Sandie Taylor, Lance Workman - Cognitive Psychology - The Basics-Routledge (2021)

C OG NIT I VE P SY CH OL OG Y
THE B A S I C S
Cognitive Psychology: The Basics provides a compact introduction to the core

topics in the field, discussing the science behind the everyday cognitive
phenomena experienced by us all. The book considers laboratory and applied
theory and research alongside technological developments to demonstrate how
our understanding of the brain’s role in cognition is improving all the time.
Alongside coverage of traditional topics in the field, including attention and
perception; learning and memory; thinking, problem-solving and decision-
making; and language, the book also discusses developments in interrelated
areas, such as neuroscience and computational cognitive science. New
perspectives, including the contribution of evolutionary psychology to our
understanding of cognition, are also considered followed by a thoughtful
discussion of future research directions. Using real-world examples throughout,
the authors explain in an accessible and student-friendly manner the role our
human cognition plays in all aspects of our lives.
It is an essential introductory text suitable for all students of cognitive
psychology and related disciplines. It will also be an ideal read for any
reader interested in the role of the brain in human behaviour.
Sandie Taylor is an experienced lecturer and author. Her DPhil in cognitive

psychology focused on memory, in particular face recognition, and applied
memory approaches to facilitate recognition of faces. She has previously
published four books and many peer reviewed articles and book chapters.
Lance Workman is Visiting Professor of Psychology at the University of

South Wales. He was formerly Head of Psychology at Bath Spa
University. Lance has published widely in psychology including over 100
articles and nine books. For seven years he was interviews editor for The
Psychologist and regularly appears in the media.
The B as ic s
The Basics is a highly successful series of accessible guidebooks which

provide an overview of the fundamental principles of a subject area
in a jargon-free and undaunting format.
Intended for students approaching a subject for the first time, the
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Each text comes with recommendations for further study and
gradually introduces the complexities and nuances within a subject.
Town Planning
Tony Hall
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Michael McCarthy
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Billy Clark
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COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
TH E B AS I C S
San di e Ta yl or an d L an c e W or km an
First published 2022
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© 2022 Sandie Taylor and Lance Workman
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ISBN: 978-0-367-85686-1 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-367-85685-4 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-01435-5 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003014355
Typeset in Bembo
by MPS Limited, Dehradun
For Dafydd
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements viii
1 What is cognitive psychology? 1

2 Relationship between brain structure, function
and cognitive modelling 24
3 Attention and perception 50
4 Memory and learning 84
5 Thinking: decision-making and problem-solving 127
6 Language and communication 164
7 Consciousness and metacognition 197
8 Cognitive neuropsychology 221
9 Future directions of cognitive psychology 243
Glossary 261
References 264
Index 295
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to acknowledge Professor Ray Bull. Also to Sandie

Taylor for 92 per cent of the figure work.
WHAT IS COGNITIVE
PSYCHOLOGY?
•
Cognitive psychology is concerned with how we process in
formation. It has been eloquently defined by the American
1
Psychological Association (APA) in 2020 as “the branch of psy

chology that explores the operation of mental processes related to
perceiving, attending, thinking, language, and memory, mainly
through inferences from behavior”. The exploration of mental
processes is not new. For a very long time, philosophers and ‘sci
entists’ have been fascinated by the connection between our mind,
mental processes and the brain. Studying the brain using ‘scientific’
methodology began during the Renaissance period; a time in
European history arguably between 1400 and 1700. It was during
this period that scholars became interested in studying nature,
which included the mechanics of the human body. Great thinkers
such as René Descartes pondered over the philosophical approach
of ‘dualism’ to understand the difference between mind and body.
He believed the two were separate from each other such that our
body (including the brain) represented a physical entity while the
mind represented a spiritual one. The implication of this is that the
mind can exist independently of the body. Conversely, monism
described the mind and body as coexisting. With the development
of scientific technology used to map the brain, the notion of the
mind existing separately from the physical brain became very un
likely. Nevertheless, Descartes helped expand our way of thinking
about the mind and body interface. Even today with our extensive
explorations inside the working brain, finding direct connections
between structure and function is not always straightforward (see
Chapter 2). It could be argued that ideas from dualism and monism
DOI: 10.4324/9781003014355-1
2 WHAT IS COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY?
spurred questions about whether it is possible to replicate a model

of how the mind works. For example, a sub-group of researchers in
Information Technology (IT) have sought to develop a robotic
brain based on a series of inputted commands and algorithms. This
is designed in such a way as to emulate the connections of neurons
(nerve cells) in the human brain. This type of neural networking
comes out of research in computational modelling, which aspires to
imitate cognitive functioning in humans. Despite this, develop
ment of a ‘brain’ that is able to learn independently of further
human instruction is still beyond our reach.
The reason for this short history lesson is to provide us with a
context of how cognitive psychology has developed. Not only this,
but how the different disciplinary routes of science and philosophy
have found their way as sub-disciplines into modern cognitive
psychology. In this chapter, the objective is to outline these dif
ferent contributory disciplines, and their contributions towards an
understanding of how our brain processes information. The four
main areas of contribution include: cognitive psychology; cognitive
neuroscience; cognitive neuropsychology and computational cog
nitive science.
The development of cognitive psychology was, in part, a reaction
to the focus on overt behaviour advocated by ‘Behaviourism’. The
behaviourist movement was concerned with only what you can see
and not that which is hidden from scientific scrutiny. In other
words, aspects of brain function, such as how we think and re
member, were off limits. For behaviourists, such brain activity was
encapsulated in a ‘black box’ that could not be researched objec
tively. Nevertheless, even as behaviourism maintained its hold over
academic psychology, there were key scholars who contributed
towards developing a method for studying mental processes.
George Miller is one such scholar who, in 1956, introduced an
experimental method for studying memory. Alongside Miller,
there were others who devised ingenious experiments to under
stand mental processing. Also, with the popularisation of in
formation processing during the 1970s, an all-encompassing
approach for understanding mental (or cognitive) processing was
WHAT IS COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY? 3
introduced. The information processing approach helped cognitive

psychology to develop further. It enabled cognitive psychologists
to formulate models to represent, for example, how attention,
perception and memory might operate. There were many types of
information processing models, some of which highlighted the
similarities in function between the human brain and a computer.
As we will see in Chapter 3, information processing models have
helped cognitive psychologists understand the transition from
sensory pick-up of stimuli in our environment to forging meaning
in the brain. Models of attention have brought with them new
terminologies such as bottom-up versus top-down processing, and
serial versus parallel processing (see Chapter 3). Different types of
memory storage have been introduced such as short-term versus
long-term memory (see Chapter 4).
So how are cognitive information processing models derived?
A succinct answer to this is by collating participant scores from
cognitive-related tasks. This appears to be simple, but these
cognitive-related tasks have to be controlled such that they test
the same aspect of cognition under the same conditions. This
means that to test problem-solving, for example, the same con
ditions of the study must be applied to all participants. Often two
groups are compared where only one variable is changed. In this
context, the term variable is used to denote something that can be
changed or manipulated. An example of this might be that one
group is given more time to complete the task or that they have to
do so in the presence of a distraction. In this way we can compare
the performance of the two groups for the effect of time or dis
traction on problem-solving. Different cognitive tasks are de
signed to test specific aspects of performance; such as, how many
items participants recall within a set period of time, after mem
orising them for one minute. For each group of participants, it is
possible to derive an average score of performance for the specific
task in question. This average score can be considered as re
presentative of how a particular population sample performs on
the task studied (under each condition). The average performance
of each group is known as a normative score. This is important as
it can be added to existing knowledge about how people perform
on such a task but under slightly different conditions. In our
problem-solving example, it could be that resolution of the task
fails when the time allowed is halved or when distracted. This

information can then be added to existing theory or a model of
problem-solving (see Box 1.1).
Cognitive tasks can be used as an objective method of exploring
mental processes. Moreover, by adopting such a method, cognitive
BOX 1.1 HOW ARE COGNITIVE INFORMATION

PROCESSING MODELS DERIVED?
An interesting way of developing scientific knowledge was outlined
by philosopher Karl Popper (1959). He provided a protocol for
devising experiments in his Deductive Model of Science. Not only
was this embraced by cognitive psychologists, but by the scientific
community as a whole. It describes a number of stages which
should be followed as a means of building knowledge based upon
existing knowledge. Sometimes the existing knowledge becomes
extended, but it can also be refuted. The key element is to test and
retest using the same variables and method; the experimental
method. He described how it is important to make predictions or
hypotheses about the phenomenon under investigation. For ex
ample, ‘Faces presented twice during learning are more likely to be
recognised in a test than those faces shown once’. This hypothesis
is making a statement of prediction and prescribes the best way of
investigating this. The experimental method should have two
conditions, one where participants see a series of faces, some of
which are repeated and some of which are not. In the other
condition, participants are shown the same faces but all of them
are shown once only. The test should include the target faces with a
set of new unseen faces. This means that all participants have the
same test. If the hypothesis holds true, then participants shown the
faces twice should recognise more of the faces than those
participants who saw one presentation only. Results supporting
the hypothesis are added to existing theories about memory for
faces; in this case showing faces more than once improves facial
memory. Hence, the hypothesis is supported, and findings are
added to the general theory of memory for faces. We could devise a
simple model based on this hypothesis (see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1 Fictitious model based on collated performance results
This example shows how it is possible to develop models based

on participant scores from a cognitive task (face recognition). It
makes sense, however, to include scores that are similar. If scores
are ‘all over the place’, then the hypothesis will not be confirmed.
Scores have to be evaluated carefully because it is possible that
there are one or two scores that are odd, in that they fail to fit the
majority pattern. These scores are considered as outliers and can be
above or below the average score. Hence, most scores that are
similar are considered the average (norm or mean) while other
scores are distributed away from mean. The distance from the mean
is calculated as standard deviations and these scores can still be
included. Outliers that are ‘many’ standard deviations from the
mean, fail to represent a normative population and can be excluded.
Unless we are interested in the extreme scores (which we can be),
the exclusion of ‘outliers’ is important if we want to obtain a
consensus on individuals’ performance for specific cognitive tasks.
This type of scoring fits with the bell-shaped Yerkes-Dodson curve
(see Figure 1.2). Such results help cognitive psychologists under
stand how the brain processes information and enables the
tweaking of existing models.
Figure 1.2 Yerkes-Dodson curve

Soutce: Adapted from Yerkes and Dodson (1908)
psychologists have a means of opening the ‘black box’ that beha

viourists so vehemently argue cannot be accessed. There are many
examples of where cognitive tasks have helped progress our un
derstanding of cognition. One interesting area is mental imagery.
Mental imagery is considered to be a series of pictures in the mind’s
eye without input from the outside world. One study examined
the hypothesis that mental imagery uses visual representations (see
Box 1.2).
Cognitive psychology has contributed to how we study and
understand mental processing. It has introduced a successful
methodological ethos. It has, however, introduced limitations to
how cognitive tasks are designed and who comprises the parti
cipant population. Most research is conducted within the walls
of a laboratory using university students. This, it has been ar
gued, can result in findings that are divorced from the ‘real’
world; findings which lack ecological validity. Another problem
BOX 1.2 MENTAL IMAGERY

The study of mental imagery is attributed to Stephen Kosslyn, who
devised an experiment in 1973 to examine how we can ‘see’ images
in our mind, without actually receiving input from our visual system.
He argued that we scan images introspectively in our mind, and that
this is a cognitive process. Kosslyn found that when participants
were instructed to imagine moving from one location to another, it
took them longer to achieve this when the distance between the two
points was further away. He also demonstrated that when asked to
scan an object using mental imagery, such as a boat, the more
distant the components of the boat were, the longer it took to
‘reach’ them. For example, when asked to scan for the anchor from
the motor, participants moved in real time across the deck and bow
to find it. In 1978, Kosslyn, Ball and Reiser wanted to know whether
these mental images preserve the spatial distances between the
parts of objects. They used a map of a fictitious island which had a
series of objects on it, such as a lake, hut, rock, sand, grass and a
well. The spatial distances between these objects were pre-defined
and set in a way that some objects were closer together than others
(see Figure 1.3).
Figure 1.3 Fictitious island map

Source: Adapted from Kosslyn, Ball and Reiser (1978)
Participants learnt the objects on the map, their locations and

relative positions. The map was removed, and participants were told
that they would hear the name of one of the objects on the map, at
which point they had to mentally image the whole map and focus
on the object. Participants effectively scanned their mental image of
the map and pressed a button when they arrived at the location
of the object. From this object’s location they had to travel mentally
to the next object and so on. The length of time it took to travel from
one object to the next was consistent with the spatial distances on
the map. Hence, the further the distance between two objects, the
longer it took to scan the mental image. They concluded that the
content of a picture, including the spatial properties, are preserved
in our mental imagery. In 2005, Kosslyn calculated that there is a
two thirds overlap of areas activated in the brain during mental
imagery and during visual processing.
concerns the level of interpretation of the findings. For instance,

measures taken, including the correctness and speed of task
performance, can be interpreted as providing evidence of spe
cific cognitive function. Mental processes involved in task
completion are often more complicated and operate on an in
terdependent basis. In recent years this latter problem has been
addressed by the development of scanning technology provided
by cognitive neuroscience.
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
When cognitive neuroscience was initially conceived its remit was
to study the involvement of physical brain mechanisms during
cognitive processing. This has been enabled by the development of
technological advances such as scanning techniques. Using brain
scanning technology has enabled cognitive neuroscientists to map
brain function. By doing so they have unravelled the intricate
complexities of a brain with multi-neural links (some 100 billion
neurons) and seemingly independent areas of the brain that operate
interdependently. The brain is far more complex than they had
originally envisaged over 30 years ago. Cognitive neuroscience has
contributed towards our understanding of individual differences,
cognitive intervention and rehabilitation, and theoretical neu
roscience. Of interest here, however, are the different scanning
techniques available and how these have been used to map the
brain. There are many different scanning (or imaging) techniques
used in cognitive neuroscience (see Table 1.1).
Table 1.2 provides some examples of how these three different
imaging techniques can be used to investigate cognitive processing.
Scanning techniques have provided detailed pictorial informa
tion about the structure and function of the brain (as discussed in
Chapter 2). For example, in Figure 1.4, the basic structure of the
brain can be seen.
An interesting case of the woman who has no fear due to serious
damage to the amygdala (see Box 1.3) has shown the important
role that brain imaging has as a diagnostic tool.
This confirms the mapping of the brain produced by neurologist,
Korbinian Brodmann (1868 ̶ 1918). Scanning techniques such as
fMRI have helped cognitive neuroscientists to understand how the
different areas of the brain are interconnected while, at the same
time, maintaining some function specificity.
COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY
While cognitive neuroscientists highlight how intricately the brain
is interconnected, another relatively new field – cognitive neu
ropsychology ̶ has developed the concept of modularity. Ellis
and Young (1988) defined modularity as ‘the orchestrated activity
Table 1.1 Different scanning techniques commonly used by cognitive neu

roscientists
Scanning techniques How it works
Single unit recording The activity of a single neuron can be studied
through the insertion of a micro-electrode into
the brain. This is very sensitive and can pick up
the activity in a single cell.
Event related Many electrodes are placed in several areas on
potentials (ERPs) the scalp. These record brain activity while the
individual is performing a cognitive task. The
recordings are averaged to produce a single
continuous waveform.
Positron emission This indirectly measures neural activity by
tomography (PET) using radioactive substances that release atomic
particles known as positrons. When the
released positrons are detected by this scanner,
a spatial image is created.
Functional magnetic Changes of blood oxygenation and flow are
resonance indicators of neural activity. Active areas in the
imaging (fMRI) brain consume more oxygen and it is this that
fMRI detects and images.
Event related functional A measure known as BOLD (blood oxygen
magnetic resonance level-dependent) is used to detect the amount
imagining (efMRI) of deoxyhaemoglobin in the capillaries and
veins of the brain. This provides a measure of
the amount of oxygen used (OEF: oxygen
extraction fraction) by areas active in the brain.
This measure provides information regarding
areas active during specific cognitive tasking.
Magnetic encephalography Electrical activity of neurons generates a
(MEG) magnetic field. It is this magnetic field that is
measured by sensors called magnetometers.
This is then translated into images of structure
and function.
Transcranial magnetic Magnetic pulses are applied to the brain. A
stimulation (repetitive non-invasive coil is placed against the head
transcranial magnetic which delivers an electric current. When this is
stimulation: rTMS) repeated in quick succession it is known as
rTMS. This helps to stimulate areas of the
brain where applied.
Table 1.2 Different scanning techniques commonly used to investigate cog

nitive phenomenon.
Scanning techniques When is it used
Event related potentials EEG is often used as part of a ‘bio-pack’ for
(ERPS) from undergraduate biological and cognitive
Electroencephalography laboratory experiments. An averaged single
(EEG) waveform can be recorded from a series of
electrodes placed on the scalp. ERPS are
produced from EEG recordings which can
provide useful information about reaction
times. Reaction time is a useful behavioural
measure indicating how quickly participants
respond to cognitive tasks. This also
provides information about the speed of brain
activation once the task has been given. For
example, if the task is to detect a face amongst
other non-face stimuli, then ERPS can provide
information regarding the general area of brain
activation. This method has limitations such as
teasing out ‘noise’ from brain tissue itself, as this
can distort the brain’s electrical fields during
task performance. Also, ERPS can only be used
for simple cognitive tasks that draw upon basic
processes and rely on a single measure like
reaction time. Jutai and Hare (1983) considered
differences of focused (or selective) attention
among criminal psychopathic and non-
psychopathic inmates. They listened to a series
of tone pips through headphones while playing
a video game. Their performance on the video
game was used as a measure of their attention
deployed to playing. Psychopaths had small
N100 (measure on the ERPS) readings
suggesting that they suppress the distractor tone
pips. It was concluded that psychopaths show
altered deployment of attention in comparison
to non-psychopathic inmates.
Positron emission This scanning technique can obtain images of
tomography (PET) areas of brain activity while participants
perform a cognitive task. A clear structural
image is obtained of an active area of the
brain within 5-10 mm. This clarity, however,
does not extend to the amount of activity in
(Continued)
Table 1.2 (Continued)
Scanning techniques When is it used

specific areas of the brain. PET scans have
been used to investigate how murderers
perform on a task requiring focused attention
(Raine, Buchsbaum, Stanley, Lottenberg
et al. 1994). PET scans made it possible to see
the brain in action. Raine et al. found that the
murderers in comparison to the controls, had
processing deficits to the area of the brain
called the prefrontal cortex. This area has a
controlling influence on evolutionary older
parts of the brain such as the amygdala which
itself is involved in the processing of fear and
feelings of aggression. Deficits in the
prefrontal cortex have repercussions for a host
of behaviours (aggressive outbursts,
argumentative, rule breaking). This, in turn,
influences cognitive thinking styles such as
how focused attention is used.
Functional magnetic There are two types of MRI scans: structural
resonance imaging (fMRI) and functional. Of interest to psychologists is
functional MRI scans. The clarity of fMRI far
exceeds that of PET scans. Using fMRI,
cognitive psychologists have discovered why
specific words are forgotten in comparison to
the remembered words. It has been found that
remembered words receive more processing
during learning (Wagner, Schacter, Rotte,
Koutstaal et al. 1998). Furthermore, Kiehl,
Smith, Hare, Mendrek et al. (2001) found the
fMRI scans of psychopaths demonstrate
reduced amygdala activity for the processing of
negative emotional words such as angry or
frightened.
of multiple cognitive processors (modules)’. It is these that make

our mental life possible, they argued. There are different modules,
each processing its own specific stimuli independently of other
modules. For example, one module might be responsible for
processing faces; another for the recognition of written words and
Parietal Lobe
Angular Gyrus
Occipital Lobe
Prefrontal Lobe Temporal Lobe
Figure 1.4 Lobes of the brain and the position of the angular gyrus (the
junction point between the different lobes)
Source: Taken from Taylor (2015) Crime and Criminality: A multidisciplinary
approach (p. 156)
BOX 1.3 THE STRANGE CASE OF THE WOMAN WHO

KNEW NO FEAR
A 44-year-old woman from Kentucky in the US, known as SM,
became famous for being fearless when wandering around the
‘haunted’ Waverly Hills Sanatorium showing tourists the spooky
empty corridors. During Halloween when the building was deco
rated to scare the tourists and was littered with ‘monsters’ who
leapt out when least expected, SM showed no fear. Her behaviour
has been described as fearless and, even when faced with a
dangerous situation, she laughs. Once she was held at knifepoint
but talked her attacker out of it and then just walked away from him
as if nothing had happened. She now handles snakes and spiders
even though she claims she dislikes them. But why does SM behave
this way? What has gone wrong? By all accounts she wasn’t always
like this. She was scared of the dark as a child. She screamed and
ran away when her brother jumped unexpectedly out of a tree and
showed extreme fear when a Doberman trapped her in a corner. It

was discovered that SM has a rare genetic condition called Urbach-
Wiethe disease. This disease slowly causes areas of the brain to
harden and waste away.
SM underwent an MRI brain scan which showed severe damage
to her amygdala (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio and Damasio 1994).
These almond-shaped structures reside in each hemisphere of the
brain and play a major role in recognising and experiencing fear. SM
epitomises an individual with problems to the amygdala. Her
difficulty discerning fearful facial expressions and recognising fear
in others and feeling fear herself, has not interfered with her ability
to experience other emotional states. Interestingly, despite being an
accomplished artist, she is unable to draw a face showing a scared
expression. Despite her dislike of spiders and snakes, she shows
excitement at holding large snakes and had to be reminded not to
provoke the dangerous snakes and tarantula by poking them. To
this she replied, ‘Why’ and was filled with curiosity! Even her own
children are bemused by the contradiction of disliking snakes but
happily approaching them. Her son describes an event where they
saw a huge snake on the road. ‘Well mom just ran over there and
picked it up and brought it out of the street, put it in the grass and
let it go on its way… She would always tell me how she was scared of
snakes and stuff like that, but then all of a sudden, she’s fearless of
them. I thought that was kind of weird’ (Yong 2010).
Without a working amygdala, it appears that the long-standing
evolutionary advantage of experiencing fear becomes lost.
yet another engaged in stimuli concerning spatial orientation.

Modules therefore process stimuli within their own domain but
can be in direct communication with closely linked modules. The
way in which these modules function is sometimes referred to as
domain specificity; simply because they are receptive to specific
types of stimuli. Jerry Fodor introduced the notion of cognitive
modules as a way of understanding how the mind works in relation
to language (see Figure 1.5). In 1983, he argued in his book, The
Modularity of Mind, that the mind should be understood as com
prising a set of related, and yet independent ‘organs’ which func
tion together, thereby resulting in behaviour. A simple analogy is
Figure 1.5 Modular system of language

Source: Adapted from Fodor (1983)
to consider the physiological example of digestion. Different organs

which function within the alimentary canal help convert food into
energy givers. The stomach, for instance, churns partially digested
food amongst a mix of enzymes and hydrochloric acid, while the
liver detoxifies harmful molecules from broken down food particles
and the small intestine releases specific enzymes for protein di
gestion. Each organ has its own function but collectively they
combine to digest food. Fodor argues that our cognition is the
product of a multi-tiered processing system. Within this are in
dependent sub-processes receiving distinct inputs and producing
distinct outputs that are communicated to other relevant modules.
The notion of cognitive modularity is at the heart of the work of
many cognitive neuropsychologists. Much of their research has
come from studying the workings of the brain in clinical popula
tions; in other words, individuals who have sustained brain damage
that has led to deficits of brain function. Using the cognitive
modularity notion, it is possible to isolate deficits of behaviour and
cognitive processing in relation to the location of brain damage.
Taking our example of Fodor’s language modularity, it can be

seen that there are different cognitive processors responsible for
understanding what is written on paper (i.e. being able to read the
written word) and for producing speech (i.e. being able to pro
nounce words). Although the system works as a whole, the in
dividual components have segregated roles. Therefore, it is possible
to ascertain the focal point of damage within the semantic system.
To do this, cognitive neuropsychologists study individuals with
specific cognitive deficits resulting from brain damage. The un
derlying assumption of modularity is that a deficit on one specific
cognitive task will not extend to other tasks. Hence, cognitive
neuropsychologists look for dissociations across different types of
cognitive tasking. An individual with a brain injury might only
have problems recognising faces while object recognition is spared.
Likewise, a patient known as HM had amnesia regarding long-term
memory but an intact short-term memory. The problem was
pinpointed to the hippocampus which was considered to play an
important role in the laying down of long-term memories.
There are obvious problems with the assumption that different
cognitive tasks rely on different modules, just because performance
on one is good but poor on the other. The idea that a dissociation
of performance can be traced to an area of brain damage might be
rather simplistic. Differences in performance across cognitive tasks
can be a consequence of varying levels of task difficulty rather than
one module not functioning as well as another. Hence, both tasks
could be processed by the same module, but one task is harder to
resolve. The solution? Cognitive neuropsychologists have in
troduced the concept of double dissociation across two cognitive
tasks. This means the performance on two cognitive tasks in two
differentially brain-damaged individuals is compared. For example,
one of the individuals might perform normally on a task of lin
guistic understanding but simultaneously show a deficit in math
ematical ability while the other individual might demonstrate an
opposite pattern. The conclusion here is that these two tasks are
processed by separate regions of the brain and cannot be explained
away by differences of task difficulty. Research from clinical po
pulations has in the past typically relied on single case studies. The
case-series method, however, is more commonly used in cognitive
neuropsychology today (see Box 1.4).
BOX 1.4 CASE-SERIES METHOD

In cognitive psychology, the emphasis is on testing a large sample
of participants so that performance scores can be averaged, and
outliers excluded from the analysis (see Box 1.1). When studying
clinical populations, it is difficult to find individuals with damage to
the same areas of the brain. Furthermore, it is difficult to assume
that, despite the same brain damage, their cognitive performance
would be similarly affected. This is why the emphasis is on testing
for similar cognitive impairments. Performance data are then
compared for variations between all brain-damaged participants.
This method provides a richer data base and allows cognitive
neuropsychologists to assess the level of variation across the
participants. Moreover, it is possible to formulate theoretical
explanations based on these performances and exclude the outliers.
This is not possible when using single case studies. Nor can it be
established in single case studies whether the participant makes for
a representative and reliable source of explanation for other brain-
damaged individuals who may or may not perform similarly.
While cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience and cog

nitive neuropsychology rely on data generated through testing
individuals, computational cognitive science does not.
COMPUTATIONAL COGNITIVE SCIENCE

This approach to understanding human cognitive processing uses
computational models based on theoretical assumptions. Bechtel
and Graham (1998) claim that most models can be categorised as
being computational, mathematical or verbal-conceptual. Whereas
computational models use algorithms and mathematical models use
equations, verbal-conceptual models apply an informal lexicon to
describe relations, processes and entities. While simple mathema
tical modelling, for instance, can be useful in making predictions
about behavioural outcomes, these are generally a ‘number-
crunching’ exercise devoid of reliable explanation. They are based
on limited inputted details. An example of their application can be

for insurance companies wanting to predict which drivers are likely
to be a high risk. One aspect of this prediction might be based on a
driver’s record of traffic transgression. If there are many, then car
insurance could feasibly be declined. Needless to say, such models
have a limited use if we want to understand and explain human
cognitive performance. Computational models are of more interest
to cognitive psychologists because they provide the explanations
that simple mathematical ones fail to do.
Computational models are tools for generating theories about
human cognitive performance. Such models can also provide
cognitive architectures; in other words, a framework in the guise of
a computer program designed to understand cognition. Sun (2008)
described cognitive architecture as a “comprehensive, domain-
generic computational cognitive model, capturing the essential
structures, mechanisms, and processes of cognition” (p. 7). It
should be noted that Sun, in contrast to Fodor (who espouses
domain-specific processing), is referring to domain-generic pro
cessing. This means that processing covers many domains or areas
of cognition. In other words, Sun is describing a general-purpose
computational model which oversees the function of many mod
ules. Furthermore, it allows for cross-module analysis of cognition
per se.
There are many computational models. Of interest to cognitive
psychologists, however, are those that consider interconnected
networks of units; hence the label connectionist models. (For
further discussion of connectionist models see Chapter 2.)
Cognitive psychologists have also made use of production systems.
Young (2001) defined a production system as: “a model of cog
nitive processing, consisting of a collection of rules (called pro
duction rules, or just production)”. Production systems consist of a
series of ‘if’ and ‘then’ statements. There is a working memory
buffer that stores information. This information is compared with
the content of the ‘if-then’ statement. When there is a match in
working memory with the ‘if’ part of the statement, the production
system executes the ‘then’ component. The production system
operates by following these statement rules. It is, however, only as
good as the information inputted into the system. The General

Problem Solver introduced by Newell and Simon (1972) was one
of the early production systems designed to identify the cognitive
processing used to solve problems. Another example is the
Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational (ACT-R) system (see
Box 1.5).
BOX 1.5 ADAPTIVE CONTROL OF THOUGHT-

RATIONAL (ACT-R) SYSTEM
Anderson and Lebiere (1998) developed ACT-R as a demonstration of
how the brain might be organised to coordinate the processing of
individual modules. The combined processing of these modules
produces cognition per se. Anderson and Lebiere found, by using
the ACT-R model, that they could simulate how neurons in the brain
process information while individuals try to solve a difficult problem.
This model enabled them to see how specific areas of the brain would
be activated during such problem-solving. Once such problems were
solved, the level of activation in these brain areas would be reduced
during future solving of the same type of problem.
They outline the ACT-R modules associated with specific areas of
the brain as follows:
● Inferior ventrolateral prefrontal cortex houses the retrieval

module. This uses retrieval cues to access data.
● Posterior parietal cortex houses the imaginal module. This makes
a problem easier to solve by making it more user-friendly.
● Anterior cingulate cortex houses the goal module. This moni
tors intentions and controls how data are processed.
● Basal ganglia houses the procedural module. This decides the
action as a result of following the ‘if-then’ rules.
The information from these modules is integrated, so that the

most appropriate response can be made. ACT-R is a profound
model and perhaps a simpler example by way of applying ‘if-then’
statements is seen in Figure 1.6.
Figure 1.6 A simple ‘if-then’ problem
Thus far, we have learned that cognitive psychology, as a dis

cipline, has benefited from:
● brain scanning techniques used by cognitive neuroscientists

● theoretical assumptions of modularity by cognitive neuros
cientists
● computational models such as connectionist and production
systems, adopted by computational cognitive scientists.
The influence from these other disciplines can be clearly seen when
we consider the core and sub-areas researched by cognitive psy
chologists. The British Psychological Society (BPS) has highlighted
areas which cognitive psychologists should study.
These include the four core-areas: perception, memory,
thinking and language; and
the sub-areas: attention, learning, problem-solving and com
munication.
AREAS OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

When Ulric Neisser published his book, Cognitive Psychology in
1967, this was considered to mark the official onset of the ‘cognitive
revolution’. It was not the beginning of cognitive research as this was
accredited to scholars such as George Miller and Jerome Bruner who
founded the Centre for Cognitive Studies at Harvard. All three
scholars, however, had a clear vision about what cognitive psy
chology should be about; the study of mental [cognitive] processes.
To study cognitive processes in its entirety would be a very difficult
feat. Hence, why cognitive psychologists compartmentalise the areas
considered to be in their remit. What we have to remember is that the
areas within cognitive psychology are all interconnected and inter-
dependent despite being studied separately. In this section, the in
tention is to describe briefly these different areas of cognitive psy
chology, which will be explained further in the following chapters. It
should be noted that there are other areas of cognitive psychology
specified by the BPS and the APS which will also be considered in this
text: consciousness and metacognition; cognitive neuropsychology.
ATTENTION AND PERCEPTION
By attending to stimuli in our environment, it is argued that we can

then process them. Hence, our ability to attend to what we see,
hear, smell, taste and feel allows us to process the information
further, and to understand what is occurring around us. Our sen
sory organs (such as eyes, ears and nose), are designed to pick up
light, sound and pressure waves and molecules, all comprising the
process of sensation. By attending closely to these inputs, we are
able to process these further for meaning. The brain interprets these
inputs based mainly on experience which is the process of per
ception. In Chapter 3, William James’ early work of passive and
active modes of attention is considered and how this is still used
today as a basis for the division of focused and divided attention.
Models are helpful in the understanding of attention and their
applications to visual and auditory phenomena. Attention and
perception are clearly inter-dependent. We perceive what goes on
in our environment and try to make sense out of potential chaos.
Our brain is responsible for making sense out of potential chaos by
interpreting, for example, object form and movement as well as

face familiarity. Our interactions with our environment are im
portant for helping the brain to learn and remember events, so that
we can put meaning to them.
LEARNING AND MEMORY
Learning can occur when we interact with our environment. Being

able to attend and perceive connections with stimuli is an important
factor in learning. But learning is of no consequence unless we can
store and retrieve information when and as required. There are many
models of memory but perhaps the two most popular are the multi-
store model and working memory (as will be discussed in Chapter 4).
Studies have focused on how these models operate in learning,
storing, retrieving and forgetting information. The processes in
volved in learning new information and how this is eventually re
tained in long-term storage have been examined. The most popular
of these over the years have been levels of processing and implicit
learning. The understanding of how these play a role in the con
solidation of information in long-term storage continues to expand
and develop. There are many other types of memory studied such as
episodic and semantic memory (known as declarative). And with the
increasing interest in everyday memory, credence has been given to
autobiographical, flashbulb and prospective memory. Theories of
memory have played an important role in how we remember and
recall criminal events (known as eyewitness memory) and faces.
THINKING: DECISION-MAKING AND PROBLEM-SOLVING
Thought processing consists of a multitude of activities such as

problem-solving and decision-making. When we consider
thinking, it is hard not to regard it as some type of reflective
process. We think about a book we read and make a judgement
about it; such as its quality of writing or script. Thinking, however,
is so much more than this (see Chapter 5). How do we do it and
what form does it take? Reasoning is required for hypothesis
testing, such as that needed in order to solve the classic Wason task.
When doing such tasks deductive reasoning serves us better than
inductive for instance. Theories of deductive reasoning include
mental models and dual-system models which give insight to how

we use information to problem-solve. There are different strategies
used in problem-solving such as means-ends analysis, progress
monitoring and planning; all of which can be successful when
applied appropriately to the task at hand. Judgements are made in
decision-making and can often require a quick analysis using rules
of thumb known as heuristics. Heuristics can be reliant on statistical
inductive thought but are, for the best part, the antithesis of de
ductive thought used in problem-solving.
LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION
Reading, writing and speech are all considered as part of language

(see Chapter 6). Various models have been developed in order to help
us understand how we do all three. Classic and contemporary theories
of language comprehension focus on a multitude of aspects of language
such as parsing, pragmatics and discourse. Phonological processes re
quired in reading are linked with word recognition. The Dual-route
cascaded and connectionist triangle modes models are used to illustrate
how reading and speech are possible. Theories of speech production,
perception and communication draw upon models to help understand
how problems of language can occur. There is debate about whether
we naturally develop language as our brain structure predisposes us to
communicate using speech and writing. Hence, many of the theories
of language development address how we learn language; in other
words, the acquisition of language. Some theories focus on whether
language acquisition is innate; hence driven by nature. Other theories
view this as a learning process taught by those who influence us most
such as our caregivers; hence driven by nurture. The consensus is very
much that language acquisition is driven by both nature and nurture.
While language is a means to communicate with others, it is also a sub-
set of communication. Communication can be non-verbal. Animals
communicate but, as yet, there is no evidence that they are able to
produce something akin to human language!
SUMMARY
Cognitive psychology is concerned with the study of mental (cog
nitive) processing. It concerns itself with understanding the core areas
of cognitive processing such as perception, memory, thinking and

language. Other important sub-areas include attention, learning,
decision-making, problem-solving and communication. One way of
investigating these processes is to devise cognitive tasks, the success of
which can be measured using variables such as response time and
correct versus incorrect responses. There are many types of cognitive
tasks, but more often than not these are laboratory based and require
large numbers of participants in order to reduce outliers. Knowledge
about how we process information and the involvement of the brain
has increased by including other disciplines such as cognitive neu
roscience and cognitive neuropsychology. Both disciplines have
contributed towards how the brain is structured and functions.
Cognitive neuroscience has developed brain scanning technology
which has provided evidence of which areas of the brain are involved
in specific types of cognitive processing. In the case of cognitive
neuropsychology, theoretical notions of modularity have helped us to
understand how areas of the brain are involved in specific processes
such as face recognition. It also provides information about module-
specificity, and cognitive deficits incurred when a module is struc
turally and functionally impaired. Computational cognitive science has
offered another way of representing cognition via use of modelling.
Technological advancements here have also enabled the development
of connectionist models (i.e. networking) and production systems (i.e.
ACT-R). These have provided cognitive psychologists with ideas of
how neurons are interconnected in the brain.
FURTHER READING
Farrell, S. (2018) Computational Modelling of Cognition and Behavior. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Heyes, C. (2018) Cognitive Gadgets: The cultural evolution of thinking. Harvard:

Harvard University Press.
Shallice, T. and Cooper, R.P. (2011) The Organisation of the Mind. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Wilshire, C. (2014) Cognitive Neuropsychology: Exploring the mind through brain

dysfunction. Hove: Psychology Press.
• 2
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BRAIN

STRUCTURE, FUNCTION AND
COGNITIVE MODELLING
It was during the latter period of the Renaissance that scientists

were exploring how the human body and brain are structured.
Leonardo da Vinci in the early fifteenth century drew the anatomy
of the human brain. He even considered the inter-connection
between the brain, olfactory and optic nerves. His intention,
however, was to find where the human soul resided in the brain;
needless to say, he failed to locate it. Understanding the macro-
structure of the brain relied on observations made during autopsies
by the eminent anatomists of the time. Thomas Willis, an English
physician, outlined the brain’s structure in his text, ‘Anatomy of the
Brain’ in 1664. Based on the understanding of the circulatory
system examined by William Harvey, Willis highlighted how cir
culation in the brain occurred by using animals which he injected
with India ink. Furthermore, he classified the ten cranial nerves,
distinguished sympathetic nerves and documented the interaction
between localised areas of the brain with function. In 1669,
Nicolaus Steno, a Danish anatomist, put pen to paper to create his
‘Lecture on the Anatomy of the Brain’. Mapping the macro-
structures of the brain was undertaken by noting the various di
visions of the brain such as there being two halves (or hemispheres)
largely connected by numerous neural fibres known as the corpus
callosum. Areas that were easily defined structurally were referred
to as lobes. These lobes appeared to be segregated by ridges and
inward folds, labelled gyri and sulci respectively. The Renaissance
era certainly revived interest in the human brain, and in contrast to
DOI: 10.4324/9781003014355-2
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BRAIN STRUCTURE, FUNCTION AND COGNITIVE MODELLING 25
previous eras, this revival was driven by science and not religion. As
the anatomy of the brain became increasingly explored by scientists,
the macro-structure was comprehensively mapped before the arrival
of twentieth-century technological developments. With the devel
opments of brain imaging techniques, however, micro-structures of
the brain can now be seen, and their functioning observed in real time
(see Chapter 1). Such developments in brain imaging now allow for
cognitive psychologists to make connections between brain structure
and function, through experimentation.
Although cognitive psychologists have a framework of how the
brain is structured and how it functions, there is still much to be
discovered. The interface between brain structure and function is still
an enigma. This can be demonstrated when we consider individuals
who have sustained brain damage. Among younger individuals with
brain damage, clinical cognitive psychologists have discovered how
resilient the brain can be. Functions that would normally be processed
by certain areas can often be performed by different areas of the brain
following brain damage. This is an example of plasticity in the brain
and demonstrates how the brain can reconfigure itself for function.
Eric Lenneberg (1967) observed that there is a timeframe when the
brain shows particular resilience and plasticity. In his example of
language acquisition, Lenneberg suggests, this occurs before the brain
becomes fully lateralised for function at about the age of 12 years.
Being able to perform cognitively to the same level prior to sustained
brain damage, is far more difficult in older individuals. From cognitive
neuropsychology, the notion of modularity (see Chapter 1) has helped
us to understand that there are areas of brain localisation. Hence,
individuals with damage to one area of the brain, are very likely to
show a specific deficit of function that is controlled by this area
(especially when the damage is sustained later in life). It is possible to
identify the connection between the damaged area and cognitive
deficit using double dissociation (see Chapter 1). The early observa
tions from anatomists and physicians have helped to highlight the
relationship between brain structure and function. This interface has
proven to be extremely complex, as modern technology has shown. It
is worth us studying the structure of the brain and outlining the inter-
connectiveness between the different areas and connecting neural
pathways. Understanding how the structure of the brain and its inter-
connectiveness is related to function, is important in the development
26 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BRAIN STRUCTURE, FUNCTION AND COGNITIVE MODELLING
of accurate cognitive psychological theories. These theories after all

should sing to the hymn sheet of brain science.
STRUCTURE OF THE HUMAN BRAIN
MICROANATOMY
At birth a healthy human brain is 25 per cent of its adult weight,

reaching 75 per cent at two years of age. The gross structure of the
brain is largely formed by the end of prenatal development. The inter-
connections between these structures, however, are immature as the
nervous system, consisting largely of neurons, is still developing.
Although neurons develop during the embryonic stage of gestation as
elongated shapes, these information processing units are very limited
in their transmission but are ready to make new connections. The
elongated shape allows for quick transmission of an electrochemical
message called an impulse. This impulse travels down the length of the
neuron (i.e. axon) which tapers into a series of synapses that produce
a chemical called a neurotransmitter. The neurotransmitter enables the
impulse to cross the synaptic gap and excite (or inhibit) another
neuron (see Figure 2.1). In the brain there are numerous types of
neurotransmitter: acetylcholine, noradrenaline, serotonin, dopamine
and GABA to name but a few. According to Azevedo, Carvalho,
Grinberg, Farfel et al. (2009) our brain contains 86 ± billion neurons.
Sixteen billion (19 per cent) of these neurons are found in the outer
layer of the brain called the cerebral cortex (Azevedo et al. 2009;
Bigos, Hariri and Weinberger 2015). These neurons communicate via
synapses, of which there are believed to be some 10,000 synaptic
connections for each neuron – this translates to 86 million, million
synapses in the brain (see Figure 2.1).
GROSS ANATOMY
The architecture of the human brain is very complex. For our pur
poses the majority of the human brain consists of the two enlarged
cerebral hemispheres. These are connected by bundles of axons which
make up the commissures (‘bridges’), the largest being the corpus
callosum. Both hemispheres divide further into the frontal, temporal,
parietal and occipital lobes (see Figure 1.4; Figure 2.2). There are
Figure 2.1 A representation of neurons in the brain showing activity among

connecting synapses
other structures that lie beneath the cerebral cortex, some of which
will be considered when addressing specific cognitive functions of
the brain in future chapters. Figure 2.2 also shows an area of the brain,
the cerebellum and the medulla [oblongata]. The medulla is part of the
lowest portion of the brainstem and continues with the spinal cord.
The cerebellum itself is divided into three lobes: anterior, posterior
and flocculonodular. The brainstem consists of three main structures:
midbrain, pons and medulla. Information is transmitted to and from
the cerebral cortex to the rest of the body, across the brainstem
through the many nerve tracts. An important structure (not shown in
Figure 2.2) is the hippocampus. The hippocampus projects out in each
hemisphere where it connects with the amygdala. It plays an im
portant role in the consolidation of short-term memories into long-
term memories (see Chapter 4).
In addition to the neurons present in the brain, there is cerebrospinal
fluid which cushions the brain and acts as a drainage route of waste
products from brain tissue. Two circulatory systems supply oxygenated
blood to the front and back of the brain while another drains the
deoxygenated blood away. There are areas of the brain which process
Figure 2.2 Structure of the brain with its many parts
sensory information from our sensory organs such as our eyes and ears.
Given the importance of interpreting signals from our sensory system
as a means of surviving and navigating our environment, the structure
of the most commonly researched sensory organs in cognitive psy
chology (the eye and ear) will be considered later.
Neural pathway activation in the brain

Neural activity occurs throughout the structures of the brain. There
are neural pathways, packaged as bundles of fibres, that connect areas
of the brain involved in passing specific information. For example, in
Chapter 3, two neural networks involved in passing specific visual
information are considered in relation to attention. These neural
networks become activated by information from the primary visual
cortex of the occipital lobes of the brain. This part of the brain
processes information received from our eyes via the optic nerve. In
the case of the ventral attention network, activation is driven by the
components of stimuli (such as the vertical lines comprising a tree
trunk). These components are pieced together by the brain. For the
dorsal attention network, however, activation occurs in response to
the intact stimulus (such as the whole tree). Other areas of the cortex
draw on the information processed in these two neural networks in
order to help decision-making (see Figure 2.3).
SENSORY ORGANS: THE EYE AND EAR
The eye and ear have layers of cells that are receptive to specific visual
shapes / patterns or sounds and their frequencies. When these cells
become activated, neural impulses travel down neural axons and
across their synapses. These neural axons eventually synapse with
connecting cells which then change their pattern of activation (i.e.
‘firing rate’). Where there are masses of synaptic connections and
cells, a ganglion is formed which acts as a way station for sending
signals to higher ordered cells in the brain. This is clearly seen where
Figure 2.3 Brain showing the locations of the dorsal and ventral attention
networks
Figure 2.4 Structure of the eye and the layers of cells in the retina
the hierarchical structure of cells in the retina of the eye passes

fragmented bits of visual information to the optic nerve (see
Figure 2.4). Figure 2.4 shows how the ganglion cells collect in
formation and forward feed this to the optic nerve.
Figure 2.5 shows the route taken from the eye to the area of the brain
concerned with initial processing of visual stimuli (the primary visual
cortex). This area of the brain then begins to decode and attribute
meaning to the incoming visual stimuli due to the collective activation
of the neurons. In the case of the ear, there are different structures
operating. The principle of passing information on via the auditory
nerve to the brain is the same, however. The mechanism involved with
the ear is to decipher sound waves, hence, the outer ear is shaped to
funnel sound into the auditory canal. Once inside there are a series of
bones which vibrate as a sound wave enters. The more sound, the more
these bones vibrate causing neurological activation. This activation
continues from the auditory nerve to the auditory cortex of the brain
(Hall 2011). This is where sensations become perceptions.
Neuron activation in the retina

The 1950s saw pioneering research on feature detectors in the retina
of frogs and cats. Researchers such as visual neuroscientist, Horace
Barlow; cognitive scientist, Jerome Lettvin and neurophysiologists,
Hűbel and Wiesel were at the forefront of understanding how the
Figure 2.5 Mapping of the visual route from the eye to the visual processing
area of the brain
eyes of frogs and cats could so easily detect their prey. Barlow (1953)
provided evidence of retinal cells in frogs having a limited receptor
field. Some cells were responsive to light and some to the dark such
that they would be inhibited if the opposite conditions were present.
He argued that certain cells in the retina could be feature detectors.
Lettvin, Maturana, McCulloch and Pitts (1959) identified four classes
of ganglion cells in the retina that served the frog’s ability to detect,
strike and catch its prey successfully. He labelled these cells as: sus
tained contrast detectors; bug detectors; moving edge detectors and
net dimming detectors. Hűbel and Wiesel (1959) studied cats’ eyes in
the context of feature detection (see Chapter 3). Through electro
physiological recordings these researchers were able to unravel the
workings of visual cells and their sensitivity to certain types of stimuli.
As we saw in Figure 2.4, the human eye is structured such that
specific cells are receptive to specific types of stimuli. When these
cells are activated, their firing-rate is altered in order that impulses are
sent to other higher ordered cells. These also become activated (i.e.
their firing-rate alters) and in so doing pass information to the optic
nerve. The sequencing of this activation can be compared to the
‘Pandemonium Model’ introduced by Selfridge (1959; see Box 2.1).
BOX 2.1 THE PANDEMONIUM MODEL METAPHOR

The Pandemonium Model is a useful way of representing how
information coded by individual cells (in this case visual) is passed on
to the next layer of higher ordered cells. Although rarely referred to in
modern cognitive psychology, it is a model that provides a simplistic
metaphor of how particular stimuli are processed further for meaning. It
is a model describing how an ‘image demon’ detects an image and how
a network of ‘feature demons’ recognise different aspects of the image.
These ‘feature demons’ operate in a bottom-up pattern recognition
modus. This means in the case of visual processing information comes
in a piece-meal fashion and is reconstructed to form an image. The term
‘demons’ is used to account for how stimuli are passed on from basic
feature detectors to the next level of processing referred to as ‘cognitive
demons’. The ‘cognitive demons’ can be regarded as ganglion way
stations where many stimuli are received but only those that ‘shout’ the
most and loudest are transmitted to the ‘decision demon’ – the point of
perception. Although the terms used appear far from scientific, the
processing mechanism of neural activation or inhibition are accounted
for (see Figure 2.6).
Figure 2.6 Selfridge’s Pandemonium Model

FUNCTION OF THE HUMAN BRAIN

How the brain functions is dependent on its gross structure and
micro-infrastructural mechanisms. These micro-infrastructural
mechanisms, as we have seen, operate by way of passing in
formation forward and sometimes backward (i.e. a feedforward-
feedback neural processing mechanism). Hence, both gross
and micro-structures are at the interface with brain function. Early
experimental research on mapping the brain for function was un
dertaken by neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield, who in the 1930s
developed a method called the Montreal Procedure. This involves
probing the brain’s cortex using a small electrode and observing
bodily reactions when specific areas received electrical impulses (in
other words, these areas were stimulated). Interestingly, this pro
cedure was undertaken on conscious patients under local anaes
thetic since the brain does not feel any pain. Penfield was interested
in pinpointing the origins of a seizure in the brain of individuals
with debilitating epilepsy. By using this method, Penfield was able
to map the architecture of the brain and link sensation with areas of
the brain including the gyri and sulci (singular, gyrus and sulcus; see
Figure 2.7). He found that specific areas would induce sensations
such as numbness in the fingers when stimulated while others
evoked memories or flashes of light. Penfield concluded that brain
circuits involved in the sensation and perception of stimuli, could
be activated or deactivated by using electrodes to transmit electrical
impulses. By using a numbering system, he was able to map the
areas causing a specific action. For example, in the case of No.8, a
sensation of thumb movement was reported by individuals (despite
there being no movement) undergoing the Montreal Procedure.
Figure 2.7 Diagram showing the gyrus and sulcus folds of the cortex of the
brain
Interestingly, when personal memories were recalled, Penfield

believed that he found evidence of physical structures for memory
residing in the brain. Penfield, however, is famous for developing a
‘homunculus’ depicted as an exaggerated cartoon image of the
human body. This representation showed how various parts of the
body were oversized in accordance to the proportionate amount of
brain-space devoted to each body part. Hence, the hands and
mouth look extremely oversized because a large amount of our
brain is used for controlling dexterity and speech.
Much of our understanding of the interface between the brain’s
structure and function has come from clinical cases of individuals
with specific brain injuries and observations of their cognition and
behaviours. One classic example of such a case study is Phineas
Gage (see Box 2.2). Developments within cognitive neuroscience
and cognitive neuropsychology have also contributed to under
standing this interface. By studying the different lobes of the brain
using scanning techniques, cognitive neuroscientists have devel
oped the ‘locationist’ perspective. This refers to how different areas
BOX 2.2 THE FACT AND FICTION OF PHINEAS GAGE:

THE MAN WITH A HOLE THROUGH
HIS HEAD
Prior to 1848 Phineas Gage was a well-respected man and
considered to be reliable, thoughtful and industrious by both his
peers and colleagues. But in that year, he suffered a serious accident
which apparently altered his personality beyond recognition. Gage
helped in the construction of one of the new railroads running
across North America as a foreman in charge of a team of workers.
This involved the laying down of new tracks through a terrain of
large boulders that often blocked the planned route of the railway.
To remove such obstacles, holes were drilled into the rock so that a
bundle of dynamite could be ignited to explode the rock into tiny
pieces. In 1848, Gage had drilled a hole and used a tamping rod to
push the dynamite into place which inadvertently caused enough
friction to ignite the dynamite. The sheer force caused by the
explosion catapulted the tamping rod into his left cheek exiting
through the top-front area of his skull. The tamping rod exited his
skull in one piece and was found some 300 feet away. Gage
surprised the doctors of the time as he survived the accident and
was able to walk to a carriage which took him for medical attention.
Despite surviving and making a recovery, he was no longer Phineas
Gage; he had changed. He was now childish, thoughtless and
irritable (Harlow 1848; Ratiu and Talos 2004). Harlow went on to
report that Gage was capricious, impulsive, foul-mouthed and lazy.
A number of reports from the archives suggest that Gage became a
changed man who drifted from one town to another as a fairground
attraction who could no longer look after himself. This suggests that
the brain damage had seriously altered his personality in detri
mental ways. But is this really true? To help uncover the nature of
his brain injury, various neuroscientists and neuropsychologists
have been involved in studying Gage’s skull using modern scanning
techniques. Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda et al. (1994)
reconstructed the damage to the front of Gage’s brain using high-
power computer modelling. They located this to the orbitofrontal
cortex of both hemispheres. Ratiu and Talos (2004), however,
concluded that it was not possible for the tamping rod to cross over
to the right hemisphere. Jack Van Horn (2012) used neuroimaging
to explore millions of possible trajectories of the tamping rod and
concurred with Ratiu and Talos that the rod did not enter the right
hemisphere but instead some of the neural networks connecting
both hemispheres might have endured damage; hence quite
profound injuries. We might ask did Phineas Gage ever recover
some of his personality from these severe brain injuries? Were his
post-behaviours due to his brain injuries or as a result of the fungal
infection to his brain that nearly killed him? Harlow performed
emergency surgery 14 days into the fungal infection by puncturing
Gage’s tissue inside his nose to drain his wound. It was then Gage
lost sight in his left eye which was sewn shut. It is difficult to know
the impact of the fungal infection on his behaviour, but records of
his later life can inform us if any recovery to normality had occurred.
Harlow’s report of Gage post-accident provides little guidance of
timeline. There were unusual speculations of what had become of
Gage. Some reported how his skeleton was sold to a medical
school, while others claimed he lived for 20 years with the tamping
rod still impaled in his skull. But evidence of Gage’s later years
shows that he was employed to drive horse and cart coaches along
rugged mountainous tracks in Chile during the gold rush of 1852
(Harlow 1868). When doing such a job, the driver (Gage) requires
intricate rein-work when controlling the horses and a good memory
of the route. An impulsive and uncontrolled driver would have been
a great risk. After seven years of doing this Gage travelled to San
Francisco and worked as a farm labourer but in 1860 had a series of
seizures after immense ploughing. He died, aged 36, nearly twelve
years post his accident. His story tells us that he lived as normal a
life as possible as his driver’s job for seven years after his accident
shows. Moreover, this suggests that the brain can relearn lost skills
in some circumstances thereby demonstrating brain plasticity
(Kean 2014).
of the brain process specific types of information; this means dif

ferent locations are associated with specific function.
FRONTAL LOBES: THE ORBITOFRONTAL CORTEX (OFC)
The OFC is part of the prefrontal cortex within the frontal lobes
and sits above the orbits of the eyes (see Figure 1.4; Figure 2.2).
The frontal lobe is very much in control of our cognitive pro
cessing for decision-making, memory and language. The OFC is an
important component of this processing, and in addition to having
connections with other frontal lobe regions, also has connections
with sensory systems and the limbic system (see Figure 2.2). This
means it is very much informed about both the external and the
internal world. The orbitofrontal cortex is made aware of planned
behaviours through the connections it has with these regions which
can be an advantage in regulating the activity of the limbic system
especially the amygdala (see Table 1.2; Box 1.3). For this reason, it
has been associated with the processing of emotion (Toates 2014;
Workman and Reader 2021). Ray (2013) found that while the left
OFC processes positive emotions (such as happy and pleasantly
surprised), the right OFC focuses on negative emotions (such as
anger and disgust). Ray further suggests that this supports the no
tion of there being lateralised function of emotion. Damage to this
region of the frontal lobe can cause profound alterations to emo

tional perception and response. Moreover, damage to the OFC can
change an individual’s personality (see Box 2.2). This can be ex
ternalised as extreme euphoria and irresponsibility (Kringelbach
and Rolls 2004).
CORPUS CALLOSUM
The left and right hemispheres are known to operate in

dependently and interdependently (that is working together due to
complementary specialisation). This ability to work together on
many tasks is made possible due to interhemispheric transfer of
information through commissures such as the corpus callosum.
Hence, the corpus callosum is involved in sharing information
between each hemisphere. This function of the corpus callosum
has been demonstrated in cognitive research using ‘split-brain’
individuals who have endured a corpus callosotomy (that is a
procedure to sever the fibres joining the hemispheres; see Box 2.3).
Similarly, the different lobes of the brain are connected by neural
pathways criss-crossing the brain (see Figure 2.3 as an example).
BOX 2.3 THE CASE OF ‘VICKI’ LIVING WITH A

‘SPLIT-BRAIN’
Whether we can live with a brain whose halves have been separated
by a corpus callosotomy is an interesting question. This is
particularly so given what we know about the sharing of information
between two brain hemispheres via the corpus callosum. The
succinct answer is ‘yes we can’. But what impact would this have
on everyday cognition for individuals with a divided brain? In 1979,
Vicki underwent a ten-hour procedure where her corpus callosum
was severed thus disconnecting her two hemispheres. Vicki suffered
severe epileptic seizures prior to the operation. These seizures were
extreme and often put her life in danger. There was one occasion
where she collapsed onto an old-fashioned oven and burnt her back.
It was her neurologist in 1978 who suggested a radical procedure
involving the severance of the corpus callosum to relieve her of the
grand mal fits that often traversed across one hemisphere to the
other. After the corpus callosotomy, Vicki’s fits were greatly reduced,
suggesting the operation was a complete success. Her life, however,
had changed in a number of ways. Activities such as shopping and
choosing clothes to wear became a challenge as the left and right
arm had to reconcile their differences of action. Vicki claimed that,
‘I’d reach with my right for the thing I wanted, but the left would
come in and they’d kind of fight.’ She claimed that she would end
up wearing three outfits at the same time and would have to put all
the clothes on the bed and start all over again. There were
improvements after a year where Vicki’s difficulties of conflicting
conscious thought and control over movement subsided (see
Chapter 7). She could now perform the mundane things that we
normally take for granted such as tying shoelaces and slicing
vegetables. Vicki was even able to coordinate her body for water-
skiing. Vicki’s plight is similar to other individuals who have had a
corpus callosotomy. Michael Gazzaniga, a cognitive neuroscientist,
has continued the early work of Roger Sperry who was a pioneer in
performing corpus callosotomies in cats, monkeys and humans in
the 1950s. Gazzaniga’s early studies demonstrated how the left
hemisphere is dominant for speech and language while the right
specialises in visuospatial skills. Through studying split-brain
individuals, it is apparent, however, how both hemispheres are
competent at most tasks but offer two different perspectives of the
world. Gazzaniga, Volpe, Smylie, Wilson et al. in 1979 studied a boy
of 14 known as P.S. who had a corpus callosotomy. He was
interested in whether the boy’s right hemisphere could process
written words. In writing, presented to the right hemisphere,
Gazzaniga asked what the boy’s favourite girlfriend’s name was.
He shrugged and shook his head indicating he didn’t know.
Moments later he giggled and blushed and used his left hand to
select Scrabble tiles that spelled the girl’s name as LIZ. Hence, there
was some language processing occurring in the right hemisphere.
Vicki also demonstrated this right hemisphere capacity for speech
(Gazzaniga 2000). On a final note, there is still much to learn about
split-brain individuals. When Vicki was presented with two stories
one involving intentional harm and one involving accidental harm
and asked which of the two is more morally reprehensible, she
reasoned that there was no difference between the two scenarios.

This demonstrates a failure of being able to understand the
intentions of the protagonist in the two scenarios. Her friends
and family, however, vouched that she was able to perform such
tasks outside of a laboratory setting. Perhaps in everyday life other
reasoning mechanisms compensate for the divided brain.
TEMPORAL LOBES
The temporal lobes comprise about 17 per cent of the cerebral

cortex (see Figure 1.4; Figure 2.2). They are involved in the
processing of sensory stimuli such as olfactory, visual, auditory and
vestibular (sense of balance and bodily posture) and linguistic in
formation. It has been suggested that one of the major functions of
the temporal lobes is the ability to listen and convert sounds to
pictures. The temporal lobes enable us to anticipate words in
utterances and to express thoughts using lexemes. A lexeme is
defined as “a minimal meaningful unit of language, the meaning of
which cannot be understood from that of its component mor
phemes. Take off (in the senses to mimic, to become airborne, etc.)
is a lexeme, as well as the independent morphemes take and off”
(Collins English Dictionary 2020). Furthermore, the temporal
lobes are involved in recognising speech intonation and facial ex
pression used in communication as well as emotional and memory
management (Jeneson and Squire 2011).
By studying individuals who have had damage to the temporal
lobes, the important role in integrating linguistic with visual in
formation becomes obvious. In the case of right temporal lobe
damage, individuals often show deficits in non-verbal auditory
stimuli recognition (such as music). Damage to the left temporal
lobe, however, leads to deficits in the recognition, memorisation
and formation of speech. Individuals with damage to the temporal
lobes often report dysfunctional perception of auditory stimuli,
such as that coming from oral speech, and problems of analysing
and forming speech sounds. This can also be confounded by pro
blems with memory and the organisation of complex mental
processing. There is a region at the back of the left temporal lobe
known as Wernicke’s area. (Note that even though there is still some
controversy over its exact location, it is generally agreed that it is in the
temporal lobe.) Wernicke’s area is considered to be associated with
language comprehension. When there is damage to this area of the
temporal lobe, verbal communication can be severely compromised
(hence, this is known as Wernicke’s aphasia; see Box 2.4). Other
symptoms from temporal lobe damage have been reported such as
dizziness, mental disorders and extreme unprovoked irritation.
BOX 2.4 CASE OF INCOMPREHENSIBLE SPEECH:

LENIN?
There have been some interesting historical cases of language
disruption technically known as aphasia . One example is Vladimir
Ilyich Ulyanov, known as Lenin, the Bolshevik leader who led the
communist party during the Russian Revolution. Lenin was 52 years
of age in 1922 when he suffered a series of strokes leaving sensory
deficits to the right side of his body and language impairment
(Volkogonov 1994). His neurologist Professor Kramer claimed
Lenin had a clinical profile of an aphasic individual; one who
made incomprehensible sounds every time he tried to speak.
Kramer also described Lenin as suffering from complete motor
aphasia as he was conscious but could not respond verbally (see
Chapter 7). Volkogonov (1994) claimed that there were reports at
the time of Lenin responding “Vot-vot” to all questions put to him.
On further investigation, Volkogonov found secret archives of Lenin
using the expression ‘vot-vot’ as a means of communicating; this
could be to agree or disagree, complain or to initiate conversation.
Today Lenin would be diagnosed with a language impairment
known as Wernicke’s aphasia. This form of aphasia was uncovered
by German neurologist, Carl Wernicke in 1874. Wernicke discovered
an area of the temporal lobe in the left hemisphere of the brain
associated with the comprehension of speech. Wernicke described
individuals with lesions to this area as being compromised in their
ability to comprehend language. Hence, although Lenin was able to
produce speech of a sort, he was unable to understand the
utterances of others. It is likely that Lenin incurred damage to the
left temporal lobe during the strokes he had suffered. In fact, this
was the neurological assessment that Otfrid Foerster (a
distinguished neuroscientist) suggested (Sarikcioglu 2007).

Individuals with damage to the Wernicke’s area exhibit sensory
aphasia: they can speak fluently but often they are incomprehen
sible. They can also exhibit receptive aphasia where they make
meaningless speech sounds (most likely the case with Lenin). The
problem associated with diagnosing which aphasia a person has, is
the complicated neural interconnections across the areas involved
with language: damage can be to more than one area. Moreover,
Harley (2013) highlights how those with the same form of aphasia
can be very different in the way their symptoms are exhibited. Lenin
never recovered from this aphasia and died in 1924 aged 54.
PARIETAL LOBES
The parietal lobes occupy the upper side of the hemispheres and
form a large part of the cerebral cortex (see Figure 1.4; Figure 2.2).
There are numerous functions that the parietal lobes perform. As is
often the case, despite localised processing, the brain operates as a
singular unit where the lobes are closely interconnected via neural
pathways and commissures. Hence, the parietal lobes also perform
functions in common with other areas of the brain, albeit differ
entially. The parietal lobes are considered to be a centre for the
processing of sensory information, in particular the identification of
objects in our environment. The parietal lobes interpret spatial
relationships between objects and our own bodily position relative
to our surroundings; in other words, our spatial awareness. There
are different parts to the parietal lobes such as the primary soma
tosensory region which processes sensory stimuli involved with
shape, weight and composition of objects. Within this area are
zones that are receptive to pain, tactile contact, temperature as well
as information from muscles, tendons and joints. In another area
(posterolateral), visual and spatial information is processed in rela
tion to object motion. It is here that information about the body’s
position is processed (this is known as proprioception). Writing,
computing and perception of left-to-right orientation are processed
in an area called Gerstmann while naming objects and word re
cognition occur in the angular gyrus. Interestingly, this area has
connections with Wernicke’s area due to a bundle of neural fibres

known as the arcuate fasciculus which passes through the left
parietal lobe. Musculoskeletal awareness and recognition of objects
through touch are processed in the upper parietal gyrus. The
posterior central gyrus area processes information about one’s own
bodily parts such as arms and legs and adds further data about
proportionality and relative position. Damage to the parietal lobes
can result in a diversity of problems given the different areas with
different functions (see Box 2.5).
BOX 2.5 TWO CASES OF PARIETAL LOBE DAMAGE

EXHIBITING VERY DIFFERENT PROBLEMS
Alan Burgess had a stroke which caused damage to the right
parietal lobe. This left him ignoring friends and familiar objects to
the left side of his body. Hemispatial neglect is one example of
what can happen when there is damage to the parietal lobes (see
Chapter 3). This commonly occurs after a stroke to either the left or
right parietal lobe. If damage is to the right parietal lobe then
anything occurring on the left side (which is what happened to
Alan Burgess) is ignored and vice versa for damage to the left
parietal lobe (see Box 3.3). Damage to the right parietal lobe can
also lead to short-term memory impairments for visual features,
including the colour, shape and location of objects (Berryhill and
Olson 2007). There are problems with long-term memory also. For
instance, neuroimaging of the brain during memory retrieval of
personal experiences (e.g. episodic memory; see Chapter 4) shows
how the parietal lobes are activated (Wagner, Shannon, Kahn and
Buckner 2005). The posterior parietal area is more active when old
rather than new items are correctly recognised (Konishi, Wheeler,
Donaldson and Buckner 2000). Berryhill, Phuong, Picasso, Cabeza
et al. (2007) studied episodic memory in individuals with damage
to the parietal lobes. Patient EE555, a 39-year-old, suffered a third
stroke in 2004. MRI scans revealed damage to specific areas of the
parietal lobes. When shown a drawing of a scene, she found it
difficult to interpret and understand the context of the whole scene
depicted. Instead she described individual parts of the scene.
Moreover, on tasks where items in a picture are crossed off as they
are seen, she performed poorly as only the central items were
acknowledged; all peripheral items were ignored. When subjected

to a series of memory tests, deficits in the recollections of
autobiographical events in her life lacked richness of depth and
specificity of when they had occurred. Her recollections were
scored as ‘probably abnormal’ although the descriptions she
provided for events recalled were ‘acceptable’. Berryhill et al.
(2007) concluded that the parietal lobes have an important role
in memory retrieval. Such patients, they argue, are not amnesic
because when probed for more details they are able to recollect
their personal experiences. They further suggest that these probes
act as external pointers to help retrieve relevant information which
become inaccessible when there is parietal lobe damage.
OCCIPITAL LOBES
The brain’s smallest lobes, the occipital lobes, are positioned to

the back of the cortex, under the parietal but above the temporal
lobes (see Figure 1.4; Figure 2.2). The occipital lobes have an
important role in making sense of what our visual system is
seeing. And given how quickly we need to interpret our external
world, for all sorts of reasons but primarily survival, rapid pro
cessing of visual stimuli is vital. Although the occipital lobes are
primarily associated with processing visual stimuli, they perform a
multitude of tasks:
1 By composing a visual map of the external world, the occipital

lobes enable us to perform spatial reasoning and acquire visual
memory that is needed to recall what was just seen.
2 By providing information about the colour, distance, depth
and size of objects our visual experience is richer.
3 By identifying stimuli, we can make sense of our interactions
with others and objects we come into contact with.
4 By sharing visual information with other lobes of the brain,
information can be added such as responding using appropriate
action or language or retrieving relevant episodic memories.
5 By receiving and processing stimuli from our eyes, the
occipital lobes are the first locations for understanding our
external world.
There are different structures operating within the occipital lobes

that interconnect with other areas of the brain. The V1 area is also
known as the primary visual cortex (see Figure 2.5) and provides
data about object location, colour and spatial information. The V2
area is considered to be the secondary visual cortex (i.e. the ventral
network; see Figure 2.3). This is a neural network that connects
attention with the assignment of meaning and recognition. The
dorsal network connects the V1 and V2 areas and provides gui
dance for action and object spatial information (see Figure 2.3).
The lateral geniculate body, as seen in Figure 2.5, obtains the
unprocessed data from the optic nerve and passes this to the visual
cortex. Hallucinations can be a symptom of occipital lobe damage
(see Box 2.6).
The brain is a complex organ, the workings of which have been
compared to a computer. It is through the discipline of computational
cognitive science (see Chapter 1) that the mechanisms involved in
brain function can be understood through cognitive modelling.
COGNITIVE MODELLING OF THE HUMAN BRAIN

Computational cognitive science applies cognitive modelling as a
way of understanding the processes used by the brain to accomplish
complex tasks. These complex tasks involve the pillars of cognition:
BOX 2.6 THE HALLUCINATING WOMAN

An 84-year-old woman claimed she was seeing people in her dreams
during her waking state; in other words, she was hallucinating. She
described seeing bands of three colours on walls. She saw children
in old-fashioned clothing, a castle and boxes strewn across streets.
When she underwent neurological tests, it was revealed that she
had blindness in her right eye and impaired vision in the left. Her
score on the Minimental State Examination revealed she was not
psychotic. A CT scan revealed damage to two areas of the right
occipital lobe caused by a stroke (Paradowski, Kowalczyk, Chojdak-
Lukasiewicz, Loster-Niewińska et al. 2013). These sensory phantoms
could be due to damage in the neural networks of the occipital lobes
(Brzecki, Podemski, Kobel-Buys and Buys 2001).
● attention and perception

● memory and learning
● thinking, decision-making and problem-solving
● language and communication
The objective of cognitive modelling is to provide a scientific ac

count of how such processes work and interact with one another. As
mentioned in Chapter 1, there are different types of cognitive models
but what they all have in common are the basic principles of cog
nition. Cognitive models are quite different from neural models
despite their interrelatedness. When devising cognitive models, the
aim is to bridge the gap between behaviour and its neural under
pinnings. According to Rumelhart and McClelland (1986), con
nectionist models are better at retaining the balance between
mathematical models and properties inherent in neural models.
Connectionist models resemble the layout and function of inter
connecting neurons in the brain. Once a neuron in the brain responds
to a stimulus, it becomes activated and sends a message to the next
connected neuron to become activated also. Note that it is actually
more complicated than this as neurons can become inhibited also. In
the same vein as how brain neurons operate, an interconnected
network of units or nodes can also have an excitatory or inhibitory
action. Moreover, they too have the capacity to weight the sum of all
the inputs from other connecting neurons to produce a single re
sponse. If the weighted sum goes above the threshold of activity, then
there will be a response. As suggested by Sun (2008), connectionist
models can have multi-layers (see Figure 2.8).
Figure 2.8 Example of a multi-layer connectionist model

For example, when a pattern is presented, the input layer will

become activated (just as neurons do in response to a stimulus).
Following this the next layer (that is hidden units) are responsible
for the spread of activation in an attempt to resemble the pattern,
and in so doing, have learned the rule. The final layer provides a
response that mimics the pattern originally shown. Connectionist
models can be designed to focus on visual processing (as the above
example shows), while others on more complex processing in
tegrate more than one type of stimulus. One example of a con
nectionist model of memory is parallel distributed processing (PDP;
McClelland and Rumelhart 1981). According to this, memory is
stored via the collective strength of connections between nodes
(see above on weighted sum). This implies that the brain is capable
of performing a range of memory-related activities in parallel.
The main aim of cognitive neuroscientists is to attain a better
understanding of the involvement different areas of the brain
have in cognition. Cognitive scientists, alternatively, devise
cognitive models based on sound findings from cognitive psy
chology. One approach in cognitive psychology that has em
braced cognitive models is information processing (McLeod,
Plunkett and Rolls 1998). Numerous cognitive models based on
the information processing approach have been introduced to
show information feedforward and feedback systems in percep
tion (see Chapter 3); in memory (see Chapter 4); in thinking and
decision-making (see Chapter 5) and in language (see Chapter 6).
Models, however, are only as good as the interpretation of the
findings from cognitive psychological research. According to
Lee, Criss, Devezer, Donkin et al. (2019),
standard modeling practice is to summarize the ability of a model to

capture patterns in the data through an omnibus measure of
goodness-of-fit ….A limitation of such an approach is that a single
quantity may fail to capture the full richness of information that the
data provide for evaluating a model.
(p. 144)
What Lee et al. are implying here, is that models are normally based
on one measure of cognitive performance such as reaction times or
the number of correctly recalled items. Experiments are devised
such that the conditions or variable manipulations under which

participants remember information can be changed. The effects
such changes have on performance are added to the theoretical
knowledge base which is then incorporated into existing models.
While there have been great leaps in the development of con
nectionism, in particular models of brain structure and function,
critics have argued that preservation of our memories and per
sonality onto a ‘chip’ is a far-fetched notion (see Box 2.7).
BOX 2.7 LIVING INSIDE A ‘CHIP’

With professional expertise in computational neuroscience, neural
engineering, psychology and information theory, Dr Randal Koene
(2014) believes it will be possible in the future to perform mind
uploading. Koene outlined how such a feat can be achieved using a
Punnett square diagram (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Punnett square of the stages of research before mind up
loading can be achieved
Understand how the brain is Understand how the brain
structured functions
✓ ✓
Provide connectionist models Implementation – do we use
‘chips’?
✓ ?
Koene considers the mind to be a collection of our memories,

personality and other unique attributes. With developing technology
our mind, he believes, will one day be transferred from the living
brain to an ‘artificial computational substrate’. And once this can be
achieved, the mind becomes a ‘substrate-independent mind’ (SIM).
This SIM, just like a USB (memory stick), can then be used in a
structure or hardware that has the software to operate without the
need to be rewritten. Koene considers the different states of neural
activation in the brain to be the same as computational processes in
sophisticated computing machines; only these are able to modify
original instructions. By modifying original instructions using skills
of reading, writing and erasing, this makes it a dynamic and

universal computing machine (an example of this is the Turing
machine). Who knows, if Koene is right, then one day in the distant
future your mind may exist inside a machine.
SUMMARY
Mapping the structure of the brain is important for under
standing how it functions. The architecture of the brain can be
considered at two levels; the microanatomy and gross anatomy.
While the microanatomy provides information about how the
neurons in the brain interconnect and the neural pathways
transmit information from one area of the brain to another, the
gross structure shows the position of the lobes of the brain. The
gross structure also shows how the brain consists of two
hemispheres that are bonded via commissures such as the corpus
callosum. The microanatomical structures show how intricately
connected the two hemispheres are and the lobes of the brain as
well as the more hidden structures beneath the cortex. One
approach to understanding what the different areas of the brain
do is through studying individuals who have brain damage.
Cognitive psychologists can ascertain the function of specific
areas of the brain by considering the deficits to cognition in
dividuals with damage experience. Of course, it is also possible
to ascertain the function of different areas of the brain using
modern brain scanning techniques. These methods combined
have enabled cognitive psychologists to devise specific tasks that
can be used to measure brain function. This has helped com
putational cognitive scientists to develop models as a means of
understanding how structure and function are intricately inter
connected. In devising different types of models, they have
attempted to equate cognitive performance (behaviour) with the
workings of neural networks. Connectionist models are based
on an understanding of how the neural connections within the
brain operate and thereby interconnect the different areas.
FURTHER READING
Bigos, K.L., Hariri, A. and Weinberger, D. (2015) Neuroimaging Genetics:
Principles and practices. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gazzaniga, M.S., Ivry, R.B. and Mangun, G.R. (2008) Cognitive Neuroscience:
The biology of the mind (3rd edn). New York: W.W. Norton.
McLeod, P., Plunkett, K. and Rolls, E.T. (1998) Introduction to Connectionist

Modelling of Cognitive Processes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Toates, F. (2011). Biological Psychology: An integrative approach. (3rd edn).

Harlow: Pearson Education.
• 3
ATTENTION AND PERCEPTION
From the time we are born we are constantly trying to make sense
of the world. New-born babies appear to be inactive and unable to
focus on what is happening around them. To some extent this is
true as they find it difficult to focus directly on stimuli. This,
in part, is due to an immature sensory system and brain that is
still developing. William James described the baby’s world as a
“blooming, buzzing confusion” (p. 462), implying that the new-
born is bombarded with stimuli from its surrounding world. And as
yet has not developed the capacity to interpret what this all means.
Given time and constant interaction with caregivers and objects,
the new-born begins to process stimuli and understand what it all
means (albeit at a rudimentary level). The starting point to un
derstanding the world is very much at the basic level of processing
information (process of sensation). You may recall this was ad
dressed in Chapter 2 when the structure and function of the human
brain, including two of our sensory organs (eyes and ears), was
examined. These two sensory organs were selected because there is
an abundance of research examining how our visual and auditory
systems attend to images and sounds in our immediate environ
ment. Sensory input is clearly processed. But how? What me
chanisms do we have to facilitate the processing of important and
relevant sensory stimuli? In this chapter the focus is on how we
become aware of these stimuli; the role of attention and percep
tion. Attention is the process of selectively focusing on stimuli at
the expense of other stimuli. Perception alternatively, is the re
cognition and interpretation of information derived from sensation
and the stimuli we decide to attend to. Hence, perception is the
DOI: 10.4324/9781003014355-3
ATTENTION AND PERCEPTION 51
process of making sense of the information derived from our sur

roundings. This, in turn, is used to enable further interaction with
our environment. Perception uses two types of information: sen
sory derived and experiential (laid down as memories). Considering
our example of the new-born, during their early days of life there
will be much reliance on sensory information. They will rely on
what they hear, see, smell, taste and feel. They will be born with an
innate ability to avoid negative stimuli such as loud noises by
turning away from them and to approach positive stimuli by
looking at, for example, the caregiver’s face. There will be very
little experiential information at this stage of life. But with a re
petitive daily schedule, the new-born will begin to associate spe
cific stimuli together such as the caregiver’s face and lactation. This
association between stimuli becomes learned and eventually a
memory is formed of the link between the two events. In order to
develop memories, the new-born needs to attend to specific stimuli
or be selective. They will also need to apply previous knowledge
derived from their experiences with the caregiver so that they can
make inferences about what to expect (e.g. a cuddle versus ignore).
The new-born’s brain will then need to be able to organise their
sensations into mental representations of their world. These three
processes are important for perception.
In order to understand how perception operates it makes sense
to consider first how we attend to stimuli in our environment.
Models describing how we process sensory information have a
long history extending back to the works of American psychol
ogist William James. James is arguably the first to establish a la
boratory and describe what psychology should be about in his
book, Principles of Psychology in 1890. Of relevance here, James
introduced the idea that we have a ‘stream of consciousness’, such
that our thoughts and reactions to events are experienced as a
continuous flow (see Chapter 7). He speculated on how the brain
enables us to process information to maintain this continuous
flow. In the case of new-borns, they would initially be confused
by the world around them. As they become better able to focus
on stimuli and form memories, however, their waking world
begins to make more sense and they begin to experience life as a
continuous flow ̶ a stream of consciousness that James so elo
quently described.
52 ATTENTION AND PERCEPTION
According to James the processing of information is reliant on

two types of attention – active and passive. In the case of active
attention, we selectively process information occurring in our
immediate environment that we are aware of. This could be
searching for a friend in a crowd where attention is directed spe
cifically towards a female with long hair. In this case attention is
driven by the individual’s motivation and intention to spot a friend
in the crowd. A new-born might focus on the sound of the
caregiver’s voice and associate this with being soothed and cuddled.
Passive attention conversely is the processing of information that is
not driven by the individual but rather is a response to events. For
example, a flash of light is likely to draw an individual’s attention
towards its source. The reaction is often spontaneous and auton
omous. James’ distinction between active and passive attention
remains very much at the core of how cognitive psychologists
currently understand and research attention. James also considered
the process of automaticity. This is best highlighted by the example
of walking. Once walking has been mastered the execution of a
series of actions enabling us to walk no longer need to be con
sciously vocalised or referred to. The act has become automated.
Infants learning to walk crawl before eventually struggling to stand
up and take their first steps. They appear awkward while con
tinuing to learn how to keep their balance and put one foot in front
of the other. For infants the action of walking is far from auto
mated. Another example is when we learn to drive. When under
the supervision of the driving instructor, the actions of clutch and
accelerator control in gear changing are clumsy. With experience,
however, these actions become so engrained that we no longer
need to think about performing them – they have become auto
mated. We can even drive and talk except when approaching a
congested junction, when suddenly talking becomes difficult. The
cognitive processing necessary for conversing has become com
promised by the need to focus on the driving conditions. There are
therefore conditions where our attention can be divided across
different tasks (especially when one task is automated) but not
when both tasks require equal amounts of concentration. In 1890
James wrote about focused and divided attention which has spurred
theoretical explanations for how attention operates and ultimately
influences perception (see later).
As we discussed in Chapter 2, sensory organs (such as the eyes and

ears) have receptor cells which respond to specific types of stimuli –
these can be so specific that they respond to a horizontal or vertical line.
Such information is passed on to higher ordered cells in the brain ready
to be interpreted. This then becomes the beginning of the process of
perception. External information from our immediate environment is
therefore transformed to a format that the brain can understand and to
which we can then provide the context of meaning. This context of
meaning is based on learning and memories from previous similar
encounters with our environment. Returning to the example of our
new-born, there will be many stimuli processed in this way and
connections made between these stimuli then become stored as
memories. The person who approaches the crib, speaks gently and
then caresses and feeds the infant will begin as a series of stimuli but will
rapidly become associated and recognised as the caregiver. Clearly, the
role attention plays in enabling stimuli to be processed and interpreted
by the brain is important. Cognitive psychologists have provided
models of how this might be achieved which we will consider next.
ATTENTION
MODELS OF AUDITORY ATTENTION
One of the first studies of attention that students are often introduced
to is that of Colin Cherry in 1953. He noticed that when there are
many groups of people in conversation, the focus of attention is with
what is being discussed by those in the same group. What is being
discussed by people in other groups remains generally inaudible.
Cherry found there are, however, circumstances where what is being
discussed by other groups can become heard. This appeared to occur
when the topic of conversation was pertinent to the individual such as
their name or the fact that they too experience Seasonal Affective
Disorder (SAD). This phenomenon became known as the Cocktail
Party Effect. Cherry investigated this phenomenon through a series of
experiments using the method of ‘dichotic listening’. Dichotic lis
tening tasks are devised as follows:
● Participants wear headphones where they hear two spoken

messages
● One message is presented to the left ear and the other to the
right ear
● The two spoken messages are different
● Participants are instructed to repeat the words of the message
to say the right ear as they hear it out loud (this is called
shadowing)
● On completion of the task they are asked questions about the
message to the left ear (the unattended message)
● Questions could be simple such as the sex of the voice (i.e. a
physical attribute) or a complex question about what was said
(i.e. meaning of the language spoken)
The findings indicate that very little about the unattended

message, barring simple physical attributes, is discerned. These
findings led to a series of proposed filter models showing what
happens to stimuli that are attended to and those that are not. All
stimuli compete to pass through a ‘bottleneck’. This bottleneck
allows only so many stimuli to be fully processed, and this de
pends on the level of attention it receives. There is debate,
however, regarding whether the bottleneck occurs early or late
on during processing. To understand how filter models work
refer to Figure 3.1 (models by Broadbent (1958); Treisman
(1964) and Deutsch and Deutsch (1963)).
As we can see from Broadbent’s single filter model, many au
ditory signals enter the sensory buffer (a holding site) but only a few
will be processed further. Once in the selective filter, only a couple
(in the case of Figure 3.1) continue their journey into our atten
tion. These will be examined further at a higher ordered level of
processing in the brain. Broadbent’s model is an example of an
early bottleneck. In the case of Treisman’s attenuator model, signal
selection occurs later in the system. She considered a model that is
far more flexible than that proposed by Broadbent. For Treisman
all auditory signals are processed superficially for physical attributes.
The signal continues to the semantic filter where they are either
processed fully or attenuated. Depending on the importance of
these signals and our expectations, they continue into our attention
or remain in an attenuated form. Further processing of these stimuli
also depends on our expectations of what is important, and what
we should be attending to. Directing our attention in this way is a
Figure 3.1 Filter models and selected stimuli
top-down processing strategy. In Treisman’s study levels of top-

down processing had occurred when some individuals recalled
words from the unattended message whilst shadowing the message
in the right ear. Treisman claimed this to be a consequence of these
words fitting in with the context of the shadowed message.
Deutsch and Deutsch argued for a late bottleneck. This means that
all stimuli are fully processed but only those most important to the
current situation are likely to influence and direct an individual’s
behaviour. Today there is general consensus that the attended
message is managed largely by top-down processing (see Box 3.1).
Audition is just one sensory input researched by cognitive psy
chologists – we also have others including vision. We might ask
whether visual stimuli are subjected to the same selection processes.
In vision are there also bottom-up and top-down processes oc
curring simultaneously?
VISUAL ATTENTION
Corbetta and Shulman (2002) identified two attention systems; one

operating on the basis of top-down or goal-directed attention and the
other resembling a bottom-up or stimulus-driven attention system.
BOX 3.1 TOP-DOWN PROCESSING FOR THE

ATTENDED MESSAGE?
Based on dichotic listening experiments, filter models suggest that
auditory information is picked up by our ears and briefly stored in a
sensory buffer. This information is passed through the bottleneck filter
but only if it is attended to. This, it has been argued, occurs when we
use top-down processing. Note that a top-down processing strategy
means we direct our focus and use knowledge from our previous
experiences. And it is during dichotic listening tasks that the top-down
strategy is used to process the attended message. This is largely due to
the instructions to shadow the message in the right ear. In 2009
McDermott suggested that top-down processing is involved in
understanding speech (such as how words are separated in a
sentence). This, in part, comes from our experience of hearing
language and acquiring knowledge and expectations of how words
in sentences are ordered. This makes it easier to separate messages
more clearly and even to ‘pick’ bits out from the unattended message.
But do we also rely on the opposite strategy of bottom-up processing?
In the case of bottom-up processing, the auditory stimulus which has
the most dominant presence is processed fully at the expense of other
potential stimuli. In this case knowledge, motives and expectations do
not determine whether the auditory stimulus is processed further or
not. This makes perfect sense when we consider our new-born who is
relying on sensory input rather than knowledge to understand what is
happening around them (given they haven’t been in the world very
long!). Which stimulus is likely to be most dominant – the sound of
mum’s voice or the dog barking? It’s most likely that mum’s voice will
pass through the bottleneck.
Top-down processing is adopted when a cue showing the location

of a target is shown. Bottom-up attention is stimulus-driven and
kicks into action when an unexpected and pertinent stimulus occurs.
This potentially life-saving mechanism is designed to redirect top-
down controlled visual attention. The way in which top-down
and bottom-up attention works is best illustrated by an example.
Suppose you are watching your favourite television programme
and suddenly a flash of flames and smoke filters from under

the lounge door. Immediately the bottom-up attention system
redirects your focus from the television to the fire and smoke. In
this case bottom-up processing disrupts top-down processing, po
tentially saving your life. These two processing systems operate in
teractively (Corbetta, Patel and Shulman 2008). In the case of
mundane stimuli, then, distractor information such as a car passing
the house (bottom-up processing) is stopped from interrupting what
we are focusing on, in this case the television (top-down processing).
Hence, bottom-up processing can stop or override top-down pro
cessing when it is highly pertinent to do so. Having both systems
helps us to focus and direct attention away towards a potentially
threatening situation.
Devising experiments to analyse how visual attention works is
more challenging than it is for auditory attention. Egly, Driver and
Rafal in 1994, however, developed a successful method (see
Box 3.2).
Theories of visual attention

In 1980 Posner argued that visual attention is like a single spotlight
casting a ray. Others such as Eriksen and St James (1986) instead
argued for a zoom lens analogy. Just as a camera can adjust the focus
of a visual field so too can our eyes. In 2000, however, Awh and
Pashler introduced the spotlights theory. Unlike Posner, Awh and
Pashler’s spotlights theory argues that our attention can be split so
that many separate and non-adjacent areas in our visual field can be
covered. Not everyone agrees with this split attention theory. One
criticism is to ask what happens to the areas of space where there is
no focused attention? For example, what happens to the middle
space when there is only extreme left and right focus? Jans, Peters
and de Weerd (2010) argued that such a split would interfere with
decisions about appropriate action. What if the two visual fields are
contradictory or require differences of action? Conversely, Cave,
Bush and Taylor (2010) argued that this would not cause inter
ference but instead provide flexibility to increase the likelihood of
the best response. Various research findings support all three ap
proaches. The consensus, however, is that the way visual attention
is used will depend on the demands of the situation and the goals of
BOX 3.2 VISUAL ATTENTION METHODOLOGY

Egly et al. were interested in whether we are more likely to focus our
attention on objects or ‘pockets of space’ within our visual field. In
their study participants were instructed to detect a visual target as
quickly as possible. They were presented with a cue (prior to the
target) showing where the target will most likely be. This cue either
showed the same location (i.e. valid) or a different location (i.e.
invalid) to the target’s location. Cues could also be of the same
object form or different to that of the target. Their findings
suggested that the response rate for target detection was quicker
when the valid cues were presented beforehand. Only when the
invalid cue was of the same object form as the target, were response
rates faster than that for valid cues. They concluded that attention
was, in part, object-based. Hollingworth, Maxcey-Richard and
Vecera (2012) introduced a similar task. But this time they wanted
to explore whether space-based attention is also present. Invalid
cues (that were either the same object or different to the target)
varied in their distance from the target’s location. They found:
● Detection time was faster when the invalid cue was the same as
the target object than when it was different
● Detection time increased when the same object invalid cue was
furthest away from where the target was located
● Hence, detection time was the slowest when the invalid cue
was furthest away from the target’s location but gradually
increased in speed as the cue’s distance became closer to
where the target would be
● Implication is that both object-based and space-based attention
work in tandem
Researchers in this field have also identified feature-based attention.

This occurs when we look for relevant features belonging to a friend
for example – features such as long blonde hair. In this case colour
and hair length become focused features against a backdrop of
many other hair colours and styles.
All three types of visual attention are shown to interact to
improve our overall visual experience (Kravitz and Behrmann 2011).
the individual. Hence all three approaches will be used at some

point or another as required.
When we consider the spotlight and zoom lens approaches, the
implication is that selective attention is drawn towards areas or
space – often referred to as space-based attention. On examining
what we selectively attend to, however, studies reveal that we
generally focus on objects rather than space (see later in chapter).
Object-based attention fits well with our pattern of visual-based
behaviour, as we often search for objects such as a specific building
or a post-box. We can nevertheless focus on both space and objects
which the spotlight, zoom lens and split spotlights approaches ac
count for effectively. In the case of object-based attention, Hou
and Liu (2012) found that top-down processes are involved. This is
not surprising given we often interact with our surroundings by
focusing on objects (e.g. when we navigate through a town, we
look for signposts or a bus stop). For some individuals, however,
being able to focus on objects fully is problematic. These in
dividuals are likely to have visual attention disorders. Individuals
with visual attention disorders have problems with top-down and
bottom-up processing. Neuroimaging shows that top-down and
bottom-up processing have separate networks operating within the
parietal lobes of the brain (Talsma, Coe, Munoz and Theeuwes
2010). How top-down and bottom-up processing work has been
studied by cognitive neurologists (see Box 3.3). Although all forms
of sensory information help us to navigate our surroundings, we
live in a very visual world. We are constantly bombarded with
visual images of people and objects and have to distinguish relevant
from irrelevant visual stimuli. Visual search is a constant process but
how is it performed?
Visual search
There are three main accounts of how visual search occurs.
1. FEATURE INTEGRATION THEORY
Treisman and Gelade (1980) argued the visual system performs a

quick breakdown of an object into its component features pre-
attentively. The recombination of these features, however, relies
BOX 3.3 VISUAL ATTENTION DISORDERS

There are two recognised visual attention problems studied by
cognitive psychologists: spatial neglect and extinction. The term
spatial neglect refers to a lack of awareness of stimuli. It follows
brain damage leading to a deficit in awareness of stimuli presented
to the opposite side to where the damage occurred (known as the
contralateral side). In most people with visual attention disorders
the damage is to the right hemisphere of the brain leading to
neglect in the left visual field. This means that if the individual is
shown a stimulus such as a toy to their left visual field, they will not
see it. The example of a toy failing to be seen by an individual
demonstrates what is called subject-centred or egocentric neglect.
In contrast, object-centred or allocentric neglect shows itself as a
problem of not seeing the left side of the object – hence in our
example only the right side of the toy is seen. When asked to draw
an object, individuals with this problem will only draw the right side
of it. This becomes a problem when there are multiple objects in
both the right and left visual fields (Gainotti and Ciaaffa 2013).
Interestingly, evidence of an overlap of the brain areas associated
with both types of neglect has been found (Rorden, Hjaltason,
Fillmore, Fridrikasson et al. 2012). Corbetta and Shulman (2011)
argued that it is the ventral attention network controlling bottom-up
processing that is damaged. This has a knock-on effect on top-down
processing (the dorsal attention network; see Chapter 2). This raises
the question of how this occurs. Corbetta and Shulman claim that
the two systems interact such that an impaired ventral attention
network influences the functioning of the dorsal attention network.
The result of this is an inability to stay focused.
In the case of extinction, individuals demonstrate a specific form
of neglect. It operates as follows:
● when two stimuli are presented simultaneously to the left and

right visual fields then the stimulus in the visual field asso
ciated with the damaged hemisphere is ignored and only the
remaining stimulus is reported as seen
An example of this is a patient presented with a plateful of food who

eats only half of the meal in the unaffected visual field (i.e. either the
left or the right). The other half of the food is left uneaten. In such
cases rotating the plate by 180 degrees, generally leads to comple
tion of the meal. Extinction is problematic. This is because of the
way we visually interact with our environment. We constantly see a
multitude of objects and spaces between objects in both visual
fields. De Haan, Karnath and Driver (2012) claim that individuals
with extinction have impaired attention capacity such that they are
only able to detect one target stimulus. And this is generally the
stimulus presented to the right visual field.
on focused attention. This process is important and aids in the

correct interpretation of the recombination of features – a long-
haired blonde friend and not a banana!
2. TEXTURE TILING MODEL
Rosenholtz, Huang and Ehinger (2012) claimed that when we

focus on a visual scene the central details are processed clearly but
the more peripheral aspects are lost. Hence there is a texture var
iation across the visual scene. This means that central details are
clear while peripheral details are less defined. They argue for gra
dations of texture – such that acuity decreases the further away it is
from the point of focus.
3. DUAL-PATH MODEL
Wolfe, Võ, Evans and Greene (2011) suggested there are two
pathways involved in visual search: selective and non-selective. In
the case of the selective pathway objects are found individually for
recognition. For the non-selected pathway, the gist of a scene is
processed to aid the selective pathway. The non-selected pathway
interacts strongly with our general knowledge of our surroundings
such as the design of a train platform. In support of this Ehinger,
Hidalgo-Sotelo, Torraiba and Oliva (2009) gave participants dif
ferent pictures to find either people or outdoor objects such as
pavements. Eye fixations were recorded to measure which areas in
the pictures individuals focused on to find the target. Top-down
processing was used, and eye fixations shifted to areas where they
believed a person or pavement was most likely to be.
Divided attention
William James (1890) made the observation that we can perform
two tasks at the same time provided one of the tasks was au
tomated (limited focused attention required). James was de
scribing divided attention. Being able to divide our attention
across many tasks enables us to process various kinds of in
formation at the same time. So, what is the evidence for divided
attention? Treisman and Davies (1973) found deficits when
performing tasks that competed for the same processing capacity.
This was apparent when the same sense modality (auditory or
visual) was required. They found that performance was com
promised when participants were instructed to monitor two
stimuli from the same sense modality (visual or auditory).
Hence, these stimuli were interfering with one another. If,
however, the dual-tasks rely on different sense modalities, dif
ferent processing components and resources are used. Hence,
both tasks can be successfully performed (Wickens 1984, 2008).
Taylor (2018) explored the effects of divided attention on the
recognition of face-name pairs (full-frontal face photos with the
name underneath). She found that when attempting to process
both names and faces simultaneously, performance for the re
cognition of names was significantly compromised. This suggests
the processing of names is effortful while, in contrast, the pro
cessing of faces is automatic.
Automatic processing
Another of William James’ (1890) observations is that we can
divide our attention and perform more than one task at the same
time provided one of the tasks has become automated. The use of
controlled and automatic processes was introduced by Shiffrin
and Schneider in 1977. They argued that controlled processes (or
effortful processing) rely on attention and are dependent on
limited capacity. In contrast, automatic processes did not rely on
attention or have capacity limitations. The notion of controlled
versus automatic processes, however, was criticised by Moors and

de Houwer (2006). They argued that automaticity should:
● have no conscious awareness of ongoing processing

● not require attentional resources to be an efficient system
● be a rapid process
● be independent of any goals
● not require the above factors to occur simultaneously – it is
not an ‘all or nothing’ process
Moreover, Hasher and Zacks (1979) have suggested that there is

some overlap between automaticity and involuntary processing.
Our ability to attend to stimuli in our environment is very much
at the forefront of being able to interpret what is occurring around
us. That is our ability to perceive.
PERCEPTION
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, perception uses information
derived from our sensory systems and from memories of our ex
periences. Perception is a complex process relying on a multitude
of cognitive algorithms designed to help us understand our
world. Basic processing of sensory information and the specialised
areas of the brain dealing with such information were discussed in
Chapter 2. We will first consider how we perceive colour, size and
depth as they are so fundamental to understanding our world.
PERCEPTION OF SIZE, COLOUR AND DEPTH
In Chapter 2, we examined the structure of the eye and the ear.

How the images on the retina of the eye are focused for instance
appear very different from what we actually ‘see’. The image on
the retina is upside down but that is not how we perceive the
world. Even a new-born does not perceive the world upside down.
The brain interprets the images as they appear in reality and assorts
them such that we have continuity – a bit like watching a film. So
how does the brain do this? How does the brain know when one
object is further away than another? Also, how does the brain
know that the shape of a door is the same regardless of its angle? Or
even that an object’s colour remains consistent regardless of dif

ferences in luminosity? The brain makes use of perceptual con
stancies for aspects of objects such as size, shape, lightness and
colour. A constancy is defined as, “the tendency to perceive objects
or their qualities in the same or similar ways, despite differences in
their retinal images” (Cheyne and Davies 1999, p. 579).
Size constancy is important as it helps us to determine when
some objects are further away than other objects. An image of an
object is cast on the retina but as the object moves further away
from us, the retinal image decreases. Nevertheless, the size of the
distant object remains correct. A cow in the distance will look
smaller but we still can gauge its true size. Under conditions where
it is difficult to recognise an object or judge its distance, however,
size constancy breaks down. Haber and Levin (2001) investigated
whether object familiarity or variations in viewing distances play an
important role in correct judgements of size. In their study there
were three categories of objects all viewed from close or distant
viewing points: familiar but invariant in size (e.g. cricket bat), fa
miliar but size variant (e.g. television) and unfamiliar (e.g. shapes).
They found that participants were better at judging size when the
objects were familiar. Nevertheless, participants made fairly accu
rate judgements of size for the unfamiliar objects also. The viewing
distance did not appear to affect size judgements. Interestingly, van
der Hoort, Guterstam and Ehrsson (2011) showed a body size ef
fect where we tend to perceive the size of objects relative to our
own body size. In van der Hoort et al.’s study, participants wore
attached CCTV cameras and viewed their surroundings from the
perspective of a doll which was either small or large. This affected
how they perceived the size of objects. When the doll was small
objects were seen as further away and larger. Not so when the doll
was large. An interesting example of how we can fool our size
constancy perception is the Ames room (Ames 1952; see
Figure 3.2). This room has an unusual shape such that one wall is
out of synch with the other walls and the floor slopes. This has a
robust effect on the perception of size of a person inside the room.
When participants looked through a peephole, the illusion is set.
The person inside when walking across the room will appear tall
scaling down to small. The perception of size in this case appears to
be influenced by the perceived distance.
Figure 3.2 A representation of the illusion of two objects of different heights in

the Ames Room by looking through a peephole
Colour constancy helps us to perceive the colour of an object as

invariant despite changes of luminosity. Objects show changes of
colour as the light projected on them alters throughout the day.
And yet we do not perceive colour changes to these objects. We
may see reflections of work surfaces on an object such as a yellow
mug, but the yellow colour of the mug is retained. Interestingly,
Shepherd (2020) points out how colour constancy can be im
perfect. She provides the example of #TheDress in 2015 which
became a viral sensation. Some people perceived the colour of the
dress as blue and black while others saw it as white and gold.
Shepherd concluded that lighting and our expectations contributed
towards the divergent colour perceptions.
The shape of objects remains constant despite changes of angle.
For instance, the angle of an open door appears different to when it
is closed but shape constancy enables us to perceive it as a constant
shape – a long oblong. There is a strong element of learning in
volved with how we perceive objects. Objects become familiar
through repetitive interactions with them. We learn that an orange
is of the colour orange and an edible banana is yellow. An infant
has yet to learn about what the size, shape and colour of objects
should be, but through interacting with their environment, the
learning curve is rapid. Moreover, this learning coupled with
constancy, provides us with a greater understanding of how objects
interact with one another.
The ability to perceive a two-dimensional (2-D) image cast on
the retina as a three-dimensional (3-D) entity is achieved by
different types of sensory information. This ability can be important

when judging heights. There are three types of cues which help us
to determine whether we are looking at something that could
potentially be of a dangerous height or depth – such as an extreme
drop from a cliff or the ‘Buttertubs’ seen in Yorkshire. These cues
have been categorised as monocular (based on viewings from one
eye), binocular (based on simultaneous viewings from both eyes)
and oculomotor (based on muscular contractions around the eyes
providing a muscle sense called kinaesthesia). Monocular cues are
often used by artists to achieve the illusion of a 3-D representation
on a flat 2-D surface such as a canvas. There are many monocular
cues which help us put objects into perspective but also to de
termine the depth of what we see. We are surrounded by at least
one of these monocular cues daily. Parallel lines that are tall in
dicate closeness, but the shorter they become the more we perceive
them as being further away. For example, driving on a straight flat
road, the telegraph poles to the side appear tall but the more distant
ones seem much shorter – this cue is called linear perspective.
Texture of a visual scene also provides information about distance.
The closer an object the more detail of texture there is such that a
cobbled path will have larger and more regular stone patterning the
closer it is but as it increases in distance the stones appear smaller
and closer together. There is a gradual texture gradient which
provides the look of a cobbled path receding into the distance.
Shading provides objects with a 3-D outlook by making them look
solid and projecting out from their contextual backdrop. Another
cue which gives the illusion of distance is when objects overlap one
on top of the other. This partially obscures the object underneath
which makes it appear as further away. This is known as inter
position (see Figure 3.3).
Motion parallax also provides information about distance and
depth. This refers to how an image of a moving object traverses
across the retina. It is interesting that nearer objects appear to move
in the opposite direction to one’s head such that they move further
and more quickly. Distant objects, however, move in the same
direction as one’s head but more slowly. This is best demonstrated
when looking out of the window from a travelling train. The
objects close to the track pass by quickly unlike the hills in the
distance which move slowly. Looming also provides information
Figure 3.3 Demonstration of how shapes can appear more distant due to in
terposition
about depth. Looming occurs when an object moves towards us

thereby expanding the retinal image (the reverse occurs when an
object moves away from us). Bridge (2020) raises an important
question of why the world remains still as our eyes move around.
She addresses this question by explaining how the brain is able to
calculate whether we are moving, or our environment is moving,
by using the retinal images and information about the position of
our eyes. Lastly, the familiarity of an object provides us with size
dimensions thus helping us to judge depth in the absence of
other cues.
Binocular cues, sometimes referred to as stereoscopic vision,
occur when both eyes cast an independent retinal image. Due to
the structure of the eye and position there are slight differences in
the two retinal images – known as binocular disparity. Thus, when
both eyes focus on the same object there is a slightly different image
on the left and right retina which are then compared and in
tegrated. As a result of this automatic process of integration, known
as stereopsis, we are able to perceive depth. Both oculomotor and

binocular cues help us to make judgements of distance based on
being able to perceive depth. Oculomotor cues help to perceive
depth by sensing the muscle contractions occurring around the eyes
when we focus on a distant or near object. Two processes arise
from oculomotor cues: vergence and accommodation. In the
case of viewing close objects our eyes converge more than
for distant ones and this is controlled via the muscular contrac
tions surrounding our eyes. This process is called vergence.
Accommodation, alternatively, operates by thickening the eye lens
when focusing on a close object. This heightens optical clarity but
generally of one object at a time. We integrate information
from monocular, binocular and oculomotor cues to ascertain
both distance and depth. Nardini (2020) found that the way in
which children integrate all these cues is different from adults. In
fact, Nardini’s data suggest that this does not occur until about
10 ̶ 12 years of age. Only then does the precision of perceptual
judgements improve. Neuroimaging studies confirm how visual
reshaping continues into late childhood.
Occasionally, however, we are tricked by what our eyes are telling
us about the depth of an object. This usually occurs when a 2-D
image is made into a 3-D representation by using contradictory
monocular cues. This is one way in which visual illusions work.
Visual illusions are very robust and difficult to ignore (see Figure 3.4).
In the case of the Necker cube the brain finds it difficult to not
flicker from one interpretation to another. The shaded square either
shifts to the background or to the foreground in an effort to per
ceptually resolve the ambiguous figure. The Poggendorf illusion
provides a context for line misalignment. The Műller-Lyer illusion
makes the two vertical lines appear of different size when in fact they
are exactly the same length. The inward and outward directions of
the arrowheads provide cues of distance. This can be seen when
comparisons between vertical lines of the same length of an interior
corner of a room and the exterior corner of a building are viewed.
The same illusion is created. The brain perceives the different regions
of the Penrose figure as 3-D. Due to its paradoxical nature the whole
figure appears twisted and contorted. It does not obey the algorithms
of a truly 3-D object. There have been different theories explaining
how our brain is fooled by visual illusions, such as ‘Gestalt theory’
Figure 3.4 Examples of visual illusions
which highlights how the organisation of perception is robust in

accounting for visual illusions (see Box 3.4). The perceptions of size,
colour and depth help us to understand the attributes of objects, in
particular how they move (see later).
OBJECT PERCEPTION
When we distinguish objects from each other we rely on being able

to recognise patterns. In other words, we engage in pattern
BOX 3.4 GESTALT THEORY OF PERCEPTUAL

ORGANISATION
The Gestalt school of thought was developed in Germany under the
auspices of Wertheimer (1880 ̶1943), Koffka (1886 ̶1941) and Kohler
(1887 ̶1964). The underlying premise of their work was that we have
innate brain processes used to explain the relationship between our
experiences and the world. They focused primarily on perceptual
processes and developed a series of basic laws of perception. The
Gestaltists emphasised the point that we perceive objects as
‘wholes’ rather than a breakdown of their component parts. They
introduced the overarching law of Prȁgnanz which states that the
simplest perceptual organisation will occur. There are other laws
subsumed under the law of Prȁgnanz accounting for the grouping
of stimuli as a way of trying to interpret them. The law of proximity
describes the need for perceiving elements of a stimulus together,
given their closeness. Hence in the case of Figure 3.5, there are three
pairs of lines and one odd line.
Figure 3.5 Parallel lines of proximity
The law of closure is the inclination to see a complete object.
Figure 3.6 An almost complete ‘rectangle’

The law of similarity groups similar stimuli together.
Figure 3.7 Similar objects are grouped together

The law of good continuation enables us to see a clear and
continuous pattern.
Figure 3.8 Two separate but continuous patterns

Figure-ground segregation, Gestaltists argue, is an important aspect
of how we perceive objects. Our brain perceives an object in the
context of the background in which it resides. In the famous
ambiguous drawing, a depiction of two non-featured side profiles
of human faces amidst a neutral background is often perceived (the
Rubin vase). The dominant image, however, can flitter between the
two faces and the space between them of a vase (see Figure 3.9). It
works even when it is not perfectly symmetrical.
The perceived figures have form and are in the foreground, in
contrast to the space between them which is in the background.
According to Wagemans, Elder, Kubovy, Palmer et al. (2012), areas
of figures which curve outwards and are symmetrical tend to be
perceived in the foreground as the dominant features. Researchers
have tested Gestalt laws and concluded that these hold up very well
in the light of how we perceive objects (Elder and Goldberg 2002).
For Gestaltists, however, figure-ground segregation is an innate
ability independent of any learning. When considering the work of
the Gestaltists, there is much description but little explanation of
how these principles might operate. Kersten, Mamassion and Yuille
(2004) have attempted to address this by making use of the
Bayesian approach. In fact, many experts today consider the
Figure 3.9 The Rubin vase optical illusion
Bayesian approach to be a good explanation for the Gestalt

principles of visual perception. Kersten et al. suggest that we, as
observers, consider statistical regularities in our environment.
Hence, in relation to proximity or similarity, our interactions with
our environment enable us to learn about the relationship of the
visual elements of objects. This means we learn about what belongs
to an object or patterns we see. Moreover, our knowledge of this is
used to distinguish figures from backgrounds (e.g. figure-ground
segregation).
recognition. Pattern recognition occurs constantly on a daily basis.

In tasks such as reading, the letters printed are identified by spe
cialised visual cells – some cells are designed to identify vertical
lines whereas others identify curves. These are then integrated to
form a letter of the alphabet. How this is interpreted depends on
previous experience of language and the operation of the lexicon
(see Chapter 6).
As mentioned in Chapter 2, feature detectors respond to specific
elements of a stimulus such as a horizontal line. These elements are
eventually integrated with the other elements of the stimulus
concerned which the brain then deciphers for meaning. This re
presents a bottom-up processing strategy (see earlier). Much of our
understanding of feature detection models comes from the neu
rophysiological research of Hűbel and Wiesel (1959). In 1959 they
studied visual perception in cats. Using simple stimuli presented to
the cat’s visual system, electrodes recorded activity of cortical cells
responding to specific types of patterns such as lines or edges.
Hűbel and Wiesel concluded that individual cells extract un
ambiguous data from the features of the objects seen. All this in
formation is then constructed by the visual system to form
perceptions of objects. Our visual system operates similarly. It is
hierarchically organised such that there are levels of feature de
tectors (see Figure 2.5). This means the output from one level is
passed on to the next level as input. This continues through a
number of levels of processing to eventually build up a complete
picture by integrating the features from each level. This is how it is
believed that, beginning with a series of individual cells firing, we
finally end up being able to recognise our own grandmother.
In contrast to bottom-up processing as described by Hűbel and
Wiesel, template matching is an example of top-down processing
(Selfridge and Neisser 1960). In this case shapes or patterns detected
by the visual system are compared holistically with existing tem
plates stored in memory. These templates are acquired as a con
sequence of previous interactions with our environment. If there is
a sufficient overlap with an existing template, then the stimulus is
considered to belong to the class of objects the template represents
(see Box 3.5 for further theories of object recognition).
Cognitive psychologists acknowledge that both top-down and
bottom-up processing often operate in tandem or that one occurs
BOX 3.5 THEORIES OF OBJECT RECOGNITION

The new-born’s visual system is still immature but begins to develop
as increasingly it interacts with objects; hence, “the brain has to ‘learn
to see’ during infancy and childhood” (Nardini 2020, p. 42). Visual
sharpness and acuity of objects improves. The recognition of an object
is ‘coarse’ to begin with but will eventually progress from coarse to fine
as the missing finer details are added (Hegdé 2008). There are cells in
the visual cortex responding to low or high spatial frequencies which
capture coarse and fine detail respectively. Hegdé argued that coarse
processing is fast-tracked by a specific brain pathway (magnocellular);
hence the images appear as blurred. This is followed by a slower brain
pathway (parvocellular) which conveys the finer detail of stimuli. In a
study by Musel, Chauvin, Guyader, Chokron et al. (2012), participants
were shown images (for 150 ms) which progressively changed from
coarse (i.e. low spatial frequency) to fine detail (i.e. high spatial
frequency) and vice versa. Decisions about the type of images shown,
such as indoor or outdoor scenes, were measured using reaction
times. Reaction times favoured the coarse-to-fine rather than the fine-
to-coarse direction of processing. This meant that low followed by high
spatial frequency was the norm. In line with Navon’s (1977) research,
the findings suggest that global processing relies on low spatial
frequency, local processing on high spatial frequency (Flevaris,
Martinez and Hillyard 2014). Low and high spatial frequencies provide
us with an approach that is in keeping with how visual cortical cells and
brain pathways operate. Theoretical approaches either emphasise a
global (top-down) or local (bottom-up) slant. For example, Marr’s
(1982) computational model describes a series of processing stages:
primal sketch (providing a 2-D description of input such as contours
and blobs); 2 ½ -D sketch (providing descriptions of depth and
orientation); 3-D model representation (providing fuller information of
objects independent of viewpoint). Biederman (1987) modified Marr’s
model in his recognition-by-components theory. He referred to the
components of objects, such as their shapes, as ‘geons’ and identified
as many as 36. Of importance is the ability to distinguish objects from
surfaces. For example, the edges of an object help to form a basic line-
drawing representation separate from any background. Also, concave
shapes provide information of an object’s contour. The processing of
object edges is independent of any viewing point. This implies edges
have invariant properties so that they remain constant despite changes

of orientation. Biederman claims there are five invariant properties
concerning edges such as curvature (set points on a curve) and
symmetry (opposing asymmetry). And it is these invariant properties
driving how geons are constructed. For instance, a cylinder is
considered a geon as is a triangle or square (see Figure 3.10).
Figure 3.10 Examples of ‘geons’
Once the geons of an object are established comparisons are made

in memory to find a match (analogous to template matching).
Biederman’s theory, nevertheless, is very much a bottom-up proces
sing approach, and has some neurological support. The neurological
support shows that information is progressively constructed as it
passes through the hierarchy of visual neurons; hence operating on a
feedforward basis. There are, however, neurons operating in a
different way such as backward processing (Gilbert and Li 2013).
This supports top-down processing. Evidence for the influence of top-
down processing in the recognition of objects comes from the use of
ambiguous pictures. When one of two image interpretations are
shown prior to the ambiguous picture, participants are influenced by
the interpretation they see beforehand. In other words, they have been
primed to see the same image in the ambiguous picture. Hence,
“during our attempts to interpret the world around us, perception
relies on existing knowledge as much as it does on incoming
information” (Yardley, Perlovsky and Bar 2012, p.1).
more dominantly depending on the demands of the situation.

Kinchla and Wolfe (1979) claimed our visual system does not
necessarily operate on a bottom-up or top-down basis but on a
‘middle-out’ basis. Hence, our visual system operates by using the
information it has available at the time such as the size of a stimulus
or its distance. Their conclusions are based largely on a study by

Navon (1977). His method considered how ‘global’ and ‘local’
processing operate in pattern recognition. By presenting a large
letter such as ‘S’ or ‘H’ which comprises smaller letters such as ‘S’
or ‘H’, Navon was able to determine when global or local pro
cessing occurred using reaction times (see Figure 3.11). For some
trials, participants had to decide whether the large letter was an ‘S’
or ‘H’. And for the remaining trials whether the smaller letters were
‘Ss’ or ‘Hs’. The large letter interfered with the processing of the
smaller letters when it was different. The processing speed of the
large letter was unaffected by the smaller letters. These findings
suggest a preference for global processing, which enables general
scanning of visual patterns before adding the detail.
FACE PERCEPTION
New-borns will instinctively scrutinise face-like stimuli (Shah 2020).

Shah, Gaule, Bird and Cook (2013) even showed this to be the case
with adults on the autism spectrum. This suggests that their in
stinctive responding to face-like stimuli remains intact despite
showing deficits in other areas. An infant’s ability to perceive faces
(albeit in a primitive form until the visual system develops further) is
paramount to survival. Being able to recognise the caregiver’s face, in
particular, and associate this with love and care helps it to thrive. Face
perception appears to be an innate ability that is unaffected by divided
attention and separates it from perceiving objects (see Box 3.6).
Evidence suggests that faces are processed holistically rather than
on a feature-by-feature basis. Hence a top-down rather than a
bottom-up processing strategy. Holistic processing enables facial
features, and the inter-spacing between features, to remain in
tegrated. Holistic processing is fast and allows features to be pro
cessed in parallel rather than serially. Bruyer (2011) demonstrated
holistic processing in faces using the face inversion effect where
faces were presented upside down, inverted or upright; faces are
difficult to recognise under upside down and inverted presenta
tions. This is not the case for non-facial stimuli, which suggests
there is something special about the way faces are processed.
One well-developed theory concerning how we process faces
is that of Bruce and Young (1986). They introduced a model
Figure 3.11 The global (large) ‘S’ and ‘H’; the local (smaller) ‘Ss’ and ‘Hs’
consisting of a number of components each with a defined

function (see Figure 3.12). In the case of ‘structural codes’,
a literal pictorial representation of the face is produced.
This means that if a full-frontal view of the face is presented
then the pictorial representation will be the same; if on the
other hand a ¾ profile is viewed then this will be depicted as
such. Familiar faces will have more structural codes depicting
different angles of the face unlike unfamiliar faces where there is
one pictorial representation. Information from the structural
codes is passed on to ‘face recognition units’ for processing.
This information is then compared with facial data stored in
memory (as part of our ‘cognitive system’). Information re
garding ‘person identification’ and ‘name generation’ is
BOX 3.6 BRAIN AND FACIAL PROCESSING

fMRI has provided evidence for facial processing occurring in a
separate area of the brain - the fusiform gyrus located in the
occipitotemporal lobes (Tsao and Livingstone 2008). Jonas,
Jacques, Liu-Shuang, Brissart et al. (2016) found a right hemisphere
dominance for face recognition (see Chapter 8). Interestingly, man’s
best friend, the dog, has been considered by many dog owners to be
good at reading our faces. This may well be the case, but recent
fMRI scans have found no areas in the dog’s brain for encoding
human faces. Instead, dogs have brain specialisation for
conspecific-preference (Bunford, Hernández-Pérez, Farkas, Cuaya
et al. 2020). In other words, they are geared towards identifying
other dogs.
processed further down the chain which ultimately is inter

preted by our cognitive system.
Bruce and Young’s model is actually a little more complex than
that depicted in Figure 3.12. There are, for example, separate
routes for the analysis of facial expression and facial speech analysis.
This suggests that in reality when trying to recognise faces we also
draw upon expression and speech. In addition to recognising ob
jects and faces, we also recognise these in relation to how we
perceive movement, our next topic.
PERCEPTION OF MOTION AND ACTION
James Gibson (1966) introduced the ecological theory of percep

tion which is known also as direct perception. He referred to his
theory as ecological because it explained perception in the real
world. Gibson argued that perception is about ‘picking up’ in
formation from arrays of light belonging to objects we see in our
visual field. As this occurs in a direct way, Gibson believed sen
sation to be more informative than perception. His approach be
longs to the bottom-up genre. He added that objects are directly
perceivable because of their functional properties (or their ‘affor
dances’). For example, a bed ‘affords’ lying down while a steering
Figure 3.12 Face recognition model

Source: Adapted from Bruce and Young (1986)
wheel ‘affords’ turning to direct a car. Hence, these affordances

provide us with opportunities for action.
Our memory system also plays an important role in deci
phering sensory information from the optic arrays picked up by
retinal cells. Similar or repetitive events become stored as
memories. It is these memories which enable us to respond to
future events. Memories of appropriate action to take when a car
heads towards us, for instance, is potentially life-saving. Gibson
argued that we perceive the movement of objects by their
covering and uncovering of parts of the background. This en

ables us to track an object’s trajectory. According to Gibson, the
invariance of this process enables us to perceive motion and
distance. In terms of what prompts us to act appropriately,
Gibson further claimed that object affordances trigger motor
action. This means that when we see a rake, specific areas of the
brain are activated to prepare motor action consistent with raking
a lawn. What happens, however, when we are presented with
‘graspable’ and ‘non-graspable’ objects? Wilf, Holmes, Schwartz
and Makin (2013) looked at the effect of affordance ‘graspability’
on motor action. Participants had to move their arm in a way
that reflected the appropriate ‘reach-like movement’. They found
faster reaction times for ‘graspable’ objects and concluded that
affordance does play a role in motor activation. Given that hu
mans are social beings, the ability to perceive other people’s
movements is an important skill. An interesting study had ob
servers view the movement of lights attached to the joints of a
person dressed in black in the confines of a darkened room
(Johansson 1973). The accuracy of perceived movement was
achieved with only six lights placed on various points on the
body (‘point-lights’). The level of competency in motion de
tection was further explored by Runeson and Frykholm (1983).
In their study people (with the same light placement set-up)
performed actions consistent with how they would naturally do
them versus how they think the opposite gender would. The
correct gender identification occurred at 85 per cent but redu
cing to 75 per cent when deception of gender was used. This
suggests that, not only are we good at detecting human motion,
but we are also able to identify gender based on this motion.
Even new-borns appear to have an innate ability to detect mo
tion relating to living creatures, especially humans (Pinto 2006).
This makes perfect sense given how reliant new-borns and in
fants are on human contact and care. This raises the question of
whether, in addition to the detection of faces, human motion
also receives specialised processing. Evidence suggests that when
provided with limited sensory information (i.e. bottom-up pro
cessing), top-down processing plays an important role in per
ceiving human motion. We might ask is this, therefore, reflected
in the way the brain functions (see Box 3.7)?
BOX 3.7 BRAIN AND HUMAN MOTION DETECTION

Our ability to detect human motion exceeds the success rates for
the detection of other animal movement (Shiffrar and Thomas
2013). There are designated areas of the brain that appear most
active when detecting human motion. Areas such as the superior
temporal sulcus and the inferior frontal gyrus are involved in the
recognition of human actions and the interpretation of the under
lying goals of these actions respectively. There is evidence from
neurocognitive brain imagery that the super temporal sulcus plays a
more important role in detecting human motion than any other type
of non-biological motion (Gilaie-Dotan, Kanai, Bahrami, Rees et al.
2013). So why is biological, especially human, motion special? Some
argue this is because we can both perceive and create motion. There
is some support for this when individuals with damage to parts of
the motor cortex have problems associated with interpreting a
person’s movement. Others argue that with increased experience of
human movement our visual system becomes more sensitised to it.
Again, there is some support for this. Jacobs, Pinto and Shiffrar
(2004) found that practice makes perfect. Participants observed
different walkers who wore dark clothes and had point-lights
attached to their joints. Of the walkers they had previously seen,
their identification rate was higher than it was for non-familiar
walkers. Atkinson, Dittrich, Gemmel and Young (2004) found
evidence to support the view that human motion provides us with
emotional and social data; useful in guiding our responses to
others. They showed how body movements and posture (using
point-lights) provide information regarding the human emotional
state. Actors, whose faces were covered, expressed emotions of fear,
anger, sadness, disgust and happiness using body movement. A
detection rate of 80 per cent for emotions such as fear, sadness and
happiness was explained by exaggerated movement. When we
observe what others do, we can imitate or mirror their actions (to
some extent). Interestingly, this ability arises from sensorimotor
neurons in the brain known as ‘mirror neurons’ (see Chapter 8).
Areas of the brain such as the inferior frontal gyrus and inferior
parietal lobe are associated with mirror neuron activation. These
areas are also involved in the perception of motion and in the
production of actions. It has been suggested that mirror neurons

enable us to understand the intention behind the action, which
improves significantly when the context of the action is also present.
Understanding actions involves a combination of mirror neurons
and cognitive processing in the prefrontal cortex (Lingnau and
Petris 2013).
SUMMARY
Our focus has been on how we attend to and process sensory
information in our environment. Attention is key to how we
perceive the world, in that sensory information is guided by what
we see, hear, smell, taste or touch. The models of attention have
been inspired by Cherry’s Cocktail Party Effect, where we can
tune in to other conversations when we hear our name or hear
something pertinent to us. Most models of attention use the
notion of a bottleneck but differ in where it is located; some have
no bottleneck. When task demands are simple or one action is
automated, we can perform both successfully at the same time.
Hence, we can divide our attention. This is lost once the de
mands of one task requires our full attention, such as approaching
a complicated road junction. In this situation, our ability to have
a conversation is compromised. Attention helps us to process
relevant sensory stimuli and enables these to be processed fully for
interpretation. This bottom-up processing is useful especially
when learning new information for the first time. As our
knowledge-base of events increases, we have a memory store in
which to draw upon; thereby adopting a top-down processing
strategy. When our brain provides meaning to stimuli, this is
known as perception. We understand our environment by sen
sing and perceiving objects and how they interact. Gibson
claimed we understand objects by their ‘affordances’, hence direct
perception. We use monocular and binocular cues to calculate
depth and distance and rely on shape, size and colour constancies
to provide information about objects. Our brain has specialised
areas for processing human faces and motion, which makes sense
given our reliance on human social interaction.
FURTHER READING
Bruce, V. and Tadmor, Y. (2015) Direct perception: Beyond Gibson’s (1950)
direct perception. In M.W. Eysenck and D. Groome (eds) Cognitive
Psychology: Revisiting the classic studies. London: Sage.
Bruce, V. and Young, A. (2012) Face Perception. Hove: Psychology Press.
Wade, N.J. and Swanston, M.T. (2013) Visual Perception: An introduction (3rd
edn). Hove: Psychology Press.
Wu, W. (2014) Attention. Hove: Psychology Press.

• 4
MEMORY AND LEARNING
Throughout our development we are constantly learning new skills

and perfecting the skills we have already acquired. In order to achieve
this, as we have previously seen in Chapter 2, the architecture of the
human brain and its neural connections is structured to enable
learning. In infancy the number of synaptic connections far exceed
the number we have as adults. This excess of synapses becomes
‘pruned’ during infancy as part of a process of maintaining only the
pertinent connections. According to Creutzfeldt (1977) the structure
of our brain is filled with many meaningless, useless and ineffective
synaptic connections. By pruning the synaptic landscape of the brain,
we create a neural system that is stable and effective. So how is this
achieved? It is achieved by interacting with our environment through
learning. Learning enables the developing new-born to engage with
the environment by performing actions – albeit very limited actions
to begin with. These actions will eventually become refined as they
are repeated. Such repetition of actions help reinforce stable synaptic
connections, which themselves become modified as more effective
ways of performing actions are mastered. The acquisition of new
skills through learning, however, relies on an individual’s ability to
remember how they were acquired. This is where the interface be
tween learning and memory is crucial for human development. Cases
of individuals, documented by cognitive neuropsychologists, who
fail to store information in memory (whether in the short or long
term) experience detrimental life consequences. When there are
problems in remembering recently performed actions, individuals
find it difficult to learn new skills or retain new information.
Alternatively, for those who find it difficult to retrieve distant
DOI: 10.4324/9781003014355-4
MEMORY AND LEARNING 85
memories, their ability to perform past skills can be severely com

promised. The interface between learning and memory is a dynamic
one, where remembering a newly acquired skill can be improved as
more skills and new information are assimilated from further learning.
Memory can also be fine-tuned through effective learning strategies.
The more effective the learning strategy, the more information can
be retained effectively in memory.
MEMORY
According to Klahr and MacWhinney (1998) memory is an aspect of
information processing because information flows through a series of
stages. This flow of information is demonstrated using models. These
models are a metaphor for how memory might be structured, and
how the flow of information is directed. There are many models
which have focused on how memory is structured, and the in
formation processed by different structural components. It is Atkinson
and Shiffrin’s 1968 multi-store model, however, that is the most well-
known. We will begin with the multi-store model and then progress
to other models that have been added to this basic structure.
STRUCTURE OF MEMORY
Multi-store model
Atkinson and Shiffrin outlined a model of memory comprising
three basic sequential components: sensory store (SS), short-term
memory (STM) and long-term memory (LTM) (see Figure 4.1).
The sensory store is considered to be modality specific which
means that there is a separate sensory store for both visual and auditory
stimuli. Hence, when visual stimuli are presented, SS will very briefly
hold a representation of the image seen. In the case of auditory stimuli
there is an identical sound-byte. Early researchers such as Sperling
(1960), estimated that visual images, for example, remain in SS for 500
milliseconds. Other cognitive psychologists, however, argue that such
stimuli are held for longer. This is a reasonable assumption when we
consider what we need to do in order to read a passage of prose.
Accomplished readers are able to process individual letters and words
very quickly in order to maintain the continuity of the act of reading
86 MEMORY AND LEARNING
Figure 4.1 The multi-store model of memory

Source: Adapted from Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968)
(see Chapter 6). Moreover, when words are learnt and familiar to us,
we are able to perform even more quickly, often by glimpsing over
the words. Even with prior knowledge of words and their predictive
grammatical order, we still need to hold words in SS long enough for
them to be processed. Information held long enough in SS can be
transferred to STM provided we attend to it. STM has a limited ca
pacity and is not the most efficient way of remembering something. It
is because of this limited capacity that for items in STM to be
maintained, they receive rehearsal. According to Atkinson and
Shiffrin, LTM has unlimited storage capacity and can retain memories
for a lifetime – it therefore makes sense to transfer information to be
retained from STM to LTM (see Box 4.1).
BOX 4.1 THE ROLE OF REHEARSAL IN INFORMATION

TRANSFERENCE
There are two types of rehearsal known as maintenance (or Type I) and
elaborative (or Type II). Maintenance rehearsal is used to keep
information long enough in STM to be acted upon. Maintenance
rehearsal occurs through repeating information over and over again,
such as remembering a new telephone number just long enough to
dial it. If the number is engaged and you need to redial, then this
number has to be looked up once more and repeated yet again. In
other words, the number has not been learned but merely held in STM
long enough for the action of dialling. Another example of this, occurs
when we receive a series of convoluted directions to a holiday cottage.
It is important in this case that these directions are maintained in STM
by rehearsing the information repeatedly out loud or to ourselves. If
this rehearsal process is interrupted, however, it is very likely that only
a few fragments of the directions will be retained. Furthermore, if new
relevant information is introduced to the mix, the previous informa
tion in STM could become redundant and displaced. Research by
Miller (1956) suggested the number of items that can comfortably be
rehearsed simultaneously for maintenance in STM is the ‘magic’ figure
of 7 ± 2. Given the conditions of rehearsal and individual differences
in ability to rehearse items, individuals typically vary between five and
nine. Remembering more numbers can be achieved by what Miller
(1956) referred to as ‘chunking’. Instead of rehearsing each number
individually, numbers can be combined so that in the case of ten
numbers, this can become five numbers (i.e. 56, 90, 21, 13 and 97).
This reduces the capacity needed and the rehearsal required. Earlier,
Ebbinghaus (1879 ̶ 80), considered how information can be trans
ferred from STM to LTM using repetition. He memorised many lists
of three consonant-vowel-consonant nonsense syllables (i.e. ZEQ)
using repetition until he could recall the lists correctly. Interestingly,
mere maintenance repetition led to LTM of these nonsense syllables.
Another phenomenon regarding STM is the serial position curve
(Glanzer and Cunitz 1966; see Figure 4.2). Items at the beginning
(primacy effect) and end (recency effect) are remembered more
effectively than are items in the middle of a sequence. Primacy
numbers receive more rehearsal (transferred to LTM) and recency
numbers remain active in STM during recall.
Figure 4.2 Serial position curve
Source: Adapted from Glanzer and Cunitz (1966)

It is a different situation when we want to remember the
information on a long-term basis. In this case maintenance
rehearsal is replaced by elaborative rehearsal. Here, the information
is rehearsed to a profound level of analysis (such as for meaning).
By using elaborative rehearsal, it is possible to establish a memory
trace that can be stored in LTM (this will be discussed further in
relation to Craik and Lockhart’s ‘levels of processing model’).
Hence, it is in STM that stimuli receive processing either to
maintain the information long enough to achieve its purpose or
to transfer it to LTM.
The retrieval of LTM memories, however, can also be com

promised through interference caused by new similar memory
traces. Such new memory traces can mistakenly be retrieved at
the expense of older ones. This can cause problems concerning
the accuracy of when an event first occurred. For example, in
many cases of sexual abuse victims sometimes confuse the
timeline of when one event occurred over another. This
primarily occurs due to non-distinct memories of many separate

but similar events that have occurred repeatedly. Support for the
multi-store structure comes from research on brain injury. In the
case of some brain injuries, the sufferer loses the ability to retain
long-term memories but is still able to make use of STM. In
other cases, we observe the opposite. Nevertheless, despite em
pirical support for the multi-store model, cognitive psychologists
agree that the structure is over-simplified. Consequently, over
the years there have been modifications to the multi-store model:
first, to STM by introducing the notion of working memory.
The working memory model is complex and consists of many
components. Second, additional components have been in
troduced to the concept of LTM.
Working memory model

The notion of a working memory was introduced by Baddeley and
Hitch in 1974 and consisted of three components: central execu
tive, phonological loop and a visuospatial sketchpad. Working
memory (WM) was generally considered to be a form of STM but
Baddeley and Hitch argued that it is more than this. They provided
examples where WM is involved in the execution of complex tasks –
hence, the label ‘working memory’. WM is also involved in tasks
that are not considered to be strictly memory-oriented tasks. For
example, in the execution of reading, we store many words
comprising a sentence in WM but in order to understand the
context of these words, we draw upon other existing knowledge
(see Chapter 6). Likewise, when solving a complicated numerical
problem, information is held in WM while existing knowledge of
formulae and rules are simultaneously applied. In 2000 Baddeley
added the episodic buffer (see Figure 4.3).
As Figure 4.3 shows, the four components of WM interact not
only with each other but also with LTM. This interaction with
LTM demonstrates how learned and known knowledge is drawn
from LTM storage to help solve the problem at hand. When
reading we draw on both our knowledge of words and grammar
and their physical appearance from LTM via the phonological
loop and visuospatial sketchpad respectively. These two struc
tures allow us to hear what we are reading and identify what it is
Figure 4.3 The structural components of WM

Source: Adapted from Baddeley and Hitch (1974); Baddeley (2000)
we see written on the page. When we read a sentence aloud, it is

the phonological loop that enables us to hold all the words in
active memory until the sentence is completed and its meaning
understood. The same principle applies to the identification of
‘squiggles’ representing the words vocalised. Clearly both the
visuospatial sketchpad and phonological loop play an important
role in reading.
A. CENTRAL EXECUTIVE
The central executive is synonymous with an attentional system.

Despite being involved in all complex cognitive activity, however, it
is not a depository of information. Instead its role is one of organising
and coordinating cognition so that we can achieve our goals. In order
to organise and coordinate effectively, Baddeley (1996) identified
four executive processes undertaken by the central executive:
1 The ability to focus attention or concentrate on specific events

2 The ability to divide our attention between two events
3 The ability to switch attention across tasks
4 The ability to interact with information stored in LTM
Brain scanning studies provide support for the existence of a central

executive. Mottaghy (2006) conducted a review of the studies that
had adopted transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS; see Chapter 1)
as a way of disrupting the function of the prefrontal cortex.
Many iconic executive processes were impaired by this procedure
which led to the conclusion that the prefrontal cortex is a likely lo
cation in the brain for central executive control. What has become
known as dysexecutive syndrome, however, demonstrates that
there are other areas of the brain involved in executive processing
(see Box 4.2).
B. PHONOLOGICAL LOOP
Baddeley and Hitch referred to the phonological loop as being a

‘slave’ system to the central executive. This is due to the control
executed by the central executive which guides our cognition
through the manipulation of the WM components. The pho
nological loop is involved in processing speech-based informa
tion that is cycled in a loop for brief storage (see Figure 4.4).
This can be seen when we try to remember a novel phone
number which we then repeat sub-vocally over and over
again until we no longer need to remember it (see Box 4.1).
There are two components to the phonological loop: a pho
nological store and an articulatory process enabling the rehearsal
of items.
BOX 4.2 WHAT IS DYSEXECUTIVE SYNDROME?

As we have seen, executive processing involves our ability to direct
our attention to relevant and important events in our immediate
environment. In Chapter 3, how attention operates and feeds into
our perception of the world was discussed in relation to the
processing of contents currently active in the brain; the dorsal
and ventral attention networks in the case of visual information for
instance (see Chapter 2). Directing attention and being able to
control this direction is governed by the central executive. Executive
processing, however, is complicated and elicits other cognitive
processes such as memory, thinking (decision-making) and lan
guage. These processes all interact dynamically through the central
executive. A good analogy of how the central executive orchestrates
cognitive processing is how a thermostat regulates the temperature
of a room by switching the heating on and off in response to
feedback fluctuations of above (hot) or below (cold) the set-point
gauge. Just as the thermostat monitors and regulates, so does the
central executive. It constantly monitors and adjusts the direction of
cognitive processing in response to demands. Therefore, when the
central executive fails to perform effectively, the result is a
dysexecutive syndrome (Baddeley 1996). Shimamura (2001) de
scribes dysexecutive syndromes as, “problems controlling their
attention, memory, emotion and actions…Deficits in controlling
mental processes…including those that involve paying attention,
searching for memories, making plans, controlling emotions and
initiating actions” (p. 3911). In 1998, Baldo and Shimamura showed
that patients who had frontal lobe damage found it difficult to direct
their memory searches such as retrieving as many animal names
beginning with the letter ‘A’ as they can. They typically found that
these individuals retrieved only around five and six words within a
minute with many repetitions. Shimamura (2001) describes dysex
ecutive syndrome akin to a library without a librarian. In the same
vein as a thermostat, Stuss (2011) identified the importance of
integrating and coordinating information as an executive process:
“[it includes] recognising the differences between what one knows
[and] what one believes” (p.761). This type of executive function
uses metacognition (see Chapter 7).
Figure 4.4 A representation of the phonological loop
If there are two tasks performed simultaneously that require

access to the same component of working memory such as the
phonological loop, then the success of the tasks will be compro
mised. If, however, one task involved the phonological loop and
the other the visuospatial sketchpad, then both can be performed
without interfering with each other. It is possible to compromise
the performance of the phonological loop whilst listening to a
poem by asking the participant to rapidly repeat a word such as
‘rhubarb’. Performance is compromised because there is articu
latory suppression of the phonological loop. The word ‘rhubarb’
displaces the words of the poem as it cycles the phonological loop.
It therefore becomes very difficult for the participant to keep track
of the poem; in a similar vein to what happens to the unattended
message in dichotic listening tasks (see Chapter 3).
The phonological store component is responsible for speech
perception – in other words understanding what is being said. The
articulatory control process enables what is being rehearsed (in the
phonological loop) to interact with the phonological store. This
makes perfect sense as we need to be able to understand what is
being said to us as it is being said. Moreover, being able to monitor
what is being said helps us to respond verbally to the speaker. The
rehearsal of information in the phonological loop is influenced by
two phenomena: word-length effect and phonological similarity
effect (see Box 4.3).
BOX 4.3 WHAT INFLUENCES REHEARSAL IN THE

PHONOLOGICAL LOOP?
The amount of rehearsal occurring in the phonological loop can be
affected by word-length and how similar the words sound (or phonolo
gical similarity). Baddeley, Thomson and Buchanan (1975) found evidence
that the amount of rehearsal is influenced by the length of the word.
Shorter words can be repeated more easily and more often than longer
words (Baddeley 2012). Furthermore, the immediate recall of words that
are similar in length and rhyme, is reduced in comparison with words that
are phonologically different (Larsen, Baddeley and Andrade 2000).
Schweppe, Grice and Rummer (2011), however, explained this as resulting
from how similar the words sounded (i.e. acoustic similarity) and not the
similarity in how these words are articulated (i.e. the movements involved
in making the word sounds; articulatory similarity).
C. VISUOSPATIAL SKETCHPAD
Just as the phonological loop is a slave to the central executive so is the

visuospatial sketchpad. The visuo-spatial sketchpad stores informa
tion about a visual stimulus such as its shape and colour. This enables
us to visualise images in our mind and to manipulate them. This can
be demonstrated in a game of Tetris where shapes are rotated, in one’s
mind, to fit together to build a solid block. Another example is when
assembling IKEA furniture by following the diagrams; here we have
to imagine the parts being rotated to get them to match. Another
function of the visuospatial sketchpad is its role in helping us navigate
through our surroundings. Logie (1995) outlined two components:
visual cache and inner scribe (see Figure 4.5). It is the visual cache, he
argues, that stores details about the visual stimulus whereas the inner
scribe is concerned with spatial and movement properties. The inner
scribe rehearses information contained in the visual cache which is
then transferred to the central executive.
D. EPISODIC BUFFER
This component was introduced by Baddeley (2000) as a means of

integrating stimuli from the phonological loop and the visuospatial
sketchpad. The episodic buffer not only provides storage for these
Figure 4.5 A representation of the visuospatial sketchpad
stimuli, but, more importantly, holds ‘chunks’ of information about

episodes or events. Baddeley (2012) describes chunks as referring to
entities of integrated information (as many as four) in the episodic
buffer. Moreover, the episodic buffer interfaces with other sources
of information such as perception and that stored in LTM (see
later). This enables us to effectively process and recall long com
plicated sentences. Baddeley and Wilson (2002) claimed that this is
possible because the episodic buffer has the capacity to store such
information. Studies generally suggest this ability to hold extensive
prose is due to the capacity of the episodic buffer (Allen, Hitch,
Mate and Baddeley 2012). The role of the episodic buffer is best
explained by Baddeley 2012: “The episodic buffer [is] an essentially
passive structure on which bindings [integration of information]
achieved elsewhere can be displayed” (p. 17).
The WM model has played an important role in explaining how
we can understand and respond so readily during conversation but
has also explained the workings of executive processing with brain-
damaged individuals. Interestingly, WM capacity has been asso

ciated with intelligence. In particular, fluid intelligence which is
associated with rapid information processing and its temporary
storage. There is evidence showing that individuals with a high-
capacity WM excel in complex tasks unlike their low-capacity
counterparts (Logie 2011).
Atkinson and Shiffrin’s 1968 model has been structurally mod
ified, as we have seen, for STM but there have also been additions
to the structure of LTM.
Long-term memory models

Long-term memory is divided into declarative (explicit) and non-
declarative (implicit) memory. Declarative memories can be con
sciously recollected such as events that have occurred and factual
information. These memories are therefore explicit in that the
learning of them can be recalled. Non-declarative memories are those
acquired without being able to stipulate a timeframe of when or
recollect how. Non-declarative memories are interesting because
they imply that we can learn how to do things without having any
conscious recollection. Hence, it is because we have difficulty de
claring such memories that they are implicit. Declarative and non-
declarative memory are divided further (see Figure 4.6).
It was Tulving (1972) who recognised three different types of
LTM: episodic, semantic and procedural. Episodic memory en
capsulates memories that can be clustered under individually time-
framed events or personal experiences (see Box 4.4).
Hence, the event of having breakfast is more than the re
collection of eating a boiled egg at a specific time; it can include
the Earl Grey tea drunk from a china cup for instance. Going to
the dentist can include not just sitting in the dentist chair but also
in the waiting room. Semantic memory is described as a store of
world knowledge where information is held as a series of facts.
Semantic memory contains factual information that we have
learned over the years which is stored in an organised way. How
factual information is stored and organised can have a significant
influence on the speed of retrieval or the increased probability of
forgetfulness. Our world knowledge stored as facts in semantic
memory is considered to be hierarchical, which is why a cat can
Figure 4.6 A representation of the structure of LTM
be classified as a member of the feline family, as a mammal, an

animal and an organism. Hence, facts can be stored under a
superordinate category such as animal, a basic-level category such
as cat and subordinate category such as Persian blue cat (see
Box 4.5). It depends on what we want to retrieve, but basic-level
categories tend to provide information that helps inform us about
the category and provides some level of distinctiveness. If,
however, we want to know something very specific about the
category in question then looking towards the subordinate level
of detail would be most effective (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson
et al. 1976).
Although episodic and semantic memory are compartmentalised,
the two clearly interact. When having breakfast, we have factual
information at our fingertips, for we understand the concept of
breakfast and what it entails which comes from world knowledge
in semantic memory. At the same time, we remember breakfast as
an event and a personal experience derived from episodic memory.
Does this mean that the two memory systems are not exclusive?
BOX 4.4 EPISODIC MEMORY

Recognition and recall are measures used to test how well we can
form episodic memories. We are generally better at remembering
pictorial information such as old photographs from high-school
yearbooks used as in a study by Bahrick, Bahrick and Wittlinger in
1975. In their study, not only was the recognition of faces and their
names as high as 90 per cent, but the longevity of this lasted almost
50 years. Recognition has been explored using the remember/know
procedure. This is a simple procedure where participants are
presented with a series of items and are later asked to indicate
which are ‘new’ or ‘old’ when shown again. When providing an ‘old’
response, participants can elaborate on this by responding ‘re
member’ or ‘know’. In the case of ‘remember’ participants are
claiming recollection of seeing the item in the previous presenta
tion. When they respond ‘know’ they are claiming not to be aware of
having seen the item previously; hence, they are familiar with the
item from some other source. It has been argued that the difference
between the two responses rests on the fact that stronger traces
equate with recollection and weaker traces with familiarity. The
remember/know procedure has also been used for recall.
Participants respond in the same way; ‘old’ or ‘new’ and for ‘old’
a further division of ‘remember’ or ‘know’. In this case, however,
with each word presented there was a question asked about it such
as ‘is it living or non-living?’ Most of the words recalled were listed
as ‘remember’. For each of these words participants correctly
answered the question asked. This was not the case for words
listed as ‘know’. In the case of recognition and recall, the amount of
contextualised information processed increases for recalled words
listed as ‘remember’.
The short answer is that they are two exclusive memory systems
(see Box 4.6).
Finally, according to Tulving, procedural memory involves the
gradual learning of a skill such as pedalling a bicycle. Such a skill is
acquired over time without awareness of what had been learned
with each successive trial. It is called procedural because the learner
knows how to perform the actions of the skill acquired. Since
BOX 4.5 SEMANTIC MEMORY

We are able to form concepts about our world, often as mental
representations. It has been argued that these representations can
be abstract in that they do not resemble our sensory information
and yet when people are asked to form a representation of any
concept provided, they develop a similar one. For example, in the
concept of ‘loss of freedom’, we might represent this as a man
dressed in a stripy outfit with a chain and ball attached to his ankle.
The concept ‘loss of freedom’ in itself is quite abstract and difficult
to represent directly. Barsalou (2009) argues that the type of
representation activated depends on the current goals of the
individual. This means that a broken leg of a chair is likely to
come to mind if the goal is to be able to sit on the chair. If, however,
the goal is to furnish a newly decorated dining room, then the
colour and style of the chair might be activated instead. If specific
words such as ‘grapefruit’ or ‘half a grapefruit’ are given to
participants, then the properties they mention are different; outer
properties such as the rind for grapefruit versus inner properties like
segments for half a grapefruit. This, Barsalou argues, is due to the
differences of perceptual input that these words evoke. Semantic
memories are not only represented conceptually but can be
encapsulated in structures known as schemes. These schemes
contain an abundance of information about our knowledge of the
world and how it operates. Hence, university students will have a
scheme for how lectures work and what lecturers do. Moreover,
these schemes will contain scripts outlining a sequence of events.
For example, when students arrive in the lecture theatre, they find a
place to sit, listen to the lecturer, make notes and ask questions
once the lecturer has invited them to do so. Schemes and scripts
have been used to explain why eyewitnesses can make errors in their
accounts of a crime. Milne and Bull (2003) considered the
significance of misleading script-consistent and misleading script-
inconsistent suggestive questions put to children who were inter
viewed about a crime. Script-consistent misleading questions
contained information that could feasibly have occurred in the
crime event recalled by the child. For instance, in scripts of sexual
abuse, it is typical for certain behaviours to occur such as getting
the child to perform a sexual act. If the question alludes to such
actions consistent with the expectations of the sex abuse script,

then child witnesses were more likely to agree with the inherent
suggestibility in the question even though it hadn’t occurred.
Alternatively, there was less suggestibility when the question posed
misleading script-inconsistent content. In support of their hypoth
esis, Milne and Bull demonstrated that these children were more
resistant to script-inconsistent misleading questions. Schemes and
scripts can facilitate memory recall of events but equally they can
merge information and the specific details become lost.
Tulving outlined these three facets of LTM, these have been di
vided according to declarative and non-declarative, such that both
procedural and repetition priming are considered as non-
declarative memory. Repetition priming involves the presentation
of a stimulus that has been shown before or as a similar stimulus. A
picture of a house, for example, can have a priming effect on a later
picture of a house such that further processing occurs. Repetition
priming is an important learning mechanism (see later in the
learning section of this chapter).
Thus far our focus has been on the structure of memory which
has been primarily based on experimental research in laboratory
settings. There has, however, been a movement in the last 40 years
towards studying everyday memory. The focus has shifted away
from testing the memory of participants for irrelevant stimuli they
have just learnt to the study of autobiographical memories.
EVERYDAY MEMORY
According to Neisser (1996), “Remembering is a form of purpo
seful action” (p. 204). This implies that when we remember in
formation we do so for good reason. We need to be motivated and
for the information to fit in with our personal goals. Other factors
such as the situations we encounter can influence how motivated
we are to engage with information. For example, when giving a
PowerPoint presentation to potential business partners, knowing
the information and being able to respond to questions will help to
‘seal the deal’. This everyday recalling of information is a far cry
BOX 4.6 AMNESIA SPLITS EPISODIC AND SEMANTIC

MEMORY
Findings from individuals with different types of amnesia have
demonstrated that episodic and semantic memories are separate,
despite there being a relationship between them. There are two ways
of considering amnesia: anterograde (after the onset of amnesia)
and retrograde (before the onset of amnesia). In the case of
anterograde amnesia, a study of 147 individuals with amnesia
caused by damage to the hippocampus exhibited impairment in
the formation of new episodic memories while new semantic
memories were formed (Spiers, Maguire and Burgess 2001).
Bindschaedler, Peter-Favre, Maeder, Hirsbrunner et al. (2011)
described deficits to episodic memory but preserved semantic
memory in a boy with severe hippocampal damage. In the case of
retrograde amnesia, Tulving (2002) found that episodic memories
are impaired but semantic ones preserved. More distant episodic
memories, however, are remembered more clearly than those
closest to the onset of amnesia. Consolidation theory explains
this through the extensive processing of older episodic memories
received which are then stored away from the hippocampus.
Another explanation is that older episodic memories evolve into
semantic memories. And finally, some researchers advocate that
episodic memories are learnt on one occasion unlike their semantic
counterparts.
from the laboratory-based memory research requiring the im

mediate recall of numbers and words. This is why researchers such
as Neisser and Hyman (1982), advocated an ecologically valid way
of understanding memory; that is to study memory in as natural a
format as possible. If the experiment is conducted in a naturalistic
way such that the tasks and stimuli used reflect what we remember
on a daily basis, then the findings can be generalised to the wider
population. Based on an ecologically valid approach to under
standing memory, it makes perfect sense to study autobiographical
memory – our own personal memories comprising our own life
story.
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
Parallels between autobiographical and episodic memory are

often drawn, and indeed our personal autobiographical mem
ories do tend to have timeframes attached to when specific
events occurred. Moreover, in order to make sense of ex
periences, autobiographical memory needs to interface with
semantic memory. Neural network activation (see Chapter 2)
engages the frontal, temporal and parietal lobes of the brain
which operate together in the retrieval of information that
overlaps with autobiographical, episodic and semantic memory
(Burianova, McIntosh and Grady 2010). In order to understand
the way autobiographical memory might be structured and
how our life story can be encapsulated in the memories
we form, Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) developed the
self-memory system model (see Box 4.7). This model provides
a good account of the organisation and timeline of our life
story.
Flashbulb memories
Some autobiographical memories are recalled in great clarity and
are immortalised in a set timeframe. These have been labelled as
flashbulb memories (Brown and Kulik 1977). One method of as
sessing flashbulb memories, is to ask participants what they were
doing (and to embellish this further) when ‘9/11 occurred’ or
‘George Floyd lay on the ground’ or ‘the announcement of the
Covid-19 pandemic’. Brown and Kulik argued that surprising
events trigger a robust imprint on the memory system that often
contain information about the source, location, event details,
emotional state of self/others at the time and the impact made.
Given the clarity and richness of detail retrieved, such flashbulb
memories are not always accurate (Pezdek 2003). Accuracy,
however, can be assumed if the content of the flashbulb memory is
consistent across time. Unfortunately, researchers have found that
the level of consistency is no different from other autobiographical
memories (Talarico and Rubin 2003, 2019) and there is no clear
division between flashbulb and other autobiographical memories
(Brewin 2014).
Lifetime memories
An interesting aspect of autobiographical memory is how difficult
we find it to remember events during our first two to three years of
life. This is often labelled as ‘childhood amnesia’ (see Figure 4.8).
Why can’t we remember events during this age? One theory is that
in the early years of life, infants have no self-concept: as demon
strated by the ‘rouge on the nose test’. Infants of different age
BOX 4.7 STRUCTURE OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL

MEMORIES
There are two main components of the self-memory system model
(Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 2000): an autobiographical memory
knowledge base and a working self. The autobiographical memory
knowledge base contains three levels of personal information:
1 Lifetime periods – these are periods in a person’s life which are

demarcated by major situations (e.g. length of time living at
home with the parents)
2 General events – these can be frequent or single events (e.g.
attending classes or meeting the Queen respectively)
3 Event specific knowledge – this can pertain to pictorial,
emotional or semantic information about general events over
a lifetime that are temporally (time-based) sequenced
The working self can be concerned with past, present and future
selves. Different autobiographical memories will be activated
depending on previous, current or future goals and plans and, as
such, act as a record of one’s life. Therefore, retrieved autobiogra
phical memories can be positive (focusing on successes) or
negative (focusing on failures). In Figure 4.7 we can see how the
autobiographical memories retrieved are organised, such that there
is a theme (i.e. work), a lifetime period (i.e. working for the police),
general events (i.e. events relating to working for the police) and
event specific knowledge (i.e. specific events relating to events
occurring while working for the police).
A person’s
life story
A component of the conceptual self
The work
theme example
Work location:
police station
Chief Training
Constable Promotion events
Catalogue of episodic memories
Specific
Specific event
event
Specific
Specific event
event
Specific Specific Specific
event event event
Specific
event
Specific
event
Figure 4.7 The self-memory system model

Source: Adapted from Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000)
groups are placed in front of a mirror and a dab of rouge is placed

on their nose. When there is no understanding that the image in
the mirror is theirs and that they have rouge on their nose, it is
concluded they have yet to develop a self-concept. Once self-
concept is attained, however, infants laugh at their reflection and
Figure 4.8 Curve of autobiographical memories in early childhood

Source: Adapted from data by Rubin and Schulkind (1997)
try to touch their nose to remove the rouge (Lewis and Brooks-
Gunn 1979). Hence, if there is no understanding of the self, then
events surrounding the infant will have little personal significance
and are unlikely to be remembered (Jack and Hayne 2010).
Furthermore, Jack and Hayne describe the development of aspects
of cognition, such as self-recognition and language, as precursors to
the formation of autobiographical memories. Ma, Li, Li and Zhou
(2020) added to this by describing how young children’s immature
episodic memory will compromise their ability to output mem
ories. In a similar vein, Alberini and Travaglia (2017) conclude that
an infant’s brain is still developing such that newly experienced
events fail to become consolidated into LTM.
When retrieving autobiographical memories throughout the
lifespan, differences in how many are retrieved at different ages
have been referred to as a reminiscence bump. In terms of the
reminiscence bump, the largest number of memories recalled is
found to be from the age cross-section of 10 ̶ 30 years. This re
miniscence bump is a cross-cultural phenomenon (Conway, Wang,
Hanyu and Haque 2005) and has been explained by the existence
of a ‘life script’. According to Rubin and Berntsen (2003) a life
script provides individuals with a guide to what events we should
expect throughout our lifetime. These events include typical
occurrences in our lives such as having an education, finding

employment and a partner, settling down and having children and
death of loved ones. These life scripts, they argue, organise our
autobiographical memories according to time snapshots, and most
of these life script events occur between 15 and 30 years. Adults
over 40 years tend to recall more autobiographical memories oc
curring from the years 15 ̶ 30 which might be a causal effect of the
proportion of memories arising from this time-period (Koppel and
Rubin 2016). Given the nature of older memories being rehearsed
or thought about over the years, it is not surprising that older
people are very good at reminiscing! But can such memories be
subjected to biases from life scripting and to alterations to the
original memory? How reliable our autobiographical memories are
is an important question when the legal system relies on eyewitness
memories to solve criminal cases.
Eyewitness memories
Eyewitness memories have come under intense scrutiny. Given
that eyewitness accounts are often used to provide police with
information about the ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘who’ of a crime, the
level of accuracy is paramount in order to ensure the real perpe
trator is apprehended. Eyewitnesses provide testimonials of what
they have witnessed; often by providing descriptions of the event,
answering police enquiries and identifying the potential suspect.
Many studies have demonstrated that there are potential errors at
each stage of this process. A real-life example of the murder of
Sweden’s Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh, serves well to illustrate
this. Witnesses to this provided information to the police within a
month of the attack. Granhag, Ask, Rebelius, Ohman et al. (2013)
compared the eyewitness testimonies with footage of the culprit on
CCTV and found their descriptions to be flawed, in fact 42 per
cent of what they reported was error-ridden.
The repercussions of a jury believing the evidence provided by a
single eyewitness can be problematic if there is no other physical
corroboratory evidence. Jurors do, however, place much con
fidence in the accuracy of an eyewitness. As many as 37 per cent of
people in the US are of the view that the evidence provided by a
confident eyewitness is enough to base a conviction on (Simons
and Chabris 2011). Furthermore, even eyewitnesses can be duped

by their own confirmation bias; in other words, they have scripts
about what to expect in specific events. In the case of a bank
robbery script, there are expectations of one or two men wearing
balaclavas, holding guns and a money sack. Bartlett (1932), argu
ably one of the first researchers to study everyday memory, ad
dressed this problem when he illustrated how schemas can
adulterate our records of events by reconstructing the original
memory trace. This problem can be exacerbated by what happens
after the witnessed event; how police questions are framed post-
event and how eyewitnesses identify potential suspects (see
Box 4.8).
Another area of everyday memory that influences how we or
ganise our daily activities is prospective memory. It is different
from other types of memory discussed thus far in that it concerns
future, and not past, events (i.e. retrospective). Graf (2012) de
scribed prospective memory as, “the cognitive function we use for
formulating plans and promises, for retaining them, and for re
collecting them subsequently either at the right time or on the
occurrence of appropriate cues” (pp. 7 ̶ 8).
PROSPECTIVE MEMORY
Zogg, Woods, Sauceda, Wiebe et al. (2012) reviewed the literature

concerning the formation and execution of intentions in pro
spective memory and concluded that there are a number of stages
(see Figure 4.9).
During the formation of an intention, we often attach a cue that
will enable us to remember what it is we want to do. For example,
we might want to send an email to a friend and so we set up a cue
to trigger the action. An obvious cue to help us remember to send
the email would be when we sit at our desk in front of the
computer to open our email server. Once the cue is detected, then
the intention to send an email is retrieved. There might be com
peting intentions such as having to send work-related emails which
is why we may have to refer to long-term memories; hence,
prospective and retrospective memories often interact with one
another. Finally, once the intention to email a friend is triggered
and the opportunity to do so is present, then sending the email is
BOX 4.8 HOW GOOD ARE WE AS EYEWITNESSES?

Elizabeth Loftus was the prime instigator of a method for studying
the impact post-event information has on the original memory trace
of an event. She, and her colleagues, demonstrated through a series
of experiments the fragility of eyewitness memories. The original
memories could be distorted by misleading information often
presented accidentally through police questioning. Misleading
information was found to interact with the original memory trace
such that details originally absent became present. Misleading
information can occur through seemingly innocent questions such
as, ‘did the man you saw have a dark beard?’ or ‘did you see a large
knife?’ This phenomenon was labelled the misinformation effect
and continues to be studied even after 46 years since the study by
Loftus and Palmer (1974) was conducted. The misinformation effect
is alive and kicking although it is possible to reduce the size of effect
by instructing eyewitnesses to be wary of misleading information.
Changes to how police conduct interviews of eyewitnesses was
initially driven by Fisher, Geiselman, Holland and MacKinnon
(1984) and Fisher and Geiselman (1992) with the introduction of
the cognitive interview. This interview technique highlights all the
flaws of the standard police interview. This is because the cognitive
interview contains a series of phases (that investigators should
follow) based on sound memory research which has proven to be
the most effective way of attaining unadulterated information from
eyewitnesses. The cognitive interview has been improved over the
years through the addition of memory enhancing techniques
derived from sound memory research (Milne and Bull 2003;
Paulo, Albuquerque, Vitorino and Bull 2017). Inappropriately
phrased questions (Milne and Bull 1999) and suggestive tactics
which have caused eyewitnesses to be swayed by misleading
information (Bull 2019), can clearly interfere with the original
memory trace of the event.
Although the misinformation effect is an important factor in how
well memories are retrieved, there are other reasons for the
ineffective retrieval of memories such as levels of intoxication,
how long after the event the witness recalls information and what
questions are actually asked (Jores, Colloff, Kloft, Smailes et al.
2019). Are we any good at identifying perpetrators? Our memory for

faces far exceeds our ability to recall names and other forms of
verbal information. And for the most part our performance at
recognising faces is reasonably high at 90 per cent. Laboratory
based research, however, puts face recognition at 70 per cent when
there are changes of pose (Bruce 1982) and context (Watkins, Ho
and Tulving 1976). We tend to be confident when recognising faces
(Brewer and Wells 2011) as was borne out by a correlation of +0.38
between accuracy and confidence (Odinot, Wolters and van Koppen
2009). Police use line-ups for eyewitnesses to identify a potential
suspect from five or so other individuals who may resemble the
suspect in terms of height and weight. By considering the data from
314 real life line-ups, Valentine, Pickering and Darling (2003) found
that of 640 eyewitnesses, only 40 per cent identified the suspect.
While 20 per cent got it wrong, as many as 40 per cent were unable
to make a decision. Horry, Halford, Brewer, Milne and Bull (2013)
conducted a meta-study of 833 real life line-ups with 709 eye
witnesses based in England. Crimes of a different nature such as
robbery and rape were considered. The overall identification rate
from line-ups was 46 per cent, with the selection of an innocent
person at 18 per cent and non-selection at 36 per cent. These rates
are comparable with Valetine et al.’s findings. Line-ups are now
largely conducted by showing eyewitnesses footage of a series of
faces including the suspect (resembling a line-up). In line with this
approach, Taylor, Workman and Hall (2018) showed participants
black and white CCTV style footage of a shoplifter followed by a face
recognition test. The faces were shown one at a time, which, once
all viewed, were repeated as is the norm (this is known as a
sequential line-up). They also included a ‘lookalike’ face which was
shown before or after the suspect’s face (including its repetition).
Their findings showed that the identification rate was higher when
the lookalike appeared before the suspect, whereas the misidenti
fication rate was higher when the lookalike appeared after the
suspect (hence, later in the sequence). There are problems, albeit of
a different nature, with line-ups presented live or using footage.
Figure 4.9 Stages of prospective memory formation

Source: Adapted from Zogg, Woods, Sauceda, Wiebe et al. (2012)
executed. Prospective memory can be time-based and/or event-

based. For example, a time-based intention might entail the action
of being at the airport at a specific time to catch a flight. In the case
of an event-based intention, teaching a ballroom formation dance
troupe a new step might be triggered when the next rehearsal
session is due. Event-based intentions are more likely to be suc
cessfully executed than are time-based ones (Cona, Arcara,
Tarantino and Bisiacchi 2012). The reasons for this are because
event-based actions:
● are easier when externally triggered

● are less demanding
● receive more processing activity
Prospective memory plays an important role in our daily activity

and even more so in specific types of occupations (e.g. train
drivers, pilots, traffic controllers, those who monitor under
ground tube systems). In such jobs monitoring controls through
focused attention (see Chapter 3) and remembering to execute
intended actions is paramount in insuring the safety of passengers
on board. An influential explanation of how prospective memory
operates is the multi-process theory developed by Einstein and
McDaniel in 2005. In the multi-process theory, ongoing tasks are
separated according to the amount of focused attention received.
They argue that cues play an important role in tasks that do not
receive focused attention. Scullin, McDaniel and Shelton, how
ever, expanded this theory in 2013, by invoking the use of top-
down and bottom-up processing (see Chapter 3) to explain why
some prospective memories require monitoring while others are
retrieved automatically. They argue that top-down attention
actively searches for cues when intentions are being monitored;
in other words, performing tasks where a cue is expected. When
a cue has already been triggered, however, bottom-up processing
takes over; this induces automatic retrieval to enact the intention.
An example of these processes working in tandem is when you
are out of the work context, like shopping for clothes, then the
need to monitor a cue, such as the boss, is irrelevant. Top-down
processing involved with searching for the boss under these
circumstances would be a redundant activity. But, once at work,
by passing a series of offices, the intention to speak to the boss is

enacted and searching for the boss then becomes an active pursuit
– hence, top-down processing occurs.
How accurately our intentions are communicated has become an
area of interest especially in the light of terrorist security breaches at
airports. In 1981, Johnson and Raye outlined the involvement of
reality monitoring in the verbal communication of our experi
ences. This means that our memories are constructed in an orga
nised way by separating the details of events and sub-events and so
on based on how we perceived them. When we are asked to de
scribe an experience, we use a reality monitoring approach to ac
cess the details accordingly. Johnson and Raye argued that the
differentiation between truthful and fabricated accounts of our
experiences is down to how memories have been constructed. For
instance, in the case of a genuine account of a holiday in Spain,
reality monitoring is used to extract the perceptual details. For
fabricated accounts, however, there is no perceptual experience to
draw upon, and instead these are built using cognitive routes such
as making up a story. This line of capturing deception has proven
fruitful (see Box 4.9).
All forms of memory require information to be processed so that
it can be remembered. The creation of memories occurs when
information is encoded and stored. But in order to encode and then
store information we need to acquire it. This acquisition of in
formation is what we call learning. Memory and learning, as
mentioned in the introduction, are closely entwined. In fact, di
viding cognitive processes into memory and learning can be
thought of as an arbitrary distinction.
LEARNING
When we think about learning we often envisage various mne
monic techniques that help us to remember facts. Mnemonics will
be explored later. First, however, we will consider Craik and
Lockhart’s (1972) levels of processing approach. According to
Wheeler (2020) the levels of processing approach is a good example
of a learning theory, which is why we will begin with their work.
BOX 4.9 LYING INTENTIONS AS A SOURCE OF

CAPTURING DANGEROUS INDIVIDUALS
In the fight against terrorism, prospective memory offers investiga
tors another avenue for detecting deception. Instead of a retro
spective approach (e.g. asking questions about an event that has
already occurred), suspected individuals can be asked questions
tapping into their intentions for travelling to or entering from
another country. Prospective memory research has shown that the
use of sensory information (in particular auditory and visual) and
temporal details (such as the order of when events occurred) helps
to establish a truthful from a fabricated account (Masip, Sporer,
Garrido and Herrero 2005). The empirical evidence for this success
comes from the accuracy rates obtained in separating fabricated
from genuine accounts; above chance level between 63 ̶ 82 per cent
(Vrij, Blank and Fisher 2018). Vrij, Granhag, Mann and Leal (2011)
asked passengers at international airports to either give a genuine
account about their forthcoming journey or to lie about it. They
found that the liars added an abundance of less plausible details
about their journey which were also littered with contradictions.
Despite a similar amount of details provided by liars and truth-
tellers, the latter gave a plausible and stable account. Kleinberg, van
der Toolen, Vrij, Arntz et al. (2018) conducted an online study where
participants provided either truthful or fabricated statements about
their intentions for the coming weekend. They found that those lying
included many more references to location and people than those
who were telling the truth about what they intended to do over the
weekend. Kleinberg et al. concluded that such over detailing can be
used as a signal of false accounts. This, they argued, suggests that
liars are more likely to over prepare their statement by flourishing it
with names of people and places to sound convincing and therefore
believable. Liars do this as they are not sure “what a truthful
statement about an intended action might look like so that they
include unrealistically many specific pieces of information out of
precaution to sound believable” (Kleinberg et al. 2018, p. 10). It
might be possible, in the future, to ask people passing through
security gates at airports questions about their travel intentions. In
the future, the instalment of ‘names entity recognition’ (NER)
detectors, could be used to analyse the language content in the
responses to questions about travel intentions. And based on the

findings from prospective memory research, those with dangerous
deceptive intentions might be captured.
LEVELS OF PROCESSING APPROACH
Craik and Lockhart believed that the longevity of information and its
transference to LTM depended on how effectively it was processed
during learning. During learning, new information is processed
further and is eventually encoded. Encoding information is a way of
converting it into a construct that can be stored as a memory. The
process of encoding involves electrochemical changes in the neurons
of the brain such that novel events and sensations we experience
become stored as new memories. In other words, the brain can be
rewired to accommodate these new memories. For Craik and
Lockhart, it is what we do with incoming information that de
termines how well it is encoded and remembered. They claimed that
information can be encoded in different ways. Information can be
encoded very superficially such as looking for graphemic features of a
written text (is it lower or upper case?). In the case of pictorial in
formation such as a human face, superficial processing (or shallow
processing) might mean a simple decision of whether the face is fe
male or male. This shallow processing is not the most effective way of
remembering text or faces and unsurprisingly often leads to forget
ting. Information processed in this way is less likely to lead to effective
encoding and the formation of a memory trace in LTM. The in
termediate phonetic level, however, is concerned with how words
sound. In many studies, participants are asked to decide whether a
series of words rhyme with the target word. This task involves
phonetic processing unlike the shallow graphemic level, and, ac
cording to Craik and Lockhart, accounts for the higher level of re
called words and reduced forgetting. In the case of pictorial stimuli
such as faces, participants are instructed to decide which facial feature
is the most distinctive. This leads to increased recognition perfor
mance over shallow decisions of the sex of the face shown. Deep
semantic levels of processing encourage participants to analyse the
information in a meaningful way. This induces elaborative rehearsal
that leads to robust encoding of information. Words are compared to
other words for their conceptual relatedness, for example, while faces
are analysed for their emotional content to inform decisions about the
person’s personality. Studies where the levels of processing approach
was adopted use three different ‘orienting tasks’; one for each level
(see Box 4.10).
As pointed out in Box 4.10, learning can be incidental or im
plicit. A quote provided by Cleeremans and Jiménez (2002) defines
what is meant by implicit learning:
… the process through which we become sensitive to certain

regularities in the environment (1) in the absence of intention to
learn about these regularities, (2) in the absence of awareness that
one is learning, and (3) in such a way that the resulting knowledge is
difficult to express.
Cleeremans and Jiménez (2002), p. 20.
IMPLICIT LEARNING
Implicit learning is impervious to differences in age (Simon,

Vaidya, Howard and Howard 2012) and IQ (Janacsek and Nemeth
2013). In other words, the course of implicit learning occurs re
gardless of whether an old or young person has an IQ of 100 or
135. Implicit learning occurs even if an individual has memory
problems such amnesia due to the robustness of systems involved.
Brooks and Baddeley (1976) demonstrated deficits in explicit
verbal learning in amnesic patients but implicit learning in the
solution of specific motor tasks (i.e. the rotary pursuit task). Graf
and Schacter (1985) found performance on an implicit word
completion task showed similar learning across controls and am
nesic patients. Implicit learning in this case occurs as missing letters
in words are slowly completed as they are presented more than
once – this is known as priming. Amnesic patients could complete
the words even though they could not remember previously seeing
the uncompleted words and being tested (Graf and Schacter 1985).
Furthermore, these systems show less individual variability than
those systems supporting explicit learning. A technique commonly
used to separate implicit from explicit learning is known as the
process-dissociation procedure first introduced by Jacoby (1991).
BOX 4.10 IT’S NOT WHAT YOU DO BUT THE WAY

THAT YOU DO IT
A multitude of studies have adopted the levels of processing
approach using verbal and pictorial material. These studies are
designed such that they normally contain three types of orienting
task, each used as a way of distracting the participant from the true
nature of the experiment (to recall verbal stimuli such as words or
sentences or to recognise pictorial stimuli such as objects or
unfamiliar faces). This means that participants are instructed to
perform the orienting task but are not informed there will be a
memory test at the end. In this case, recall or recognition
performance during the test are considered to be examples of
incidental learning. In other words, learning takes place without
awareness (also referred to as implicit learning). A typical design
used to test the effectiveness of levels of processing on memory
performance for word recall is as follows:
● Intentional versus incidental learning

● Intentional: participants are instructed to learn the words
in preparation for a memory test
● Incidental: participants perform one of three orienting
tasks and are not informed of a memory test
● Orienting tasks
● Shallow graphemic: participants are instructed to identify
whether words are written in upper case or lower case
● Intermediate phonetic: participants are instructed to iden
tify words which rhyme with the target word
● Deep semantic: participants are instructed to identify
words for their conceptual relatedness
● Test phase
● All participants are instructed to recall as many of the

words as possible
There have been many studies using this basic design, some
comparing all three orienting tasks and others concentrating on
only two. Hyde and Jenkins (1973) explored intentional versus

incidental learning for 24-word lists. They compared deep semantic
with shallow graphemic processing and found a deeper processing
advantage under both intentional and incidental learning condi
tions. They demonstrated that the intentionality of learning was not
the important factor but rather the orienting task used. Findings
such as these have been replicated many times using verbal or
pictorial material (Beales and Parkin 1984; Hager 1985). The levels
of processing approach has not been without its critics, so much so
that Craik and Tulving (1975) made revisions by firstly changing the
name to ‘elaborate processing’. Another important change was the
realisation that even shallow levels of processing involve a degree of
simultaneous semantic processing. This minimal core encoding is
what enables meaning to be added to words during shallow
orienting tasks. Craik and Tulving used the term elaborate proces
sing to mean that the input is related to what is already known
about it. Hence, deeper semantic processing involves elaboration
which, in turn, increases the retrieval routes, providing easier access
to the information. This means the way information is encoded is
what facilitates retrieval and the robustness of memory traces in
long-term storage.
In his ‘false fame’ experiment, participants were shown a list of

names during the first session. In the second session participants
were divided into two groups. For one of the groups, they were
informed that none of the names belonged to famous people.
Therefore, in the second session they were to respond ‘no’ to the
question of fame (this is the exclusion task). In the other group,
participants were told that the names belonged to obscure famous
people and when asked if they were famous names during the
second session they were to respond ‘yes’ if they remembered the
name from the first session and/or knew them to be famous (this is
the inclusion task). According to Jacoby, saying ‘yes’ in the ex
clusion condition is likely to be a result of the name being re
membered unconsciously (implicit learning). Responding ‘yes’ in
the inclusion condition is a consequence, he argued, of the name
being remembered either consciously (explicit learning) or
unconsciously. The latter implies an interaction between the two

systems. Implicit learning has been studied in relation to how ty
pists learn to navigate the keyboard – do they explicitly or im
plicitly learn the positions of the keys? (see Box 4.11).
When we intentionally learn information, it is important that we
leave time to consolidate what we have learnt. Sometimes we even
say, ‘think about it’ or ‘sleep on it’. This alludes to an element of
mulling over information which can help with the consolidation
process. Consolidation is not a new concept. Hintzman (1974)
considered consolidation as an explanation for the deficient pro
cessing of the same stimulus when presented immediately after it is
first shown. He argued that when the same stimulus is presented in
quick succession, there is a time period necessary for the cognitive
processes of consolidation to occur. This means that during the
second presentation, processing of the first has not yet finished.
The moral here is that, when learning a passage from Shakespeare,
having a rest from it by reading a different passage might serve as a
better learning strategy than to continuously read the same passage.
More about this learning technique will be considered in the
section on repetition priming, aka the ‘spacing effect’.
BOX 4.11 TYPING IMPLICITLY OR EXPLICITLY?

Interestingly, you would think that typists with an average experi
ence of 11.4 years could easily write the letters correctly on a blank
keyboard. Snyder, Ashitaka, Shimada, Ulrich et al. (2014) found,
however, the level of accuracy to be poor as only 57.3 per cent
(translating to 14.9 letters) were correctly located. And yet they must
know where the letters are or else their typing would be littered with
errors. Snyder et al. substituted the ‘QWERTY’ keyboard layout for
the ‘Dvorak’ one and asked typists to practise using this keyboard
for two hours. Once practice was completed, participants were
asked to write the letters correctly on a blank keyboard. Accuracy
was at the same level as for the QWERTY keyboard for which they
had many years of experience. Snyder et al.’s findings show the
importance of implicit learning and how quickly typists can retrieve
letter placement on the keyboard without explicit learning and
awareness.
CONSOLIDATION
Consolidation can be likened to a backup disk in our hard-drive that

we use to store documents. Using this analogy, consolidation is a
physiological process that puts related information together and
transfers it to LTM. Consolidation theory can account for why we
forget information – we simply fail to allow recently learnt in
formation to be consolidated (see Box 4.12). Wixted (2004) claimed
that newly acquired memories are still being consolidated which is
why they are vulnerable to being forgotten; the forgetting curve for
newly learnt information supports this contention (see Figure 4.10).
Earlier, procedural memory was introduced as a type of long-term
memory that is non-declarative (no conscious recollection required).
Repetition priming, where a stimulus is repeated, is a very effective
way of learning material without conscious awareness.
REPETITION PRIMING
There are two forms of repetition priming: perceptual and con

ceptual. In the case of perceptual priming, the repetition of a stimulus
increases the probability of its perceptual characteristics being re
cognised; contained in pictures or faces. Conceptual priming, alter
natively, facilitates the recall of information such as meaning usually
contained in stimuli of a verbal nature. Learning without awareness
has support from numerous studies of amnesic patients whose
memory performance improved under conceptual and perceptual
priming (Levy, Stark and Squire 2004). Interestingly, learning can be
enhanced depending on how repetition priming is ordered (see
Box 4.13).
The use of mnemonics was briefly touched upon at the begin
ning of this section. Mnemonics has certainly been successful as a
memory aid to learning information.
MNEMONICS
Mnemonics are defined as encoding strategies that facilitate the

organisation and chunking of novel information. By doing this the
to-be-learned information becomes easier to remember as its
meaningfulness increases. Bellezza (1996) argued this is due to the
BOX 4.12 DO WE FORGET BECAUSE WE ARE POOR AT

LEARNING?
We have seen how easily items in STM can be forgotten, especially if
information is not effectively rehearsed so that it can be transferred
to LTM. Under these circumstances, information can be lost.
Maintenance rehearsal helps in the retention of information in
STM long enough for us to take appropriate action, such as dialling
an unfamiliar number. Information, however, is lost because it
hasn’t received sufficient processing for the formation of a memory
trace. In other words, the information has not been consolidated.
This concept can equally apply to long-term memories. We can ask
the question, why do we forget information that has been stored in
LTM? Is it a case of sufficient consolidation for information to be
transferred to LTM but not enough to be effectively consolidated in
an existing network of memories? Understanding forgetting from
LTM was first explored by Ebbinghaus in 1885. He is renowned for
learning lists of nonsense syllables, known as consonant-vowel-
consonant (CVC) trigrams. After learning these lists, he relearned
them again between 21 minutes and 31 days later. He recorded the
extent of forgetting using a measure he introduced called ‘savings’.
As Figure 4.10 demonstrates, the savings method enabled
Ebbinghaus to ascertain the extent of forgetting by recording how
many lists of CVC trigrams he could recall. By relearning the lists
and recording the number recalled, the impact of savings was
calculated. Ebbinghaus concluded that forgetting newly learnt
material occurred very quickly after one hour but slowed gradually
with relearning. Relearning the lists allowed him to reconsolidate
the information. There have been various explanations of why we
forget information from LTM. An early theory was that of decay. This
claims that memories fade over time. Despite some biological
support for this, many argue that other factors are operating to
cause the loss of these memories. It could be that memory traces
decay over time when they are no longer retrieved. Hence, they need
ongoing consolidation; supporting the adage of ‘use it or you lose
it’. Interference was another theory put forward. Interference could
be proactive (previously learnt information disrupts the consolida
tion of new information) or retroactive (newly learnt information
disrupts the retrieval of old information). Hence, old information
interferes with the new and new information interferes with the old
respectively. In 2018, Sosic-Vasic, Hille, Kröner, Spitzer et al.
investigated how learning can disturb memory. They asked partici
pants to learn lists of German ̶ Japanese paired words. Participants
had to recall the Japanese word when its paired German word was
presented as a cue. When, however, new lists of German ̶ Japanese
paired-words were learnt, recall of the first lists was down by 20 per
cent. Hence, retroactive interference damaged the consolidation of
previously learnt word-pairings. Tulving (1979) introduced the
encoding specificity principle as an explanation of cue-dependent
forgetting. If information encapsulated in the memory trace mis
matches information available during retrieval, it becomes difficult
to recall the required information. Memory traces contain other
encoded information such as the context in which information was
learnt. Godden and Baddeley (1975) demonstrated this when divers
learnt information underwater but had to retrieve it on land. Divers
best recalled information when underwater; hence, the context
served as a cue for retrieval. This implies that other information is
covertly consolidated during learning. It is possible that if informa
tion is not effectively consolidated during learning, then other
information, such as the context, can be forgotten. Memory traces,
however, might be triggered when appropriate cues are reinstated.
intention to learn and the extent of effortful processing used. The

information becomes embellished with knowledge encapsulated in
existing schemas; in other words, the encoding and retrieval is
enhanced through elaboration (Balch 2005). Furthermore, in line
with Paivio’s (1986) dual-coding theory, the use of mnemonics
helps create two or more information codes that increase avenues
of retrieval. This means that information codes could be for ex
ample, visual or verbal. McDaniel and Einstein (1986) claimed that
by mentally visualising interacting bizarre images, the memorability
of information can be increased. Bizarre interacting imagery can be
used to improve learning words from another language such as a
horse kicking an eye. Spanish for horse is ‘caballo’ and the pro
nunciation of the second segment overlaps with the English sound
for ‘eye’.
Figure 4.10 Forgetting curve for information learnt

Source: Adapted from Ebbinghaus (1885)
Mnemonics such as acronyms have been used to aid in the

learning of reading music. The lines for the treble clef, for example,
can be learned by the saying, ‘every good boy deserves fruit’
(EGBDF). The saying, ‘King Phillip came over for good soup’, can
be used to remember the order of taxonomic categories in biology:
kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus and species. Keyword
mnemonics are found to be useful in remembering difficult words
such as harpaxophobia which refers to a fear of robbers. Carney and
BOX 4.13 THE SPACING EFFECT

Both recall and recognition of verbal and visual stimuli can be
facilitated by their repetition. Repetition priming can be of a
‘massed’ or ‘distributed’ format. When items are presented in the
massed format, the first and second presentation occur in quick
succession. In the distributed format the second presentation of an
item occurs at some point later in a sequence of other items. For
example,
A, B, A, C, B or A, B, C, D, E, F, G, A, H, C
When there is one item between the first and second presentation a
‘lag1’ effect occurs. This increases item memorability from a massed
format (e.g. A, A, B, B, C, C). The greater the number of interpolated
(in between) items between the first and second presentations, the
greater the memorability of the target item. Hence, distributed
repetition facilitates learning more than massed repetition. This
phenomenon is referred to as the spacing effect. Russo, Parkin,
Taylor and Wilks (1998) demonstrated facilitated recall and recogni
tion of words and unfamiliar faces using the spacing effect format.
Taylor (2018) adopted the spacing effect to explore the robustness
of implicit learning for unfamiliar face-name pairs under conditions
of focused and divided attention. Due to the differences in
processing (perceptual priming for faces and conceptual priming
for names), when attention was divided the recognition of faces
remained the same, but the recognition of names was impaired.
Moreover, when unfamiliar faces were presented as two different
poses during learning, participants did not perform as well, and the
advantages incurred under distributed learning were lost. Did they
fail to recognise the two poses belonging to the same face? Even
when asked to detect whether the second presentation belonged to
the same face, those high scorers performed the same as low
scorers at test. This implies that it makes no difference whether they
identify the two poses as belonging to the same face. In terms of
learning where does this leave us? Perceptual repetition priming
increases learning when item presentations are the same; in this
case faces. Learning that relies on perceptual characteristics is
therefore more successful when the material is kept constant.
Levin (2008) conjured up an interactive image of robbers stealing a

harp. Those who learnt the word using repetition fared badly in
comparison to those using this mnemonic. Shimamura (1984)
even introduced an acronym for mnemonics, ‘MOVA’ – mean
ingfulness, organisation, visualisation and attention!
The ‘peg-word’ method is an effective way of remembering new
words/concepts by using imagery and an existing structure from
which to pin new words as images. A structure consists of a number
of ‘pegs’ which have to be learned first, so that another image or
concept encapsulated as an image can be attached, one to each
‘peg’. An example of this would be rhyming pegs such as ‘1 is for
bun’, ‘2 is for shoe’ and ‘3 is for tree’. In this case the rhyming
facilitates the learning, and the bizarre interactive imagery the
learned cues for retrieval. The method of loci is another example of
this type of mnemonic. Simonides (c.556 ̶ c.468 BCE), a Greek
poet, used a form of mental imagery known as the method of loci.
His ability to use mental imagery helped him to identify and locate
where people were seated before they were crushed under the
collapsed roof of a banqueting hall. The method of loci can be
applied by learning a series of objects in different locations. For
example, a sofa in the lounge, the breadbin in the kitchen, a sink in
the bathroom and a wardrobe in the bedroom could comprise a
structure of a house. Once these images are remembered, then
further images can be pinned to these locations. Words such as dog,
tulip, swimmer and balloon could be visualised as a dog jumping on
the sofa, a tulip sticking out of the breadbin, a swimmer sitting in
the sink and a balloon attached to the wardrobe.
The use of rhymes, songs and stories has proven to be good
mnemonics. Students who learned to sing what VanVoorhis (2002)
called ‘stat jingles’, outperformed those (on a test), who merely read
the concepts aloud. The explanation for this lies in the increased
chunking of information which is transferred to LTM. VanVoorhis
also claimed that the ‘stat jingles’ were enjoyable and motivated
students to learn. Learning and memory are intricately entwined.
SUMMARY
Memory models provide a structured way of conceptualising the
flow of information from short-term to long-term storage.
Atkinson and Shiffrin provided the backbone structure of

memory from which other components have been added,
such as working memory, and to long-term memory, episodic,
semantic and procedural. Whereas episodic concerns memories
of events and semantic our world knowledge, procedural in
volves skill acquisition. Both episodic and semantic memory are
considered as declarative (involvement of conscious awareness)
whereas procedural memory is non-declarative (no involvement
of conscious awareness). Episodic and semantic memories can be
influenced by schemas. Our memories of events can be em
bellished by our pre-existing schemas such that we recall details
of events that did not actually occur. In the case of semantic
memories, knowledge can be added to factual information from
schemas. Hence, factual information from a schema about
marsupials can embellish limited knowledge concerning kan
garoos. Everyday memory has been explored by looking at
autobiographical memories throughout the lifespan. Also,
memories involving the intention to do something (known as
prospective memory) have been studied in relation to being
time-based and/or event-based. The involvement of monitoring
and cue detection plays an important role in how the intention
to perform an action is enacted. Learning is important for re
membering. How we engage and learn information influences
the longevity of memory traces. The levels of processing ap
proach has shown that when information is processed deeply for
meaning, it is less likely to be forgotten from long-term
memory. Memories that are encoded efficiently are more
likely to be consolidated and remembered. Implicit learning can
be achieved through repetition priming. The spacing effect is an
effective way of learning without conscious awareness and is
often how procedural memories are formed. Other methods of
learning include a variety of mnemonic techniques which have
proven to be successful aids in learning.
FURTHER READING
Baddeley, A. (2014) Essentials of Human Memory. Hove: Psychology Press.
Kandel, E.R. (2007) In Search of Memory: The emergence of a new science of mind.
New York/London: W.W. Norton and Company.
Luminet, O. (2017) Flashbulb Memories: New challenges and future perspectives

(2nd edn). London: Taylor and Francis.
Santos, C. (2018) Mastering Memory: Techniques to turn your brain from a sieve to a
sponge. New York: Puzzle Wright Press.
THINKING: DECISION-MAKING
AND PROBLEM-SOLVING
•
The way in which we define and segregate ourselves from other
5
living organisms is often encapsulated in the philosophical motto

introduced by René Descartes, ‘I think therefore I am’ (Cogito
ergo sum). Descartes considered the ability to think as an indicator
of existence – of being alive. While there are philosophical debates
over the accuracy of this phrase, the essence of its meaning does
appear to ring true. Psychologists for many years have considered
language as a factor differentiating us from other animals, but
without the capacity to think, language would be disorganised and
incomprehensible. The capacity to think therefore influences how
we behave and navigate through our daily lives. The importance of
thought processes can readily be seen in babies born with severe
or life-threatening chromosomal anomalies that impact on brain
development. This generally leads to impairments in cognitive
functioning and, in particular, the ability to think. In babies without
brain developmental problems, the ability to think becomes apparent
soon after birth. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the world appears
confusing to the new-born but the ability to form hypotheses about
how their immediate world operates is helped by inborn infant
competencies. These competencies enable new-borns to navigate
their immediate world and develop an understanding using
their capacity to think. There are individual differences, however,
in how well we can adapt our thinking to solve problems and
make judgements and decisions using information available to
us. Some individuals are better at using logical deduction
when problem-solving and decision-making, whereas others invoke
experiential knowledge. Why there are differences and the impact
DOI: 10.4324/9781003014355-5
128 THINKING: DECISION-MAKING AND PROBLEM-SOLVING
this has for problem-solving and decision-making for instance, are of

interest to cognitive psychologists. Studying thought processes is not
new. Plato (427 ̶ 347 BCE) postulated that the soul is divided into
reason (or rational thought), spirit (or emotions) and desire (for excess
appetites). It was Aristotle (384 ̶ 322 BCE), however, who addressed
thinking in terms of logic in his treatise, Organon. He is particularly
known for his logic that revolves around the notion of deduction or
sullogismos in Greek (hence the derivation of syllogistic logic).
Aristotle’s writings have an important role in how cognitive psy
chologists study different types of thinking processes used in
problem-solving and decision-making.
THINKING DEFINED
According to the American Psychological Association, thinking is,
“cognitive behaviour in which ideas, images, mental representa
tions, or other hypothetical elements of thought are experienced or
manipulated …. it is covert … not directly observable but must be
inferred from actions or self-reports …. it is symbolic …. involve
operations on mental symbols or representations.” (2020).
There are different types of thinking, all of which can be suc
cessfully deployed depending on the nature of task. For example,
when presented with information about the risks of contracting
Covid-19, decisions concerning travelling abroad to a country with
a high versus low number of cases can be made by weighing dif
ferent factors, such as one’s age and condition of health. This type
of decision will have personal consequences. By travelling to a
country with a high case number, there is an increased risk of
catching Covid-19 especially if one is old and frail. Under these
circumstances, travelling to a low risk country would be a better
solution. Eysenck and Keane (2015) outlined six different types of
thinking, some of which we might regularly use and others less so:
1 Judgements are considered to be a sub-set of decision-making

and involve the careful consideration of how likely events will
occur.
2 Decision-making involves the selection of one possible option
from more than one.
THINKING: DECISION-MAKING AND PROBLEM-SOLVING 129
3 Informal reasoning involves the evaluation of the robustness of an

argument by using existing knowledge and personal experience.
4 Inductive reasoning involves making decisions about the
truthfulness of a statement using the information available.
Unlike deductive reasoning, logical conclusions are not always
possible.
5 Deductive reasoning involves forming logical conclusions
based on information (such as statements) known to be true.
6 Problem-solving involves, first, the identification of the
problem, and second, formulating a stage-by-stage plan of
solution. Depending on the nature of the problem, any of the
above types of thinking may be used.
These different forms of thinking will be the basic structure for

understanding how we think, beginning with making judgements.
JUDGEMENTS
A judgement is defined by Eysenck and Keane (2015) as, “an as

sessment of the probability of a given event occurred based on
incomplete information” (p. 722). Our judgements are not set in
stone as we can change our original conclusion when we receive
new information. For example, making a judgement of an 80 per
cent likelihood that a close friend is seeing a new friend behind
one’s back can be revised when information verifies the close friend
spending some of these occasions with her parents. In these cir
cumstances the judgement might be revised to the odds of a 50:50
per cent likelihood. Hence, the process of forming judgements is
often dynamic. Nevertheless, there are situations where judgements
made are in error. We are generally poor at considering base-rate
information. For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1972) in
troduced a problem concerning a witness’s identification of a ‘cab’
involved in an accident. On the evening concerned there were cabs
operating from two different companies: 85 per cent Green and 15
per cent Blue. The witness said it was a Blue cab but when tested
for identification under the same viewing conditions, she was in
error 20 per cent of the time (probability of witnessing or seeing
the data (D)). The question Kahneman and Tversky posed was,
‘what is the likelihood of it being a Blue cab?’ Many of us get this
wrong because base-rate information fails to be considered in the

calculation. Using the formula developed by Bayes for the calcu
lation of the ‘odds ratio’ we can use the information available to
calculate the probability that the cab was Blue (H1) or Green (H2).
The formula used to solve the problem posed by Kahneman and
Tversky can be seen in Figure 5.1.
The odds ratio therefore is 12:17 and the chance that the cab is
Blue is 12/29 (29 is obtained by adding 12 and 17). This means the
witness has a 41 per cent chance of being right. This stands in
marked contrast to the assumed 80 percent chance of being right.
Base-rates can provide us with important data allowing us to
make informed judgements. It has been argued that we do have
knowledge about the effects ‘A’ has on ‘B’. This provides us with a
knowledge-base of the consequences events have on other events.
In other words, we have the knowledge to help ascertain the causal
effects of events on other events, or information on the causes of
different outcomes. Provided we have full access to information
details and the question is framed with all the information present,
then we do make good use of base-rates. Using Kahneman and
Tversky’s cab example, Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007) accounted
H1 = a probability of 0.15 (as 15 percent were operating)

0.15 / 0.85
H2 = a probability of 0.85 (as 85 percent were operating)
p (D/ H1) = probability of identifying a Blue cab when it is Blue

0.80 / 0.20
p (D/ H2) = probability of identifying a Blue cab when it is Green
Putting the two elements of the formula together:

0.15 0.80 0.12
× =
0.85 0.20 017
Figure 5.1 Formula used to solve the problem posed by Kahneman and
Tversky
for why it was difficult for participants to answer the problem

correctly. Krynski and Tenenbaum argued that if participants were
armed with information that could explain why an identification
error was made for 20 per cent of the time, they would correctly
solve the problem. Hence, when they were informed that for 20
per cent of the time for both Blue and Green cabs the paint had
faded, this offered an explanation for the errors made by the
witness. The correct solution increased from 8 per cent to 46
per cent.
When information is incomplete, however, we tend to ignore
base-rate data, and instead rely on a ‘rule of thumb’ approach
(Kahneman and Tversky 1972). This rule of thumb known as a
heuristic provides us with quick accessible guidance on decision-
making. One example is the representativeness heuristic. The re
presentativeness heuristic is often used for deciding whether events,
individuals or objects belong to a category based on traits that are
typical of the category. This means that descriptions of people and
what they do can be used to make judgements about them by virtue
of the content fitting well with that of a specific category. For ex
ample, Mary doesn’t drink or smoke and works for the church. She
also loves to wear dresses which cover her knees and have a high
collar. Is Mary a vicar or an old-fashioned vicar? Most judgements
would depict her as an old-fashioned vicar based on how she dresses
and by her habits fitting the category ‘old-fashioned’. But this can’t
be right. The error here is that an old-fashioned vicar is a sub-set of
vicar. Hence, Mary has to be allocated to the category of vicar before
she can be classified as an old-fashioned vicar.
There have been a number of theories put forward to account
for how we make judgements. The ‘support theory’ proposed by
Tversky and Koehler (1994) is based on the availability heuristic
which claims it is easier to estimate how often an event occurs
based on the ease of its retrieval from long-term memory. This
means, if the rate of deaths in the UK increased due to the Covid-
19 virus, then it is more likely to be considered a common killer.
The Covid-19 virus in 2020 becomes readily available in long-term
memory as a frequent cause of deaths in the UK. In relation to
support theory, Tversky and Kochler argued that the likelihood of
an event’s frequency depends on the descriptive frame in which a
question is asked. If the question is vague without a breakdown of
possibilities, then the prediction of something occurring is low. For

example, do you think you will inherit your aunt’s money next year?
The answer is likely to be ‘very unlikely’. If the question was framed
as: do you think you will inherit your aunt’s money next year given
how ill she is, and it is now December? Then the answer is likely to be
‘very likely’. Hence, the more detail, the higher the probability. This
arises as a consequence of increased attention towards heightened
aspects of events not provided under vague questioning. Also, by
providing such details, aspects of events are made available in memory.
The ‘fast-and-frugal’ heuristic is another approach proposed by
Gigerenzer and Gigerenzer (2011). They argue that we use ‘fast-
and-frugal’ heuristics to make judgements; this helps us to make the
best judgement. When using this heuristic three rules are applied:
searching, stopping and decision-making. We will continue to
engage search cues until the right one helps answer the question.
Once the right discriminatory cue is found, it is necessary to know
when to stop, as continuing is a waste of time and effort. A decision
can then be made. An important model of decision-making in
corporates both heuristics and more effortful processing, as does the
dual-process model (see Box 5.1).
BOX 5.1 DUAL-PROCESS THEORY

Kahneman (2003) argued that we don’t always use heuristics, but
under some circumstances we adopt other strategies which engage
complicated cognitive operations. In his model there are two
processing pathways, one of which involves heuristics and the
other more complex processing (see Table 5.1).
Table 5.1 Two processing pathways

System 1 System 2
Includes an automatic, effortless Includes a serial, effortful,
and fast cognitive process that is monitored, directed and slow
difficult to stop, control or cognitive process that can be
change. Based on the changed or modified at any
representativeness heuristic. point. Note this is not a form of
heuristics.
There are occasions when the situation demands we make quick

decisions based on heuristics. Just because we assume, however,
that performing poorly on base-rate problems (mentioned earlier) is
on account of using System 1, the errors often made from effortful
calculation using System 2 should not be ignored. Errors on base-
rate problems can occur equally through cognitive miscalculation
based on judgement biases (Le Mens and Denrell 2011). For some
types of problem, however, Pennycook and Thompson (2012) have
argued that neither Systems 1 nor 2 are used. Furthermore, it
depends on how the problem information is presented as to
whether Systems 1 or 2 is activated (Chun and Kruglanski 2006).
The dual-process model nevertheless has empirical support and
provides a successful explanation for individual differences ob
served in judgement performance.
Making judgements is considered to be a sub-set of decision-

making, our next topic.
DECISION-MAKING
Every day we make many decisions. What to wear, who to speak

to and who to avoid are just three examples. This makes decision-
making a ubiquitous phenomenon. There are, however, different
types of decision-making, some of which feature in our professions
or as part of our civil duty, as is the case in the process of jury
deliberation (see Box 5.2). Making decisions about where we want
to go or who we want to befriend are different from making de
ductive or inductive assumptions. This is because these types of
decisions form as a result of the exclusion of one option from
another. Furthermore, the decisions we make will have an effect on
our lives; hence, the option considered will have personal con
sequences for us. For example, opting to marry someone who lives
abroad might mean that living in a different country determines
how often it is possible to visit one’s parents. Whereas opting to
marry someone who lives in the same country might mean more
opportunities to visit one’s parents. Hence, some decisions will
carry more personal risks or benefits than others.
BOX 5.2 MOCK-JUROR DECISION-MAKING

The ‘mock-juror’ paradigm is a productive way of investigating how
real jurors might engage with court case material when making
decisions about a defendant’s innocence or guilt. Information can
be presented as a transcript or shown as video footage. At the end
of the transcript or on viewing the footage, mock-jurors answer a
series of questions using a rating scale such as ‘extent of guilt’ and
‘probability of intent’. The mock-juror paradigm is a flexible one,
which means that in addition to the case details, information can be
manipulated in ways that introduce different levels of intent based
on the defendant’s account. This type of information is considered
to be ‘evidential’, but non-evidential information can also be
included such as a photograph attached to the transcript (either
an attractive or unattractive defendant). Non-evidential information
has no relevance to the case but instead stereotypes the defendant.
Kaplan and Kemmerick (1974) showed how mock-jurors use non-
evidential information when the availability of evidential information
is limited. Furthermore, Ellison and Munro (2015) found that mock-
jurors had difficulty jettisoning their ‘common sense’ and ‘personal
experience’ when deliberating. Taylor, Alner and Workman (2017)
showed how middle-aged mock-jurors, when viewing a video court
case enactment of a defendant with Borderline Personality Disorder,
would typically rate their behaviour as rude, bad and punishable
rather than as a person with mental health issues. The middle-aged
mock-jurors rated the defendant as highly guilty, with a high
probability of intent rating and a more extreme sentence. Izzett
and Fishman (1976) found that defendants with a high justification
for their crime were given a lenient sentence. Defendants with a
socially attractive profile and with low justification for their crime
were given a more lenient sentence than their socially unattractive
counterparts. Hence, defendant physical/social attractiveness ap
pears to influence mock-juror sentencing decisions (Korva, Porter,
O’Connor, Shaw et al. 2013). Taylor, Lui and Workman (2018)
conducted a mock-juror study using three versions of a fictitious
theft/handling court case transcript. The three versions varied in the
defendant’s intent by indirectly considering the differences of
motive. A photograph of the defendant was attached (high or low
physical attractiveness). Differences across the three intent levels

for extent of guilt, probability of intent and sentence occurred. An
attractive-leniency effect was not found on any of the ratings. Taylor
et al. concluded that when mock-jurors deliberated, they considered
the evidential information and paid little credence to physical
attractiveness. In this case decision-making was informed by the
facts of the case and whether the defendant confessed to the crime
(albeit with varying justification of intent) or pleaded not guilty.
In 1944, von Neumann and Morgenstern introduced ‘utility

theory’ as a way of explaining the basis for our decision-making. As
the term suggests, utility implies that we try to attain the most
benefit to serve our needs – we try to maximise our utility. In other
words, we place an arbitrary value to each option in the mix and
select the one with the highest return (the utility which benefits us
the most). This involves making objective probability calculations
of the best option providing us with the optimal utility. Using the
previous example of choosing a potential partner to marry, mar
rying a resident of your own country might be the option offering
the best utility, if visiting the parents frequently is a priority.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern had a formula for the utility
theory:
Outcome probability × Outcome utility = Expected utility
The expected utility approach has been criticised on the grounds

of not being representative of how we normally make our deci
sions. We rarely estimate objective probabilities when deciding on
an option but instead we use subjective probabilities. Most people
find the concept of probability difficult to understand, let alone
being able to view options collectively and calculate the prob
abilities of compound options. Moreover, we tend to exclude
options immediately by making short-cut decisions using ‘rule of
thumb’ assumptions (see earlier). Another problem for the ex
pected utility approach is that we don’t always make the right
choices especially when calculating gains and losses (Kahneman and
Tversky 1984). This should appear to be a simple type of decision-

making; deciding whether one option leads to gain and the other to
loss. Kahneman and Tversky showed how fallible our choices can
be. Prospect theory, introduced by Kahneman and Tversky in
1979, highlights the fallible thinking processes involved when
making decisions concerning gain or loss.
Prospect theory
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) outlined different types of heuristic.
The most commonly used is a simple counting method of how often
the same solution worked previously when faced with the same
dilemma. Hence, a decision to burgle a house over a commercial
property might be based on the number of successful hauls made
from burgling residential properties and the narrow escape when
fleeing a factory. Experiences such as these make heuristics a quick
and computationally simple method of decision-making. It is not
uncommon, however, to overweight some outcomes over others by
relying on decisions made previously under similar situations. Also,
we tend to overweight the small probabilities to protect ourselves
against losses. The ‘availability’ heuristic is also important in prospect
theory. This heuristic provides a rough guideline about which op
tion is best. For example, a potential criminal wanting to know the
best crime to commit to evade police apprehension, might refer to
information available regarding how often perpetrators get caught
for committing a specific type of crime.
Kahneman and Tversky predicted that we are more sensitive to
potential loss than we are to potential gain; loss-aversion. This
means when deciding on an option, we tend to avoid those where
we perceive potential loss. According to Kahneman (2003), this is
why most people will renounce a 50:50 bet unless circumstances
are such that there is a possibility of winning twice as much. (For
example, most people would not place a bet of £10 which has a
50:50 chance of winning £10. They probably would, however,
place the same bet if they had a 50:50 chance of winning £20.)
Kahneman and Tversky proposed a two-phase assessment process
for decision-making. In the first phase, options are edited using
six types of heuristic: coding, combination, segregation, cancel
lation, simplification and detection of dominance. Outcomes are
valued as losses or gains using coding and this is compared to an

individual’s current asset situation known as their reference point.
Hence, any option outcome below the reference point is con
sidered a loss and is discarded. If, however, it is above, then the
option outcome is a gain and might be considered. Calculating
compound outcomes are made easier by adding them together
using the combination heuristic. For example, if there is a 40 per
cent chance of attaining £400 or a 50 per cent chance of attaining
£400 for the ‘fencing’ of stolen television sets, then this prospect
will be a 90 per cent chance of £400. In the case of using the
segregation heuristic, the options are considered individually ra
ther than together. For example, if there is a 0.6 likelihood of
attaining £400 and a 0.4 likelihood of attaining £600, then an
individual will reduce the odds of attaining £600 by raising the
odds of gaining £200 as an assured sum of money. In this case,
fencing stolen goods is the selected option, not for gain but to
avoid a loss. The money attained is lower but is more than would
be the case if the television sets were not fenced off. Generally, we
would prefer to accept a small gain over a larger one if this is a
certainty. Occasionally, however, people will cancel outcomes
from various options if they were similar in value and likelihood
of occurring (Ranyard 1995). Tversky and Kahneman (1987) also
observed this whereby people cancelled common elements in
compound gambles rather than combining them. By doing this,
the cognitive load involved in comparing many options becomes
easier to handle. This is similar to an elimination-by-aspects ap
proach which helps to reduce cognitive load. For example, when
deciding on a property to buy, it is easier to eliminate properties
that do not fit the desired location first. Doing this cancels out
common elements such as the design of the house and size of
garden. This leaves fewer options of property once a must-have
location is selected. In a similar vein, Kaplan, Bekhor and Shiftan
(2011) claimed that by retaining options which fit the criteria, it is
easier to make detailed comparisons across the remaining ones.
The detection of dominance is a heuristic enabling a quick de
cision about the easiest option to take. For example, a decision
over which property to break-and-enter could be as simple as
selecting a house with inadequate security such as a hidden and
open window. The second phase of the assessment process is the
evaluation of the edited prospects considered previously. After

consideration of the edited prospects, the prospect with
the highest return is selected. Hence, by substituting probabilities
for weights, and utilities for subjective values given to all
options available, decision-making becomes easier. An interesting
alternative to prospect theory is one which has been proposed by
Payne (1973). This model, which considers our motivations for
doing something, is known as the Simple Contingent Process
Model (see Box 5.3).
BOX 5.3 SIMPLE CONTINGENT PROCESS MODEL

According to Payne, individuals make a series of judgements based
on their current situation. There are sub-step questions which
individuals ask themselves and these are simple, often requiring
‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers. An example of how the Simple Contingent
Process Model operates is as follows:
1 How much money do I have (lots leads to no need for crime;

very little leads to the need for crime)
2 How certain am I of success (low leads to no crime; high leads
to crime)
3 How much will I get (low leads to asking question 4; high leads
to committing the crime)
4 What are the risks concerned (high leads to no crime; low leads
to committing the crime)
5 I will commit the crime but need to decide how, what, where
and when
As we can see these questions are quick and easy to answer. The
answers very much depend on the individual’s situation and
motivation for committing a crime. Carroll (1978) asked incarcer
ated criminals whether they would consider any of the different
types of gamble varying on factors such as loss or gain, the amount
of gain and type of punishment received if caught. They had
difficulty combining the different factors to inform their decision.
Instead each factor was considered independently; 60 per cent
considered success, 41 per cent likelihood of police capture, 67 per
cent focused on punishment severity while 84 per cent were

interested in the haul available. These findings indicate how
different perpetrators focus on different aspects of committing
crime and therefore why deterrents have a differential effect for
different perpetrators.
Emotional influences
There are other aspects to decision-making that play an important
role, such as our emotions. Emotions can be negative as a con
sequence of a bad outcome from a decision made that affects us
personally. Likewise, we can feel elation after winning a large sum
of money on the lottery following a decision to buy a ticket. If we
experience the loss of a large amount of money after being
swindled, then we are likely to feel unhappy and highly unlikely
to be caught out again by a con-person; hence, ‘once bitten,
twice shy’. Such experiences influence how we behave in future
and the decisions we make. Omission bias, for example, is when
we decide not to take action under circumstances of risky
decision-making.
Omission bias, however, is influenced by emotions. This can be
seen when parents were asked whether they are likely to have their
children vaccinated. Given the negative media coverage con
cerning side-effects brought on by some vaccinations, parents were
worried about their children being adversely affected (Brown,
Kroll, Hudson, Ramsay et al. 2010). Status quo bias occurs when
people are reluctant to change a situation even when there are no
costs incurred for doing so. More regrets occurred when people
decided to change a situation that went wrong afterwards than was
the case for maintaining the status quo (even if it were a mistake to
do so; Nicolle, Fleming, Bach, Driver et al. 2011).
Influence of selective exposure

Researchers have considered why we often make poor decisions.
One reason, it has been argued by Fischer and Greitemeyer (2010),
Figure 5.2 Model of selective exposure

Source: Adapted from Fischer and Greitemeyer (2010)
is due to selective exposure (see Figure 5.2). Selective exposure

means that we make decisions based on our beliefs. We adhere to
these beliefs even when presented with information to the con
trary; we continue to use them in our decision-making.
This model suggests that we feel the need to defend our belief
system by virtue of the decisions we make. When the need to
define our personal stance arises, we enter a defence motivation

state which increases selective exposure. When selective exposure
increases, we search for information supporting our beliefs. In
other words, we find confirmatory information. When the need to
make decisions based on optimal choices arises, accuracy motiva
tion reduces the impact of selective exposure. In cases where access
to information is limited, but accuracy motivation is high, in
dividuals will resort to searching for data consistent with their
beliefs. Doing this increases selective exposure.
Naturalistic decision-making (NDM)

The NDM model consists of five-phases and was proposed by
Galotti (2002) to account for how we make decisions about ev
eryday real-life situations. As Figure 5.3 shows, there are four
different things that we do before a decision is made and it is not
uncommon for us to backtrack and modify plans and goals as a
consequence of the information we have found. There is much
support for this model from various studies. Moreover, the model is
in keeping with predictions from the elimination-by-aspects
heuristic approach.
According to Galotti, making decisions can be difficult. We
also have a tendency to make biased decisions. This is in part due to
the fact that we retrieve information about past experiences and
events stored in long-term memory (see Chapter 4). Hence,
new information is encoded and compared within a context of
pre-existing decisions. As mentioned previously, we often make
decisions that maintain the status quo due to this selective exposure.
Decisions we make are often appropriate to our needs, but they are
by no means perfect. The decisions we make on a daily basis
are often bounded by informal reasoning based on our knowledge
and experiential learning.
INFORMAL REASONING
Reasoning used on an everyday basis is more likely to be informal

rather than the more stringent, logically based, deductive thinking.
Informal reasoning has its roots in our knowledge base and our
personal experiences. It is also referred to as critical thinking which
Figure 5.3 Naturalistic decision-making model

Source: Adapted from Galotti (2002)
is a sub-set of logic. It is formal reasoning that is commonly con

sidered to be the route to logical processing, however (see
Figure 5.4).
The importance of the content influences the credibility of the
argument presented. Moreover, who presents the argument de
termines the acceptance of it: experts versus non-experts (Walton
Figure 5.4 The sub-sets of logic
2010). When presented with an argument or statement, we in

formally reason that the statement, for instance, is probably true or
probably false. Hence, we deal with likelihoods rather than cer
tainties (as is the case with formal reasoning; see later). The mo
tivations underlying informal reasoning, according to Mercier and
Sperber (2011) are important as a differentiating factor between this
type of reasoning and formal thinking. In everyday situations,
when we discuss information with others, the intention is to en
courage others to see things the same way as we do. For example,
when discussing politics, if opinions are incongruent, then dis
cussion turns towards persuading others eventually to agree on the
specifics of the argument. According to Mercier and Sperber,
“Skilled arguers are not after the truth but after arguments
supporting their views” (p. 57). This is considered to be a some

what pessimistic understanding of how we engage with informal
thinking. Its uses can be extrapolated to many other situations such
as how we interpret language involved in statements, how we
classify information and our ability to plan based on the data-
content. We cannot ignore, however, that there are informal fal
lacies, such as the straw man fallacy. The straw man fallacy is used
to depreciate the opinions of others which are at odds with our
own. The other person’s arguments can be misconstrued as a
strategy of reducing any chance of their opinion being considered
as correct (Aikin and Casey 2011). This strategy operates at many
different levels of society, including academia (see Box 5.4).
BOX 5.4 HOW THE STRAW MAN FALLACY CAN

MISCONSTRUE EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY
Daly and Wilson (1998) uncovered figures indicating that children
living in reconstituted families are 200 times more likely to be
abused by the non-biological parent than by residing with two
biological parents. This phenomenon is called the ‘Cinderella effect’.
Importantly, they were not suggesting that abuse will occur in all
reconstituted families. In 2005, Buller criticised this finding and
claimed that under conditions of a fostered or adopted household
(where neither are biological parents), abuse should be much higher
than is the case for reconstituted families. Buller argues that this is
not the case, as the figures of abuse are lower than that found in
one-step-parent households. The conclusion made by Buller is that
Daly and Wilson have got it wrong; their claims are false. What is
the error in Buller’s reasoning? Has he set up a straw man fallacy?
First, fostering and adopting is a different scenario from reconsti
tuted family living. He is not comparing like with like. Second, the
argument that two non-biological parents should increase the
Cinderella effect was never made by Daly and Wilson. This means
that Buller makes this argument, on Daly and Wilson’s behalf, and
then discredits it (Workman and Reader 2016). Now that is a straw
man argument.
Figure 5.5 Relationship between deductive and inductive reasoning in sci

entific research
There are other types of informal fallacies which influence rea

soning. One in particular known as the ‘slippery slope’ argument
has often been used to account for how low-level deviant beha
viour can escalate into something more. For example, if someone
smokes cannabis then they have a greater chance of taking harder
drugs such as heroin. Stealing from grandmother’s purse is the
beginning of the slippery slope to a life of crime is another example
of this. Regardless of problems associated with informal thinking, it
is used more readily in everyday situations than formal thinking
such as inductive and deductive reasoning. It is easy to confuse
inductive and deductive reasoning, but their involvement in sci
entific research for example, is equally important as Figure 5.5
demonstrates.
When theories or models are tested for their validity, hy
potheses (statements of prediction) are tested using strict scientific
methodology (e.g. an experiment with defined testing variables or
independent variables (IVs). The results are interpreted by using
deductive reasoning (see later) and whether these findings are
unlikely to have occurred by chance alone. If the results are not a
chance finding, then inductive reasoning is used to generate
support of the hypothesis which is fed into an existing theory or
model. Hence, in these circumstances inductive reasoning helps

generate new ideas based on empirical observations. A simple way
of thinking about the difference between inductive and deductive
reasoning is that inductive ‘indicates’ whereas deductive ‘de
duces’.
INDUCTIVE REASONING
Hamad (2007) considered inductive reasoning as the application of

specific cases (or information) to general principles. Inductive
reasoning occurs when we make general suppositions from state
ments referring to specific events. This implies that the supposi
tions we make are likely to be valid; but this is not always the case.
As we saw in Figure 5.5, empirical observations (or results) sup
porting a hypothesis, can be added to existing knowledge en
capsulated in a theory, but there are no rules for performing
inductive reasoning. In fact, performing inductive reasoning is very
much influenced by the information to hand. Klix (2001) claimed
that we use inductive reasoning when a conclusion does not follow
with certainty given the available information. Conclusions can
change when additional information is in the mix. Modifications to
our conclusions can occur as new information alters our subjective
probability calculations. A boyfriend accused of cheating, for in
stance, can be seen differently when new information challenges
the likelihood that he was ‘playing away from home’. Inductive
reasoning, however, falls foul of ‘confirmation bias’. This occurs
when we entertain a hypothesis (of an everyday event) and then
search for information to prove it. According to Cowley and Byrne
(2005) we have the tendency to want to maintain our opinions and
hypotheses while discrediting those entertained by others; which is
achieved through confirmation bias. They found that, even when
evidence falsified an original hypothesis, only 25 per cent of par
ticipants aborted their own hypothesis. Confirmation bias is less
prominent, according to Cowley and Byrne, when the hypothesis
tested belongs to another individual. When applying inductive
reasoning, there is a tendency to rely on the accumulation of in
formation which supports a theory’s validity (Page 2014; see
Box 5.5).
BOX 5.5 THE COELACANTH FISH: FACT OR FICTION?

Page (2014) outlined how inductive reasoning has left marine
biologists believing the coelacanth fish was extinct. In 1836, fossils
found near Durham, north England by Swiss naturalist Louis
Agassiz were labelled as belonging to the coelacanth fish. These
were dated back to the Cretaceous-Paleogene period. The conclu
sion drawn was that this fish became extinct as far back as 66
million years. Concluding that the ancient coelacanth fish became
extinct was further validated by the fact that it had not been seen in
its living form. That is until 1938 when a living coelacanth was
caught off the South African coast (others have also been found
subsequently). Page argued that scientists fell afoul of the ‘out of
sight, out of mind’ adage and in this case the conclusion drawn
using inductive reasoning was incorrect for over 100 years.
Inductive reasoning has been likened to creativity. Hamad

(2007) claimed that, in everyday life, inductive reasoning is prob
ably more akin to creativity than to reasoning. Trickett and Trafton
(2007) claimed, however, that when scientists explore ideas they
often use ‘what if ’ questions while imagining various scenarios.
Albert Einstein reportedly did this when he was 16. Imagining
hitching a ride on a light beam fuelled his creative thought which
led to the development of his theory of relativity. Similarly, using
thought experiments engages us in thinking ‘outside the box’ by
allowing us to imagine ‘what if’ scenarios. Thought experiments
enable us to be creative and use inductive reasoning without having
to actually test ideas.
DEDUCTIVE REASONING
As we have seen in Figure 5.4, deductive reasoning is formal thinking,

which, in turn, is a form of logic. This type of reasoning is often
referred to as top-down thinking due to there being a general idea that
reaches one possible conclusion. Hence, there is movement from
general to specific premises leading to a logical conclusion. For ex
ample, in chemistry the first premise might state that ‘noble gases are
inert’ and the second that, ‘neon is a noble gas’. The conclusion here is
that ‘neon must be inert’. There is only one possible correct inference
that can be made. There are two types of deductive reasoning: pro
positional (also referred to as conditional) and syllogistic.
Propositional
In the case of propositional reasoning, there are logical operators
that are stated within a proposition. Logical operators include
language such as:
● if-then
● if and only if
● or
These logical operators, such as, ‘if P then Q’, bind the two
propositions together so a conclusion can be drawn, where ‘P’
refers to the first proposition, such as, ‘If the sun is out’ and ‘Q’ to
the second, ‘Then John gets sunburnt’. ‘P’ can be true or false and
there are no in-betweens. There is no entertainment of there
being a hazy sun – the sun is out, or it isn’t under the conditions
of the first proposition. There are two logical argument con
structions in propositional reasoning: modus ponens and modus
tollens. These are influential in deciding the validity of the con
clusion made from the given propositions. Modus ponens is Latin
for ‘method of affirming’ while modus tollens refers to ‘method of
denying’. We tend to find it a challenge to make the correct
inference (see Box 5.6).
BOX 5.6 WHY DO WE HAVE PROBLEMS WITH

DEDUCTIVE REASONING?
People find it difficult to do deductive reasoning, perhaps because it
is generally not the type of problem-solving required in daily life.
Having to decide the validity of the ‘if P then Q’ problem doesn’t
come naturally. This, in part, is a consequence of using our own
knowledge base and previous experiences as a guide to making
inferences. Markovits, Brunet, Thompson and Brisson (2013) found
that some types of propositional problem were more likely to be
considered valid than others despite being invalid. An example from

Markovits (2017) demonstrates how modus tollens (‘if P then Q. Q is
false’) should lead to the inference that ‘P’ is false hence:
‘If a rock is thrown at a window, then the window will break. A

window is broken’. From this one generally concludes that the rock
caused the window to break, but what if it was already broken?
This falsifies the validity of the proposition, simply because the
cause of window breakage could be due to something else.
In the case of another example, ‘If a person cuts their finger, then their
finger will bleed’, there are fewer alternative inferences to be made and
this proposition is valid. If, however, the following is added, ‘Their
finger is bleeding. Therefore, the finger was cut’, again there could be
an alternative reason for the finger to bleed. With this particular
proposition, participants have problems negating. This, Markovits
et al. argue, is due to our knowledge of how things work interfering
with our reasoning. Participants switch towards relying on their general
knowledge of cause-and-effect (blood pours from a cut to the finger).
They also use their understanding of how individuals’ aspirations and
preferences operate by relying on a kind of ‘theory of mind’. While
these strategies are successful when used in daily life, they distract
from logical thinking. Markovits et al. also found support for a dual-
processing approach, where under time limitations, participants adopt
a statistical reasoning strategy, but a counterexample one when time
constraints were removed. In the case of statistical reasoning,
statistical information held in general knowledge about the premises
enables a quick route for processing the premise content. In effect the
estimates generated lead to the validity of the inference.
Counterexamples generated, alternatively, are based on the logical
structure of the proposition presented and how probable the inference
made is (also based on our knowledge of reality). Here, however, we
consider the number of counterexamples disproving the inference –
such that the more there are the less likely the inference is considered
to be valid. According to Markovits, Brisson and de Chantal (2016),
this dual-strategy approach considers how logical inferences are made
rather than the use of heuristics.
Modus ponens refers to inferences in the form of ‘P therefore Q’.

The following example illustrates a valid conclusion:
‘If it is sunny, then Mary gets sunburnt,

It is sunny.
Then Mary gets sunburnt’.
Modus tollens refers to inferences in the form of ‘if P, then Q. Not Q.

Therefore, not P’. The following example illustrates a valid con
clusion:
‘If it is a wheelbarrow, then it has a wheel.

It does not have a wheel.
Then it is not a wheelbarrow’.
A good test of propositional deductive reasoning is the Wason

selection task, named after Peter Wason (1960) (see Figure 5.6).
The task is as follows:
● Four cards are presented

● There is a letter on one side of each card and a number on the
other side
● The rule is; ‘if there is a vowel on one side then there is an
even number on the other side of the card’
● Turn over the least number of cards to see if you can disprove
the rule
● Which cards do you turn over?
Most people will turn the cards that have ‘E’ and ‘4’ which is in
correct.
Evans (1998) claimed that this was due to the use of ‘matching
bias’. In other words, people tend to select the cards mentioned in
Figure 5.6 The Wason selection test example

the Wason task. This is the case even when different letters and
numbers were substituted (Evans and Ball 2010). In fact, the cards
you should turn over are ‘E’ and ‘3’. While the ‘4’ appears to be a
card we should turn over, the rule does not specify that if there is
an even number on one side there must be a vowel on the other.
Astonishingly, only 4 percent of participants got this right when
Wason first developed this test.
Syllogistic
Syllogistic reasoning differs from propositional in its presentation.
Like propositional there are two premises with a conclusion, but
the language (or quantifiers) used differs:
All A are B
No A are B
Some A are B
Some A are not B
In the case of syllogistic reasoning, the premises refer to ‘sets’ rather

than to individuals (Geurts 2003). Geurts gives the example of
foresters:
“At least half of the foresters are vegetarians” (p. 232).
This implies that of the set of foresters, the set who are non-
vegetarians is smaller than the set who are. Aristotle presented the
earliest case of a universal quantifier (i.e. the use of ‘all’) using the
following example:
All men are mortal.

Socrates is a man.
Socrates is mortal.
If the first and second premises are true, then the conclusion must
also be true. If the conclusion was changed to ‘Something is mortal’
then this is also true. Why this is also true relates to Socrates being
an example of at least one thing being mortal. Therefore ‘some
thing’ implies one thing being mortal, hence it does not contradict
the premises. We generally find syllogistic reasoning challenging

because statements that are logical can have information that we
know to be false. The following example shows this principle in
operation:
All adults own dogs.

All males are adults.
Therefore, all males own dogs.
The conclusion drawn is logical, but we know from everyday life

that premises ‘A’ and ‘B’ are incorrect. Not all adults own dogs and
there are males who are children. And we know that not all males
own dogs. Our belief bias can interfere with syllogistic reasoning,
which means we consider the content of the premises and con
clusions to be false instead of structurally being logical. This is
borne out by the fact that it takes longer to process unbelievable
premises from believable ones (Stupple and Ball 2008). There is
also the misconception that ‘All As are Bs’ is reversible which
means that ‘All Bs are As’. This we believe applies to the use of
other quantifiers such as ‘some’.
There are two main theoretical approaches explaining deductive
reasoning: mental models and dual-processing (see Boxes 5.1 and 5.6).
A mental models approach was first introduced by Johnson-Laird in
1983. The basis of this approach is that we construct mental models
when we are given a task involving reasoning. Johnson-Laird claims
that we construct mental models all the time and each one represents a
possibility of the same thing. Alfred, Connolly, Cetron and Kraemer
(2020) argue that to develop a mental model we engage both spatial
and non-spatial content. Moreover, brain activity in the superior
parietal and anterior prefrontal cortex are involved in the creation and
maintenance of such mental models. Hence, when provided with
information such as the example below, we form a mental model that
reflects and preserves the spatial relationships described which, in turn,
helps us to make a conclusion:
The oak tree is to the left of the door,

The swing is to the right of the door,
The dog is sitting in front of the swing,
Therefore, the dog is sitting to the right of the oak tree.
Figure 5.7 Possible premises devised from a visual representation
In the above example, a mental model depicting the spatial re

lationships using all premises can be constructed using visual ima
gery. Equally it is possible to construct a series of premises from an
existing visual representation (see Figure 5.7).
For example, the star on the circle is between the square and
triangle but above the diamond.
Johnson-Laird (1999), however, claimed that we often con
struct models representing that which is true at the expense of that
which is false. We do this to reduce our working memory load
(see Chapter 4). This inclusion of ‘principle of truth’ states,
“reasoners represent as little information as possible in explicit
models and, in particular, that they represent only information
about what is true” (Johnson-Laird and Savary 1996, p. 69).
Hence, models tend to be formed for what is true and not false.
According to Johnson-Laird, Girotto and Legrenzi (2004) this
leads to two fallacies:
1 Illusion of what is possible

2 Illusion of what is impossible
Importantly, Johnson-Laird et al. (2004) argue that we focus on

models containing the possible rather than the impossible. This can
often lead to fallacious conclusions and to the exclusion of alternative

ones. The illusion of the possible can be exemplified as follows:
Suppose you are presented with the following three premises
about a hand of cards and informed that only one is true. You are
asked, ‘Is it possible that there is an ace in the hand?’ Which one
would you select to determine whether or not there is an ace in
the hand?
1 There is a king in the hand or there is an ace, or both

2 There is a queen in the hand or there is an ace, or both
3 There is a jack in the hand or there is a ten, or both
Johnson-Laird et al. (2004) found that 95 per cent of participants

concluded there is an ace in the hand. You may be surprised to
learn that this is incorrect. Johnson-Laird et al. (2004) explained
why this conclusion is wrong using the illusion of possibility. If you
selected premise one or two, because you believe that either pre
mise enables the possibility of there being an ace, then you have
broken the rule that only one premise is true. Therefore, this
implies that the third premise can be true. If so, this means that
there can be no ace in the hand. Selecting premise one as being
true, means that premise two must be false and vice versa because
the task requirement of only one premise being true is contra
vened. Selecting the third premise means there is no ace (because
this means that both one and two must be wrong).
All of the forms of reasoning discussed thus far can be adopted
for problem-solving.
PROBLEM-SOLVING
We are presented with different types of problems to solve on a

daily basis. While most problems are familiar and can be resolved
by referring to similar experiences, some are more challenging.
Problems can be classified as well-defined or ill-defined. A well-
defined problem has all the information that is needed to resolve it
encapsulated in its presentation. This means all the information is
there and we just have to use it to resolve the problem. Well-
defined problems tend to be ‘knowledge-lean’, simply because
information is inherent in the presentation; hence, there is no need
to search our memory for information. This contrasts with an ill-

defined problem where information required to solve it is drawn
from both knowledge and experience. Such problems are
‘knowledge-rich’ as they rely on additional information to find a
solution. Often these problems require the introduction of
benchmarks to help define how and which direction the solution
should take. For example, how to become a more assertive person
requires further information regarding what assertiveness is so that
ways of achieving it can be found. Solutions are not always im
mediate, so we often adopt a trial and error approach. This fits
the adage, ‘If at first you don’t succeed, then try and try again’.
Different hypotheses are tried and tested by performing activities
to see what works. Thornton (1999) presented school-age chil
dren with the ‘building a bridge across the river’ task. They were
provided with a variety of sized, shaped and weighted blocks. On
the floor a river was painted. There were only two blocks that,
when used together, could form a bridge to cross the river. Only
one five-year-old was successful and the solution took time
through trial and error; she used the blocks as counterweights.
Three different approaches accounting for how we solve pro
blems will be considered.
Gestalt school of thought

Gestalt is probably one of the most renowned approaches – active
between 1920-40. Gestaltists differentiated between reproductive
and productive thought. In the case of reproductive, thought relied
on the recycling of existing knowledge; doing things the same way
because it worked previously. Productive, alternatively, involved
the reformulation of the problem in a novel way. This, the
Gestaltists argued, is like thinking laterally or ‘outside of the box’.
Insight is considered to be a way of resolving a challenging problem
that is new and requires a different outlook. This has been wit
nessed in chimpanzees who had to restructure the problem so that
they could achieve their goal of attaining the banana. Wolfgang
Köhler (1925) set problems for chimpanzees to solve, ‘How can I
get the banana that is out of reach?’ Sultan, the chimpanzee, was in
an enclosure but could see a banana placed outside of the enclosure
which was out of reach. There were two sticks, one short, the
other long. The short stick could be used to reach the long stick
which could then be used to drag the banana within reach. That is
what Sultan did in the moment of an ‘ah-ha experience’. This ‘ah-
ha’ experience is known as insight; a flash of sudden inspiration.
We humans also experience insight. Maier (1931) presented a
problem whereby two cords suspended from the two far ends of a
ceiling could not be reached at the same time. There were various
objects in the room such as pliers. The task was to work out how
these two cords could both be held at the same time. Participants
who experienced the ‘ah-ha’ moment used the pliers to add weight
to one of the cords, so that it could be swung like a pendulum.
While holding onto the other cord while standing in the centre of
the room, they waited for the pendulum to come close enough to
grab hold of it. Solved!
Gestaltists have also explored insight in relation to timeframes of
problem-solving. For example, we often use the phrase, ‘let’s sleep
on it’. This idea that putting a problem aside for a while will ac
tually help us to resolve it, was considered by Wallas (1926) in his
incubation approach. This implies that even when we stop con
sciously thinking about a problem we continue to do so sub
consciously (see Chapter 7). Incubation can easily be tested by
giving two groups of participants a problem to solve. The control
group is asked to continue working on the problem until it is
solved while the experimental group is allowed a ‘timeout’ period.
Sio and Ormerod (2009) performed a meta-analysis and found: a
small effect of incubation; a more robust effect using creative
problems rather than linguistic problems, and larger effects when
more time was spent on the problem before incubation
Moreover, Sio, Monaghan and Ormerod (2013) found that
sleep aided the solution of challenging problems. Simon (1966)
suggested that sleeping on a problem was a good way of en
couraging a fresh look at the problem. Sometimes it is difficult to
dispel the ways we consider a problem and we can become stuck
in a loop. Sleep helps to break the cycle by forgetting the ways the
problem had been thought about. An example of the effectiveness
of sleeping on a problem arises from German-born chemist,
Friedrich Kekulé, who struggled to identify the structure of a
molecule called benzene. The solution fortuitously came to him
in a dream where a snake seized its own tail (i.e. the ouroboros).
Kekulé woke up to realise that the benzene molecule has a ring-

like structure.
Insight, however, does not occur readily. Gestaltists argued that
this is a consequence of how our past experiences interfere with
our mind-set and our beliefs about the function of objects (referred
to as functional fixedness). Our mental set can be obstructive in
problem-solving. We have set strategies for solving problems
which in the past may have helped solve specific types of problem.
The drawback for applying the same set strategies to different types
of problem, is that they may be inappropriate – and yet we still use
them. Even experts fall foul of using set strategies that have worked
previously at the expense of finding new, efficient and less time-
consuming ones. Bilalic, McLeod and Gobet (2008a, 2008b) found
this to be the case with expert chess players who maintained a
previously successful strategy even at the expense of a more ef
fective one. Furthermore, when their eye movements were
tracked, they continued to search in areas of the chessboard con
sistent with their previous strategy.
In the case of functional fixedness, we focus and adhere to our
knowledge about the uses different objects have, instead of creatively
changing the object function to help solve a problem. In a classic
experiment by Dunker (1945), participants were asked to attach a
candle to the wall without it dripping onto the table below. Armed
with a candle, strip of matches, a box of tacks and some other objects
some participants showed insight by using the box of tacks as a can
dleholder and using the tacks to attach the box to the wall. According
to Challoner (2009) insight can be induced by identifying an obscure
object feature and using this to solve the problem.
There are different problem-solving approaches arising from an
information-processing approach.
Information-processing
This approach was promoted by Newell and Simon (1972). They
described how our limitations in problem-solving stem from a
limited memory capacity (see Chapter 4) and cognitive processing
based on a step-by-step (serial) approach. One of the well-defined
problems set by Newell and Simon is the Tower of Hanoi (see
Figure 5.8).
Figure 5.8 The Tower of Hanoi problem

Source: Created by Édouard Lucas (1883)
The objective of this task is to transfer all five disks with the order
of size preserved across to the right peg. This can only be done by
moving one disk at a time and ensuring that smaller disks are on top of
larger ones but not the reverse. The middle peg is a space used for disk
manoeuvre. Newell and Simon introduced the notion of a problem
space whereby the initial state is the starting point and the goal state
defines the problem closure. In between these two states are the
moves that are necessary for success. Examples such as the Tower of
Hanoi can be solved by using rules – relying more on algorithms (set
procedure of steps) than heuristics. The smallest number of moves is
actually 31, but most people, if they solve it at all, take many more
moves. This is because we tend to use heuristics given the limitations
of our information processing capabilities rather than algorithms.
There are different types of problem-solving heuristics considered by
Newell and Simon (see Box 5.7).
BOX 5.7 PROBLEM-SOLVING HEURISTICS

Although the use of an algorithm will guarantee a solution to a
problem, it is generally slower and more effortful than applying a
heuristic. For example, using an algorithm to find a painting by
Edgar Degas (such as checking every painting in turn) will help
eventually locate it in the art gallery, but this might not be the
most effective way of finding it. Instead by using a heuristic,
containing general knowledge about types of painting styles,
looking in the impressionist section will lead to a painting by
Degas more quickly. A means-end analysis is an effective heuristic
where the problem is broken down by the solver into the ultimate
goal and the current situation. The intermediary stages are then
thought through. These can be modified as circumstances change,
such as taking a different route due to bad weather. The working-
forward approach involves trying to solve a problem holistically
from start to finish. Alternatively, when working-backward, the
solver takes account of the end point and tracks backwards to the
starting position. For example, one’s flight leaves at 10 a.m. from
London, so the aim is to work out what time one needs to arrive at
the airport, catch the train, get to the train station and leave the
house. The generate-and-test heuristic involves devising different
courses of action and deciding for each course whether it can
solve the problem. For example, if the route from A to B works
then this is used. If not, then a different one is generated.
MacGregor, Ormerod and Chronicle (2001) claimed that we often
evaluate our progress towards our goal by using the heuristic of
progress monitoring. We tend to monitor how well we are
progressing towards our goal and will change tactics if this progress
is too slow or likely to exceed the allotted number of stages. Newell
and Simon (1972) considered planning as a type of heuristic, but
claimed we only use planning to solve problems modestly given our
limited short-term memory capacity. Interestingly, Paynter, Kotovsky
and Reder (2010) demonstrated how many of our problem-solving
processes occur subconsciously. By recording ERPs (see Chapter 1)
during challenging problem-solving, they found that there was a
differential pattern of ERPs between correct and incorrect moves.
They concluded that subconscious learning occurs independently of
any deliberate planning.
Experience and knowledge play a role in another type of

problem-solving known as analogical, considered next.
Experience and knowledge

Our experience and knowledge shape how we understand our
immediate environment and the objects therein. This enables us to
make comparisons across objects in everyday events. By doing this

we are making analogies. This becomes particularly useful when
we experience new events. Making analogies across events, such as
the new with the old, helps to process information quickly without
too much demand on our processing capacity. Furthermore, an
analogy can be creative, in that two unalike events are compared.
‘Analogical transfer’, for instance, involves the retrieval of suc
cessful strategies and solutions and applying them to similar pro
blems (Goswami 2006). However, the success of these previously
acquired strategies and solutions to new problems, relies on the
degree of similarity of the ‘deep structure’ and superficial features
shared. Chen (2002) recognised three levels of similarity that can
occur across different problems:
1 Superficial similarity where the details overlapping are often

unimportant in the solution.
2 Structural similarity where there are causal connections for
some of the shared components of the problems.
3 Procedural similarity where problems can be solved using
common operations.
Chen found that the best form of similarity was procedural as this
was easier to find and execute. Using analogies is a successful way
of solving many different types of problem (see Box 5.8).
BOX 5.8 DIVERSITY OF ANALOGICAL USE

The development of new theories has often come about through
using analogies from different domains of knowledge, such as the
hydraulic model of the circulatory system and the ‘billiard ball’
model of different gases (Gick and Holyoak 1980). Experts often
draw upon analogies to account for different phenomena such as
‘knowledge brokers’ who develop social networks among people
and organisations through the provision of knowledge sources and
linkages (Hargadon 1999). Dunbar (2001) described how molecular
biologists used structural analogising to help formulate theories.
Experts and novices differ in what they focus on when making
analogies. While experts encode information at a deep structural

level, novices encode superficially (Klein 1999), although this has
been disputed by Dunbar who found that novices could also engage
at the structural level. Vogelaar and Resing (2018) examined
analogical reasoning and problem-solving in 40 gifted and 95
average ability nine-to-ten-year-old children. Children who were
provided with additional training in the application of analogies to
problem-solving showed transference of skill more than those who
were allowed to practice unguided. Methods of increasing sponta
neous analogical problem-solving have been considered across
many areas such as education, design and business (Minervino,
Olguín and Trench 2017). Encouraging participants to make
multiple analogies across many examples before problem-solving
has been found to be a successful way of increasing spontaneity.
This success is due to the increased focus on abstract structures
instead of superficial information.
As we have seen problem-solving involves the use of knowledge

stored in memory as well as previous experience of successful
problem solution. Moreover, to solve problems we make use of
cognitive processors in the brain. Does this mean that changes take
place in a child’s brain as new information is acquired such as how
to solve the ‘bridge over the river’ task? In Chapter 2, we con
sidered how the brain processes information and the changes in
curred at both structural and neurological levels (i.e. the synaptic
landscape). The synaptic landscape of the brain changes as we learn
and shows plasticity. Herholz and Zatorre (2012) defined plasticity
as: “changes in structure and function of the brain that affect be
haviour and that are related to experience or training” (p. 486).
The hippocampus, in the temporal lobe of the brain, has an im
portant role in the development of long-term memories through
learning. The hippocampus enables us to acquire knowledge
through learning and successful problem-solving. Taxi drivers who
have been ‘on the go’ a long time have superior spatial knowledge of
street locations; they have been found to have increased grey matter
in the hippocampus (Woollett, Spiers and Maguire 2009). Despite
research showing changes to brain structure after learning and

training, what is actually changing is still speculative (see Chapter 8).
SUMMARY
There are different types of thinking studied by cognitive psy
chologists: judgements, decision-making, informal reasoning, in
ductive and deductive reasoning and problem-solving. Judgements
involve assessing the probability of something occurring based on
limited information. This is why judgements are dynamic and can
change as further information is added to the mix. Kahneman, in
his dual-process theory, proposed that we have two pathways of
processing information, one automatic and based on the re
presentativeness heuristic and the other effortful relying on cog
nitive processing. Decision-making is ubiquitous and, like
judgements, information is considered using different heuristics.
Kahneman and Tversky argued that heuristics rely on quick
computationally simple calculations of decisions with optimal
outcomes. Decision-making can fall afoul of emotional influences
such as that seen in omission bias and selective exposure. Informal
reasoning is used daily. It is rooted in our knowledge base and our
experiences. Sometimes referred to as critical thinking, it is a sub-
set of logic. Such critical thinking enables us to infer whether a
statement is probably true or false based on likelihoods rather than
certainties. Common errors in this type of reasoning are the straw
man fallacy and the slippery slope argument. Inductive reasoning
involves applying specific cases or information to general princi
ples. Inductive reasoning is used when a conclusion is restricted by
the available information; hence, it is uncertain. However, in
ductive reasoning is akin to creativity. Deductive reasoning is a
form of logic: propositional and syllogistic. The Wason task is a
good example of propositional testing. Syllogistic reasoning also
presents with two premises and a conclusion, but instead the
premises refer to ‘sets’ rather than individuals. The logic of the
premises follow the truth of the conclusion, but the content can
contradict our knowledge of how the world operates. Problem-
solving can utilise any of the above forms of thinking. Problems can
be well- or ill-defined, knowledge-lean or knowledge-rich.
Gestaltists argued we generally solve by trial and error but there
are occasions of insight. In information processing approaches there

is limited cognitive processing capacity which can reduce problem-
solving capabilities. Experience and knowledge used when making
analogies can help reformulate problems and increase solution.
FURTHER READING
Hardman, D. (2009) Judgment and Decision Making: Psychological perspectives.
Chichester: Wiley and Sons.
Krawczyk, D. (2017) Reasoning: The neuroscience of how we think. Cambridge,

MA: Academic Press.
Sternberg, R. (2013) Thinking and Problem Solving, Volume 2. Cambridge, MA:

Academic Press.
Weisberg, R. (2020) Rethinking Creativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.
• 6
LANGUAGE AND
COMMUNICATION
What makes humans unique? Some might argue it’s having a large
brain. Unfortunately, many cetaceans and elephants have larger
brains than us. Or perhaps it’s tool use. But tool use is now known to
be quite common in the animal kingdom from chimps to crows, and
from dolphins to octopuses. Then perhaps it’s bipedal locomotion.
No, here again there are many examples observed in the animal
kingdom including kangaroos, jerboas and pangolins – not to men
tion avian species. The thing that makes us unique is language. While
some apes and parrots have been taught to put a few words together,
they do not come close to the 50,000–100,000 sized vocabulary that
the average literate human has. Nor are members of other species able
to combine these words into an inestimable number of permutations
we observe in our own species. Language allows us to communicate
about past, present and future events and to share our innermost
thoughts and feelings. In this chapter we examine this remarkable
system of communication, including consideration of how language
is acquired, whether it is innate, and how reading, writing and speech
occur. We also consider how it is that we are able to perceive these
forms of language when they are presented to us. Before all of this,
however, we must first consider one fundamental question. If
all animals exchange information, what is it about language that is
different from other forms of communication?
WHAT IS LANGUAGE?
Providing a definition of language which differentiates it from
other forms of communication is no easy task. Rather like love, we
DOI: 10.4324/9781003014355-6
LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 165
all know what it is but defining it is a lot less straightforward than

most people appreciate. Fortunately for our purpose, cognitive
psychologists define language by its properties or criteria. While
there has been a degree of debate about such properties, psycho
linguist Jean Aitchison’s (1989) list has generally become well ac
cepted. Aitchison suggests 10 properties:
● Use of vocal auditory channel: A language uses verbal

communication. While well accepted, this property is also a
little controversial today as it appears to exclude sign language.
It also excludes written communication. But as Aitchison
states, this criterion captures the essence of human language.
● Arbitrariness: Languages makes use of arbitrary symbols which
need not bear a resemblance to features of the discussion.
Hence, ‘cat’ bears no resemblance to the animal it conveys.
One exception to this is the use of onomatopoeia (where the
word sounds like what it refers to such as ‘bang’ and
‘whoosh’).
● Semanticity: Semanticity refers to the fact that words convey
meaning.
● Cultural transmission: Languages are passed on within and
between generations. The words of a language are specific to a
culture.
● Spontaneous usage: Language involves motivation, adults do
not have to instruct their children to talk. Even young babies
attempt to babble as soon as they are able.
● Turn taking: Outside of formal contexts, such as giving a
speech, a conversation involves turn taking.
● Duality or double articulation: To say that there is a duality of
language means that there are two layers. The first layer
consists of the individual letters which are meaningless until
combined together to form the second layer. Hence ‘p’, ‘i’ and
‘g’ have no meaning other than the terms for these letters.
When put together in this order, however, they form the
name of an animal ‘pig’.
● Displacement: Language often refers to things not present
(either in time or place). Hence, we can talk about a soccer
match we watched elsewhere (spatial displacement) and on a
previous date (temporal displacement).
166 LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION
● Structure dependence: All languages have rules about the order

in which words are used. In English we can say ‘cats are furry’ or
‘are cats furry?’ but we can’t say ‘furry are cats’. In contrast
animal vocalisations do not generally require a structure.
● Creativity: To linguistics, creativity refers to aspects of
language which allow us to generate an indeterminately large
number of novel sentences.
You may find it useful to refer back to these ten points when
considering the sections which are coming up in this chapter. We
begin with a word that has struck terror in the hearts of many a
school student, ‘grammar’.
GRAMMAR
In the case of language teachers, grammar refers to the rules of how

words can be put together to form sentences. That is, syntax. To a
cognitive psychologist, however, the definition is somewhat broader
more than this. To them, in addition to syntax, grammar also refers to
phonology (sound patterns – see later), semantics (meaning patterns –
see above) and the lexicon (the ‘dictionary’ that each of us holds in our
heads) (Aitchison 2008). It is worth noting, at this point, that the
lexicon is made up of small units known as lexemes. As we saw in
Chapter 2 each lexeme is a minimal meaningful unit of language. Each
lexeme can occur in various forms such as drive, driving and driven.
Is language innate?
One of the most enduring debates in psychology is whether features of
‘human nature’ are innate or learned. This ‘nature ̶ nurture ’ argument
can be traced back at least as far as Plato (427 ̶ 347 BCE) and Aristotle
(384 ̶ 322 BCE). Plato considered that much of human nature is innate
(nature) while in contrast Aristotle considered we have to learn ev
erything (nurture). During the first half of the twentieth century the
predominant view in psychology followed Aristotle with humans
being considered to be born as ‘blank slates’ and to have to learn lit
erally everything. This view was due largely to the behaviourist per
spective which was predominant at that time (see Chapter 1). The
most famous behaviourist was of course Harvard psychologist, B. F.
Skinner. Having suggested that, in effect, there is no such thing as

‘human nature’ with all responses being learned, in 1957 Skinner
published a behaviourist account of language development entitled
Verbal Behavior. He suggested that language can be explained simply in
terms of forming associations between two stimuli (object and sound)
that work via trial and error (known as ‘operant conditioning’) with no
need for any complicated innate mental mechanisms.
Linguist Noam Chomsky decided it was time to challenge this
behaviourist assumption and, in reviewing Verbal Behavior, suggested
simply making stimulus associations cannot explain the development
of human language (Chomsky 1959). He suggested that this form of
learning could not explain language learning with use of the ‘argu
ment from the poverty of the stimulus’, also known as the ‘learnability
argument’. The reasoning here is that, given children learn language
so rapidly, and given they make so few errors, trial and error, stimulus
association learning could not work without there being some form of
general learning mechanism. Put differently, we can say that children
have innate knowledge which helps them to fill in the blanks.
We can illustrate this by turning a statement into a question (as
Chomsky did). Taking the following statement:
(1) The woman is eating pasta.
Simply by taking the ‘is’ and moving it to the beginning of the

sentence the sentence can be turned into a question.
(2) Is the woman eating pasta?
Now imagine a child is attempting to induce the rule which

changes statements into questions simply by observing instances of
the type of statement (1) and question (2) above. Then imagine the
child encounters a different sentence that she needs to know how
to turn into a question.
(3) The woman who is wearing a red dress is eating pasta.
The problem here is that the word ‘is’ appears twice. So, which one
should the child move? A child who is familiar with simple sentences
such as sentence 1 might be tempted to move the first ‘is’ to produce:
*(4) Is the woman who wearing a red dress is eating pasta?
Clearly, this is ungrammatical (note linguists flag this up by use of

an asterisk). According to Skinner’s trial and error conditioning
view of language development, we should expect to see this sort of
error. And yet we don’t. This, according to Chomsky, is because
children innately break up (parse) sentences into units such as noun
phrases and verb phrases.
In sentence (3), the noun phrase is longer: ‘the woman who is
wearing a red dress’ because ‘who is wearing a red dress’ is saying
something about the woman (noun) rather than what she is doing
(verb). Since forming a question means the child has to ask what the
woman is doing (the verb phrase), the ‘is’ that is moved needs to be
the one that relates to the verb phrase not the noun phrase. (Note, if
we were asking a question about the woman (whether she is wearing
a dress) then we would need to move the ‘is’ from the noun phrase to
end up with ‘is the woman who is eating pasta wearing a red dress?’).
Even though most people have never even heard of noun and verb
phrases, they appear to know implicitly how to use them in a manner
that is grammatically correct. This is also true of quite young children
who have yet to study formal grammar.
Universal grammar
The example presented above is a typical one which supports
Chomsky’s learnability argument. Parents do not explicitly teach
their children these rules concerning noun and verb phrases and yet
they pick them up implicitly due, according to Chomsky, to the
innate ability to learn languages (which contrasts with other species –
see Box 6.1). Put simply, we can think of evidence of ‘learnability’ as
being supportive of the conception of the development of language
being an innate facility. If we have an innate ability to acquire lan
guage, then arguably, we must have innate ‘language software’.
Chomsky has proposed that children are born with a series of mental
switches which he calls ‘parameters’ that can be turned on by lin
guistic experience. This is part-and-parcel of a package that he calls
‘universal grammar’. This does not mean that language (or even
grammar) is innate but that we naturally respond to vocal input by
creating our own grammar and that, while this appears to vary, it is
BOX 6.1 ARE ANIMALS CAPABLE OF LANGUAGE?

As we have seen, Chomsky suggested language is a specific human
ability. This raises the question, are we alone in having this special
ability? Do any animals have the ability to use language? There are
two ways of addressing this question. First, we can ask, do any
animals naturally communicate in ways which we might label
‘language’? And second, if they don’t naturally make use of
language, can they be taught to do so?
With regard to the first question, much progress has been made
in our understanding of the nature and complexity of animal
communication over the last half century. Primates, being our
closest relatives, have been studied in some detail. One of the most
impressive findings comes from field observations of vervet
monkeys. These small old-world monkeys use four different alarm
calls to distinguish between different predators (Cheney and
Seyfarth 1990). They use a chutter call when they see a snake, a
chirp when they see a lion or leopard, a rraup when they see an eagle
and finally a uh! when they see a spotted hyena. Not only do they
use specific calls for specific predators, but also other members of
their troop respond in different and appropriate ways (such as
standing on their hind legs to look for snakes and climbing trees to
avoid lions and leopards). This finding is certainly impressive and
suggests monkeys are capable, up to a point, of symbolic commu
nication (see Aitchison’s 10-point list earlier). More recently, wild
chimpanzees have been shown to make use of a large number of
different gestures, each of which appears to have quite specific
meaning (Hobaiter and Byrne 2014). Note this suggests that, in
addition to making use of symbolic communication, apes are
capable of semanticity. Interestingly, not only do chimps make
use of quite specific gestures, but 46 of the same gestures have
been also been observed in 1 ̶2-year-old toddlers (Cartmill and
Hobaiter 2019). This might be taken as suggestive that such
gestures are evolutionary, ancient, and arose in a common ancestor
prior to our split from the great apes.
Turning to the second question, once again most attempts to
teach animals language have involved the great apes. One of the
earliest was the case of Washoe, a female chimp who was taught
American Sign Language (ASL) by Allen and Beatrix Gardner from
the mid-1960s on. There are debates as to how well she was able to
learn and make use of ASL. On the one hand, she did learn to use
350 different signs and quite often put a short string of signs
together (usually 2- or 3-word strings) (Gardner and Gardner 1969,
1980). On the other hand, the vast majority of 2- or 3-word strings
were requests for food and the word order could be seen as random.
That is, Washoe would just as likely sign ‘GO SWEET’ as ‘SWEET
GO’. So, while there is reasonably strong evidence of semanticity
and symbolism, the evidence for creativity is less clear cut
(Aitchison, 2008). Greater success was attained with a bonobo (a
cousin of common chimps) called Kanzi who was taught to make
use of a keyboard containing symbols representing various words.
Kanzi not only managed to learn to use over 200 symbols
appropriately, he also responded to over 500 words when used by
his researcher Sue Savage-Rumbaugh. It is clear that he was able to
respond appropriately to novel requests such as ‘give pine needles
to Kelly’ (Savage-Rumbaugh, Murphy, Sevick, Brakke et al. 1993).
This is good evidence both of semanticity and of structural
dependence. Despite this, he rarely engaged spontaneously in this
language beyond, like Washoe, requesting food. This is quite
different from human toddlers who appear to be strongly motivated
to engage in conversation and, as any parent will be aware,
constantly ask questions about the world around them. In summary,
some other primates can be taught to make use of a number of
aspects of what we define as language, but probably not all of
Aitchison’s ten features of human language. This might be taken as
indirect evidence that language is a specific human ability.
broadly similar between cultures. Languages around the world, for

example, are all based around subjects, objects and verbs, even if the
specific rules of syntax vary somewhat. Hence, due to universal
grammar, children take basic input and very rapidly induce the rules
of that specific language.
READING AND SPEECH
Most experts today consider that the roots of human language date
well back into prehistorical times (Hauser, Yang, Berwick,
Tattersall et al. 2014). While spoken language, as we understand it,

is likely to have arisen with the evolution of Homo sapiens around
150,000 ̶ 200,000 years ago, it is believed that a simple proto-
language first evolved around 1.8 million years ago (in a ‘proto-
human’ species called Homo erectus; Fitch, 2010). In contrast,
written language is a newcomer on the scene with most scholars
dating it back to cuneiform writing that arose in Mesopotamia
around 5,500 years ago. This means that, while spoken language
may, in some sense, be seen as an innate human faculty, written
language is more of a recent human cultural invention. This may
help to explain why children develop spoken language so rapidly
(and appear motivated to do so) but find learning how to write it
down so arduous. In fact, recent estimates suggest 10 per cent of
the population have some form of dyslexia (British Dyslexia
Association 2018). Given this high proportion, developing an
understanding at a cognitive level of how reading works and why it
sometimes doesn’t, goes beyond mere academic intrigue.
Reading involves a number of different forms of cognitive
processing including phonology (the way that words sound), or
thography (the conventions of how a language is written and in
particular, how words are spelled), semantics (the meaning of
words) and grammar (as discussed above).
Phonological processing
Phonological processing refers to the idea that when we read
words, we are accessing the sounds these words make when
spoken. The question is, is this how we read? Two main models
have been developed which seek to answer this:
● The strong phonological model – it is necessary to represent

words phonologically in order to read them.
● The weak phonological model – because phonological
processing is relatively slow it is not vital for word identifi
cation.
The strong phonological model is particularly associated with Ram

Frost (1998). Frost proposed that it is necessary to form an inner
phonological representation when reading even though this does
not always require explicit pronunciation of each word. In contrast,

Max Coltheart and co-workers have provided evidence that, when
reading, we do not process individual letters, which suggests we do
not need to engage in strong phonological representation of the
words (Coltheart, Rastle, Perry, Langdon et al. 2001). How, we
might ask, do people like Frost and Coltheart study this process? In
fact, there are a number of experimental methods that have been
devised to study the relationship between seeing written material
and the processes then taken to read it.
One method of investigating the psychology of reading is
through a process called ‘phonological priming’. Priming in cog
nitive psychology refers to the presentation of a stimulus (usually a
word or ‘non-word’ or a picture; see Chapter 4) prior to a second
word in order to influence the reaction to the second word.
Hence, in phonological priming, two phonologically overlapping
words are presented with the first word (the prime) being used to
influence the speed or accuracy of the second (target) word. Some
primes are considered as positive if they increase either the speed or
the accuracy of the target word. An example of this might be
presenting the prime word ‘NURSE’ followed by target
‘DOCTOR’. In this case the prime increases speed and accuracy of
reading the target word. Negative primes do quite the opposite by
reducing the speed and/or accuracy of the target word. An ex
ample of this might be using the prime of ‘APPLE’ followed by the
target word ‘DOCTOR’. In this case the prime is likely to reduce
speed and accuracy of the target word because, at some level, the
participant is likely to expect the next word to be a fruit. This
phonological priming paradigm has been used in a number of
experiments in order to determine the role of phonology in
reading. In some experiments a word is preceded by a phonolo
gically identical non-word. This might sound rather strange – but
such non-words can be derived. Think of ‘CUP’ and ‘KUP’. They
should have identical pronunciation, but the former is a real word
and the latter a non-word. When Rastle and Brysbaert (2006)
reviewed a large number of phonological priming studies, they
found words are processed more rapidly if phonologically identical
non-words were presented first (i.e. used as primes). They took this
finding as evidence for the strong phonological model as it suggests
phonological processing having occurred to the prime then
increased speed and accuracy to the target word. Rastle and

Brysbaert suggest this occurs both rapidly and automatically (see
also Castles, Rastle and Nation 2018).
Another way of addressing this issue is by studying individuals who
have received brain injury which has altered their language abilities.
One such study by Hanley and McDonnell (1997) provided evidence
that the meaning of written words can be attained without access to
phonology. Hanley and McDonnell made a study of PS, a man in his
late forties, who following a left hemisphere cerebral infarct (stroke),
had quite severe language problems. In particular, assessments
showed that PS did not have access to phonological processing.
Despite this he was still able to access the meaning of written words.
Interestingly, despite his linguistic problems, PS had relatively well-
preserved written spelling. Clearly, this case study provides evidence
that we do not have to make use of phonetics in order to read. Other
case studies have subsequently reported broadly similar findings (Han
and Bi 2009). Such studies therefore provide support for Coltheart
et al.’s weak phonological model.
Overall, while the evidence suggests phonological processing
is normally involved in reading, hence supporting the strong
phonological model, specific case studies have demonstrated that
this is not essential, thereby providing some support for the weak
phonological model.
Reading out loud

Although reading was described earlier as an arduous task to master,
once we have mastered it, rather like driving a car, reading out loud
appears be have become almost effortless. We should not, however
underestimate just how complex a process this really is. We can
illustrate this with an example of a couple of sentences that you will
no doubt find very easy to read aloud:
John was stuck in a jam with the shopping. He was concerned about
what his wife would say.
We doubt you had any problems reading this sentence aloud and
importantly, understanding its meaning. But what you have just
done is, in reality, quite astonishing (Castles et al. 2018). Think
about it. You see words on a page or screen. You have to identify
them individually which involves, among things, distinguishing
them from numerous similar other words. You also have to extract
meaning from them. This also isn’t as simple as it sounds because
we determine meaning partly from context. For example, we
realise that the ‘he’ in the second sentence refers to John. We also
understand the word ‘jam’ in this context means that John is stuck
in traffic rather than being entrapped in a sticky conserve.
Furthermore, we understand from ‘what his wife would say’ that
John’s wife is likely to be annoyed that he is late, perhaps suggesting
this is not the first time this has happened (or that he has done other
things that she is unhappy about). All of this involves integrating
information and placing demands on working memory and enga
ging executive functions (see Chapter 4). And we haven’t even
begun to consider the demands and skills of reading out loud (see
below). All in all, reading even relatively short and straightforward
sentences involves undertaking a series of highly complex neuro
cognitive tasks. How might we understand this process? Over the
last 20 years cognitive psychologists have developed computational
models of reading in order to describe and understand the cogni
tively driven operations involved in this process.
Computational models of reading

Computational models of reading are, as the name suggests,
computer program-based models which are designed to mimic the
human cognitive processing involved in reading a word (see
Chapters 1 and 2). The aim of producing a computational model is
not only to help understand how we are able to read but also to aid
in our understanding of why some individuals have problems of
acquiring this skill. That is, those who have been diagnosed with
dyslexia. We will consider how each model strives to explain
different forms of dyslexia. Currently there are three main com
putational models of reading:
● Dual-route cascade (DRC) model

● Triangle model
● Connectionist Dual Process models (CDP – hybrids of the
DRC and triangle models)
1. THE DUAL-ROUTE CASCADE MODEL
According to the dual-route cascade model, there are two mechan

isms or routes involved in reading (Coltheart et al. 2001). One of the
routes simply matches the written word as it appears on the page (or
screen) to the spelling entries in the individual’s personal lexicon (see
Figure 6.1). The second route converts the written letters to sounds
which are then matched to the auditory representations in the lex
icon. One of the positive features of the DRC is that it accounts for
the fact that, once we have learned how to read, we can then read
words we have not encountered before. Moreover, we can read non-
words such as slet and nish. Given that slet and nish have no lexical
entries, without this second route we would struggle to read them.
And yet we are able to read such non-words effortlessly (even though
they make no sense). This, of course, raises the question, why do we
need the first route (that is, simply matching the word to our spelling
entry in the lexicon)? This is necessary because it helps to explain how
we are able to read phonetically irregular words such as pint and
answer. That is, words where the second route would not work as we
would pronounce the ‘w’ in answer and the ‘i’ in pint would be
pronounced as it is in pin.
Looking at Figure 6.1, we can see it is called ‘dual-route’ be
cause, following detection of the appropriate features for letters,
there are then two routes to reading; a left hand one which relies
on the lexicon and the right hand one which is a letter-to-
phoneme pathway.
The DRC has been used to help to explain the existence of dif
ferent forms of dyslexia. Most people are aware of the problem that
some individuals have with reading known as dyslexia. They may be
unaware, however, that there are several different forms of dyslexia
(Willingham and Riener 2019). Confusingly, there are a number of
different ways of labelling and classifying forms of dyslexia. However,
three of the most common and recognised forms are:
● Surface dyslexia – the inability to read ‘irregular’ words (those

with unusual print-to-sound correspondences such as yacht)
● Deep dyslexia – a form of acquired (that is, due to brain
injury) reading problem where there are semantic errors and
the inability to read non-words
Figure 6.1 The dual-route cascade model of reading aloud

Source: Adapted from Castles et al. (2018)
● Phonological dyslexia – another form of acquired dyslexia; in

this case there are serious problems with phonology (that is
manipulating the basic sounds of language)
Surface and deep dyslexia, arguably, provide evidence to support

the dual-route cascade model of reading (we will consider pho
nological dyslexia later). Interestingly, those with surface dyslexia
are able to read regular words and non-words, but have great
difficulty reading irregular words. Hence, they can read and pro
nounce the words curse or crebe correctly but have great difficulty
with the pronunciation of the irregular glove (generally reading it as
rhyming with cove; Willingham and Riener 2019). With regard to
the DRC, this suggests the letter-to-phoneme route (on the right-
hand side of Figure 6.1) remains intact but that the orthographic
lexicon to phonological lexicon route (left-hand side) is damaged.
In contrast, those with deep dyslexia can read both irregular words
such as knife and regular words such as dig, correctly but are unable
to read non-words such as blad. This suggests the letter-to-
phoneme route is damaged, but the phonological lexicon route is
unimpaired. Hence, the fact that we observe these two quite dif
ferent forms of acquired dyslexia appears to be conducive to dis
ruption of the two separate routes of the DRC.
2. THE TRIANGLE MODEL
A second computational model is the ‘triangle model’ (also known as

the ‘connectionist triangle model’; Harm and Seidenberg 1999;
Seidenberg and McClelland 1989). The three points of the triangle
are orthography (broadly spelling), phonology (sound patterns) and
semantics (meaning). The triangle model proposes there are two
routes by which a printed word comes to be read out loud. There is a
direct route which involves linking orthography to phonology
(spelling to sound). And there is an indirect route via semantics to
sound (that is, readers can also use their phonology-semantics system
which has previously been developed for spoken language). This
means that ‘mapping’ from orthography to phonology involves si
mulation of reading out loud, but also involves an indirect route via
semantics. Note that in this model these two routes are able to in
teract making it somewhat different from the DRC (see Figure 6.2).
Figure 6.2 An illustration of the ‘triangle’ model in which three cognitive

facilities interact to enable various language skills: known as the
‘connectionist framework for lexical processing’
Source: Adapted from Seidenberg and McClelland (1989) and Plaut,
McClelland, Seidenberg and Patterson (1996)
Importantly, the DRC model assumes that pronouncing non-

words and irregular words involves separate routes. In contrast,
according to the triangle model, because all words vary in their
consistency, they may be available to all routes, but consistent words
and non-words should be read more rapidly than inconsistent words.
In a nutshell, there are two main differences between the DRC and
the triangle model. First, according to the former, the ability to
pronounce irregular words and non-words involves separate routes
and second, in the latter, the two routes interact in the process of
reading.
Given that computational models of reading were developed in
order to help understand reading problems, this raises the question,
how does the triangle model explain the dyslexias? The model
suggests phonological dyslexia occurs when there is a general im
pairment in phonological processing. This is why individuals with
this condition have difficulty reading both unfamiliar words and
non-words. Coltheart (1996) identified a large number of cases of

phonological dyslexia where a general phonological impairment
was clear. This is at least consistent with the triangle model. Also,
when considering both phonological and deep dyslexia participants
together, Crisp, Howard and Lambon Ralph (2011) found, as the
triangle model predicts, both groups had a substantial impairment
in the ability to translate orthography into phonology. This is more
conducive to the triangle model than the DRC.
3. CONNECTIONIST DUAL PROCESS MODELS
Because both dual-route cascade and connectionist triangle models

have some evidential support, one problem which has arisen is how do
we determine which is the better model of reading? One way of re
solving this is to attempt to incorporate facets of each into a new model.
This is what proponents of the third type of model, the ‘connectionist
dual process model’ (CDP), have attempted to do (Perry, Ziegler and
Zorzi 2007; Ziegler, Perry and Zorzi 2014). The term connectionist
refers, in this context, to models in which behaviour emerges from a
large set of loosely connected units (see Chapter 2). In a sense this can
be seen as a division of labour model where lexical and non-lexical
processing is conducted by different neural networks. The model
makes use of input nodes from feature detectors to letter nodes (that is
sub-lexical units). It then passes processed information onto two main
routes; a grapheme based one (note, a grapheme is a specific single
sound and can be represented either by a single letter such as ‘o’ or a
group of letters such as ‘er’) and an orthographic and phonological
route eventually leading to phoneme output (see Figure 6.3).
Because such models are designed via computer programs, they
have seen a number of up-dates. Hence, we have seen the devel
opment of the CDP + , the CDP + + and the CDP + + .parser over
recent years (just think of the various versions or Microsoft Word or
Adobe that have been rolled out over the years). The precise nature
of each would be beyond the scope of this text. What they all share in
common is the conception of reading being the result of following a
set of grapheme-to-phoneme conversion rules. In applying their
model to the understanding of various forms of dyslexia, Ziegler et al.
(2014) suggest it is visual and phenome deficits in this connectionist
dual code approach which are responsible for reading difficulties.
Figure 6.3 Representation of connectionist dual process model

Source: Adapted from Perry, Ziegler and Zorzi (2007)
In summary, the three models of reading which we have briefly

presented here may appear complex and even perplexing at times.
The important take home message is that all converge on the
conception of reading as involving two key cognitive processes or
routes. First, there is one route that decodes a word’s spelling into
its sound and then its meaning. Second, there is another route
which involves direct access to meaning from spelling (without
having to resort to phonology). (Note, the notion of dual pro
cessing is supported by brain scanning findings – see Box 6.2).
SPEECH PERCEPTION
As with reading, the ability to perceive speech is a complex one

about which much research has taken place. Speech perception
involves a number of stages from hearing through processing to
understanding. How this process operates is important not just for
our general understanding of speech but also, as in reading, to help
us understand why some people have difficulty in this faculty. One
influential model of speech perception was outlined by Anne
Cutler and Charles Clifton in 1999. They proposed that there are
five main stages to speech perception:
BOX 6.2 THE NEURAL BASES OF READING

Recent evidence from brain scanning studies suggests there are two
main neural pathways which convert the printed word into the
spoken word (Castles et al. 2018). First, there is a dorsal pathway
(top of the brain) which underlies phonologically facilitated reading
and second, there is a ventral pathway (side of the brain) which
underlies direct access from print to meaning (see Figure 6.4).
Findings from neuropsychology support this model since it is
known that patients suffering from damage to parts of the dorsal
pathway have great difficulty reading non-words, whereas those with
damage to parts of the ventral pathway have much difficulty reading
irregular words (Castles et al. 2018; Rastle 2019). Note that such
findings add weight to the computational models of reading.
Figure 6.4 Dorsal and ventral pathways from print to spoken word
Source: Adapted from Rastle (2019)
1. Decoding – separating speech from other auditory input

(including other voices)
2. Segmentation – of the signal into its component parts
3. Recognition – of words as such
4. Interpretation – of the utterance
5. Integration – of meaning to construct a model of the message
Cutler and Clifton’s model is represented in Figure 6.5. As with all

auditory information, speech consists of sound waves which reach
our ears. Spoken language, however, rarely occurs in isolation of
other sounds, meaning that, from the cacophony of noise which our
Figure 6.5 The processes involved in speech perception and comprehension

Source: Adapted from Cutler and Clifton (1999)
ears pick up, we must first recognise those which constitute speech.
Fortunately, the human auditory system is able to make use of
grouping mechanisms such as frequency characteristics which allows
us to assign them as speech (this means that speech occurs within
certain anticipated frequency parameters; Cutler and Clifton 1999).
Isolating the sound components which constitute speech, that is
phonemes, is part of the decoding stage. Note that at this stage we also
have to transform this input into an abstract representation. Hence,
we extract specific phonetic elements that make up the speech we are
hearing. There is debate as to whether the next stage involves
identification of phonemes or syllables (Eysenck and Keane, 2020)
but, in either event, this process is one of segmentation so that lan
guage does not appear as a stream of sound. Following segmentation,
we begin to recognise words via comparison with our personal
lexicon. This is not as easy as it may sound since the indeterminately
long list of words in, for example, the English language, is based
around a mere 35 phonemes. This means that many words resemble
each other and distinguishing between them is no mean feat.
Context, of course, helps us here. If, for example, someone says ‘one,
two three’, rather than ‘set me free’ then, even though the last word
of these sentences is very similar, context helps us to recognise the
correct word. According to Cutler and Clifton part and parcel of this
process is lexical competition. This means that there is competition
between candidate words when assessing which word we have heard.
This comparison process acts to sharpen up distinctions between
candidate words, leading rapidly to rejection of the inappropriate
words and acceptance of the appropriate one. Following segmenta
tion and recognition we begin to interpret the utterance by extracting
meaning. Finally, the fifth stage involves integrating the meaning of
the current utterance with previous ones in order to fully understand
the discourse. (Note, some experts consider language to be supported
by specific functional modules – see Box 6.3).
LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION
So far, we have considered how we are able to deal with written

language and speech as separate processes. Language comprehension
goes beyond this, however, as higher level processing involves un
derstanding entire narratives (often by bringing together information
BOX 6.3 FODOR’S CONCEPTION OF A LANGUAGE

MODULE
In 1983 the American philosopher of science Jerry Fodor introduced a
new concept into our view of cognition. This is the concept of the
‘module’ or, to be more precise, the ‘modular mind’. In his book ‘The
Modularity of Mind’, Fodor proposed that many cognitive processes
are self-contained, domain specific modules (see Chapters 1, 8 and 9).
Following on from the ideas of Chomsky, Fodor suggested such
modules were innate and evolved to serve specific functions. In
particular, Fodor perceives modules in relation to perception and
language. But what does it mean to say that cognitive processes are
modularised? The most important feature of modules is that of
domain specificity, which means they process particular forms of
input. Hence, according to Fodor, modules react to specific stimuli
such as certain aspects of speech. Max Coltheart’s proposed dual-
route cascade model of reading (see earlier) is an example of a system
which contains specific language processing modules (see also
Figure 1.5 in Chapter 1). Fodor’s original conception of a dedicated
language module has not been without its critics. Neuroimaging
studies suggest that the human brain demonstrates a relatively high
degree of connectivity (Zerilli, 2021). That is, various areas of the brain
interact when cognitive processes are engaged. This apparent dispute
might be partly resolved if we consider modularity to be more
functional rather than structural. This means that while there might
not be strict anatomical modularity, there may still be pathways in the
brain which are largely devoted to quite specific problem-solving tasks
(such as identifying aspects of linguistic input, Fodor, 1983, 2000).
from both written and spoken forms of language). Here we consider

this higher level of comprehension through developing an under
standing of two important linguistic concepts – parsing and prag
matics. This then leads us on to a consideration of discourse.
Parsing
Parsing, as we saw earlier, consists of breaking down a sentence
into its component parts based around syntax and grammar. This
Figure 6.6 Diagram of a parsed sentence
allows us to classify each word by the part it plays in a sentence.

Often, as a linguistic exercise, this is illustrated by sentence dia
grams. Figure 6.6 presents an example of this.
Here we see that the sentence can first be broken down into a noun
phrase (who the person or thing is – in this case Sandie) and a verb
phrase (what the person or thing is doing – in this case eating a bis
cuit). We can then go further by identifying Sandie as a proper noun
(that is a specific named entity) and the verb phrase can be sub-divided
into a verb – ‘ate’ and a noun phrase within the verb phrase – ‘the
biscuit’ (which incidentally is a common noun meaning it is a general
non-specific thing). The noun phrase embedded in the verb phrase
can then be broken down into a determiner (a word that introduces a
noun) – in this case ‘the’ and the common noun – ‘biscuit’. Note that
in English a determiner always comes before a noun.
While the above provides a formal grammatical explanation of
parsing, this is something we do all the time in a less formal manner in
order to understand a speaker. That is, we have to know what the
noun phrase and the verb phrases are in order to follow the speaker,
even if we don’t know these are the formal names for such com
ponents. This means that parsing involves working out the gram
matical and syntactical structure of language. How we parse is a
matter of debate. One way that this is achieved is via an under
standing of prosodic cues. Prosody concerns elements of speech other
than simple phonetics, such as intonation, rhythm, pause, stress and
word duration. Hence, prosodic cues are those where differences in
these features help us to extract meaning. This can make a big dif
ference when a sentence is ambiguous. If we say, “the children make
tasty snacks”, then this can mean either that the children are good at
preparing a tasty snack or that they are themselves tasty! Prosodic cues
help here – although it has to be said that this is an extreme example
for the sake of illustration. Researchers have made use of ambiguous
statements to help understand the importance of prosodic cues.
An example of this is Gayle DeDe’s (2010) research into how
individuals with aphasia (language problems which follow brain
damage) struggle with ambiguous sentences where the ambiguity
can be created by use of a pause, such as:
“While the parents watched (,) the child sang a song.”
Note that if we pause between the first four and the last four words
it reads as if the parents were watching something, but not ne
cessarily the child. If we exclude the pause, then it becomes clear
that the parents are watching the child sing. DeDe found that in
dividuals with aphasia were less able to make use of the prosodic
pause cue. So even pausing very briefly can help us to parse a
sentence, although this can be difficult for those suffering from
aphasia. This suggests that the ability to make use of prosodic cues
can be one of the facilities which is disrupted by aphasia.
Pragmatics
Pragmatics concerns how language is used in terms of what the
speaker intended to say, rather than the actual words used. Sounds
confusing? Here’s some examples:
● ‘It’s raining cats and dogs.’ Clearly this is not literally the case,
hence pragmatics includes figurative rather than literal language.
● ‘You got a mark of 20 per cent on the exam, boy you really
put in a lot of effort.’ Here the speaker is using irony, with the
real meaning being the opposite of the stated meaning.
● ‘You failed your driving test 6 times now; you certainly take
the biscuit.’ This combines both figurative language and irony.
Note that in each of these cases, simply understanding the se

mantics of what is being said is not enough to follow the speaker’s
meaning. Hence, pragmatics is very much about context.
Discourse and predictive inference

Thus far we have focused on individual sentences. Most linguistic
encounters involve at least several sentences. When we use the term
‘discourse’, we are normally referring to speech or written language
which is at least several sentences long. When a series of sentences is
written down and they are related to each other (the normal pattern)
researchers refer to this as ‘text’. Hence, written discourse concerns
extended language or text rather than a simple statement. (Note that
‘discourse’ means something a little different to social scientists. To
sociologists in particular, the term carries connotations about power
and politics.) To follow discourse, we need to make inferences about
what the speaker (or writer) is attempting to communicate. Discourse
allows us to understand a great deal more than stand-alone sentences.
Consider the following example:
‘Sandie was getting annoyed’

‘It took Lance a very long time to make the tea’
‘When Sandie saw Lance, she gave him the cold shoulder’
The individual sentences provide us with information, but by

putting all three together we are able to make a number of in
ferences. We infer that Sandie is annoyed with Lance because he
took such a long time to make tea for her (note that in this context
a ‘cold shoulder’ is, of course, figurative rather than literal and
hence related to pragmatics). We might also infer a great deal more.
Perhaps Lance has a history of being slow to make the tea. Perhaps
this isn’t the case but rather Sandie is a somewhat impatient person.
We would also probably infer that Sandie and Lance are an ‘item’.
We might be right or wrong in all of these inferences, but without

considering all three sentences we would be unlikely to make as
many inferences.
As we read or listen to someone speaking, we constantly predict,
by inference, what we are about to read or hear. For obvious reasons,
cognitive psychologists and linguists call this predictive inference.
Cognitivists have shown a great deal of interest in the role that
predictive inference plays in comprehending discourse, especially
when reading. In particular they have developed two main theories
to explain how such inferences are generated (Nahatame 2014):
● The constructionist theory – readers construct a global mental

model of events
● The minimalist theory – readers construct a relatively re
stricted mental model of events
According to the constructionist view many elaborate inferences are

drawn as we read (Bransford, Barclay and Franks 1972). This per
spective suggests we form elaborate inferences due to embellishing the
information as we read. If we look at the sentence above which began
with ‘Sandie was getting annoyed’, it is certain that we immediately
begin to wonder why this is the case. Many researchers, however, who
subscribe to the minimalist approach, suggest the constructionist ap
proach would open up too many possibilities and that we are likely to
make only one or two possible inferences (Nahatame 2014). Graesser,
Millis and Zwaan (1997) have attempted to reconcile minimalist and
constructionist theories by suggesting we make use of the former
when scan reading but move on to the latter when we are reading
slowly and consciously attempting to comprehend the discourse.
Note that in either case a reader has to draw on both long-term
memory (otherwise much of what we read would be incompre
hensible) and working memory (that is, we need to maintain in
formation we have just read in order for us to develop a narrative; see
Chapter 4).
Understanding discourse – the construction-integration model

One model of discourse comprehension which builds in the
notion of inference, is that of Walter Kintsch (1988, 2005). In his
construction-integration (CI) model a number of inferences are

activated in parallel, but then the irrelevant ones are rapidly
deactivated. (Note that this can be seen as a compromise be
tween constructionist and minimalist theories introduced above.)
In order to achieve this both top-down and bottom-up processes
are involved (see Chapter 3). According to Kintsch, during initial
processing we make use of bottom-up mechanisms as word-
meanings are activated and inferences made. Then, we begin to
draw on general knowledge, as top-down expectation-driven
processes kick in. It is this drawing on top-down knowledge
which keeps us on the right track and away from blind alleys. In
the CI model it is contextual information which allows us to
prune irrelevant propositions that we initially develop in order to
comprehend the text. It is these top-down processes which give
the model the ‘integration’ part of its name. The model also
suggests we develop three separate levels of representation as we
read a passage:
1 Surface – the actual text

2 Propositional – propositions are formed as we read (and then
elaborated)
3 Situational – a mental model is developed which describes the
situation
Put simply, in the CI model we construct meaning and then

integrate it with pre-existing knowledge (see Figure 6.7). While
Kintsch’s CI model is not the only one which has been devel
oped to help explain how we build up an understanding of
discourse, it does appear to stand up well to scrutiny. In parti
cular, the pattern of forgetting each of the three progressive le
vels of representation supports the model. That is, in time we
retain the situational information better than the propositional
information and this, in turn, is retained better than the surface
representation (Eysenck and Keane 2020). For example, if we
look at an actual passage of text (surface) such as ‘cat sat under
the palm tree on the left side of the hut’, we form a series of
propositions which in turn helps us to form a mental model (see
Chapter 5). In this case it is very much a visual image. It is this
situational representation which is the most memorable.
Figure 6.7 Diagram representing Kintsch’s construction-integration model
WRITING AND SPELLING
As we saw when we discussed reading and speech, some form of

spoken language is considered to have begun to evolve around 1.8
million years ago. In contrast, the first known written language,
cuneiform, is believed to date back to around 3,500 BCE. This makes
writing a relatively recent cultural invention when compared with
speaking. In a sense we can think of writing as having piggybacked on
top of talking as a new way of recording events and passing on in
formation. This means that, while we may be well adapted to develop
speech (Workman and Reader 2021), writing comes less naturally to
us and involves a whole series of complex processes which we need to
learn. This raises the question what are these processes? Over the last
40 years cognitivists have developed models to help us understand

such processes. A comprehensive review of each model would be out
of place here and hence we confine ourselves to the most well ac
cepted (although by no means universally so) model today – Hayes’
writing model. Based on earlier work by Chenoweth and Hayes
(2001), his model involves three levels plus a task environment
(Hayes 2012 – see Figure 6.8).
The three levels that Hayes proposed are:
1 Control level – this involves motivation and goal setting to

help form a current plan. In a sense, this level considers why
people write and what the intended outcome should be. Your
Figure 6.8 Representation of Hayes’ writing model

Source: Adapted from Hayes (2012)
motivation might be to revise for or pass an exam, it might be

a letter or email to a friend in order to keep them informed or
it might be to earn money and gain prominence as a
professional writer. Whatever the motivation, in order to
achieve a positive outcome, we need to set goals and monitor
our progress. The writing schemas represent the writer’s views
on how writing processes and resources may be used to create
the text that is currently planned.
2 Process level – this has two major interactive parts: the writing
processes and the task environment. The writing process
involves a number of sub-processes (a proposer, evaluator,
translator and transcriber) all of which interact with the task
environment. Here, transcription (which includes spelling and
orthography) is of particular importance as it takes the language
and creates the text from it. Transcription draws on the
‘transcribing technology’ (from the task environment) which
has changed greatly over the last 40 ̶ 50 years. Today this may
include pens, keyboards and voice recognition technology. The
task environment can also include collaborators or critics who
may aid text construction (at least if they are constructive).
3 Resource level – this includes cognitive resources such as ability
to focus attention, reading abilities, working memory and long-
term memory. According to Hayes, a number of facets of the
writing processes compete for such cognitive resources. For
example, transcription competes with other processes for atten
tion and access to working memory.
Hayes’ model of how experienced writers work can be thought of as

a flow chart of mental processes. Note that, in addition to cognitive
processes, the model also incorporates social and cultural factors.
Hayes’ model appears to suggest that, when we write, there is a
natural sequence we follow from 1 to 2 to 3 as discussed above. The
evidence suggests, however, that while Hayes is broadly correct in
this assumption, there are relatively large individual differences in the
order with which writers make use of these processes (Eysenck and
Keane 2020). Hence, we should not see this sequence as carved in
stone, but rather one that allows for back-tracking and at times
jumping between stages. It is worth noting, at this stage, that inherent
in the ability to write is the ability to spell (see Box 6.4).
BOX 6.4 SPELLING THE DUAL-ROUTE MODEL

In order to write we have to be able to spell. This, of course, is also
true when it comes to reading. Hence, spelling is important for both
of these language abilities. You won’t be surprised to learn that
cognitive psychologists have developed complex models of spelling.
As with reading (see earlier on) a dual-route model of spelling has
been developed (Eysenck and Keane 2020). In this case we have:
1 A lexical route which retrieves spellings of known words from

our personal lexicon.
2 A non-lexical (or assembled) route which uses a sound-to-
spelling process.
These two processing systems are considered to operate in parallel.

In the case of the lexical route, three facets of processing are
brought into the mix: phonology (sound), semantics (meaning) and
orthography (reading). This means that the lexical route contains
information required to connect the sound of a word with both its
meaning and how it is read. In this way this route draws heavily on
long-term memory of word-specific knowledge. The lexical route is
the main one we use when considering familiar words, whether they
are regular letter-to-sound (e.g. dog) or irregular (e.g. ewe) words.
In contrast, the non-lexical route does not involve retrieval of stored
information concerning the sound, meaning and spelling of a word.
Rather it makes use of recalled rules which have previously been
successful when converting sounds or phonemes into letter groups
or graphemes. In this sense it assembles the spelling of the word
based on previous experience. This means that the non-lexical
(assembled) route is efficient for languages where there are
consistent orthographic-to-phonological correspondences (e.g.
Italian or Japanese kana which are symbols used to write
Japanese phonological units) but is significantly less effective for
language where there is inconsistency between orthography and
phonology.
Evidence for this dual-route model comes from neurological case
studies where various forms of acquired dysgraphia (problems with
writing related to brain injury) are observed. Two main forms of
dysgraphia are surface and phonological. In the case of surface

dysgraphia individuals have problems with orthographic represen
tations of words. This means that they rely very much on sound. In
contrast, with phonological dysgraphia it is the spelling of irregular
words that is particularly impaired. This means that those with the
phonological form have problems spelling by sound. The fact that
we see these two forms of dysgraphia provides evidence for the
dual-route spelling model with those suffering from phonological
dysgraphia having an impairment to the non-lexical route and those
suffering from surface dysgraphia having an impairment with the
lexical route (Cholewa, Mantey, Heber and Hollweg 2010). Note in
cognitive neuropsychology this form of evidence is known as a
‘double dissociation’ study (see Chapter 1). Double dissociation
suggests two related mental processes are observed to function
independently of each other because when one route is impaired the
other can still operate.
Working memory in writing

Why, we might ask, is writing so effortful compared to talking? At a
functional level, as we have emphasised, writing is a relatively new
development when considered in the light of human evolution. At a
more structural level, we can explain this by referring to the notion
that writing draws on so many of our cognitive resources (see ‘re
source level’ in Figure 6.8). While attention and long-term memory
are clearly necessary, it has been argued that it is the constant use of
working memory which makes it such an effortful process (Kellogg
and Whiteford 2012). You may recall from Chapter 4, that working
memory is used when we need to store specific information tem
porarily (Baddeley and Hitch 1974). Clearly this is an important facet
of writing. Working memory has four main components: a central
executive, phonological loop, visuo-spatial sketchpad and episodic
buffer (Baddeley 2000; see Figure 4.3). Of these, the central execu
tive is particularly important due to the attentional processes.
Additionally, the phonological loop is used for verbal rehearsal and
the visuo-spatial sketchpad is required for visual processing (Eysenck
and Keane 2020). Given this massive load on working memory and
all of its components, it is hardly surprising writing is so effortful!
SUMMARY
Most psycholinguists agree crucial features of human language
include arbitrariness, semanticity, syntax, cultural transmission,
displacement and creativity. Grammar consists of syntax (rules
about word order), phonology (sound patterns), semantics (the
meaning of words) and the lexicon (the ‘dictionary’ we hold in our
heads). Chomsky suggested language has a universal grammar and is
an innate ability in humans. While some apes demonstrate evidence
of semanticity, their linguistic abilities fall far short of those of
humans. Reading involves phonology, orthography (conventions
of how a language is written), semantics and grammar. There are
two main phonological models of reading: strong models where it
is necessary to represent words phonologically in order to read
them and weak models where this isn’t necessary. Three compu
tational models of reading have been derived. The dual-route
cascade model suggests there are two routes to reading (one which
relies on the lexicon and one which uses a letter-to-phoneme
pathway). The triangle model suggests there is a direct route
linking spelling to sound and an indirect route via semantics to
sound. Finally, the connectionist dual process model conceives of
reading as being the result of following a set of grapheme-to-
phoneme conversion rules. Speech perception is considered to
involve five stages: decoding (separating speech from other
sounds), segmentation (of the signal into its parts), recognition (of
words), interpretation (of utterance) and integration (constructing
meaning). Language comprehension involves the processes of
parsing (breaking down a sentence into its parts), and of under
standing pragmatics (the intention of the speaker). During dis
course we make inferences about the message. Cognitivists have
developed two main theories to explain how inferences are gen
erated. These are the constructionist theory where readers con
struct a global mental model of events and the minimalist theory
where readers construct a restricted mental model of events. The
construction-integration model suggests a number of inferences are
activated in parallel, but then irrelevant ones are discarded. The
model suggests, when reading, we develop three levels of re
presentation: surface (the actual text), propositional (propositions
are formed) and situational (a mental model to describe the
situation). The Hayes model of writing suggests the process has

three levels: a control level (involving planning), a process level
(involving actual writing) and a resource level (involving cognitive
resources).
FURTHER READING
Aitchison, J. (2008) The Articulate Mammal. (5th edn). London: Routledge.
Harley, T. (2017) Talking the Talk: Language, psychology and science. Hove:
Psychology Press.
Seidenberg, M. (2017) Language at the Speed of Sight: How we read, why so many
can’t, and what can be done about it. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Zerilli, J. (2021) The Adaptable Mind: What neuroplasticity and neural reuse tell us
about Language and Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND
METACOGNITION
• 7
‘Cogito ergo sum’ – translating to, ‘I think therefore I am’, a quote by

philosopher René Descartes, was considered in Chapter 5 as key to
understanding how important thought is to our existence. Is there,
however, a deeper meaning encapsulated in Descartes’ quote? Is
the ability to think an aspect of consciousness? When we are in
thought we use a hypothetical mental system resembling a language
shorthand known as mentalese. Mentalese enables us to put con
cepts into pictorial form without the need of words; as used in
speech. When we think about information presented to us, when
we recall memories and even when we enjoy what we are seeing,
we mark the occasion using self-commentary. This self-
commentary can be simplistic such as, ‘Oh this is nice’ or it can be
quite complicated such as ‘I wonder if Tom thinks Mary is an
noyed with me?’ Is the ability to do this a sign of being conscious?
Whilst reading this, you are likely to be attending to the words and
their meaning, which you later reflect and churn over in your mind
to attain the sense of what you have just read. This reflecting is
known as metacognition. Koriat (2007) defined it thus:
“Metacognition research concerns the processes by which people
self-reflect on their own cognitive and memory processes (mon
itoring) and how they put their metaknowledge to use in reg
ulating their information processing and behavior (control)”
(p. 289). Consciousness and metacognition, it seems, go hand in
hand. Koriat (2000) further argued that it is consciousness which
unites our knowledge and metaknowledge together. Defining
consciousness is not straightforward but it is generally considered to
refer to a unique individual awareness of one’s memories,
DOI: 10.4324/9781003014355-7
198 CONSCIOUSNESS AND METACOGNITION
sensations, thoughts, emotions and the external world. This

awareness extends to how the ‘self’ interacts with the external
world. William James (1890) compared consciousness to a con
tinuous and uninterrupted stream, despite changes of direction and
shifts of current. This is a good analogy given that we can attend to
one thing and change our attention to something else, and yet at
the same time experience unbroken consciousness. This suggests
that our consciousness is a dynamic process. We can also experi
ence different natural states of consciousness such as when we sleep,
dream, hallucinate or undergo hypnosis or meditation. There are of
course other altered states of consciousness experienced through
underlying mental conditions such as delirium, disorientation,
confusion, lethargy, stupor and coma. James (1890) also described
the experience of the new-born as a “blooming, buzzing confu
sion” (p. 462; see Chapter 3). What kind of consciousness does this
suggest? It is clear that new-borns are conscious as they appear to be
aware and attentive at times. We might also ask, what is the
conscious experience of individuals who are in a coma? Unlike
new-borns they appear to be unaware of their surroundings and fail
to show behavioural signs of attention. But does this imply that
they lack an internal conscious state? It is interesting how moving
away from traditional behavioural measures of consciousness to
wards neurocognitive ones, provides a new perspective on the role
of consciousness. To understand how we got here, however, it is
important to review the definitions of consciousness and the dif
ferent forms it takes.
CONSCIOUSNESS
There are different perspectives regarding what consciousness is.
For some academics, consciousness is an illusion, and our inner
world merely a commentary on what we should do next (Dennett
1988). Dennett (2003) poses the question of whether the under
lying mechanisms of consciousness can be revealed by researching
this illusion. Alternatively, Oakley and Halligan (2017) conceive
consciousness as a passive observer of our inner and outer world
experience instead of a controlling mechanism for our actions.
They also consider consciousness as an epiphenomenon; an effect
resulting as a by-product from some other process. Meese (2018)
CONSCIOUSNESS AND METACOGNITION 199
said of Oakley and Halligan’s approach that, “They suggest it is the

internal broadcasting … of a selective personal narrative that de
fines the wick of our life during its transfer to memory” (p. 2).
According to Miles (2015) it provides an intuitive review of how
we perceive the world and ourselves. Even Oakley and Halligan’s
understanding of consciousness, however, has been criticised on
account of the fact that consciousness has causal feedback whereas
an epiphenomenon does not (Robinson 2015). Causal feedback
provides us with information about the current situation and what
would be the appropriate action to take next (see Figure 7.1).
Bor and Seth (2012) claim that we should be making a dis
tinction between conscious content and conscious level. This
distinction could be used to clarify how consciousness might be
studied. In the case of consciousness, Coleman (2001) defines it as,
“the experience of perceptions, thoughts, feelings, awareness of the
external world, and often in humans … self-awareness” (p. 160).
This fits in with Bor and Seth’s description of what conscious
content is as it implies that we are aware of information at any
point in time. Conscious level, however, describes the different
states of consciousness, which we established earlier can be
Figure 7.1 A causal feedback loop between consciousness and action

numerous (from being alert to comatose). Further distinctions have

been made – access and phenomenal consciousness. As the name
implies, the access element of consciousness enables us to review
contents and pass this on to memory. Private experiences that are
difficult to present in an available form comprise phenomenal
consciousness. Yet another distinction was made by Baumeister
and Masicampo (2010). In this case phenomenal consciousness is
accessible and refers to our sensations and feelings of the moment; a
basic type of consciousness. Alternatively, the higher form of
consciousness enables us to reason and reflect about past, present
and future life events and the self. By this description, the higher
form of consciousness is analogous to metacognition. To help
establish what behavioural measures can be used to understand
consciousness the functions of consciousness are outlined below
(see Box 7.1).
BOX 7.1 WHAT FUNCTIONS DOES CONSCIOUSNESS

SERVE?
There has been controversy over the issue of free will. The fact that
we can make our own decisions rather than being subservient to
controlling environmental and internally driven factors seems
important to us as humans. Therefore, it is not surprising that
one of the functions of consciousness is to control our actions. By
doing this we are displaying free will. In order to control our actions,
however, we need to be able to perceive our environment and to
communicate with others in social situations (again both controlled
by our consciousness). During social interactions, we make judge
ments about what the other person is thinking – a process referred
to as ‘theory of mind’. While we can communicate information to
others in the here-and-now, we can also entertain ideas about
events and factors unrelated to the present. In fact, Kane, Brown,
McVay, Siliva et al. (2007) found that we consciously think about
things other than the task at hand for about 30 per cent of the time.
Consciousness, it is argued by Tononi and Koch (2015), provides us
with valuable information about our circumstances. Given that we
can only be in one conscious state at a time, the current state of
consciousness excludes other states of consciousness. This means
that specific types of information are available, integrated and

combined; ultimately packaged in a useable form and directed by
the current state of our conscious mind. Consciousness can
therefore be regarded as a form of information processing
(Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts 2017). Some argue that it is in fact a
special way of processing information (Marchetti 2018).
BEHAVIOURAL MEASURES OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Consciousness is measured by considering our conscious experi

ence in relation to the world around us. Gamez (2014) claims that
consciousness can only be measured using first person reports. This
is problematic for various reasons such as accuracy of reporting and
the failure to verbalise non-reportable elements of consciousness.
Much of our conscious experiences appear to be lost in translation
due to being unreportable. This implies that a part of our actual
conscious experiences remains hidden such that what we do report
is limited and lacks intensity (Lamme 2010). Furthermore, Lamme
argues that, in order to report our conscious experiences, we resort
to other cognitive processes such as mentalese, memory and at
tention, all of which can interfere with verbalising experience. It is
this, Lamme argues, that acts as a limiting factor and not the
conscious experience per se. When we consider consciousness, we
often state that we are aware of events occurring. For example, we
use words such as, ‘I saw’, ‘I felt’ or ‘I heard’ – all descriptors
implying a sense of being aware of an event and being ‘tuned in’ or
attending to it. It is not surprising therefore that many behavioural
measures used to study consciousness draw upon our ability to
attend to stimuli. This was demonstrated in an experiment by
Sperling in 1960 (see Chapter 4). Sperling presented participants
with a three-by-four array of letters displayed for 50 milliseconds.
Typically, only four-to-five letters were reported. The explanation
for such underreporting lay with the degradation of the presenta
tion before participants could report all the letters. When, how
ever, participants were cued to recall a part of the presentation,
recall performance increased. A similar result was found by Lamme
using the same system of cueing by pointing to a particular object
only two seconds before the array disappeared and before the
second presentation of the same array. Such findings suggest that
participants do have conscious access to all the stimuli presented for a
while after the array presentation disappears.
An interesting phenomenon called subliminal perception supports
the idea of having access to information and yet being unable to recall
it. This information is presented below the threshold of conscious
perception. This raises the question of how we determine the
threshold of conscious perception. In fact, there are two ways in
which this can be ascertained: objective and subjective threshold. The
objective threshold is determined by the participant’s failure to ac
curately select the correct stimulus from a forced-choice proce
dure. Using this procedure, when participants perform at or below
chance level then objective threshold is achieved. In the case of
subjective threshold, participants are unable to report being con
sciously aware of a stimulus presented and fail to select the correct
stimulus in a forced-choice design. The subjective threshold is typi
cally 30 ̶ 50 milliseconds slower than the objective threshold, sug
gesting that participants are able to detect the stimulus before their
perceived accuracy ratings indicate (Chessman and Merikle 1984).
Whether awareness of information presented to us is a necessary
prerequisite for control over our actions was investigated by Persaud
and McLeod (2008). A letter of the alphabet was presented visually at
two-time intervals: a short interval of 10 milliseconds and a long in
terval of 15 milliseconds. Participants were asked not to respond to the
letter presented but to provide a different letter. The idea behind this
was that if they perceived the letter then they would provide a dif
ferent letter of the alphabet. If they had not perceived the letter, then
they would not know whether the letter they provided was the letter
presented or not. For the 15-millisecond presentation, participants
correctly responded for 83 per cent of trials, but this decreased to 43
per cent for 10 millisecond presentations. The latter was below chance
level and suggested that processing had occurred but was devoid of
conscious awareness. Windey, Vermeiren, Atas and Cleeremans
(2014) provided evidence for there being a grading of perceptual
awareness for simple tasks, but an all-or-none effect for complex tasks.
Subliminal messaging has been used as a marketing ploy for
many years. In addition to marketing, it has also been used in
music, games and Disney and Pixar animations. According to
Kardes, Cronley and Cline (2011) the subliminal message is pro

cessed unconsciously and is unperceived by being masked by
images presented for longer and is therefore consciously perceived.
But can this still have an impact on our behaviour? The evidence
appears to suggest that a subliminal message can influence our
behaviour provided it remains simple. Perloff (2010) claimed that
perception can occur without awareness as seen in the perception
of the subliminal. Such findings as Sperling’s experiments and
subliminal perception indicate that understanding the way con
sciousness operates is far from straightforward. Block (2012) argues
that these findings support his view that there is a difference be
tween access and phenomenal consciousness. Block considers
phenomenal consciousness to be far more extensive than access
consciousness. The reporting of access consciousness, however,
fails to encapsulate the richness of detail found in phenomenal
consciousness. This point of view is not supported by some aca
demics such as Kouider, Sackur and de Gardelle (2012), who refute
the existence of phenomenal consciousness. They consider the
notion of a rich conscious experience as illusory. At the same time,
they suggest we can overestimate the richness of our experiences as
a consequence of our expectation bias. By adapting the Sperling
task, de Gardelle, Sackur and Kouider (2009) demonstrated how
expectations interfere with reporting what was seen in the arrays.
De Gardelle et al. rotated and flipped letters and introduced
pseudo-letters but these were rarely identified by participants. They
concluded that we exaggerate the profundity and richness of our
conscious experience and recall inaccurately.
Whichever way we interpret consciousness and our reporting of
conscious experiences, the role played in social communication and
the control over our actions is difficult to ignore. We find it difficult
to socially isolate from others. This has recently been borne out from
the Covid-19 pandemic. People across the world find it difficult to
avoid communicating with family and friends, which demonstrates
the adaptive role of social communication. Interacting with other
people not only helps us to gauge their intentions but also serves to
develop a sense of self which is rooted in our conscious experiences of
the social and physical world. Marchetti (2018) argued that con
sciousness does more than merely transmit information, it also pro
duces it. Hence, when we attend to stimuli, we are not just
transmitting what we experience but we are also responding to the

information thereby creating new information. To do this effectively
and to report our conscious experiences, Marchetti argues that
consciousness draws upon attention (see Chapter 3) and working
memory (see Chapter 4) to create new information which influences
the self (see Figure 7.2). When communicating with a friend, for
example, we focus on what they are saying and all other manner of
non-verbal communication (such as gestures and eye direction) to
interpret what the intention behind the utterance might be. Such
interpretations rely on the use of working memory and long-term
Figure 7.2 Role of self, attention and working memory in the formation of
conscious experiences
Source: Adapted from Marchetti (2018)
memories of what, for instance, a gesture might mean. Moreover,

what the interpreted intention means for the self, will generate new
information – all processed by our conscious mind. When we try to
make sense of another person’s awareness, we also depend on neural
mechanisms such as sensorimotor neurons (also known as mirror
neurons; see Chapter 8).
Our conscious mind it seems can be passive and active. The in
formation generated is meaningful and adds to our catalogue of con
scious experiences. It also fits in with our plans and goals (Zlatev
2002).This implies that our experiences are continuously transformed
as we interact with our environment and it is the self which provides
the data for our conscious experiences. When reporting our conscious
experiences, we assume that our thoughts to perform an action are of
our own free volition. As pointed out by Aarts and van den Bos (2011),
our own free will involves, “the ability to make choices and to de
termine one’s own outcomes free from constraints” (p. 532). Thus,
when we decide to eat a piece of cake, we do so because it is the choice
of food we have selected. Conscious implementation intentions are
those which determine when, where and how our goals will be
achieved, and we use these in everyday life. Gollwitzer and Sheeran
(2006) studied implementation intentions by considering the findings
from numerous studies (that is, a meta-analysis). The findings from the
meta-analysis highlighted how increased goal achievement occurred
when intentions were of the implementation type rather than less
defined. They concluded that behaviour can be manipulated by
conscious intentions, provided we can break away from the cycle of
habitual behaviours such as putting the radio on when preparing a
salad. Implementation intentions suggest we have free will. Can we
make participants believe they have free will when in actual fact the
experiment was rigged? (see Box 7.2).
Behavioural measures of reporting conscious experience can be
inaccurate and difficult to extract from other factors acting as in
terference or noise. For this reason, cognitive psychologists use
experiments which rely on brain activity indicators.
BRAIN INDICATORS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Given that when we think of consciousness, we associate it with

attention, many studies have focused on what happens in terms of
BOX 7.2 FAKE FREE WILL

Van der Weiden, Ruys and Aarts (2013) designed an experiment to
investigate whether participants can be duped into believing that
they magically made something happen. Participants were pre
sented with a sequence of words shown rapidly on a computer
screen. They had the option to press a button causing the word
sequence to stop at their goal word. When they pressed the stop
button and the word displayed matched their word goal, partici
pants’ perception of self-advocacy was higher than when the word
mismatched the word goal. In reality there was no control over
which word was frozen on the screen – it was all computer
generated unbeknownst to the participants. This study highlights
how easy it is to be duped into believing we have control over
outcomes, when in fact it is a fake free will set-up.
brain activity when we attend to visual stimuli. Lamme (2010) has

studied how conscious experience of visual objects activates areas of
the visual cortex of the brain automatically. Early activation initially
occurs at the visual cortex but progresses rapidly to higher centres
of the brain within a 100 ̶ 150 millisecond timeframe. As previously
discussed in Box 3.5, information flows through the hierarchy of
visual neurons on a feedforward basis. This means that information
progresses on a ‘bottom-up’ processing basis (see Chapter 3). As
pointed out by Gilbert and Li (2013), however, information can
also be based on feedback processing; in this case ‘top-down’.
Lamme claims it is the feedback processing where information
passes from higher to lower areas of the brain that conscious ex
perience co-occurs. In other words, it is top-down and not
bottom-up processing that is involved with our conscious experi
ence. Banich and Compton (2018) emphasise “that there is not one
brain region that is the seat of consciousness, but rather con
sciousness is an emergent phenomenon that arises from the inter
action of brain mechanisms and regions” (p. 330). This implies that
in feedback processing, information about objects is integrated to a
high level thus providing the complexity of detail required for
conscious experience (see Box 7.3). There are different methods
for preventing feedback processing but enabling feedforward
BOX 7.3 IS THERE ANY PROCESSING OCCURRING IN

UNCONSCIOUS PATIENTS?
There are different states of consciousness. When we are asleep, we
are unaware of what is going on around us. When we are in a
lecture, we listen to what is being said and read the PowerPoint
slides – we are alert and attending to our surroundings. Patients
who are in a vegetative state (VS) and those who are in a minimally
conscious state (MCS), are believed to be non-responsive and non-
attentive to what is going on around them. But is there some kind of
processing occurring in the brain? If so, is this feedforward or
feedback or both? Boly, Garrido, Gosseries, Bruno et al. (2011)
hypothesised that impairment to top-down processing (feedback) is
a reliable indicator of consciousness. The frontoparietal cortex (see
Chapter 2) plays an important role in awareness through the explicit
processing of stimuli. Boly et al. studied three groups: VS, MCS and
a healthy control group. They used event-related potentials (ERPs;
see Chapter 1) as a measure of brain activity during the presentation
of auditory stimuli. Feedforward processing was similar for all three
groups. Feedback processing, however, was disrupted in the brain
damaged patients which indicated a loss of consciousness.
Nevertheless, this measure usefully differentiated between the VS
and MCS patients, and could, Boly et al. argued, be reliably used as
a diagnostic tool to quantify the level of consciousness. Hence, such
electrophysiological measures could separate MCS patients from
their VS counterparts.
processing as a means of investigating what happens to conscious

experience. One method adopted by Koivisto, Railo, Revonsuo,
Vanni et al. (2011) was to cease feedback processing using tran
scranial magnetic stimulation (TMS; see Chapter 1). TMS enabled
feedforward processing to continue such that participants could
process the natural scenes and animals embedded but could not
integrate information further using feedback processing. The result
was that participants could not make decisions as to whether ani
mals were present in the natural scenes. In other words, their TMS
interfered with feedback processing and was detrimental to their
conscious visual perception.
But can conscious visual perception occur without feedback

processing, in other words top-down processing? Empirical find
ings suggest it can. When a stimulus is presented briefly and im
mediately followed by another stimulus, known as a masking
stimulus, the second stimulus blocks any feedback processing of the
first one. When Koivisto, Kastrati and Revonsuo (2014) used this
masking approach for some of the target photographs (those con
taining animals), performance rate for responding failed to be sig
nificantly different regardless of being masked (86 per cent) or
unmasked (88 per cent). Despite this, however, the participants
reported being less aware of the masked photographs. Koivisto
et al. concluded that feedback processing enhances perception, but
it is not always necessary. Interestingly, feedback processing can
occur without there being conscious awareness of it (Scholte,
Wittreveen, Soekreijse and Lamme 2006) and yet neural activity in
the brain occurs (Thakral 2011).
Understanding the role of consciousness and feedforward and
feedback processing is best exemplified by studying brain-damaged
individuals. When studying brain-damaged individuals, the level of
consciousness can be categorised according to the severity of da
mage to the brain. Three levels have been identified; coma, ve
getative state (VS) and minimally conscious state (MCS). The most
severe brain damage is coma, and whilst under a coma the in
dividual experiences no wakefulness or conscious awareness. In
contrast, VS individuals show wakefulness but no conscious
awareness. For MCS individuals there is evidence supporting
consciousness. VS individuals have been of particular interest to
academics, given that in some cases, neuroimaging has shown
conscious awareness when performing specific cognitive tasks
(Owen 2013). This occurs despite an exterior presentation of non-
responsivity to behavioural measures (see Box 7.4).
When describing consciousness, we have alluded to the im
portance of attention operating in tandem. In fact, Eysenck and
Keane (2015) likened attention to our choice of television channel
and consciousness to the picture seen on the television set. As we
have seen some individuals in a VS demonstrate consciousness by
the ability to attend to questions asked using the medium of
imagery. Those in a coma show no attention nor consciousness.
So, what is the relationship between the two?
BOX 7.4 ARE INDIVIDUALS IN A VEGETATIVE STATE

(VS) RESPONSIVE?
The cognitive tasks that VS individuals have been subjected to
appear simple enough but, when the processing involved is broken
down, it becomes apparent that the level of cognition required is
multifaceted. For example, these tasks involve working memory,
focused attention, understanding of language and choice of
response. Imagery is often used to enable response selection. In
one case a 23-year-old woman in a vegetative state was requested to
imagine either playing tennis or moving through the rooms of her
house. The two different forms of imagery can be tracked by the
pattern of brain activity evoked which had been established in
healthy participants. This particular VS individual was found to be
able to respond by producing the appropriate brain activity. Using
the same method of imagery, another individual was able to answer
the question concerning his father’s name. In this case, imagining
playing tennis corresponded to ‘yes’ while moving through the
rooms of his house meant ‘no’. His pattern of brain activity
corresponded to the correct answer. Monti, Pickard and Owen
(2013) found it was possible for an individual with a profound
disorder of consciousness to shift attention from superimposed
pictures of houses to faces and vice versa. This shifting of attention
was mirrored by distinct brain activity comparable to that seen in
healthy participants. What is of significance here is that brain
activity changes were driven by the individual’s intention to shift
attention. It seems to be the case that individuals who show the
most consciousness make the best recovery and performance on later
behavioural measures. Although enlightening, sadly some 81 per
cent of individuals fail to show signs of brain activity when
presented with cognitive tasks.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND ATTENTION
The global workspace theory emphasises the role of selective at

tention (see Chapter 3) in influencing which information we be
come consciously aware of. This theory also outlines how our
conscious awareness is directed through early and integrated
processing of information. Event related potentials (ERPs) indicate

that during the early stage of processing visual information, in
dividuals do so without conscious awareness. This is equivalent to
feedforward or ‘bottom-up’ processing. Hence, when Lamy, Salti
and Bar-Haim (2009) instructed participants to locate a target and
vocalise the point at which they were aware of it, ERP amplitudes
occurred independently of conscious awareness. ERP amplitudes,
however, showed an increase of activity once conscious awareness
of the target was realised. Integrated processing is synonymous with
conscious awareness. This is borne out by a study using electro
encephalography (EEG; see Chapter 1) to measure brain activity
using auditory stimuli (King, Sitt, Faugeras, Rohaut et al. 2013).
King et al. compared four groups of individuals: VS (no conscious
awareness); MCS; those recovering from VS or MCS and healthy
controls. Integrated brain activity varied across the four groups such
that those individuals with higher levels of conscious awareness
demonstrated the most integrated brain activity. This is what
would be predicted. Explaining what actually caused the brain
activity (is it conscious awareness or pre- or post-neural activation?)
is a difficult problem to overcome. Also, areas of the brain that
become activated (such as the prefrontal cortex; see Chapter 2)
overlap for attention and conscious awareness. Hence, separating
brain activation for attention from conscious awareness is difficult
and cognitivists have to resort to clever methods of design and
technology such as using TMS. We often consider attention as
being important for conscious awareness and vice versa. But is it?
(See Box 7.5.)
BOX 7.5 THE ATTENTION-CONSCIOUS AWARENESS

CONNECTION
Can attention influence how we behave without being consciously
aware? In one study it was demonstrated that unseen nude pictures
did influence the processes involved in attention (Jiang, Costello,
Fang, Huang et al. 2006). They found that heterosexual men
attended to pictures of naked women even though they were
presented too rapidly for conscious awareness (and vice versa for
heterosexual women). Similarly, Troiani, Price and Schultz (2014)
found that the amygdala and connected neural networks involved in

attention became active when ‘unseen’ fearful faces were presented.
These findings suggest that we do not have to be consciously aware
of stimuli for them to influence our behaviour. The global workspace
theory assumes that attention occurs before conscious awareness.
Some cognitive psychologists, however, contend that conscious
awareness is independent of prior attention. It has been argued that
the global workspace theory has much empirical support, but this is
limited to visual perception. Different results might be found when
the emphasis is on the self and self-knowledge.
An interesting question, and related to attention-conscious

awareness, is whether consciousness is a continuous stream (‘one
stream’) or are there ‘two streams’? In Chapter 2, symptoms of a
discontinuous consciousness were discussed in relation to split-
brain patients. As a reminder, split-brain patients had their corpus
callosum severed by a callosotomy in order to eradicate the oc
currence of their detrimental epileptic grand mal seizures. Sperry
(1968) argued that split-brain patients showed behaviours sugges
tive of a consciousness consisting of two streams. In 2000, Baynes
and Gazzaniga reported, “She [VJ] …. is frequently dismayed by
the independent performance of her right and left hands. She is
discomfited by the fluent writing of her left hand to unseen stimuli
and distressed by the inability of her right hand to write out words
she can read out loud and spell” (p. 1362). There is evidence that
the left and right hemispheres can function independently.
Numerous studies using cognitive behavioural measures have
shown this to be the case (Schiffer, Zaidel, Bogen and Chasan-
Taber 1998; Trevarthen 2004). According to Gazzaniga (2013)
there is only one stream of consciousness which resides in the left
hemisphere (which is usually the dominant one). He accepts that
both hemispheres process information and have their processing
niches, but the left hemisphere plays a more pivotal role in
streaming our consciousness. He uses the example of patient Paul S,
who appeared to have two streams of consciousness but would
typically interpret behaviour exhibited by the right hemisphere
using the left dominant hemisphere. Support for this comes from
anarchic-hand syndrome (see Box 7.6). Colvin and Gazzaniga
BOX 7.6 STRANGE CASE OF ANARCHIC-HAND

SYNDROME
Sixty-nine-year-old GH endured damage to his corpus callosum
which resulted in his left hand not knowing what the right hand was
doing – literally. This condition is known as anarchic-hand syn
drome. It was reported that he would present money with his left
hand on the shop counter, only to put it back into his pocket with
the right hand. When a stimulus, to which he was asked to respond,
was presented to the right hemisphere, he responded poorly in
terms of speed of response and the number of mistakes made using
his left hand. ERP measurements supported this poorer perfor
mance by showing reduced P3 readings in the range of 300 ̶400
milliseconds. P3 is one aspect of an ERP reading and is specifically
involved in attention. The normal response range for P3 is 250 ̶280
milliseconds. In the case of stimuli presentations to the left
hemisphere, the right hand responded more quickly and accurately.
This suggests that the control of processing involved in attention
and the ability to attend resided in the left hemisphere.
(2007), however, claimed that, “No split-brain patient has ever

woken up following callostomy … and felt as though his/her ex
perience of self had fundamentally changed or that two selves now
inhabited the same body” (p. 189).
Conscious awareness is only useful if we can make sense of it
and our conscious experiences can be reflected upon for their
meaning and consequences. This is what metacognition enables
us to do.
METACOGNITION
Schunk (2006) defined metacognition as, “the deliberate con
scious control of cognitive activity” (p. 180). However, Norman,
Pfuhl, Saele, Svartdal et al. (2019) added to this that occasionally
metacognition is automatic and occurs involuntarily which means
we are unaware of it happening. More often than not, however,
it is within our control and allows us to reflect upon our own
thinking. There are at least two functions that metacognition

serves:
1 To monitor our current cognitive activity

2 To control our current cognitive activity
These two functions are interdependently entwined such that me

tacognitive control is influenced by the cognitive activity monitored
and monitored activity needs to be regulated by methods of control.
Monitoring and control can influence both self-regulatory (such as
controlling thoughts, behaviours and emotions) and introspective
processes (such as conscious thoughts and feelings as well as mental
states). Hence, cognitive psychologists have outlined three sub-
components of metacognition (Efklides 2011):
● knowledge
● strategies
● experience
Originally defined by Flavell (1979), knowledge refers to our

ability to understand our own and others’ cognition and the stra
tegies used to help with this understanding. For example, by using a
specific route to travel to work more than once, the route will
become engrained in memory. Therefore, a good strategy is to
stick with the route that works. In the case of metacognitive
strategies, Efklides (2008) outlined how our cognition can be
controlled by using different methods to improve our cognitive
processing. If, for instance, we find it difficult to understand a
passage written in German, then we might use the German-to-
English online dictionary. Metacognitive experiences refers to the
judgements and emotions occurring simultaneously with the cog
nitive activities performed. This, in turn, encourages us to reflect
on these activities. An example of this would be our feelings ac
companying the experience of recording a voiceover on a
PowerPoint slide; is it enjoyable or scary?
Koriat (2007) claimed that metacognitive experiences can be
divided into information-based and experience-based metacog
nitive feelings. In the case of information-based metacognitive
feelings, an individual’s conscious knowledge and past
experiences are influential. Having expertise skills in a particular

area will increase one’s confidence in the accuracy of execution,
for instance. Alternatively, experience-based metacognitive feel
ings can arise from an unconscious route such that the answer
popped into one’s mind or due to familiarity with a task the
response appeared without much thought. Nevertheless
experience-based metacognitive feelings can arise both con
sciously and unconsciously. For Rosenthal (2000) and other re
searchers, the mere definition of metacognition involves
consciousness. Given how metacognition is a form of conscious
reflection about our own and other people’s cognitive processing
(see Figure 7.3), interesting research has been conducted on
dysfunctional thoughts (see Box 7.7) and how these can be
modified using therapeutic intervention (Matthews 2015).
The theory of Self-Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF)
provides an explanation for how dysfunctional metacognitive be
liefs reinforce psychopathological thinking and behaviour (Wells
2009). Cognitive attentional syndrome (CAS) for instance, is
perpetuated by ongoing rumination, anxiety and inappropriate
coping techniques. The negative thoughts held and, just as im
portantly, the dysfunctional beliefs encompassing these thoughts
Figure 7.3 A metacognitive representation of what makes a person smile

BOX 7.7 DYSFUNCTIONAL METACOGNITION

Dysfunctional metacognition such as deficits in thinking or irrational
thoughts have long been associated with psychopathology. The
inability to form theories about another person’s intentions (i.e.
theory of mind), for example, reflects a deficit in processing informa
tion about what other individuals’ behaviour and communication are
telling us. For most of us, understanding of intent becomes apparent
very quickly when we see a person checking their pockets and then
looking on the ground where they were standing. Such behaviour
indicates that the person has lost something and searches for it by
looking nearby. We, in effect, form a theory of what is going on in the
other person’s mind. Some individuals find this very difficult and
some fail to do this at all. Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985)
demonstrated how children on the autistic spectrum fail at this
specific type of metacognition. This has also been found to occur in
some individuals with schizophrenia (Brüne 2005). Dysfunctional
metacognition is common across many mental disorders such as:
● Schizophrenia (Lysaker, Erickson, Ringer, Buck et al. 2011)

● Personality disorders (Dimaggio and Lysaker 2015)
● Depression (Halvorsen, Hagen, Hjemdal, Eriksen et al. 2015)
● Anxiety disorders (Spada, Nikcevic, Moneta and Ireson 2006)
● Dependencies (Saed, Yaghubi and Roshan 2010)
● Obsessive compulsive disorder (Salkovskis, Richards and
Forrester 1995)
Dimaggio and Lysaker (2015) consider metacognition as reflecting

upon what is occurring moment-by-moment in one’s own body and the
surrounding environment. Being able to do this involves the conscious
experience of the self. This draws upon a host of cognitive activities such
as being able to think about one’s thinking and interpret one’s
intentions and feelings and to make connections across different
events. All this information is then integrated to form profound mental
constructs of the self and other selves. Individuals with schizophrenia,
for example, find this difficult to do, and their metacognitive deficits can
cause difficulties in understanding both the intent and internal states of
others, adopting different perspectives of events and the ability to use
metacognitive knowledge. The inability to integrate information is
considered a likely explanation of the disorganised thought experienced

by many individuals with the disorder. Research using EEG measure
ments has shown the importance of information integration by the
brain. Bob, Pec, Mishara, Touskova et al. (2016) claim that, “brain
disintegration corresponds to psychological disintegration” (p. 5).
Individuals with psychosis, such as schizophrenia, have been
treated using metacognitive therapy, which aims to change the way
an individual often thinks and feels about their thoughts. This
approach has proven to be successful in a number of cases
(Vitzthum, Veckenstedt and Moritz 2014).
contribute towards the development of psychopathology (Sun,

Zhu and So 2017; Wells 2009).
Clearly being cognisant of one’s awareness and higher order
thinking skills (i.e. metacognition) plays a key role in how we
reflect on and monitor what is happening around us – and ul
timately our consciousness. But can metacognition also be a
hindrance?
METACOGNITION: HELP OR HINDRANCE?
Metacognition can facilitate optimal cognitive achievement and our

psychological well-being. In the case of cognitive achievement, meta
cognition can help improve learning and retention, problem-solving
and rational and logical reasoning and decision-making. Psychological
well-being has been defined in different ways such as being happy and
self-fulfilled or living without dysfunction or even as having equilibrium
between challenges and resources. Metacognition has been shown to
help achieve psychological well-being via cognitive achievement for
instance. Siegesmund (2016) commented on how metacognitive
awareness can help improve learning in educational settings. In
Norway, children of 6 ̶ 7 years, are actively encouraged at school to
make use of metacognition in their learning (Furnes and Norman
2016). Psychological well-being can also be improved through meta
cognitive awareness, especially by promoting social skill development
(Umino and Dammeyer 2016). Its uses in therapeutic settings have been
discussed earlier in relation to metacognitive awareness of dysfunctional
thought attained through metacognitive therapy (Wells 2011).
Norman (2020), however, outlined three ways metacognition

can disrupt optimal cognitive achievement and the health of our
very being:
1 Interferes with task performance

2 Costs of enacting metacognitive strategies outweigh the benefits
3 Negative self-evaluations arising from metacognitive judge
ments and emotions
Taking the first point, that metacognition can interfere with task
performance, Schooler, Fiore and Brandimonte (1997) demonstrated
how, by verbalising (or verbal overshadowing) about a cognitive task
while trying to perform it, a negative effect can result rather than a
facilitative one. This has been explained as a consequence of there
being a discrepancy between using verbal labels to report on what is
occurring, and the properties of the perceptual experience itself. Chin
and Schooler (2008) refer to this as a ‘processing shift’ from global to
local processing (see Chapter 3). In some cases, verbal overshadowing
works well but in these circumstances it has been argued that me
tacognition is not involved. In the case of costs outweighing the
benefits of using metacognitive strategies, new strategies might need
to be acquired. These therefore require initiative and effort. Norman
(2020) provides an example where the use of a metacognitive strategy
might impair performance: “if reading a novel was part of a student’s
course requirement in English, a conscious strategy to monitor one’s
comprehension during reading is unlikely to increase comprehen
sion, but could very well reduce well-being” (p. 4). Having a ne
gative metacognitive belief about one’s abilities and self-esteem,
could have a detrimental effect on motivation to perform well. The
negativity surrounding one’s sense of worth can be exacerbated by
the metacognitive beliefs held (Tarricone 2011). Engaging ex
cessively in self-reflection can enable opportunities for ruminating
over negative appraisals, and, for some people, this could lead to
obsessive-compulsive disorder.
It should be highlighted, however, that despite the possible hin
drance effects of metacognition, on the whole it has been useful in
encouraging cognitive performance insight. There is clearly a robust
link between awareness and metacognition. Conscious knowledge,
for instance, can be construed as knowledge we know we have
whereas knowledge we do not know we possess is within the domain

of unconscious knowledge (likely to operate using feedforward
processing). This means that metacognition is a controlled and in
tentional process requiring effortful reflection upon one’s mental
activity. But is knowledge about something from a textbook the same
as experiencing it for oneself? (See Box 7.8.)
BOX 7.8 DOES CONSCIOUSNESS OFFER MORE THAN

VICARIOUS KNOWLEDGE EXPERIENCE?
Jackson (1986) introduced the ‘well-known knowledge argument’, a
puzzle that asks whether actual conscious experience offers more
than finding something out in a textbook. Jackson provides the
example of Mary who resides in a black and white room, and who
has therefore never had personal experiences of colour. She is aware
of how colour vision operates and has attained knowledge about
colour from viewing black and white television. She eventually
leaves the confounds of her black and white room and for the first
time she sees a red tomato. From her knowledge she knows that
this is a tomato and that tomatoes are red. But for the first time she
knows what it is like to see red. This can be described as a new
learning experience for Mary. Mary learns and experiences what it is
like to see the colour red. In other words, Mary learns about what
Jackson refers to as qualia – the properties characterising what it is
like to see red. Qualia are individual occurrences of subjective
conscious experience. This implies that perhaps consciousness is
not reducible to physical processing (bottom-up-feedforward).
Hence, how consciousness and the physical world interact is still
an open question. Interestingly, Jackson (1998) changed his view
about the ‘knowledge argument’, and now embraces physicalism –
in other words, the real world is simply physical. Mary, he states,
“acquires a new piece of propositional knowledge, namely, that
seeing red is like this” (Jackson 2003, p. 439).
Is consciousness more than knowledge? Is Timmermans, Schillbach,
Pasquali and Cleeremans’ (2012) quote the way forward in thinking
about the relationship between metacognition and consciousness?
“…thus, metacognition, or ‘cognition about cognition’ appears to
be fundamental to our understanding of consciousness” (p.1412).
SUMMARY
Consciousness appears to be an obvious phenomenon but when
we try to understand it using behavioural measures it can become
ethereal. It is easy to categorise different states of consciousness,
and this tends to be done by considering different levels of
conscious awareness or the ability to attend directly to stimuli.
Nevertheless, when individuals in a VS or MCS are studied using
behavioural strategies but analysed neurologically, it becomes
apparent that some VS cases can answer questions using mental
imagery. Neurological measurements of brain activity show that
their responses to questions using mental imagery are correct.
Hence, even when they outwardly show no signs of attention,
the brain is active and ‘aware’. This begs the question of
how consciousness comes about. When visual stimuli are pro
cessed automatically, feedforward processing (or bottom-up)
occurs. This information is then processed further by feedback
processing, and it is at this point where consciousness becomes
apparent as information is integrated (and a top-down processing
strategy occurs). Conscious experience is considered as part of
our ability to recall memories of events and knowledge. It is also
considered to be fuelled by conscious awareness and our ability
to attend to stimuli. We are, however, able to reflect upon these
experiences and the knowledge we attain using metacognition.
Metacognition has been defined as the ability to monitor and
control our thoughts and behaviour. It is cognition about our
cognition. Although metacognition is widely considered as a
positive process, there are times when it can be a hindrance to
our task performance and well-being. Consciousness and meta
cognition appear to go hand in hand such that, in order to reflect
on our cognition, we need to be aware of our cognition, and to
monitor and control what we do. This only makes sense when
we are consciously aware and have conscious experiences and
knowledge to reflect upon.
FURTHER READING
Dehaene, S. (2014) Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering how the brain codes
our thoughts. New York: Viking Press.
Fleming, S.M. and Frith, C.D. (2014) The Cognitive Neuroscience of

Metacognition. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Koch, C. (2012) Consciousness: Confessions of a romantic reductionist. Cambridge,

MA: MIT Press.
Shoji, M. (2020) Self-Consciousness: Human brain as data processor. Bloomington,

IN: iUniverse.
COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY
• 8
In cognitive neuropsychology the focus is very much on explaining

the mind rather than the brain. In particular, it attempts to explain
“the functional architecture of cognition” (Coltheart 2010, p. 4).
Caramazza and Coltheart (2006) view cognitive neuropsychology as
the exploration of models befitting the cognitive processing deficits
seen in brain-damaged individuals. They claim, however, that cog
nitive neuropsychology “should reach out to cognitive neuroscience
in their common effort to understand the mind-brain” (2006, p. 12).
While the facts about the brain arise primarily from research in
cognitive neuroscience, it is nevertheless important to understand the
brain’s involvement in how the mind operates (see Chapter 2). In
fact, many developments in understanding how our cognition
functions stem from studying brain-damaged individuals. The fol
lowing areas have benefited from such research:
● Production of language (such as speech and reading)

● Memory (such as semantic and working memory)
● Thought (such as problem-solving)
● Social cognition (such as Theory of Mind)
● Perception of motion and action execution
● Attention and visual recognition
As we have seen in Chapter 1, cognitive neuropsychologists use

observational methodologies, such as single-case/case-series and
dissociation, to derive flowcharts of models demonstrating the
structure of cognition. Fodor (1983), for example, developed a model
based on modularity to account for how language might operate.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003014355-8
222 COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY
This model involved the ‘semantic system’ and the interlinking

‘modules’ of the ‘visual input lexicon’ and ‘speech output lexicon’,
‘visual analysis system’ and ‘phoneme level’. When working normally
in unison, these modules enable us to understand written words and
speech (see Figure 1.5). This model enables cognitive neu
ropsychologists to identify which modules are damaged by con
sidering patterns of behavioural deficits observed in brain-damaged
individuals. In other words, it is possible to speculate on the ‘modules’
that are not working properly in brain-damaged individuals through
a process of elimination. This can be done by simply observing where
the specific language behavioural deficits lie. This approach was used
to understand the deficits experienced by a well-known brain-
damaged case, going by the initials of ‘H.M’. H.M. suffered severe
seizures due to epilepsy. In 1953 (aged 27 years old) he subsequently
underwent surgery. Post-operation, he was unable to form new long-
term memories (see Box 8.5). It is from studying patients such as
H.M. that model constructs of memory, have helped develop our
understanding of the relationship between short-term and long-term
memory. Hence, here we see an important crossover between cog
nitive neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience. Despite this
important crossover, our primary focus will be on the models used by
neuropsychologists to account for both ‘typical’ and ‘atypical’ pat
terns of cognition. We will also consider brain anatomy, but only in
the context of its effects on behavioural observations and measure
ments used to account for cognitive phenomena. For example,
sensorimotor neurons (a.k.a. mirror neurons) in the brain, help us
to understand what we think is going on in the minds of others and to
copy and perform the actions they enact. From devising experiments
and recording brain activity, models describing how we develop a
‘theory of mind’ (ToM) can be generalised to groups of individuals
who have problems with understanding the mental states of others.
We will begin with the theory of mind.
SOCIAL COGNITION: TOM, IMITATION AND EMPATHY

Having a theory of mind (ToM) involves being able to recognise
what causes people to behave in the way they do. This sounds
straightforward and easy to do. It is only when you have a problem
interpreting another person’s behaviour and the intention behind
COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 223
it, that the complexities involved become apparent. Our own ac
tions are guided by our thoughts, beliefs, goals and emotions.
Given that other people’s actions are guided by their own thoughts,
beliefs, goals and emotions, the equation for predicting the beha
viour of others becomes complicated. Yet for most of us, this
comes naturally. ToM is very much a cognitive issue and involves
how we think about the information presented to us. For example,
in solving the following statement, we draw upon our ability to
think about the statement and its implications.
Is the following statement ‘true’ or ‘false’:
‘Isobel believes that kangaroos are giant rodents’
Did you find this difficult to answer? It is difficult to answer because

while the content is incorrect, you cannot disagree with Isobel’s
belief. She believes this, so the statement is true, but kangaroos are
marsupials and not rodents. Hence, the content of her belief is false.
Many people make the error of assuming such statements are false.
Nevertheless, we are aware that people entertain different beliefs or
feelings to our own which is why it is possible both to empathise and
to deceive others. Telling the truth is less complex than formulating a
lie. The fact that we are able to lie, however, provides us with
the ability to manipulate others which is known as Machiavellian
intelligence (Whiten and Byrne 1988). Dennet (1996) claimed
there are four orders of understanding intentionality:
1 I believe something
2 I believe you believe something
3 I believe that you believe that I believe something
4 I believe that you believe that I believe that you believe something
So how do we fathom these levels? What mechanisms enable us to

understand the mental states of others by decrypting their inten
tions? Leslie (1994) introduced the ‘Theory of Mind Mechanism’
(ToMM) that enables us to infer all mental states from other
people’s behaviour (see Box 8.1).
Having a ToM enables us to be accomplished communicators
and plays a pivotal role in social cognition (such as the thinking
about social interactions). As we can see in Figure 8.1, cognitive
BOX 8.1 WHAT THE THEORY OF MIND MECHANISM

ENABLES US TO DO
The Theory of Mind Mechanism (ToMM) allows us to infer all types
of mental states from behaviour, including what Baron-Cohen refers
to as epistemic mental states. Examples of epistemic mental states
include pretending, knowing, believing, dreaming, guessing,
thinking, deceiving and imagining. ToMM highlights how people’s
actions are robustly related to their mental states. It also allows us
to suspend the normal truths encapsulated within propositions,
known as ‘referential opacity’. Take the following example of Snow
White:
Proposition 1: ‘Snow White thought the woman selling

apples was a kind person’.
Proposition 2: ‘Snow White thought her wicked

stepmother was a kind person’.
Proposition 1 can be true and proposition 2 false if Snow White was

unaware that the woman selling apples is also her wicked stepmother.
Children of four to five years enjoy tales of deception, such as that
seen in pantomime and Punch and Judy puppet shows. This
suggests that they have developed referential opacity early in
childhood. Children of above three and a half to four years are
also very good at another aspect of ToMM. This can be demon
strated by considering a series of false-belief experiments, the most
famous being the Sally-Anne test (Wimmer and Perner 1983). The
test is as follows: ‘Sally has a basket and Anne has a box. Sally has a
marble and puts it into her basket, then goes out. Anne takes out
Sally’s marble and puts it into her box. Sally comes back and wants
to play with her marble. Where will Sally look for her marble?’ The
answer is her basket because that is where she left the marble and
she has no reason to think differently. Children three and a half
years and younger nearly always answer ‘in the box’ demonstrating
that they struggle to understand false-belief. Interestingly, there are
other children above the age of three and a half who still fail to
perform successfully on false-belief tests – these children are on the
autism spectrum. Children on the autism spectrum have problems

reading the intentions behind the behaviours of others, known as
‘mindblindness’ (Baron-Cohen 1997). This is an example of how
specific types of assessment can distinguish between ‘typical’ and
‘atypical’ behaviour (see Figure 8.1). Models of the mind and, in this
case, the mechanisms developed, can be traced to underlying
problems of the brain.
Performance on Belief Question
AUTISM SPECTRUM
Diagnostic Group
DOWN SYNDROME
CONTROL
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage Correct
Figure 8.1 Performance on belief question of false belief task

Source: Adapted from Rutter and Lockyer (1967)
neuropsychologists can introduce tasks that help to separate in

dividuals with different diagnoses by using, in this case, specific social
cognitive tests. Despite the control group being younger (unimpaired
4 ̶ 5-year-olds), they out-performed children on the autism spec
trum. This is also true of a third group (Down Syndrome group).
There are two biological approaches to understanding ToM:
modularity hypothesis and ‘mirror neurons’.
MODULARITY HYPOTHESIS
A 30-year-old patient, known as S.M., presented with severe da

mage to the amygdala (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio and Damasio
1995). S.M. was shown photographs of faces depicting a range of
emotional expressions but failed to recognise the expression of fear

and could not experience it. Furthermore, she failed to identify any
bodily posturing expressing a fearful state. Not only does this de
monstrate the link between perception and action, but also the
importance of being in tune with the emotions of others. This case
shows how challenging making inferences about intention and
emotional state (i.e. fear) from behaviour can be. Hence, despite
some facets of ToM remaining intact, there were deficits in the
quality and depth of understanding others. Note this case allows us
to make a direct observation between specific areas of brain-
damage and behavioural deficits.
‘MIRROR NEURON’ ACTIVITY
The “[M]irror neuron system is a group of specialised neurons that

“mirrors” the actions and behaviour of others” (Rajmohan and
Mohandas 2007, p. 66). Mirror neurons are active when we imitate
the behaviours of others. It is therefore an important aspect of social
cognition, and, in particular, when we mentalise about another
person’s intention (i.e. ToM). How we understand the meaning of
emotional expression in faces, the intention behind such expres
sions and other related behaviours can be attained through mi
micry. By imitating facial expressions, we can increase our ability to
identify how another person is feeling. Neal and Chartrand (2011)
demonstrated this in a study where participants, when given Botox
to induce short-term facial muscular paralysis, failed to identify
facial expressions portrayed by others. Hence, this demonstrates
how important it is to social interactions to be able to display
emotional expressions. When we interpret the mental state of
another individual, for instance, we interpret emotions expressed in
their faces. This, in combination with their other behaviours, helps
us make sense of their current mental state. In order to do this,
however, we need to ignore our own current mental state and
adopt the mental state of the person under observation. The
‘Mind-in-the-Eyes’ task is used to test whether we can identify the
emotional state of a person from very limited information, that is, a
strip showing the eyes only. Baron-Cohen, Ring, Wheelwright,
Bullmore et al. (1999) used fMRI to examine brain activity when
making judgements concerning emotions expressed in the eyes.
fMRI detected activity in the left frontal lobe and the tempor
oparietal junction (an area where the temporal and parietal lobes
meet) for emotional state inferences. In the case of false belief tasks
(see Box 8.1), this area is also activated. This implies that the
temporoparietal junction is involved in different types of menta
lising.
Another important aspect of ToM is the ability to empathise with
another person’s distress or pain, even though we are not actually
experiencing the emotions ourselves. ‘Simulation’ studies have been
devised to see what happens when we imagine the emotions and pain
experienced by another person. fMRI scans are used to measure
which areas of the brain become active. When participants imitate or
observe the emotional expressions portrayed on faces, there is gen
erally an influx of neural activity in areas of the brain involved in
understanding emotional facial expression. The premotor cortex (an
area of the frontal lobe), however, also shows neural activity. It is
mirror neurons that are responsible for this neural activity. In the case
of empathising with someone else’s pain, the same pattern of mirror
neuron activation occurs as that of the person experiencing the pain
(Singer, Seymour, O’Doherty, Kaube et al. 2004). When, for ex
ample, participants experienced a sharp probe or viewed a video of
someone experiencing a needle prick, Singer et al. found the same
pattern of neural activation. fMRI scans show activation of the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the insular. The ACC has
connections with the limbic system (involved in emotional proces
sing) and the prefrontal cortex (involved in cognitive processing)
which makes perfect sense when expressing empathy. Mirror-like
neurons can be found in the ACC that encode pain observed in
others. According to Ray (2013), the ACC has a pivotal role in both
social cognition and emotional regulation. In the case of the insular
(located in an area that separates the frontal, parietal and temporal
lobes), there are neural connections to the amygdala and the ACC
which makes it important in detecting emotions and social emotional
responses (Nieuwenhuys 2012).
Mirror neurons appear to be at the heart of understanding the
actions of others. Ferrari and Rizzolatti (2014) claim that empathy
is a simulative process and is driven by the firing of mirror neurons
when we perform an action and when we observe its execution by
other individuals. Some mirror neurons are involved only with
coding for the inferred goal of the action instead of the perfor
mance of it. In ballet dancers the same brain activation and firing of
mirror neurons in the premotor and parietal lobes occurs while
watching other ballet dancers perform.
Mirror neurons also play a role in attention and perception, more
specifically motion perception and action production.
PERCEPTION OF MOTION AND ACTION EXECUTION

The perception of motion is an important aspect of our daily life.
Without the ability to perceive the motion of objects, static
snapshots of objects in time, like photographs, are what we would
see (see Box 8.2).
There are specific areas of the temporal lobes known as MT (i.e.
‘middle-temporal’; also known as V5) and MST (i.e. ‘medial superior
temporal’) that are responsible for the perception and representation
of motion (Zeki 2015). The MT area receives input from other areas
involved in vision (i.e. V1, V2 and V3; see Chapter 2) and then passes
information back to these areas as well as feedforward to the MST.
Imaging scans have revealed that the MT becomes active when we
BOX 8.2 THE CASE OF NO MOTION PERCEPTION

A patient lost her ability to perceive the motion of objects. This was
the only functional deficit concerning the perception of objects, but
it profoundly affected her life. For example, the simple task of
pouring a cup of tea was difficult because she could not register the
movement of the liquid into the cup. The liquid appeared as a
snapshot in time. The result of this was that there was no way of
monitoring when the cup was full. It is possible that she could work
out an algorithm based on time and the angle she held the kettle
which would inform her of when to stop pouring, but the whole
procedure was not an automatic process like it is for most of us.
Crossing the road was problematic too. In her own words, “When
I’m looking at the car, first it seems far away. But then, when I want
to cross the road, suddenly the car is very near” (Zihl, von Cramon
and Mai 1983, p. 315). She solved this problem using her hearing to
form a judgement of noise distance.
focus on moving patterns and objects. When there is a lesion to this

area of the brain or processing is disrupted using transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS; see Chapter 1), perception of motion and the
faculty to use motion cues to facilitate action become impaired. It is,
however, the MST that is responsible for processing more complex
motion such as that experienced as we run through a town. Here we
have to keep track of what is ahead of us and need to avoid, as well as
realising that as we approach objects they appear to increase in size
and decrease in size as we pass them. In contrast, MT processes simple
movements of objects.
Our visual system (see Chapter 2) and our ability to attend to
stimuli (see Chapter 3) are important in informing us of the world
around us. Together these facilitate an understanding of objects and
their spatial dimensions, as well as how they move around. This
provides us with a spatial representation of the external world. This
representation, however, is futile unless we can act upon it appro
priately. The dorsal network (see Chapter 2) plays an important role
in connecting areas such as V1 and V2 and provides us with a neural
pathway that contributes towards planning action. The dorsal net
work has been studied in the laboratory using constructional tasks
such as producing a drawing of an abstract representation, known as
the ‘Rey-Osterrieth Complex’. Individuals with damage to the
temporoparietal area of the right hemisphere are unable to identifi
ably draw the figure. Visually guided action is important for reaching
and grasping objects. To reach for an object we need to know its
location but to grasp it we need to know its shape. Individuals with
optic ataxia can find both reaching and grasping challenging. They
generally find it difficult to use visual feedback required for making
fine adjustments to their grasping actions (i.e. V6 area closely con
nected to the ventral network). The main problem lies, however,
with the inability of neurons (such as mirror neurons) in the parietal
lobe to connect sensory representations of what the action should be,
with how it can be executed. In other words, there is a sensory-motor
exchange problem that prevents information about the movements
needed to perform the action from getting through.
Interestingly, mirror neurons in the premotor area of the frontal
lobes evoke stronger activity when participants are shown simple
hand and foot movements using the first rather than third person
perspective (Jackson, Meltzoff and Decety 2005; see Figure 8.2).
Imitation of Simple Movement

0.5
Mean Latency (seconds)
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
FOOT HAND
First person Third person
Figure 8.2 Imitation of simple foot and hand movements

Source: Adapted from Jackson, Meltzoff and Decety (2005)
Jackson et al. presented participants with two different visual per

spectives of simple hand and foot movements. The first-person
perspective was consistent with their own viewpoint, unlike the
third-person which was the mirror image. Participants had either to
imitate or simply observe the hand and foot movements depicted in
five video clips, while in the fMRI scanner. These movements were
shown for an equal amount of the time in the first or third-person.
Participants found it easier to imitate these movements when shown
in the first-person which is reflected in the faster mean latency scores
(equivalent to watching the model from behind).
These findings suggest that, while we are good imitators, it is
easier to copy the movements observed when they are presented as
the same as one’s own perspective. Mirror neurons play an im
portant role in action formation, but they are also involved in
learning. Learning can alter the structural and neurological land
scape of the brain – in particular the synaptic connections made.
There are cases, however, where individuals, through disease or
accidents, sustain damage to specific areas of the brain and yet make
incredible recovery. The brain can show resilience to damage by
the ability to modify neural connections or ‘re-wire’ itself. This
ability is referred to as neuroplasticity – our next topic.
NEUROPLASTICITY IN LEARNING
As was discussed in Chapter 2, we are able constantly to change the
structure and function of the brain through learning. This learning
helps us develop our cognitive abilities by making the connections
between neurons more effective at relaying information. This ul
timately increases the speed of information processing. These
neural developments also enable us to continue learning. Hence,
this neuroplasticity not only enables learning but is changed by
learning and new experiences (see Box 8.3).
BOX 8.3 LEARNING PROTECTS THE BRAIN

It is no surprise to hear that a stimulating environment conducive
for learning will help children avoid degenerative brain diseases as
they get older. There is evidence to suggest that children who have
experienced enriched environments were less likely to develop
Alzheimer’s disease. Moreover, early exposure to learning increases
the body’s ability to repair damage incurred to brain cells. But what
enables us to learn? The connections among neurons (i.e.
synapses) hold our knowledge in the brain. In our early years we
have an excess of synaptic connections, some of which are effective,
but many are ineffective. In order to improve the synaptic landscape
of the brain, two processes occur: proliferation (blooming) and
elimination (pruning) (Greenough and Black 1992). The initial
proliferation of synapses is adjusted by the elimination of mean
ingless or useless synaptic connections. This synaptic blooming and
pruning become initiated as we experience and learn about our
world more effectively. For example, older children are better at
categorising objects than are younger children, which, in effect,
improves how they learn. This, in turn, facilitates the formation of
new and effective synaptic connections. This means that older
synaptic connections no longer used are eliminated via pruning.
There is evidence that neuroplasticity occurs in adulthood also
especially in areas of the brain involved in memory and learning.
The hippocampus in the temporal lobe is involved in the formation
of new memories via learning. Fotuhi (2015) claimed that the
growth and volume of the hippocampus can increase when we eat
healthy foods containing omega-3, reduce stress, anxiety and
depression, sleep well and have an active lifestyle such as exercising

daily. He also found that the hippocampus can shrink in size when
these things are not in place. Shrinkage of the hippocampus can
have a deleterious effect on our memory and our ability to learn new
information. This can increase our chances of developing
Alzheimer’s disease. MacMaster and Kusumakar (2004) studied
34 teenagers aged 13 to 18 years old. Half of these teenagers
suffered from depression. Using fMRI, the volume of their left and
right hippocampi were measured. The teenagers suffering from
depression had hippocampi that were 17 per cent smaller than the
control teenagers. Hence, depression can have an impact on our
ability to learn and retain new information.
Draganski, Gaser, Kempermann, Kuhn et al. (2006) studied

German medical students who were revising for their medical
exams. They had their brains scanned three months prior to the
exam date and once they had finished their studies. These students
were compared with a control group who were not revising. The
scans revealed that learning-induced changes had occurred in the
parietal lobes and in the hippocampi for the students who were
revising. Such changes to these areas are associated with memory
retrieval and learning. These findings provide direct evidence of
neuroplasticity when we learn new information. The brain,
however, can also compensate after brain damage to these areas by
reorganising damaged synaptic connections to form new ones with
neurons that are still intact. Again, learning plays an important role
in stimulating new synaptic connectivity (see Box 8.4).
There are a combination of factors influencing the extent of
recovery from brain injury (see Table 8.1).
An individual’s level of cognitive functioning prior to brain
damage is important to the likely level of recovery. For instance, a
person with a high level of intellect and who has received extensive
education is more likely to make a better recovery than someone
who has neither of these advantages. In fact, this prediction was
made back in 1937 by Symonds, “It is not only the kind of head
injury that matters but the kind of head” (p. 1092). Why this is the
case relates to two possibilities:
BOX 8.4 ROLE OF MIRROR NEURONS IN POST-

STROKE RECOVERY
Mirror neurons become activated in post-stroke patients when they
imagine performing an action, such as a hand movement. This motor
imagination has been used as part of a treatment regime to activate
mirror neurons during training/learning (Garrison, Winstein and Aziz-
Zadeh 2010). The underlying reason why such an approach is
successful at retraining the brain, is that we have a mechanism
enabling us to make mental notes of how different behaviours can be
imitated (Martineau, Andersson, Barthelemy, Cottier et al. 2010).
Hence, we mentally imitate actions observed before attempting to
perform them. fMRI studies show that mirror neurons become
activated during this process which indicates their importance in
learning. Interestingly, Burns (2008), showed how regaining abilities
in post-stroke patients was accelerated after observing motor actions.
fMRI scans have shown how their mirror neuron activation increases
when watching a video of hand, foot and mouth movements. Mirror
neuron activation facilitates neuroplasticity in the premotor region and
the parietal lobes, by changing the synaptic landscape in these areas.
1 Such an individual has a greater reserve and therefore has more

capacity to draw upon
2 Such an individual may be more resourceful at learning or
devising alternative strategies for coping with the challenges
resulting from the brain damage
Table 8.1 Factors influencing recovery post brain damage

Nature of Brain Damage Individual Differences
Severity of damage incurred Age at time of damage
Frequency of damage to the brain Individual brain structural differences
Spacing between occurrences of brain damage Prior level of cognitive functioning
Level of brain intactness Motivation to recover
Possibility of another area taking over function Emotional response
Level and quality of rehabilitation
Source: Adapted from Banich and Compton (2018)

When cognitive neuropsychologists talk about a brain-damaged

individual overcoming their challenges, it is necessary to differ
entiate between ‘true’ and compensatory recovery. In the case of
true recovery, physical and mental functions are restored. For
compensatory, the individual overcomes challenges by resorting to
other means of achieving their goal targets, such as leaving notes as
reminders of tasks to be completed. Unfortunately, the window of
opportunity for achieving true recovery using rehabilitation mea
sures is small; the first few months after brain injury (Zeiler and
Krakauer 2013). There is no time limit for the implementation of
compensatory rehabilitation. According to Banich and Compton
(2018) there is an “emphasis on repeated use of the affected
function as a tool for recovery in both acute and long-term time
frames … therapies for aphasia emphasize expecting the patient
to use spoken language, however difficult it may be, rather than
relying upon … writing or gesturing” (p. 482).
Head injuries can cause specific cognitive dysfunction such as
aphasia or amnesia. Damage to the hippocampus in particular, can
cause problems in the formation and the ordering of memories.
Cognitive neuropsychologists were fortunate in being able to study
extensively the memory of H.M. who suffered lesions to various
areas of the brain including a region of the temporal lobe and the
hippocampus (see Box 8.5).
BOX 8.5 THE MEMORY PROBLEM OF H.M.

H.M. suffered from profound amnesia following removal of three
structures positioned near the centre of his brain. It was believed at
the time that these areas were concerned with the sense of smell,
and a loss of this ability would be a minor imposition. This was not
the case. Although his surgeon kept accurate medical notes of the
structures excised, it was only following death and post-mortem that
the extent of lesion incurred could be understood. Over many years
H.M. participated in research examining his memory problems
post-surgery. This could be compared to his baseline memory
performance before he had undergone surgery. Hence, there was an
abundance of information about what happens to memory function
when specific areas of the brain endure damage. There were lesions
to areas of the temporal lobe, hippocampus and amygdala among
many neighbouring areas of the brain. It is well established that the
hippocampus plays a major role in the memory of visual, auditory,
olfactory and somesthetic (such as touch, pain and temperature)
sensory modalities (Corkin 1984). H.M. had substantial loss of
memory. He had both retrograde amnesia (loss of memories from
before his surgery) and anterograde amnesia (the inability to lay
down new memories following surgery). The hippocampus is
involved in the formation and consolidation of new memories.
The hippocampus also connects memories from different areas of
the brain and helps to piece them together in order to make sense.
Lesion damage to the hippocampus suffered by H.M. is dif

ferent to the problems experienced by individuals who use their
hippocampus ineffectively. In the case of depression (see
Box 8.3) where the hippocampi of sufferers show signs of
shrinkage, once treated for their depression this shrinkage could
be reversed. Hence, there was evidence of neuroplasticity. But is
it possible to create neuroplasticity in individuals with a lesion to
the hippocampus? Currently there is exciting work being un
dertaken using a drug called CPTX. It is considered to be a
‘glue’ which promotes synaptic growth. CPTX mimics a protein
called Cerebellin-1, responsible for linking neurons that send
signals (i.e. pre-synaptic neurons) with those receiving them (i.e.
post-synaptic neurons). Individuals with injuries to the spinal
cord often become paralysed as a consequence of damage to
neural connections. The problems occur when the pre- and post-
synaptic neurons can no longer communicate. What would
happen if a protein that binds to both was created? Would the
signal then get through? Scientists working in collaboration from
the UK, Japan and Germany, believe they have created such a
protein that can form a ‘molecular bridge’ across the damaged
areas, therefore allowing for new neural growth and synaptic
connections. These scientists injected CPTX into the hippo
campi of mice with Alzheimer’s disease and spinal cord injury.
These mice demonstrated improvements to both memory and
locomotion respectively (Suzuki, Elegheert, Song, Sasakura et al.

2020). This could be a form of treatment in the future.
Our attention now focuses on research on brain lateralisation
(see Chapter 2), in particular, cognition and emotion.
BRAIN LATERALISATION
In Chapter 2, the structure of the brain and how the two hemispheres
of the brain are connected via the corpus callosum were explained.
Furthermore, specific structures in the left and right hemispheres
were highlighted in terms of their role in processing language and
non-verbal stimuli respectively. Neural networks and their inter
connections with specific brain structures were also considered.
Here, the aim is to consider the relationship between lateralisation,
cognition and emotion. Historically, cognitive neuropsychologists
have studied individuals with brain damage. By studying the location
of brain damage and then testing for cognitive ability, it is possible to
make connections between the area of damage and specific deficits. It
is through these studies that an understanding of hemispheric spe
cialisation or the lateralisation of function was established. While the
left hemisphere is dominant in language processing, the right hemi
sphere excels in tasks involving non-verbal and spatial stimuli.
Gazzaniga (1970), for example, showed how the left hand (controlled
by the right hemisphere) excelled at depicting a three-dimensional
object in a two-dimensional plane. Moreover, the left hand and not
the right fared better at drawing a three-dimensional cube on paper.
Prete and Tommasi (2018) considered such motor control at a
neurophysiological level and concluded that there is a behavioural
preference for using one side of the body that is controlled by the
contralateral (the opposite) hemisphere. This is because the neural
pathways for motor control emanate from the opposite hemisphere.
They argue that this allows for each hemisphere to enhance com
petencies in its specific domain of function. In 1998, Crow, Crow,
Done and Leask, claimed that individuals who are less lateralised for
behavioural preference (such as being ambidextrous or left-handed),
have a propensity to show cognitive developmental deficits. This
suggests that it is necessary to form a good pattern of lateralisation
during development. The effects of lateralised motor skill in children
can be tested by devising different tasks where the dominant and non-
dominant hand can be compared using a variety of performance

measures. The preferred hand usually performs more favourably in
terms of accuracy, strength and speed than the non-preferred hand,
especially for right-handers (Häger-Ross and Rösblad 2002). Bondi,
Prete, Malatesta and Robazza (2020) found that children who are
right-handed have more asymmetry when performing motor activity
such as playing sport than left-handers. They found robust later
alisation in these right-handed children.
Individuals with lesions to the right hemisphere experience
different deficits to those with left hemisphere damage. Right
hemisphere damage disrupts spatial and visuospatial skills. Other
problems present themselves such as:
● recognising objects from different perspectives and angles

● making line orientation judgements
● distinguishing previously seen faces from new ones
● distinguishing variations of pitch in sounds and tones ex
pressed in speech
● interpreting emotional expressions in faces
These challenges faced by individuals with right hemisphere damage,

suggest that the right hemisphere is also involved in processing
cognitive stimuli. To test for lateralisation, cognitive neuropsychol
ogists resort to measures of speed and accuracy in performing tasks
where items are presented to the right visual field (RVF; or to the
right ear for auditory presentation) or the left visual field (LVF; or to
the left ear for auditory presentation). Where superior performance is
shown when items are presented to the LVF, for instance, the right
hemisphere is considered to be specialised in processing that in
formation. Many studies have revealed a difference in the perception
of stimuli depending on whether it is presented to the LVF or RVF.
This difference is referred to as perceptual asymmetries. Findings
from research on perceptual asymmetries suggest that the left hemi
sphere is superior at processing words while the right has an ad
vantage processing faces. Non-verbal sounds, such as wildlife noises, a
door slamming or musical tones, are processed more accurately when
heard by the left ear (right hemisphere) for instance. An interesting
question is whether differences in perceptual asymmetries occur
across the sexes (see Box 8.6).
BOX 8.6 ARE THERE HEMISPHERIC SEX

DIFFERENCES?
If we are to believe the stereotypes about sex differences, such as
men being good at navigation and visuospatial skills with women
being better at language and reading people’s emotions, then we
might expect to see performance differences for perceptual asym
metry tasks. Sommer, Aleman, Bouma and Kahn completed a meta-
analysis of 14 studies in 2004 and 26 studies in 2008, looking at
verbal task performance. They failed to find any significant sex
differences in the lateralisation of verbal stimuli. Interestingly,
Jordan, Wüstenberg, Heinze, Peters et al. (2002) found that females
used both hemispheres when performing a mental rotation task
whereas men showed lateralisation of the right hemisphere. This
finding, however, was never repeated. In a meta-analysis by
Thompson and Voyer (2014), an advantage in emotional perception
was found for females. Neuroimaging in a study by Wager, Phan,
Liberzon and Taylor (2003), however, showed more lateralisation
for emotional activity in males than females. When they focused on
specific regions of the brain there were more likely to be sex
differences. They concluded that the lateralisation of emotional
activity is not straightforward and is likely to be more region-
specific. This suggests that, rather than comparing the hemispheres
for differences, a region-specific comparison approach might be
more fruitful. Furthermore, researchers should be looking for sex
differences by comparing performance on same domain-specific
tasks such as different aspects of emotional or visuospatial skills.
In a nutshell, the consensus is that the left and right hemispheres

simultaneously contribute to almost all forms of complex cognitive
activities. This also applies to activities originally believed to be
associated only with the left or the right hemisphere. As succinctly
put by Banich and Compton (2018), “it means that the right
hemisphere is not just taking a nap while we are reading, and the
left hemisphere is not just snoozing while we recognize a friend’s
face. Going around in such a half-brained manner doesn’t seem a
very good strategy!” (pp. 58 ̶ 9). We can therefore conceptualise
lateralisation in terms of complementary specialisation rather than
simply having one hemisphere that is dominant. An example of this

specialisation is the perceptual asymmetries which have been found
in the processing of facial emotional expressions.
PERCEPTUAL PROCESSING OF FACIAL EMOTIONAL EXPRESSIONS
Ekman and Friesen (1971) claimed we have six facial expressions

that can be seen cross-culturally: happiness, pleasant surprise, sad
ness, anger, fear and disgust. These expressions stem from
‘approach-avoid’ expressions demonstrated in new-borns by using
simple behaviours such as smiling and crying respectively.
Traditionally, the processing of facial expressions is considered to
be predominantly lateralised to the right hemisphere (Springer and
Deutsch 1998). There are two schools of thought, however, re
garding the extent of involvement of both the right and left
hemispheres:
1 right hemisphere hypothesis which argues this hemisphere

processes positive and negative emotions
2 valence hypothesis which proposes a right hemisphere specia
lisation in processing negative emotions while the left
processes positive emotions
Workman, Peters and Taylor (2000) considered whether positive

and negative facial expressions are processed to the same extent by
the right hemisphere (see Box 8.7).
BOX 8.7 DOES THE RIGHT HEMISPHERE PROCESS

ALL FACIAL EMOTIONAL EXPRESSIONS?
By using all six emotional expressions, Workman et al. (2000)
devised a series of ‘chimeric faces’. These chimeric faces had one
side of the face showing a neutral expression while the other side
showed one of the six emotional expressions. The emotional
expression for half of the faces appeared on the left side with the
remainder appearing on the right side (as it appeared to the viewer).
Thus, two sides of a face consisted of a neutral and emotional
expression in order to create a whole face. The mirror image was
created such that the emotional half of the face and the neutral half
were represented in both sides of the face. This was then reversed
so that both the right and left sides of the face were used. Hence,
each emotion expressed in these chimeric faces appeared on the left
or right and the mirror image was presented below or above. This
meant there were a total of 48 pairs of chimeric faces which breaks
down as follows:
“2 posers X 6 emotions X 2 versions (emotive half-face produced

by the left/right side of the poser’s face) X 2 positions (once with
the mirror image placed at the bottom and once with it placed at
the top)”
Workman et al. (2000, p. 241)
Participants were informed of the emotion they expected to see so

that they could make an immediate judgement of which representa
tion portrayed the strongest emotional expression (the top or
bottom). A quick response was considered to be a robust indicator
of the visual field advantage shown. The findings showed a left
hemiface perceptual bias. In other words, the involvement of the
right hemisphere (RH). This bias increased from happiness to
sadness, pleasant surprise, disgust, fear to anger. This means that
the strongest left hemiface bias (RH) was with the negative
emotions of anger first, followed by fear then disgust. The positive
expressions such as happiness and pleasant surprise showed a shift
in the direction of the left hemisphere. Although sadness differed
from anger and fear, it failed to differ from happiness or pleasant
surprise. The data do not definitively support the valence hypoth
esis, but they do show some separation between positive and
negative emotional processing – with a shift towards the left
hemisphere for happiness and pleasant surprise. The conclusions
drawn propose a quick reacting response from the RH towards
negative emotional expressions for survival purposes. In the case of
positive emotional expressions, the interpretation is that the face is
friendly and in order to engage in communication we need to
engage the left hemisphere (LH). According to Borod, Koff and Buck
(1986), the RH is likely to be superior in the processing of facial
expressions but when the possibility of communication is involved
(such as invitation to communicate by a friendly face), the LH may

be superimposed onto this pattern of RH superiority. In the case of
sadness, we often feel concern towards the person and not repelled
by them. Using this same method, it is interesting how for some
individuals such as those on the autism spectrum, a RH advantage
was only found for ‘happiness’ and ‘anger’ (Taylor, Workman and
Yeomans 2012). There was a clear developmental deficit for an RH
advantage for the remaining emotions. Given the problems of
communication experienced by those on the autism spectrum, such
a disadvantage in reading emotional expression goes some way
towards explaining this.
SUMMARY
Cognitive neuropsychology draws upon neuroscience to explain
how the brain functions cognitively. Models of how the brain
functions when performing cognitive tasks are often gleaned from
what happens when there is damage to specific areas of the brain.
This means that to investigate memory or language performance,
cognitive neuropsychologists resort to methodologies that enable
comparisons across brain-damaged individuals and controls. They
also study individuals who have specific types of disorder such as
autism or schizophrenia. Developments in brain imagery techni
ques have helped to see, in real-time, the areas of the brain that
become active when specific tasks are performed. fMRI, for ex
ample, has been useful in understanding areas of the brain involved
in specific cognitive activities such as the frontal lobe and tem
poroparietal junction in the understanding of the emotional states
of others. This is particularly important in the understanding of
theory of mind (ToM). Moreover, the neural pathways and types
of neurons involved in ToM help us to understand what their
behaviour and actions mean. These mirror neurons also help us to
imitate the actions of others and to learn how to do things as well as
enabling us to empathise with another person’s distress.
Neuroplasticity, where new neurons and synapses grow, can be
facilitated by learning and new experiences. The processes of
blooming and pruning of synapses can help to create optimal
connections that improve the speed of information processing.
Mirror neurons can help with learning in individuals with brain

damage through imitating the actions of others, thereby promoting
new synaptic connections. Research on brain lateralisation shows
that, while there are some differences in the processing of in
formation, the consensus is that both the left and right brain
hemispheres are involved in most forms of processing. The per
ception of facial expressions, however, is primarily the role of the
right hemisphere (RH).
FURTHER READING
Asenova, I.V. (2018) Brain Lateralization and Developmental Disorders: A new
approach to unified research. New York: Taylor and Francis/Routledge.
Costandi, M. (2016) Neuroplasticity. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
Murden, F. (2020) Mirror Thinking: How role models make us human. London:
Bloomsbury Sigma.
Slotnick, S.D. (2017) Cognitive Neuroscience of Memory. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF
• 9
In this book we have covered a range of topics which between them

constitute the subject matter of cognitive psychology. We have also
considered the contributions of closely associated disciplines such as
cognitive neuroscience, cognitive neuropsychology and computa
tional cognitive science. These new and ground-breaking dis
ciplines have helped to revolutionise our understanding of cognitive
psychology. Cognitive neuroscience, for instance, has facilitated our
understanding of how the brain is structured and functions through
the use of developing brain scanning technologies. Such under
standing of how the brain is structured and functions clearly has
implications for theories and models of cognition. With more ex
tensive clarity of brain structure and function, it is possible to ex
plore how existing theories and models in cognitive psychology fit
with neurological-based science. This has generally revealed a good
match between cognitive theories and models with the science,
although there are those in need of some modification, or even
rejection. Cognitive neuropsychology has played an important role
in translating how cognition is affected when brain structure and
function are compromised in some way. Technological develop
ments, such as that seen in computational cognitive science, have
also provided valuable insights into, for example, how memory and
logic might operate. An interesting question we may ask is what
future directions cognitive psychology is likely to take given de
velopments in these closely related disciplines. Evolutionary psy
chology has also been making an impact on psychology per se and
has more recently offered cognitive psychologists new perspectives
on how cognition can be considered and researched.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003014355-9
244 FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS
If we consider past methods of understanding memory, for ex
ample, the presentation of stimuli followed by measures of parti
cipant response, the limitations become apparent very quickly.
Recently, however, developments in computer and media tech
nology have enabled cognitive psychologists to present stimuli in
different ways. Such technology has also allowed for different
measures of cognitive output and how this can be recorded. This
has provided cognitive psychologists with a diversity of ways to
present and record stimuli. It is interesting that, despite the different
ways in which stimuli are now presented in, for example, memory
experiments, many theories and models derived previously have
withstood the test of time. For example, the three main compo
nents of Atkinson and Shiffrin’s (1968) multi-store model of
memory, sensory store, short- and long-term memory are still re
garded as the foundation stones of the main processes involved in
memory formation. These technologies have enabled cognitive
psychologists to be more accurate in the way different measure
ments are recorded. There is also more opportunity of using dif
ferent stimuli to tap into areas of cognition that were previously
difficult to study. An example of this is the fact that neuroimaging
has revealed that we use both top-down and bottom-up processing
when visually attending to a stimulus. Modifications have, for
example, been made to theoretical assumptions and models of at
tention and memory. These modifications often involve additional
components to models as new areas are explored. An example of
this is the development of the concept of working memory. Also,
our understanding of attention, and, in particular, the way neural
networks operate in feedforward and feedback processing has been
improved through the use of brain scanning. Such data provide an
understanding of the areas activated in the brain when we attend to
stimuli and the neurological pathways involved. Furthermore,
brain scanning technologies enable a window of observing the
brain in real time. This is particularly useful when those being
tested have endured brain damage. In particular, studying areas of
brain activation during learning has become a hot topic in the
rehabilitation of brain-damaged individuals. Understanding the
involvement of the hippocampus in memory and learning per se has
FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 245
helped to develop existing theories of short-term memory. The

importance of learning in the neuroplasticity of the hippocampi has
helped cognitive psychologists to understand the impact depression
has on cognition. One of the symptoms of depression is a sense of
apathy and an inability to engage mentally with many types of task.
We learned in Chapter 8 how scanning techniques have shown
shrinkage of the hippocampi in depressed teenagers. Hence, this
provides a valuable lesson in the relatedness between a disorder and
learning and keeping the brain active.
Brain scanning is not only useful for studying memory, attention
and learning but in tasks involving language and thought. Fodor
argued that there are interdependent modules, each with their own
domain of function. The notion of modules has received much
support. By observing how individuals with brain damage perform
on language-related tasks while under the scanner (i.e. fMRI or
PET), areas of the brain failing to show activity can be seen in
contrast with those of control participants. It is not just problems of
language that can be highlighted in this way, but other modules
concerned with many types of cognitive activity. Ineffective mirror
neuron firing, for example, provides information about defective
modules concerned with the processing of social communication
such as that seen in theory of mind (ToM) and in empathy.
Although brain scanning techniques provide scientists with a fairly
accurate depiction of brain activity, neuroscience has problems
with unpicking cause and effect. Is it the case that a person who
lacks empathy does so because their brain is ‘wired’ differently from
most other people or is it a consequence of experiencing parental
rejection in childhood? What causes what? Can we be 100 per cent
certain that a brain deficit is the cause of the behaviour? The an
swer usually lies in the grey territory of it being a bit of both.
Perhaps with more sensitive recordings of neural activity, it might
be possible in the future to have a clearer picture of cause and
effect; certainly, for motor-based decision-making.
Using an experimental task called n-back, it is possible to in
vestigate working memory updating in the solution of insight
problems, a feat not possible without the use of sophisticated
computer programs. N-back, as used in a study by Nęcka, Żak and
Gruszka (2016), involved the presentation of two-digit numbers
for 1800 milliseconds that were masked by patterns of dots
randomly displayed for 500 milliseconds. Participants were in

structed to press the spacebar only if they thought the stimulus had
appeared previously either two or four numbers back. Using this
design, Nęcka et al. found the function of working memory up
dating is partly to support insight problem-solving. Such a task, as a
means of investigating the efficiency of working memory updating,
would be challenging without new computer technologies.
Developments in measuring electrode activity in the brain using
electrodes that are driven by a computer program such as ‘BioPak’,
have enabled brain response exploration in cognition within the
realm of undergraduate research. Technological developments,
however, are not restricted to computer, media and brain scanning.
Great strides have also been made in technologies measuring eye
movement which have proven insightful for researching how we
deploy our attention towards environmental objects. It has also
provided greater understanding of language related problems such
as dyslexia. The use of eye-tracking goggles with sensors measuring
when and where we move our eyes to look at events has been
successfully applied to eyewitness research. A multi-layered study
researching how effectively eyewitnesses attend, encode, re
member and recall details of a criminal event, using the cognitive
interview, used such goggles to record what was being observed
(The OpenLearn Team 2010). This enabled researchers to compare
what was actually observed with what eyewitnesses could re
member. Interestingly, the eyewitnesses failed to describe the
suspects they had observed (as recorded by the eye-tracking gog
gles) and yet recognised the suspects they had difficulty describing.
The use of eye-tracking goggles in this study revealed that what we
observe is not always processed definitively. Hence, there can be
discrepancy between what we see and what we can recall.
The use of virtual reality systems is another technology providing
a creative approach to investigating cognition. Frequently this in
volves the use of a headset which enables the wearer to experience
a virtual environment that has stereoscopic depth. Hence, the brain
becomes tricked into believing we are perceiving objects in a
virtual space and are therefore present in a different reality. This is
achieved by stimulating our visual senses. This technology has al
ready been applied to pain management, treating phobias and
controlling motion sickness. Virtual reality can be used to
improve learning and memory. By increasing the sensory dimen

sions involved in our interactions with the environment, we are
more likely to encode information and form robust memories. The
virtual reality headsets have shown promise in facilitating learning
and in the creation of robust memories. This technology provides
cognitive researchers with the ability to manipulate how stimuli are
presented and which responses are measured. Hence, this increases
the ecological validity of cognitive research. In other words, cog
nitive research can become more applied and reflect what we do
and see in our natural environment. Rizzo, Schultheis, Kerns and
Mateer (2004) claimed that virtual environments are akin to being
‘the ultimate Skinner box’ where a diverse range of stimuli of
varying complexity can be controlled. This, in turn, can help
cognitive psychologists to manipulate complex stimuli that would
normally be too challenging to create. Moreover, it enables cog
nitive psychologists to examine performance using other forms of
presentation. Also, such stimuli can be explored in different con
texts. For example, visual illusions can be presented under condi
tions where the observer is moving. Bruder, Steinicke, Wieland
and Lappe (2012) examined how visual motion illusions are per
ceived when the observer is moving. They found that the change
of light from images can influence judgements concerning self-
motion. Recent developments in virtual reality combine eye-
tracking technology as a means of researching the effects of mild
traumatic brain injury. Horan, Heckenberg, Maruff and Wright
(2020) created a virtual reality concussion assessment tool called
CONVIRT which incorporates eye-tracking technology. This
enables cognitive neuropsychologists to provide assessments of
decision-making ability and levels of attention in concussed in
dividuals. With further developments in technology, cognitive
psychologists should be able to study cognition at many different
levels of analysis. As a discipline, cognitive psychology can expand
its horizons by embracing these new technological developments.
Another area that has influenced cognitive psychology is artificial
intelligence (AI). This, in combination with developments in
cognitive neuroscience, can potentially improve our understanding
of how we think; for example, the algorithms we automatically
embrace when making deductions and inductions. Models of at
tention, memory, language and thought, provide byte size flow-
charts of information processing. We have seen how connectionist

models of memory provide insight into how memories are stored as
connections between nodes, and how this enables parallel dis
tributed processing (PDP). The developments in the ‘cognition’ of
robots have provided greater understanding of how neural con
nections in the human brain might be formed. Despite the de
velopment of sophisticated robots with the ability to ‘acquire’
language and logic, and to respond to human language interactions,
they are still in their infancy when compared to what our brain is
capable of learning. This, in part, is a consequence of limited al
gorithmic input. The computational science behind robotics,
however, is improving. For example, the seemingly farfetched
‘weird science’, often appendaged to computational cognitive sci
ence, has entered the realm of scientific understanding and in
vestigation (see Box 2.7). Cognitive psychology, in order to dispel
any fallacious ‘weird science’ assumptions concerning cognition,
will need to explore these using scientific methods. By doing so,
empirical evidence of the plausibility of such claims (like being able
to download our minds onto a computer chip) can be discussed
scientifically. When empirical evidence, however, repudiates such
claims, then ‘weird science’ can be excluded from the cognitive
psychological research agenda.
An area of psychology that has made an impact on how cognitive
theories are interpreted, at both an ultimate and proximate level, is
evolutionary psychology.
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
According to evolutionary psychologists, theories of how we op
erate cognitively have focused primarily on proximate causes in
stead of ultimate ones. In the case of proximate explanations,
behaviour is accounted for by examining the cognitive processes
underlying it – how it operates in the ‘here and now’. There is little
discourse concerning the underlying purpose of the cognitive
processing driving the behaviour in the first place. In other words,
an ultimate explanation. An ultimate explanation involves the
importance of the behaviour being driven by specific cognitive
strategies that were once adaptive in our evolutionary past. An
ultimate explanation is best understood by asking how cognitive
processes helped our ancestors to solve specific problems they had

encountered. More succinctly, what purpose does cognitive pro
cessing serve? The areas of cognitive psychology that have been
considered using ultimate explanations include:
● vision
● memory
● reasoning
VISION
In Chapter 3, Marr’s computational model was briefly considered

(see Box 3.5). Given the importance of his ultimate explanation of
visual perception, it will be discussed further here. He began by
simply asking, what our visual system was initially designed to do?
Starting with this question, Marr introduced three levels of ex
planation:
1 Computational theory: What is the visual system for?

2 Representation and algorithm: How does the visual system
achieve this purpose computationally?
3 Hardware implementation: What physical substrate is needed
(i.e. eyes, optic nerve) for the visual system to achieve its
purpose by following a series of computations?
Evolutionary psychologists are primarily interested in the compu

tational theory as this asks an ultimate question. Why do we need
the visual system to operate in the way that it does? Levels two and
three can then be explored (and indeed level two is often re
searched by cognitive psychologists). Evolutionary psychologists
argue that our visual system is not designed to represent the world
as it really is. Our visual system, they argue, evolved to deal with
recurrent ancestral challenges. Hence, our brain contrives to dif
ferentiate what the retina sees in an adaptive way. Take for example
Figure 9.1. What do you see?
Our brain interprets this as a triangle whose points occlude three
circles. Hence, according to Workman and Reader (2021), “If our
visual system were truly designed to represent the way that the
world is then we should see three Pac-Man characters having a chat
Figure 9.1 A visual illusion
in a triangular configuration…” (p. 226). But we actually perceive

a triangle that is not really there. This fits in with Marr’s (1982)
claim that our visual system produces edited descriptions of our
world from a series of images. In so doing, we see a version that has
useful information without the extraneous clutter. The outlines of
objects, in particular, edges, provide all the information required to
make an identification, which is why we see a triangle in
Figure 9.1. As discussed in Chapter 3, we have perceptual con
stancies which act to compensate for variations of object size,
colour and illumination.
MEMORY
Evolutionary psychologists consider memory to be optimally

adapted for the information we need to suit the environment we
frequent. Anderson and Milson (1989) argued that the superior
speed of recall for words frequently encountered versus non-
frequently experienced words is an adaptive design. It makes sense
to be able to formulate intelligent predictions of the words that are
useful to us and to access them more speedily than those we en
counter infrequently. They further consider the process of repeti
tion priming (see Chapter 4) and how this too enables us to access
useful words quickly as we encounter them again. It is the con

sensus that memory evolved to support how we make decisions
(Klein, Cosmides, Tooby and Chance 2002). Decision-making
relies on information and this information can be accessed through
stored memories. Klein et al. argue that separate memory systems,
such as episodic and semantic, are used to process information
required for specific types of decisions made. For example, they
argue that episodic memories hold different types of information
from semantic memories. Episodic memories are associated with
personal experiences and often contain emotional content. This
makes them likely to be useful for making decisions based on
previous experiences (see Box 9.1).
BOX 9.1 WHAT MIGHT EPISODIC MEMORIES BE

TELLING US?
Schacter (1999) argued that Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
encourages us to relive negative experiences as a reminder to avoid
situations that can be dangerous for our survival. In other words,
stay away from such situations that can compromise our safety.
When we consider PTSD from this evolutionary angle, how memory
interacts with the symptoms of this condition can offer a new way of
controlling the constant ruminations experienced by individuals.
Interestingly, the existence of flashbulb memories discussed in
Chapter 4, also has an ultimate explanation. When we consider our
flashbulb memories of the death of Princess Diana (for those of us
old enough to have been around at the time), we can recall where
we were, what we were doing and possibly even what we were
wearing. We may ask the question why evolutionists consider
flashbulb memories as having ‘fitness’ consequences. In other
words, such memories enable us to avoid negative events and, in
so doing increase our chances of survival and passing on our genes
(i.e. increased fitness) to the next generation. But what purpose
could the recall of details associated with the death of Princess
Diana possibly serve? In order to answer this, we need to consider
the environmental conditions under which our prehistoric ancestors
lived. In our evolutionary past, living conditions were very different.
It would have paid our ancestors to have such flashbulb memories

of how emotional we felt at the time when we saw a pride of
lionesses attack one of our family members. In this example it
would pay to take heed not to hunt in the vicinity of these lionesses
next time. Hence, remembering such an event with all the emotions
and actions that had occurred, serves us well in avoiding repeating
the unfortunate hunting error. What we see here is an environ
mental mismatch between our evolutionary past (when such
flashbulb memories facilitate good decision-making) and present
day. Flashbulb memories can therefore be considered as an
adaptation designed to facilitate good decision-making for our
ancestors. The mismatch hypothesis, however, argues that it is an
adaptation we don’t always need today.
Given, that our memory facilitates effective decision-making, it

makes perfect sense to store our past experiences. The more we are
exposed to the same events, the greater the likelihood that these
memories (regardless of being episodic or semantic) will be pro
cessed rapidly in comparison to singular events. Suggestions of
there being an ‘adaptive memory’ by evolutionary psychologists
can impact on how cognitive psychologists research memory in the
future. Perhaps in the future the focus might shift away from
analysing the content of what is processed and the structure of
short- and long-term memory to understanding how memories
served our ancestors in decision-making. In other words, an ulti
mate explanation of the purpose our memory serves can help us
better understand why it appears to malfunction occasionally.
REASONING
The Wason task (see Chapter 5) has been researched using the
standard abstract format of ‘if a card has a vowel on one side, then it
has an even number on the other’. People struggle with having to
select two cards to see if the rule is broken. When, however, the
problem is less abstract, such as ‘if a person is drinking alcohol, then
they must be over 19 years of age’, we find this an easier task to
solve. Evolutionary psychologist, Leda Cosmides in 1989, argued
that we can solve the less abstract format because it appeals to our
need to spot free riders (those who take without contributing

anything). The drinking alcohol and not being over 19 problem can
be conceived as a free rider if the rule is contravened. This, in effect,
activates a mental module concerned with detecting those who
cheat. There are two domains of a mental module, what Sperber
(1994) refers to as ‘actual’ and ‘proper’. In the case of the proper
domain, a stimulus triggers an action, such as the red belly of a male
stickleback triggering an aggressive reaction from another male. The
actual domain, in this instance, could be something else that is red
thus resembling the male stickleback. So, what has this got to do
with the Wason task? The standard Wason task is considered to be
an indicative problem in that it is factual and relies on cause and
effect. In the case of the underaged drinking scenario, however, the
problem is a deontic example – it relates to a moral issue. Hence, the
detection of who is breaking the rule and should therefore be
reprimanded. According to Cosmides, Barrett and Tooby (2010)
the detection of violating a deontic rule should be instigated when
the cheater has made gains through cheating; cheating was a de
liberate act and it is possible to contravene the rule by cheating.
They argue that once these three stipulations are met, then the
mental module will become activated as a consequence of the
‘cheater-detection algorithm’ firing. Hence, the underaged drinking
scenario (or deontic rule) will be solved. Cosmides et al. have of
fered an evolutionarily sound explanation for the differences in
solution rate between indicative and deontic representations of the
Wason task. We, in effect, have evolved a mechanism to detect
cheats which has served our ancestors well for maintaining co
operation and expelling free riders. This ultimate explanation pro
vides an answer as to why we find some versions of the Wason task
easier to solve. By considering ultimate explanations, as evolutionary
psychology does, studying logic and reasoning can focus less on the
analysis of content difficulty and more on why there should be a
difference in solution difficulty. Evolutionary psychologists em
phasise that our cognition has evolved to facilitate action – our
behaviour. With such ultimate explanations in mind, it is possible to
explore our cognition using a different perspective.
How our genes on the X chromosomes influence our cognition,
has been of interest to geneticists. Given that evolutionary psychol
ogists draw upon the mechanism of sexual selection introduced by
Charles Darwin, any sex differences relating to cognition, ascertained

through our sex-determining chromosomes, are worth dis
cussing here.
AN XX ADVANTAGE?
Research has long shown that males are more likely to

suffer from specific genetical conditions inherited from the
X-chromosome contributed by the mother. To be male (XY),
the X chromosome comes from the mother during fertilisation
and the Y chromosome from the father. The Y chromosome
contains genetical information determining the male develop
mental pathway. In females (XX), genetical conditions that are
carried on the X chromosome, are counteracted by the other X
chromosome determining the female pathway of development
(provided this X chromosome is functioning normally). In the case
of a male, the faulty X chromosome cannot be counteracted by the
Y chromosome as it contains far less genetical information. Hence,
psychologists talk about the ‘gender paradox’, whereby more males
have sex-linked disorders, but when a female has the same con
dition (carried by both X chromosomes), she will show more se
vere symptoms than her male counterparts. And that is the gender
paradox. Moalem (2020) explores the genetic advantage females
have over males in areas of resilience, stamina, immunity, survival
and, important to our discussion here, intellect (see Box 9.2).
BOX 9.2 THE FEMALE ADVANTAGE

Cells in our body contain a genetic/chromosomal blueprint, also
known as the karyotype. Therefore, the XX complement for females
and the XY pair in males carrying our sex-determining genes, are
present in our cells. It was previously believed that only one of the X
chromosomes in females was active while the other was a silent
partner. This has been shown to be inaccurate, and, in fact, the so-
called silent X partner is also active. This helps to explain the high
frequency of males experiencing conditions such as haemophilia (a
blood clotting disorder) over females. The males, in effect, inherit the
faulty gene(s) carried on the X chromosome and show the symptoms
while females have their other X chromosome to fall back on – hence,

why they are the ‘carriers’. Moalem (2020) argues that geneticists are
able to track the cause of many intellectual disabilities in males to the
X chromosome. He claims that, “An X-linked inheritance pattern on a
family tree stands out when only the boys in the family seem to be
affected” (p. 62). Taking fragile X syndrome as an example, more often
than not, it is males who are severely affected. The X chromosome is
prone to breakage and it is the fragile-X mental retardation (FMR1)
gene that is the source of the problem. FMR1 is responsible for
producing a protein which helps in the formation of synaptic
connections (see Chapter 2). In fragile X syndrome, FMR1 fails to
initiate the production of this protein which then interferes with the
development of the brain. This means that executive functions such as
working memory, learning, planning, thought, language and attention
fail to operate efficiently and why one of the main symptoms is
disruption to cognition. Gissler, Järvelin, Louhiala and Hemminki
(1999) looked at the risk of delayed development as a consequence of
birthing complications in a sample of 60,254 Finish children born in
1987. Some 31 per cent of the sample who had birthing problems were
boys. Moreover, in a sub-set of 14,000 of these children, boys were
more likely to be developmentally arrested such that starting school
was postponed and special education necessary. In a US study in 2011,
boys were more likely to develop learning disabilities and stuttering,
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and being on the autism
spectrum (Boyle, Boulet, Schieve, Cohen et al. 2011). Sex differences in
how we learn information and which type of information is learned
more easily by males or females needs further investigation. Is it
plausible that learning differs across the sexes? We know that there
has been a recent trend over the past 30 years of girls out-performing
boys as measured by ‘GCSE’ grades in the UK. Duell (2020) described
how schoolgirls are now 14 per cent more likely than their boy
counterparts to pass exams in English and maths (64 per cent versus
56 per cent respectively). Miller and Halpern (2014) showed that there
are differences between males and females in the type of spatial ability
tasks that they excel in. Males out-perform females on reasoning and
problem-solving, mental rotation, geometry and statistics while
females do better on algebra and comprehending numerical patterns.
Liu and Wilson (2009) found that girls are better at solving
conventional problems arising from content in textbooks. For boys,

their forte is for unconventional problems. This, it is argued, despite
the fact that girls out-perform boys at GCSE, means girls have a
disadvantage in areas where some standardised tests are based on
unconventional problem-solving. There is still much to learn about
cognitive differences between the sexes and information assimilation.
SO, WHAT HAVE WE LEARNT ABOUT COGNITIVE

PSYCHOLOGY?
CHAPTER 1
Cognitive psychology is the study of mental processing. Areas

investigated include attention and perception; memory and
learning; thinking and problem-solving and language and com
munication. Disciplines such as cognitive neuroscience and cog
nitive neuropsychology have contributed to our knowledge of the
brain’s involvement in information processing. Brain scanning
technology from cognitive neuroscience allows us to understand
the areas of the brain involved in cognition. Information about
module-specificity, and how cognitive deficits are linked to im
paired module function, comes from cognitive neuropsychology.
Computational cognitive science offers an understanding of how
neurons are interconnected in the brain.
CHAPTER 2
The architecture of the brain is divided into microanatomy and

gross anatomy. How neurons in the brain are interconnected and
the way that neural pathways pass information to different parts
of the brain, is the realm of microanatomy. Gross structure
concerns the interrelationship between the lobes of the brain.
From the gross anatomy of the brain, it is possible to see how the
two hemispheres interact via commissures such as the corpus
callosum. By using brain scanning techniques and tasks that help
to measure brain function, as well as modelling, understanding
the intricate interconnections between structure and function
have been studied.
CHAPTER 3
Attention is important to the way the world is perceived. Sensory

information guides our attention by what we see, hear, smell, taste
or touch. Models of attention frequently include a bottleneck. For
those models where there is no bottleneck, it is assumed that we
can divide our attention. We can divide our attention across tasks
when one is automated, or the demands of the tasks are very
simple. The processing of sensory stimuli is enabled during focused
attention – this allows for stimuli to be fully processed. Such
bottom-up processing is useful in the learning of new information.
With increases to our knowledge-base of events, our memory store
expands and can be used; hence, adopting top-down processing.
Meaning applied to stimuli is known as perception. Our en
vironment is interpreted by the sensation and perception of object
interaction.
CHAPTER 4
Shiffrin and Atkinson introduced a basic memory structure of

short-term to long-term storage, but other components have since
been added – working memory, episodic, semantic and procedural.
Memories of events are stored in episodic memory whereas world
knowledge resides in semantic memory. Skill acquisition is stored
in procedural memory. The involvement of conscious awareness,
as occurs in declarative memory, is part of both episodic and se
mantic memory systems. Alternatively, non-declarative memories
(without conscious awareness) are part of procedural memory. Pre-
existing schemas embellish our memories of events and can influ
ence recall accuracy. A lifespan of autobiographical memories is
considered to be part of everyday memories. Prospective memory
can be time-based and/or event-based. This is involved in our
intentions to perform actions. Remembering cannot happen
without learning. Engaging and learning information impacts on
how well we form memory traces. Efficient encoding of memories
results in optimal consolidation and recall. Information can be
learned using repetition priming without explicit learning (una
ware) – hence, implicitly. Mnemonic techniques rely on explicit
learning.
CHAPTER 5
Different forms of thinking include judgements, decision-making,

informal reasoning, inductive and deductive reasoning and problem-
solving. When information is limited, we make judgements about the
likelihood of something occurring. Both judgement and decision-
making rely on heuristics. Kahneman and Tversky describe heuristics
as simple but quick computational calculation of decisions leading to
rapid outcomes. Informal reasoning is based on our knowledge-base
and experiences. It is considered a sub-set of logic and often referred
to as critical thinking. This helps us to conclude if a statement is
probably true or false using likelihoods. Inductive reasoning is used
when a conclusion is uncertain because the information available is
limited. Deductive reasoning divides into two forms of logic: pro
positional and syllogistic. Both propositional and syllogistic reasoning
present two premises and a conclusion. Propositional uses premises
referring to individuals whereas syllogistic refers to ‘sets’. Problem-
solving can present with well- or ill-defined problems, knowledge-
lean or knowledge-rich. We solve by trial and error and insight ac
cording to Gestaltists. Limited cognitive processing capacity can
prevent problem-solving.
CHAPTER 6
According to Chomsky, human language has an innate universal

grammar. Computational models of reading suggest there are
two routes to reading, one of which is a direct route linking
spelling to sound and the other an indirect route via meaning
(semantics) to sound. Language comprehension involves breaking
down a sentence into its parts (parsing) and understanding the
intention of the speaker (pragmatics). During discourse we make
inferences about the message. The construction-integration
model suggests, during reading, we develop three levels of re
presentation: a surface level (actual text), a propositional level
(propositions are formed) and a situational level (a mental model
describes the situation). Hayes’ model of writing suggests the
process has three levels: a planning (control) level, an actual
writing (process) level and a (resource) level which draws on
cognitive resources.
CHAPTER 7
Different levels of conscious awareness or the ability to attend directly

to stimuli, determine category states of consciousness. Individuals in a
VS or MCS, when considered neurologically, provide measurements of
brain activity to questions using mental imagery. This means that, de
spite no signs of attention, their brain is active and ‘aware’. Feedforward
processing (or bottom-up) occurs automatically when visual stimuli are
presented. By feedback processing such information is processed fur
ther. This is where consciousness occurs as the information becomes
integrated through top-down processing. Conscious experience en
ables us to recall memories of events and knowledge. We can reflect
upon these experiences and knowledge using metacognition.
CHAPTER 8
Neuroscience is referred to by cognitive neuropsychologists to un

derstand the brain’s role in cognition. Brain-damaged individuals
provide information about the involvement of specific areas of the
brain in memory and language performance. fMRI helps to examine
the role of areas such as the frontal lobes and temporoparietal junction
in specific aspects of cognition and emotion (e.g. ToM). fMRI also
helps us understand the role of neural pathways and mirror neurons in
the imitation of the actions of others. Neuroplasticity is facilitated by
learning. This involves the blooming and pruning of synapses to drive
optimal connections that will increase the speed of processing.
SUMMARY
Understanding cognition has progressed immensely due to techno
logical advances in brain scanning techniques, computerised data
processing and new experimental measurements such as n-back,
BioPak, eye-tracking goggles and virtual reality headsets. The way in
which the brain operates, and the intricate neural connections and
pathways, can be brought to light by adopting these technologies.
These enable cognitivists to ‘see’ inside the brain and how the soft
ware is operationalised to perform the many cognitive processing
feats that we are unaware of. Artificial intelligence, once a fiction of
the movies, is now within our grasp and also provides a window to
how neural connectivity forms and influences our cognitive cap

abilities. Evolutionary psychology is becoming ever more ubiquitous
as an explanation of our behaviour in psychology; for which cog
nitive psychology is no exception. It offers, in addition to proximate
explanations, overarching explanations as to why our brain has
evolved to function the way it does, and the adaptations to brain
structure arising from environmental pressures in our ancestral past.
These ultimate explanations also include the impact of mechanisms of
sexual selection. In other words, the impact of female choice in mate
selection as a driving force in the direction of male development.
Evolutionary psychology has provided a different perspective to
understanding areas of cognition such as vision, memory and rea
soning. Evolutionary psychologists ask what the visual system is for
and claim that it provides edited descriptions of the images we see.
Memory has evolved to support our decision-making so that our
stored episodic memories and experiences help us make optimal
decisions that promote our survival. By providing an ultimate ex
planation for the purpose of memory, a better understanding of why
it malfunctions can be derived. The Wason task used to study
thinking is presented in an abstract format but once it becomes more
concrete (e.g. about underaged drinking), it becomes easier to solve.
This is because in our evolutionary history detecting those who
violated rules (cheaters) helped to solve ancestral challenges. There is
the assumption that having two X chromosomes can provide females
with an advantage over males in areas such as intellect. This as
sumption, however, requires further research.
FURTHER READING
Barkow, J.H., Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. (1992) The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary
psychology and the generation of culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moalem, S. (2020) The Better Half: On the genetic superiority of women. UK:
Penguin Random House.
Nurit, E. (2011) Haptic Weight Perception in Virtual Reality. Germany: Lambert

Academic Publishing.
Sutcliffe, A. (2003) Multimedia and Virtual Reality: Designing multisensory user

interfaces. Hove: Psychology Press.
GLOSSARY
Amnesia: Partial or total inability to recall memories. Two types

of amnesia include antegrade (inability to form new memories) and
retrograde (loss of pre-existing memories).
Bottom-up processing: Incoming stimuli from our sensory or-
gans initiate processing. These stimuli are passed on for further
processing to higher ordered cells involved in stimulus recognition
and interpretation. Sometimes called data-driven processing.
Cerebral cortex: This is the largest area of the brain where higher
order functions and processing such as perception, memory, lan-
guage and thought as well as voluntary action occur.
Cognitive algorithms: Algorithms provide step-by-step guidance
for solving set problems. In cognitive problem-solving, algorithms
provide successful procedures used to solve specific types of problem.
Dyslexia: A general term used to describe those who have problems
with reading, writing and spelling yet have a level of general in-
telligence within the normal range. Various schemes exist for sub-
classifications of dyslexia. Three well established forms are: surface
(inability to read ‘irregular’ words), deep (inability to read ‘non-
words’) and phonological (difficulties manipulating the basic sounds of
language).
Feedforward-feedback neural processing mechanism: This
involves two types of interactive neural processes. In the case of
feedforward, specific cells are receptive to specific elements of a
stimulus, such as a vertical line. Such information is collectively
passed on to other cells that combine the information received to
form a reconfiguration of the stimulus. This involves an automatic
forward passing and processing of information. However,
262 GLOSSARY
information about the stimulus is also passed back to other areas of

the brain for interpretation. This feedback processing interacts with
our existing knowledge about the stimulus for optimal processing
and interpretation.
Forced-choice procedure: This procedure forces a decision
about a question, opinion or test. For example, there is a ‘yes’ or
‘no’ option without any option encouraging indecision.
Global processing: This is where stimuli are processed holistically
rather than at the local level (e.g. process ‘H’ rather than the smaller
‘s’ comprising the letter).
Heuristic: This is a short-cut, ‘rule of thumb’ approach to solving
a problem. Unlike an algorithm, it is a quicker way of informing
our decision-making.
Implementation intentions: Often used as a plan for goal at-
tainment, this involves the use of an ‘if-then’ strategy.
Information processing: This approach concerns the way in
which we attend to and perceive, remember, use and manipulate
information.
Local processing: Unlike global processing, local processing re-
fers to the attention to specific stimulus detail (e.g. process the
smaller ‘s’ forming part of the larger letter ‘H’).
Machiavellian intelligence: This is used to describe an individual
who is able to manipulate social situations to favour their own
ambitions, such that they often mask their true personality and
emotions to serve them well in deceiving others.
Metacognition: This involves the ability to reflect upon one’s
own thinking by using processes such as planning, monitoring and
assessing.
Mirror neurons: These are sensorimotor neurons involved in our
ability to mimic another person’s actions. Mirror neurons are ac-
tivated equally when an action is executed and when we observe
others performing the same action. Moreover, this occurs when
someone experiences distress which is why we can feel empathy.
Mnemonics: These are memory techniques used to improve
encoding, recalling and therefore learning new information.
Modularity: This is the notion that our mind is composed of
independent information centres (or modules), each of which have
their own domain of processing specific stimuli.
GLOSSARY 263
N-back: This is an experimental technique used to measure how

working memory and its capacity operate.
Odds ratio: This is used to measure the likelihood of an event
occurring in one group in comparison to it occurring in a different
group. The comparison pertains to a dichotomous classification.
Orthography: The conventional spelling system of a particular
language.
Perceptual asymmetries: A difference in the perception of stimuli
occurs depending on whether the presentation occurs to the left or
right visual field. When presented to the right visual field, the stimulus
is processed by the left hemisphere and by the right when presented in
the left visual field. The left hemisphere is superior at word processing
whereas the right has an advantage for pictorial formats.
Plasticity: This refers to the brain’s capacity to change or modify
as a consequence of new experiences, in particular learning. In the
case of neuroplasticity, this refers to the neurons comprising the
building-blocks of the brain.
Rotary pursuit task: This is a task used to measure motor per-
formance and involves the tracking of a revolving target using a
pointer.
Scanning techniques: These technologies (e.g. MRI and PET)
are used to provide images of the structure and function of the
human brain.
Synapses: These are found where one neuron ends, and another
begins. There is a gap between these neurons that allows for the
transmission of a signal (impulse) and is enabled by a neurotransmitter.
Top-down processing: While bottom-up processing is involved
in building up an interpretation of stimuli, top-down works to
process and interpret stimuli using existing knowledge. This acts as
a fast-route to understanding stimuli. Sometimes called
conceptually-driven processing.
Trial and error: This is a method used in problem-solving where
multiple attempts are methodically used and observed until the
correct solution is found.
Universal grammar: The hypothesis proposed by Noam
Chomsky that language is, in part, an innate faculty.
Virtual reality: By implementing a computer-generated simula-
tion, a 3-D environmental space is created. A person can interact
with this fake world by wearing special goggles.
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INDEX
algorithms 2, 16, 63, 68, 158, 247, 261 161–2, 231, 234, 236, 243, 256,
attention 3, 10–11, 19–20, 23, 28–9, 260; corpus callosum 24, 26, 37,
35, 44–5, 50, 52–63, 76, 82, 91–2, 48, 211–12, 236, 256; frontal/
111, 123–4, 132, 192, 194, 198, prefrontal 11–12, 18, 26, 36–7, 82,
201, 204–5, 208–12, 214, 219, 91–2, 102, 152, 210, 227, 229,
221, 228, 236, 244–7, 255–7, 259; 241, 259; hippocampus 15, 27,
and consciousness 208–12; 101, 161, 231–2, 234–5, 244;
dichotic listening 53, 56, 93; parietal 12, 18, 26, 41–3, 59, 81,
models of 3, 53–9, 82, 244, 102, 152, 207, 227–9, 232–3, 241,
247, 257 259; occipital 12, 26, 28, 43–4;
automatic processing 62–3; temporal 12, 26, 39–40, 43, 78,
see also divided attention; versus 102, 161, 227–8, 231, 234–5
effortful processing 62, 121, 132
Chomsky, N. 167–9, 184, 195, 258
Baddeley, A 86, 89–2, 94–5, 115, cognition 3, 6, 14, 17–18, 23, 34, 38,
121, 194 44–6, 48, 91, 105, 184, 209, 213,
Biederman, I 74–5 218–19, 221–3, 226–7, 236,
bottom-up processing 56–7, 59–60, 243–8, 253–6, 259–60
73, 75–6, 80, 82, 111, 206, 210, cognitive neuropsychology 2, 8,
244, 257, 261 15–16, 20, 23, 25, 34, 194, 221–2,
brain 1–3, 5–6, 8–16, 18–31, 33–48, 241, 243, 256
50–1, 53, 59–60, 63, 67–8, 70–1, cognitive neuroscience 2, 7–8, 16,
73–4, 78, 80–2, 84, 89, 91–2, 102, 23, 34, 221–2, 243, 247, 256
105, 114, 127, 152, 161–2, 164, communication 13, 19, 22–3, 39–40,
173, 175, 180–1, 184, 186, 194, 45, 112, 164–5, 169, 203–4, 215,
205–12, 216, 219, 221–2, 225–9, 240–1, 245, 256
230–6, 238, 241–9, 255–6, computational cognitive science 2,
259–60; brain damaged individuals 16, 23, 44, 243, 248, 256;
15, 208, 221–2, 241, 244, 259; cognitive modelling 44–5
cerebral cortex 26–7, 39, 41, 261; consciousness 20, 51, 197–212, 214,
brain structure 1, 8–9, 22–8, 30–1, 216, 218–19, 259;
33–4, 44, 47–8, 50, 63, 67, 84, see also attention; behavioural
296 INDEX
measures 198, 200–5, 208–9, 211, 164–97, 209, 221–2, 234, 236,
219; brain indicators 205–9; 238, 241, 245–8, 255–6, 258–9,
see also metacognition 261, 263; definition of 164, 166;
Conway, M. 102–5 modularity 8, 13–15, 19, 23, 25,
184, 221, 225, 262
decision-making 21–3, 29, 36, 45–6, lateralisation 236–8, 242
92, 127–8, 132–6, 138–42, 162, learning 4, 11, 19, 21–3, 45, 52–3,
216, 245, 247, 251–2, 258, 260 65, 71, 82, 84–5, 96, 98, 100, 112,
deductive reasoning/thought 21–2, 114–25, 141, 159, 161–2, 167,
129, 145–8, 150, 152, 162, 258 171, 216, 218, 230–3, 241–2,
divided attention 20, 52, 62, 76, 123 244–5, 247–8, 255–7, 259
dual-process theory 132, 162 levels of processing 21, 73, 88, 112,
dyslexia 171, 174–5, 177–9, 246, 261 114–17, 125
logic 128, 142–3, 147, 162, 243, 248,
evolutionary psychology 144, 243, 253, 258
248, 253, 260; adaptation 252,
260; proximate 248, 260; ultimate memory 84–112; episodic 21, 42–3,
248, 249, 129, 252–3, 260; XX 89, 94–8, 101–2, 104–5, 125, 194,
advantage 254 251–2, 257, 260; explicit 96, 115,
Eysenck, M. 83, 128, 183, 189, 117–18, 257; flashbulb 21, 102,
192–4, 208 126, 251–2; implicit 21, 96,
115–18, 123, 125; long-term 3,
feedback processing 46, 92, 199, 15, 21, 42, 85, 88–9, 96, 107, 117,
206–8, 219, 229, 244, 259, 261–2 119–20, 124–5, 131, 141, 161,
feedforward processing 46, 75, 188, 193–4, 204, 222, 234, 244,
206–8, 210, 218–19, 228, 244, 252, 257; procedural 18, 96, 98,
259, 261 100, 119, 125, 160, 257;
Fodor, J. 13–14, 17, 184, 221, 245 prospective 21, 107, 110–11,
113–14, 125, 257; see also working
grammar 89, 166–8, 170–1, 184, memory; semantic 15, 21, 54,
195, 258, 263 96–7, 99, 101–3, 114, 116–17,
125, 175, 221–2, 251–2, 257;
heuristics 22, 132–3, 136, 149, 158, short-term 3, 15, 27, 42, 85, 124,
162, 258 159, 222, 226, 245, 257
mental imagery 6–7, 124, 219; use in
inductive thought 21–2, 129, 133,
altered consciousness 198, 207,
145, 146–7, 162, 258
209, 211
James, W. 20, 50–2, 62, 198 metacognition 20, 92, 197, 200,
212–20, 259, 262; dysfunctional
Kahneman, D. 129–32, 135–7, 39, 214–16; in learning 213–14,
162, 258 216; in therapy 216;
see also consciousness
language 7, 13–15, 19, 22–3, 25, 36, mnemonics 112, 119–24, 262
38–43, 45–6, 54, 56, 73, 92, 105, modularity 8, 13–15, 19, 23, 25, 184,
113, 121, 127, 144, 148, 151, 221, 225, 262
INDEX 297
neurons 2, 8–9, 18, 23, 26–7, 30, repetition priming 100, 118–19, 123,
45–6, 48, 75, 81–2, 114, 205–6, 125, 250, 257; implicit learning
222, 225–33, 235, 241–2, 256, 21, 115–18, 123, 125; implicit
259, 262–3; neural pathways 25, memory 96; procedural memory
28, 37, 41, 48, 181, 236, 241, 256, 98, 119, 125, 257; spacing effect
259; synapses 26, 29, 84, 231, 241, 118, 131, 125
259, 263
scanning techniques 8–11, 19, 34–5,
orthography 117, 177, 179, 192–3, 48, 245, 256, 259, 263
195, 263 semantics 166, 171, 177, 187, 193,
203, 258
perception 3, 19, 20, 22–3, 32–3, 37, spelling 173, 175, 177, 180, 190,
39, 41, 45–6, 50–3, 63–4, 69–70, 192–5, 258, 261, 263
72–3, 75–6, 78, 81–3, 92–3, 95,
180, 182, 184, 195, 202–3, 206–8, top-down processing 3, 55–61, 73–6,
211, 221, 226, 228, 237–8, 242, 80, 82, 111, 147, 189, 206–8, 219,
249, 256–7, 260–1, 263; 244, 257, 259, 263
constancies 64, 82, 250; face 76–8; Treisman, A.M. 54–5, 59, 62
movement 228–9; object 69, 278; Tulving, E. 96, 98, 100, 101, 109,
space 58–9, 71; speech 180–2 117, 121
phonemes 177, 179, 183, 193,
195, 222 universal grammar 168, 170, 195,
phonology 166, 171–7, 179–80, 258, 263
193, 195
plasticity 25, 36, 161, 263; virtual reality 246–7, 259–60, 263
hippocampus 23, 27, 101, 161,
222, 231–2, 234–5, 244; learning Wason, P.C. 21, 150–1, 162,
230–3; neuroplasticity 196, 230–3, 252–3, 260
235, 241–2, 245, 259, 263 working memory 17, 21, 89, 93,
problem-solving 3–4, 18–19, 21–3, 125, 153, 174, 188, 192, 194, 204,
45, 127–9, 148, 154–62, 184, 216, 209, 221, 244–6, 255, 257, 263;
221, 246, 255–6, 258, 261, 263 central executive 89, 91–2, 94,
194; episodic buffer 89, 94–5, 194;
reading 22, 48, 73, 78, 85, 89–90, phonological loop 89–91, 93–4,
118, 122, 164, 170–81, 184, 188, 194; see also memory; visuospatial
190, 192–3, 195, 197, 217, 221, sketchpad 89–90, 93–5
225, 238, 241, 258, 261 writing 21–2, 38, 41, 48, 164, 171,
rehearsal 86–9, 91, 93–4, 111, 114, 190–6, 211, 234, 258, 261
120, 194; see also levels of processing;
see also phonological loop

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C OG NIT I VE P SY CH OL OG Y

Cognitive Psychology: The Basics provides a compact introduction to the core

Sandie Taylor is an experienced lecturer and author. Her DPhil in cognitive

Lance Workman is Visiting Professor of Psychology at the University of

The Basics is a highly successful series of accessible guidebooks which

For a full list of titles in this series, please visit www.routledge.com/

ISBN: 978-0-367-85686-1 (hbk)

1 What is cognitive psychology? 1

We would like to acknowledge Professor Ray Bull. Also to Sandie

Psychological Association (APA) in 2020 as “the branch of psy­

spurred questions about whether it is possible to replicate a model

introduced. The information processing approach helped cognitive

fails when the time allowed is halved or when distracted. This

BOX 1.1 HOW ARE COGNITIVE INFORMATION

Figure 1.1 Fictitious model based on collated performance results

This example shows how it is possible to develop models based

Figure 1.2 Yerkes-Dodson curve

psychologists have a means of opening the ‘black box’ that beha­

BOX 1.2 MENTAL IMAGERY

Figure 1.3 Fictitious island map

Participants learnt the objects on the map, their locations and

concerns the level of interpretation of the findings. For instance,

Table 1.1 Different scanning techniques commonly used by cognitive neu­

Table 1.2 Different scanning techniques commonly used to investigate cog­

Table 1.2 (Continued)

Scanning techniques When is it used

of multiple cognitive processors (modules)’. It is these that make

Prefrontal Lobe Temporal Lobe

BOX 1.3 THE STRANGE CASE OF THE WOMAN WHO

showed extreme fear when a Doberman trapped her in a corner. It

yet another engaged in stimuli concerning spatial orientation.

Figure 1.5 Modular system of language

to consider the physiological example of digestion. Different organs

Taking our example of Fodor’s language modularity, it can be

BOX 1.4 CASE-SERIES METHOD

While cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience and cog­

COMPUTATIONAL COGNITIVE SCIENCE

on limited inputted details. An example of their application can be

good as the information inputted into the system. The General

BOX 1.5 ADAPTIVE CONTROL OF THOUGHT-

● Inferior ventrolateral prefrontal cortex houses the retrieval

The information from these modules is integrated, so that the

Figure 1.6 A simple ‘if-then’ problem

Thus far, we have learned that cognitive psychology, as a dis­

● brain scanning techniques used by cognitive neuroscientists

AREAS OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

ATTENTION AND PERCEPTION

By attending to stimuli in our environment, it is argued that we can

interpreting, for example, object form and movement as well as

LEARNING AND MEMORY

Learning can occur when we interact with our environment. Being

THINKING: DECISION-MAKING AND PROBLEM-SOLVING

Thought processing consists of a multitude of activities such as

mental models and dual-system models which give insight to how

LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION

Reading, writing and speech are all considered as part of language

of cognitive processing such as perception, memory, thinking and

Heyes, C. (2018) Cognitive Gadgets: The cultural evolution of thinking. Harvard:

Wilshire, C. (2014) Cognitive Neuropsychology: Exploring the mind through brain

Psychological Association (APA) in 2020 as “the branch of psy

psychologists have a means of opening the ‘black box’ that beha

Table 1.1 Different scanning techniques commonly used by cognitive neu

Table 1.2 Different scanning techniques commonly used to investigate cog

While cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience and cog

Thus far, we have learned that cognitive psychology, as a dis

of the brain process specific types of information; this means dif

region of the frontal lobe can cause profound alterations to emo

The left and right hemispheres are known to operate in

The objective of cognitive modelling is to provide a scientific ac

process of making sense of the information derived from our sur