LMB V CA
LMB V CA
LMB V CA
Land Titles; Land Registration; Private respondents has not produced a single
muniment of title to substantiate hijs claim of ownership.—The petition for land
registration at bar is under the Land Registration Act. Pursuant to said Act, he who
alleges in his petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must present
muniments of title since the Spanish times, such as a titulo realor royal grant,
a concession especial or special grant, a composition con el estado or adjustment title,
or a titulo de compraor title through purchase; and ‘information possessoria’ or
‘possessory information title,’ which would become a ‘titulo gratuito’ or a gratuitous
title. In the case under consideration, the private respondents (petitioner below) has
not produced a single muniment of title to substantiate his claim of ownership. The
Court has therefore no other recourse, but to dismiss private respondent’s petition
for the registration of subject land under Act 496.
Same; Same; Evidence adduced by private respondent is not enough to prove his
possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the manner and for the number of
years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.—Even if considered as
petition for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act (CA No. 141),
as amended, private respondent’s petition would meet the same fate. For
insufficiency of evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the private
respondent is not enough to prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in
the manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of
imperfect title.
Same; Same; Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon
the possessor.—Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the
possessor, unless the occupant can prove possession or occupation of the same under
claim of ownership for the required period to constitute a grant from the State.
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* THIRD DIVISION.
758
PURISIMA, J.:
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1 Original Records (O.R.), pp. 4-6.
2 Direct Examination of Aquilino Cariño, August 23, 1977; O.R., p. 36.
3 Id., pp. 40-41.
4 Id., p. 36.
760
1. That the land subject for registration thru judicial confirmation of imperfect
title is situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao, province of
Laguna as described on plan Psu-108952 and is identical to Lot No. 3015,
Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre; and that the same is agricultural in nature
and the improvements found thereon are sugarcane, bamboo clumps, chico
and mango trees and one house of the tenant made of light materials;
2. That the land subject for registration is outside any civil or military
reservation, riverbed, park and watershed reservation and that same land is
free from claim and conflict;
3. That said land is neither inside the relocation site earmarked for Metro
Manila squatters nor any pasture lease; it is not covered by any existing
public land application and no patent or title has been issued therefor;
4. That the herein petitioner has been in continuous, open and exclusive
possession of the land who acquired the same thru inheritance from his
deceased mother, Teresa Lauchangco as mentioned on the Extrajudicial
partition dated July 26, 1963 which applicant requested that said instrument
will be presented on the hearing of this case; and that said land is also
declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 6359 in the name
of the petitioner;
5
x x x”
With the private respondent as lone witness for his petition, and the
Director of Lands as the only oppositor, the proceedings below ended. On
February 5, 1990, on the basis of the evidence on record, the trial court
granted private respondent’s petition, disposing thus:
“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders and declares the registration and
confirmation of title to one (1) parcel of land identified as Lot 6, plan Psu-108952,
identical to Cadastral Lot No. 3015,
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5 Original Records, p. 26.
761
From the aforesaid decision, petitioner (as oppositor) went to the Court of
Appeals, which, on November 11, 1993, affirmed the decision appealed from.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present
Petition; theorizing that:
I.
II.
_______________
6 O.R., p. 54.
7 Petition, Rollo, p. 12.
8 O.R., p. 4.
9 Act No. 496.
762
________________
10 Javellana vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40353, December 13, 1999.
11 Tsn.,p. 10, Cross-examination of Aquilino Carino, August 23, 1977.
12 Further amended by P.D. No. 1073, issued on January 25, 1977.
763
and the issuance of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.” (Emphasis supplied)
Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the
possessor, unless the occupant can prove possession or occupation of the
same under claim13
of ownership for the required period to constitute a grant
from the State.
Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government, the
petitioner in land registration cases is not relieved of the burden of proving
the imperfect
14
right or title sought to be confirmed. In Director of Lands vs.
Agustin, this Court stressed that:
“x x x The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the
Torrens system, simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the
registration of his land. He must show, even though there is no opposition, to the
satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not
justified in registering property under the Torrens system, simply because there is
no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny the
registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground that the facts
presented did not show that the petitioner15 is the owner, in fee simple, of the land
which he is attempting to have registered.”
________________
13 Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210, p. 218, citing Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177,
195.
14 42 Phil. 227.
15 Ibid.
764
“x x x Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less
than the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to
abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to
private ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in wellnigh
incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be
forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic
assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state.
Unless alienated18
in accordance with law, it retains its right over the same as
dominus. x x x”
In order that a petition for registration of land may prosper and the
petitioners may savor the benefit resulting from the issuance of certificate of
title for the land petitioned for, the burden is upon him (petitioner) to show
that he and/or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation of the land sought for
registration, for at least thirty (30) years
19
immediately preceding the filing of
the petition for confirmation of title.
In the case under consideration, private respondent can only trace his
own possession of subject parcel of land to the year 1949, when the same
was adjudicated to him by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement and
partition. Assuming that such
________________
16 Republic vs. Marcos, 52 SCRA 238, pp. 244-245.
17 Republic vs. Lee, 197 SCRA 13, p. 20, citing Santiago vs. de los Santos, 61 SCRA 146.
18 Ibid.
19 Javellana vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40353, December 13, 1999.
765
a partition was truly effected, the private respondent has possessed the
property thus partitioned for only twenty-six (26) years as of 1975, when he
filed his petition for the registration thereof. To bridge the gap, he proceeded
to tack his possession to what he theorized upon as possession of the same
land by his parents. However, other than his unilateral assertion, private
respondent has not introduced sufficient evidence to substantiate his
allegation that his late mother possessed the land in question even prior to
1911.
Basic is the rule that the petitioner in a land registration case must prove
the facts and circumstances evidencing his alleged ownership of the land
applied for. General statements, which are mere conclusions20 of law and not
factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.
From the relevant documentary evidence, it can be gleaned that the
earliest tax declaration covering Lot No. 6 was Tax Declaration No. 3214
issued in 1949 under the names of the private respondent and his brother,
Severino Carino. The same was followed by Tax Declaration No. 1921 issued
in 1969 declaring an assessed value of Five Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-
three (P5,233.00) Pesos and Tax Declaration No. 6359 issued in 1974 in the
name of private respondent, declaring an assessment 21
of Twenty-One
Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy (P21,770.00) Pesos.
It bears stressing that the Exhibit “E” referred to in the decision below as
the tax declaration for subject land under the names of the parents of herein
private respondent does not appear to have any sustainable basis. Said
Exhibit “E” shows that it is Tax Declaration 1921 for Lot22 No. 6 in the name
of private respondent and not in the name of his parents.
The rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals
are binding upon this Court is not without exceptions. Where, as in this
case, pertinent records belie the
_________________
20 Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 150, p. 156.
21 O.R., pp. 34 and 41.
22 O.R., p. 41.
766
and—
Verily, the Court of Appeals just adopted entirely the findings of the trial
court. Had it examined the original records of the case, the said court could
have verified that the land involved was never declared for taxation
purposes by the parents of the private respondent. Tax receipts and tax
declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are
________________
23 167 SCRA 150, p. 155.
24 Id.,p. 155, citing Carabot v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 368, 377-378; Perez v. Court of
Appeals, 127 SCRA 636; Vda. De Javellana v. Court of Appeals, 123 SCRA 799; and Fegurin v.
NLRC, 120 SCRA 910.
767
________________
25 Director of Lands vs. Santiago, 160 SCRA 186, p. 194, citing Director of Lands vs. Reyes,
68 SCRA 177; Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 339, p. 348.
26 160 SCRA 186.
27 Id., p. 194.
28 Republic vs. Lee, 197 SCRA 13, p. 21.
29 Supra.
768
“Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the
alleged twenty year or more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernards
Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the thirty (30) year period prior to the
filing of the application, was open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and in concept of
owners. This burden, private respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the
Court. The bare assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had
been in possession of the property for more than twenty (20) years found in private
respondent’s declaration is hardly the ‘well-nigh incontrovertible’ evidence required
in cases of this nature. Private respondent should have 30
presented specific facts that
would have shown the nature of such possession, x x x”
31
In Director of Lands vs. Datu, the application for confirmation of imperfect
title was likewise denied on the basis of the following disquisition, to wit:
“We hold that applicants’ nebulous evidence does not support their claim of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 2027-B en concepto de
duefio. Although they claimed that they have possessed the land since 1950, they
declared it for tax purposes only in 1972. It is not clear whether at the time they filed
their application in 1973, the lot was still cogon land or already cultivated land.
They did not present as witness their predecessor, Penaflor, to testify on his
alleged possession of the land. They alleged in their application that they had
tenants on the land. Not a single tenant was presented as witness to prove that the
applicants had possessed the land as owners.
xxx
On the basis of applicants’ insubstantial evidence, it cannot justifiably be
concluded that they have an imperfect title that should be confirmed or that they
had performed all32
the conditions essential to a Government grant of a portion of the
public domain.”
_________________
30 Id., p. 21.
31 115 SCRA 25.
32 Id., p. 28.
769
________________
33 Issued on January 25, 1977.
34 Republic vs. Sayo, 191 SCRA 71, p. 74.
35 Lee Hong vs. David, 48 SCRA 372; Pinero vs. Director of Lands, 57 SCRA 386.
36 Republic vs. Lee, 197 SCRA 13, p. 20; citing: Santiago vs. de los Santos, 61 SCRA 146.
37 Director of Lands vs. Datu, supra.
770
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