofYer a strong critique
ofthe idea of state neutrality. According to them, the view that the state should bc value-neutral,
whereby ilidividuals are left free to make tlieirown choices stems from an atolnistic belief that
ailtonolny is protected only when judgements about tlie good life arc laken out ofthe political realm
and made on an individi~al(private) basis. Re-jectingsuch ''aton~ism",cornrnunitariansargue that, in
reality, individual judge~nentsrequire the sharing ofexperiences. the give and take ofcollective
deliberation and tlie collective evaluation ol'sliared practices. In other words, peoples' clloices
abo~jttl~egood lifc can only be exercised in a pnrtic~llarsort of commi~nityand not a cilltural
~iiarketplaceguided by fseedom and neutrality, of the type guarantedd by liberal i~idividualism,

111advancing an alternative account, 6f the nature of tlie slate, cornrnunitarians argue for tlic
abandonmenl of liberal neutralily in favo~trorthe politics oftlie common good. The common

\
good is,conceive as a substantive conceptioli of tlie good lil'e, which defines the community
way of life as we I as ~rovidesstan ards fro111 which individual preferences and values are
I' good fornis the basis on wliich different co~~ceptions
evaluaLed. In otlie~words, the comnioli
of the good are ranked. 'The weight given to an indididual's conception then depends on how
much it cosrespolids,to or deviates fioni the conlliion good.
 The common good, cori~~nunitarians believe, is required not only for guiding people's decisions
about the good life, but also for establishing a just and legitimate political co~iimunity.According to
Taylor, the common good is required to vindicate and make legitinlate the j~~stice-demands ofa
welfare state. At the heart of the theory ofjustice in a welfare state is the claim that those privileged
ought to sacrifice a portion oftheir rights and rewards for the sake ofothers (the underprivileged).
For instance, in a liberal capitalist society, the propertied are required to sacrifice solne oftheir
property (derived in the form of taxes) for the benefit ofthe non-propertied and for sustaining a just
society. According to Taylor, claims for such a sacrifice in an individualistic society would seem
improper, if not unjust, as we would be required to sacrifice our rightdpropet-tyfor the sake ofthose
witli whom we share no colnm~lnityidentity or comlilon way of life. Ifwe are distanced from a
con~munityor shared way of life, we would necessarily be ilnwilling to shoulder sucli justice-
demands of a welfare state. Justice, co~nniunitarians argue, is rootcd in a community whose primary
bond is the shared understanding ofthe good. A just state then, is not one that remains neutral
towards all individual conceptions ofthe good: rather it is one wl~ichencourages its citizens to adopt
conceptions oftlie good that agree with the colnlnon good, \vhile discouraging conceptions of the
good that conflict with it.

In the communitarian view then. the guarantee of a free and just state is deeply intertwined with the
well being ofthe community. The ideal state is one that elnploys its power and authority to encourage
the continuation and health oftliosecultural traditions and values that serve to determinethe comrnon
good. Commu~iitarianism,thils, endows the state witli apositivehnction of prornoting the common
good, rather than tnerely with a negative filnction ofensuri~lgan absence of interferellce in the
realm of individual rights. It is worthy of mention that a number of political theorists in India are
influenced by and draw from the arguments oftlze communitarian perspective.

. So far we have concentrated on the communitarian perspective in political theory. In the following
sections, we examine thk main ideas and arguments ofthe civic republican tndition and attempt to
compare this tradition with the comrnunitarian perspective.

28.5 CIVIC REPUBLICANISM: AN INTRODUCTIOIV

Civic republican political theory takes its starting point fiom a long established tradition ofthinking
about politics-atmdition that is understood 10 have contributed sigliiticantlyto the development of
democracy. This tradition is associated witlt silch political thinkers as Aristotle, Cicero, Guicciardini,
Machi veICi, Janles Harringon and Rousseau as well as with the many commonwealth theorists of
tt
the 18 century. In recent tinyes this tradition has been defended and developed by Hannah Arendt,
John Pocock, Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit. among others.

The term republicanism is defined and understood in contrast with nlonarcl~yor the personal rule of
kings and emperors. Wl~ereasa monarch enjoys personal authority over his subjects and rules his
realm as his personal possession and more or less Lo realize his personal interests, government in a
republic is, in principle, the common business ofthe citizens conducted by them for realizing the
common good. The idea of republ icanism, thus, develops from a desire and the attempt to replace
'the empire oflnen with the empire of law'.

The civic republican perspective begins by adopting some ofthe important ideas of Greek political
begins, as does Gtzck political thinking, from the premise that
thought. Infact, civic republicat~is~n
man is by nature a social-political animal. Men, however, arealso moral beings as they embody
certain rnoral purposes. Naturally therefore, and in order to realize their interests and develop their
true selves, nlen ri~ustlive together in a political association, more specifically in a self-governing
political con~munity.A self-governing political co~nniunityis one in which citizens participate to
realize the good of both the individual as well as the collective. In a republic then, citizens are
essentially virtuous as they piace tlie co~nniongood above their particular individual goods. To put
in a nutshell, a good polity is an association of good citizens, good citizens being those who possess
the qi~alityofcivic virtue or the predisposition to seek the good of all in public matters. To use
Aristotle's words, the end ofa political comniunity "is the good life and the good in politics is the
7
comtnon interest '.

Underlying and contributing to the civic republican ideal of a good polity are somewhat distinct
ideas of freedom and government - ideas, which republicans conclude, go beyond and are
deeper than tlie do~iiinantliberal notions of freed0111and government. It is this distinctiveness
whicli, they believe, makes civic republicanis~na conipelling theory of political order and
freedom. Below, we exaniine the civic republican ideas of freedom and government.

28.6 THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN FREEDOM

At the Iieart ofcivic repi~blicanis~nis a distinct and supposedly rich idea of freedom. According
to republican theorists, this idea of freedorn contributes to the discourse on freedom by going
beyond tlie traditional dominant liberal conception offreedom. To understand thedistinctness
and contributions ofthis idea. it would be Iielpli~lto give a summarized account ofthe traditional
conceptions of freedom.

In an important work titled Two Concepts qf Liherfy (1 958), Isaiah Berlin drew a distinction
between what lie understood to be two difircnt conceptions of liberty, namely negative and
positive liberty. The idea of liberty has since been i~nderstoodwith reference to this distinction.
According to Berlin, the negative conception of liberty required the absence of interference
by others, where interl'erence be understood broadly to mean any intentional form of obstruction
or coercion. The positive conception of liberty, alternatively, required a presence rather than
an absence - the presence of self-mastery, where self-mastery is interpreted as the ability of
an individual to master his passions with his reason. In 1988, Benjamin Constant, in a famous
lecture titled, "'The Liberty of the Ancients and the Liberty of the Moderns" developed the
distinction between negative and positive liberty: while the 'liberty of the moderns' was
identified with the negative conception of liberty, defined as tlie absence of interference, the 'liberty
ofthe ancients' was dcfined differently, yet positively as the right of the individual to participate in
the process ofdernocratic self-determination. It is worthy af~nentionthat the liberal political tradition
has been domi~zateciby the negative conception of freedom as non-interference.

According to tlie civic republican tmdition, the dis'tinction between negative and positive freedom,
between the liberty ofthe ancients and the liberty of the moderns, fails to capture the true essence
and value offreedom. As an alternative, republican theorists develop and advocate the idea of
republican freedo~n.Republican freedom, they argue, although akin to the traditional distinction,
transcends it to deliver a richer and more valid account of freedom. As noted by Pettit, "the
republican conception of liberty is akin to the negative one in ~naintainingthat what liberty requires
is the absence of something, not necessarily the presence. It is akin to the positive conception in
Iiolding that that which must be absent has to do with mastery rather than with interference.
Freedom consists, not in the presence of sel f-mastery, and not in the absence of interference by
others. but rather in the absence of mastery by others: in the absence ... of domination. Freedom
just is non-domination".
 Underlying the republican notion of freedorn as non-domination is an understanding ofthe meaning
of domination as well as its relationship with interference. Domination, as understood by the
republica~is;isthe ability and capacity ofone agent to exercise power over the other, pallicularly
the power ofarbitrarv interference. In other words, a person is don~inatedby an other, and thereby
unfree, to the extent that the other has the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis in hidher
affairs. Such a relationship ofdomination is exemplified in the relationship between master and
slave/servant, employer and employee and even I~usbandand wife, where the dominant agent
interferesarbitrarily in the affairs ofthe other; thereby restricting the heedom ofthe other. According
to civic republicans,the distinction between negative and positive liberty fails to address the denial
of freedoin asdominatioli. It is such indifference to the notion of donlination as adenial of freedom
that allowtd liberals to remain for long tolerant ~Trelationshipsof dominance at home and in
workplaces.

The relationship hctween domination and interference,according to republicans. is deeper as we11

as more proble~naticthan is apparent. Do~nination,as they argue, can be expcrienced and exercised
witho~~t actual interference. such 3s experienced by the lucky slave. Contrarily, interference can be
practiced without real clomination such as in the case ofa good polity, which interferes in the lives
oftlle citizens to promote their welfare and we11 being. It is, therefore, possible to have domination
without interferencejust as it is possible to have interf'erence without domination. What we need to
protect o~~rselves from is nor.all f*orn~s
of interference, but only those forms of interference, which
are of an arbitrary dominating nature.

On this ground, the negative conception of freedom as non-interference appears insufficient as it

fails to distinguish between desirable and arbitrary forms of interference. It ignores the extent to
which interference lnay in sorne cases contribute to the sustenance and pro~notionof individual
freedom and welfare. The Indian State, for instance, interferes in the fi-eedomof its citizens, in
diffemnt ways, sucli as to ban certain evil practicessanctioned by religiouscustom, like untouchability
andsati, as well as to provide certain specific rights and welfare in the form ofaffirmative action
to the underprivileged sections of society. I n fact no st states. if not all, interfere in the econo~niclife
of their citizens through policies oftaxation, which is then etnployed for the distribution ofwelfare
goods such as health, education and housing, atnong many others. By defining freedom simply as
non-interference, political theo~ywould indeed be ins~~ficiently placed in justifying such necessary
acts of interference by the state. The idea of republican lieedom as noti-dominationgives space
for such laws, which altl10~1g11 do ititerfel.e, do not enslave or dominate but rather free one from
domination and subjugation by othel-s.

As mentioned above, the negative conception of freedom as non-interference follows from the
liberal understanding offreedo~nas natural and the state as a necessary evil. For the republicans,
in contrast, the cause of fieedom rests scluarely wit11 the law and the state. The laws of a good
state - a republic, create tl1c freedom enjoyed by citizens; they do not offend against that freedom.
The state, in this view, is not antagonistic to civic Freedom: rather it is "freedom-friendly". To use
Harri~~gton's words, *'liberty,in the proper sense, is Iibertyb the laws, not Iibertyfrolnthe laws".

It may be noted that-with the ideaof freedom as non-domination, civic rep~tblicanismtends to agree
with the coriception of Geople as situated in certain communities and cultures rather than with the
individualistic conception ofthe self as detached and disembodied. Doruination is often associated
with certain cultural ~narltersSLICII as gender, race, religion and class anlong others. A person
facing domination is more liltely to belong to a vuInerable class. Freedoni as non-domination can be
enjoyed and guaranteed only in so far as the salient groups to which these people belong enjoy it.
Upliolding tlie republican idea ofti-eedom, Pettit argues. tliat it is o~ilywhen tlle idea offi-eedoni as
non-interfewr~ceis replaced with tliat ol'frcedorii as lion-domination would the political theory and
practice ot'such stri~gglcsas l'emi~lism,multiculti~ralismand envirunmen~alismgain recognition and
response. Iiifact. it is arguecl tliat tlie republican notion oi'fi.cedom wcnt out o f i'asliion in tlie 18th
century, when citizenship was extended beyond tlic real111ofpropertied males, and when it was no
longerpossible to tliink oi'mnltingall citizelis, particularly woriien and servants, free in the rep~~blican
sense. Freedom, ifgi~itranteedto all, had to bc less demnnding.

It may not be incorrect to arguc: that under-lying tlie rep~tblicanidea of'freedorii as non-domination
is a value ofcquality, wliercby no one is dominated by, and t l i ~ ~ i~rieqi~al
s to the other. Frcedom
reqi~irestlie capacity ofcacli individ~~al to staiitl asi111C C I L I ~ I with f e l l o ~ c i t i ~ ein
n s shared awareness
tliat no one lias tlie po\\fcl-ofasbitral.y interl'crence over tlic otl~cr.'I'lie idea of sepublican fieedoni
appears to be somecvhut niore co~npatiblewith and wcl I-disposed to tlic ideas ol'democracy, welfare
and enipowcrnient - idcas that have gaincd ci~i.rencyand iml~orta~ice in conteriiporary political
theory and practice.

28.7 THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT

Based on tlie republican idea of'lkeedom as nun-clominntio~iis the idea ol'rcp~~blican government.
Freedom as ~iu~-~-Jo~ninatio~i, as republicans believe, \vould be achieved only WIICII each citizen
feels that lie/slie is not being rulcd or dominated by tlie power ol'otl~ers,but by liisllier own interests.
As S L I C ~rcpublican
, l e rathcr- not to bc ruled. 'l'liis, republicans
fiecdom is the desire not to r ~ ~but
believe, neccssitatcs adiilkrent alid a more incl~~sive ide~~of'govcmmcnt. Below, we examine the
idea ol'a republican government.

Underlying the iclcrl oftlie rcp~~blican government asc the pri~iciplcof' civic virtue, the idea of
coni~iio~i good and tlie notion ofactive civic participation. Tkc repi~blicnnidea oi'civic virtue
niay be understood as he willingness to set the columon goocl ;~bnveone's own or fttmily's
interests. Infact, the idea of citizc~lsbeing vi~.tuousis an integral part of tlie tradition ol'civic
republicanism. Civic repubIic:lnisrn. i n ii sinii lar vein with com~iii~nitarixns, r e q i ~ i ~that
t s wc :IS
citizens place tlie common good above our parlicular inciivici~~al interests. For it is only by placing
the common good -the good of all - :~bovt:0111.private interests that we would guarantee and
realize tlie value of Sreeclom as non-domination. Republicn~isemphatically claim tliat withot~tcivic
t ' , republic wi I I degenerate into a battlefield ol'rival intcrests.
v i ~ ~ u[lie

While the repi~blicnndoctrine lays great strcsson tlie ti~nda~iiental importance ofcivic virtue, it lays
eq~1a1stress on tlle fiagi lity ol'virtue -the danger that rt people or its le:lders would become corn~pt,
thereby tllrealening tlic republic. Civic republicans are cautious of the state oi'ftcinls exercising
power in an arbitrary \my, tllercby denying republican fi~ocdom.I-low then can the state and its
of?cials be ~srcvzntedlisorn exercising power in an arbitrary way? Repi~blicansalso recognize that
peoplc clu 11otmakc LIP11per-Seclly Iianiio~iiousor Iiomogeno~~s body with identical intel-ests; rather
they are divided 011the basis of interests. Such division of interests could translate into a niajor
threat to both civic virtue and [lie republic. I-low thcii slioi~lda t.epwblic be organized so as to
reconcile tlie different co~iflicting interests in society?

It is to gi~arda g a i ~ iSs L~I C i.Iii.eats

~~ to tlie republic that civic rcpublica~iismadvocates a ~iuniberof
measures. tlie most important of which is active civic participation. Activc civic participation,
republicans argue, is essentially 'tlie price of liberty' -the tool wii.11 which citizens can place an
eternal vigilance on the govelnnlcnt and its oflicials. Active participation ensures that a powerful
 group or citizen does not dominate or violate the freedom of others by talting control of tlle
government. Infact. active civic participation is understood to be a prerequisite and a condition for
the guarantee of republican freedom.

The republican idea ofcitizetlship, however, ouglltto be contrasted with tlie liberal ideaofcitizenship:
while the latter regards citizenship as a right passively enjoyed by citizens who desire fi-eedomfro111
esternal restraints, tlie i'ornmer identifiescitizensliip witli those rights which empower citizens with
tlie freed0111 to actively engage with other citize~isunder conditions and in pul.suance of freedom
and equality. Citizenship, ill the republican view, is an office and a responsibility that is proudly
assumed by citizens. To be a citizen in a republic is to be a self-governing ~iieniberof a self-
governing conimunity.

In addition to civic participation, civic republicanism argues in favoiir ofco~~stitutionalism as a

~neasureto guard against threats to republican virtue. Tlie task ofcivic repi~blicanisrnis to design a
constitution that wo~11dreflect ant1 bala~icetlie diverse interests in society. The British Constitution
isoften cited as an exaniple ofsuch a balance wherein tlie interests ofone-the monarch, tlie few
-the arisLocracy, and tlie many- the co~ii~iio~i people, are balanced in tlie mixed govern~nentof tlie
Crown, tlie House of Lords and tlie House of Commons. Tlle idea of a separation of powers
arnong tlie legislature, tlie executive and the judiciary is also identified as an eqiially impel-tant
guard. According to rep11blici~iitheorists, 111econcentration ofpowers ill tlie hands ofone person or
group is tlie most potelit source of domination and sirbjugation ol'otliers.

The advocacy oftlie ideas ofcivic virlue. co~iinio~i good, active civic citizenship, mixed constitutions
and separation of po\vers make up an impo~.tant,if not t lie core of tlie idea of republican government.
Understandably then, civic republica~iismis seeti to be co~nple~lie~itary if not in support oftlie idea
of de~nocrncy.It is wit.11 iliese ideas of government as well as with tlie idea of freedom as non-
domination that rep~~blicans aini at replacing 'the empire ofmen with tlie empire of laws'.
- - -- -

28.8 SUMMARY
In tlie sections above, we have examined, separately though, two important perspectives in
contemporary political theory, namely co~iimi~nitarianism and civic republicanism. In this
section and by way of concl~rdingthis unit, we niake a comparative assess~iientof tliese
perspectives by Iiigliligliting tlie ideas 011 wliich tliey complement and differ from each other.
We also attenipt to bring out some of the st]-engtlisand weaknesses of these two perspectives.

'I'o begin with, we look at [lie points of co1ii13Icliientaritybetween tliese two perspectives. As
rne~itionedabove, both com~~iunitarianisn~ and civic republicanisni contain I'orcefi~lcritiqiies
and co~iipell i n ~alternatives lo tlie ideas of liberal individualisl~i.Firstly, they botli begin by
cllaracterizing IILIIII~IIS as social and political animals who in order to realize their interests
and lead good lives o i ~ g hto t live in rissociation witli one another. Secondly, both perspectives
criticize the libcral individualist conception of tlie self as a self detached and disenibodied
from its ends: while fbr the cornn~~~nitarians this conception is unreal, the rept~blicanssee it to
be i~~ldesirable for tlie establishment o f a good and fiee polity. l'hirdly, botli endow tlie stace
witll'a positive rather than a negative role. In fact a just state, according to both perspectives,
rather than being neutral, is one 1-hat protects and promotes Ilic common good. ina all^,-botli
c o ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ n i t a and
s i a lcivic
i i s r i ircp~~l~licanis~ii
see the community and ct~ltl~ral ~iiembersliipas
playing on i~npol-tantrole in deter~iii~iing the clioices that we ~iialcein the public sphere: while
coni~ii~~~iitarians 21-emore candid about tlie centrality ofco111111~11iity membership to i~idividualchoices,
civic republicans make a more subtle statelllent when they advocate tlie idea of freedom as now
doiiiination.

An impol-tant dift'ercnce bet wee!^ these perspectives is that wliiie the cotnmunitarians reject the
possibility ofa neutral state, civic rep~~blicanisni
advocates tlie possibility ofa state, wliich transcends
religio~~sand other related divides,

Indeed, both com~ii~~nitariariis~~iand civic republicanism make eq~lally.although somewhat ditierent

important and conipellingcontrib~itio~is to political theory. So~iieol'such contributions are tlle
comti-~unitarianunderstanding of tlie relationship betwecn the person and tlie community, the
importance of comtnutiity niembersliip and vali~esin the determination of peoples' choices, tlie
critique oftlie idua ofstate neutrality,the republ icari idea of heedom as non-domination,the nuanced
understanding oftlie relationship between duminatio11and interference and the emphasis an civic
virtue 2nd pat-ticipation.

While the cornm~~nitarian ilrid civic republican perspectives are recognized for tlie contributions
they riialte to contemporary pol itical theory, they have been criticized by some political theorists,
particularly liberal individualists. According to lhese political tlieo~.ists, by prioritizing
colii~ni~nity niembersliip, cornm~~tiitarinns undervalue the i~iiportnnceof individual rights and
aulonomy. Infact they leave tlie indivitlual a hostage to the will and good of tlie comm~~nity,
which could, and oftcn does redi~cetlie space of individual Sruedom and choice. The idca ol'a
C O ~ T I I I I ~good
II such 3 good is dil'ficult to deterniine in societies
is criticized on Ilie groi~~~cIstIiat
that are characterized by dcrp pluralisn~.Infact il'dcterniined, the idca of the colnnioti good
can have conservative and repl-essive conno~ations,tiiainly because it woi~ldprovide a standard
from wliich individuaf conceptions of the good wo~~lcl be judged and thereby, advanced or
eliniinated. Both tl~eseperspectives. therel'ore. Ptil to see aticl guard against tlie possibility of
the common good becoming n perpetrator ol'dotni~~ntion and ir?justice.

To conclude it may bc appropriate to say that Ibr us in India, an understandi~~g ofthe com~nunitarian
and civic rep~~blicari perspectives is rclevant in tc~msol'botl~politicill theory and political practice.
011 one hand, wc need to ~~nders~and and assess the difl'ercnt contributions niade by these perspectives
as well as ofthe alternative principles they advocate. 011the
in.theircritique of liberal inclivid~~alism
other Iland, we need to relate these conlributions and nlternativc principles to our present political
practice.

28.9 EXERCISES
I) Wliat do you understand by communitarianism? Explain in your own words,

2) Discuss the value o f c o t i ~ ~ i ~ ~membership.

~nity

3) Exatnine the c o ~ i i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~positiorl

t i i f a r 011
i ~ statc
i ~ ~ ~ieutrality.

4) Write an essay on civic republicanism.

5) Discuss tlie ideas of rrpublican ficedom and government.