Critically examine the dimensions of 17 ce crisis

OR
Discuss the various issues involved in the 17th CE crisis.
OR
The 17th CE was a black century for Spain and italy. comments
OR
Assess the relative importance of economic and political factors which went into making of 17th CE
european crisis
OR
Do you think that the 17th crisis touched every aspect of life in Europe? Comment.

Introduction

The idea behind a ‘seventeenth century crisis’ is not new, for even during the contemporary time, people like John
Goodwin commented how it was a period of discord. The mid-seventeenth century, Voltaire concluded,
constituted “a period of usurpations almost from one end of the world to the other’; and he pointed not only to
Cromwell in Europe but also to Muley-Ismail in Morocco, Aurangzeb in India and Li Tsu-Cheng in China.”

The period of 17th century has been a topic for debate and discussion for a very long time. Primarily there are three
parts to the debates: the nature of the crisis, the time period of the crisis, and if there was a crisis at all. The
crisis has roughly four dimensions: economic, political, socio-cultural and climatic. Recent writing has also
shown how this crisis actually took the shape of a worldwide crisis, affecting east and south Asia. But this also
remains hotly debated.

E. Hobsbawm: A General Crisis of the European Economy

A Marxist historian and scholar of English history,E.J. Hobsbawm saw a general crisis of the European economy,
marked by a break from feudal culture. To him, it was a crisis in the mode of production in the last stage of
transition from feudalism to capitalism, the latter marked by the Industrial Revolution. Hobsbawm points to the
general argument of regression- citing the decline of Italy, Spain and Germany, and advance of the “Maritime
Powers”- England, Netherlands, Sweden and Russia. For England, he specifically mentions it to be a
“decisive advance”

Population declined with the exception of Netherlands, “Spain was a by-word for depopulated”, while English
population slumped after 1630s. Morality rate was higher and areas were deindustrialised. There was thus, a
general commercial crisis- the Baltic and Mediterranean declined, as did the volume of trade, and it is
unlikely he argues that homegrown industries made up for this scarcity. The expansion of Europe also passed
through a crisis- the Spanish and Portuguese empire contracted, there was the collapse of the Dutch West Indian
Company and the English Africa Company.

This was also the time of social revolt- from France’s Fronde rebellions to Catalan, Neapolitan and Portuguese
revolutions, maritime and peasant unrest in Bordeaux and Brittany, the Ukrainian revolution and the Bohemian
peasant uprising of 1680 bear testimony to the fact. Also, absolutism brought with it its own woes. The whole
business was now officially controlled by government, and Hobsbawm argues that the pomp and splendour of
the age distracted the people from the more pressing problems.

The only immunity of states from this crisis was if they had undergone a bourgeois revolution. By comparing the
price history, Hobsbawm argues that the crisis began about I620; perhaps with the slump period from I619 into the
early I620s. The only signs of revival outweigh those of crisis in the Maritime States but it was the period of great
fluctuations- constant “boom and depression”.
Capitalism during the 17th century is generally described as a parasite operating under the constraints of a
feudal apparatus. Hobsbawm held that if capitalism is to rise, feudal or agrarian society must be revolutionized.
There must be enough capital to furnish investment and there must be enough labour power to increase production,
and these changes must also be manifested in the colonial system.
However, peasants and much of the general population rarely used money except when dealing with the state.
Under the self-sustaining localized agrarian economies of feudalism, there are an insufficient number of buyers of
mass produced goods. This makes mass production uneconomical and thus capitalistic profits impossible.
Mercantilist enterprise business adapts itself to operating in this feudal framework, accepting its limitations and the
peculiar demand for its services and becomes parasitic. But trade could, even under feudal conditions, produce
large enough aggregate profits to give rise to large-scale production, if it was properly organised in concentrated
pockets, yet the growth of markets was slim.
He argues that in the case of Italy, it was primarily due to the diversion of resources that led to Italy’s ruin, as did
the lack of trade- the Italian people did not have the buying capacity for luxury textiles, and hence, trade declined.
In eastern Europe, there was the contradiction- feudalism was strengthened, while the peasants were transformed
into “less of a cash customer”, and there was a decline among the minor nobility as well. The overseas colonies
were also stuck in the trap of bullionism, and the Americas exported more than they imported. In Europe, export
was not expanded due to mercantilist policies, and when the single bonus of bullion was exhausted, it led to
decline and an economic crisis. Within Europe, the homegrown industries remained underdeveloped, and no
revolt targeted or led to specialisation of labour. There was not much technological innovation, and during the
period of diminishing returns, the population could not protect itself, either from landlords or from the grips of
famine. There was also the rise in labour costs, which however, did not affect them positively, given the scenario
of scarcity.
There were two obstacles in the way of Industrial Revolution in the 17 th century- one, that the social and economic
structure was not developed enough, and two, simply the presence of labour and specialisation did not lead to this
result, as seen in Birmingham. The I7th century crisis resulted in a considerable concentration of economic power.
Directly and indirectly this concentration served the ends of future industrialization, due to mercantilist policies.
The economic concentration took place in various forms, in East and West, under conditions of expansion,
contraction or stagnation. Administrative measures like the Prussian excise might intensify this process but were
not wholly responsible for it.
This crisis aids the Industrial Revolution in two ways. First, the resulting economic concentration in the state sped
the process of capital accumulation that favoured the `putting-out' industry at the expense of craft production and
second, it helped solve the problem of providing surplus agricultural goods by creating a market that led peasant
farmers to adopt higher yield per acre crops. Hence, for Hobsbawm, the crisis provided its own solution by forcing
a change in production methods, increased capital investment to answer needs of colonial system and  war
production, and the creation of a regional `home market' among the north-western Atlantic states.
Alexandra Lublinskaya challenges many of the premises of Hobsbawm’s arguments. Lublinskaya argues that
while levels of accumulated capital were probably less than optimal, there were avenues one could pursue to
overcome this barrier. There were a large number of commercial and industrial companies to finance and invest in
businesses requiring large sums of capital. Thus, apparatuses for acquiring large sums of capital to enable
capitalistic enterprise did exist prior to the 17th century. However even if it is a given that there was an inadequate
concentration of capital in prior to the 17th century to establish capitalism, Hobsbawm still fails to demonstrate
how the crisis affected to use of capital. Lublinskaya shows that there was a concentration of disperse
manufactures in Germany, Spain and especially France who had already established large scale manufacturing
using division of labour since the early 16th century. Hence, it can hardly be said that conditions for growth of
capitalism was missing in the 17th century.
Hugh Trevor Roper: A crisis in institutions
Hugh Trevor-Roper responded to Hobsbawm’s idea of a general economic crisis and though he accepted the idea
of a general crisis, he perceived it differently. Trevor-Roper addresses the problem to be of a more political nature.
He criticised Hobsbawm for not basing his arguments on solid evidence and said that it was too English-centric,
calling the idea of a “bourgeois capitalist” revolution, a mere “priori hypothesis”.
Trevor-Roper argues that though the sixteenth century did see discord, the revolutions it saw, namely the
Reformation and Counter-Reformation, were less profound than those of the coming centuries. There is not much
change in society he cites, “Aristocratic monarchical society is unbroken” and marked by lack of
technological innovation. However, a distinctive feature is the rise of princes in the 16th century, which led to the
rise of the “Renaissance Court” and governance, marked by the decline of European cities. This was also the age
of economic expansion, marked by capturing colonies and formation of allies.
This differs in the 17th century, which did not “absorb these revolutions”, it marks the end of the Renaissance, and
the beginning of the “years of change”. To Trevor-Roper, the real problem lies in the defects of the social
structure- the structural weaknesses of the western monarchies. Contemporaries saw it as a political revolution,
the struggle between the Crown and the Estates. This is demonstrated heavily in Spain. France, Germany, England,
Denmark and Sweden.
Renaissance State: An important feature is the idea of the Renaissance state to Trevor-Roper, where one finds the
growth in number of courtiers and lesser officials. These officials usually received small customary payments, a
“trivial fee”, leaving most of them free to do corrupt activities, what he calls “casual profits”. These casual profits
increased with time, and every time new offices were created, there was a new burden on the subjects. For
example, Queen Elizabeth preferred giving her courtiers leases (with the right to exploit) than cash as salaries.
Hence, even if taxes were low, there was no choice but to tax peasants more, like the King of France obliged his
peasants to buy more salt than needed to raise his yield from the gabelle. The Church as well had become
bureaucratic, aggravated by the Counter-Reformation.
17th century: Thus the 17th century was marked by an increase in the number of costly officials- offices were sold to
the highest bidder and the purchaser sought to raise profits by extracting from the country, increasing the “margin
of waste”. These costs were further aggravated by war, like the Thirty Years War, however, the nobility and
Crown continued to lead lavish lives.
In 1620, there was a political crisis in Prague, resuming the war of Philip II, bringing in new forms of tax and
exploitation. There was a great depression, the “universal decay of trade of 1620”. On top of that, there was a
hatred for the Court, courtiers, the bureaucracy, and towards Puritanism, by the general masses. Most states
adopted austere rules, like the Archbishop forbade long hair in Oxford, in 1624, Philip II of Spain passed
sumptuary laws and banished the ruff.
There were also differences in society- in England, the cost of the Court fell most heavily on the gentry, who were
the tax-paying class, while in France, the nobles were exempted from taxes, and it was the peasants who bore the
brunt of taxes. The revolt of the tax-paying classes was also seen in Cortes, Spain by the arbitrsitas. Essentially,
there were demands for emancipation from the burden of the peasantry, abolition of hereditary offices, reduction of
fees. This was also the time where identities got mixed up -men who deemed themselves part of the “country”
found themselves to be part of the “Court”.
The Renaissance courts knew that to survive, they had to cut down on their bureaucracy and strengthen their
mercantilist programme- thus, we see the rise of a national economy, marked by limited imports and
controlled prices of food and labour. There was investment in capacity building of the lower strata- local
education, creating skilled workers at the base of society, and there was an attempt to reduce Academies in France,
monasteries in Spain.
In Spain, however, there was not much effort made to reform the existing machinery of the state, rather they
continued to be exploited. Though taxes were tried to redistributed, rate of taxes did not decrease. In
Netherlands however, there was economic reform, the social problem of tax-heavy state apparatus was purged, and
Amsterdam became the “new Venice in the north”. In France, there was the rise of absolutism and of Colbert. The
Fronde rebellions had “burnt up the overgrown patronage of the great nobles” and the Court. It saw some
administrative changes at this time, systemising the sale of offices, however under Colbert and Richelieu, the state
continued its mercantilist policies. In England, Robert Cecil, Earl of Salisbury and Francis Bacon did try to curb
the bureaucracy, but to no avail. The system had actually grown. The English economy encouraged formation of
capital and investment and paid less attention to the base of the society. In the 1640s, there were revived efforts to
curb the “waste”, and hence the “triumphant enemies of the English court were simply the country” folk, who
rebelled against the parasitic bureaucracy.
Thus, the revolts were actually against a dynamic absolutism, marked by its oppressive taxation, violation of
customary laws, threatening to disrupt social balance of the population.
Mousnier: A crisis affecting all Mankind
For Mousnier the 17th century crisis was actually the crisis of culture. He argues that the participation of the
nobility in the peasant revolts of the Fronde refutes Trevor-Roper’s arguments. To Mousnier, there is a difference
between the high-level bureaucrats and the lower moderate officials. The Fronde is not the critical moment in early
modern France but instead the French Wars of Religion of the late sixteenth century. For him too, it was less an
economic crisis but one involving changes in the social framework. For Mousnier the crisis affected all Mankind.
The crisis was permanent with fluctuations and shifts. There was contention among the nobility and the bourgeois,
while the masses were faced with food shortages, and are hence, revolting.
The powers in Europe as well are declining, especially the power of the Pope, the Habsburgs and there is the rise
of expansionist France. There is a general discord for the Church is also facing trouble, science is uncertain and is
reflected in the arts by the baroque style which expresses this discord. “The struggle against this general crisis
fails: all sober forms of government organization, of systems of thought such as Cartesianism or of soberness of
style as in Classicism, of international ideas regarding balance of power and international law were unable to check
the crisis. This period therefore also ends in crisis: economic depression, lengthy, expensive wars, new uncertainty
in thought and faith.”
Elliott: Questioning the crisis
Elliott disagrees with Trevor Roper regarding the issue of Court and Country, by arguing that Spain spent a lot of
resources on war and navies than on Court and offices- there was no parasitic bureaucracy and the burden lay on
the taxpayers of Castille. The revolts of 1640 were due to Count Duke Olivare’s extension of taxes to areas beyond
Castille. With reference to Spain, Elliot argues that the decline of Spain is due to loss in population, productivity
and overseas wealth. There was widespread migration due to plague and expulsion of moriscos led to decline in
the tax-paying group. Thus, it was not the tension between Court and Country but a series of unwise economic
decisions leading to exploitation of tax payers and decrease in productive investment that led to the decline of
Spain. He also claims that the ‘crisis’ in Spain was actually in the 1560s, and hence he dates back the crisis theory
by nearly a century.
Christopher Hill: Characterising the crisis
Christopher Hill traces out the recent historiographical debate, stating that most of the historians have tried to give
causal reasons for the phenomenon. However, many countries also reacted to the crisis in religious forms, and
inherently there was a difference between religion and society. Hill points out the features of the 17 th century crisis.
To him they are:

● An economic and political crisis affecting western and central Europe

● There were different reactions to the crisis, and these differences are varied and hence, worth studying

● The national circumstances should be analysed in terms of the social and political structures and religious
institutions and beliefs
● The crisis impacted different regions differently- in Netherlands and England, there were revolts leading to
significant political changes while the effects on France and Sweden represent a “halfway house”.
● The history of Netherland or England, differs from that in France, Spain or Italy because of the choices
made which led to successful or abortive revolts respectively
● Thus, Hill advocates this method of comparative analysis as it comes as near as it can to scientific
laboratory testing
Geoffrey Parker: Role of climate
Geoffrey Parker believes that the answer to the causes of the crisis can be found in the climatic conditions of the
period. He cites the work of John Eddy, who worked on the Maunder Minimum- the scarcity of sunspots during
the late 17th century. This is corroborated by contemporary accounts of astronomers, like John Hevelius, G. D.
Cassini and John Flamsteed. Recent research on glacier movements and harvest dates in Europe has shown that
harvests in the mid-17th century occurred far later than normal and suggests long winters and excessive rain as the
principal culprits.

This change in climate leads to the lingering of snow in Central Asia, and westerly winds blow eastwards, what is
known as El-Nino, affecting Ethiopia, northwest India and Europe. The temperatures decline in the Northern
Hemisphere while the fall in this temperature triggers extreme climatic events. Le Roy Ladurie’s talks about the
Maunder Minimum and the climate thesis. He connected climatic anomalies with political upheavals in France and
England between 1648 and 1650.
Also, measurements of carbon show that there was an increase in carbon at this time, associated with reduction
un solar energy. This phenomenon was not just seen in Europe, but evidence of it is also found in Korea, China,
Vietnam and India. A fall of one-degree Celsius in overall temperature led to the ‘Little Ice Age’, restricting
growth of vegetation. According to F. Braudel, 80-90% of the population depended on crop yields and this goes on
to show that the decline in production led to food scarcity, increased morality due to diseases and migration.
Economists have termed this as a ‘high-level equilibrium trap’, due to equal input and output, a stage of
stagnation is reached, as pointed out by Steensgaard. As for the population, in the late 16 th century, population
drifted from towns to cities, and migrations generally led to an increased size of the cities, like in Madrid and
London. The literature interestingly conveys a sense of fear towards these migrants. Epidemics also caused huge
loss to the populations, removing almost 20 to 30% of the total population. In many cases harvest failure also
precipitated industrial and commercial crises, for the sharp rise in food prices led to a falling demand for
manufactured goods, which in turn led to widespread unemployment among wage earners. Many families therefore
lost their main source of income just as the price of essential items escalated.
There were thus many popular strikes- 374 revolts were seen in the 17 th century. Rebels tended to target grievances
that could, in theory, be redressed —the policies and demands of government—and the commonest victims of the
rioters were normally the officials who tried to enforce those policies, especially tax-collectors.

Parker connects the climatic reason and political crisis and says that much of southern Portugal rebelled in 1637
when drought forced the price of bread to unprecedented heights, there were popular revolts spread throughout
Catalonia in spring 1640 as prolonged drought threatened catastrophic harvest failure, as well as in Osaka. Three
disastrous harvests preceded the Irish Rebellion in 1641; the catastrophic harvests of 1647 and 1648 helped to
precipitate major revolts in Sicily, central Italy, Poland, and Russia; while the harvest of 1650 was the worst of the
century in Sweden, creating the backdrop for near-revolution when the Estates of the kingdom met in Stockholm.

The price inflation also meant that few soldiers could be employed and hence, few governments could wage war.
Thus, as Ogilvie points out, there was a need to redistribute the taxation burden to increase revenue and there thus
developed a resistance to the new taxation policies. There was also religious tension as there were a lot of reforms
made during this time like the Russian Orthodox Church underwent a liturgical reform in the 1640s and 1650s.

Niels Steensgaard: Interrelating the crisis

● A general economic crisis

● A general political crisis

● A crisis in the development of capitalism

● A crisis encompassing all mankind

The economic crisis has many facets to it, and statistical data available needs to be revaluated with more care and
precision. According to him, population was declining, not due to a low morality rate, but due to low birth rate-
primarily because the mindset of people was changing. There was deliberate family planning- the “most important
variable in this respect is women’s age on first entering marriage, but the number of pregnancies within
marriage also shows fluctuations, which must be the outcome of decisions founded upon either economic
considerations or ‘mentalités collectives’.”
AGRICULTURAL CRISIS
The outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War brought rising prices, which continued in Denmark, France and northern
Italy until the 1620s, in Germany and Holland until the 1630s and in England, Belgium and Austria until the
1640s. Prices thereafter were low all over Europe until the middle of the eighteenth century, although in
Germany a tendency to rise can be demonstrated somewhat earlier.
With regard to industries Steensgaard takes up different sections like woollen textiles and says that the earlier
sectors did decline in the 17th century, but this was primarily in the late 17 th century. For example, Dutch textile
exports continued to increase till 1640s. The actual figures of decline stem in from the late 17 th century in Italy and
Spain. Thus, there were fluctuations, but at different times, and two factors marking a qualitative shift were of
great importance according to him- the conversion to rural industry, and the change-over to the production of
lighter textile materials.
Steensgaard points out that there was thriving trade in England and Netherlands- trade declined primarily in
Spain. There are signs of a trade depression in the Baltic only from about the middle of the century. Trade with
Asia continued though there was some decline from 1620-50. Thus, it was not a crisis of production, but that of
distribution, due to the state-imposed levies.
In the public sector, if one reckons protection to be a service, in the economic-theoretical meaning of the word,
the whole question of a seventeenth-century crisis falls to the ground. Never before was Spain so thoroughly
protected as under Philip IV, or Germany during the Thirty Years’ War. The production of protection was the
seventeenth century’s ‘leading sector’. Thus, by interrelating these factors, Steensgaard concludes that there was
an economic crisis which affected only states at certain points only.
The political aspect, was actually marked by a dynamic growth of absolutism. He disagrees with Trevor-Roper’s
Court-Country dualism and argues that the common feature of all the states at this point were the growing rate of
taxes- it was taxes that disrupted the social order. He cites Mousnier who wrote about the increasing taxation
policies and how it reached a breaking point for the peasantry.
Steensgaard in another article ‘The Seventeenth-Century Crisis and the Unity of Eurasian History’ sees Europe as
a “gestalt of interdependent states and regions”. He argues that the crisis in Europe was actually not simply limited
there, but also in different parts of East and South Asia, citing the work of William Atwell. J. F. Richards argues
that in the early 1630s, there was a “well-documented and unusually severe” shortage and mortality in Gujarat
and Deccan regions of India. F. Braudel argues that the demographic development in China and Europe showed
similar trends between the 14th and 17th century.
Peter Kriedte: Demographic trends
For Peter Kriedte the demographic decline showed both- a Malthusian as well as a social crisis. The growing
population during the 16th century had put heavy pressure on the fixed ceiling of agricultural output. According to
Thomas Malthus, in a natural economy, population has a natural growth rate and increases geometrically while
the natural resources necessary to support the population grows arithmetically. This results in a crisis till it is
resolved with a drop-in population. The impact of demographic factors had long term consequences on family life
and birth patterns. The earlier growth of population seems to have created problems of food supply and shortage of
food brought about a change in the reproductive behaviour of people. Thus, the average marrying age of women
rose, This prevented an increase in the gap between the size of the population and the availability of food- leading
to deterioration of the overall economic situation, enabling landlords to appropriate larger portions of agricultural
income.
Ivo-Schoffer: Debating the extent of the crisis
The Dutch scholar Ivo-Schoffer in his article ‘Did Holland’s Golden Age Coincide with a Period of Crisis’ points
out that while there is agreement of a general crisis affecting Europe, Netherlands at this time actually
flourished. He cites that there is a general human nature to confine history by imposing uniformity- that the idea
of a crisis affecting Europe is imposed on every country, to the extent, unrelated events are given special
meanings. Like, Baroque art which was once seen to be dramatic, is now seen to be signifying a crisis. The
historian Merriman points out that there were six contemporary revolutions which could be studied in relation to
the English revolution- Fronde in France, rebellions in Catalonia, Naples, Portugal and William II’s attack on
Amsterdam. However, Schoffer critiques Merriman that his description is limited by land geography. We tend to
“look” for revolts in different countries, after stalwarts like Hobsbawm and Trevor-Roper agree on the idea of a
crisis. However, if we assess the Dutch case, there was hardly any revolt, but rather a marked prosperity. A century
is a long time, and a “crisis” cannot encompass a whole century- mankind proceeds from crisis to crisis.
Schoffer critiques Mousnier who placed great emphasis on fluctuations from year to year, greater than the 16 th
century. Schoffer agrees that indeed there were fluctuations, but these are not unique- it was the end of the
exceptional boom in the 16th century economy. The fall in the import of silver from Spanish-America was also a
stabilising factor for the economy, according to him, for it had been ravaged by inflation- the circulation of
money had probably slowed down, but the total supply of currency was not reduced to a minimum. There
was a new supply, especially from Brazil and copper met the emergency. As for the population, which shows a
“spectacular drop”, there was actually a slight rise he argues. Plagues, epidemics and local disasters kept the
population below the general level of overpopulation. Mercantilism actually posed a bigger problem, for it closed
off the economic barriers, left limited means for economic welfare.
Theodore Rabb: A crisis in the arts?
Drawing from Paul Hazards’ description of intellectual ferment in the years around 1700, and R. Mousnier’s
identification of a broad “century of crisis”. T. Rabb outlines an era of turmoil and uncertainty extending from
mid-16th century to the 17th century, that was resolved by the scientific revolution.
Rabb argues that the crisis of the 17 th century was reflected in the arts: he believes there to be a distinct shift from
“belligerence to restraint, from upheaval to calm”. To Rabb, the crisis had three characteristics:

● Must be short-lived

● Must be distinct in terms of a phase

● Has to be worse than the period which follows it

What is significant is the discontinuity of the period- for Rabb it is a crisis in the “location of authority” much
like how Trevor-Roper views the crisis to be.
Rabb calls the 16th century and early 17th century a “growing fever”. In the cultural sphere, Rabb cites several;
factors which act as evidence of a ‘growing unease’- the rise of mysticism, larger than life Baroque art of
Bernini and Rubens and a growing emphasis on introspection and restraint. To Rabb, like Elliot and
Steensgaard, he asserts that the main impetus for the centralisation of state power was warfare. In the economic
sphere, Rabb disagrees with Hobsbawm that a crisis cannot be found in terms of economics or demography.
Rabb particularly focussed on art and emphasized on the perception of realities- the 17 th century according to him
is characterised by passivity and subdued feelings. Paintings were now decorative and pleasing. To him, there
was a change in the focus of the aristocracy and a “critical mass” theory of bureaucratisation.
Jan de Vries: Questioning the economic crisis
In ‘The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600–1750’, Jan de Vries re emphasises on the importance of the
economic crisis. According to him, the fundamental problem of the debate is the matter of periodisation, and to
him, it needs to be contextualised in the wake of Confessionalization and Enlightenment.
De Vries questions the kind of economic crisis that affected the 17 th century and if the label of crisis appropriate.
There is a distinct pattern of long term changes shared in broad outline by all of Europe: prices were either
increasing or decreasing in a cyclical manner. They rose in the 13th century during the Black Death, falling
thereafter. It revived in the late 15 th century, rising till the 16th, the era of price revolution. In the 17 th century there
was an inflection in the Mediterranean and North Europe, following which there was a decline.
De Vries connects this to the endogenous (unique to technologies and reproductive factors of the society) and
exogenous (factors like plague beyond the control of society) and cites that there was a decline in the population-
though it increased till 1660, after which it fell due to repeated famine, war and plague. He argues that there is a
“suggestive correlation than a convincing causation” in the relationship between climate and the general crisis.
Climate however, can have a direct effect on morality.
The crisis economy of the 17th century was fundamentally impacted by the reduction in official silver shipments.
Repeated harvest failures and plagues, decline in Mediterranean population led to collapse of export industries and
demise of long-distance trade links, withering of commercial cities. To top it off, the Thirty Wars affected the
Holy Roman Empire, France had the combined pressure of failing agricultural returns and peasant unrest, while
England faced severe competition with the Dutch.

The 17th century however, did not show universal regression, but that it hit different sectors at different times.
There were low prices and failing yields, demographic trends show a decline- this price decline is fundamentally
due to the decline in the purchasing power of the people. The public sector and the protection theory also fails for
during the period of absolutism and mercantilism, to de Vries, the ‘protection sector’ was the most flourishing
sector. Increased public demand would probably more than compensate for the reduced private demand, but not
necessarily within the same production areas. Moreover, the difference in the level of taxes and the taxation
systems would have different effects on the production costs and thereby on the ability to compete in the various
production centres.

Conclusion
In conclusion, it is difficult to assess whether there was truly a general crisis during the 17 th century. However,
what can be assessed is that there was a decline in trade, agricultural production, population, and the era saw
rebellions and social discord. However, the time period of a century is a long time, and these changes were seen
at certain points in some pockets. However, this period did have a lasting impact: there was a regional shift of
power from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, there was a qualitative shift in the means of production,
displacement of industry from the urban to the rural sector, it led to the first phase of industrialisation in
Europe, a decline in the guild system, there was a widening gap between the East and West and large scale
demographic lost, coupled with the strengthen of the European aristocracy in the wake of absolutism.