Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership (Arts 712-773, NCC)

CASE #1

A) Doctrine:
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor
through the requisite lapse of time. To ripen into ownership, possession
must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.

B.) Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag vs. Gabriel, GR. No. 175763,
April 11, 2012

C) Facts:
Petitioner, representing her parents (spouses Nicomedesa), filed
with MCTC a complaint for the recovery of ownership and possession
and/or quieting of title of a one-half portion of the subject property against
the respondents. She alleged that her great-grandfather Catalino was the
owner of the subject property. When he died. his daughter Gliceria.
married to Gavino. inherited the subject property. When Gliceria died,
Gavin inherited one-half of the land, while Nicomedesa acquired the other
half through inheritance. Roberto was Nicomedesa's tenant of half of her
propertv. The former later bought it from her in 1997. However.
Nicomedesa discovered that since 1974. Roberto had been reflecting the
said property solely in his name under his tax declarations.
On the other hand, the respondents alleged that their ownership of
the said property goes back to Gavino who cultivated it since 1956.
Roberto bought half of the subject property from Nicomedesa in 1965,
and the remaining half from Gavin's heirs. In 1975, a certain Belacho filed
a complaint against them claiming that he is Gavin's natural child.
However, Roberto and Nicomedesa entered into a Compromise
Agreement with Belacho to settle the case. By virtue of it. Roberto bought
the subject property from Rolachn
MTC brushed aside the respondents' argument that they acquired
the subject property by ordinary acquisitive prescription. It held that since
the said property was the conjugal property of Gavino and Gliceria,
Roberto was entitled to only three-fourths, as this was Gavin's entire
share, while the petitioner was entitled to one-fourth of it. RTC affirmed in
toto MTC's ruling. CA set aside MTC and RTC ruling. It ruled Roberto as
the lawful owner because the Compromise Agreement executed by
Belacho gave Roberto's possession of the subject property the characters
of possession in good faith and with just title. Hence. this instant petition.

D) Issue:
Did the CA err in relying upon the compromise agreement and the
contract of sale to conclude that the respondents could acquire the
subject property through ordinary acquisitive prescription?

E. Held:
Yes, CA erred in its decision.

Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor

through the requisite lapse of time. To ripen into ownership possession
must be in the consent of an owner, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted.
By the nature of a compromise agreement, it brings the parties to agree
to something that neither of them may actually want, but for the peace it
will bring them without a protracted litigation.
In the present case, to avoid any conflict with Belacho, Roberto, and
Nicomedesa bought two (2) parcels of land, including the subject
property, from Belacho. Thus, no right can arise from the compromise
agreement because the parties executed the same only to buy peace and
to write finis to the controvercy: it did not create or transmit ownership
rights over the subject property.

CASE #2

A) Doctrine:
Under the law, in a contract to sell, ownership is passed over the
buyer upon full payment of purchase price.

B) San Lorenzo Devt. Corp. vs. CA, GR. No. 124242 J. Tinga January
21, 2005

C) Facts:
Spouses Lu are the owners of the parcels of land which were sold
to respondent Babansata. Respondent therefore made downpayment and
several payments as evidenced by receipts. Hence, respondent
demanded the execution of the final deed of sale in his favor so that he
could effect full payment of the purchase price. Later. he discovered that
the spouses also sold the same property to another. Hence, respondent
filed a complaint for specific performance against the spouses before the
RTC, demanding that the second sale be cancelled, and a final deed of
sale be issued to him.
On their part, SLDC alleged that the said property had been sold to
it in a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage. It further claimed that it was
a buver in good faith and for value and therefore it had better right over
the said property.
RTC upheld the sale of the property to SLDC applying Article 1544
of the Civil Code. It held that since both Babasanta and SLDC did not
register the respective sales in their favor, the ownership of the property
should pertain to the buyer who first acquired possession of the property,
and in this case, it was SLDC.
CA set aside RTC ruling. It held that the sale between Babasanta
and spouses Lu was valid and subsisting. It further ruled that the sale in
favor of SLDC was null and void since SLDC was a purchaser in bad
faith.

D) Issue:
Who has the better right over the disputed property?

E) Held:

SLDC has the better right over the disputed property.

Under the law, in a contract to sell, ownership is passed over the
buyer upon full payment of purchase price.
Here, the receipt signed by spouses Lu can be considered as a
perfected contract to sell to Babasanta. Glaringly absent from the records
is an indication that Babasanta even attempted to make the proper
consignation of the amounts due, thus, the obligation on the part of the
sellers to convey title never acquired obligatory force. There was neither
actual nor constructive delivery as his title is based on a mere receipt.
Even if the sale between spouses Lu and Babansata is a perfected
contract of sale ownershir could not have passed to Babasanta in the
absence of delivery, since in a contract of sale ownership is transferred to
the vendee only upon the deliver of the thing sold.
Since SLDC acquired possession of the property in good faith in
contrast to Babasanta. Who neither registered nor possessed the
property at an time. SLDC's right is definitely superior to that of
Babasanta's.
 WHEREFORE. the instant petition is herey GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, of San
Pedro laguna is REINSTATED

CASE #3
A) Doctrine:
The burden of proof is on the person seeking original registration of
land to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his
possession and that of his predecessors-in-interest was of the nature and
duration required by law.

B) Republic vs. Northern Cement, GR. No. 200256, April 11, 2018

C) Facts:
Northern Cement filed with TC an application for registration of title
over the subject lot pursuant to PD 1529. It alleged that it is the owner in
fee simple of the said lot which it acquired by way of a Deed of Absolute
Sale from the former owner. It provided as evidence affidavit of adjoining
landowners, tax declarations from 1971-2003, and approved plan and
CERO from DEN stating that the land is alienable and disposable. The
Republic of the Philippines, thru OSG, pointed out, among others, that the
CENRO Report and the Approved Plan hardly suffice to prove that the
subject lot is an alienable portion of the public domain.
RTC granted the application for registration of title in favor of
Northern Cement. It ruled that from the evidence presented, Northern
Cement was able to prove, by preponderance of evidence, its claim of
ownership over the subject lot. CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
Hence, this petition.

D) Issue:
Should the application for registration of title by Northern Cement
be granted?
E) Held:
No, the application of Northern Cement should not be granted.
In the case of Heirs of Crisologo v. Rañon, the Court held that
prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights
over immovable property. It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner
and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession
should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and
adverse. The burden of proof is on the person seeking original
registration of land to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence
that his possession and that of his predecessors-in-interest was of the
nature and duration required by law.
Applying these, the Court is unconvinced by the pieces of evidence
submitted by Northern Cement to prove compliance with the requirement
of possession under the law. For one, tax declarations are not conclusive
evidence of ownership but only a basis for inferring possession. It is only
when these tax declarations are coupled with proof of actual possession
of the property that they may become the basis of a claim of ownership.
Second. Northern Cement failed to prove possession of the subject lot in
the concept of an owner, with the records bare as to any acts of
occupation, development, cultivation or maintenance by it over the
property. The importance of exercising acts of dominion on a land sought
to
be registered cannot be downplayed. Thus, Northern Cement failed to
satisfy the required possession under PD 1529. Section 14(2).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review
is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated August 15, 2011 and the
Resolution dated January 13, 2012 of the CA Special Third Division in
CA-G.R. CV No. 94172 are SET ASIDE. Northern Cement Corporation's
application for registration of Lot 3250, Ap-01-004756. Pls 796 Sison
Public Land is hereby DENIED.

CASE #4

A) Doctrine:
In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it
must be made in a public document specifying therein the property
donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.

B) Heirs of Rosendo Sevilla Florencio vs. Heirs of Teresa Sevilla de

Leon, GR. No. 149570 (J. Callejo, Sr.) (March 12, 2004)

C) Facts:
Teresa Sevilla de Leon is the owner of the subject residential lot.
She allowed the spouses Florencio to construct a house on the said
property and stay therein without any rentals therefor. With the consent of
her husband, she leased the said land to Santos. Thereafter, Santos
constructed a house thereon. When she died, her heirs, the petitioners,
allowed Florencio to continue staying in the property. When Florencio
died, his heirs, the respondents, remained in the property. Soon, the
petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the property, but the latter
refused. Hence, petitioners filed a complaint for ejectment against them
before the MTC. They alleged that they were the pro-indiviso owners of
the said lot.
In their answer, the respondents alleged that the plaintiffs had no
cause of action because Teresa had executed a Deed of Donation over
the said land in favor of their predecessor, Rosendo Florencio. The latter
accepted the donation, as shown by a deed which was executed and
notarized. They further claimed that they arranged for the registration of
the said land subject of the donation but due to demise of Jose de Leon,
the property remained in the name of Teresa.
The petitioners filed a complaint for ejectment against the heirs of
Santos as well. The latter alleged that they occupied the same based on
a contract of lease executed by De Leon which was later donated to
Florencio who allowed and permitted them to remain in the property
without any compensation. These two cases were consolidated.
MTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. RTC reversed MTC ruling. CA
affirmed RTC ruling. CA held that the Deed of Donation was not a
credible piece of evidence to support the petitioners' claim over the
property; hence, did not transfer ownership to the petitioners. Hence, this
petition.

D) Issue:
Who between the parties have a better right to the possession of
the property?
F) Held:
Respondents have the better right to the possession of the property.
In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it must
be made in a public document specifying therein the property donated
and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
In this case, the deed of donation, on its face, appears to bear all
the essential requisites of a valid donation inter vivos. However, there are
cogent facts and circumstances of substance which engender veritable
doubts as to whether the petitioners have a better right of possession
over the property based on the Deed of Donation. First. there is no
evidence on record that the deed of donation was ever filed with and
registered in the Register of Deeds. Second, respondents consistently
paid the realtv taxes for the property. Third, petitioners never adduced in
evidence the owners duplicate of the title, nor registered the deed and
secure title over the property under his name. Lastly, at the deed,
Florencio was to subscribe and swear his acceptance of the donation
before the Municipal Mayor, however, the mayor did not affix his
signature above his typewritten name.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The
Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan Branch 20, in
Civil Cases Nos. 1018-M-99 and 1019-M-99, and the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 59698-99. are AFFIRMED.

CASE #5

A) Doctrine:
Certificates of title issued pursuant to emancipation patents acquire
the same protection accorded to other titles and become indefeasible and
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the
issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent.

B) Charles Bumagat vs. Regalado Arribay, GR. No. 194818, June 9,

2014

C) Facts:
Petitioners are the registered owners and possessors of the subject
agricultural land. Their certificates of titles were issued in 1986 pursuant
to emancipation patents. They filed a complaint for forcible entry against
respondent before the MCTC. They alleged that respondent - with the aid
of armed goons, and through the use of intimidation and threats of
physical harm - entered the said land and ousted them from their lawful
possession; that respondent then took physical possession and
cultivation of these parcels of land.
Respondent claimed, among others, that the petitioners' titles have
been ordered cancelled in a resolution issued by the DARAB: that he is
the absolute owner of said land and is the administrator and overseer of
the remaining portion thereof; that petitioners abandoned the subject
properties in 1993; and that he planted the same with corn and rice.
MCTC ruled in favor of petitioners. It held that based on the
evidence, petitioners were in actual possession of the subject parcels of
land. RTC affirmed in toto MCTC decision. While CA reversed and set
aside the appealed decision. It agreed that the parties' dispute fell under
the jurisdiction of the DARAB since petitioners' titles were obtained
pursuant to PD 27. Hence, this instant petition.
D) Issue:
Are the petitioners the lawful owners of the subject land?
E) Held:
Yes, the petitioners the lawful owners of the subject land.
Certificates of title issued pursuant to emancipation patents acquire
the same protection accorded to other titles, and become indefeasible
and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the
issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent.
Hence, when petitioners' titles were issued in 1986, these became
indefeasible and
incontrovertible. When petitioners obtained their emancipation patents
and subsequently their certificates of title, they acquired vested rights of
absolute ownership over their respective landholdings. It presupposes
that the grantee or beneficiary has, following the issuance of a certificate
of land transfer, already complied with all the preconditions required
under P.D. No. 27, and that the landowner has been fully compensated
for his property. And upon the issuance of title, the grantee becomes the
owner of the landholding and he thereby ceases to be a mere tenant or
lessee. His right of ownership, once vested,
becomes fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy. Petitioners became the owners of the subject property upon
the issuance of the emancipation patents and, as such, enjoy the right to
possess the same--a right that is an attribute of absolute ownership.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed February
19, 2010 Decision and November 9, 2010 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 101423 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
April 12, 2007 Decision of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Cabagan-Delfin Albano, Isabela in Special Civil Action No. 475 is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED

CASE #6

A) Doctrine:
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and
with just title for 10 years.
 B) Spouses Anita and Honorio Aguirre vs. Heirs of Lucas Villanueva,
GR. No. 169898 (J. Ynares-Santiago) (October 27, 2006)

C) Facts:
Private respondents alleged that they are the legitimate children
and grandson of the late spouses Villanueva, the owners of the disputed
land: that spouses Villanueva possessed said land during their lifetime
openly, publicly, and continuously in the concept of an owner and after
their death. they were succeeded by their children: that sometime in
1997. petitioners and their hired laborers fenced the whole land in
question without the knowledge and consent of private respondents; that
when confronted petitioners alleged that the acquired the same through
inheritance from their father. Salazar, who in turn purchased the land
from the late Tirol by virtue of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property.
Hence, complaint for annulment of deed of exchange, tax declarations
and recovery of ownership and possession was filed by private
respondents against petitioners.
RTC noted that the tax declarations in the name of Tirol and the
survev plan did not establish the fact that Ciriaco Tirol is the owner and
possessor of the land in question, thus. he has no right to transfer
ownership of the same to petitioners father that petitioners did not acquire
the land via extraordinary acquisitive prescription considering that their
possession only lasted for 26 ears from 1971 o to 1997. This decision
was affirmed in toto b the CA. Hence, this petition.
D) Issue:
Are the petitioners the rightful owners of the disputed land?
E) Held:
Yes. petitioners are the rightful owners of the disputed land.
acquiring it through prescription.
Prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights
through the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down
hv law namely that the possession should he in the consent of an owner,
public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. It ran he an ordinary
acquisitive prescription which requires possession in good faith and with
just title for 10 years.
In the instant case, the Court find sufficient evidence to support
petitioners' claim that the requirements for ordinary prescription are
present. The petitioners have just title over the land hv way of exchange
which is one of the modes recognized by law in acquiring ownership.
Moreover, they have been in public, and uninterrupted possession of the
land in the concept of an owner for a span of twenty-six (26) years from
1971 un to 1997. They are also in good faith when their father bought the
same from Ciriaco Tirol who presented various documents to evidence
that said land was transmitted to Anita by succession from his deceased
father, and who thereafter possessed the property and exercised
dominion
over it.
Moreover. to prove their ownership. petitioners presented tax
declarations for the year 1974 and 1980 to 1994. in the name of their
father Salazar declaring the subject land for taxation purposes. While tax
declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and
do not prove title to the land nevertheless when coupled with actual
possession they constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis
of a claim of ownership through prescription.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
March 17, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72530,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch
8, in Civil Case No. 5745, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioners are hereby DECLARED as lawful owners of the subject
property through acquisitive prescription.

CASE #7

A) Doctrine:
Prescription is a mode of acquiring or losing ownership and other
real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions
laid down by law.

B) Heirs of Marcelino Cabal vs. Spouses Lorenzo Cabal, GR. No.

153625 (J. Austria-Martinez) (July 31, 2006)

C) Facts:
Marcelo was the original owner of the disputed lot. Before he died,
he allowed his son, Marcelino, to build his house on a portion of said lot.
Since then. Marcelino resided therein. Upon his death, his heirs divided
the said lot into two equal shares; the other portion was divided in favor of
Marcelino, while the other was co-owned by his other siblings, Lorenzo in
particular. Marcelino mortgaged his share to a bank. While Lorenzo and
all the other siblings of Marcelino executed a Deed of Agreement of
Partition with Sale as to the other portion of the lot.
Respondents filed a complaint for Recover of Possession with
Damages against Marcelino before the MCT. They alleged that Marcelino
introduced improvements in bad faith on their land with knowledge that
the adjacent lot is titled in his name.
MTC ruled in favor of Marcelino. It held that prescription has barred
the respondents from filing a claim.
RTC reversed MC ruling. It held that Marcelino's possession, which
was tolerated by his co-owners, does not ripen into ownership.
CA sustained RTC ruling. It held that Marcelino's occupation in
good faith diminished after the lot was surveyed when he was apprised of
the fact that the portion he was occupying was not the same as the
portion titled in his name.

D) Issue:
Did Marcelino validly acquire the disputed portion through
prescription?
E) Held:
No, Marcelino did not validly acquire the disputed portion through
prescription.
Prescription is a mode of acquiring or losing ownership and other
real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions
laid down by law namely that the possession should he in the concept of
an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive
prescription can either be (1) ordinary or (2) extraordinary
Here, the evidence presented during the trial in the MTC were
sorely insufficient to prove that acquisitive prescription has set in with
regards to the disputed lot. The tax declaration and receipts presented in
evidence factually established only that Marcelino had been religiously
paying realty taxes on said lot. Tax declarations and receipts can only be
the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription when coupled with
proof of actual possession. Evidently, Marcelino declared and paid realty
taxes on property which he did not actually possess as he took
possession of a lot eventually identified as not his portion. Furthermore.
Marcelino no longer invoked prescription in his pleadings before the RTC
CA and this Court. They are thus deemed to have abandoned the
defense of prescription
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
64729 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
court of origin for further proceedings to determine the facts essential to
the proper application of Article 448 in relation to Articles 546 and 548 of
the civil code.

CASE #8

A) Doctrine:
Devolution cannot have any effect on donations.

B) Republic vs. Federico Daclan, GR. No.197115, March 23, 2015

C) Facts:
Sometime in 1972, the Ago Breeding Station was established by the
Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Animal Industry
(BAI), for the purpose of breeding cattle that would be distributed to the
intended beneficiaries pursuant to the livelihood program of the national
government. In support of the said project, plaintiff Daclans and other
donors executed four documents denominated as Deed of Donation in
favor of defendant Republic of the Philippines, donating to the latter four
parcels of land. The donation was subject to the conditions that these
parcels of land 1) shall be used solely for the establishment of a breeding
station, 2) shall not be used for any other purpose, except with the
previous consent of the donors or their heirs, and 3) in case of non-use,
abandonment or cessation of the activities, possession or ownership shall
automatically revert to the donor.
However, La Union Medical Center (LUMC) was constructed in the
donated lands. Hence, the plaintiffs filed a case for specific performance
before TC demanding the return of their donated lands on the ground that
the breeding station has ceased operations pursuant to the automatic
reversion clause.
 RTC dismissed the case. It held that the Daclans' consent to the
transfer of functions and powers of BAI to the Province was not
necessary as to affect the validity of the donations of their lands:
devolution of power took effect by operation of law. It held further that
contrary to the Daclans' claims, the operations of the breeding station
never ceased as there are farm animals, buildings, and offices therein.
CA set aside TC decision and ruled that the donated lands being
used by the LUMC for its medical facility, hence no longer being used for
the purpose for which the donation was constituted, is revoked.
D) Issue:
Should the donated lands be returned to the Daclans?
E) Held:
No, the donated lands should not be returned
Devolution cannot have any effect on the donations made by the
Daclans to the Republic. Devolution refers to the act by which the
national government confers power and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. While
the breeding station may have been transferred to the Province of La
Union by the DA as a consequence of devolution, it remained as such,
and continued to function as a breeding station; and the purpose for
which the donations were made remained and was carried out. Besides,
the deeds of donation did not specifically
prohibit the subsequent transfer of the donated lands by the donee
Republic. The Daclans should bear in mind that "contracts take effect
between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in cases where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by
their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law." Thus, as a general
rule, rights and obligations derived from contract are transmissible.
The deeds of donation merely stipulated that the donated lands
shall be used for the establishment of a breeding station and shall not be
used for any other purpose. It was never stipulated that the may interfere
in the management and operation of the breeding station.
Moreover, the Daclans admitted that the portion where the LUMC is
constructed does not form part of the lands they donated. Hence, they
have no right to ask return of the donated lands.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves as follows:
1. The January 25, 2011 Decision and May 30, 2011 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R CV No. 90014 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE;
 2. The Petition in G.R. No. 197115 is GRANTED. The July 31, 2007
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32
dismissing Civil Case No. A-2363 is REINSTATED.

CASE #9

A) Doctrine:
Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership. It is concerned
that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.

B) Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo vs. Agrifina Rañon, GR. No.

171068 (J. Chico-Nazario) (September 5, 2007)

B) Facts:
Respondent Rañon filed a Complaint against spouses Montemayor
with the MCTC claiming ownership over an unregistered residential lot.
She claimed that her familv had enioyed continuous, peaceful and
uninterrupted possession and ownership of the property since 1962 and
had religiously paid the taxes thereon. Unfortunately, in 1986, fire
destroyed the said house. Nonetheless, they continued to visit the
property. Soon, they discovered that the subject property was already in
the name of the spouses Montemayor by virtue of an Affidavit of
Ownership and Possession. The Affidavit was alleged to have
created a cloud of doubt over Rañon's title and ownership over the
property.
On the other hand, Spouses Montemayor alleged that they acquired
the subject lot by purchase from the heirs of its previous owners,
Arzadon-Crisologo.
MCTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. It held, among others, that
the period of possession of the spouses Rañon in the concept of an
owner from 1962 to 1977 did not ripen into ownership because their
occupation was in bad faith. TC reversed and set aside the MCTC
decision. It held that respondent Rañons had acquired the subject
property by virtue of acquisitive prescription, and therefore adjudged
respondents are the absolute owners thereof. CA affirmed in toto the TC
ruling. Hence, this petition.
C) Issue:
 Did the respondents acquire ownership over the subject property
through prescription?
D) Held:
Yes, the respondents acquired ownership over the subject property
through prescription. Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership
and other real rights over immovable property. It is concerned that the
possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,
uninterrupted and adverse. By preponderance of evidence, it has been
established that the respondents have been in possession of the parcel of
land in suit continuously, peacefully, publicly, notoriously, uninterrupted
and in the concept of an owner since 1962 to the present. Actual
possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over
it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property. One need not to stay on it. The acts of dominion exercised by
the respondents over the parcel of land in suit are consistent with
ownership. Thev even paid taxes in their name. Jurisprudence is clear
that although tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is
not in his possession. As is well known, the payment of taxes coupled
with actual possession of the land covered by the tax declaration strongly
supports a claim of ownership. Hence, respondents validly acquired
ownership over the subject property through prescription.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 10 November 2005 and the Resolution dated 12 January
2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72552 are AFFIRMED.

CASE #10
A. Doctrine: Jurisprudence provides that it a contract of donation
provides tor automatic reversion in caseof a breach of a condition and
the donee violates it, the property donated automatically reverts back
tothe donor without need of anjudicial declaration. It is only when the
donee denies or challenges itspropriety that the court can intervene
to conclusively settle whether the resolution was proper.

B. Case Title: Province of Camarines Sur vs. Bodega Glassware, GR.

No. 194199, (J. Jardeleza) (March 22, 2017)
 C. Facts: Petitioner is the owner of the subject land. It donated a portion
of it to the Camarines Sur Teachers Association. Inc. CASTEA)
through a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos. The deed included
anautomatic revocation clause which provides that CASTEA shall not
sell, mortgage, or incumber the donated land to any party and that it
shall be used for no other purpose by CASTEA in connection with its
functions under its charter and by-laws, otherwise, the donation shall
be automatically revoked and voided.

In 1995, CASTEA entered a 20-year Contract of Lease with Bodega

over the donated land. By 2005,the petitioner wrote Bodega regarding the
building it built on the property and requested to show proof of ownership or
any other legal document as legal basis for his possession. Bodega failed
to present any proof. Nevertheless, petitioner left Bodega undisturbed and
merely tolerated its possession of the property. But by 2007, petitioner
demanded that Bodega vacate the property to which the latter refused to
comply. Hence, petitioner revoked its donation to the land and asserted
that CASTEA violated the conditions set in the deed of donation when it
leased the property to Bodega. This was never challenged by CASTEA.
Hence, petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against Bodega
before the MTC.
MTC ruled in favor of petitioner TC reversed MTC decision on the
ground of lack of evidence. CA affirmed TC decision. It held that petitioner
should have first filed an action for reconveyance of the property against
CASTEA. It theorized that judicial intervention is necessary to ascertain if
the automatic revocation clause suffices to declare the donation revoked.
Also, it held that petitioner's action has already prescribed. Hence this
petition.
D. Issue/s: Who between petitioner and Bodega has the right over the
property?

E. Held: Petitioner has the better right over the property.

Jurisprudence provides that it a contract of donation provides for

automatic rescission or reversion in case of a breach of a condition and the
donee violates it or fails to comply with it, the property donated
automatically reverts back to the donor without need of a judicial
declaration. It is only when the donee denies the rescission or challenges
its propriety that the court can intervene to conclusively settle whether the
resolution was proper. In this case, the Dead of Donation contain a clear
automatic revocation clause. The deed provided three conditions, among
which, CASTEA breached the first and second conditions when it leased
the property to Bodega. Accordingly, the property automatically reverted to
the petitioner. The records even show that CASTEA never contested this
revocation. Hence, petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and
by virtue of the automatic revocation clause this revocation was automatic
andimmediate without need of judicial intervention. As to the question of
prescription the petitioner's right against Bodega has not prescribed since
under the Civil Code prescription of actions for the revocation of a donation
does not apply in cases where the donation has an automatic revocation
clause.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2010 which AFFIRMED the Decision
of the RTC of Naga City Branch 26 dated May 13, 2009 is REVERSEDand
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the MC Naga City is REINSTATED.
CASE #11
A. Doctrine: Certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. It is conclusive evidence as regards ownership of the land therein
described, and the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of
ownership of the property, including possession Thus, the Court has
time and again reiterated the age-old rule that the person who has a
Torrens title over a parcel of land is entitled to possession thereof.

B. Case Title: Heirs of Jose Mariano and Helen S. Mariano, et. al. vs.
City of Naga, GR. No. 197743, (J. Tijam) (March 12, 2018)

C. Facts: The officers of City Heights Subdivision wrote to the mayor of

the City of Naga (City), offering to construct the Naga City Hall within the
premises of the Subdivision. Their letter indicated that the City Hall would be
built on an area of not less than two hectares within the Subdivision, which
would be designated as the open space reserved for a public purpose. Upon
the City's request, the Subdivision amended its offer and agreed to donate five
hectares to the City. The area is a portion of the land registered in the names
of Macario Mariano and Jose Gimenez under TCT No. 671 measuring a total
of 22.9301 hectares. The amended offer was signed by Mariano and
Gimenez to indicate their "conforme," together their respective spouses.
 Thereafter, the Municipal Board adopted Resolution No. 89 accepting the
Subdivision's offer of donation and its proposed contract. According to the
City, the Mayor Imperial and the registered landowners, Mariano and Gimenez,
executed a Deed of Donation on August 16, 1954, whereby the latter donated five
hectares of land (subject property), two hectares of which to be used as the
City Hall site, another two hectares for the  public plaza, and the remaining
hectare for the public market. By virtue thereof, the City entered the
property and began construction of the government center. It also declared
the five-hectare property in its name for tax purposes. Subsequently, other
government agencies and instrumentalities entered the same property and built their
offices thereon. However, the heirs of Mariano (petitioners) aver that the plan to
donate five hectares to the City did not materialize as the contract to build the City
Hall was not awarded to the Subdivision but to a another contractor (Francisco
Sabaria). This caused Mariano and officers of the Subdivision to meet with Mayor
Imperial to demand the return of the five-hectare lot as the condition for the donation
was not complied with. Mayor Imperial purportedly assured them that the City would
buy the property from them. On May 14, 1968, Mariano instructed the Subdivision's
President to make a follow-up on the City's payment for the subject lot. The
purchase, however, did not materialize. In 1971, Mariano died without receiving
payment from the City. In 1976, a certain Tirso Mariano filed an action for partition
of Mariano's estate. The action was opposed  by his widow, Irene, and their
adopted children, Jose and Erlinda. Irene died in 1988. Jose's heirs and
Erlinda were declared as Irene's heirs.
In 2003, Danilo Mariano, as administrator of Irene's estate, demanded upon
then City Mayor of Naga, Jesse M. Robredo, to vacate and return the subject
property. When the City did not comply, petitioners, as heirs of Jose and Erlinda, filed
a Complaint for unlawful detainer against the City. The MTC dismissed the complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that the City's defense, which
involved a claim of ownership, removed the issue from the case of unlawful
detainer. The RTC reversed the dismissal and ruled in favor of petitioners by
ordering the City of Naga and the other government agencies occupying the subject
property to vacate therefrom and pay back rentals to  petitioners. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals (CA), in an amended decision, overturned the RTC and upheld the
dismissal of the MTC. The CA thus concluded that the existence and due execution
of the Deed of Donation had been duly established, warranting the dismissal of the
ejectment case. The CA also found that petitioners' claim was barred by laches,
noting that the City had been in open, public and adverse  possession of the
subject property for 49 years at the time the ejectment case was filed.
 D. Issue/s: Whether or not the Petitioners, as heirs of a registered
owner of the subject property, have the preferred or better right of
possession?

E. Held: Yes. The Court has consistently upheld the registered owners'
superior right to possess the property in unlawful detainer cases. A
fundamental principle in land registration is that the certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of
the. person whose name appears therein. It is conclusive evidence as regards
ownership of the land therein described, and the titleholder is entitled to all
the attributes of ownership of the property, including possession
Thus, the Court has time and again reiterated the age-old rule that
the person who has a Torrens title over a parcel of land is entitled to
possession thereof. The title to the subject property remains registered in the
names of Macario and Gimenez. The alleged Deed of Donation does not
appear to have been registered and TCT No. 671 does not bear any
inscription of said Deed. It has likewise been constantly emphasized that when
the property is registered under the Torrens system, the registered owner's title
to the property is presumed legal and cannot be collaterally attacked,
especially in a mere action for unlawful detainer. It has even been
held that it does not even matter if the  party's title to the property is
questionable. It has been held that a certificate of title has a superior
probative value as against that of an unregistered deed of conveyance in
ejectment cases. As against the City's unregistered claim, the Torrens title in
the name of Mariano and Gimenez must prevail, conferring upon the
registered owners the better right of possession. This superior or
preferred right of possession applies to petitioners as Mariano's
hereditary successors who have stepped into said decedent's shoes by
operation of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals'

Amended Decision dated July 20, 2011 is SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
June 20, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26 of Naga City in Civil
Case No. RTC 2005-0030 is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION in that:
(a) petitioners shall be paid only half of the adjudged monthly rental of
P2,500,000; and (b) the award of attorney's fees is reduced to P75,000. SO
ORDERED.

CASE #12:
A. Doctrine: Article 737 of the Civil Code, “[t]he donor’s capacity shall
be determined as of the time of the making of the donation.” By
analogy, the legal capacity or the personality of the donee, or the
authority of the latter’s representative, in certain cases, is determined
at the time of acceptance of the donation. Article 738, in relation to
Article 745, of the Civil Code provides that all those who are not
specifically disqualified by law may accept donations either personally
or through an authorized representative with a special power of
attorney for the purpose or with a general and sufficient power.

B. Case Title: The Missionary Sisters of our Lady of Fatima vs. Amando
L. Alzona, et. al., GR. No. 224307, (J. Reyes, Jr.) (August 06, 2018)

C. Facts: The Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of Fatima is a religious

and charitable group whose primary mission is to take care of the
abandoned and neglected elderly persons. In October 1999,  through
a letter, Purificacion, a spinster donated her parcels of land to
petitioner Missionary through Mother Concepcion, the petitioner’s
Superior General who took care of her during her illness. In August
2001, Mother Concepcion was advised by a lawyer to register their
group to the Securities and Exchange Commission. On August 28,
2001 she applied for the registration of the Missionary. The next day,
Purificacion executed a Deed of Donation Intervivos in favor of
petitioner conveying her properties. Two days later, the Certificate of
Incorporation was issued by the SEC.

D. Issue/s: Whether or not the donation is valid given that the time the
donation was made, the Missionary was not yet registered with the
SEC?

E. Held: Yes, the donation was valid and has complied with all the
requisites of a valid donation.
 In order that a donation of an immovable property be valid, the
following elements must be present:

(a) the essential reduction of the patrimony of the donor;

(b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee;
(c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi;
(d) the donation must be contained in a public document; and
(e) that the acceptance thereof be made in the same deed or in
a separate public instrument; if acceptance is made in a
separate instrument, the donor must be notified thereof in an
authentic form, to be noted in both instruments.

In spite of the fact that the Missionary was not yet registered with the
SEC when the properties were donated,  the donation would still be valid
because Purificacion, applying the doctrine of corporation by estoppel, was
aware that the Missionary was not yet incorporated and registered with the
SEC. Purificacion dealt with the petitioner as if it were a corporation. This is
evident from the fact that Purificacion executed two (2) documents
conveying her properties in favor of the petitioner – first, on October 11,
1999 via handwritten letter, and second, on August 29, 2001 through a
Deed; the latter having been executed the day after the petitioner filed its
application for registration with the SEC. She is estopped to deny the
Missionary’s legal existence in any action involving the transfer of her
property by way of donation. She has assumed an obligation in favor of a
non-existent corporation, having transacted with the latter as if it was duly
incorporated. The doctrine of corporation by estoppel is founded on
principles of equity and is designed to prevent injustice and unfairness. It
applies when a non-existent corporation enters into contracts or dealings
with third persons.The doctrine of corporation by estoppel applies for as
long as there is no fraud.

The doctrine of corporation by estoppel rests on the idea that if

the Court were to disregard the existence of an entity which entered
into a transaction with a third party, unjust enrichment would result
as some form of benefit have already accrued on the part of one of
the parties. Thus, in that instance, the Court affords upon the unorganized
entity corporate fiction and juridical personality for the sole purpose of
upholding the contract or transaction.
 In this case, while the underlying contract which is sought to be
enforced is that of a donation, and thus rooted on liberality, it cannot be
said that Purificacion, as the donor failed to acquire any benefit therefrom
so as to prevent the application of the doctrine of corporation by estoppel.
To recall, the subject properties were given by Purificacion, as a token of
appreciation for the services rendered to her during her illness. [46] In fine,
the subject deed partakes of the nature of a remuneratory or compensatory
donation, having been made “for the purpose of rewarding the donee for
past services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt.”

Under Article 737 of the Civil Code, “[t]he donor’s capacity shall be
determined as of the time of the making of the donation.” By analogy, the
legal capacity or the personality of the donee, or the authority of the latter’s
representative, in certain cases, is determined at the time of acceptance of
the donation. Article 738, in relation to Article 745, of the Civil Code
provides that all those who are not specifically disqualified by law may
accept donations either personally or through an authorized representative
with a special power of attorney for the purpose or with a general and
sufficient power.

Jurisprudence settled that “[t]he filing of articles of incorporation

and the issuance of the certificate of incorporation are essential for the
existence of a de facto corporation.” In fine, it is the act of registration
with SEC through the issuance of a certificate of incorporation that
marks the beginning of an entity’s corporate existence.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the

instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Decision dated January 7, 2016 and Resolution dated April 19, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101944, are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.

CASE #13

A. Doctrine: A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person

disposes a thing or right gratuitously in favor of another, who, in turn,
accepts it. Like any other contract, agreement between the paiiies
must exist. Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites:
(1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to
which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous.
 The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of
consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable. In order for
a donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor's
capacity to give consent at the time of the donation.

B. Case Title: Lydia Lavarez, et. al. vs. Angeles S. Guevarra, GR.
No. 206103, (J. Peralta) (March 29, 2017)

C. Facts: On June 7, 1996, Rebecca died intestate and without any

issue, leaving several properties to be settled among her nearest kins
– the sons and daughters of her siblings – who later became the
parties in this case. On October 16, 1996, the petitioners, filed an
action for reconveyance, partition, accounting, and nullification of
documents, with damages, against respondents. For their defense,
respondents alleged that there was nothing to partition since they
were not aware of any real or personal properties which their aunt
Rebecca had left behind. Said properties which were included in the
complaint had already been validly donated to them by Rebecca,
resulting to new Certificates of Title being issued in their names. It is
the contention of respondents that Rebecca still had full control of her
mind during the execution of the deeds. The fact that she was already
of advanced age at that time or that she had to rely on respondents’
care did not necessarily prove that she could no longer give consent
to a contract. On May 26, 2010, the Lucena RTC granted the
complaint in favor of defendants-appellants are declared valid.
Respondents elevated the case to the CA. The appellate court partly
granted the appeal and sustained the validity of the subject Deeds of
Donation. Hence, this petition.

D. Issue/s: Whether or not Rebecca, on May 12, 1993, possessed

sufficient mentality to make the subject deeds of donation which
would meet the legal test regarding the required capacity to dispose?

E. Held: No. Rebecca did not possess sufficient mentality to effect the
contract of donation. Putting together the abovementioned
circumstances, that at the time of the execution of the Deeds of
 Donation covering numerous properties, Rebecca was already at an
advanced age of 75, afflicted with dementia, not necessarily in the
pinkest of health since she was then, in fact, admitted to the hospital,
it can be reasonably assumed that the same had the effects of
impairing her brain or mental faculties so as to considerably affect her
consent, and that fraud or undue influence would have been
employed in order to procure her signature on the questioned deeds.
The correctness of the trial court’s findings therefore stands
untouched, since respondents never provided any plausible argument
to have it reversed, the issue of the validity of donation being fully
litigated and passed upon by the trial court.

Petitioners claim, as confirmed by Dr. Conde, that the unsoundness

of the mind of the donor was the result of senile dementia. This is the form
of mental decay of the aged upon which wills or donations are most often
contested. Senile dementia, usually called childishness, has various forms
and stages. To constitute complete senile dementia, there must be such
failure of the mind as to deprive the donor of intelligent action. In the first
stages of the disease, a person may still possess reason and have will
power. It is a form of mental disorder in which cognitive and intellectual
functions of the mind are prominently affected; impairment of memory is
early sign. Total recovery is not possible since organic cerebral disease is
involved. It is likewise the loss, usually progressive, of cognitive and
intellectual functions, without impairment of perception or consciousness,
caused by a variety of disorders including severe infections and toxins, but
most commonly associated with structural brain disease. It is characterized
by disorientation, impaired memory, judgment and intellect, and a shallow
labile effect.

Thus, after an extensive examination of the records of the instant

case, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the lower court’s
conclusion that Rebecca Zaballero, on May 12, 1993, could not have had
full control over her mental faculties so as to render her completely capable
of executing a valid Deed of Donation.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court GRANTS

the petition and REINSTATES the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Lucena City, Branch 53, dated May 26, 2010 in Civil Case No. 1996-159.
SO ORDERED.
CASE #14

A. Doctrine: A donation is, by definition, "an act of liberality." Article 725

of the Civil Code provides: Article 725. Donation is an act of liberality
whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of
another, who accepts it.

B. Case Title: Republic of the Philippines vs. Spouses Francisco R.

Llamas and Carmelita C. Llamas, Gr. No. 194190, (J. Leonen)
(January 25, 2017)

C. Facts: On April 23, 1990, the Department of Public Works and

Highways initiated an action for expropriation for the widening of Dr.
A. Santos Ave, which also known as Sucat Road. This action was
brought against 26 defendants, none of whom are respondents in this
case. On November 2, 1993, the Commissioners appointed by the
Regional Trial Court in the expropriation case submitted a resolution
recommending that just compensation for the expropriated areas be
set to P12, 000.00 per square meter. Llamas spouses filed "Most
Urgent and Respectful Motion for Leave to be Allowed Intervention as
Defendants-Intervenors-Oppositors" on January 27, 1994. They also
filed their Answer-in-Intervention on March 21, 1994. After which, on
August 2, 1994, they filed a "Most Urgent Motion for the Issuance of
an Order Directing the Immediate Payment of 40% of Zonal Value of
Expropriated Land and Improvements."

After years of not obtaining a favorable ruling, the Llamas Spouses

filed a "Motion for Issuance of an Order to Pay and/or Writ of Execution
dated May 14, 2002. In this Motion, the Llamas Spouses faulted the
Department of Public Works and Highways for what was supposedly its
deliberate failure to comply with the Regional Trial Court's previous Orders
and even with its own undertaking to facilitate the payment of just
compensation to the Llamas Spouses. Department of Public Works and
Highways and the Llamas Spouses had an understanding that the
resolution of the latter's claims required the submission of: (1) certified true
copies of the TCTs covering the lots; and (2) certified true copies of the tax
declarations, tax clearances, and tax receipts over the lots.  But, due to
their continued failure to comply with their undertaking, the Department of
Public Works and Highways did not pay them.

On October 8, 2007, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order

directing the payment to the Llamas Spouses of just compensation at
P12,000.00 per square meter for 41 square meters for the lot covered by
TCT No. 217267. It denied payment for areas covered by TCT No. 179165
and noted that these were subdivision road lots, which the Llamas Spouses
"no longer owned" and which "belonged to the community for whom they
were made." In the Order dated May 19, 2008, the Regional Trial Court
denied the Llamas Spouses' Motion for Reconsideration.

D. Issue/s: Whether or not just compensation must be paid to

respondents Francisco and Carmelita Llamas for the subdivision road
lots covered by TCT No. 179165?

E. Held: Yes. The Department of Public Works and Highways insists

that the road lots are not compensable since they have "already been
withdrawn from the commerce of man." It relies chiefly on this Court's
1991 Decision in White Plains Association, Inc. v. Legaspi, which
pertained to "the widening of the Katipunan Road in the White Plains
Subdivision in Quezon City.”More specifically, in the 1991 White
Plains Decision that shows a compulsion for subdivision owners to
set aside open spaces for public use, such as roads, and for which
they need not be compensated by Subdivision owners are mandated
to set aside such open spaces before their proposed subdivision
plans may be approved by the government authorities, and that such
open spaces shall be devoted exclusively for the use of the general
public and the subdivision owner need not be compensated for the
same. A subdivision owner must comply with such requirement
before the subdivision plan is approved and the authority to sell is
issued. On the other hand, in its assailed Decision, the Court of
Appeals set aside the Regional Trial Court's Orders and required the
Department of Public Works and Highways to similarly compensate
 the Llamas Spouses for the two (2) road lots at P12, 000.00 per
square meter.

The Court of Appeals correctly stated that a "positive act" must first
be made by the "owner-developer before the city or municipality can
acquire dominion over the subdivision roads." As there is no such thing as
an automatic cession to government of subdivision road lots, an actual
transfer must first be effected by the subdivision owner: "subdivision streets
belonged to the owner until donated to the government or until expropriated
upon payment of just compensation." Stated otherwise, "the local
government should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or
expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road." Delineated roads
and streets, whether part of a subdivision or segregated for public use,
remain private and will remain as such until conveyed to the government by
donation or through expropriation proceedings. An owner may not be
forced to donate his or her property even if it has been delineated as road
lots because that would partake of an illegal taking. He or she may even
choose to retain said properties. Respondents have not made any positive
act enabling the City Government of Parañaque to acquire dominion over
the disputed road lots.

A donation is, by definition, "an act of liberality." Article 725 of

the Civil Code provides: “Article 725. Donation is an act of liberality
whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of
another, who accepts it.” To be considered a donation, an act of
conveyance must necessarily proceed freely from the donor's own,
unrestrained volition. A donation cannot be forced: it cannot arise
from compulsion, be borne by a requirement, or otherwise be
impelled by a mandate imposed upon the donor by forces that are
external to him or her. Article 726 of the Civil Code reflects this
commonsensical wisdom when it specifically states that conveyances
made in view of a "demandable debt" cannot be considered true or
valid donations. In jurisprudence, animus donandi (that is, the intent
to do an act of liberality) is an indispensable element of a valid
donation, along with the reduction of the donor's patrimony and the
corresponding increase in the donee’s patrimony.
 Therefore, they retain their private character. Accordingly, just
compensation must be paid to respondents as the government takes the
road lots in the course of a road widening project.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The

assailed October 14, 2010 Decision of the Fifth Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104178 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.