Algo Writing Exp

Algorithmic Writing Assistance on Jobseekers’
Resumes Increases Hires

Emma van Inwegen Zanele Munyikwa John J. Horton
MIT MIT MIT & NBER
January 26, 2023
Abstract
There is a strong association between the quality of the writing in a resume for new labor
market entrants and whether those entrants are ultimately hired. We show that this
relationship is, at least partially, causal: a field experiment in an online labor market
was conducted with nearly half a million jobseekers in which a treated group received
algorithmic writing assistance. Treated jobseekers experienced an 8% increase in the
probability of getting hired. Contrary to concerns that the assistance is taking away a
valuable signal, we find no evidence that employers were less satisfied. We present a
model in which better writing is not a signal of ability but helps employers ascertain
ability, which rationalizes our findings.
1 Introduction
For most employers, the first exposure to a job candidate is typically a written resume. The
resume contains information about the applicant—education, skills, past employment, and
so on—that the employer uses to draw inferences about the applicant’s suitability for the
job. Conveying this information is the most important function of the resume. A better-
written resume—without any change in the underlying facts—might make it easier for the
employer to draw the correct inferences, which could lead to a greater chance of an interview
or job offer. We call this the “clarity view” of the role of resume writing quality. However, a
resume might not merely be a conduit for match-relevant information; the resume’s writing
itself could signal ability. In particular, the quality of the writing might be informative about
the jobseeker’s ability and communication skills. This is another reason better writing could
lead to a greater chance of an interview or a job offer. We call this the “signaling view” of
the role of resume writing quality.
In this paper, we explore how resume writing quality affects the hiring process using
both observational data and a field experiment. We focus on distinguishing between the
1
“clarity view” and “signaling view.” Using data from a large online labor market, we doc-
ument a strong positive relationship between writing quality and hiring (and not simply
callbacks). This relationship persists even after controlling for other factors that might oth-
erwise explain the relationship. In terms of magnitude, an additional 1 percentage point
increase in error rate (number of errors in the resume divided by the number of words in
the resume) is associated with a 3% decrease in the probability of being hired. However,
this is only an association and there are other potential reasons writing quality could be
correlated with hiring even with our controls. To understand if this relationship is causal,
we report the results of a field experiment in this market in which we vary resume writing
quality.
The typical approach to addressing a question of causality in hiring preferences would be
an audit study, where the researcher would make fictitious job applications and observe call-
back rates. However, this method of analysis has a number of downsides, such as deception
and wasting employers’ time (Kessler et al., 2019). Furthermore, a callback is merely the
first step in the hiring funnel, making it an imperfect proxy for who actually gets hired.
We use an alternative approach. We intercept jobseekers at the resume-writing stage
and randomly offer some of them—the treatment group—algorithmic writing assistance.
Others—the control group—had the status quo experience of no assistance. This writing
assistance creates random variation in writing quality. The algorithmic writing assistance
was a service provided by a company we call the Algorithmic Writing Company. We will
discuss in depth what the Algorithmic Writing Service provides, but generally, it makes
writing better by identifying common errors and offering the writer suggestions on how to
address those errors.
In the experimental data, there is a very strong “first stage,” in that those treated had
better-written resumes on several quantifiable dimensions. For example, we find fewer
spelling and grammar errors in the resumes of the treated group of jobseekers. Positive
effects on resume quality were concentrated among the low-end of the distribution in writ-
ing quality, as jobseekers with already excellent resumes can benefit little from writing
assistance.
After creating a resume, jobseekers engage in search, which may or may not lead to a
job. We observe job search behavior and outcomes for both treated and control jobseekers.
Treated workers did not send out more applications than workers in the control group,
nor did they propose higher wages. This is a convenient result because our interest is in
employers’ decision-making, even though randomization was at the level of the jobseeker.
If jobseekers had altered their application behavior—perhaps sending more applications
because they know they have a stronger case to make—we might wrongly attribute greater
2
job-market success to the resume rather than this endogenous effort.
Our primary outcome of interest is the effects of writing assistance on hiring. We find
that treated jobseekers had a 8% increase in their probability of being hired at all relative
to the control group. The 95% confidence interval on the percentage increase in hiring
is (3%, 13%.) They also had 7.8% more job offers over the experimental period than those
in the control group. In terms of the matches themselves, treated workers’ hourly wages
were 8.4% higher than the hourly wages of workers in the control group. However, it is
important to remember this is a conditional result and could simply be due to composition
changes in which workers are hired.
In the “signaling view” the treatment removed or at least weakened a credible signal of
jobseeker ability. If this is the case, this should leave employers disappointed. Unique to
our setting, we have a measure of employer disappointment, as both sides privately rate
each other at the conclusion of the contract. Although these ratings have been shown to
become inflated over time (Filippas et al., Forthcoming) and can be distorted when they are
public and reciprocal (Bolton, Greiner and Ockenfels, 2013), they are still a useful signal of
worker performance. If employers are disappointed with the performance of the worker, this
would likely manifest in lower employer ratings at the conclusion of the contract. We find no
evidence that this is the case. If anything, the treatment group had slightly higher ratings.
The average rating of employer satisfaction of workers in the control group was 8.835 on a
ten-point scale. The average rating in the treatment group was 8.84 and had a confidence
interval of (8.74, 8.94). A natural question is how much statistical power we would have
to detect differences in the marginal hires induced by the treatment. Under conservative
assumptions, we have 80% power to detect if marginally induced hires were 0.2 standard
deviations worse. Given the 8.4% higher average wages in the treatment group, if employers
were simply tricked into hiring worse workers generally, these higher wages should have
made it even more likely to find a negative effect on ratings (Luca and Reshef, 2021).
One possible explanation for our results is that employers are simply wrong in regarding
resume writing quality as informative about ability. However, the “clarity view” can also ra-
tionalize our results without making this assumption. It is helpful to formalize this notion
to contrast it with the more typical signaling framing of costly effort and hiring. To that end,
we present a simple model where jobseekers have heterogeneous private information about
their productivity but can reveal their type via writing a “good” resume. This is not a sig-
naling model where more productive workers face lower resume-writing costs—any worker,
by writing a good resume, will reveal their information, and this cost is assumed to be inde-
pendent of actual productivity. Our model has heterogeneous “good” resume writing costs.
We show that writing assistance shifting the cost distribution can generate our findings of
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more hires, higher wages, and equally satisfied employers.
Our main contribution is to compare the “clarity view” and “signaling view” for the pos-
itive relationship between writing and hiring. Our main substantive finding is evidence for
the “clarity view.” We can do this because we can trace the whole matching process from re-
sume creation all the way to a measure of post-employment satisfaction. Helping jobseekers
have better-looking resumes helped them get hired (consistent with both explanations), but
we find no evidence that employers were later disappointed (which is what the “signaling
view” explanation would predict). We also contribute more broadly by showing the impor-
tance of text in understanding matching (Marinescu and Wolthoff, 2020). The notion that
better writing can help a reader make a better purchase decision is well-supported in the
product reviews literature (Ghose and Ipeirotis, 2010) but is a novel finding in labor mar-
kets. In one related example, Hong, Peng, Burtch and Huang (2021) shows that workers
who directly message prospective employers (politely) are more likely to get hired, but the
politeness effect is muted when the workers’ messages contain typographic errors.
In addition to the general theoretical interest in understanding hiring decisions, there
are practical implications to differentiating between these two views of the resume. If the
“clarity view” is more important, then any intervention that encourages better writing is
likely to be beneficial. There will likely be little loss in efficiency if parties are better in-
formed. Even better, as we show, the kind of assistance that improves clarity can be deliv-
ered algorithmically. These interventions are of particular interest because they have zero
marginal cost (Horton, 2017; Belot et al., 2018), making a positive return on investment
more likely, a consideration often ignored in the literature (Card et al., 2010). On the other
hand, if the “signaling view” is more important, then providing such writing assistance will
mask important information and lead to poor hiring decisions.
Unlike general advice, algorithmic interventions are adaptive. In our study, the algo-
rithm took what the jobseeker was trying to write as input and gave targeted, specific advice
on improvement. This is likely more immediately useful than more vague recommendations,
such as telling jobseekers to “omit needless words.” This advice comes in the form of rec-
ommendations that are predicted to improve the resume’s effectiveness. A limitation of our
study is that we cannot speak to crowd-out effects (Crépon et al., 2013), which are relevant
to discuss the welfare implications of any labor market intervention. However, this concern
is somewhat secondary to our narrower purpose of understanding how employers make deci-
sions with respect to resumes. Additionally, given that in our setting, new entrants compete
with established jobseekers on the platform, we anticipate the crowd-out effect will be small,
and perhaps even welcome if at the expense of more established workers, given the obstacles
new entrants face (Pallais, 2013).
4
In addition to exploring an AI technology in a real labor market, we contribute to a large
literature on how variation in applicant attributes affects callback rates (Moss-Racusin et
al., 2012; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Kang et al., 2016; Farber et al., 2016). While
we are not the first to show that writing matters in receiving callbacks from employers
(Sterkens et al., 2021; Martin-Lacroux and Lacroux, 2017), we are the first to do so on such
a massive scale and with natural variation in writing quality1 . Our experiment involves
480,948 jobseekers which is an order of magnitude larger than the next largest experiments.
Another benefit is that we do not need to guess how workers might make mistakes on their
resumes, as it is workers and not researchers writing their resumes. Additionally, unique
in this literature, we can follow the induced changes all the way through hiring and even
post-employment assessment which allows us to answer our “clarity view” vs. “signaling
view” questions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the online labor market
which serves as the focal market for this experiment. Section 3 reports the experimental re-
sults of the treatment effects on writing quality and subsequent labor market outcomes. In
Section 4 we present a simple model that can rationalize our findings. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical context and experimental design

The setting for this experiment is a large online labor market. Although these markets are
online, with a global audience, and with lower search costs (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2019), they
are broadly similar to more conventional markets (Agrawal et al., 2015). Employers post job
descriptions, jobseekers apply, and there are interviews followed by hiring and managing.
One distinctive feature of online labor markets is that both the employer and the worker
provide ratings for each other at the end of a contract.
Because of the many similarities between on and offline labor markets, a growing body
of research uses online labor markets as a setting, often through randomized experiments.
These studies contribute to the theory in longstanding questions about labor markets, such
as deepening our understanding of the mechanisms and processes by which employers and
workers find jobs. Online labor markets also allow researchers to broaden the range of
questions in which it is possible to make causal estimates (Horton, 2010; Barach and Horton,
2021) because platforms store detailed data on things like applications, text, length of time
spent working on an application, speed of hire, and much more.
Many studies on online labor markets identify and measure phenomena that are rele-
1
While the reason this preference exists is not known, recruiters report, anecdotally, caring about a re-
sume’s writing quality (Oreopoulos, 2011).
5
vant to labor markets both online and offline. Like the offline labor market, online labor
markets have been shown to have hiring biases (Chan and Wang, 2018). But, Agrawal et al.
(2016) shows that these biases tend to be ameliorated with experience and that general, em-
ployers are able to learn as they hire (Kokkodis and Ransbotham, 2022). And Stanton and
Thomas (2016) shows that in an online labor market, agencies (which act as quasi-firms)
help workers find jobs and break into the marketplace.
2.1 Search and matching on the platform

A would-be employer writes job descriptions, labels the job opening with a category (e.g.,
“Graphic Design”), lists required skills, and then posts the job opening to the platform web-
site. Jobseekers generally learn about job openings via electronic searches. They submit
applications, including a wage bid and a cover letter. In addition to jobseeker-initiated ap-
plications, employers can also use the interface to search worker profiles and invite workers
to apply to particular jobs. The platform uses the jobseeker’s history and ratings on the
platform to recommend jobseekers to would-be employers (Horton, 2017). Despite platforms
making algorithmic recommendations, none are based on the writing quality of their re-
sume. In terms of selection, Pallais (2013) shows that employers in an online labor market
care about workers’ reputation and platform experience when hiring. After jobseekers sub-
mit applications, employers screen the applicants, decide whether to give interviews, and
then whether to make an offer(s).
2.2 Experimental intervention at the resume-writing stage of pro-

file creation
When new jobseekers sign up to work on the platform, their first step is to register and
create their profile. This profile serves as the resume with which they apply for jobs. This
profile includes a list of skills, education, and work experience outside of the platform, as
well as a classification of their primary job category (e.g., “Graphic Design”), mirroring what
employers select when posting a job. The interface consists of a text box for a profile title
and a longer one for a profile description. Jobseekers either enter their profile information
on the spot or they can copy and paste it from somewhere else.
During the experimental period, jobseekers registering for the platform were randomly
assigned to an experimental cell. The experimental sample comprises jobseekers who joined
the platform between June 8th and July 14th, 2021. For treated jobseekers, the text boxes
for the profile description are checked by the Algorithmic Writing Service. Control jobseek-
ers received the status quo experience. The experiment included 480,948 jobseekers, with
6
Figure 1: Example of the Algorithmic Writing Service ’s interface showing suggestions on
how to improve writing
Notes: Example of the Algorithmic Writing Service applied to a paragraph of text. To receive the suggestions,
users hover their mouse over the underlined word or phrase. For example, if you hover over the first clause
“Rooms that are tiny" underlined in blue, “Tiny rooms" will pop up as a suggestion.
50% allocated to the treated cell. Table 1 shows that it was well-balanced and the balance
of pre-treatment covariates was consistent with a random process.
2.3 The algorithmic writing assistance

Words and phrases which are spelled wrong or used incorrectly are underlined by the Algo-
rithmic Writing Service. See Figure 1 for an example of the interface with an example of
the text “marked up” by the Algorithmic Writing Service. By hovering a mouse cursor over
the underlined word or phrase, the user sees suggestions for fixing spelling and grammar
errors. The Algorithmic Writing Service also gives advice about punctuation, word usage,
phrase over-use, and other attributes related to clarity, engagement, tone, and style.
2.4 Platform profile approval

When jobseekers finish setting up their profiles, they have to wait to be approved by the
platform. The platform approves jobseekers who have filled out all the necessary informa-
tion and uploaded an ID and bank details. The platform can also reject jobseekers at their
discretion. However, platform rejection is somewhat rare. About 10 percent of profiles are
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rejected, usually as a part of fraud detection or because the jobseekers leave a completely
empty profile. 46% of workers who were allocated into the experiment upon registration
complete and submit their profiles. About 41% of workers who begin registering get all the
way through the approval process.
As approval is made following profile creation, this platform step creates a potential
problem for interpreting any intervention that changes profile creation. For example, it
could be that better writing just led to a greater probability of platform approval. Or, it
could have caused jobseekers to be more likely to complete the registration process and
submit their profile, both of which could effect hiring. While unlikely, this is possible, and
we do several things to deal with this potential issue.
First, see whether there is any evidence of selection. We find no evidence that treated
jobseekers were more likely to be approved—the estimate is a precise zero. In Appendix
Table 12 we show that treated jobseekers are no more likely to submit their profiles and
that approval too is unaffected by the treatment.
Second, in our main analysis, we condition on profile approval in our regressions. We also
do robustness checks where we report the same analysis not conditioned on profile approval
and where we control for profile approval as a covariate. All our results are robust to these
strategies and are described in Section 3.11.
Once a jobseeker is approved, they can begin applying for jobs posted on the platform.
Their profile will include their resume and a “profile hourly wage" which is the wage offer to
employers searching for workers. After they complete their first job on the platform, their
profile also shows the worker’s actual wages and hours worked on jobs found through the
platform.
2.5 Description of data used in the analysis

The dataset we use in the analysis consists of the text of jobseekers’ resumes as well as all of
their behavior on the platform between the time they registered and August 14th, 2021, one
month after allocations ended. We construct jobseeker level data including the title and text
of their profile, the number of applications they send in their first month on the platform, the
number of invitations to apply for jobs they receive, the number of interviews they give, and
the number of contracts they form with employers. These workers most often list Design &
Creative, Writing, Administrative Support, and Software Development as their primary job
categories, in order of frequency.
In Table 1 we present summary statistics about the jobseekers in the full experimental
sample as well as the sample conditioned on platform approval. 16% of the jobseekers spec-
8
Table 1: Comparison of jobseeker covariates, by treatment assignment
Treatment Control Difference in means: p-value

mean: mean: X̄ TRT − X̄ CTL
X̄ TRT X̄ CTL
Full sample description: N = 480,948

Resume submitted 0.456 (0.001) 0.455 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.454
Platform approved 0.407 (0.001) 0.406 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.187
Resume length 32.910 (0.116) 32.859 (0.117) 0.051 (0.165) 0.758
Profile hourly rate 18.843 (0.126) 18.917 (0.126) -0.075 (0.178) 0.676
Flow from initial allocation into analysis sample

Treatment (N) Control (N) Total (N)
Total jobseekers allocated 240,231 240,717 480,948
,→ who submitted their profiles 109,638 109,604 219,242
,→ and were approved by the platform 97,859 97,610 195,469
,→ with non-empty resumes 97,479 97,221 194,700
Pre-allocation attributes of the analysis sample: N = 194,700

From English-speaking country 0.182 (0.001) 0.183 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) 0.363
US-based 0.141 (0.001) 0.143 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) 0.223
Specializing in writing 0.166 (0.001) 0.168 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) 0.150
Specializing in software 0.115 (0.001) 0.115 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.769
Resume length 70.393 (0.222) 70.260 (0.222) 0.133 (0.314) 0.671
Notes: This table reports means and standard errors of various pre-treatment covariates for the treatment
group and the control group. The first panel shows the post-allocation outcomes of the full experimental
sample i) profile submission, ii) platform approval, iii) length of resume in the number of words, iv) profile
hourly wage rate in USD. The means of profile hourly rate in treatment and control groups are only for those
profiles which report one. The reported p-values are for two-sided t-tests of the null hypothesis of no difference
in means across groups. The second panel describes the flow of the sample from the allocation to the sample
we use for our experimental analysis. The complete allocated sample is described in the first line, with each
following line defined cumulatively. The third panel looks at pre-allocation characteristics of the jobseekers in
the sample we use for our analysis, allocated jobseekers with non-empty resumes approved by the platform. We
report the fraction of jobseekers i) from the US, UK, Canada, or Australia, ii) from the US only, iii) specializing
in writing jobs, iv) specializing in software jobs, and v) the mean length of their resumes in the number of
words.
ify that writing jobs are their primary area of work. Only 14% of jobseekers are based in the
US, and over 80% are based in a country where English is not the native language.
9
2.6 Constructing measures of writing quality
We do not observe the changes that Algorithmic Writing Service suggested—we simply ob-
serve the resumes that result. As such, we need to construct our own measures of writing
quality to determine if the treatment was delivered.
Algorithmic Writing Service gives suggestions to writers about how to improve text
along several dimensions. Perhaps the most straightforward measure of writing quality
is spelling. To see if the treatment impacted spelling errors, we take each worker’s profile
and check if each word appears in an English language dictionary. We use the dictionary
hunspell, which is based on MySpell dictionaries and is the basis for the spell checker for
Google Chrome, Firefox, and Thunderbird.
As many of the resumes are for technical jobs, they often contain industry-specific terms
such as “UX” or brand names like “Photoshop.” To prevent these from being labeled as er-
rors, we augmented the list of words in the dictionary by checking the 1,000 most commonly
“misspelled” words in our sample and adding non-errors manually.
Spelling is not the only measure of writing quality. To broaden our measures, we use
LanguageTool, an open-source software that finds many errors that a simple spell checker
cannot detect, to understand employers care about measures of writing quality other than
simply the number of spelling mistakes. LanguageTool is a rule-based dependency parser
that identifies errors (rule violations) and categorizes them. Some example categories in-
clude “Nonstandard Phrases,” “Commonly Confused Words,” “Capitalization,” and “Typog-
raphy.” For example, the nonstandard phrase “I never have been" would be flagged with a
suggestion to replace it with “I have never been.”2
2.7 Spelling errors are associated with lower hiring probabilities

in the control group
Before presenting the experimental results, we explore the relationship between resume
writing quality and hiring in the control group. We begin by studying the most unambiguous
measure of writing quality: spelling. In Figure 2 we plot the relationship between hiring
outcomes and the percentage of words spelled correctly on the resumes of jobseekers in the
control group. Because the distribution of percent correctly spelled is so left skewed, we
truncate the sample to only those who spell at least 75% of the words in their resumes
correctly. This window includes 98% of jobseekers in the control group. The x-axis is deciles
between 75% and 100% of words spelled correctly.
2
For a more detailed explanation of all of the rule categories, see Table 7 in Appendix A.
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Figure 2: Association between spelling errors and hiring outcomes in the control group
Number of contracts in total Probability of being hired at least once

0.10
0.08
0.06
0.04
5] 5] 5] 6] 8] 5] 8] 6] 1] ,1] 5] 5] 5] 6] 8] 5] 8] 6] 1] ,1]
, 0.90 ,0.93 5,0.9 5,0.9 ,0.96 ,0.97 5,0.9 ,0.98 ,0.99 .991 ,0.90 ,0.93 5,0.9 5,0.9 ,0.96 ,0.97 5,0.9 ,0.98 ,0.99 .991
1 5 3 9 6 8 7 8 6 (0 1 5 3 9 6 8 7 8 6 (0
75 90 (0.9 (0. (0.9 0.96 (0.9 (0.9 0.98 75 90 (0.9 (0. (0.9 0.96 (0.9 (0.9 0.98
(0. (0. ( ( (0. (0. ( (
Percentage of Words Spelled Correctly in Profile
Notes: These data show the relationship between the percentage of correctly spelled words on a jobseekers’
resume with various hiring outcomes. A 95% confidence interval is plotted around each estimate. The sample
is of all new jobseekers who registered and were approved for the platform between June 8th and July 14th,
2021, and had resumes with more than 10 words. Plotted are jobseekers in the control group, truncated at
those who spelled at least 75% of the words in their resume correctly.
Job seekers with resumes with fewer spelling errors are more likely to be hired. In the
left facet, the y-axis is the number of contracts a jobseeker forms in their first month on the
platform. In the right facet, the y-axis is the probability that a jobseeker is ever hired in
their first month on the platform. A jobseeker with fewer than 90% of the words in their
resume spelled correctly has only a 3% chance of getting hired, while jobseekers with around
99% of the words spelled correctly has an 8% chance of getting hired. However, as is visible
in both facets, resumes with 100% of words spelled correctly are much less likely to receive
interest from employers. This is likely because those resumes tend to be much shorter than
the others—the average length of a resume that has zero spelling errors is only 52 words
long.
2.8 The association between various kinds of writing errors and

hiring probabilities
Moving beyond spelling, in Table 2, we show the correlation between hiring outcomes on
each type of language error in the resumes in the control group of the experimental sam-
ple.3 In these regressions, we control for the jobseekers’ profile hourly rate and their job
3
In Table 8 of Appendix A we summarize the occurrence of other types of errors within the control group.
11
category. Resumes with more errors in capitalization, grammar, typography, miscellaneous,
collocations, possible typo, commonly confused words, and semantics all hired less. This
linear model places some unreasonable assumptions like constant marginal effects on the
relationship between various writing errors and hiring. There may be interactions between
these error types. However, it is still useful to summarize the relationships. We can see
generally negative relationships between writing errors and hiring.
Interestingly, more style errors positively predict hiring. While initially surprising, style
errors are often caused by language being unnecessarily flowery. Some examples of style
errors are “Moreover, the street is almost entirely residential” and “Doing it this way is
more easy than the previous method.” This implies that despite employers’ dislike of most
writing errors, they forgive or even prefer this kind of flowery language.
3 Effects of the treatment

We look at two main kinds of experimental results. First, we examine how the treatment
affected the text of resumes. We are looking to see whether there is a “first stage.” Next,
we look at market outcomes for those treated workers. For convenience, we present these
treatment effects as percent changes, in Figures 3 and 5. We calculate the standard errors
using the delta method.
3.1 Algorithmic writing assistance improved writing quality

The first step is to measure the effect Algorithmic Writing Service has on writing in the
treatment group. We start with the fraction of words in the resume spelled incorrectly. In
the control group, resumes are 70 words long on average. Even the worst spellers spell most
of the words correctly, and an average resume has 96% of the words spelled correctly.
To understand the effects of the treatment on other types of writing errors we return to
the more fine-grained LanguageTool definitions of writing errors. In Figure 3, we look at
the effect of treatment on the number of each type of writing error, normalized by resume
length.4 Our outcomes of interest are the error rate for each type, so we normalize each type
of error to the number of words in the resume. We calculate the standard errors using the
delta method.
We find that jobseekers in the control group had a higher rate of errors of the following
types: capitalization, collocations, commonly confused words, grammar, spelling, possible
typos, miscellaneous, and typography. We find larger treatment effects for errors associated
4
The treatment had no effect on the length of resumes—see Table 9 in Appendix A.
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Table 2: Hiring outcomes predicted based on language errors (normalized by word count) in
the control group
Dependent variable:
Number of Contracts Hired
(1) (2)
Capitalization Error −0.298∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.039)
Possible Typo −0.049∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.006)
Grammar Error −0.320∗∗∗ −0.223∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.049)
Punctuation Error 0.064∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.012)
Typography Error −0.053∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.008)
Style Error 0.164∗ 0.092∗
(0.098) (0.050)
Miscellaneous Error −0.457∗∗∗ −0.241∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.073)
Redundant Phrases 0.123 0.086
(0.385) (0.195)
Nonstandard Phrases 0.860 −0.074
(1.275) (0.646)
Commonly Confused Words −1.192∗∗ −0.667∗∗
(0.531) (0.269)
Collocations −0.588∗ −0.368∗∗
(0.347) (0.176)
Semantic Error −1.229 −0.683∗
(0.789) (0.400)
Constant 0.167 0.167∗∗
(0.142) (0.072)
Controls X X
Observations 93,725 93,725
R2 0.002 0.004
Notes: This table analyzes correlation between various writing errors on jobseekers’ resumes and their hiring
outcomes. The independent variables, writing errors, are divded by the number of words in the jobseekers’
resume. Column (1) defines Number of Contracts as the number of unique jobs they work over the month after
they register for the platform. Column (2) defines Hired as the probability the jobseeker was hired over that
month. All analysis includes controls for profile hourly rate and job category. Writing errors are defined by
LanguageToolR. The sample is made up of all jobseekers in the control group of the experimental sample who
submitted non-empty resumes and were approved by the platform.
Significance indicators: p ≤ 0.10 : ∗, p ≤ 0.05 : ∗∗ and p ≤ .01 : ∗ ∗ ∗.
13
Figure 3: Effect of the algorithmic writing assistance on writing quality measures
Commonly Confused Words
Miscellaneous Errors
Collocations
Capitalization Errors
Typographic Errors
Nonstandard Phrases
Grammar Errors
Redundant Phrases
Possible Typo
Punctuation Errors
Spelling Errors
Style Errors
Semantic Errors
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10
%
20
%
−4 −3 −2 −1
Percentage (%) Difference between Treatment and Control Group
Notes: This plot shows the effect of the treatment on various writing errors in jobseekers’ resumes. Point
estimates are the percentage change in the dependent variable versus the control group for the treatment
groups. A 95% confidence interval based on standard errors calculated using the delta method is plotted
around each estimate. The experimental sample is of all new jobseekers who registered and were approved
for the platform between June 8th and July 14th, 2021, and had non-empty resumes, with N = 194,700.
Regression details can be found in Tables 10 and 11 of the Appendix.
14
Treatment Effect in (%) Figure 4: Effect of treatment on percentage of words spelled correctly, by deciles
0.6
0.4
0.2 OLS Estimate

0.0
−0.2
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Notes: This plot shows the effect of the treatment on the percentage of words spelled correctly in jobseekers’
resumes, by deciles. The experimental sample is of all new jobseekers who registered and were approved for
the platform between June 8th and July 14th, 2021, and had non-empty resumes, with N = 194,700.
with writing clarity than for many others. For example, the largest magnitudes of differ-
ences in error rate were commonly confused words and collocations, where two English
words are put together that are not normally found together. Interestingly, the treatment
group had more “style” errors.
3.2 Algorithmic assistance helped the worst writers more

The treatment was predominantly effective for jobseekers at the bottom of the spelling dis-
tribution. In Figure 4 we report results from a quantile regression on the effect of the
treatment on the percentage of words they spelled correctly. The effect is concentrated in
jobseekers in the bottom half of the spelling distribution. The treatment effect is largest for
jobseekers below the 30% decile, with effects decreasing at each decile until the median at
which point the treatment did not affect spelling.
3.3 Heterogeneous treatment effects to spelling

A natural question is whether effects differed by jobseeker background. In Table 3 we inter-
act pre-randomization jobseeker attributes with the treatment. We can see that jobseekers
from the US, from English-speaking countries,5 and who are writers all do better in “lev-
els.” We find that jobseekers from countries that are not native English speaking experience
significantly larger treatment effects to the fraction of words they spell correctly than their
anglophone counterparts.
5
We define whether or not a jobseeker is from a native English-speaking country, as when they login to the
platform from USA, UK, Canada, or Australia.
15
Figure 5: Effect of algorithmic writing assistance on hiring outcomes
Number of applications
Mean worker wage bid
Number of invitations to apply
Number of interviews
Hired
Number of contracts
Mean hourly rate for worked jobs
Mean rating on worked jobs
0% 5% 10
%
15
%
Percentage (%) Difference between Treatment and Control Group
Notes: This analysis looks at the effect of treatment on hiring outcomes on jobseekers in the experimental
sample. The x-axis is the difference in the mean outcome between jobseekers in the treated group and the
control group. A 95% confidence interval based on standard errors calculated using the delta method is plotted
around each estimate. The experimental sample is of all new jobseekers who registered and were approved
for the platform between June 8th and July 14th, 2021, and had non-empty resumes, with N = 194,700.
Regression details on the number of applications and wage bid can be found in Table 4. Regression details
on invitations, interviews, hires, and the number of contracts can be found in Appendix Table 13. Regression
details on hourly wages and ratings can be found in Table 6.
16
Table 3: Effects of writing assistance on spelling
Dependent variable:
Frac Words Spelled Correctly x 100
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Algo Writing Treatment (Trt) 0.090∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.102∗∗
(0.046) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050)
Native-English 2.405∗∗∗
(0.084)
Trt ×English −0.218∗
(0.119)
US 2.394∗∗∗
(0.093)
Trt × US −0.192
(0.131)
Writer 0.875∗∗∗
(0.087)
Trt × Writer −0.063
(0.123)
Constant 96.399∗∗∗ 95.957∗∗∗ 96.055∗∗∗ 96.251∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
Observations 194,700 194,700 194,700 194,700
R2 0.00002 0.008 0.006 0.001
Notes: In Column (1) we show the overall effect of the treatment to the percentage of correctly spelled words on
a jobseekers’ resume. In Column (2) we interact the treatment with a dummy variable for if the jobseeker is in
the US, UK, Canada, or Australia. In Column (3) we interact the treatment with a dummy for if the jobseeker
is in the US. In Column (4) we interact the treatment with a dummy for if the jobseeker lists Writing as
their primary category of desired work. The sample is made up of all jobseekers in the control group of the
experimental sample who submitted non-empty resumes and were approved by the platform. Significance
indicators: p ≤ 0.10 : ∗, p ≤ 0.05 : ∗∗ and p ≤ .01 : ∗ ∗ ∗.
17
3.4 Treated workers did not change their job search strategy or
behavior
One potential complication in our desire to focus on employer decision-making is that the
treatment could have impacted jobseekers search behavior or intensity. Suppose treated
jobseekers changed their behavior, knowing they had higher quality resumes. In that case,
we could not interpret our treatment effect as being driven by employers’ having improved
perceptions of treated jobseekers. However, we find no evidence that jobseekers changed
their search behavior due to the treatment. In the first facet of Figure 5, the outcome is the
number of applications a jobseeker sends out over their first 28 days after allocation. We
find no effect of the treatment on the number of applications sent.
In the second facet, the outcome is the mean wage bid proposed by the jobseekers on
their applications in their first 28 days on the platform. Average wage bids in both the
treatment and control group were $24 per hour. The lack of effects on jobseekers’ behaviors
makes sense because they were unaware of the treatment.
Table 4 show the effects of the treatment on jobseekers application behavior. In Column
(1) we see whether treated jobseekers applied for more jobs than those in the control group
over the experimental period and find they did not. In Column (2) we find that treated
jobseekers do not bid for more hourly jobs than those in the control group. They also could
have bid for higher wages knowing they had better-looking resumes. In Column (3) we see
no evidence of this, where we narrow the sample to only applications to hourly jobs and look
at the effect of the treatment on hourly wage bids.
3.5 The treatment did not affect employer recruiting

Employers were able to seek out workers using the platform’s search feature to invite job-
seekers to apply to their job openings. In the third facet of Figure 5 from the top, the outcome
is the number of invitations to apply for a job that the jobseeker receives in their first month.
We find the effect of the treatment on employer invitations is a precise zero. In the fourth
facet from the top, the outcome is the number of interviews a jobseekers gives over their
first month on the platform. We find that this is also a precise zero.
Although it may seem surprising given the results on hires and contracts, it makes sense
given that our experimental sample consists of only new jobseekers to the platform. New
entrants almost never appear in the search results when employers search for jobseekers,
given that their rank is determined by their platform history.
18
Table 4: Effects of writing assistance on jobseekers’ application behavior
Dependent variable:
Num Applications Num Hourly Applications Mean Hourly Wage Bid
(1) (2) (3)
Algo Writing Treatment 0.010 0.009 −0.223
(0.028) (0.018) (0.391)
Constant 2.466∗∗∗ 1.325∗∗∗ 24.283∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.012) (0.276)
Observations 194,700 194,700 68,664
R2 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Notes: This table analyzes the effect of the treatment on jobseekers’ application behavior. The outcome in
Column (1) is the number of total applications a jobseeker sent out between the time the experiment began
and one month after it ended. The sample is made up of all jobseekers in the control group of the experimental
sample who submitted non-empty resumes and were approved by the platform. The outcome in Column (2) is
the number of specifically hourly applications sent out in that same time period. The outcome in Column (3) is
the mean hourly wage bid they proposed for those hourly jobs, and the sample narrows to only jobseeker who
submitted at least one application to an hourly job.
3.6 Treated jobseekers were more likely to be hired

The treatment raised jobseekers’ hiring probability and the number of contracts formed on
the platform. In the fifth facet of Figure 5, the outcome is a binary indicator for whether
or not a jobseeker is ever hired in their first 28 days on the platform. During the experi-
ment, 3% of jobseekers in the control group worked at least one job on the platform. Treated
jobseekers see an 8% increase in their likelihood of being hired in their first month on the
platform. In Table 5 Column (1) we report these results in levels.
Jobseekers in the treated group formed 7.8% more contracts overall. In the sixth facet
of Figure 5, the outcome is the number of contracts a jobseeker worked on over their first
month.
3.7 Hourly wages in formed matches were higher

Treated workers had 8.4% higher hourly wages than workers in the control group. In the
seventh facet, the outcome is the mean hourly rate workers earned in jobs they worked over
their first month on the platform.6 In the control group, workers on average made $17.17
per hour. In the treatment group, workers made $18.62 per hour, a significant difference at
6
Hourly wage rates for new entrants are not representative of rates on the platform. New entrants usually
experience rapid wage growth once they gain experience on the platform.
19
Table 5: Effects of writing assistance on hiring, by sub-groups
Dependent variable:
Hired x 100
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗
Algo Writing Treatment (Trt) 0.247 0.223 0.242 0.237∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.088) (0.086) (0.088)
Native-English 2.508∗∗∗
(0.146)
Trt ×English 0.155
(0.207)
US 2.602∗∗∗
(0.161)
Trt × US 0.072
(0.228)
Writer −0.293∗
(0.151)
Trt × Writer 0.061
(0.214)
Constant 3.093∗∗∗ 2.632∗∗∗ 2.719∗∗∗ 3.142∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.063) (0.061) (0.062)
Observations 194,700 194,700 194,700 194,700
R2 0.00005 0.003 0.003 0.0001
Notes: This table analyzes the effect of the treatment on whether or not a jobseeker was ever hired on the
platform in the month after they joined, times 100. In Column (1) we show the overall effect of the treatment
to hiring. In Column (2) we interact the treatment with a dummy variable for if the jobseeker is in the
US, UK, Canada, or Australia. In Column (3) we interact the treatment with a dummy for if the jobseeker
is in the US. In Column (4) we interact the treatment with a dummy for if the jobseeker lists Writing as
their primary category of desired work. The sample is made up of all jobseekers in the control group of the
experimental sample who submitted non-empty resumes and were approved by the platform. Significance
indicators: p ≤ 0.10 : ∗, p ≤ 0.05 : ∗∗ and p ≤ .01 : ∗ ∗ ∗.
20
the 0.059 level. Since workers did not bid any higher, this result suggests that employers
are hiring more productive workers, or that they thought the treated workers were more
productive. If it is the latter, the “signaling view” would predict that employers would then
be disappointed with the workers they hired, which we should be able to observe in worker
ratings.
Table 6: Effect of algorithmic writing assistance on wages and ratings of worked jobs
Dependent variable:
Hourly wage rate Private rating
(1) (2)
∗
Algo Writing Treatment 1.448 0.004
(0.766) (0.072)
Constant 17.173∗∗∗ 8.835∗∗∗
(0.558) (0.052)
R2 0.001 0.00000
Notes: This analysis looks at the effect of treatment on outcomes of worked
jobs for jobseekers in the experimental sample. Column (1) defines hourly
wage rate as the hourly wage rate paid for all hourly jobs worked. Column
(2) defines private rating as the private rating on all jobs given by employers
to the workers after the job ended. The experimental sample is of all new
jobseekers who registered and were approved for the platform between June
8th and July 14th, 2021 and had non-empty resumes. Significance indicators:
p ≤ 0.10 : ∗, p ≤ 0.05 : ∗∗ and p ≤ .01 : ∗ ∗ ∗.
3.8 Employers gave treated workers slightly better ratings on av-

erage
At the end of every contract, employers rate the workers’ quality by reporting a private
rating to the platform. These ratings are not shared with the worker. In the control group,
workers had an average rating of 8.835. In the final facet of Figure 5 we show that treated
workers who formed any contracts over the experimental period did not have a lower rating
than workers in the control group. We show this result in levels in Table 6— workers in the
treated group have an average rating of 8.84 with a standard error of 0.072.
21
3.9 How much power do we have to detect worse contractual out-
comes?
Although the treatment has slightly more positive ratings, a natural question is how much
power is available to detect effects. While we do find a substantial increase in hiring—
8%—these marginal hires are mixed in with a much larger pool of “inframarginal” hires
that would likely be hired anyway, but for our intervention. How much worse could those
marginal applicants have been and still get our results of slightly higher ratings in the
treatment?
Let I indicate “inframarginal” jobseekers who would have been hired in the treatment
or control. Let M indicate “marginal” jobseekers who are only hired in the treatment. For
workers in the control group, the average private rating will be r̄ C = r̄ I . But for the treat-
ment, the mean rating is a mixture of the ratings for the inframarginal and the ratings for
the induced, marginal applicants, and so
r̄ I + τ r̄ M
r̄ T = (1)
1+τ
where τ is the treatment effect. We assume no substitution, making our estimates conser-
vative. The sampling distribution of the mean rating for the marginal group is
r̄ T (1 + τ) − r̄ C
r̄ M = (2)
τ
Our course, r̄ T , τ and r̄ C are all themselves random variables. Furthermore, they are not
necessarily independent. To compute the sampling distribution of r̄ M , we bootstrap sample
both the hiring regressions and the private feedback regressions on the experimental sam-
ple.7 Because we do not have feedback on workers who are never hired, we use the estimates
values to calculate r̄ M . Figure 6 shows the sampling distribution of r̄ M .
The treatment and control actual ratings are plotted as solid vertical lines. As expected
given the treatment has a slight positive effect on average ratings, the distribution is cen-
tered at these mean values.
The dashed line indicates the control mean rating minus a standard deviation in the
private ratings (which is 2.34). Comparing this value to the distribution of r̄ M , this is only
about 0.025 of the density. In short, it would be quite surprising for us to get the results we
have—an 8% increase in hires and slightly higher (but not significant ratings) if the actual
7
We define this sample as the workers allocated into the experiment who were approved by the platform
and had non-empty resumes. From this we bootstrap sample with replacement. We run the hiring regressions
on this sample and the ratings regressions on the same samples, narrowed to only those workers who were
ever hired.
22
Figure 6: Sampling distribution of the private ratings of marginal hired jobseekers
1.00 Ctl Mean Rating − 1 Std Dev Ctl Trt

Mean Mean
Rating Rating
0.75
CDF
0.50
0.25
0.00
5 6 7 8 9
Bootstrap estimate of mean private ratings for induced (marginal) hires
marginal hires were a standard deviation worse.
3.10 Heterogeneous treatment effects to hiring

We might have expected the treatment to have differential effects on these subgroups, par-
ticularly since the treatment disproportionately impacted the fraction of words spelled cor-
rectly in non-native English speakers’ resumes. In hiring outcomes, we might expect, for
example, that native English or US-based jobseekers would benefit less, writers might ben-
efit more—though as we saw earlier, writers already make few errors. However, for these
same jobseekers, the treatment might do less.
We have already shown above in Table 3 that the treatment disproportionately impacted
the fraction of words spelled correctly in non-native English speakers’ resumes. If we look
downstream to hiring outcomes, in Table 5, we interact the same groups with the treatment
and look at their effect on the probability they were hired. The point estimates are generally
quite imprecise and we lack the power to conclude much. While non-native English speak-
ers’ writing might benefit more from the treatment, it does not translate into more hires
relative to native English speakers.
3.11 Robustness checks

In our main analysis narrow the sample to only those jobseekers whose profiles were ap-
proved by the platform. In Appendix Table 14 we run a similar regression on the full exper-
23
imental sample, but we include profile approval as a control to see if it affects the estimates.
In this analysis, we find that the treatment effect on the number of hires is slightly smaller
than in the analysis conditional on platform approval—conditioning the sample on only job-
seekers whose profiles were approved has an estimate of 7.8% while it is 10% in the full
sample. The effect on the probability of any hire is 8% in the sample of only approved job-
seekers and 8% in the unconditional sample. This approach and narrowing the sample to
only approved jobseekers would “block” the approval channel. In Appendix Table 15 we re-
port the same analysis not conditioned on profile approval. None of these robustness checks
change the direction or significance of any of the hiring estimates, and the slightly larger
estimates in the unconditional sample are unsurprising because of the positive effect of the
treatment on platform approval.
24
4 A simple model of the “clarity view” of resume writing
In this section, we formalize a rational model of how the writing intervention could (a)
increase hiring but (b) not lead to worse matches. We formalize the argument that better
writing allowed employers to better ascertain who was a potential match with a simple
model, and show how this kind of interplay between resume quality and hiring could exist
in equilibrium.
4.1 A mass of jobseekers with heterogeneous productivity

There is a unit mass of jobseekers. If hired, their productivity is θ i . Workers are either
high-type (θ = θH ) or low-type (θ = θL ), with θH > θL . Workers know their own type. It is
common knowledge that the fraction of high types in the market is γ. All workers, if hired,
are paid their expected productivity, from the employer’s point of view. Hires only last one
unit of time.
4.2 Jobseekers decide whether to put into resume-writing

Before being hired, jobseekers write resumes. Jobseekers must decide whether to put effort
e ∈ {0, 1} into writing that resume. Effort itself is not observable. The cost of this effort is
jobseekers-specific and there is a distribution of individual resume effort costs. The support
of the cost distribution is [0, c̄]. The distribution has mass everywhere and the CDF is F
and PDF is f . Jobseekers who put in no effort have resume costs of 0, while those that put
in effort have a cost of c i . Critically, this cost is independent of a jobseeker’s type i.e., there
is no Spence-like assumption that better workers find it cheaper to create better resumes
(Spence, 1978).
Before making an offer, firms observe a signal of jobseekers’ type on their resume, R ∈
{0, 1}. With effort, a high-type jobseeker generates an R = 1 signal; without effort, R = 0. A
low-type jobseeker generates R = 0 no matter what.
Clearly, low-types will never put in effort. The question is whether a high type will put in
effort. The decision hinges on whether the cost of resume effort is worth the wage premium
it creates. Let wR =0 be the wage paid in equilibrium to jobseekers with R = 0. Note that
wR =1 = θH , as there is no uncertainty about a jobseeker’s type if R = 1.
A jobseekers i who is a high-type will choose e = 1 if θH − wR =0 ( ĉ) > c i , and so the
marginal high-type indifferent between putting in effort or not has a resume-writing cost of
25
ĉ, where
ĉ = θH − wR =0 ( ĉ). (3)
This implies that there are F ( ĉ)γ jobseekers that choose e = 1. There are the high-type
jobseekers with relatively low resume writing costs. The remaining [1 − F ( ĉ)]γ high-type
jobseekers choose e = 0. They are pooled together with the 1 − γ jobseekers that choose e = 0
because they are low-types.
From the employer’s perspective, if they believe that the resume effort cost of the marginal
high-type jobseekers is ĉ, the probability an R = 0 jobseekers is high-type is
1 − F ( ĉ)
pR =0
H ( ĉ) = . (4)
1/γ − F ( ĉ)
The wage received by an R = 0 worker is
wR =0 ( ĉ) = θL + (θH − θL ) p R =0
H ( ĉ) (5)
When the cost of the marginal jobseeker is higher, more jobseekers find it worth choosing
e = 1, as F 0 ( ĉ) > 0. This leaves fewer high-types in the R = 0 pool, and so
d pR
H
=0
< 0. (6)
d ĉ
4.3 The equilibrium fraction of high-type workers putting effort

into resume-writing
In equilibrium, there is some marginal high-type jobseeker indifferent between e = 0 and
e = 1, and so
(θH − θL )(1 − p R =0 ∗ ∗
H ( ĉ )) = ĉ .
Figure 7 illustrates the equilibrium i.e., the cost where the marginal jobseeker is indif-
ferent between e = 0 and e = 1. The two downward-sloping lines are the pay-offs to the
marginal jobseeker for each ĉ. The pay-off to R = 1 is declining, as the wage is constant (at
θH ) but the cost is growing linearly. The pay-off to R = 0 is also declining, from Equation 6.
Both curves are continuous.
Note that when the marginal jobseeker has ĉ = 0, there is just a point-mass of high-types
that have a cost that low, i.e., f ( ĉ). This implies that the R = 0 pool is just the expected value
26
Figure 7: Equilibrium determination of the marginal high-type jobseeker indifferent be-
tween putting effort into a resume
θH
Resume writing
θH γ + (1 − γ)θL costs decrease
Payoff to marginal
H-type worker
when R = 0
θL
Cost to
Marginal
0 ĉ∗ĉ∗0 c̄ Worker
θH − ĉ
Payoff to marginal
H-type worker
when R = 1
of all jobseekers, so the wage is just γθH + (1 − γ)θL . The “marginal” jobseeker pays nothing,
so the pay-off is θH . At the other extreme, ĉ = c̄, all but a point mass of jobseekers have a cost
less than this, so the R = 0 pool is purely low-types and the wage is θL . For the R = 1 market,
the “marginal” jobseeker has a cost of ĉ so the pay-off is θH − ĉ. We know θH > γθH + (1 − γ)θL .
And by assumption, θL > θH − ĉ, and so by the intermediate value theorem, an equilibrium
ĉ∗ exists on (0, c̄).
4.4 A shift in the resume writing cost distribution leads to more

high-type workers choosing to exert effort
Now suppose a technology comes along that lowers—or at least keeps the same—resume
writing costs for all jobseekers. This would shift F higher for all points except the endpoints
of the support, creating a new distribution of costs that first-order stochastically dominates
the other.
Before determining the new equilibrium, note that no matter the marginal ĉ, when F
27
increases, the probability that an R = 0 worker is a high-type declines, as
d pH 1
=− < 0. (7)
dF (F − 2)2
This shifts the wR =0 curve down everywhere, without changing the endpoints.
Because wR =1 − ĉ is downward sloping, it intersects wR =0 ( ĉ) at a higher value of ĉ. At
the new equilibrium, the marginal jobseeker has resumes costs of ĉ∗0 , where ĉ∗0 > ĉ∗ . At
this new equilibrium, more jobseekers choose e = 1, causing more R = 1 signals. This lowers
wages for the R = 0 group.
4.5 The effects of lower costs are theoretically ambiguous

Note that this shift in costs is not Pareto improving—low-types are made worse off as they
find themselves in a pool with fewer high-types. Furthermore, because workers are all paid
their expected product, the ideal outcome would be for everyone to choose R = 0. Resume
effort purely changes around the allocation of the wage bill, not the total amount. Total
surplus is
Z c̄
θH γ + (1 − γ)θL − c f ( c) dc, (8)
0
which is maximized at ĉ = 0, i.e., when no one finds it worthwhile to choose effort. However,
with a shift in cost distribution (raising F ), whether matters is whether the marginal de-
crease in costs for all inframarginal workers i..e, those with c < ĉ outweighs the costs borne
by the (newly) marginal jobseekers who choose to put in effort.
In our model, all job offers are accepted. However, if we think of jobseekers as having
idiosyncratic reservation values that determine whether they accept an offer, the shift in
costs makes it more likely that high-types will accept an offer, while making it less likely
that low-types will accept an offer. This is consistent with our results of a greater chance
an employer hires at all in the treatment. It is also consistent with our result of higher
wages. Finally, if we think of employer ratings being a function of surplus, our finding of
no change in satisfaction is also consistent, as employers are, in all cases, just paying for
expected productivity.
5 Conclusion
Employers are more likely to hire new labor market entrants with better-written resumes.
We argue that better writing makes it easier for employers to decide to hire a particular
28
worker. We show results from a field experiment in an online labor market where treated
workers were given algorithmic writing assistance from Algorithmic Writing Service. These
jobseekers were 8% more likely to get hired and formed 7.8% more contracts over the month-
long experiment. While one might have expected writing quality to be a valuable indicator of
worker quality, the treatment did not affect employers’ ratings of hired workers. We provide
a model of the hiring process where the cost of exerting effort on a resume is lowered by
algorithmic writing assistance, which helps employers to distinguish between high and low-
type workers.
One possibility is that the benefits to treated workers came at the expense of other work-
ers, as both treated- and control-assigned workers compete in the same market. Crowd-out
concerns have been shown to be important with labor market assistance (Crépon et al.,
2013). However, even if additional hires came from experienced workers, this is likely still
a positive result. New labor market entrants are uniquely disadvantaged (Pallais, 2013) in
online labor markets. To the extent that the gains to new workers come partially at the
expense of experienced workers, this is likely a good trade-off.
Conceptualizing AI/ML innovation and proliferation as a fall in the cost of prediction
technology fits our setting (Agrawal et al., 2018b,a). Writing a resume is, in part, an ap-
plied prediction task—what combination of words and phrases, arranged in what order, are
likely to maximize my pay-off from a job search? Algorithmic Writing Service reduces the
effort or cost required for making these decisions. When revising their resumes, rather than
identifying errors in their own predictions themselves, jobseekers with access to Algorith-
mic Writing Service specify their target audience and writing goals and enter their draft
profiles into Algorithmic Writing Service. Algorithmic Writing Service assists jobseekers in
error correction. Furthermore, the treatment, by lowering the costs of error-free writing for
at least some jobseekers, causes them to do better at writing their resumes.
Interestingly, this algorithmic writing assistance will likely “ruin” writing as a signal.
With the proliferation of writing technologies with capabilities far beyond what is explored
here (Brown et al., 2020), even if the “signaling view” was at one time true, technological
changes are likely to make it not true in the future.
29
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A Appendix
32
Table 7: Description of Error Rule Categories with Examples
Category Description Examples

American En- Sentence favors the American English apologize, catalog, civilization, defense
glish Phrases spelling of words.
British English, Sentence favors the British English apologise, catalogue, civilisation, defence
Oxford Spelling spelling of words.
Capitalization Rules about detecting uppercase words This house is old. it was built in 1950.
where lowercase is required and vice I really like Harry potter.
versa.
Collocations A collocation is made up of two or more Undoubtedly, this is the result of an extremely dy-
words that are commonly used together in namic development of Lublin in the recent years.
English. This refers to an error in this I will take it in to account.
type of phrase. It’s batter to be save then sorry.
Commonly Con- Words that are easily confused, like ’there’ I have my won bed.
fused Words and ’their’ in English. Their elicit behavior got the students kicked out of
school.It’s the worse possible outcome.
Grammar Violations related to system of rules that Tom make his life worse.
allow us to structure sentences. A study like this one rely on historical and present
data.This is best way of dealing with errors.
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous rules that don’t fit else- This is best way of dealing with errors.
where. The train arrived a hour ago.
It’s nice, but it doesn’t work. (inconsistent apostro-
phes)
Nonstandard I never have been to London.
Phrases List the names in an alphabetical order.
Why would a man all of the sudden send flowers?
Possible Typo Spelling issues. It’a extremely helpful when it comes to homework.
We haven’t earned anything.This is not a HIPPA
violation.
Punctuation Error in the marks, such as period, "I’m over here, she said.
comma, and parentheses, used in writing Huh I thought it was done already.
to separate sentences and their elements The U.S.A is one of the largest countries.
and to clarify meaning.
Redundant Redundant phrases contain words that We have more than 100+ customers.
Phrases say the same thing twice. When one of the He did it in a terrible way.
words is removed, the sentence still makes The money is sufficient enough to buy the sweater.
sense. Sometimes the sentence has to be
slightly restructured, but the message re-
mains the same.
Semantics Logic, content, and consistency problems. It allows us to both grow, focus, and flourish.
On October 7, 2025 , we visited the client.This was
my 11nd try.
Style General style issues not covered by other Moreover, the street is almost entirely residential.
categories, like overly verbose wording. Moreover, it was named after a poet.
Doing it this way is more easy than the previous
method.
I’m not very experienced too.
Anyways, I don’t like it.
Typography Problems like incorrectly used dash or This is a sentence with two consecutive spaces.
quote characters. I have 3dogs.The price rose by $12,50.
I’ll buy a new T—shirt.
33
Table 8: Summary statistics on error counts and rates in the control group
Total Errors Error Rate
Capitalization Errors 0.112 (0.488) 0.003 (0.015)

Possible Typo 2.350 (8.098) 0.041 (0.102)
Grammar Errors 0.195 (0.541) 0.004 (0.012)
Punctuation Errors 0.654 (2.096) 0.010 (0.048)
Typographic Errors 0.758 (2.356) 0.015 (0.071)
Style Errors 0.343 (0.933) 0.004 (0.012)
Miscellaneous Errors 0.094 (0.353) 0.002 (0.008)
Redundant Phrases 0.027 (0.172) 0.000 (0.003)
Nonstandard Phrases 0.002 (0.052) 0.000 (0.001)
Commonly Confused Words 0.008 (0.093) 0.000 (0.002)
Collocations 0.013 (0.125) 0.000 (0.003)
Semantic Errors 0.007 (0.113) 0.000 (0.001)
Notes: This table reports means and standard errors of the writing errors in the resumes of the control group.
The first column displays the average total error count and the second column displays the average error rate
(total errors normalized by word count). Writing errors are defined by LanguageToolR. The sample is made up
of all jobseekers in the control group of the experimental sample who submitted non-empty resumes and were
approved by the platform.
Table 9: Effects of writing assistance on length of resume
Dependent variable:
Number of words in resume
Algo Writing Treatment 0.127
(0.314)
Constant 70.541∗∗∗
(0.223)
Observations 194,700
R2 0.00000
Notes: This table analyzes the effect of the treatment on the number of words
in a jobseeker’s resume. The sample is made up of all jobseekers in the exper-
imental sample who submitted non-empty profiles and were approved by the
platform. Significance indicators: p ≤ 0.10 : ∗, p ≤ 0.05 : ∗∗ and p ≤ .01 : ∗ ∗ ∗.
34
Table 10: Effect of Treatment to Writing Errors, Page 1
Dependent variable:
Spelling Capitalization Possible Typo Grammar Punctuation Typography Style
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
Algo Writing Treatment −0.001 −0.0005 −0.002 −0.0005 −0.0004 −0.002 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0001)
Constant 0.036∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.00005) (0.0003) (0.00004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.00004)
Observations 187,857 187,857 187,857 187,857 187,857 187,857 187,857
R2 0.00002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0004 0.00000 0.0004 0.0001
Notes: This table analyzes the effect of the treatment on all types of writing errors, normalized by resume
length. Writing errors are defined by LanguageToolR, and divided by the number of words in a jobseekers’
resume to calculate their error rate. The sample is made up of all jobseekers in the experimental sample who
completed the platform registration page and submitted non-empty resume. Significance indicators: p ≤ 0.10 :
35
∗, p ≤ 0.05 : ∗∗ and p ≤ .01 : ∗ ∗ ∗.
Table 11: Effect of Treatment to Writing Errors, Page 2
Dependent variable:
Miscellaneous Redundant Phrases Nonstandard Phrases Commonly Confused Words Collocations Semantics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
Algo Writing Treatment −0.0004 −0.00003 −0.00001 −0.00005 −0.0001 0.00001
(0.00003) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Constant 0.002∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.00003∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00000)
Observations 187,857 187,857 187,857 187,857 187,857 187,857
R2 0.001 0.00002 0.00001 0.0002 0.0001 0.00000
Notes: This table analyzes the effect of the treatment on all types of writing errors, normalized by resume
length. Writing errors are defined by LanguageToolR, and divided by the number of words in a jobseekers’
resume to calculate their error rate. The sample is made up of all jobseekers in the experimental sample
who completed the platform registration page and submitted non-empty resume. Significance: p ≤ 0.10 : †,
36
p ≤ 0.05 : ∗, p ≤ 0.01 : ∗∗ and p ≤ .001 : ∗ ∗ ∗.
Table 12: Effects of writing assistance on profile submission and platform approval
Dependent variable:
Profile submitted x 100 Approved x 100
(1) (2) (3)
Algo Writing Treatment 0.106 0.199 0.186
(0.144) (0.133) (0.142)
Constant 45.532∗∗∗ 89.057∗∗∗ 40.550∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.094) (0.100)
Observations 480,948 219,242 480,948
R2 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000
Notes: This table analyzes the effect of the treatment on In Column (1) the outcome is 100 times a binary
indicator for whether or not the jobseeker completed platform registration and submitted their resume, on
the full experimental sample. In Column (2) the outcome is 100 times a binary indicator for whether or not
the platform approved the resume, on the sample of only those jobseekers who submitted their resumes. In
Column (3) the outcome is 100 times a binary indicator for whether or not the platform approved the resume,
on the full experimental sample. Significance indicators: p ≤ 0.10 : ∗, p ≤ 0.05 : ∗∗ and p ≤ .01 : ∗ ∗ ∗.
37
Daily Allocations into Experiment Figure 8: Daily allocations of jobseekers into experimental cells
8000
7000
Control
6000
Treatment
5000
4000
n 15 l0
1
l 15
Ju Ju Ju
Notes: This plot shows the daily allocations into the treatment and control cells for the experimental sample
of 480,948 new jobseekers to the platform.
Table 13: Effect of algorithmic writing assistance on hiring outcomes
Dependent variable:
Num Contracts Hired x 100 Num Hourly Interviews Num Invitations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Algo Writing Treatment 0.004∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.080) (0.004) (0.003)
Constant 0.047∗∗∗ 3.093∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.057) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 194,700 194,700 194,700 194,700
R2 0.00003 0.00005 0.00000 0.00000
sample. Column (1) defines Number of Contracts as the number of unique jobs they work over the month
after they register for the platform. Column (2) defines Hired x 100 as one hundred times the probability the
jobseeker was hired over that month. Column (3) is the number of interviews they gave over that month. And
the Column (4) outcome Invitations is the number of times they were recruited to a job over their first month.
The experimental sample is of all new jobseekers who registered and were approved for the platform between
June 8th and July 14th, 2021 and had non-empty resumes. Significance indicators: p ≤ 0.10 : ∗, p ≤ 0.05 : ∗∗
and p ≤ .01 : ∗ ∗ ∗.
38
Table 14: Effect of algorithmic writing assistance on hiring outcomes, controlling for plat-
form approval
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∗∗ ∗∗∗
Algo Writing Treatment 0.002 0.104 0.001 0.0004
(0.001) (0.033) (0.002) (0.001)
Approved by Platform 0.048∗∗∗ 3.171∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.033) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant −0.0003 −0.013 −0.0003 0.00001
(0.001) (0.027) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 480,948 480,948 480,948 480,948
R2 0.011 0.019 0.030 0.023
The sample used in this analysis is the entire experimental sample. Significance indicators: p ≤ 0.10 : ∗,
p ≤ 0.05 : ∗∗ and p ≤ .01 : ∗ ∗ ∗.
Table 15: Effect of algorithmic writing assistance on hiring outcomes, unconditional on plat-
form approval
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Algo Writing Treatment 0.002∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.033) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant 0.019∗∗∗ 1.273∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.023) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 480,948 480,948 480,948 480,948
R2 0.00001 0.00002 0.00000 0.00000
The sample used in this analysis is the entire experimental sample. Significance indicators: p ≤ 0.10 : ∗,
p ≤ 0.05 : ∗∗ and p ≤ .01 : ∗ ∗ ∗.
39
Table 16: Hiring outcomes predicted based on language errors in the control group
Dependent variable:
Number of Contracts Hired
(1) (2)
Capitalization Error −0.010∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
Possible Typo 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Grammar Error −0.002 −0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Punctuation Error 0.006∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0003)
Typography Error −0.001 −0.001∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0002)
Style Error 0.010∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Miscellaneous Error −0.010∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002)
Redundant Phrases 0.019∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.003)
Nonstandard Phrases 0.071∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗
(0.022) (0.011)
Commonly Confused Words −0.028∗∗ −0.014∗∗
(0.012) (0.006)
Collocations −0.007 −0.006
(0.009) (0.005)
Semantic Error −0.014 −0.007
(0.010) (0.005)
Constant 0.140 0.152∗∗
(0.142) (0.072)
Controls X X
R2 0.004 0.005
Notes: This table analyzes correlation between various writing errors on jobseekers’ resumes and their hiring
outcomes. Column (1) defines Number of Contracts as the number of unique jobs they work over the month
after they register for the platform. Column (2) defines Hired as the probability the jobseekers was hired over
that month. Column (3) is the number of interviews they gave over that month. And the Column (4) outcome
Invitations is the number of times they were recruited to a job over their first month. All analysis includes
controls for profile hourly rate and job category. Writing errors are defined by LanguageToolR. The sample is
made up of all jobseekers in the control group of the experimental sample who submitted non-empty resumes
and were approved by the platform.
40
Table 17: Hiring outcomes predicted based on language errors in the control group
Dependent variable:
Number of Contracts Hired Interviews Invitations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
Total errors 0.001 0.0003 0.003 0.002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Error rate −0.048∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.004) (0.021) (0.017)
Constant 0.162 0.171 0.164∗∗ 0.169∗∗ −0.025 0.013 −0.015 0.009
(0.142) (0.142) (0.072) (0.072) (0.380) (0.380) (0.305) (0.305)
Normalized N Y N Y N Y N Y
Controls X X X X X X X X
Observations 93,725 93,725 93,725 93,725 93,725 93,725 93,725 93,725
R2 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004
41
Notes: This table analyzes correlation between all writing errors on jobseekers’ resumes and their hiring
outcomes. The first independent variable is the total number of writing errors on a jobseekers’ resume. The
second independent variable is the total number of errors divided by the length of their resume, in number
of words. Columns (1) and (2) define Number of Contracts as the number of unique jobs they work over the
month after they register for the platform. Columns (3) and (4) defines Hired as the probability they were
hired over that month. Columns (5) and (6) is the number of interviews they gave over that month. And the
Columns (7) and (8) outcome Invitations is the number of times they were recruited to a job over their first
month. All analysis includes controls for profile hourly rate and job category. Writing errors are defined by
LanguageToolR. The sample is made up of all jobseekers in the control group of the experimental sample who
submitted non-empty resumes and were approved by the platform.

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Algorithmic Writing Assistance on Jobseekers’

Resumes Increases Hires

January 26, 2023

2 Empirical context and experimental design

2.1 Search and matching on the platform

2.2 Experimental intervention at the resume-writing stage of pro-

2.3 The algorithmic writing assistance

2.4 Platform profile approval

2.5 Description of data used in the analysis

Treatment Control Difference in means: p-value

Full sample description: N = 480,948

Flow from initial allocation into analysis sample

Pre-allocation attributes of the analysis sample: N = 194,700

2.7 Spelling errors are associated with lower hiring probabilities

Number of contracts in total Probability of being hired at least once

2.8 The association between various kinds of writing errors and

3 Effects of the treatment

3.1 Algorithmic writing assistance improved writing quality

Commonly Confused Words

0.2 OLS Estimate

3.2 Algorithmic assistance helped the worst writers more

3.3 Heterogeneous treatment effects to spelling

Mean worker wage bid

Number of invitations to apply

Mean hourly rate for worked jobs

Mean rating on worked jobs

3.5 The treatment did not affect employer recruiting

3.6 Treated jobseekers were more likely to be hired

3.7 Hourly wages in formed matches were higher

3.8 Employers gave treated workers slightly better ratings on av-

1.00 Ctl Mean Rating − 1 Std Dev Ctl Trt

marginal hires were a standard deviation worse.

3.10 Heterogeneous treatment effects to hiring

3.11 Robustness checks

4.1 A mass of jobseekers with heterogeneous productivity

4.2 Jobseekers decide whether to put into resume-writing

The wage received by an R = 0 worker is

4.3 The equilibrium fraction of high-type workers putting effort

4.4 A shift in the resume writing cost distribution leads to more

4.5 The effects of lower costs are theoretically ambiguous

, , and , Prediction machines: the simple economics of artificial intelligence, Harvard

, Nicola Lacetera, and Elizabeth Lyons, “Does standardized information in online

, “The Effects of Algorithmic Labor Market Recommendations: Evidence from a Field

Moss-Racusin, Corinne A, John F Dovidio, Victoria L Brescoll, Mark J Graham,

Pallais, Amanda, “Inefficient Hiring in Entry-level Labor Markets,” American Economic

Spence, Michael, “Job market signaling,” in “Uncertainty in economics,” Elsevier, 1978,

Category Description Examples

Total Errors Error Rate

Capitalization Errors 0.112 (0.488) 0.003 (0.015)

Table 9: Effects of writing assistance on length of resume

Table 13: Effect of algorithmic writing assistance on hiring outcomes

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