(NASA-TM-89825) Design, Development, and Test of Shuttle - Centaur G-Prime Cryogenic Tankage Thermal Protection Systems

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 44

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?

R=19870014252 2020-03-20T10:27:04+00:00Z
\

r =

aL

NASA Technical Memorandum 89825

Design, Development, and Test of Shuttle/


Centaur G-Prime Cryogenic Tankage
Thermal Protection Systems

Richard H. Knoll
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio

and

Peter N. MacNeil and James E. England


General Dynamics
Space Systems Division
San Diego, California

I_ASk-[I_-8982- _} I_S/G1N, DEV_I_f_EN_ AND N87-23665

_KAC-£ I£E_AL f_O_£C_IC_ -_£I_5 [NASA}


_,_ F Avail: b_lJ- _ £,C A03/R_ AOl CSCL 22B Onclas
HlI18 0077t45b

May 1987
Trade names or manufacturers' names are used ira this report for identification
only. This usage does not constitute an official endorsement, either expressed or
implied, b)' the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT, AND TEST OF SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-PRIME CRYOGENIC

TANKAGE THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS*

Richard H. Knoll
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio 44135

and

Peter N. MacNell and James E. England


General Dynamics
Space Systems Division
San Diego, California

SUMMARY

The thermal protection systems for the shuttle/Centaur would have had to
provide fall-safe thermal protection during prelaunch, launch ascent, and
on-orblt operations as well as during potential abort, where the shuttle and
Centaur would return to Earth. The thermal protection systems selected used a
hellum-purged polylmlde foam beneath three radiation shields for the liquid-
hydrogen tank and radiation shields only for the llquld-oxygen tank (three
shields on the tank sidewall and four on the aft bulkhead). A double-walled
vacuum bulkhead separated the two tanks. The llquid-hydrogen tank had one
O.75-1n.-thlck layer of foam on the forward bulkhead and two layers on the
larger-area sidewall. Full-scale tests of the flight vehicle in a simulated
,_r shuttle cargo bay that was purged wlth gaseous nitrogen gave total prelaunch
!
heating rates of 88 500 Btu/hr and 44 000 Btu/hr for the liquld-hydrogen and
-oxygen tanks, respectively. Calorimeter tests on a representative sample of
the llquld-hydrogen-tank sidewall thermal protection system indicated that the
measured unit heating rate would rapidly decrease from the prelaunch rate of
~lO0 Btu/hr ft 2 to a desired rate of <1.3 Btu/hr ft 2 once on-orblt.

INTRODUCTION

The shuttle/Centaur G-prlme vehicle, using liquid hydrogen and liquid


oxygen as propellants, was designed for use in the Space Transportation System
(STS) and afforded a means of significantly increasing the payload capability
of the STS (ref. l). Although the shuttle/Centaur project has been terminated,
the design, development, and test history of the cryogenic tankage thermal pro-
tection systems used for the vehicle are reviewed to possibly benefit future
programs requiring the transfer of cryogenics to Earth orbit.

The thermal protection systems for the Centaur G-prlme llquld-hydrogen


and -oxygen tanks were unique in that they would have had to provide thermal
protection during prelaunch, launch-ascent, and on-orbit operations as well as

*A shorter version of this report was presented at the 22nd Thermophyslcs


Conference sponsored by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
Honolulu, Hawaii, June B-lO, 1987 (AIAA-87-1557).
during abort operations, where the shuttle and Its cargo would return to desig-
nated landing sites. Other cryogenic stage thermal protection systems such as
those for the shuttle main tank, the Saturn, and the Centaur D-IA (ref. 2) pro-
vtde protection primarily during prelaunch and aerodynamic boost. The Centaur
D-1T (ref. 3), used as a second stage on the Titan, also had to provide thermal
protection for an extended time on-orbit, but none of the expendable vehicles
had a requirement to return to Earth. In addition to affording thermal protec-
tion during descent and landing (and after landing), it was imperative that the
Centaur G-prtme thermal protection systems not be hazardous to the shuttle or
tts crew.

This report describes (1) the basic design of the shuttle/Centaur G-prime
thermal protection systems, (2) various small-scale and full-scale developmen-
tal tests, (3) shuttle-related developmental problems encountered and their
solutions, and (4) the full-scale performance of the fllght system In a stmu-
lated shuttle cargo bay during prelaunch operations. Emphasis ts placed on the
liquid-hydrogen-tank insulation system as it had to meet the design criteria
imposed on all shuttle/Centaur thermal protection systems plus had the addt-
tlonal requirement, because of the lower temperature of the liquid-hydrogen
tanks, of precluding formation of liquid air or liquid nitrogen on any of Its
surfaces.

SYSTEM DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

Thermal Requirements for Mission

The shuttle/Centaur G-prlme vehlcle (ref. I) was originally designed to


propel the Galileo and Ulysses spacecraft from low-Earth orbit to their respec-
tive destinations of Jupiter and a polar orbit about the Sun (vla Jupiter).
The G-prlme vehicle and Its payloads were to be inserted Into low Earth orbit
by the STS. Once in orbit the orbiter cargo bay doors were to open to allow
the Centaur G-prlme to be rotated by Its integrated support structure for even-
tual separation from the orbiter (fig. l). Nominal mission time was 6 hr from
STS launch to separation from the orbiter. An additional 3 hr was allowed for
deployment delay, giving a total of g hr. During thls 9 hr the thermal envi-
ronment imposed on the vehicle would vary from a room-temperature, gaseous-
nltrogen-purged environment at launch to the near vacuum of space, wlth a
varying radiant heat flux once on-orblt. Additionally In case of an abort the
orbiter cargo bay would have had to be refilled with atmospheric alr during its
descent to Earth.

Figure 2 gives additional details of the Centaur G-prlme and the Centaur
integrated support structure (CISS) used for interfacing wlth the shuttle. The
vehicle Is supported by a cylindrical deployment adapter on its aft end and by
a three-polnt attachment system on its forward end. The CISS would have pro-
vided all the necessary fluld and electrical interfaces for the vehicle plus
the hardware required for deployment.

The basic vehicle, before installation of the cryogenic tankage thermal


protection systems and other flight hardware, Is shown in figure 3. The vehi-
cle had the following key thermal features: (1) the highly conductive aluminum
conical forward adapter (where most of the avionics and other equipment was
mounted) was supported off the llquld-hydrogen tank forward ring by a low-
conducting, 25-1n.-hlgh composite adapter; (2) the llquld-hydrogen and -oxygen
tanks were separated by a double-walled vacuum bulkhead that contained a cryo-
pumped insulation system to llmlt gaseous conduction; and (3) a low-conducting
composite adapter was also used between the aft end of the liquid-oxygen tank
and the warmer aluminum deployment adapter of the ClSS.

In order to accomplish the Intended missions, In the rather severe and


varying environment discussed previously, the following thermal crtterla were
Imposed on the cryogenic thermal protection systems:

(1) The system shall be destgned to prevent llquefactlon of atr or the


cargo bay gaseous-nitrogen purge gas on any external surface of the Insulation
system.

(2) The prelaunch heating rates of the liquid-hydrogen and -oxygen tanks
shall be less than 103 000 and 40 000 Btu/hr, respectively, whtle In the
gaseous-nitrogen-purged cargo bay.

(3) The maxtmum on-orbtt heating rates through the !lquld-hydrogen-tank


forward bulkhead and sidewall Insulation system shall not exceed 1690 and
1570 Btu/hr, respectively.

(4) The maximum on-orbit heating rates through the liquid-oxygen-tank


sidewall and aft bulkhead shall not exceed 175 and 180 Btu/hr, respectively.

Wtth these requirements imposed on the cryogenic tankage thermal protec-


tlon systems, along with other restrtctlons on penetration heat leaks and the
heat leak through the double-walled vacuum bulkhead, the Centaur G-prime could
perform tts tntended missions.

Requirements Imposed by Shuttle Cargo Bay

As a payload tn the STS the Centaur G-prime had to meet the safety
requirements specified in references 4 and 5 and had to withstand the STS-
induced environments described In reference 6. Some of _he more important
safety criteria Influencing the thermal protection system design were as
follows:

(1) Materials must be noncombustible or self-extinguishing In the upward


flame propagation test of reference 7 (less than 6 ln. burned tn a 12-tn.-long
sample).

(2) The Insulation system shall be designed to an ultimate safety factor


of 1.4 or more and shall be capable of withstanding limit loads without loss
of function and ulttmte loads without failure.

(3) All systems shall be two-failure tolerant agalnst catastrophic


hazards.

(4) Any matertal exposed to gaseous or ltqutd oxygen must pass the impact
senstttv%ty tests of reference 7.

(5) All hardware with metallzed surfaces shall be electrically bonded per
MIL-B-5087. Cargo bay hardware with volume reslstlvttles greater than
109 ohms-cm shall not accumulate an electrical charge.
The STS-lnduced structural loads that had to be considered tn the deslgn
of the thermal protection systems were launch and emergency landtng loads,
mechanical loads due to structure-borne or airborne (i.e., acoustical) excita-
tions, loads due to rapid pressure changes In the cargo bay during ascent and
abort descent, and localized loads on the insulation system due to flow
impingement near the cargo bay vent ports.

Finally all materials used In the cargo bay had to meet strict outgasslng
and cleanliness requirements.

SYSTEM DESIGN

Basic Design Concept

The basic cryogenic thermal protection systems selected for the shuttle/
Centaur G-prime vehicle are depicted In figure 4. The ]lquld-hydrogen tank was
insulated wlth a combination of hellum-purged, open-cell polylmlde foam and
radiation shields; the llquld-oxygen tank used radiation shields only.

The hellum-purged insulation system on the liquld-hydrogen tank was


required to prevent liquefaction of the cargo bay gaseous-nltrogen purge during
prelaunch and to prevent liquefaction of alr during abort operations, when the
cargo bay would be refilled wlth alr during shuttle descent. (The gaseous-
helium purge would be terminated at llft-off but relnltlated If an abort
occurred.) The helium purge was contained by the forward adapter purge dla-
phragm (fig. 4), the forward adapter itself, the innermost sidewall radiation
shield, which was external to the foam and acted as a sealed membrane, and the
purge plenum, which sealed the system on the aft end of the llquld-hydrogen
tank. The foam insulation (I.5 In. on the tank sidewall and 0.75 In. on the
forward bulkhead) was used to achieve sufficient thermal resistance to meet the
ground-hold heatlng criteria and to ensure that all the radiation shield tem-
peratures exceeded the liquefaction temperatures of the surrounding gases dur-
ing operation wlthin the atmosphere. The radiation shields themselves afforded
very little thermal protection during ground-hold operations but would provide
nearly all the thermal protection once the shields were evacuated on-orblt.
Three shields on both the llquld-hydrogen-tank forward bulkhead and sidewall
were determined to be sufficient to meet mission requirements.

The 11quld-oxygen tank used radiation shields only _nd required no purge
since there was no danger of llquefylng the gaseous-nltrogen purge or alr on
the warmer llquld-oxygen-tank surface. Because of the heat capacity and rela-
tlvely small surface area of the llquld-oxygen tank, little or no thermal pro-
tection was needed for the ground-hold phase. The shields were used primarily
to afford thermal protection on-orblt. Three shields were used on the tank
sidewall and four on the aft bulkhead. The inner and outer shields on the aft
bulkhead (fig. 5) were edge vented rather than broadside vented. From the
standpoint of gas evacuation on-orblt, It would be better to have all shields
broadside vented. The edge venting of the inner and outer shields was primar-
ily used to contain and funnel the colder gaseous nitrogen to areas where tem-
perature-sensitive components would not be affected during prelaunch.

Figure 5 also depicts some of the other radiation shield systems used on
the aft-end components. The llst Is not complete but illustrates the shape,
size, and variety of shield systems required to meet the mission ob3ectlves.

4
The number of shields used on the various components varied with the thermal
requirements of each component, but In general the liquid-oxygen tank dtd not
require special purge systems as did the liquid-hydrogen tank.

The general operation of the purge system for the llquld-hydrogen-tank


thermal protection system ts depicted In figure 6. A controlled flow of helium
from the Centaur integrated support structure (ClSS) would enter the helium-
purged volume, discussed previously, through the forward adapter. The helium
supply system from the CISS (not shown) had two redundant flow control branches
that were controlled by the three differential pressure (bP) transducers
located wlthln the forward adapter purge volume. These AP transducers meas-
ured the differential pressure between the enclosed volume of the forward
adapter and the external environment surrounding the Centaur (i.e., the STS
cargo bay). The system was single-failure tolerant against failure of the
AP control transducers and single-failure tolerant mechanically to prevent
overpressurlzatlon during an abort return. Software control via the AP set
points allowed the purge volume differential pressure to be adjusted for vari-
ous phases of prelaunch and postlaunch activities.

The hellum purge would begin roughly 1 hr before the cryogenic propellants
were loaded. Prior to this time gaseous nitrogen would be maintained In the
purge volume to preclude any damage to the shield surfaces from moisture con-
densatlon. At helium purge initiation the Insulation blanket AP llmlts were
set high enough to allow the AP within the purge volume to exceed that neces-
sary to open the relief valves located In the purge plenum on the aft end of
the liquid-hydrogen tank. These relief valves opened at a nominal 0.4 psld.
Once the valves were opened, the heavier gaseous nitrogen would be forced out
by the lighter helium entering the forward bulkhead area. Figure 6 schemat-
lcally shows the purge flow through one of the relief valves during the
gaseous-nitrogen removal cycle. This flow and blanket AP would be maintained
for at least 1 hr to ensure that most of the condensable gases were purged from
the system. After 1 hr the blanket AP control ltmits would be reset (vla
software) to maintain the nomtnal AP between 0.1 and 0.3 psld, thus closing
the relief valves. At this point the helium purge supply would be governed by
the leakage rate of the Insulation blanket. The liquid-oxygen and -hydrogen
tanks would then be loaded (-9 hr before launch).

These AP limits would be generally maintained unttl Just before launch,


when the llmlts would be lowered preparatory to venttn9 the cargo bay at lift-
off. This was necessary since the cargo bay Itself Is slightly pressurized
(0.5 to 0.7 psld) by tts gaseous-nitrogen purge. A similar adjustment in
blanket pressure would also occur earlier when the cargo bay pressure would be
adjusted for hazardous gas checks. At launch a vent door (not shown) In the
forward adapter would be opened, and the pressure within the contained purge
volume would then closely follow that of the cargo bay during ascent. In an
abort a second vent door would reseal the forward adapter, and the helium purge
would be retntttated.

Design of Liquid-Hydrogen-Tank Insulation System

As discussed previously the radiation shlelds on the liquid-hydrogen tank


were representative of most of the shields used for the Centaur G-prime thermal
protection systems. Because of the addltlonal need to prevent liquefaction of
the gases surrounding the liquid-hydrogen tank, the resulting insulation system
was more complex and as a result was the focal point for most of the develop-
mental testing. For this reason only the liquid-hydrogen-tank Insulation sys-
tem Is addressed In more detall for the remainder of thls report.

Material selection. - The insulation materials selected for the liquid-


hydrogen tank are shown In figure 7. The purge diaphragm on the forward end
of the vehicle consisted of two Kevlar-cloth-relnforced shields separated by
an embossed Kapton shield. The high-strength reinforced shtelds were required
to withstand a purge system design 6P of O.S pstd. These shlelds are actu-
ally laminates with the high-strength Kevlar cloth sandwiched between two
layers of Kapton. A11 shteld surfaces had a vapor-deposited layer of alumtnum
(VOA) applted to achieve emtttances of O.OS or less. The embossed Kapton was
used for the middle shield to save weight (unit weights are given tn table I).
Both of the outer two shields were broadside vented so that they could be
rapidly evacuated during ascent to eliminate most of the gaseous conduction
heat transfer. The nonvented inner shleld provided the required seal for the
helium purge.

The Insulation system for the forward bulkhead consisted of a 0.7S-In.-


thick layer of open-cell polylmlde foam covered by three radiation shields.
The outermost shield ls a laminate of Nomex scrim sandwiched between two layers
of Kapton. This matertal was selected for Its low weight and rip-resistant
features. The higher strength material used on the purge diaphragm was not
required here since the forward bulkhead Insulation was completely contained
within the helium-purged volume and therefore was not exposed to any dlfferen-
tlal pressures. The center shield was embossed Kapton and the innermost shield
was a flat Kapton sheet (again for weight savings), and a11 three shtelds had
a VDA coatlng on a11 exposed surfaces. Both of the outer two shields were
broadside vented; the inner shield was edge vented. Edge venting on the inner
layer was selected to minimize the amount of hellum between the shields during
ascent venting of the forward bulkhead area. The foam Insulation next to the
tank wall contained a typical twln-pln fastener used to attach adjacent foam
panels. A layer of Tedlar tape was applled over the seam before pin tnstalla-
tlon to help minimize direct convection paths between the shields and the tank
surface.

The materials selected for the sldewall shield system consisted of two
layers of polylmlde foam (each 0.75-1n.-thlck) covered by three radiation
shtelds. The shtelds were Identical to those used on the purge diaphragm
except for the outermost lamlnate material used on the outboard shteld.
Instead of Kapton wlth an external VOA coating, a 0.5-mli-thlck layer of Teflon
with an internal VDA coating was used to achieve a relatively low ratio of
solar absorptance to thermal emlttance _/c. Thls low ratio was required to
help mtnimlze heating from the Sun and the Earth's albedo while on-orbit.
Material specifications for a11 outboard radiation shield surfaces required
that the solar absorptance be less than or equal to 0.14 and the thermal emit-
tance be greater than or equal to 0.4 to give an a/c ratio of less than 0.35.

The structural property requirements of the sidewall shield material were


primarily dictated by the radial hoop stress created by the design differential
pressure of 0.5 psid used for the hellum purge system. For the 87-tn.-radtus
sldewall shleld, a matertal tensile strength of 43.5 1b/in. was required. With
an ultlmate factor of safety of 1.4 the shield material had to have a tensile
strength exceeding 61 1b/in. (1.4 x 43.5). The material specifications were
conservatively established at a minimum tensile strength of 100 1b/in. The
material eventually selected - the Kevlar-relnforced shields - had a measured
tensile strength of 239 Ib/In. In the undamaged state and Igl Ib/In. with the
material severely creased.

Finally the particular materials selected met the flammability and out-
gassing requirements of the shuttle cargo bay and in many cases were the same
general materials used extensively In the cargo bay (e.g., aluminized Kapton).

Deslqn detalls.- The general method of attachment and construction of the


forward adapter purge diaphragm is shown in figure 8. The diaphragm was con-
structed from gore sectors sewn at their adjoining seams. Each gore sector
contained three radiation shields. The sewn Joint seam had alumlnlzed (VDA)
tape applied both outboard and inboard. The inboard tape had a thermal plastic
adhesive to help ensure an adequate seal. A circular shield section was
applied similarly In the center of the diaphragm to close out the shield. At
the outer edges of the diaphragm a Kevlar strip was sewn to the shields to pro-
vide a rigid edge member for attachment to the forward adapter. The method of
attachment, shown In vlew D, sandwiches the Kevlar edge member between the
adapter and a retainer rlng bolted around the periphery of the diaphragm. A
silicone sealant was applied to the edge member and the forward adapter to
ensure a proper seal. An installed diaphragm Is shown in figure 9.

Details of the insulation system used for the forward bulkhead area are
given in figure lO. The cross section of the forward adapter shows the corru-
gated composite stub adapter Jolnlng the aft ring of the aluminum conical
adapter to the forward rlng of the llquld-hydrogen tank. A 12-1n. strip of
polylmlde foam, which overlapped the tank sidewall foam, was bonded to the
apexes of the corrugation to preclude localized chilling of the overlying radl-
atlon shield. Foam was bonded to an outside corrugation of the adapter
wherever a seam was required In the 12-1n. foam strip (six places). Polylmlde
foam was also bonded to all the inside corrugations to help reduce convective
heat exchange inside the adapter from the tank surface Just forward of the tank
ring. The O.75-1n.-thlck polylmlde foam layer used on the forward bulkhead
surface penetrated as far as practical Into this crevice. It was held In place
by the radiation shields, which were attached with Velcro to the inner surface
of the composite adapter. The twln-pln fasteners that hold the adjacent gore-
shaped foam panels together, intermittently penetrated the radiation shields
to secure the two systems together. Figure II shows the foam panels being
assembled for the full-scale test vehicle, which was representative of the
flight articles. As shown, the foam seams, containing the twln-pln fasteners,
were taped to minimize direct convective currents between the llquld-hydrogen-
tank surface and the overlying shields. The hole In the foam at the top of the
insulation panels was for an access door to the llquid-hydrogen tank. At final
assembly a foam panel and a radiation shield cover were applied over the door.

The three-layer radiation shield system used on the forward bulkhead was
lald up and attached to the underlying polylmlde foam (shown in flg. ll) before
it was applied to the llquld-hydrogen tank. The inner two shields were each
fabricated by taping 16 adjacent gore sectors together on the foam-covered
layup tool. The outermost, Nomex-scrlm reinforced shield, was made up of four
quadrant-slzed pieces that were intermittently attached along their edges by
twln-pln fasteners penetrating the entire assembly. Each quadrant was formed
by sewing together four gore-shaped panels as shown In figure 12. The sewn
seams used a simple stitch Joint because the shield system dld not have to
withstand pressure forces as dld the purge diaphragm. The Velcro pattern near
the center of the shield was for attachment of the forward door shleld. Not
shown, for clarity, are the other two shield quadrants and the various penetra-
tions for tank vents, Instrumentation, etc. The enttre insulation system on
the forward bulkhead, including the foam, the shield, the fasteners, etc.,
weighed 22.5 lb, or about 0.085 lb/ft 2.

Details of the liquid-hydrogen-tank sidewall insulation system are shown


In figure 13. As discussed previously two 0.75-1n.-thtck layers of polytmtde
foam with three overlying radiation shields provided the necessary thermal pro-
tectlon for the liquid-hydrogen-tank sidewall. Each layer of foam was composed
of several panels, each containing a cyllndrlcal sector and a conical sector
and running from the forward tank ring to the aft end of the conical section
of the liquid-hydrogen tank. The cyllndrlcal and conical sectors were bonded
where they met. The seams between adjacent panels (running fore and aft) of
the Inner layer were offset from those of the outer layer to mlmlmtze direct
convective currents between the tank surface and the overlying shlelds. The
foam panels were held at the fore and aft ends by support channels attached to
the forward tank ring and by channels attached to tank brackets at the aft end
of the tank's contcal portton. The foam panels had Kevlar channels bonded to
their edges fore and aft to reinforce the support ptns that held the panels
within the brackets. Figure 14 shows the Installation of one of the inner
panels at the forward tank ring. Also shown is a twln-ptn fastener penetrating
the stde of the panel, which again had bonded Kevlar strips to reinforce the
foam panel. The aft brackets for foam panel attachment are shown In figure 15
along wtth the purge plenum, which transtttoned the vacuum bulkhead between the
11quid-oxygen and -hydrogen tanks. The aft end of the plenum was bolted to and
sealed to a continuous circumferential ring on the forward end of the liquid-
oxygen tank. (Also shown Is one of the two purge rellef valves discussed pre-
vlously In the section "Basic Design Concept.") The entire inner surface of
the plenum was lined with a 0.75-1n.-thlck layer of polylmlde foam to maintain
temperatures well above the condensation temperature of atr or gaseous
nitrogen.

Most major penetrations of the liquid-hydrogen-tank insulation system were


made tn one localized area (designated "the cableway") to minimize sealing
problems for the heltum purge system. The aft end of this area ls shown In
figure 16. All the required wire harnesses and fluid lines extended forward
up the side of the liquid-hydrogen tank to the forward adapter. Foam Insula-
tion was Installed both beneath and above these harnesses and flutd 11nes In
the cableway area (outer layer Is not shown). The brackets for attaching the
sidewall foam panels are shown on both sldes of the cableway. Once the side-
wall foam panels were attached to these brackets, a strip of Tedlar tape was
applied along the whole length of both seams to mtnlmlze convective flow from
these direct butt Joints. The engtne feed ltne and tank fill/drain ltne, shown
exposed, had insulated shroud enclosures that were sealed and purged wlth
helium during prelaunch operations. Before these shrouds were Installed,
Tedlar tape was used to seal off all dlrect butt Joints wlth the adjoining foam
panels. An additional Insulated-purged shroud also was Installed over the
lower end of the cableway wtth lts uppermost surface running laterally between
the two liquid-hydrogen 11ne shrouds.

Detalls of the liquid-hydrogen-tank sidewall radlatton shteld construction


are given tn figure 17. The shield was assembled from 3 circumferential panels
and 13 conical sectors. The maxlmum size of the panels was dictated by the
available stock width of the radiation shield materials. Each panel contained

8
three radiation shtelds, as described previously, wtth the nonvented seallng
shteld located inboard. The radlatlon shlelds for each panel were temporarily
held In place wlth aluminized Kapton tape before they were sewn for the final
assembly. Atyptcal sewn Joint used to Join adjacent panels Is shown tn
vlew A-A. Two stitches are used to secure the Jotnt and then a VDA-coated tape
wlth a thermal plastic adhesive was applied to the Inner surface, and a VDA-
backed Teflon tape was applied to the outer surface. The tape used externally
was selected because tt approximately matched the _/c ratio of the outer
shield surface. A typical shield edge for mechanically attaching the shteld
to the vehicle Is shown In view C-C. The shield was sewn to the thtnner sec-
tlon of a reinforcing Kevlar strip and then taped as discussed previously. The
thtcker portion of the relnforclng strip was sandwiched between the destred
sealtng surface and a retaining ring held wtth bolts and sealed nutplates as
shown In flgure 13 (for attachment to the purge plenum). A sealant was used
on the tnboard surface of the relnforclng strip to complete the seal. The
radiation shield system was sealed similarly at Its forward end to the aluminum
adapter rtng (e.g., see fig. 10) and laterally along the port side of the area
containing the fluid lines and electrical harnesses. Areas around the ltne
penetrations, etc., were treated similarly. The completed stdewall Insulation
system (Including the shlelds, the foam layers, the fasteners, the retainer
rings, etc.) welghed 119.2 lb, or about 0.25 lb/ft 2.

The completed Insulation system for the vehicle Is shown In flgure 18.
There were many other Insulated components on the vehlcle, and they In general
used three or four shtelds wlth the same materials and assembly techniques
(t.e., sewn seams). Exceptions were as follows: (1) the liquid-oxygen sump
contained 16 shteld layers, and (2) the liquid-hydrogen fill/drain line, aft
of the purged elbow at the tank, used a sealed foam under non-helium-purged
radiation shtelds.

Ftnally the techniques used to electrically ground all the metallzed (VDA)
shield surfaces on the vehicle are shown in ftgures 19 and 20. The VOA sur-
faces of the radiation shields were grounded to the vehlcle by ustng the tech-
ntques shown In flgure 19. Specifications for assembling the shield system
required that the resistance between any vehicle ground and any vehlcle radta-
tlon shleld be less than 100 ohms. The resistance across the ground wire
attachment Itself had to be less than 1 ohm.

As mentioned previously the outermost shields on the vehicle had a


O.S-mll-thlck Teflon coatlng coverlng a VDA coating wlthtn the shleld laminate.
Because of the large surface area of the stdewall shtelds there was concern
that this "hidden" VDA surface could act as one plate of a large capacitor tf
sufficient charge were to accumulate from whatever source. Although a charging
mechanism was not present for the anticipated missions, the hidden VDA was
grounded as a precautionary measure. The method finally selected for grounding
the hidden VOA is shown tn ftgure 20. A conductive Ink was applted on all
external shteld edge surfaces. Thls served to electrically connect the hidden
VDA wlth the exposed VDA on the underside of the shleld (which was grounded to
the vehtcle by the techniques shown tn ftg. 19). Test tabs were also tncluded
on major shield surfaces to vertfy that the hidden VDA was grounded and to help
monitor any degradation with time. Requlrements specified that the resistance
between the exposed VDA surface (grounded to the vehlcle) and the htdden VDA
surface be less than 50 000 ohms. Thts was more than adequate to preclude any
electrostatic discharge since It provlded a leakage path for any accumulated
charges.

9
Predicted performance. - The predicted steady-state heat transfer rates
Into the Insulated liquid-hydrogen tank are given in table II for prelaunch
ground hold and for a representative on-orbit case for the Galileo mission.
It Is apparent that the forward bulkhead and sidewall are the predominant heat
transfer contributors during ground hold, whereas the common vacuum bulkhead
would be the major contributor once on-orbit. The surface areas of these mJor
contributors are as follows: forward bulkhead 1 216 ft2; sidewall, 483 ft2; and
intermediate bulkhead, 129 ft 2.

The predicted transient performance of the forward bulkhead and sidewall


insulation systems Is shown in figure 21. Shortly after launch the expected
heating rates drop by roughly a factor of lO0 once the pressures within the
insulation approach near-vacuum conditions. The radiation shield temperatures
and heating rates then rise until the cargo bay doors are opened at l hr after
launch. At this point the temperatures generally decrease in a cyclic fashion
(due to day-nlght cycles) as steady-state conditions are approached. These
predicted temperatures and heating rates are compared with those achieved dur-
ing developmental testing In subsequent sections of the report.

DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING

In developing the Centaur G-prlme thermal protection systems, many tests,


varying from simple bench tests to full-scale system hardware tests, were per-
formed. For convenience of discussion these tests are grouped into the follow-
ing general categories (not necessarily in chronological order): (1) small-
scale material tests; (2) calorimeter tests; (3) tests related to shuttle cargo
bay safety requirements; (4) full-scale llquld-hydrogen-tank insulation system
tests; and (5) flight vehicle ground-hold tests.

Small-Scale Material Tests

Polylmlde foam tests. - The polylmide foam used for the llquld-hydrogen
tank was an open-cell foam with a density of 0.60 Ib/ft 3. The tests per-
formed on the foam and the test results are summarized as follows:

(I) Mechanical properties: The measured average ultimate tensile strength


and modulus of elasticity at -320 °F were 17.6 and 140 psi, respectively.

4.4xi O_I Thermal


In./In. properties: The and
°F between -121 measured
3 °F. coefficient of thermal expansion was

(3) Air purgeout: The time required to reduce the air concentration to
lO percent wlth a helium purge from top to bottom along the longest dimension
was B.3 mln for a sample l by I0.75 by 46.5 In.

(4) Particle generation during rapid depressurlzatlon: An insignificant


number of particles were given off, and no cell breakage was detected after the
open-cell polylmide foam was subjected to a launch-ascent pressure profile.

IThe actual surface area of the forward bulkhead is 266 ft 2. For con-
venlence of thermal modeling a portion of this area was accounted for in the
forward adapter calculation.

lO
(5) Heat forming: The heat-forming cycle for the curvatures required for
the Centaur G-prlme tank was determined to be 15 mln at 500 °F.

(6) Insulation compression due to rapid chilling of helium during liquid-


hydrogen tanking: A 4.0-1n.-dlameter, l.O-In.-thlck cylindrical foam specimen
was tested for compression and recovery at temperatures experienced during
tanking. The equilibrated surface temperatures were -360 °F for the bottom and
-ISO °F for the top. The compression was 0.37 in., and the recovery was
lO0 percent In approximately 2 mln.

In general the foam tested was ideal for the application intended and met
all mission requirements.

Shield material tests. - The structural tests performed on the reinforced


radiation shield materials and the sewn seams are summarized In table III. The
flberglass-cloth-based material was originally selected and used In the full-
scale insulation tests discussed later In thls report. The creased-strength
data were acquired after several small creases were noticed as the shield was
being assembled for the full-scale test vehicle. These data and results of the
full-scale insulation system tests eventually led to changing the liquid-
hydrogen-tank sidewall shield material to the Kevlar-based material, which has
superior strength even In the creased state. As shown, the strength of the
sewn seam Joint samples also exceeded the 43.5-1b/In. design requirement.

The radiative surface properties of the shield materials were also deter-
mined, and representative results are given in table IV. The fiberglass data
are for a fiberglass cloth that was strategically located on components exposed
to exhaust plume heating from the vehicle's reaction control system. The mate-
rials used met all the requirements.

Calorimeter Tests

A series of tests were performed on a 9.5-1n.-dlameter double-guarded


calorimeter to determine the performance of the llquld-hydrogen-tank insulation
system during simulated prelaunch, launch-ascent, and on-orblt conditions.

Figures 22 and 23 glve the steady-state thermal performance of the liquid-


hydrogen-tank insulation system for varlous radiation shield (test chamber)
pressures, l Pressures within the foam, near the tank surface, were also
recorded and were roughly lO times higher than the chamber pressure. The test
configuration shown (i.e., with two polylmlde foam layers) was actually an
earlier version of the forward bulkhead Insulatlon, and the tests were prlmar-
lly designed to simulate the hellum-purged forward adapter area of the vehicle.
The data, however, should be representative (I) of the slngle-layer foam con-
figuration (selected for the forward bulkhead) for the lower pressures, where
the foam contributes little thermal resistance, and (2) the tank sidewall
insulation, provided the volume beneath the inner shield evacuates reasonably
well.

IData from an internal GDSSD report by A. Burgells. A limited amount


of the data Is reported in reference 8.

II
The temperature data In flgure 22 are quite consistent and generally show
the expected effects of decreasing pressure. That Is, the foam temperatures
decreased rapldly, and the radiation shields began to approach a fourth power
temperature profile. Most of the data were taken with the thermocouples acci-
dentally unshlelded (I.e., the htgh emissivity epoxy cement used to secure the
thermocouples to the shield was left exposed and locally affected the shield
temperatures but had no effect on heat transfer). One set of data, however,
at a pressure of 2x10-4 torr, were taken with the thermocouples properly
covered with aluminized tape, and this set varied significantly from the other
data. The temperatures acted as expected and In fact approached those of the
predicted results for pure radiation heat transfer shown on the left s_de of
the flgure.

The heat transfer data shown In figure 23 Indicate that, for the lower
pressures expected on-orbit (I.e., 10 .4 torr or less), heat transfer rates
on the order of 1 Btu/hr ft 2 wtll be achievable wlth external shield temper-
atures of 465 °R. The predicted data given In ftgure 21 show the lowest
heattng rates and corresponding outer shield temperatures to be about
1.14 Btu/hr ft 2 and 400 °R for the stdewall and 0.85 Btu/hr ft 2 and 335 °R
for the forward bulkhead. Its obvious that tf the experimental data were
scaled to the outer shleld temperatures expected on-orbit, the heating rates
would be even lower than requtred to accomplish the mtsslon.

One of the concerns was how rapidly the forward bulkhead foam would evacu-
ate In order to quickly achieve the desired lower heat transfer rates on-orbit.
Ftgure 24 Indicates that most of the helium gas would be vented qutte raptdly.
After 5 mln the heat transfer rate has dropped to less than 5 Btu/hr ft 2.
The slower dropoff after 5 mln was due to a hydrogen leak In the calorimeter.
Addlttonal tests were planned to repeat these tests but were abandoned when the
shuttle/Centaur program was terminated. It ls expected though that heat trans-
fer rates on the order of 1 Btu/hr ft2 would be achievable within 15 m_n
after launch.

Tests Related to Shuttle Cargo Bay Safety Requirements

Electrostatic dtscharfle. - One of the requirements for the shuttle cargo

ba_ hardware was that any surface exceeding a volume resistivity of


10 ohms-cm be deslgned to prevent the accumulation of an electrostatic
charge. Because the volume resistivity of the Teflon film on al1 outboard
radiation shtelds exceeded 1015 ohms-cm, some means of preventing a charge
accumulation had to be provided or, wlth proper safety verification, a watver
could be obtained. As mentioned earlter, the hidden VOA beneath the Teflon
surface was grounded with a conductive Ink applled at the shteld edges. This
grounding technique was selected after trylng several mechanical methods of
grounding such as rlvets, serrated washers, and stainless steel thread. Most
of the mechanical methods achleved a good ground Initially, but the ground
dlsappeared after a short time probably from galvantc corrosion wlth the th_n
VOA layer or from mechanical breakdown of the contact wtth material flextng.
Ftgure 25 shows the effect of tlme on the grounding capability of conductive
lnk for 60 samples each of the Kevlar-relnforced shields on the 11qutd-
hydrogen-tank sidewall and the Nomex-scrtm-relnforced shields used on the
11quid-oxygen tank. Because some degradation takes place with time, test tabs
were deslgned tnto the radiation shteld system to check the electrical ground-
lng before f11ght. Many areas exlsted on the shields (e.g., vent holes In

12
outer shleld) for reapplylng the conductive tnk In the unllkely possibility
that all grounding disappeared.

Wlth the metaltzed surfaces properly grounded the problem of volume resls-
tlvlty of the Teflon ftlm still had to be addressed. Two approaches were con-
sldered. The first was to consider alternative materials that had lower
reststlvlty, and the second was to examine grounding techniques like that used
on the cargo bay llner, where a 6-tn.-square grld of grounding wlre was Inter-
woven Into the beta-cloth liner. In selecting an alternative material both the
high strength properties of the sidewall shield materlal and the desirable
optical properties of the VOA-backed Teflon fllm had to be retained. One pos-
slble solutlon was to add a thin coat of lndtum tin oxide (ITO) to the Teflon
to lower the resistivity at the surface. Discussions with other spacecraft
designers and evaluation of material samples revealed that the ITO coating was
very brittle and that microscopic cracks In the surface severely degraded Its
conductive qualities. Because of the extreme flexing of the shields during
fabrication, handling, and use on the vehicle, we felt that the ITO coating
would be rendered useless and this approach was abandoned.

The use of grounding wires attached to the outer shleld surface was also
brlefly Investigated. Experimental measurements of the surface charge on the
outer shleld material near a grounded wire revealed that the surface charge
dropped to near zero at the wire but assumed the full charge fractions of an
Inch away from the grounding wire. Thus to achieve the desired result, an
Inordinately large number of grounding wires would be required.

Slnce nelther approach was adequate for achieving the desired low surface
resistivity and other methods were not evident, we decided to evaluate the con-
sequences of accumulating a static charge. A series of tests were set up
whereby a sample of the shield material was purposely charged to the htghest
tnduced potential that was practically posstble and then purposely discharged.
The charge lost during the discharge was measured. The energy In the arc was
then calculated by conservatively assuming that both the maximum measured
induced potential and the maximum measured charge lost were doubled once and
then again, as an additional factor of safety. This yielded an arc energy of
0.0017 mJ (a factor of 16 higher than that using the measured data). From the
data of reference 9 the minimum energy required to sustain a reaction (ignition
energy) for the most explosive mixture of hydrogen and air possible ts 0.017 to
0.018 mJ. This ts 10 times higher than the conservatively calculated arc
energy based on experimental measurements.

In addition, If the volume concentration of hydrogen in atr varies from


the optimum, the required ignition energy can increase dramatically. This
fact along wlth the following was used tn achieving a waiver of the resistivity
requirement for the outboard shtelds of the Centaur G-prime:

(1) There Is no known charging mechanism during prelaunch, ascent, and


abort descent.

(2) All metallzed surfaces were grounded, Including the hidden VDA.

(3) Any inadvertently applied charge (e.g., rubbing against surface by


personnel) would bleed off well before the tanks were loaded with cryogenics.

13
(4) Bullt-tn clearance between the radiation shtelds and the cargo bay
precluded Inadvertent contact with a grounded surface.

Flow lmolngemen_.from cargo bay vents. - One of the concerns that arose
tn integrating the Centaur tnto the shuttle cargo bay was the effect of high-
veloclty flow near the open cargo bay vents during shuttle ascent and descent.
Because of the large diameter of the Centaur G-prtme, the liquid-hydrogen-tank
stdewa11 Insulation system was relatively close to two of these open vents, and
there was concern that the high-velocity flow could cause flutter or damage to
the overlying radiation shtelds. Since tt was not possible to predict the
flutter- or flow-Induced oscillatory stresses, a test was set up to determine
the shields' responses to these conditions.

A preliminary worst-case assessment of the airflows, by the STS prime con-


tractor, gave estimates of the velocity and dynamic pressure q for various
flight events at the two open vents exposed directly to the sidewall Insulation
system. The worst-case events are summarized tn table V along with the experl-
mental airflows (at sea level) used to simulate these events. For the ascent
condition, where the shteld would be unpressurlzed, the maximum test atrflow
velocity was selected to be the same as the maximum predicted tn flight. The
corresponding q was 52 lb/ft 2, or 1.58 times the predicted 33 lb/ft 2 dur-
tng fltght. The descent events with the shleld pressurized would generally be
more severe tn terms of velocity and dynamic pressure. The test condition
selected applied a safety factor of 1.4 to the event with the maximum dynamic
pressure (130 lb/ft2), yteldlng a test q of 182 lb/ft 2. Although the
test velocity was only 391 ft/sec, It exceeded the estimated veloctty of
209 ft/sec required to match the Reynolds number of the fllght event. The
flight event that could not be matched was the high velocity Inflow at the
higher altitudes (i.e., 1420 ft/sec at 72 500 ft). Thts event is not con-
sldered critical, however, because of the relatively low dynamic pressure. In
addition, later detatled estimates indicated that the velocity at thts altttude
would be closer to 840 ft/sec, which further lowers the dynamic pressure to
about 14 lb/ft 2.

The experlmental test setup and flow proflles Imposed on a sample shteld
to simulate the events discussed are shown In figure 26. The shield sample,
the simulated vent area, and the distance between the vent and the shield sur-
face were to the same scale as the flight hardware. The foam beneath the
shteld also contained a row of twln-ptn fasteners (not shown) near the flow
impingement area to magnify any deleterious abrasion effects in case flutter
occurred. The test flow rates shown were slowly ramped to the maximum test
dynamic pressures to determine If there were any oscillatory phenomena that
only occurred at the lower flow rates. Ntth the shield unpressurlzed some
llmlted movement was observed, but the movement was not organized and was of
very small amplitude. During testing of the pressurized shield very little
movement was noted. There was no damage to the radiation shteld or the foam
beneath the shield (fig. 27).

Early In the test program a flow control valve accldently malfunctioned


and exposed an unpressurlzed shield to a dynamic pressure of at least
1800 lb/ft 2. The shields and foam experienced some damage, but because It
was very localized, the shteld system could still contain a helium purge. The
middle shleld, which was the lightweight embossed Kapton material, partially
shredded near the flow impact area. We believe that the high-pressure air
entered through the vent holes In the outer shteld (0.25-1n.-dtameter holes on

14
4-In. centers) and caused the thinner (0.3 mtl) Kapton material to shred
locally. Although these conditions would never occur during flight, we decided
as a precautionary measure to tape over the shield vent holes near the cargo
bay vents to prevent any possible degradation due to flow impingement.

Liquid air formation. - During an abort of the shuttle after lift-off the
liquid-hydrogen-tank insulation system helium purge would have to be relnltl-
ated for an eventual descent and landing. Although the Centaur propellant
tanks would be emptied In the event of an abort, some residual propellants
would remain In the cold-soaked tanks. If for some reason the helium purge was
unexpectedly terminated or was not relnltlated, air could be ingested Into the
sidewall insulation system and eventually condense on the cold liquid-hydrogen-
tank surface. One of the concerns for this failure scenario was that liquid
air (1) could possibly compromise the structural integrity of the radiation
shields or (2) could form on the external surfaces of the sidewall radiation
shields and present a potential hazard to the shuttle and tts crew. Conserva-
tive estimates indicate that roughly 40 lb of liquid air could be generated In
vaporizing the remaining residual liquid hydrogen and warming the tank above
the condensation temperature of alr. If It was further assumed that all the
liquid would collect on the inner shield (vehicle In horizontal position), the
inner shield temperature could drop low enough to condense the surrounding
external alr.

As a result of these concerns a small-scale experiment was set up to dem-


onstrate the liquid-air containment capabilities of the sldewall radiation
shields. The overall experimental setup Is shown in figure 28. A sample of
the three-layer sidewall shield was used to form the major surface of a dish-
shaped container that was then fllled with liquid nitrogen. A typical sewn
seam ran longttudlnally along the bottom of the dtsh and was instrumented with
thermocouples on the underside (not shown) to help determine If liquid-air tem-
peratures were approached. Liquid nitrogen was used because It represented the
coldest temperature achievable with liquid air condensing inside the radiation
shield system. The dlsh held approximately 110 lb of liquid nitrogen when
filled. The resulting temperature profile across the shield seam is shown in
figure 29. It is apparent that all the temperatures are relatively high, prob-
ably as a result of water frost butldup between the shield layers. There was
no evidence of structural degradation of the shteld seam and no evidence of
liquid runoff during the entire test. After the primary testing was completed,
a small propane torch was passed back and forth below the shields (~I0 In.) to
detect any liquid alr or concentrations of gaseous oxygen that were not detect-
able from the visual observations. There were none.

On the basls of the tests conducted and the sidewall shield design used,
we concluded (I) that any air ingested and subsequently liquefied within the
llquld-hydrogen-tank insulation system would be contained by the inner (sealed
membrane) radiation shield; and (2) that there would be No external formation
of liquid alr on the radiation shield system.

Impact sensitivity of materials In liquid alr/gaseous oxygen. - Because


there was a potential of forming llquld alr within the llquld-hydrogen-tank
insulation system after slngle-polnt failures causing loss or depletion of the
helium purge during an abort, It became necessary to prove (1) that the insula-
tion system was not impact sensitive in a llquld-alr or a gaseous-oxygen envi-
ronment or (2) that the probability of catastrophic failure due to impact was

15
extremely low. Tests to accomplish this were under way when the shuttle/
Centaur G-prime program was terminated. Partial resu]ts from one series of
tests are summarized In table VI. The ob3ectlve of these tests was to deter-
mine the _mpact sensitivity of the Insulation materials In gaseous oxygen. The
reason for this was that tf any Impact on the vehicle occurred, there would be
a considerably higher probability of the Insulation behind the _mpact area
betng flooded w_th gaseous oxygen rather than the 11quid air, which would be
In a small puddle. As seen from table VI the test results were mtxed. A mate-
rlal has to be capable of sustaining 20 successive Impacts at ?2 ft-lb without
a reactlon before It Is considered not to be Impact sensitive. The Inner
shleld material, whtch Is the only shield exposed to gaseous oxygen, passed the
test. The three-layer sidewall shield with a typical taped seam and the poly-
lmlde foam, however, could only pass at the lower energy levels. The pressures
used In the tests were considerably higher than destred because of the 11mtta-
tlons of the standard test equipment. Plans were under way to modify the
equipment for gaseous oxygen tests at 1 atmosphere but could not be completed.
From the limited data taken at 50 psla, It appeared that there was a good pos-
slblllty that the materials would have passed the Impact testing at pressures
near ambient. For example, the polylmtde foam, which could not pass the Impact
tests In gaseous oxygen at 50 psla, did pass the 11quid-oxygen Impact tests
that were done at a pressure of 1 atmosphere.

It should be noted, however, that the polytm_de foam was the only element
of the sidewall Insulation system that passed the standard ambtent 11quid-
oxygen Impact test of reference ?. Th_s particular test completely lmmerses a
small wafer of the candidate matertal tn a stainless steel cup ftlled wtth
liquid oxygen and then Impacts It with a stainless steel anvil. In the failure
scenarios d_scussed previously, only the materials tnboard of the Innermost
s_dewall radiation shleld are exposed to l_quld alr. Also any lmpact would be
cushioned by the 1.5 ln. of foam (which passed the 11quld-oxygen tmpact test-
tng) that separates the shields from the 11quid-hydrogen tank. For these
reasons an experiment was devised to determine the _mpact sensitivity of the
full Insulation system configuration with 11quld air contained w_th_n the
Innermost shield only. A sketch of the test setup Is shown tn figure 30. Th_s
test was also In progress when the shuttle/Centaur program was canceled.

Both the partially completed tmpact testtng discussed above and tests on
the external formation of 11quid alr (previous sectlon) were an attempt to
realistically assess the potential hazards tnvolved wtth Ingesting a_r tnto the
l_qutd-hydrogen-tank Insulation system after a single-point failure causlng
loss of heltum purge. The assumptions used In estimating the amount of l_qu_d
alr that would form and remain as a liquid were very conservative but Justlf_-
ably so when the safety of the shuttle and lts crew were Involved. Depending
upon the results of the uncompleted tmpact testtng the Insulation system may
have demonstrated a benignity to Impact and hence met the two-failure tolerancy
requirement. If not, steps would have been taken to add another level of
redundancy to events causlng loss of helium purge.

Full-Scale Insulation System Tests

A full-scale test of the 11quid-hydrogen-tank Insulation system was con-


ducted: (1) to determine the performance characteristics of the heltum purge
system, (2) to determine the thermal characteristics and performance of the

16
Insulation system, and (3) to evaluate the structural Integrity of the Insula-
tion system. The test vehicle consisted of the Centaur G-prlme propellant
tanks, the forward and aft composite adapters, and the forward adapter with the
purge diaphragm. Figure 31 shows the vehicle before It was Installed In the
test tower and before the liquid-hydrogen-tank sldewall Insulation system was
Installed. Once In the test tower the vehicle was enclosed In a shroud that
was subsequently purged with gaseous nitrogen during testtng to simulate the
shuttle cargo bay during prelaunch. Llqutd nitrogen rather than ltquld oxygen
was used tn the unlnsulated llquld-oxygen tank for safety reasons.

The Insulation system on the liquid-hydrogen tank consisted of the flight


design with some minor variations to accommodate the various full-scale vehicle
tests planned. Also as mentioned earlter the radiation shield material orlgl-
nally selected and used for these tests was the fiberglass-cloth-reinforced
shield material whose strength properties are given In table III.

Purge system tests. - The results of key tests on the blanket purge system
are given In ftgures 32 and 33. The measured helium leakage rate of the Insu-
lation blanket system (ftg. 32) was well wlthtn the target leakage and showed
no significant hysteresis effects. The results of two gaseous nitrogen dis-
placement tests (fig. 33) show the gaseous nltrogen concentration as a function
of tlme for two different gaseous heltum flow rates. The higher rate was
selected and used for the Centaur G-prtme Insulation system. As mentioned In
the discussion of figure 6 the gaseous-nitrogen removal cycle Is lnltlated by
pressurizing the blanket with helium until the two relief valves open to allow
a flow path for removing the heavier gaseous nitrogen. It ls apparent that the
hour allowed for this cycle Is sufficient for removing most of the gaseous
nttrogen from the system. The two rellef valves, whtch were designed to open
between 0.35 and 0.45 psld, opened at 0.403 and 0.405 psid, respectively.

The control system for supplying the helium to the blanket performed flaw-
lessly. Typical pressure histories for the blanket purge system are given sub-
sequently In the section "Flight Vehicle Ground-Hold Testing."

Thermal performance tests. - A summary of the thermal data taken on the


Insulated liquid-hydrogen tank during simulated prelaunch conditions Is shown
In figure 34. The outer and inner radiation shield temperatures and outer foam
surface temperature data are shown as a function of the liquid-hydrogen-tank
vertlcal and radial positions. Also lncluded for reference ls the predicted
temperature of the inner and outer shields. The agreement between predicted
and measured shield temperatures was quite good except for the aft (conical)
end of the 11quid-hydrogen tank. The measured temperatures on the aft end of
the conical shield are markedly lower than expected. Although the temperatures
were not low enough to cause liquid-nitrogen runoff, they were low enough to
form water frost from the small amount of restdual molsture left In the
gaseous-nitrogen purge (dewpotnt of -30 °F). After careful post-test Inspec-
tion, we concluded that the seams In the foam, where butt Joints of the lnner
and outer foam layers coincided, were allowtng the cold helium next to the
11quid-hydrogen-tank wall to flow directly out to the inner shield, causing
localized chilling. All of these overlying butt Joints were concentrated In
the cableway area, where the electrical wires and fluid llnes ran up the side-
wall (~90 ° position) and around the major tank penetrations such as the fill/
drain line and the engine feed line elbows (e.g., see fig. 16). The measured
shield temperatures were correspondingly lowest In this region (1.e., at the
45 ° and 135 ° positions). As a result of these tests the design was changed to

17
lnclude local taping of the butt Joints around the areas discussed. Subsequent
testing of the full-scale flight vehtcle confirmed that no localized chllllng
occurred.

The measured heat transfer rate of 82 700 Btu/hr into the llquld-hydrogen
tank was well within the maximum and minimum rates of 76 857 and 86 g35 Btu/hr
predicted for the test article. These rates differed slightly from those of
table II because of the various peculiarities associated wlth the test (e.g.,
using liquid nitrogen rather than liquid oxygen in the llquld-oxygen tank and
different tank penetrations on the forward end). Overall, the thermal per-
formance of the system was as expected.

Structural tests. - At the conclusion of the purge and thermal performance


testing several structural tests were performed on the helium containment
shield (innermost shield). The first test consisted of a rapid pressurization
to simulate the maximum rate of pressure change expected on the insulation
system during shuttle ascent - about 0.3 psld/sec. The second test attempted
to impose a proof pressure of 0.5 psld on the system, and the final test pres-
surized the shield until It failed (burst test). Prior to these tests exten-
sive crazing or 1ocallzed creasing of the outer shield material was evident
(also expected on the inner containment shield), and four small tears in the
outer shield occurred as a result of the nitrogen purge gas removal tests.
Despite these tears the blanket leakage remained unchanged, indicating no fail-
ure in the inner containment shield. These tears were repaired before the sub-
sequent structural tests were performed. The shield system withstood the rapid
pressurization tests wlth no change In blanket leakage although another small
tear appeared. In the proof pressure test a pressure of 0.57 psld rather than
0.5 psld was applied because of an instrumentation problem. Several addltlonal
tears in the outer shield appeared and the blanket leakage increased. In the
subsequent burst test the blanket failed at 0.66 psld, well above the design
proof pressure.

As mentioned previously the shield material selected for the flight vehi-
cle was the stronger Kevlar-cloth-relnforced material. The actual decision to
change materials occurred before the structural tests when extensive creasing
appeared after the flberglass-relnforced shields had been installed for the
full-scale vehicle tests. The results of the structural tests further rein-
forced thls decision.

Flight Vehlcle Ground-Hold Tests

The first fllght vehicle and its CISS were mounted In a simulated cargo
bay at Cape Kennedy for a terminal countdown demonstration (TCD). In this test
the vehicle was tanked and controlled by its onboard computer systems up to a
simulated abort Just prior to llft-off. Two TCD's were performed. The thermal
performance of the insulated propellant tanks for the second TCD is summarized
In figure 35 (results similar to that of the first TCD). The steady-state tem-
peratures of the insulation system are shown for the various flight temperature
transducers used on the vehtcle. For reference the temperature data acquired
on the full-scale developmental tests (previous section) are tncluded where the
sensors are in the same general location. In the forward bulkhead area the
lower temperatures measured for the flight vehicle were expected since the
shlelds on the developmental test vehicle were more loosely fitting. The orig-
lnal design of the developmental vehicle had two layers of foam on the forward

18
bulkhead but was ultimately tested with one layer, hence causing the looseness
In the shields.

The sidewall temperatures on the flight vehicle were higher, and the
spread between the inner and outer shields was also higher, indicating more
heat was supplied (from the surrounding walls) to the outer shield. Thls was
expected since the emlttance of the simulated cargo bay used for the TCD was
considerably higher than that used for the developmental testing, where costs
were kept low by using a bare oxidized aluminum material for the shroud side-
walls. The simulated cargo bay emlttance was 0.85, whereas the simplified
shroud used for the developmental testing had an estimated emlttance of about
0.15. We estimated that thls would cause a roughly lO to 15 percent increase
In the sidewall heating for the TCD test, and thls was reflected In the test
results.

Note also that the temperatures on the conical portion of the flight side-
wall shield were considerably higher and more uniform radially than those
experienced on the developmental test article (fig. 34), indicating that the
localized chilling experienced previously dld not occur.

The steady-state heat transfer rates for the llquld-hydrogen and -oxygen
tanks as determined from bolloff tests were B8 500 and 44 000 Btu/hr, respec-
tively.

The llquld-hydrogen-tank insulation blanket purge system performed flaw-


lessly throughout the simulated prelaunch countdown. Figure 36 shows a typical
pressure history of the blanket demonstrating the cycling of the blanket at
5 mln before the planned launch. Prior to T - 5 mln the blanket was In Its
nominal cycle mode. At T - 5 mln the control band was changed via software
to prepare for the events at llft-off. The control band was tightened so that
the peak differential pressure was low enough to ensure that the blanket AP
would not exceed 0.35 psld when the cargo bay vents were opened at T - 41 sec.
The average AP of the blanket was also raised In preparation for terminating
the purge at T - 20 sec. Thls blanket differential pressure ensures that the
AP would still be positive at llft-off and prevents any backfilling wlth alr.
It is apparent from figure 36 that the overall cyclic performance of the
blanket was smooth and well behaved.

Post-test inspection of the insulation systems after the two TCD's indi-
cated that no structural damage occurred. There was no evidence of tears In
the llquld-hydrogen-tank shields as experienced In the developmental tests and
no evidence of shield creasing.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Overall, the Centaur G-prlme cryogenic thermal protection systems, as


designed and modified subsequent to the full-scale development tests, met all
structural and thermal requirements for the intended G-prlme missions. The
Ilquld-hydrogen-tank thermal protection system was the focus of most of the
developmental efforts because Its design had the additional requirement of pre-
cluding the formation of liquid nitrogen or alr on any of Its surfaces to pre-
vent potential hazardous situations In the shuttle cargo bay.

19
The hellum-purged foam and radiation shield blanket concept for the
llquld-hydrogen tank proved to be llghtwelght, rugged, and reliable. The high-
strength Kevlar-cloth-relnforced shields were more than adequate for withstand-
ing all the pressure loads imposed on the system during prelaunch, launch, and
ascent (including flow impingement through cargo bay vents) and during abort.
The measured thermal performance of the llquld-hydrogen-tank insulation system
during simulated prelaunch conditions was essentially as predicted, and limited
calorimeter data indicated that the thermal performance on-orblt would have
been adequate for the intended missions. The helium purge system for maintain-
ing a hellum environment around the llquld-hydrogen tank during all operations
wlthln the atmosphere performed flawlessly.

A considerable amount of development effort was necessarlly devoted to


safety issues. The basic thermal protection system materials had to, and did,
meet strict cargo bay flammability, cleanliness, and outgasslng requirements.
The basic system design exceeded the structural design requirements for cargo
bay payloads. In fact, the initial design, using the degraded fiberglass-
cloth-relnforced shields, nearly met all structural requirements. The much
stronger Kevlar-cloth-relnforced shields that were finally selected clearly
exceeded the requirements and showed no structural degradation after extensive
testing during the terminal countdown demonstrations. The requirement to prop-
erly ground (electrically) all metallzed surfaces was met. 6roundlng of the
"hidden" vapor-deposlted aluminum (VDA) In the outermost radiation shield was
especlally challenging. It was accomplished by applying conductive Ink to the
shield edges to electrically Joln the hidden VDA wlth the exposed VDA on the
underside of the outer shield.

Finally, the most difficult task involved demonstrating that the insulated
llquld-hydrogen tank would be safe If the helium purge was lost during a abort.
Two functions critical to providing helium during an abort and descent were (I)
the closure of the abort vent door In the forward adapter to allow repressurl-
zatlon of the insulation blanket with helium and (2) the operation of the
helium purge supply. Although, many of the elements of both systems were two-
failure tolerant (e.g., dual pyrotechnics for the vent door pln puller, three
AP transducers, and redundant software), there were remote situations where a
single failure could cause loss of helium purge. These functions could have
been made two-fallure tolerant but not without additional weight and complex-
ity. Therefore a considerable effort was spent looking at the effects of
ingesting air Into the llquld-hydrogen-tank insulation system. Tests demon-
strated that no liquid nitrogen or liquid air would form on the outside of the
shields even if colder liquid nitrogen was contained within the inner shield.
So even wlth a failure of the purge supply to the insulation, the shuttle could
land without the hazard of the cargo bay being exposed to liquid nitrogen or
liquid alr.

However, since there was a possibility of having liquid alr within the
insulation blanket after a single failure, It had to be demonstrated that the
system was benign to posslble impacts. Efforts were under way to demonstrate
the impact sensitivity of the insulation system wlth low-pressure (l atm)
liquid alr or gaseous oxygen contained In the system when the shuttle/Centaur
program was canceled. The preliminary test results taken at a pressure of
50 psla were mixed but looked promising. We felt that there was a good possi-
bility of the system being benign to impacts when tested as a system at atmo-
spheric pressures. If not, additional redundancy would have been required for
the helium purge system.

20
In summary, the combined helium-purged foam and radiation shield system
used for the Centaur G-prime liquid-hydrogen tank proved to be an effective
lightweight method of providing thermal protection during both ground-hold and
on-orbit operations. The technology and information generated under this
developmental effort should be directly appllcable to the design of cryogenic
thermal protection systems for future shuttle or upper stage applications.

REFERENCES

I. Spurlock, O.F., 'Shuttle/Centaur - More Capability for the 1980's,' IAF


Paper 83-18, Oct. 1983.

2. "Atlas-Centaur AC-19 and AC-20 Performance for the 1969 Mariner Mars
Missions," NASA TM X-2278, 1971.

3. Lacovlc, R.F., "Thermodynamic Data Report for the Titan/Centaur TC-S


Extended Mission," NASA TM X-73605, Ig?7.

4. "Safety Policy and Requirements for Payloads Using the Space


Transportation System (STS)," NASA TM-85402, 1982. (NHB-17OO.TA.)

5. "Payload Ground Safety Handbook," KHB-1700.7, Rev. A.

6. "Shuttle System Requirements for Shuttle Centaur Stage and Airborne


Support Equipment," NASA Johnson Space Center, JCS-07700, Vol. X,
Appendix lO.16, Dec. 1985.

7. "Flammability, Odor, and Outgasslng Requirements and Test Procedures for


Materials In Environments That Support Combustion," NASA TM-84066, 1981.
(NHB-BO60.IB.)

8. Pleasant, R.L., "Heat-Transfer Through Liquld-Hydrogen Tank Insulation on


Shuttle/Centaur G-Prlme," Cryoqenlc Properties, Processes and Applications
1986, A.J. Kldnay and M.J. Hiza, eds., AIChE, New York, 1986, pp. 75-80.
(AIChE Symposium Series, Vol. 82, No. 251.)

9. Maglson, E.C., Electrical Instruments in Hazardous Locations, Third


Revised Edition, Instrument Society of America, Pittsburgh, 1978.

21
TABLE I. - RADIATION-SHIELD DETAILS FOR G-PRIME LIQUID-HYDROGEN TANK

Basic shield Dutboard Inboard Area of use Unit weight,


material surface surface Ib/ft _
material material

Embossed Kapton VDA a VDA Middle (center) shield 0.0022


on purge diaphragm,
forward bulkhead
shields, and sidewall
shields

Kapton sheet VOA VOA Inboard shield on .0022


forward bulkhead

Kevlar cloth VDA-Kapton Kapton-VDA Outboard and inboard .04


laminate (0.5 mil) (0.5 mil) shields of purge
diaphragm and inboard
shield on sidewall

Kevlar cloth Teflon-VDA Kapton-VDA Outboard shield of .04


laminate (0.5 mil) (0.5 mil) llquld-hydrogen-
tank sidewall

Nomax scrim VDA-Kapton Kapton-VDA Outboard shield on .O2


laminate (0.3 mil) (0.3 mil) forward bulkhead

aVapor-deposlted aluminum.

TABLE II. - SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-PRIME LIQUID-HYDROGEN-TANK STEADY-STATE

HEATING DURING PRELAUNCH OPERATIONS AND DURING DN-ORBIT PORTION

OF GALILEO MISSION (OPEN DODR, PREDEPLOYMENT a)

Prelaunch b On-orblt

Maximuml Nlnimum Naxlmum I Nomlnal I Minimum

Heating rate, Btu/hr

Forward bulkhead 20 600 lg 600 202 184 165


Forward adapter ? 500 5 700 121 110 99
Sidewall 49 g70 45 000 671 610 549
Penetrations 4 085 4 085 407 370 333
Intermedlate bulkhead 1 835 l 115 1835 1475 1115
6aseous-hellum purge 4 445 2 440 ............
Total B8 435 77 940 3221 2735 2249

apayload doors open with orbiter tall oriented to Earth.


bcargo bay gaseous-nltrogen inlet temperature of 55 °F at flow rate of
180 Ib/mln past llquld-hydrogen-tank sidewall.

TABLE III.- STRUCTURAL TEST RESULTS ON SIDEWALL SHIELD

MATERIALS AND SEWN JOINTS

(a) Basic material tests

Laminate Tensile strength, a Tensile strength a Modulus,


Ib/In. (creased), E,
Ib/In. Ib/In.

Fiberglass 154 33 3173


Kevlar 239 Igl 7767

(b) Pull tests on sewn seams

Type of seam Description Tensile strength a


(at failure),
lb/In.

Overlap with two rows Shield sewn to shield:


of stltchlng (Kevlar) Warp direction 231
Fill direction 213
Shield to edge member 302
(warp direction)

aDestgn requires 43.5 lb/in, at &P = 0.5 psld.

22
TABLE IV. - SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-PRIME RADIATION SHIELD SURFACE

PROPERTY REQUIREMENTS AND MEASUREMENTS

Outer surface Specification Averaged measured


material values values a

Thermal Solar
emlttance absorptance emlttance
Thermal I absorptance
Solar

Shields

Teflon-VDA 20.40 <0.14 0.44 0.132


VOA-Kapton _ .05 _ .14 .04 .09
Fiberglass _ .81 _ .35 .88 .31

Tapes

Te'lo,
VOAI 0'0
<0''
Aluminized f0'6 Kapton < .05 _< .14 .043
0.12
.134

aMeasurements were made using a Lion Research Corp.


reflectometer/emlssometer model E25B.

TABLE V. - CARGO BAY VEN1 FLOW RAIES AND IEST FLOW RATES FOR VARIOUS SHUTTLE FLIGHT EVENTS

Cargo Fllght a Test inflow at sea level


bay
vent Phase Flow Altitude, Velocity, Dynamic Insula- Velocity,
direction ft V, pressure, tion V, pressure, tion
ft/sec q, pres- _t/se_ q, pres-
lb/ft 2 surized? Dynamic I Insula-
Ib/ft 2 surized?

6 Ascent Out 20xlO 3 130 II No 130 20 No


5 Ascent In 14 210 33 No 210 52 No
6 Descent Out 30 go 2 Yes 391 182 Yes
6 / In 72.5 1420 40 / ---

5 J In 72.5 970 IB [ ---


5 In 28 550 130 391 b182
--- J Yes
---

aRockwell International data presented at Centaur G-prlme design review.


bSafety factor of 1.4 applied to flight q of 130 ib/ft 2.

TABLE VI. - IMPACT SENSITIVITY OF LIQUID-HYDROGEN-IANK SIDEWALL

INSULAIIDN SYSIEM MAIERIALS IN LOWPRESSURE GASEOUS OXYGEN

[Test medium, lOB percent gaseous oxygen; test pressure, 50 psla.


See ref. 7 for a description of the test procedures.]

Material WSIF a Impact Number Number


test energy, of of
report ft-lb reactions tests

Polylmlde foam 86-20077 72 2 2


65 1 l
60
55
50
45
40
!
35 I 2
30 1
25 8
20 0 20

Inner shield mater_al (Kevlar 85-20016 72 20


cloth laminate)

Taped seam from three-layer 86-20078 72 3


sidewall shield 65 1
60
55
40
30
L
5
25 19
20 2
15 20

ajohnson Space Center White Sands Test Faci|Ity.

23

_J
ORIGINAL PAGE E_
OF POOR QUALITY

FIGURE I. - SEPARATION OF SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-PRIME FROM SHUTTLE


VEHICLE IN ORBIT,

AET ADAPTER -_ /-SEPARATION RING


/
1 /
FORWARD LIQUID-HYDROGEN-TANK/ _ / /- DEPLOYMENT ADAPTER
ADAPTER --, LIQUID-OXYGEN-TANK 1 // //
\

\\
INTERMEDIATE BULKHEAD W¢ 11 _/////- SUPPORT
CENTAUR SYSTEM (CISS)
INTEGRATED
PAYLOAD

INTERFACE

ORBITER STRUCTU

! NTERFACES 7-.

k
\
\
\
\\
\
\
\

\
' .¢ tj,

\ • !; I X_:_tS;
\
\ / - q-ORBITER
_GAS CONDITIONING INTERFACES J
STRUCTURAL
INTERFACES

FIGURE 2. - SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-PRIME CONFIGURATION AND MAJOR STRUCTURAL INTERFACES,

24
FIGURE 3. - BASLE SHUTILE/CENIAUR G-PRIME VEHICLE CONFIGURATION (BEFORE INSTALLA-
TION OF THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS AND FLIGHT HARDWARE).

L [QU [D-HYDROGEN-
t-L IQU ID-OXYGEN-TANK
LINE ELBOWS -

FORWARD ADAPTER !_ /t SHIELDS


SIDEWALL RADIATION
INSULATION 7 CABLEWAY _ /

FORWARD BULKHEAD RADIATION #


Y_ tl II\ It
:_-z._ _::-__: I_ _ ,-LIQUID-OXYGEN-TANK
SHIELD AND INSULATION-_ z _
_ [ t r [ _''_,._ _ _ AFT BULKHEAD RADIATION
.,,¢_
_ / __ "_" _ / SHIELDS

Y_ 1// _ r_ _-'---_--:I:----_
oI i"I,
_--_----q

PURGE DIAPHRAGMJ
/
./__ i
,_ I_,i
i t i .-I
/- ,_- PURGE PLENUM
-' _ _ __ L _,i
FORWARD ADAPTER --/ _ LL IQU iD_HYDROGEN_TANK

'_ L IQUID-HYDROGEN- SIDEWALL INSULATION

TANK SIDEWALL
RADIATION SHIELD

FIGURE q.- SHUTTLE/CENIAUR G-PRIME THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS.

25
F LIQUID-HYDROGEN-
L VENT-LINE SHIELD LIQUID-HYDROGEN
1 FUEL DUCT -_. REACTION CONTROL
i 7 LIQUID-HYDROGEN FILL/ SYSTEM THRUSTER
/ DRAIN LINE SHIELD _'_ MANIFOLD SHIELD
(FOUR PLACES)_
"_W,____ L_ _ FBOTTLE SHIELDS SLIMPSHIELD-_ / \
_ ,,_,r
_ LIgUID-OXYGEN ".,/\ _4F
/NL_ "_ _ ',(THREEPLACES) _._,%1.._" _ ,- IMPINGEMENT

,_ SHIELD
,X/A- LIOU'o-
• N_"_. ""_ OXYGEN-DUCT

a HI L )LACES
°
)/_ 7_ J (TWO PLACES) _) V [ ,

\ _ RADIATION SHIELDS: _-_'" _ { /


"- HYDRAZINE
_- ,, _o,_si_VENTED'_F---
Z_.,._....__I_ PANEL SHIELD
_- L IQUID-OXYGEN-TANK II ..1"/
I /
SIDEWALL SHIELD VENTED AT FORWARD EDGE-p

FIGURE 5.- AFT-END THERMAL PROTECTION OF SHUTTLE/CENTADR G-PRIME VEHICLE.

_--VENT _RS ON FORW_D


A_PTER (NOT SHO_)
_EN DURING ASCENT AND
-- ARRO_ SHOW GASEOUS
\ CLOSE DURING AN ABORT /
_\ _SCENT // HELI_ FLOW DURING
_OUS NITROGEN

\_ / RE_VAL CYCLE

_ .4 _\_ RELIEF V_VE _T POINT

_PTRANSDUCERS
_ I _ _ _ r GASE_S NITROGENRE_VAL (1 HR)

Nj _ o_
L I_ID-HYDR_EN-T_K
INSULATION BLANKET TIME
_ k._.J IINSULATIO
N I
RELIEF VALVES (GAS-
EOUS NITRO_N VENT) / \ IPURGE SYSTE_
LoNcIssI
FIGURE 6. - INSULATION BLANKET PURGE SYSTEM OPERATION FOR SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-PRIME LIQUID-
HYDROGEN TANK.

26
F KEVLAR CLOTH/
VDA-KAPTON/
/4-- VENTED SHIELDS /I KAPTON-VDA
1 ,I JI VD^

_-_ _ ..... : " ._ EMBOSSED KAPTON-


/_I .............................'...._ VDA
// (A) PURGE DIAPHRAE44,
// i-VDA-KAPTON/
// / NO_X SCRIM/
// _-EDGE VENTED _FAPEO SEIV_ 4-VENTED I KAPTON-VDA
// \, \ ./I SHIELDS / _VDA-

_'_------.------- _ ........... L_._.--" EMBOSSED KAPTON-

I ' // X " \\ KAPTON SHEET-


_1 i :I-IAJI TANK SKIN-- \- TWIN-PIN FASTENER ""\\ VDA
"_ :1 I J_ X_ (B) FORWARD BULKHEAD INSULATION. \_POLYIMIDE FOAM
_ I' I!\\,_ F TEFLON-VDA/
\ I'L-_--L'/_. d-VENTED SHIELDS ,/ KEVLAR CLOTH/
\ 1 I_ /r D, \ /'_ / KAPTON-VDA
v !)\\ / / / _VDA-
"IT \ _ ;._. ....... " _ _ EMBOSSED KAPTON-

_ ' _'_ "ii,._.


:..'.i
" _/ "._,"_._/.: _,":." " _ " ..........
r_ I_''. VDA..__VDA_KAPTON/
KEVLAR CLOTH/
/ \

' I \
.........................
....................
...............
--- -POLYIM,
rs / ¢
/ \ /
TANK SKI_ "--- FOAM SEAMS OFFSET _-

(C) SIDEWALL INSULATION,

FIGURE 7. - PRIMARY THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS USED ON SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-PRIME LIQUID-HYDROGEN TANK.

FORWARD F-_
I

RETA[ NER
RING FOR ,- A j
DIAPHRAGM _

THREE-LAYER.-_ _
SHIELD

VIEW D
0o Cq

THREE-LAYER
TAPE OVER SHIELD SEWN
ENTIRE EDGE TO THIN AREA
MEMBER (TYPICAL)m OF EDGE MEMBER7
__. I1 I

KEVLAR /
/
EDGE /
MEMBER J
900 2700 SECTION A-A

SEAM SEWN
AND TAPED _..
"x

__Jll i __
I
LHEAT SEALED TAPE
SECTION B-B: TYPICAL SEAM CONSTRUCTION
VIEW C-C
1800 C J

FIGURE 8. - GENERAL CONSTRUCTION OF SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-PRIME PURGE DIAPHRAGM. (SECTIONS ARE NOT TO SCALE,)

27
FIGURE 9. - INSTALLED PURGE DIAPHRAGMON FULL-SCALE SHUTTLE/CENTAURG-PRIME TEST VEHICLE.

ORIGINAL P_GE T_
POOR QUALITY

SHIELD _COI@OSITE _-RADIATION SHIELDS j-FORWARD ADAPTER


ATTACFI/ENT \_ADAPTER / ON SIDEWALL // BLANKET (FOAR) )
AT FORWARD \ / /i _ i:nAM _" _ "-I J_
RING-, ,, // "
\ , , \ ( (/ _ J," _-'_'11 |

RADIATION _ _ / ;Eom INSIDE I I tC_=.".'i'-il


SHIELDS ON _ f
/ //
.// CORRUGATIONS K I _\ -----_ _ c
i_':'"'"A

BIJLKHEADJ"" / I
I {/ ,/ _ IA\':C--_ _ ._v;,-.:..:;l
"" _'" ""< _

I _':'."';" ..... :" |"" ":"'"/ - • '--_7 RADIATION _'__ ;_ !:7:_,s:;6.4


I SHIELDS_ _
i

FOAM BLANKET

FIGURE 10. - INSULATION DETAILS ON FORWARD END DE SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-PRIME LIQUID-HYDROGEN rANK. (POLYIMIDE FOAM USED THROIJGflOI/T.)

28
ORIGIIqP,
L P;'-_;_.
,_,
OF POOR QUALITY

FIGURE II. - LAYUP OE POLYIMII](- FOA/_ FOR FORWARD BULKHEAD O__ SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-

PRIME TEST TANK.

29
/-THREE SHIELDS
/
STITCH -,_ /
"-, "'"-OUTSIDE SURFACE / /- ALIJIqINIZED TAPE
/ //
_-STITCH

STEP 1 STEP 2 STEP 3 i II


SECTION A-A: TYPICAL SEM'I CONSTRUCTION SECTION C-C: TYPICAL EDGE
TREATMENT FOR GORE SECTORS

COPPER TAPE -,\ ,,--COPPER TAPE FOR GROUNDING

/ "X

L_VI)A ON ALL SHIELD SURFACES

VIEW B SECTION D-D

rVELCRO PILE FOR ATTACHING


/
/ FORWARD-DOOR SHIELD
/

QUADRANTS OVERLAPPED I \

AND HELD BY TWIN-PIN


FASTENERS ALONG FOUR
FOAN SEAMS

_J

SHIELD GORE SECTION _I M_'-l _'_L

STRAIGHT SHIELD SECTION -_" A"-I \_'-VELCRO PILE FOR ATTACHMENT

TO FORWARD ADAPTER

FIGURE 12. - GENERAL CONSTRUCTION OF SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-PRIME FORWARD BULKHEAD RADIATION SHIELDS. (ONLY TWO QUADRANTS SHOWN
FOR BREVITY. SECTIONS ARE NOT TO SCALE.)

30
OF POOR Q_.JALrr_

SCREW
POLYCARBONATE )_,

/!
LCOMPOSITE z_TANK _L-STUD _- PLENUM SUPPORI ANGLE/CHANNEL
ADAPTER FORWARD (ALUMINUM
RING ALLOY)

FIGURE 13. - DETAILS OF POLYIMIDE FOAM ATTACHMENT FOR SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-PRIME LIQUID-HYDROGEN TANK.

i !! ! !

FIGURE IN. - ATTACHMENT OF POLYIMIOE FOA_I PANELS AT FORWARD R|NG Of SHUT[LE/CENTAUR

G-PRIME LIQUID-HYDROGEN TANK.

31
ORIGI_,_AL l:,:_t::: _']
OF POOR QUALITY

FIGURE 15. - AFT END OF SHUTTLE/CENTAUR LIQUID-HYDROGEN TANK SHOWING PURGE PLENUM AND BRACKETS FOR
FOAM ATTACHMENT.

fIGURE IG, - AFT END OF CABLEWAY AREA.

32
OF POOR QUALI_'_'
0o
/--CUTOUT FOR
/ TANK VENT

l-- LATERAL SE_

OF SHIELD

FILL/DRAIN (_
AI A BI AND ENGINE ' \ ',_

r -JIL- L--- 2700

C C

, I
- '_ 900

180o
FSTITCH
ST ITCH
/I (TWO PLACES)
/I (TWO PLACES) 7
/I. FTEFLON TAPE STITCH FTEFLON TAPE // /- HEAT-SEAL ING
/// I (THREE PLACES) (TWO PLACES)_ \ (THREE PLACES) KEVLAR EDGE //// // ALUMINIZED TAPE
II I // \
I ./_ \ MEM,
BER-7 // /

! • I
L HEAT-SEALING HEAT-SCALINess. /-/TEFLON L OUTI_)ARD
ALUMINIZED TAPE ALUMINIZED TAPE J _ SHIELD
TAPE

SECTION A-A: TYPICAL SECTION B-B SECTION C-C: TYPICAL SHIELD EDGE
SEWN JOINT

FIGURE 17. - GENERAL DETAILS OF SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-PRIME LIQUID-HYDROGEN-TANK SIDEWALL SHIELD CONSTRUCTION.
(SECTIONS ARE NOT TO SCALE.)

IANK i_
SIDEWALL _i
RINGS SHIELDS

LIQUID-
I NSUkATED ENGINE
FEED

INSULATED FILL/
DRAIN

FIGURE 18. - SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-PRIME f_e,


TED [0 CISS.

33
STITCHING_

I
(B) ELECTRICAL BONDING PROVISIONS BE_N
SHIELD PANELS ACROSS SEWN JOINTS.

dlJl'laI_R
WIRE TO
_- COPPER TAPE VEHICLE GROUND-

KAPTON
OR
TEFLON -,
_. I ii J (
$ l\ Ji I
'-COPPER FOIL TAPE _APPED / "" _ WASHER
/
AROUND EACH SHIELD LAYER z.COPPER FOIL TAPE
(A) ELECTRICALLY CONDUCTIVE TAPE INTERMITTENTLY WITH CONDUCTIVE
APPLIED TO FAYING ALUMINIZED SURFACEs BE- ADHESIVE
FORE ASSEMBLY (C) ELECTRICAL BONDING OF SHIELD EDGES
TO VEHICLE.

FIGURE 19. - TYPICAl,ELECTRICAL BONDING TECHNIQUES FOR R/Q)IATIORSHIELDS.

100 -- #_] /--LIOUID-HYDROGEN-


-9 5OO _ F 1 ., .// TANK SIDEWALL

ii° BULKItE_
2OO __, V l I I I i

!
TEFLON 'k--HIDDENVDA

(0.5 MIL) \\ ( -1000 ANGSTROMS THICK)


104 --
THfCK) _ \ /-- SILVIER-FILLEO
\ \ / POLYESTER CONDUCTIVE /- PAYLOADBAY DOORs
/ OPENED
/
VDA TO EXPOSEDVDA /

103 -- ///--(_.EA = 1183 FT2 )


INK CONNECTING HIDDEN
" S]DEWALL
/ /
/ / \
/ / \ i _,'" ,,-FORWARD
BULKHEAD

/ ' KAPTON (0.5 mL


THICK) _'- EXPOSED VDA ( -1000 ANGSTROf_
THICK) // / (AREA = 216 FT2)
/
/- REINFORCEHENT (NOHEX SCRIM
I I I I I
lg_ 2 0 2 q 6 8 10
OR KEVLARCLOTH) T(ME FROPILIlaCS, HA
FIGURE 20. - GROUNDINGOF HIDDEN VDA ON ALL OUTI_ARD SHIELDS Of: FIGURE21. - SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-PRIMELIOUID-HYDROGEN-T/VI(
SHUTTLFJCENTAUR6-PRIRE. SIDEWALLANDFORWARD-BULKHEAD _RATURE ANDTANKHEAT-
ING PREDICTIONSFROM COMPLETIONOF LIQ(IID-HYDROGEN
TANK-
]NG TO STEADY-STATE,ON-ORBIT (+XtV, _ = EOo) CONDITIONS.

34
F CALCULATEDTEMPERATURES _ CHAMBERWALL

// USING ME.ASUREDSHIELD _} THREE SHIELDS


/ PROPERTIES AND ASSUMING
// FOAM LAYERS ACT AS TWO /_SHIELD THERMOCOUPLES _\TWO 0 75-1N -THICK
/ SHIELDS WITH EMITTANCE// COVERED WITH ALUMINIZED _P-FOAM LAYERS'
/ / TAPE FOR THIS DATA
/ OF 0.87 / _ TANK
/ /I SET ONLY

500 -- // _Z m-/ • " "_---- CHAMBER WALL ........ •

_._ 00" T- _ '()--O----OUTER SHIELD--,,,


0 -- _---D_----MIDDLE SHIELD--_\,
..... "_181"-'_ _..._._"(_---- INNER SHIELD_\_\
_0' • .,..,,--"""'-'_'_OUTER SURFACE OF\\',_\\
40O _ ,.,O_rA
_ OUTER FOAM_ \>T_

INNER
SORFAEE
OF
t.// , OUTER FOAM_
300 -- ,,.,,.(_I_'_ '_'_ _ _'_OUTER SURFACE OF "'-

p_
_ _ INNER FOAM

N 200

100

_7 _7 _ _----INNER INNER
SURFACE OF _
FOAM--_

I I i I I
°,o-_-_ io-4 ,0-3 .,o-+ _ 1o2 io+
CHAMBER PRESSURE, TORR

FIGURE 22. - CALORIMETER TESTS ON CENTAUR G-PRIME LIQUID-HYDROGEN-TANK INSULATION SYSTEM (SYSTEM TEMPERATURES).

CHAMBER WALL (- 500 OR)


--} THREE SHIELDS

_TWO O.75-1N.-THICK FON_ LAYERS

TANK (37 OR) lOO


_CALCULATED ASSUMING RADIATION ONLY
100 -- / AND ASSUMING FOAM LAYERS ACTED AS
I HIGH EMITTANCE E SHIELDS. USED MEASURED u- 80 --
/ SHIELD EMITTANCES (E:0.025 ON OUTWARD-FACING
/ SHIELD SURFACES: E = 0.086 ON INWARD-FACING
SURFACES) • 60 --
lO

/
-- / _ : 40 --
_ / ,=E

.__ START OF
PUMPDOWN
=_ 20 --

10 -_ i0-4
I
i0-3
I
i0-2
I ¢ I
102
I
lO3
0
-5
I
0 5 10 15
CHAMBER PRESSURE, TORR TIME, MIN

FIGURE 23. - CALORIMETER TESTS ON CENTAUR G-PRIME LIQUID- FIGURE 24. - INSULATION SYSTEMHEAT TRANSFERRATES DURING
HYDROGEN-TANK INSULATION SYSTEM (HEAT TRANSFER). SHUTTLE/CENTAURG-PRIME ASCENTPRESSUREPROFILE,

35
J SHIELD _TERIAL F_ -

1_ LIOUID-HYDROGEN-TANK SI_WALL
i __ LIOUID-OXYGEN-T_ SI_W_L MD _T _LK_AD

i _ Go

0 40 80 120 160 2_ 240 280 $20


TIME, DAYS

FIGURE 25. - EFFECT _ TIE _ ELECTRICAL GROUNDING OF


HID_N V_ IN SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-PRI_ OUTER_ST SHIELd.
(SIXTY _LES _ EACH _RIAL _RE TESTED.)

/-HELIUM PUR_
I (0.5 PSID Ra,X.)
RADIATION SHIELD j
(96- BY 96- IN,-
THICK SPECIREN)_ i _RADIATION SHIELD

\\_SUPPORT/SEAL FRAME
1.5-1N.- THICK /i., .I II

;i.E. I llll"b"
1-iN.-THICK PLY- t 20 FT (AI:iEA : / I I/ I
,oDD
SO_PO.T
_L,TE
_ _" '" >_,, I Idl,

• ' ' '_ SI,_LATED


ORI.TER
LINER
I I_,ll 1
FLON
<O.,_OL< <,L,.ODD
AHD
ER,,_>
--__ _'It ,'_

87 IN. R %'t i
(87.5 IN. R _'_'_"
PRESSUR[ ZED) _

33 IN. R-"

(A) TEST SETUP.

B
2OO

cT
150
..... ELO,RE/IIIIIID
-
J ,//_RESSURIZED

__ 50

q 8 12
TIRE, MIN

(B) FLOW PROt:]LE.

FIGURE 26, - TEST SETUP AND FLOW PROFILE USED TO SIMULATE SHUTTLE
CARGO BAY VENT INFLOW' ON sIDEWALL RADIATION SHIELD.

36
i

FIGOR[ 27. SHUTTLEICENIAUR G PRIME SIDEWAll RADIATION SHIEID AFTER EXPOSURE FIGURE 28. - TEST SETUP FOR DETERMINING IF LIQUID AIR COULD FORM ON EX-

TO SIMULATED FLOW IMPINGEMENT FROM ORBITER VENTS. TERNAL SURFACES OF SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G PRIME SI_WALL RADIATION SHIELD.

27.5 IN.

_DI SH-SHAPED

_/ \ THREE LAYER SHIELD


LIQUID NITROGEN

":c-THREE-LAYER
\ SHIELD LIQUID NITROGEN 7
\ /
\ TAPED AREA OVER /

\ DOUBLE-SEWN SEAM _

- "[ -- L A,MBIENT AIR

TAPED AREA (~ 49 OF)


o- I
{

-100

N -2o0 --

I /-- S,tNSOR IN LIOUID NITROGEN

_ -3_ -- I/
x
-400
I I I I I t I
-6 -q -2 O 2 4 6 8

DISTANCE FRO_ SHIELD SEAM AT CENTERLINE, IN.

FIGURE 29. - EXTERNAL SHIELD TEMPERATURES NEAR SHUTTLE/

CENTAUR G-PRIME SHIELD SEAM WITH INNER SHIELD (CONTAIN-

MEN[ MEMBRANE) [MP£RSED IN LIQUID NITROGEN.

37
BLANKET
DIFFERENT [ AL
PRESSURE,
2O
f- LIQUID-AIR OR GASEOUS-OXYGEN
I INLET (OFF CENTER OF ]RPACT 0 !NCREASI NG
VENT-,, / AREA)
I L_ DECREASI NG
STEEL PLATE _ \\i I
-- LEAK RATE CORRESPONDING TO

__ =_0

_5
FOAM / /"
0
INSULATION J J "_ RADIATION SHIELD

o _ I 1 I I I
0 .05 .10 .15 .20 .25 .30
I NPACT
BLANKET DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE, _sP, P$|D

FIGURE 30. - TEST SETUP FOR IMPACTING SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-PRIRE LIQtJID- FIGURE 32. - EFFECT OF DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ON LEAK RATE OF
HYDROGEN-TANK INSULATION SYSTER WITH LIQUID AIR FORMED INTERNALLY. SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-PRIRE LIQUID-HYOROGEN-TANK INSULATION
BLANKET.

ORIG!r_AL P._.CE t'_


OF POOR QUALITY

FIGURE 31. - CENTAUR G-PRIME TEST TANK BEING INSERTED INTO TEST STAND.

38
o

-_
1 %
j _ t
/ / I I \
/ / I I \
/ /
I I \
/ /
/ / I I \
\
/ /" I
/ I \
/' I
/ I \
/ / / / I \
/ /-- /--
o z

r10 Dr OOrq oOD


[

e2_

NOIIISOd lVI(1_'_ (INV IVDll_13h u_

$9
"-'0"- OUTER SHIELD
---"L_r'-- ]NN[R SHIELD

OPEN SYMBOLS DENOTE DATA FROM DEVELOP-


MENT TEST
SOLID SYR3OLS DENOTE DATA FOR FLIGHT VEHICLE
VERTICAL LINES DENOTE PRFDICir;_D S_IFLD
,;',F TEMPERATURES
225 t-

315 --

-
_ 225
315 _--
_

,_ 13;5
225
315 I
-300 -200
TEMPERATURE °F

90 o

FIGURE 35. - THERI'M.L PERFORMANCEOF THERI'IAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS FOR SHUTTLEs'


CENTAOR G-PRIME FLIGHT VIEHICLF 1 CYROC4ZNICTANKS DU_[NG SII'EJLATED PRFLAUNCH
CO_'il)ITIONS. HEAT TRANFER RATES, BTU/HR: INTO L[QUID-HYUROGI"-N TANK, 88 500:
INTO LIQUID-OXYGEN TANK, qq 000.

PURGE OFF
(]9,_ANKET _PURGE ON

.3

w
_.2

_.1

T - MIN

o I I I
22:17:00 22:17:40 22:18:20 22:19:00
GREENWICH
MEANTIME
FIGURE 36. - RESETTING OF: BLANKET CONTROL BAND AT 5 M[N
BEFORE SIMULATED LAUNCH OF SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-PRIME
FLIGHT VEHICLE 1 (SECOND TANKING).

4O
1. Repo_ NO. 2. Government Accession No. 3, Rec¢plent's Catalog No.

NASA TM-89825
5. Repo_ Date
4. Title and Subtitle

Ray 1987
0esign, Development, and Test of Shuttle/Centaur
6. Performing Organization Code
G-Prime Cryogenic Tankage Thermal Protection Systems
917-60-01
8. Performing Organization RepOrt No.
7. Authors)

Richard H. Knoll, Peter N. MacNet], E-3473


and James E. England 10. Work Unit No.

9. Performing Organization Name and Address


11. Contract or Grant No.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration


Lewis Research Center
13. Type of Report and Period Covered
Cleveland, Ohio 44135
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address Technical Memorandum

N_tlonal Aeronautics and Space Administration 14. Sponsoring Agency Code

Washington, D.C. 20546

15. Supplementary Notes

A shorter version of this report was presented at the 22nd Theme)physics Conference sponsored by the
_,erican Tnstttute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Honolulu,Hawaii, June 8-10, 1987 (AI/_-87-1557).
Richard H. Knoll, NASALewis Research Center; Peter N. RecNeil and James E. England, General Dynamics,
Space Systems Division, San Diego, California (uork performed under NASAcontract NA53-22901).

16. Abstract

The thermal protection systems for the shuttle/Centaur would have had to provide
fall-safe thermal protection during prelaunch, launch ascent, and on-orbit opera-
tions as well as during potential abort, where the shuttle and Centaur would
return to Earth. The thermal protection systems selected used a helium-purged
polytmide foam beneath three radiation shields for the liquid-hydrogen tank and
radiation shields only for the liquid-oxygen tank (three shields on the tank
sidewall and four on the aft bulkhead). A double-walled vacuum bulkhead sepa-
rated the two tanks. The liquid-hydrogen tank had one 0.75-tn.-thtck layer of
foam on the forward bulkhead and two layers on the larger-area sidewall. Full-
scale tests of the flight vehicle in a simulated shuttle cargo bay that was
purged with gaseous nitrogen gave total prelaunch heating rates of 88 500 Btu/hr
and 44 000 Btu/hr for the liquid-hydrogen and -oxygen tanks, respectively.
Calorimeter tests on a representative sample of the liquid-hydrogen-tank sidewall
thermal protection system indicated that the measured untt heating rate would
rapidly decrease from the prelaunch rate of ~100 Btu/hr ft 2 to a desired rate
of <1.3 Btu/hr ft 2 once on-orbit.

18. Distribution Statement


17. Key Words (Suggested by Authors))

Cryogenics; Thermoprotection; Cryogenic Unclassified - unlimited


insulation systems STAR Category 18

20. S_urlty Classlf. (of this page) 21. No. of pages 22. Price"
19. Security Classif. (of this repot)

Unclassified Unclassified 41 A03

*For sale by the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161

You might also like