FT Fabie Vs City of Manila G.R. No. L-6583 February 16, 1912
FT Fabie Vs City of Manila G.R. No. L-6583 February 16, 1912
FT Fabie Vs City of Manila G.R. No. L-6583 February 16, 1912
CARSON, J. :
Ordinance No. 124 of the city of Manila, enacted September 21, 1909, is an
amendment of section 107 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila,
enacted June 13, 1908 relating to the issuance of permits for the erection of
buildings. Section 107 so amended reads as follows:
The appellees are the owners in common of a large tract of land which forms
a part of the estate known as the Hacienda de Santa Ana de Sapa and which
is inclosed between Calle Herran of the District of Paco and an estero known
as Tripa de Gallina, and lying within the corporate limits of the city of
Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On the 26th day of November, 1909, the plaintiffs and appellees sought to
obtain from the city of Manila a building permit authorizing the construction
of a small nipa house upon the property in question. It was claimed that the
purpose of the building was to serve as a guard house in which watchmen
might be stationed in order to prevent the carrying away of zacate from the
premises. The permit was denied by the city authorities on the ground that
the site of the proposed building did not conform to the requirements of
section 107 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila, as amended by
Ordinance No. 124, which provides: "That the building shall abut or face
upon a public street or alley or on a private street or alley which has been
officially approved." It is the contention of the appellees herein that this
provision is unconstitutional and in violation of the fundamental rights of the
property owners of the city of Manila as guaranteed by the established laws
of these Islands and by the Constitution of the United States, in that it
constitutes an invasion of their property rights without due process of law.
The lower court found in favor of appellees and declared the ordinance null
and void, at least to the extent of the above-cited provision. From this
judgment this appeal has been duly perfected. The only question submitted
for the adjudication on this appeal is the constitutionality of the ordinance,
and to this question alone was direct our attention in this
opinion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Its business is to regulate and protect the security of social order, the life
and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in thickly populated
communities, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use
of property.
However courts may differ as to the extent and boundaries of this power,
and however difficult it may be of precise definition, there is a general
agreement that it extends to the protection of the lives, health and property
of the citizens, and to the preservation of good order and the public morals.
In the absence of any constitutional prohibition, a legislature may lawfully
prevent all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society
though the prohibition invades the right of liberty or property of an
individual. (Thompson on Corporations, 2d ed., vol. 1, sec. 421.)
In the case of U. S. vs. Toribio (15 Phil. Rep., 92) we had occasion to discuss
at length the police powers of the State, and in the opinion in that case will
be found a number of quotations from textbook and judicial authority,
developing and exemplifying the principles on which the exercise of the
police powers of the State have been recognized and applied. But for the
purpose of this opinion the foregoing citations from Thompson's treatise on
Corporations sets forth the doctrine quite satisfactorily, and relying on the
reasoning of the opinion in the case of U. S. vs. Toribio (15 Phil. Rep., 92), it
is not necessary to enter at this time into an extended discussion of the
principles on which the doctrine rest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
In accord with the rule laid down in the case of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U. S.,
132-134), quoted at some length in the opinion in the case of U.
S. vs. Toribio, to justify the State in the exercise of it police powers on
behalf of the public, it must appear;
First, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise
of protecting the public interest, arbitrary interfere with private business, or
impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In
other words, is determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police
powers is not conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court.
That the ordinance is not "unduly oppressive upon individuals" becomes very
clear when the nature and extent of the limitations imposed by its provisions
upon the use of private property are considered with relation to the public
interests, the public health and safety, which the ordinance seeks to secure.
Discussing this question in his opinion to the Municipal Board relative to the
validity and constitutionality of this ordinance, the Attorney-General well
said: "Under the ordinance before us rights in private property are not
arbitrary regulated. No person desiring to erect a building is prohibited from
doing so. He can, if necessary, lay out a private street or the city can extend
the public street system. The property may thus be substantially increased
in value rather than the reverse, In brief, the owner's right to the enjoyment
of his property is only interfered with in so far as it is necessary to protect
the rights of others."
To this we may add the following citation from the opinion in the case of
Commonwelth vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84) which to our minds well states the
principle in this regard on which the validity of the of the ordinance in
question must be sustained: