EDWARD N. RIVO vs. DOLORES S.

RIVO
G.R. No. 210780, January 25, 2023
HERNANDO, J.:

NATURE:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 challenging the September 9, 2013 Decision2
and the January 9, 2014 Resolution3 of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 94751. The CA granted the appeal filed
by respondent and set aside the October 30, 2009 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las
Pinas City, Branch 199 in Civil Case No. 05-0086, granting petitioner's Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

FACTS:

Edward N. Rivo (petitioner) and Dolores S. Rivo (respondent) were officemates when they started
dating in 1978 and got married on January 19, 1979 in a civil ceremony. On March 14, 1979, they
celebrated their church wedding. Prior to their marriage, respondent begot a child with her former
lover. Petitioner accepted respondent's son and treated him as his own son. Petitioner and respondent
have three children.

On April 26, 2005, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent. Petitioner alleged that:
 Respondent was psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of
marriage, and the incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage
although he discovered it only after their marriage.
 During their marriage, petitioner observed that respondent gave priority to her work
and devoted little time with petitioner and their children. Even on Sundays, respondent
would tend to her family's grocery store rather than spend time with her family.
 Respondent was always too tired and unconcerned about her physical appearance.
Most of the time, she went to bed without cleaning herself thus, petitioner did not have
the urge to be intimate with her.
 Petitioner noticed that respondent was unfair to her children. She showed more care
and love towards Eduardo and Eugene while she often mistreated Jor-el. This prompted
petitioner to take custody of Jor-el after they separated.
 Petitioner admitted that he was partly responsible for the failure of their marriage. He
revealed that he had two extra-marital affairs and even sired two children with her
second mistress, Perla.
 In 1989, petitioner abandoned his family and did not disclose his whereabouts for two
years.
 On January 20, 2005, petitioner sought professional help from a clinical psychologist, Dr.
Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan). After the interview, the physician concluded that
petitioner is suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Dr. Dayan opined that
respondent is encumbered with a Compulsive Personality Disorder based on the
collated information provided by petitioner. Moreover, their marriage was marked with
a Partner Relational Problem. Dr. Dayan remarked that the parties would continue to
experience misery and psychological distress if they remain married to each other.

Respondent belied petitioner's allegation and that she was a model wife. Respondent claimed
that the grocery store adverted to by petitioner belongs to petitioner and respondent because the latter
took over it from her family. Necessarily, she had to manage it. It is not true that she was in the store
even during Sundays because it was her mother who tended the store on Sundays so she could spend
the day with them. Petitioner benefited largely from the operation of the grocery business because
respondent bought a brand-new car for him out.

Respondent also denied petitioner's accusation that she was not very particular with her
hygiene which caused their sexual life to suffer. They had a normal sexual life until petitioner started
womanizing. In fact, she filed a concubinage case against petitioner which is pending before the MTC of
Quezon City as of the time of filing of the petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage. While
respondent admitted that she had the tendency to take her anger towards Jor-el, who is the look-a-like
of petitioner, this was, however, the consequence of her emotional distress arising from petitioner's
infidelity. Aware that she was being unfair to Jor-el, respondent asked her sister-in-law to take
temporary custody of Jor-el. However, unknown to respondent, petitioner took Jor-el home to live with
his mistress.

RULING OF THE RTC: Granted the petition and declared void ab initio the marriage between petitioner
and respondent. The trial court found petitioner psychologically unfit to discharge his responsibilities as
a husband.

RULING OF THE CA: Reversed the RTC decision; CA did not find the totality of evidence presented before
the trial court sufficient. It observed that the primary reason for the grant of the petition was
petitioner's infidelity. However, sexual infidelity and abandonment of conjugal dwelling do not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity but are simply grounds for legal separation.

ISSUE:

Did the appellate court commit reversible error when it reversed the trial court's decision granting the
petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with respondent? NO.

RULING:

Petitioner anchors his petition mainly on the fact that both expert witnesses, found him psychologically
incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to respondent. Petitioner argues that the
Molina guidelines formulated in the case of Republic v. Molina have been satisfied in this case since it
was established through the testimony of expert witnesses that he is afflicted with a grave, pre-existing,
and incurable psychological incapacity.

Petitioner's argument is untenable.

In the recent case of Tan-Anda! v. Andal (Tan-Andal), the Court introduced a nuanced interpretation of
what constitutes psychological incapacity in order to address the rigid application of the Molina
guidelines. The Court came up with a new set of parameters, which either retained, abandoned, or
amended for the purpose the Molina guidelines, that will aid in the interpretation and application of Art.
36 of the Family Code, to wit:

(1) The psychological incapacity must be shown to have been existing at the time of the
celebration of marriage;
(2) Caused by a durable aspect of one's personality structure, one that was fanned prior to
their marriage;
(3) Caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause; and
 (4) Proven by clear and convincing evidence.

In addition, the Court has categorically abandoned the second Molina guideline and held that
psychological incapacity is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified; hence,
expert opinion is not required. In lieu thereof, Tan-Andal required proof of the durable or enduring
aspects of a person's personality, called "personality structure" which manifests itself through clear acts
of dysfunctionality that undermines the family such that the spouse's personality structure must make it
impossible for him or her to understand and to comply with his or her essential marital obligations. This
may be proven by testimonies of ordinary witnesses, who have been present in the life of the spouses
before they contracted marriage, on behaviors that they have consistently observed from the
supposedly incapacitated spouse.

In light of the Court's definitive declaration that psychological incapacity need not be proven by
expert opinion, We cannot sustain petitioner's excessive reliance on the expert opinions of Doctors
Dayan and De Guzman, as conclusive proof that he is truly incognitive of the essential covenants of
marriage, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of its existence. While petitioner offered the
testimony of his sister, Marlene Rivo, We find her testimony to be inadequate to prove the existence of
petitioner's psychological incapacity.

Tan-Andal emphasized that the psychological incapacity must be shown to have been existing at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one's personality
structure, one that was formed before the parties married.

Here, based on the narrative of events offered by respondent and Marlene, it is undeniable that
petitioner was a faithful and loving husband to respondent and a responsible parent to his children
before he met his present partner, Perla. Their marriage was blissful, and their family life was peaceful
and harmonious until petitioner started philandering. However, it is noteworthy that after petitioner's
first extra-marital affair, he exerted efforts to reconcile with respondent and reunite with his family. It
was only in the second instance of infidelity where petitioner got too involved with Perla that eventually
led him to abandon their conjugal dwelling. Thus, by petitioner's own statements, he has displayed full
knowledge and understanding of his obligations and has, in fact, committed positive acts towards
building and sustaining a family. This exhibits his genuine awareness of his marital obligations, which
clearly negated his claim of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity.

Moreover, apart from the claim of Marlene that their father has a history of extra-marital affairs
to make it appear that petitioner's psychological capacity is deeply rooted in his childhood, no other
convincing evidence was adduced to demonstrate how and to what extent their father's philandering
ways correlate to petitioner's alleged disorder, and how it incapacitated him to understand and comply
with his marital obligations.

On the contrary, it was indubitably established that at the inception of their marriage, petitioner
was faithful and caring to respondent. Petitioner's sister herself testified that petitioner's union with
respondent was smooth sailing and that it began to crumble only after they had kids, that is after 12
years of being together. Thus, there was no showing that petitioner's defects were already present at
the time of celebration of their marriage.

Given the foregoing, We find no concrete evidence to support a finding that petitioner's alleged
disorder is rooted in his history antedating the marriage. In the same vein, We are not convinced that
petitioner's alleged incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. An examination of
petitioner's testimony reveals that he has fallen out of love of respondent due to his dissatisfaction
towards her rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personality. He cited reasons such as,
respondent's lack of time and attention to him and the children on account of the business and
respondent's neglect of her personal hygiene. In fact, petitioner admitted that the marriage collapsed
due to their irreconcilable differences which became more complicated when he had an affair with
another woman. This clearly suggests that petitioner's failure to continue his common life with
respondent stems from his refusal, not downright incapacity to do so.

Tan-Andal stressed that the psychological incapacity cannot be mere "refusal, neglect, or
difficulty, much less ill will." Also, it has always been held that mere irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity. Verily, an unsatisfactory
marriage is not a null and void marriage.

We likewise agree with the CA that petitioner failed to establish respondent's alleged
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature. Respondent took over the business from her family
upon the prodding of petitioner in order to attain financial stability. Thus, petitioner cannot now lay the
blame on respondent for giving so much time and attention to their business for after all, they all
benefited from its operation, especially petitioner who was able to purchase a brand new car out of the
proceeds from the grocery store. In sum, respondent had shown that she is capable of fulfilling her
marital obligations and that she valued her marriage as she even opposed the petition for its annulment,
actively participated in the trial of the case, until its appeal to this Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.