Perez, Patricia Alexandria P.

11781165

Topic: 3.13. Discovery

Section: Modes of Discovery : Deposition
Provision: Rule 23: Depositions Pending Action
Rule 24: Depositions Before Action or Pending Appeal
DATE CASES
10/09/19 People v. Sergio, G.R. No. 240053, Hernando, J.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO

and JULIUS L. LACANILAO, respondents.
Provision: Rule 23 – Depositions Pending Action

Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. — By leave of court

after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is
the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served,
the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the
instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written
interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a
subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance
with these Rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken
only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.

Section 11. Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign countries.
— In a foreign state or country, depositions may be taken (a) on notice before a
secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines; (b) before such person or
officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory; or (c) the
person referred to in section 14 hereof.

Section 25. Deposition upon written interrogatories; service of notice and of

interrogatories. — A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon
written interrogatories shall serve them upon every other party with a notice
stating the name and address of the person who is to answer them and the
name or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom the deposition is
to be taken. Within ten (10) days thereafter, a party so served may serve cross-
interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition. Within five (5)
days thereafter, the latter may serve re- direct interrogatories upon a party who
has served cross- interrogatories. Within three (3) days after being served with
re-direct interrogatories, a party may serve recross-interrogatories upon the
party proposing to take the deposition.
Doctrine: While depositions are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Court held that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long
as there is compelling reason — in this case, the conditions of Mary Jane's
reprieve and her imprisonment in Indonesia.

The extraordinary factual circumstances surrounding the case of Mary Jane

warrant the resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.
Facts: 1. Mary Jane was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to death by the
 Indonesian Government and is presently confined in a prison facility in
Indonesia.

2. The Philippine Government requested the Indonesian Government to suspend

the scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It informed the Indonesian Government
that the recruiters and traffickers of Mary Jane were already in police custody,
and her testimony is vital in the prosecution of Cristina and Julius, her recruiters
who were charged with qualified trafficking in person, illegal recruitment, and
estafa.

3. The Indonesian President granted Mary Jane an indefinite reprieve, to afford

her an opportunity to present her case against Cristina, Julius, and a certain
"Ike."

4. The State then filed a motion to take the deposition upon written
interrogatories of Mary Jane before the RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija,
Branch 88, which granted the motion.

5. Julius and Cristina assailed the ruling to the CA via a petition for certiorari.
The CA reversed the Resolution of the RTC ratiocinating that pursuant to
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court the taking of deposition of Mary Jane
or her conditional examination must be made not in Indonesia but before the
court where the case is pending.

6. The State elevated the case to the SC.

Issue: Is the prosecution's resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court in taking Mary Jane's
testimony as a prosecution witness proper?
Ruling: Yes, petition is granted. Depositions are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules
on Civil Procedure. Although the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is
inscribed under the said Rule, the Court holds that it may be applied suppletorily
in criminal proceedings so long as there is compelling reason.

The Court allowed the taking of deposition through written interrogatories of

Mary Jane Sergio (Mary Jane) before our Consular Office and officials in
Indonesia pursuant to the Rules of Court and principles of jurisdiction.

Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is inapplicable in light of the unusual
circumstances surrounding the case. Mary Jane's imprisonment in Indonesia
and the conditions attached to her reprieve denied her of any opportunity to
decide for herself to voluntarily appear and testify before the trial court in Nueva
Ecija.

The denial by the CA deprived Mary Jane and the People of their right to due
process by presenting their case against the accused. By not allowing Mary
Jane to testify through written interrogatories, the CA deprived her of the
opportunity to prove her innocence before the Indonesian authorities and for the
Philippine Government the chance to comply with the conditions set for the grant
of reprieve to Mary Jane.

Also, there is no violation of the constitutional right to confrontation of a witness

 since the terms and conditions laid down by the trial court ensure that Cristina
and Julius are given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way of
written interrogatories.

In conclusion, the Court suppletorily applied the provisions of Rule 23 of the

Rules of Court considering the extraordinary factual circumstances surrounding
the case of Mary Jane.

While depositions are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Court held that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long
as there is compelling reason — in this case, the conditions of Mary Jane's
reprieve and her imprisonment in Indonesia.
Notes: Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is inapplicable
in this case. Under the said provision, in order for the testimony of the
prosecution witness be taken before the court where the case is being heard, it
must be shown that the said prosecution witness is either: (a) too sick or infirm to
appear at the trial as directed by the order of the court, or; (b) has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning.

The case of Mary Jane does not fall under either category. She is neither too
sick nor infirm to appear at the trial nor has to leave the Philippines indefinitely.
To recall, Mary Jane is currently imprisoned in Indonesia for having been
convicted by final judgment of the crime of drug trafficking, a grave offense in the
said state. In fact, she was already sentenced to death and is only awaiting her
execution by firing squad. Her situation is not akin to a person whose limitation
of mobility is by reason of ill-health or feeble age, the grounds cited in Section 15
of Rule 119. In fact, Mary Jane's predicament does not in way pertain to a
restriction in movement from one place to another but a deprivation of liberty thru
detention in a foreign country with little or no hope of being saved from the
extreme penalty of death by firing squad.

The Court of Appeals appeared to have strictly and rigidly applied and
interpreted Section 15, Rule 119 without taking into consideration the
concomitant right to due process of Mary Jane and the State as well as the
prejudice that will be caused to Mary Jane or the People with its pronouncement.

By denying the prosecution's motion to take deposition by written interrogatories,

the appellate court in effect silenced Mary Jane and denied her and the People
of their right to due process by presenting their case against the said accused.

Topic: 3.13. Discovery

Section: Modes of Discovery : Interrogatories to Parties
Provision: RULE 25 INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES

Section 1. Interrogatories to parties; service thereof. – Upon ex parte motion,

any party desiring to elicit material and relevant facts from any adverse parties
shall file and serve upon the latter written interrogatories to be answered by the
party served or, if the party served is a public or private corporation or a
partnership or association, by any officer thereof competent to testify in its
behalf.
 Section 2. Answer to interrogatories. – The interrogatories shall be answered
fully in writing and shall be signed and sworn to by the person making them. The
party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall file and serve a
copy of the answers on the party submitting the interrogatories within fifteen (15)
calendar days after service thereof, unless the court, on motion and for good
cause shown, extends or shortens the time.

Section 3. Objections to interrogatories. – Objections to any interrogatories may

be presented to the court within ten (10) calendar days after service thereof, with
notice as in case of a motion; and answers shall be deferred until the objections
are resolved, which shall be at as early a time as is practicable.

Section 4. Number of interrogatories. – No party may, without leave of court,

serve more than one set of interrogatories to be answered by the same party.

Section 5. Scope and use of interrogatories. – Interrogatories may relate to any

matters that can be inquired into under [S]ection 2 of Rule 23, and the answers
may be used for the same purposes provided in [S]ection 4 of the same Rule.

Section 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories. – Unless thereafter

allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a
party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the
adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending
appeal.
DATE CASES
11/12/18 Weingartner v. Argañosa-Maniego, G.R. No. 241891, Notice

REMEDIOS G. WEINGARTNER, petitioner, vs. HON. ISIDRA A. ARGAÑOSA-

MANIEGO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE THIRD
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MALOLOS CITY, BRANCH 7, EHMER C.
RAMIREZ, DOING BUSINESS AS "ROCKVILLE TRANSPORT
ENTERPRISES," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR BULACAN
PROVINCE (GUIGUINTO), respondents.
Provision: Section 1, Rule 25

Section 1, Rule 29

Section 1. Refusal to answer. — If a party or other deponent refuses to answer

any question upon oral examination, the examination may be completed on
other matters or adjourned as the proponent of the question may prefer. The
proponent may thereafter apply to the proper court of the place where the
deposition is being taken, for an order to compel an answer. The same
procedure may be availed of when a party or a witness refuses to answer any
interrogatory submitted under Rules 23 or 25.
Doctrine: Section 1 of Rule 25 of the Rules of Court provides that a party desiring to elicit
information from an adverse party may file and serve upon the latter written
interrogatories. In case of refusal to answer any of the questions set forth
therein, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to apply for an order compelling an
answer pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 29.
 The rules provide that a party not served with written interrogatories may not be
compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court.
Facts: 1. Remedios Weingartner (Remedios) filed a complaint for rescission of contract
and damages with application for TRO and preliminary injunction against
Rockville Transport Enterprises (RTE) and its owner, Ehmer Ramirez (Ehmer),
before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.

2. According to Remedios, she sold a parcel of land to RTE for an agreed

consideration of P35M, payable through an initial payment of P5M and 12
monthly installments of P2M.

3. Ehmer paid Remedios P2M and consequently caused the issuance of a

certificate of title over the property, which he later mortgaged in favor of
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company.

4. However, Remedios continued, Ehmer was only able to pay P8,700,000.00,

or about 25% of the purchase price.

5. The RTC granted Remedios's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, thus
enjoining Ehmer from disposing the property during the pendency of the case
upon the posting, by the former, of a bond in the amount of P2M.

6. Instead of posting the required bond, Remedios filed an omnibus motion to

reduce the amount thereof to P100K. She contended that the amount required
by the RTC was too high. In addition, she argued that Ehmer would not stand to
suffer any loss or damage by virtue of the issuance of the injunction.

7. Meanwhile, during the course of proceedings, Remedios filed a request for

interrogatories, asking Ehmer the following questions:

1. What is your occupation?

2. Are you employed?

a. If the answer is yes, who is your current employer? How long have you been
employed by your current employer?

b. If the answer is no, how long have you been unemployed?

3. Is it correct that [you] own RTE?

4. Is it the fact that RTE is engaged in car rental? If not, what is the business of
RTE?
5. How many employees does RTE have?
6. How much do you earn annually from RTE?
7. What is the net worth of RTE?
8. How much was the net income of RTE for 2014?
9. Do you have other businesses aside from RTE? If the answer is
yes, what are your other businesses? How much do you earn from each
business annually?
10. What are your other sources of income aside from these businesses, if any?
 11. How much taxes did you pay in 2014?
12. Is it the fact that you asked plaintiff to sign two Deeds of Absolute Sale of the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-38698 of the Registry of
Deeds for Guiguinto, Bulacan ("Property") to avoid payment of taxes on the P35
million purchase price of the Property?
13. Is it correct that you did not have any dealings or transactions with the
International Monetary Fund [IMF]? If you had such dealings, please provide the
details of such transactions and the name and contact details of the IMF officials
or representatives you dealt with.
14. Do you confirm that you do not have cash right now to pay plaintiff the
purchase price of P35 million for the Property?

8. Ehmer responded to the interrogatories, essentially stating that he owns RTE,

which is engaged in a car rental business, and, as such, he has been self-
employed for the past 20 years. Notably, however, he refused to answer
questions no. 5, 6, 7, 8, and 11 on the ground that they were irrelevant.

9. RTC issued an order noting Ehmer's answers to the request for

interrogatories and denying Remedios's motion to reduce the injunction bond.

10. Regarding Remedios's comment to Ehmer's answers, the trial court held that
it could not yet rule on the sufficiency of the information provided, making it clear
that, in any case, she could expound thereon during his cross-examination.
Regarding the reduced bond prayed for, the RTC held that the amount thereof
was too low compared to the agreed purchase price of P35M and the amount of
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs of litigation prayed for,
which totaled P8M.

11. RTC denied Remedios’ motion for partial reconsideration. In imputing grave
abuse of discretion to the trial court, she argued that, first, by not directing
Ehmer to provide complete and responsive answers to her request for
interrogatories, the court a quo failed to perform its duty under the rules on
modes of discovery. To her, Ehmer's failure to answer her questions led to the
admission of the matters stated therein. Moreover, since the unanswered
questions concerned Ehmer's ability to pay, she argued that they were clearly
relevant to the instant case.

12. The CA ruled that Remedios should have applied for an order to compel
Ehmer to answer all of her interrogatories. Since she never applied for such an
order, the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in merely noting his
answers.

13. The CA denied Remedios’ reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition for
partial review under Rule 45.
Issue: WON Remedios may compel Ehmer to answer all of her interrogatories.
Ruling: Yes. Section 1 of Rule 25 of the Rules of Court provides that a party desiring to
elicit information from an adverse party may file and serve upon the latter written
interrogatories. In case of refusal to answer any of the questions set forth
therein, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to apply for an order compelling an
answer pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 29.
 As Remedios correctly pointed out, one of the reliefs prayed for in the motion for
partial reconsideration she filed before the trial court was that Ehmer be
compelled to answer her interrogatories.

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO SERVE WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES

While the unanswered interrogatories may be relevant to the cause of such

failure, the responses thereto would shed no light on the fact that Ehmer
breached his obligation, which could easily be proved through other means.

Assuming that the unanswered interrogatories were in fact relevant to

Remedios's action for rescission, there is nothing preventing her from asking
Ehmer to answer the same questions during his cross- examination.

The rules provide that a party not served with written interrogatories may
not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court.

Since Remedios adequately served Ehmer with a list of interrogatories, she may
properly call him to the stand and cross-examine him on circumstances material
to her claim. Clearly, therefore, the trial court's refusal to compel Ehmer to
answer the interrogatories did not amount to grave abuse of discretion so as to
unjustly impede Remedios's ability to establish her case.
Notes: COURT’S DISCRETION

Since the trial court’s Order was merely interlocutory, the remedy therefrom was
to file a petition for certiorari challenging the trial court's refusal to issue an order
compelling Ehmer to answer as tainted with grave abuse of discretion, which is
precisely what was done in this case.

While the Court subscribes to Remedios's argument that her motion for partial
reconsideration of the trial court’s Order should have been treated as an
application for an order to compel Ehmer to answer her interrogatories, it cannot
agree with her insofar as the imputation of grave abuse of discretion is
concerned.

The issuance of an order to compel an answer to written interrogatories is a

matter best addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

The evident purpose of the discovery procedures is "to enable the parties,
consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of
the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried
on in the dark.

Parties may avail of the modes of discovery in order to establish the factual
bases of their respective claims and defenses, and, ultimately, to evince to the
trial court the merits of their case. The assessment of the evidence so
discovered is a function of the trial court, which is in the best position to
determine factual matters. Hence, it is only pragmatic that the trial court be given
the discretion to sift out irrelevant facts by limiting the availability of discovery
 procedures to only that which it deems material to the resolution of the issues of
a particular case. When such discretion is abused, and such abuse is grave, the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari lies as a panacea.

Having settled that the trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion in
recalling its order granting the writ of preliminary injunction, there is no need to
elaborate on the propriety of the bond's amount.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decisions of the CA are hereby

AFFIRMED.

Topic: 3.13. Discovery

Section: Modes of Discovery : Requests for Admission
Provision: Rule 26 Admission by Adverse Party

Section 1. Request for admission. — At any time after issues have been joined,
a party may file and serve upon any other party a written request for the
admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and relevant
document described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any
material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the
documents shall be delivered with the request unless copy have already been
furnished.

Section 2. Implied admission. — Each of the matters of which an admission is

requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the
request, which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or
within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the
request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a
sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is
requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either
admit or deny those matters.

Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court by the
party requested within the period for and prior to the filing of his sworn statement
as contemplated in the preceding paragraph and his compliance therewith shall
be deferred until such objections are resolved, which resolution shall be made as
early as practicable.

Section 3. Effect of admission. — Any admission made by a party pursuant to

such request is for the purpose of the pending action only and shall not
constitute an admission by him for any other purpose nor may the same be used
against him in any other proceeding.

Section 4. Withdrawal. — The court may allow the party making an admission
under the Rule, whether express or implied, to withdraw or amend it upon such
terms as may be just.

Section 5. Effect of failure to file and serve request for admission. — Unless
otherwise allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of
justice a party who fails to file and serve a request for admission on the adverse
 party of material and relevant facts at issue which are, or ought to be, within the
personal knowledge of the latter, shall not be permitted to present evidence on
such facts.
DATE CASES
10/06/20 People v. Ang, G.R. No. 231854, Carandang, J.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LEILA L. ANG, ROSALINDA

DRIZ, JOEY ANG, ANSON ANG, AND VLADIMIR NIETO, respondents.
Doctrine: A Request for Admission Cannot be Served on the Prosecution Because it is
Answerable Only by an Adverse Party to Whom such Request was Served.
Despite the previous rulings and opinions regarding the possibility of suppletorily
applying the civil discovery procedures, there have been no express discussions
regarding the nature and application of requests for admission in criminal
proceedings, the pivotal matter in this petition.
Facts: 1. A resolution was issued by the Deputy Ombudsman of Luzon finding probable
cause to indict Leila Ang, Rosalinda Driz, Joey Ang, Anson Ang and Vladimir
Nieto as follows:

a. Leila Ang for Falsification of Public Documents (Criminal Case No. 2005-
1046);
b. Leila Ang, Rosalinda Driz, Joey Ang, Anson Ang, and Vladimir Nieto for
Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
[RPC] (Criminal Case No. 2005-1047); and
c. Leila Ang, Rosalinda Driz, Joey Ang, Anson Ang and Vladimir Nieto for
Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 ("Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act")
(Criminal Case No. 2005-1048).

2. Leila Ang and Rosalinda Driz were officers of Development Bank of the
Philippines-Lucena City, in conspiracy with respondents Joey Ang, Anson Ang
and Vladimir Nieto, were found to have defrauded and swindled the DBP in the
total amount of P4,840,884.00 by: (1) the unlawful practice of crediting cash
deposits to the current/savings accounts of JEA Construction and Supplies;
Cocoland Concrete Products, and Unico Arte without actually depositing cash or
with a lesser amount of cash deposited; and (2) concealing the accumulated
cash shortage of P4,840,884.00 by passing and/or creating a fictitious journal
entry in the Bank's General Ledger Transaction File Report denominated as
"Due From Other Banks" when there was no such actual cash deposit made.

3. This was the result of the special-audit and fact-finding investigation

conducted by the DBP personnel pursuant to DBP SL Memorandum Order to
look into the alleged Cash-In-Vault shortage at the DBP-Lucena City Branch.

4. Respondent Leila Ang was then the Document Analyst of DBP-Lucena

Branch and the authorized Branch General Ledger System and Ticketing
System User. Rosalinda Driz was a Branch Teller of said bank. Joey Ang, Anson
Ang, and Vladimir Nieto are owners of JEA Construction and Supplies, Cocoland
Concrete Products, and Unico Arte.

5. 3 separate Informations were filed by the OMB-Luzon before the RTC of

Lucena, Branch 53. Said criminal cases were first handled by the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Lucena City.

6. OCP-Lucena received Leila Ang's Amended Accused's Formal Request for

Admission by Plaintiff (Request for Admission), which Leila Ang filed in
relation to Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act criminal case.

7. The OCP-Lucena, thereafter, filed an Amended Motion to Expunge from the

Records the Defense's Request for Admission by Plaintiff. It claimed that the
matters sought for admission are either proper subjects of stipulation during the
pre-trial, or matters of evidence which should undergo judicial scrutiny during the
trial on the merits.

8. In a Resolution, the RTC of Lucena, Branch 53 denied Leila Ang's Request for
Admission and ordered that the same be expunged from the records. The RTC
ruled that the proposed admission can be tackled and be the proper subject of
stipulation during the pre-trial conference of the parties.

9. Leila Ang moved for partial reconsideration and a motion to inhibit the
Presiding Judge. Upon inhibition of the presiding Judge, the cases were
transferred to RTC of Lucena, Branch 56 presided by Judge Pastrana, who
granted Leila Ang's motion for partial reconsideration in the Joint Order. The
RTC ruled that the prosecution failed to deny or oppose the Request for
Admission within the 15-day period from receipt of the documents; hence,
the facts stated in the Request for Admission are deemed impliedly admitted
by the People pursuant to Section 2, 20 Rule 26 of the Rules of Court.

10. The OCP-Lucena filed a Motion for Clarification arguing in the main that the
parties to whom the Request for Admission was addressed were not served
with copies of the same. It was only served to the prosecutor, which does
not constitute sufficient compliance with Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of
Court.

11. Judge Pastrana issued a Joint Order denying the Motion for Clarification for
being filed out of time. He further declared that the People is represented by the
City Prosecutor and it is only through the said public prosecutor that the plaintiff,
as a party in the present case, can be served or be deemed served, with the
subject Request for Admission. He further ruled that the implied admissions are
also "judicial admissions by the plaintiff under Section 4, Rule 129 25 of the
Rules of Court."

12. Subsequently, respondent Leila Ang filed a Manifestation formally adopting

in the Falsification of Public Documents case and Malversation of Public Funds
case the People's implied admissions or judicial admissions in Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act case.

13. The other respondents filed similar manifestations expressing their intent to
adopt the implied admissions/judicial admissions declared in Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act case insofar as they are concerned.

14. Atty. De Gorio formally entered his appearance as special prosecutor

pursuant to the Deputization/Authority to Prosecute.

15. The People also filed Requests for Admission in the three criminal cases
served on Leila Ang, Joey Ang, Anson Ang, Vladimir Nieto, and Rosalinda Driz.

16. Upon motion of the People, the three criminal cases were consolidated.

RTC

17. RTC: denied the People's Requests for Admission stating that the "judicial
admissions (of the People) can no longer be varied or contradicted by a contrary
evidence much less by a request for admission directly or indirectly amending
such judicial admissions." The RTC took judicial notice of the adoption in
Falsification of Public Documents case and Malversation of Public Funds case
by Leila Ang of the implied admissions declared as judicial admissions in Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act case.

18. The People moved for reconsideration alleging that under Section 3, Rule
26 of the Rules of Court, any admission by a party pursuant to such
request is for the purpose of the pending action only and shall not
constitute admission by him for any other purpose nor may the same be
used against him in any other proceeding. Further, there was no judicial
admission, whether verbal or written, made in the course of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act case as required in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court.

19. The RTC maintained its ruling that the court's judicial notice made on the
People's judicial admissions in the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act case as
also the People's judicial admissions in the closely related and interwoven in the
Falsification of Public Documents case and Malversation of Public Funds case,
which had been stated in the previous Joint Order. The RTC further ruled that in
consolidated cases, as in this case, the evidence in each case effectively
becomes the evidence of both, and there ceased to exist any need for the
deciding judge to take judicial notice of the evidence presented in each case.

20. The People filed a Petition for Certiorari 36 (Rule 65) before the SB.

Sandiganbayan

21. The SB dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The SB ruled that no
palpable error was committed by the RTC in declaring that the implied
admissions are regarded as judicial admissions in the 3 criminal cases. While it
may be true that Section 3, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court limits the effects
of an implied admission only for the purpose of the pending action, the
consolidation of these cases extended the effect of such implied
admission to the other cases. It declared that even assuming that the RTC
committed mistakes in arriving at the conclusions in the questioned orders, these
can be taken only as errors of judgment, and not errors of jurisdiction which are
correctible by certiorari. The SB also noted infirmities in the petition itself: (1)
lacks proper verification; and (2) questionable authority on the part of Atty. De
 Gorio to file the instant petition and sign the certificate of non-forum shopping —
whether he appeared as a "special prosecutor" of the Ombudsman or as counsel
"under the supervision and control" of the Provincial or City Prosecutor of
Lucena City.

22. The People moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the People
filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue: Can requests for admission be applied in criminal cases?
Ruling: No. The modes of discovery is not applicable in this case. A Request for
Admission Cannot be Served on the Prosecution Because it is Answerable
Only by an Adverse Party to Whom such Request was Served.

Leila Ang’s Request for Admission filed in the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act case should have been denied by the RTC. There are no judicial admissions
to be adopted in the other 2 criminal cases. Request for admission under Rule
26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable in criminal proceedings.
There is no need for the Court to dwell on the other issues raised by the People
in this petition, i.e., effect of actual consolidation; service of the request for
admission to the parties.

Despite the previous rulings and opinions regarding the possibility of suppletorily
applying the civil discovery procedures, there have been no express discussions
regarding the nature and application of requests for admission in criminal
proceedings, the pivotal matter in this petition.

Since Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure only mention of parties
serving and answering each other's requests for admission, it cannot be
reasonably interpreted to include also witnesses who are incompetent to give
admissions that bind the parties to their declarations. Witnesses such as the
private complainant in criminal proceedings cannot be served with a
request for admission and compelled to answer such request. Besides,
witnesses in criminal proceedings may be called upon to testify during the
trial state and be subjected to the crucible of cross-examination.

If requests for admission are allowed to be utilized in criminal proceedings, "any

material and relevant matter of fact" requested by the prosecution from the
accused for admission is tantamount to compelling the latter to testify against
himself. This is because failure to answer a request for admission will be
deemed as an admission of the fact requested to be admitted. More so, Section
2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the party requested to file a
sworn statement thereby exposing him/her to the additional peril of being held
liable for perjury. Such requirements unduly pressure the accused in making an
admission or denial, which is in itself a form of compulsion. Moreover, the refusal
of the accused to answer to a request for admission may later be taken against
him under Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence.

The rule on admission as a mode of discovery is intended to expedite the trial

and to relieve the parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed
on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.
 The use of requests for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or
reiterate the allegations of the requesting party's pleading but it should set forth
relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request, whose purpose is to
establish said party's cause of action or defense.

In a criminal proceeding, most of the facts are almost always disputed as the
prosecution is tasked in proving all the elements of the crime as well as the
complicity or participation of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Factual
matters pertaining to the elements of the crime as well as the complicity or
participation of the accused are obviously determinative of the outcome of the
case.

If requests for admission should be made applicable to criminal proceedings, it is

virtually certain that an accused who had already entered a plea of "not guilty"
would continue to deny the relevant matters sought by the prosecution to be
admitted in order to secure an acquittal. Moreover, matters which tend to
establish the guilt or innocence of an accused (i.e., participation, proof of an
element of the offense, etc.) are necessarily disputed in nature. Even if the Court
were to carve out an exception by permitting only those matters which have no
relevant or material relations to the offense to be discoverable through requests
for admission, the same discovery facility would serve no practical and useful
purpose tending only to delay the proceedings. Therefore, it would be pointless
on the part of the prosecution to require an accused to admit to matters not
relevant or material to the offense as the same would be vented out during the
pre-trial anyway.

The resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Joint Orders of the RTC are declared VOID. The RTC of Lucena is DIRECTED
to continue the trial proceedings in the 3 criminal cases with reasonable
dispatch.
Notes: The following inferences can be deduced from the provisions under Rule 26:
1. A request for admission may be served only on the adverse party;
2. A request for admission may only be done after the issues have been joined;
3. The adverse party being served with the request for admission may admit:

(a) The genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and
exhibited with such request; and
(b) The truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in such request.
4. Copies of the documents requested from the adverse party for admission
should be delivered with the request unless copies have already been furnished
to the latter in advance;
5. The time to respond to the request for admission shall be at least fifteen days
or at a period fixed by the court on motion;
6. The adverse party on whom the request for admission was served is required
to file a sworn statement specifically denying the matters of which an admission
is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he or she cannot truthfully
either admit or deny those matters;
7. Failure of the adverse party, on whom the request was served, to respond
shall be deemed as an admission to the matter sought to be admitted;
8. Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court by the
adverse party requested within the period for and prior to the filing of his sworn
statement of denial;
9. Compliance of the request for admission by the adverse party requested shall
be deferred until the objection is resolved by the court;
10. The resolution of any objection raised by the party on whom the request for
admission was serves shall be resolved by the court as early as practicable;
11. Any admission made by the adverse party may only be used in the case
where the request for admission was made and not in any other proceeding; and
12. A party, except for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice,
cannot anymore be permitted to present any evidence in support of a material
and relevant fact within the personal knowledge of the adverse party which
should have been the subject of a request for admission.

Under Rule 26, a request for admission may be served on the adverse party at
any time after the issues are joined.

In civil cases, there is joinder of issues when the answer makes a specific denial
of the material allegations in the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, which
would bar recovery by the plaintiff.

In a criminal case, "there is no need to file a responsive pleading since the

accused is, at the onset, presumed innocent, and thus it is the prosecution which
has the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." Nonetheless, it is
the legal duty of the accused to plead "guilty" or "not guilty" during arraignment,
for it is only after his plea had been entered, that the issues are joined and trial
can begin. In other words, "the entry of plea during arraignment x x x signals
joinder of issues in a criminal action."

In civil actions, a party is one who: (a) is a natural or juridical person as well as
other "entities" recognized by law to be parties; (b) has a material interest in
issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case (real party-in-
interest); and (c) has the necessary qualifications to appear in the case (legal
capacity to sue).

In criminal actions, however, the only parties are the State/People of the
Philippines (as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General or agencies
authorized to prosecute like the Office of the Ombudsman and the Department
of Justice) and the accused.

The State is the real party-in-interest in criminal proceedings. The private

offended party is merely regarded as a witness for the State. It means that the
State, being a juridical entity unlike the offended party, cannot be privy to the
execution of any document or acquire personal knowledge of past factual
events.

Unlike natural persons, the State cannot be reasonably thought of as capable of

perceiving as well as making known of its perception and, therefore, incapable of
being "privy" to the execution of documents or acquiring "personal" knowledge of
perceivable facts.
 Jurisprudence provides that the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others.

Topic: 3.13. Discovery

Section: Modes of Discovery : Production and Inspection of Things
Provision: Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Motion for Production or Inspection; Order. — Upon motion of any

party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may
(a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible
things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b)
order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his
possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation
thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the
inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms
and conditions as are just.
DATE CASES
07/06/22 Trans Middle East (Phils.) Equities, Inc. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180350

TRANS MIDDLE EAST (PHILS.) EQUITIES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE

SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION), REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REPRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG), respondents.
Doctrine: The provision on production and inspection of documents is one of the modes of
discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court in order to enable not only the
parties, but also the court to discover all the relevant and material facts in
connection with the case pending before it. Generally, the scope of discovery is
to be liberally construed so as to provide the litigants with information essential
to the fair and amicable settlement or expeditious trial of the case. The use of
discovery is encouraged, for it operates with desirable flexibility under the
discretionary control of the trial court.

Security Bank vs. Court of Appeals stated the procedural requisites for
production and inspection of documents:
(a) The party must file a motion for the production or inspection of documents or
things, showing good cause therefor;
(b) Notice of the motion must be served to all other parties of the case;
(c) The motion must designate the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things which the party wishes to be produced
and inspected;
(d) Such documents, etc. are not privileged;
(e) Such documents, etc. constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action; and
(f) Such documents, etc. are in the possession, custody or control of the
other party.
Facts: 1. This case involves 4 consolidated cases for involving the same shares of
stock covered by a sequestration order. All these cases emanated from the
same Civil Case before the Sandiganbayan.

2. First Philippine Holdings Corporation (FPHC) was the initial owner of

6,299,177 shares of stock in PCI Bank. Due to mergers and acquisitions, PCI
Bank became Equitable-PCI Bank, and then later, Banco De Oro (BDO).

3. Under a Sale of Shares of Stock and Escrow Agreement, FPHC sold

6,119,067 shares of stock in PCI Bank to Trans Middle East Equities, Inc
(TMEE).

4. The PCGG sequestered the 6,119,067 shares registered in the name of

TMEE. According to the PCGG, these shares constituted ill-gotten wealth and
the beneficial owner of the shares was former Governor Benjamin Romualdez.

5. After more than 1 year, the Republic, represented by the PCGG, filed a
complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages
before the Sandiganbayan entitled epublic of the Philippines v. Benjamin
(Kokoy) Romualdez, et al.

6. The complaint included TMEE's shares of stock among the properties alleged
as ill-gotten wealth. However, TMEE was neither named as a party-defendant
nor included in the list of corporations owned by the defendants therein. The
complaint was later amended several times but TMEE was not impleaded as
party-defendant.

7. TMEE filed a motion for intervention and to admit its complaint-in-intervention.

Therein, TMEE asserted ownership over the sequestered shares of stock and all
the incidents of ownership, including its right to vote as a stockholder.

8. Around 11 years from sequestration, the PCGG sought leave to further amend
the complaint. Under the third amended complaint, TMEE was finally impleaded
as one of the defendants.

9. TMEE moved to nullify the writ of sequestration.

10. The Sandiganbayan nullified the writ of sequestration on the ground that it
was issued by only one PCGG commissioner.

11. PCGG moved for partial reconsideration and thereafter, the Sandiganbayan
ordered that the shares of stock and its proceeds be deposited in escrow at the
Land Bank of the Philippines for the persons, natural or juridical, who shall
eventually be adjudged lawfully entitled thereto.

12. Aggrieved, TMEE filed a motion for partial reconsideration. TMEE argued
that since the writ of sequestration has been nullified, the actual custody and
control of the shares and its dividends should be returned to TMEE.

13. Sandiganbayan denied the motion for partial reconsideration and directed
that instead of placing in escrow the shares of stock and its proceeds, the
Sandiganbayan ordered TMEE and PCGG to surrender the same to the Clerk of
Court of the Anti-Graft Court.

14. TMEE filed the petition for certiorari before this court alleging that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Subsequent to this petition, the Sandiganbayan dismissed
the third amended complaint against TMEE.

15. The Republic and FPHC filed separate appeals before the Court, which were
both denied with finality.

16. FPHC filed a complaint-in-intervention in a Civil Case. According to FPHC,

the Sale of Shares of Stock and Escrow Agreement transferring its shares in PCI
Bank to TMEE should be annulled on the ground of fraud. FPHC's complaint-in-
intervention was dismissed by the Sandiganbayan based on prescription. The
dismissal was later affirmed by the Court in First Philippine Holdings Corporation
vs. Trans Middle East (Phils.) Equities, Inc.

17. FPHC filed before the Sandiganbayan a second complaint-in-intervention in

another Civil Case and sought to recover the same shares alleged in the first
complaint-in-intervention. This time, FPHC argued that if the Republic succeeds
in recovering the shares for being ill-gotten, the same should be turned over to
FPHC as the legitimate owner thereof. FPHC averred that otherwise, the
Republic would be guilty of unjust enrichment.

18. Sandiganbayan dismissed FPHC's second complaint-in-intervention on the

ground that it raised the same cause of action as the first complaint-in-
intervention which was already dismissed with finality. FPHC moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

19. FPHC filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. The Republic filed a
motion for production and inspection before the Sandiganbayan. The
Republic prayed that BDO be directed to produce and allow the inspection
and reproduction of all documents and records, including certificates of
stock pertaining to the shares, all stock and cash dividends issued thereon
and paid to TMEE by BDO, details of transfers of such shares, and related
transactions. Incidentally, FPHC joined the Republic's motion for
production and inspection.

20. According to the Republic, TMEE's shares in BDO were publicly traded on
the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) in a matter of months despite being in
custodia legis. BDO's published disclosures with the PSE indicated TMEE as the
sixth highest-ranked stockholder in BDO representing 3.58% of the total shares.
However, TMEE disappeared from the Top 100 list of BDO shareholders. Thus,
the Republic claimed that TMEE's shares were already sold or transferred to
third parties.

21. Sandiganbayan denied the motion for production and inspection. The
Republic and FPHC filed separate motions for reconsideration, which were both
denied.
 22. Aggrieved, the Republic filed its Petition for Certiorari while FPHC filed its
own Petition for Certiorari.
Issue: WON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it denied the motion for production and inspection of
documents and records pertaining to the shares of stock owned by TMEE.
Ruling: No. The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the
motion for production and inspection of documents or records.

The provision on production and inspection of documents is one of the modes of

discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court in order to enable not only the
parties, but also the court to discover all the relevant and material facts in
connection with the case pending before it. Generally, the scope of discovery is
to be liberally construed so as to provide the litigants with information essential
to the fair and amicable settlement or expeditious trial of the case. The use of
discovery is encouraged, for it operates with desirable flexibility under the
discretionary control of the trial court.

In this case, the documents and records sought to be produced are not in the
possession, custody, or control of the other party. The Sandiganbayan duly
exercised its discretion in denying the motion for production and inspection given
that BDO was never impleaded as a party in the said Civil Case. Moreover,
TMEE is no longer a party-defendant. Thus, BDO and TMEE cannot be directed
to produce documents and records as they are no longer parties in the pending
action.

At any rate, there is no standing basis to hold TMEE's shares of stock in

custodia legis. By reason of the dismissal of the third amended complaint
against TMEE, it is entitled to the immediate return of its previously sequestered
property.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 180350 is GRANTED. The
assailed portions of the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No.
0035 directing the turnover of the shares of stock, as well as all dividends and
interest earned thereon, to the Sandiganbayan's Clerk of Court, are ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE.

Accordingly, the Executive Clerk of Court of the Sandiganbayan, the Presidential

Commission on Good Government, and all other concerned entities are
DIRECTED to immediately release in favor of petitioner Trans Middle East
(Phils.) Equities, Inc. its previously sequestered shares of stock, including
all accrued dividends and interest thereon, as well as the corresponding stock
certificates and other evidence of ownership, which are in their possession.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari in G.R. No. 205186, and the Petition for
Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 222919 and 223237 are DENIED and DISMISSED for
lack of merit, respectively.
Notes: Security Bank vs. Court of Appeals stated the procedural requisites for
production and inspection of documents:
(a) The party must file a motion for the production or inspection of documents or
things, showing good cause therefor;
(b) Notice of the motion must be served to all other parties of the case;
(c) The motion must designate the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things which the party wishes to be produced
and inspected;
(d) Such documents, etc. are not privileged;
(e) Such documents, etc. constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action; and
(f) Such documents, etc. are in the possession, custody or control of the
other party.