Turci International Journal of Dharma Studies (2015) 3:2

DOI 10.1186/s40613-015-0013-5

DEBATE Open Access

Śraddhā in the Bhagavad Gītā: an investigation

on the primeval expressions of the contemporary
paradigm on heart-philosophy
Rubens Turci

Correspondence:
Programa de Estudos Indianos Abstract
(PEIND), Universidade do Estado do
Rio de Janeiro, Rua São Francisco Background: The Gītā, as it is well known, is an episode in the Mahābhārata when the
Xavier 524 sala 9016, Rio de Janeiro climactic battle is about to begin. Kṛṣṇa argues in the Gītā that Arjuna should cultivate
- R.J. 20550-900, Brazil the necessary śraddhā (faith-in-oneself; mind’s serene asceticism toward the heart) in
order to overcome his state of doubts and distress.
Discussion: This essay discusses in what manner the contemporary forms of
Environmentalism, such as those found in Eco-Dharma and Deep Ecology, have grown
straightforward from the heart-philosophy rooted on the concept of śraddhā as dealt
with in the Gītā.
Summary: Śraddhā is a ground to spirituality and environmentalism. No matter one’s
dogma of faith, it is always possible to display the universal soul force called śraddhā.
For, when a sincere Christian, Hindu, Muslim, or even atheist, places his or her trust in
that which transcends, what they all display is nothing but a form of the universal
śraddhā. Being the element that is common to people of different faiths, śraddhā
represents the main category for the understanding of heart-philosophy, which
encompasses Theology, Spirituality, Eco-Dharma, and Environmentalism.

Introduction
This essay explores a couple of consequences of my thesis “Śraddhā in the Bhagavad
Gītā” (2007), where I have shown both that term śraddhā keeps in the Gītā its essential
meaning of the mind’s serene asceticism toward ātman (the universal life-principle; the
pervading principle in which everything exists, and also that within each living being’s
heart), and further that, that śraddhā represents the main category for the understanding
of the theology of the Gītā.a Now I intend to discuss in what manner the contemporary
forms of Environmentalism, such as those found in Eco-Dharma and Deep Ecology, have
grown straightforward from the heart-philosophy, rooted on the concept of śraddhā as
dealt with in the Gītā – a text which paces the carrying out of day-to-day life activities
with an existence entirely oriented to the development of a deep awareness of the holistic
inner nature of the outer world.
The Bhagavad Gītā, as it is well known, is an episode in the Mahābhārata when the
climactic battle is about to begin. There, Arjuna refuses to fight, and it is Kṛṣṇa’s counsel
that will finally convince him. Ultimately, due to his dialogue in the form of a series
of kind-hearted theological arguments with Kṛṣṇa, Arjuna is able to overcome his
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Turci International Journal of Dharma Studies (2015) 3:2 Page 2 of 12

paralyzing state of distress. The discipline taught by Kṛṣṇa leads Arjuna to solve the
dichotomy between the duties of the warrior in the pravṛtti b process and those of the
disciple seeking spiritual instruction in the nivṛtti path. In the Gītā these two modes
represent the two inherent aspects of every single action. Although these processes
seem to be separate and opposite, representing the paths of (1) living in the world
(pravṛtti) and (2) retreating from it (nivṛtti), in the Gītā they are said to constitute that
one single path defined as surrender unto ātman (BhG 18.66c).d The Gītā discusses
this issue from the viewpoint of Arjuna’s gradual shifting of mindset,e from his initial ego-
centric state of distress (guṇa-para state, as described in BhG 2.67), toward a selfless sur-
render into the sacred realm of the heart (ātma-para state, as described in BhG 2.58). In
the Gītā, Kṛṣṇa teaches Arjuna to leave behind all personal desiresf (kāma), withdrawing
the senses from the sense-objects as a tortoise withdraws its limbs into its shell (BhG
2.58). Even when engaged with the objects of the senses, Arjuna should not lose sight of
ātman (BhG 2.64). For, when enslaved by the senses, the mind blinds one’s judgment
(BhG 2.67). Kṛṣṇa argues that Arjuna should acquire the necessary śraddhā in order to
shift from the egocentric sphere (guṇa-para state) to that of surrender unto ātman
(ātma-para state).
The following Hindu poetical standpoint evinces the premises of those living in
accordance with the śraddhā-based heart-philosophy:

I experience life as if all things and beings were born from a universal being that
interpenetrates and sustains the entire cosmos. I experience life as if we all, from the
lowest to the highest being, embodied nothing but a single existence. (Anonymous)

The Bhagavad Gītā inside the Mahābhārata

The Mahābhārata presents a war-like situation in which the message of the Gītā provides
a contrast between Arjuna’s process of pravṛtti – the 12 years in the forest, dedicating
himself to the practice of tapas (austerity) to get the necessary weapons for the fight-
ing – with Arjuna’s process of nivṛtti, when he appears in the Gītā eager to step into
the spiritual path. The discipline taught by Kṛṣṇa leads Arjuna to solve the dichotomy be-
tween the duties of the warrior in the pravṛtti process and those of the disciple seeking
spiritual instruction in the nivṛtti path. Śraddhā becomes in the Gītā the key element for
redefining previous concepts and, as a consequence, for solving moral dilemmas.
The common Hindu statement, quoted by Shastri, “Śraddhā is the basis of
Śrāddha – śraddhā śrāddhe yato mūlam” (1963, 390),g provides the underlying
theological frame for structuring the story that links the Gītā with the Mahābhārata. The
śrāddha rite (death rite) involves a ritual which bonds people to the deceased by śraddhā,
in a kind-hearted relation of spirituality and religious fervor. Arjuna’s regaining of śraddhā
in the Gītā, which is a subsection of the Book of Bhīṣma (Bhīṣmaparvan), and the heroic
ancestor Bhīṣma’s death ritual (śrāddha rite) that follow in the Book of Instructions
(Aṇuśāsanaparvan), therefore, are central to the understanding of how the pair śraddhā
and śraddhā link the different parvans together as a number of different reflections on
dharma. After all peace attempts of the Udyogaparvan had failed, dharma is thought of in
the following parvans in the context of the battle (dharma-yuddha). The importance of death
in ritual terms is clear in each of these different parvans, with the relation of śraddhā and
śrāddha particularly explored in the parvans celebrating commanders’ deaths.
Turci International Journal of Dharma Studies (2015) 3:2 Page 3 of 12

At the very moment one chooses not to follow what ātman indicates, one loses one’s
śraddhā and the ability to recognize dharma. The blind king loses sight of how to rule;
Bhīṣma loses sight of what he needs to protect, and, according to Kṛṣṇa, Karṇa loses
sight of who it is to whom he really owes loyalty. These are the stories of the confusion
about dharma in the Mahābhārata. Those who are ruled by the selfish motives rooted in
the individual (ahaṃkāra) are not aware of their social and sacred inner nature, or
ātman. They are not aware that ātman encompasses the individual, or ahaṃkāra. What
the message of Kṛṣṇa a in the Gītā adds to the story of the Mahābhārata, therefore, is
the theological sense that when the sattvic (pure) form of śraddhā is not manifest in a
person’s heart, the consequence is the deterioration of all forms of life. For, the ability to
recognize truth and the laws of nature comes from ātman by means of sattvic śraddhā.
The Gītā and the Mahābhārata show how the people who suffer from egocentrism,
being oblivious to the principles of the heart-philosophy (ātmic understanding), begin
to indulge in lawlessness; with the result there is soon confusion about the nature of
the holistic realm in which life itself takes place. Both texts exemplify that, although we
are naturally aware of our own existence in the world, we are not always aware of
the ātmic realm. One needs to develop the proper śraddhā and live a spiritual life to
get ātmic understanding. In the Gītā, throughout its 18 chapters, Kṛṣṇa contrasts
śraddhā with Arjuna’s whining behavior by introducing him to the discipline of
orthopraxish known as niṣkāmakarmayoga – one should put one’s heart on the
performance of one’s mission, without any ulterior motive or interest.i Arjuna’s
initial state in the Gītā is to be understood as the true dramatic moment of the
whole Mahābhārata – a point where all questioning necessarily leads to some sort
of conclusion and practical engagement. Arjuna conveys a metaphysical, social, and
political attempt to reach orthopraxis, and the Gītā represents that point of the
Mahābhārata where all questions ask for some sort of resolution. The struggle
between war and peace represents the moment and opportunity to think again
about the meaning of life, law, family ties, righteousness, and above all, the meaning
and role of one’s own conscience in the larger social process.
The Gītā, then, represents a wholehearted mode of reasoning where the transcendent
ātmanj is understood as a way to overcome the manifold world-processes ruled by
individualism and selfishness. The Gītā describes a unique and concrete situation, a
never-to-be-repeated in reality. The dialogue gives rise to a phenomenology of con-
science where different modes of thinking are laid out. The text makes use of myths
and customary values to reveal the different aspects of the human psyche that play
themselves out in the field of moral philosophy. The Gītā’s abstract discussions take
place in the field of values, Dharmakṣetra. There śraddhā emerges as the truly central
category of a heart-philosophy, and reconciles the two distinct types of human activ-
ities, defined by the conceptual pair pravṛtti (engagement in the affairs of the world)
and nivṛtti (disengagement from the affairs of the world).

The Gītā in the Light of Śraddhā

Although the two paths of pravṛtti (engagement) and nivṛtti (disengagement) used to be
seen in Vedic tradition as separate and opposite, Kṛṣṇa redefines them as the two comple-
mentary aspects of the one discipline of orthopraxis rooted in śraddhā that he is present-
ing to Arjuna.k Orthopraxis is presented as a matter of an ethical choice, rather than a
Turci International Journal of Dharma Studies (2015) 3:2 Page 4 of 12

matter of a simple moral decision based on faith and tradition. The Gītā reminds us that
the idea of ‘doxa’ is something of provisional and of relative value; something that should
be constantly re-evaluated under the light and higher authority of ātman. This is shown in
the Gītā through Arjuna’s legitimate and honest process of doubting. As a real psychological
subject (Nara), Arjuna is going through many epistemic transitions, and struggles to realize
the ideal epistemic subject (ātman), characterized by Kṛṣṇa (Nārāyaṇa). The Mahābhārata
often refers to Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna as Nara−Nārāyaṇa, the nourishers of truth. While the
Mahābhārata showcases the concrete field called Kurukṣetra, with Arjuna demonstrating
his ability in fulfilling his deeds (pravṛtti), the Gītā exhibits his inner struggle to overcome
himself and make his mind abide solely in the sacredness of the heart (nivṛtti). The Gītā
unifies these two different paths of pravṛtti and nivṛtti.l Arjuna, the warrior in the
external process, and Arjuna, the psychological subject seeking real knowledge, are
unified by means of the discipline of the realization of ātman, rooted on śraddhā.
Śraddhā is represented in the Gītā as a ground to spirituality. For, it does not define
any ‘religion’, but that which lies beyond every creed. The etymology of śrad-dhā
suggests the general meaning of ‘to place one’s heart on’. In accordance to the Gītā
different kinds of devotees (bhakta) are rewarded in accordance with their śraddhā.m
Certainty arises from śraddhā. And that is why śraddhā has sometimes been defined as
trusting judgement, or affirmative conviction – āstikya-buddhi, a Vedic ritualistic state of
mind, which is totally different from later theistic forms of ‘faith’. n The understanding of
śraddhā in the Gītā as āstikya-buddhi implies entering the sphere of ātman. W.C. Smith,
for instance, offers a thorough discussion on the view of śraddhā as āstikya-buddhi and
makes it an orientation of yes-ness, an ‘awakeness to transcendence’ that belongs to
the higher visionary self in the ‘heart’, and not to the rational mind or manas. In his
monumental study called Faith and Belief (1979), W. C. Smith comments on this
scholarly discussion of the term śraddhā. He starts his analysis noting that the major
Vedic commentator Sāyaṇa, and the major commentator on the Gītā, Śaṅkara, take
śraddhā to mean āstikya-buddhi – a kind of orientation of yes-ness (59). He uses both
Minoru Hara (1964) and Paul Hacker to support his understanding that Śaṅkara exegetes
the term as śraddhayā āstikyabuddhayā (n. 22, 217), which he translates as ‘awakeness to
transcendence’ (59). Noting that the term is linked with ‘buddhi’ rather than ‘manas’ or
the ‘mind’ he concludes that it means more than ‘believing’ or giving mental assent to
something. Furthermore, Smith explains in another note:

 
śraddhā . . . āstikyabuddhir bhakti sahitā. This formula occurs in his Śan_ kara
exegesis of Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, in the section (3:9:20–25) where it is being
set forth that the visible forms, life-generative matter, the truth (satyam), and also
faith (3:9:21) are dependent upon, are firmly supported by, dwell steadfast in
(pratiṣṭhitāni bhavanti) the heart – and indeed, the heart alone (hṛdaye hy eva).
Ed. cit. (above, our ref. 52), p. 484. It may be noted that “heart” here is explicitly
interpreted by Śaṅkara as what Westerners would call the mind: namely, the two
discriminated organs buddhi and manas together – ibid, p.483, commentary on
3:9:20.” (Smith 1979, n. 66, 239)

Manas is the category responsible for the state of doctrinal assent or ‘believing’, and
therefore it relates to faith, not śraddhā.o Even when Smith accepts the statement that
Turci International Journal of Dharma Studies (2015) 3:2 Page 5 of 12

śraddhā may be seen as faith, he does not accept the reverse, that ‘faith is śraddhā’.
The consequence of such a view is the establishment of śraddhā in the Gītā at the very
center of spirituality and all philosophical phenomena – heart-philosophy included, as
shown next.

Śraddhā and the Heart-Philosophy of the Gītā

Throughout the whole Gītā, Arjuna is led to focus his mind, not in the changeable
aspects of the external and material world, but exclusively on that which lies hidden in
what we perceive as reality – the ātman, or the unchangeable.p What the Gītā shows is
that anyone is able to ‘experience with certitude’ the truths of the sacred realm when
they discover the highest forms of śraddhā – the ‘soul force’ responsible for putting
love in action. It is śraddhā which gives us enough certainty about our intuitions.
When one is able to develop śraddhā and experience this state oneness dealt with in
the Gītā by means of the concept of ātman, the mind realizes what has been called the
sacredness of nature and of the whole universe.
A similar metaphysical position, where one experiences the world as if through a
holy person’s eyes is also present in contemporary expressions of heart-philosophy,
such as Eco-dharma and Environmentalism, inasmuch as they all assume that the
subject is to be thought of as interconnected with the objects, like in the relation of
the parts and whole. Arne Naess’ main work, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle
(Cambridge University Press, 1989), for instance, is deeply ingrained in the heart-
philosophy of the Gītā. His focus on deep ecology has given rise to what many have
also addressed as Eco-dharma. And that is why one can trace his thought back to
the Gītā, where śraddhā can be said to work as a key factor in bringing life to a perfect
balance of ‘spirituality’ and ‘materiality’.
As Naess acknowledges in many places, his philosophy, known as Ecosophy T, is
rooted in the verse 29 of chapter 6 of the Gītā, where the concept of ātman is outlined.
q
When absorbed in the ātman, one cannot deviate from the truth. For, the ignorant is
he whose ātman is sleepingr – a fact that manifests itself as one being dispossessed of
śraddhā. The ‘eco-dharmic’ life, in whatever its form, presupposes śraddhā, and śraddhā
lights the path, developing itself within that life, where someone gives one’s heart and
transforms all human affairs in a sacred experience.
Śraddhā, therefore, is what expresses the sovereignty of ātman. Śraddhā is a symbol of
illumination and revealer of truth. Arising from the vital stimuli received from the soul
(ātman) through its representative (i.e., buddhi, the power of forming and retaining con-
ceptions; intellect, reason, discernment, and so on), śraddhā is a ‘material’ phenomenon
manifested as energy in our body. This energy, even when acknowledged by some scholars
as the essential part of the religious phenomenon, is uncomfortably identified with a term
coming out of a foreign scripture. Our preference, then, falls on a term such as ‘spiritual-
ity’, which is used as a way to cut away the barriers among different ‘faiths’, and which
now seems to be taking the place of what once we used to call ‘religion.’ It is with the help
of this category ‘spirituality’ that we can draw together people with different expressions
of faith, such as, Tolstoy, Thoreau, Emerson, Luther King, Gandhi, Joan of Arc, Socrates,
Lao Tzu, The Buddha, and so on . . . In other words, the term ‘spirituality’, which
somehow translates ‘śraddhā’ helps us to understand how it is possible to draw a sort of
universal Ecosophy, or Eco-dharma, from the Gītā. For, what the Gītā shows is that
Turci International Journal of Dharma Studies (2015) 3:2 Page 6 of 12

anyone is able, subjectively, to approach and ‘experience with certitude’ something of the
transcendent ātman, when they discover their own spirituality. No matter one’s dogma of
faith, it is always possible to display through our deeds the universal soul force called
śraddhā. For, when a sincere Christian, Hindu, Muslim, or even atheist, places his or her
trust in that which transcends, what they all display is nothing but the highest form of the
universal śraddhā.s The next section will make this point clearer.

Eco-Dharma: a work in progress toward a New scientific paradigm for

reuniting the rational and the spiritual
It is worthwhile to point out next how the Roman Catholic definition of faith as fides
quaerens intellectum,t where the Latin term ‘fides’ (faith) implies this urge to accept some
‘truths’ prior to understanding them, has generated strong debates among philosophers.u
Krishna Sharma,v for instance, denounces the theological exercise undertaken from 17th
to the 19th century to safeguard the Christian concept of a personal God:

… the growing trend towards the impersonalization of God in modern European

philosophy had posed a serious threat to Christianity which could be counteracted
only through a reiteration of faith in the Biblical God, who was personal in nature,
and was different from the God of the philosophers” (Sharma 1987, 9).

The consequence, she argues, was the radical separation of religion and philosophy in
the Western world. Such a separation was followed by the Christian explanations that
religion was “a matter of faith and emotion and not of knowledge and reason” (9). That
is to say, the Western differentiation between religion and philosophy was an outcome
of the Christian understanding of religion as a dogma of faith in one personal god. The
more sophisticated “philosophical explanations of the oneness of God in impersonal
terms” were, then, labeled “as either pantheism or monism” (9). Krishna Sharma blames
Christian scholars for being interested in keeping the Western division between religion
and philosophy, between personal and impersonal concepts of God, and between mon-
ism and monotheism” (1987, x).
Paul Hacker comes to the subject with a very different approach. Hacker believes (as
all Catholics do in consequence of their definition of faith) that faith must precede
understanding, and this is the theological view he assumes when discussing the nature
of śraddhā in the Gītā. Śraddhā is to him, so to speak, the preparatory step leading first
to knowledge and then to salvation. Hacker explains the meaning of śraddhā through
the postulation of a twofold definition: śraddhā would have developed an intellectual
constituent, which nowadays may be understood as ‘faith’, but it would also have kept
its foundational ritual constituent. When defining ‘intellectual śraddhā’ in the Gītā, he
states that śraddhā must precede the knowledge that leads to salvation (1963, 153). Yet,
although arguing that śraddhā is mainly the acceptance of a doctrine (intellectual śrad-
dhā), he is also constrained to acknowledge, when discussing BhG 18.71, that redemption
comes primarily from experience, with śraddhā constituting its driving force (154).
The findings of Hacker have not impressed Smith. Smith criticizes those who argue
that śraddhā presents many different meanings, “speaking of ritual śraddhā, intellectual
śraddhā, moral śraddhā, and so on,” in a way that betrays the understanding of its
inherent simplicity, as well as of its objects (1979, 61–2). For, śraddhā “does not designate
Turci International Journal of Dharma Studies (2015) 3:2 Page 7 of 12

a relationship to anything,” but “indicates rather the attitude or initial act whereby they
enter into one or another relation” (62). And further, “It has to do with man’s capacity to
become involved: the tendency or quality inherent within each person to move outside
him or herself and to become engaged” (62). Clearly, one of the scholars Smith is referring
is P. Hacker, who also “has made the most thoroughgoing studies of the concept to date,”
and who indicates by ‘faith’ (der Glaube) both āstikya-buddhi and śraddhā (n. 28, 222).
Smith argues that Hacker has complicated the matter by “including the object of śraddhā
in the consideration of the various usages and then exploring the resultant modalities of
faith in their intricate variety, in such a way as to obscure what is common to all and is
relatively simple.” That is to say, because of “the Western tendency to define faith in terms
of its objects,” Hacker “has clearly been influenced by his prior mental association of faith
with intellectual content (an association from his modern Christian heritage),” and
the consequence is that he produces a complicated “typology of ritual śraddhā, intel-
lectual śraddhā, etc. (n.40, 227). Smith remarks, then, that śraddhā is not a primarily
intellectualistic concept, and therefore, if we manage to “understand śraddhā at all we
can understand it in all its Hindu forms” (n. 40, 228). When it comes to Hindu
writers, he says, he prefers Rao (1989), who, more cautiously than others, has gener-
ally taken śraddhā to mean ‘faith’, but has also stressed that it is “misleading to trans-
late the word uniformly and without qualification” (n. 28, 222).
As Smith admits, śraddhā “almost constitutes the differentiating characteristic that
qualifies any human activity as religious,” for it means ‘to set one’s heart on’ since the
times of the Ṛg Veda (61). Further on he adds,

That on which one puts or might put one’s heart, in the gamut of India’s complex religious
life, has been varied. Yet the religious man has been characterized (might we not say, “of
course”?) by the fact that he has put his heart on something within it. The term śraddhā is
open, in the sense that it does not itself specify or even suggest what it is on which one
puts one’s heart. The concept as a concept has no particular object, or type of object. (61)

Smith touches here on the issue of the universality of śraddhā, which is not completely
dependent on one’s faith, for it represents that inner-faith or conviction that allows every-
one to see things under the light of the heart, in the ātmic sense presented by Kṛṣṇa a to
Arjuna. As Smith points out, the regular classical Sanskrit word for ‘heart’ is hṛdaya. The
term śrad has been motive of some dispute by the linguists. However, “the question is
only as to whether śrad-/*kred is ‘heart’, the visceral organ,” and has nothing to do with
the figurative sense in which it is being used here. (n. 35, 223–4)
As Smith puts it, śraddhā “contrasts with a mind that is wandering” (63); it implies
“involvement” with our own reality. It “denotes a way of doing things” in “the way an
intellectualist relates his mind and himself to the truth” (64). There is no instance of
śraddhā where the notion of “putting the heart” “is not relevant and appropriate”
(n. 44, 229). That is to say, “once it has been affirmed that śraddhā means ‘placing one’s
heart on’, there is in a sense nothing more to be said” (62). Spirituality, whatever its
form, presupposes śraddhā, and śraddhā lights the path, developing itself within that
life, where someone gives one’s heart. As a consequence, this truth transcends what is
‘religious’ and transforms all human affairs, leading to Deep Ecology, Environmentalism,
and Eco-dharma, as A. Naess and others have described it.
Turci International Journal of Dharma Studies (2015) 3:2 Page 8 of 12

In order to help to end this quarrel about the phrase ‘fides quaerens intellectum’, which
imposes a passive acceptance of the dogmas of ‘faith’, I want to point out, therefore, that
śraddhā seems to mean more than faith. It means, at least, faith plus prudence. As a
matter of fact, I am inclined to believe that the meaning of śraddhā in the Gītā encom-
passes the Seven Virtues adopted by the Catholic Church Fathers: Prudence, Justice,
Temperance, Courage, Faith, Hope, and Compassion. This means, perhaps, that to bring
up to date the true meaning of the phrase ‘fides quaerens intellectum’, as foreseen by
the medieval Catholic Church Fathers, it would be enough to replace the term ‘fides’
by the more accurate term ‘śraddhā’. For, the half-breed expression ‘śraddhā quaerens
intellectum’ passes both the scientific and spiritual requirements. Representing a kind
of experimental certainty and trust, the expression ‘śraddhā quaerens intellectum’
seems to relate to both, the Cartesian Cogito,w and the Baconian Method.x One may
even consider that this expression represents, indeed, a fair candidate as the new
paradigm of contemporary Heart-Philosophy and Eco-dharma. For, the meaning it
conveys implies the so-called reconciliation of reason and spirituality (Fritjof Capra
states that “ecology and spirituality are fundamentally connected, because deep eco-
logical awareness, ultimately, is spiritual awareness.” (qtd. in Dudley 2005: 21))
intended at least since Blaise Pascal’s saying, “The heart has its reasons which reason
knows nothing of… We know the truth not only by the reason, but by the heart.”

Conclusion
Besides the complex philosophical and mythological elements and the ritual theory
which frames the Gītā in the context of the Mahābhārata, one cannot disregard the fact
that what explains how the different characters respond differently to the same ethical
dilemmas is śraddhā. Śraddhā also provides the underlying unity of the two texts.
Furthermore, śraddhā expresses the gradual shift from the sphere of the individual to
that of the collective, representing an altruistic ‘placing of the heart’ on righteous
expressions of activism, which are supposed to be free from any selfish interest. Ātmic
detachment and altruism are triggered by means of śraddhā, which enables one to
take the righteous deeds to the heart (ātman).
When Naess coined the expression “Deep Ecology,” he had in mind a new paradigm shift
that could bridge the huge gap in the Western world between the realms of spirituality and
science. One may but hint at the formula Naess was trying to grasp – perhaps the one we
have captured under the half-breed expression “śraddhā quaerens intellectum.”
The conclusion, then, is that śraddhā, being the element that is common to people of
different faiths, represents the main category for the understanding of heart-philosophy,
which encompasses Theology, Spirituality, Eco-Dharma, and Environmentalism. Eventu-
ally, by means of śraddhā, we come to trust our own ability to identify what constitutes
the truth, and this is just a contemporary way of restating what St. Anselm had tried to
convey through the expression “fides quaerens intellectum.”

Endnotes
In “Śraddhā in the Bhagavad Gītā” (Hamilton: McMaster University, Ph. D. diss.,
a

2007) I discuss how śraddhā (heart force or love-in-action; self-reliance, faith-in-oneself,

and also enthusiasm) appears in order with the Vedic usage, and opens the person to
contact with the soul-force, which drives the whole universe. I have shown in what ways
Turci International Journal of Dharma Studies (2015) 3:2 Page 9 of 12

śraddhā links the Gītā to the Mahābhārata and reveals in both texts the centrality of the
sacred and sacredness (dharma, the sense of spirituality and holiness) hidden in nature
itself. I have also discussed some theological implications of this view and considered how
śraddhā can manifest through a person’s heart. The Latin term ‘credere’, which is usually
rendered by the English term ‘creed’, can be etymologically traced back to the same
Sanskrit root as the term ‘śraddhā’. The metaphorical sense of ‘putting one’s heart on’
points to the common origin of these terms both rooted in the primitive Indo-European
term kred-dhe. W.C. Smith exemplifies this matter in a note with the help of the Christian
saying, “Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also” (Mathew 6:21 and Luke 12:34).
See W.C. Smith’s Faith and Belief (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979: n.35, 223).
b
The tendency one shows to express oneself through external action is known as
pravṛtti, and the tendency one shows to refrain from external activity is known as
nivṛtti. In other words, pravṛtti denotes active functioning in the external world,
whereas nivṛtti denotes a kind of disengagement from the world, associated with a spir-
itual discipline and leading from saṃsāra (this world) toward nirvāṇa (salvation).
c
‘BhG 18.66’stands for ‘verse 66 of chapter 18 of the Bhagavad Gītā.’
d
This solution is unexpected. Śaṅkara, for instance, who reads pravṛtti and nivṛtti as
karma mārga (path of action) and saṁnyāsa mārga (path of non-action) respectively,
does not consider the meaning intended by Kṛṣṇa, where ‘pravṛtti’ might express actions
worth pursuing, and ‘nivṛtti’ the actions to be avoided. Yet, these meanings are implied in
the context of the whole text, and more Specifically in the discussion starting in BhG
18.40. For, according to Kṛṣṇa’s previous arguments, one can infer that saṃsāra (the
existence, manifested in the form of movement and actions) presents some sort of
reality and cannot be completely fashioned by avidyā. According to Śaṅkara, how-
ever, calling Arjuna a saṁnyāsin is only a special deference meant to praise his ac-
tion (BhG 18.17), considering that he was not fit for the higher Sāṁkhya. Śaṅkara
disregards the fact that BhG 18.30 reintroduces the question about the meaning of
the terms pravṛtti and nivṛtti precisely in order to redefine what a real saṁnyāsin is.
Śaṅkara simply reads BhG 18.30 as if ‘pravṛtti’ meant ‘bondage’ and ‘nivṛtti’, liber-
ation. He says, “That which knows action, “pravṛtti”, which leads to bondage, the path
of Works, and inaction, “nivṛtti”, which leads to mokṣa (Liberation), the path of
saṁnyāsa”. See Śaṅkara’s Gita Bhasya, translation by C. V. Ramachandra Aiyar
(Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya. Bhavan, 1988: 573). As I have shown in my thesis, however, the
Gītā makes use of the concept of śraddhā to integrate the Vedic karma-mārga thesis and
the Upaniṣadic jñāna−mārga antithesis. The newness of the argument of the Gītā lies
precisely in this synthesis called jñānakarmasamuccaya-vada, which allows Arjuna to
learn different views on the science of being, and to shift from his momentary state of an
aśraddadhāna (one dispossessed of śraddhā) to that of a śraddhāvant (one possessed of
śraddhā).
e
The issue of Arjuna’s transformation has recently attracted some scholarly comment,
but most scholars do not discuss the role of śraddhā in this transformation. When the
Gītā starts, Arjuna is a devotee (bhakta) without śraddhā, and, when the Gītā ends,
Arjuna is a devotee with śraddhā. That is to say, one can be dejected and still be a
devotee. However, one cannot be depressed and full of śraddhā at the same time. This
distinction between śraddhā and bhakti helps one to follow Arjuna’s gradual shifting of
mindset throughout the text.
Turci International Journal of Dharma Studies (2015) 3:2 Page 10 of 12

f
We should be careful in order not to be fooled by the phrase ‘personal desire’. ‘Per-
sonal desire’ is not to be taken in the general sense of ‘desire’ as used, for instance, by
Herbert Marcuse in his One Dimensional Man (Ark Paperbacks, 1964). For, of course,
desire can never be fully eradicated from oneself.
g
See Dakshina Ranjan Shastri, Origin and Development of the Rituals of Ancestor
Worship in India (Calcutta: Bookland Private Limited, 1963).
h
In a sense, what the Gītā shows is that orthodoxy leads to orthopraxis; orthopraxis
to renewed orthodoxy, and so on, in a chain of events without end or beginning.
‘Orthopraxis’ is the theological term for ‘correct practice’, and is not to be taken as
‘inflexible practice of rituals and dharma’. On the contrary, orthopraxis is to be con-
sidered the result of one being confident and full of spiritual enthusiasm (śraddhā).
Resulting from śraddhā, orthopraxis represents something deeper than the Western
understanding of it as ‘lifestyle’. One could say that the Gītā’s orthopraxis somehow
resembles the Buddhist eightfold path, with the differences between the Buddha and
Kṛṣṇa’s teachings representing mostly the different audiences they have addressed
and their respective ‘doxas’ – the first addressing the orthodoxy of the āstikas (those
who accept the authority of the Vedas), and the second, that of the nāstikas (those
who does not accept the authority of the Vedas). The Buddhist eightfold path is
usually classified under three main headings: panna or wisdom (1. right view; 2. right
understanding), sila or moral activity (3. right speech; 4. right action, and 5. right live-
lihood), and samādhi or contemplation (6. right effort; 7. mindfulness, and 8. right
concentration).
i
Niṣkāma, or ‘non-personal desire’, is what is required from our actions, from the
viewpoint of our interest or desire to profit from their outcome. One should act for the
sake of the goodness of the action in itself, and not for any other personal reason. For,
being disciplined and learning to detach oneself from the consequences or rewards of
one’s actions separate those who are ready for the discipline of orthopraxis from those
who are not ready yet.
j
See F. O. Schrader, “Über Bhavavadgītā” (ZDMG 64, 1910: 336–340). Schrader is of
the opinion that the Gītā is placing an emphasis on the experiential knowledge
about the ātman. Moreover, he also reminds us that the ātmavidyā (science of ātman)
nullifies one’s dependency to the Vedas.
k
See P. Hacker “Sraddha” (Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens 3, 1963: 151–189),
and idem, Paul Hacker Kleine Schriften – Herausgegeben von Lambert Schmithausen
(Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1978). Hacker’s argument that there seems to exist two kinds of
śraddhā, one intellectual, belonging to the jñānamārga, and another ritualistic, belonging to
the karmamārga also suggests that the two paths of forth-going (pravṛtti) and return (nivṛtti)
represent in the Gītā the one discipline based on śraddhā.
l
In the Gītā, both processes are made one through the discipline of niṣkāmakarma.
For selfishness (svārtha) is what enslaves one’s actions, either in the form of pravṛtti, or
nivṛtti. Therefore, non-personal pravṛtti and nivṛtti together, as defined in the Gītā, is
what constitutes orthopraxis.
m
For further details see the whole discussion on my thesis. Here it is enough to point
out what Paul Hacker, Das Gupta, and Minoru Hara have already said. Paul Hacker
argues that the practice of bhakti demands a prior faith (śraddhā) in the mythological
tradition. He acknowledges that śraddhā comes close to bhakti in some passages, and
Turci International Journal of Dharma Studies (2015) 3:2 Page 11 of 12

that the commentator Madhusūdana, in his discussion of BG 7.21, equates śraddhā to

bhakti. Hacker reminds us, however, that in Śāṇḍilya Bhaktisūtras 22–4 such equiva-
lence is expressly denied. These Śāṇḍilya sūtras demonstrate the difference between
śraddhā and bhakti with a logical argument: sūtra 22 states that śraddhā is the
common element of all paths, bhakti included; sūtra 23 states that the identity of
śraddhā and bhakti, therefore, would lead to infinite regression, and sūtra 24, then,
states that it is impossible to equate both terms. Das Gupta (1930, 315-333 and 487-
513) has shown that the meaning of śraddhā in the Vedic Saṃhitās cannot be said
to be very close to that of bhakti. Minoru Hara has shown that in the Gītā bhakti
can be seen as related to dependence on a theistic god, whereas this is not the case
with śraddhā. In his view it preserves a more traditional concept of religion, quite
independent of theism. As Das Gupta sees it, bhakti has a personal connotation and
implies a human relation, whereas śraddhā is a non-personal and neutral principle,
resulting from a ritual context.
n
Those who propose śraddhā as a synonym of bhakti could only do so if they
held the complete identity of ātman and Kṛṣṇa. As a consequence, they will also
argue that Arjuna’s ultimate aim is to realise the supreme Godhead in a ‘theistic’
way. We find a similar view in St. Jean-Baptiste-Marie Vianney’s Catechism on
The Holy Spirit: “When we have the Holy Spirit, the heart expands; it bathes
itself in divine love. The contrast between the experiential concepts of śraddhā
and bhakti actually corresponds to the contrast between what one believes the terms
ātman and Kṛṣṇa designate as objects. Love towards the personal deity Kṛṣṇa;
however, seems to represent nothing but an instance of Arjuna’s universal love,
grounded on ātman.
o
To be precise, śraddhā combines in itself the unflinching devotion and a deep-
rooted and clear understanding; it is both intellectual and mental. As it is seen,
śraddhā is difficult to be translated into any single word in any modern language. In
the Saivagama-s we find in the context of initiation (dīkṣā), that only he who pos-
sesses bhakti and śraddhā will get the saving dīkṣā. One may note the redundant
usage here: bhakti and śraddhā. Even when it is possible to be a devotee (bhakta) with-
out śraddhā, the reverse, to be endowed with śraddhā without bhakti, is not pos-
sible. That is to say, bhakti is a prerequisite to the more essential category śraddhā.
p
The man of restraint is wakeful in that which is the night of all beings, and the time
in which all beings are wakeful is the night of the sage who sees [or perceives the light
of ātman] (BhG 2.69).
q
BhG 6.29: He whose ātman is disciplined by yoga, seeing the same in all around,
sees ātman in everything, and everything in ātman.
r
Kṛṣṇa is using in BhG 4.40 the same metaphor he had used in BhG 2.69: the sage is
awake to ātman, which is the night of the other beings.
s
Rembert Lutjeharms who insists in translating 'śraddhā' as 'faith' presents a slightest
different view in his recent "FIRST FAITH: ON THE MEANING AND ROLE OF
ŚRADDHĀ IN CAITANYA VAIṢṆAVA THOUGHT" (ISKCON Studies Journal, Vol. 2,
2014: 71–110). He argues that "the notion of faith (śraddhā)" is "closely linked to
‘conversion’" (105), and concludes that the devotee starts "with a faith in devotion
(śraddhā)," and "progresses as his faith in devotional practices is strengthened by his
systematic study of devotional scriptures" (106).
Turci International Journal of Dharma Studies (2015) 3:2 Page 12 of 12

t
Although faith is contrary to reasoning, Christian thinkers still base mostly of their
philosophical thought on St. Anselm’s assertion that faith represents the real
pre-requirement to knowledge and self-understanding – ‘fides quaerens intellectum’.
u
See, for instance, Kai Nielsen’s “Wittgensteinian Fideism” (Philosophy v. 42 1967:
191–209 [reprinted in The Philosophy of Wittgenstein v. 14. Aesthetics, Ethics, and
Religion), edited by J. Canfield]). Wittgensteinian fideism reveals the fallacy involved in
the acceptance of the dogmas, which supposedly constitute the final truths of humankind.
v
See Krishna Sharma, Bhakti and the Bhakti Movement – A New Perspective (New
Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1987).
w
The Latin phrase ‘cogito ergo sum’ (I think, therefore I am) is acknowledged in
Western philosophy as a foundation for all rational knowledge. It was stated in
French on Descartes’ Discourse on the Method (1637), and in Latin in his Principles of
Philosophy (1644).
x
The Baconian method was proposed in Bacon's Novum Organum (1620). While
Descartes have put forward the deductive process of reasoning used in science, Bacon
puts forward the inductive reasoning. Together, they have given raise to the scientific
method. Scientific investigation involves the observation of phenomena, the formula-
tion of a hypothesis, experimentation, and a conclusion that validates or modifies the
hypothesis. Both, Descartes and Bacon, have based their theories on the results of men
such as Copernicus and Galileo, who have doubted the dogmas of faith.
Competing interests
The author declares that he has no competing interests.

Received: 6 July 2014 Accepted: 14 January 2015

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