Ngiy A

NG iy a
EVIL AND
THE RESPONSE
OF WORLD
RELIGION
EVIL AND
THE RESPONSE
OF WORLD
RELIGION
Edited by
William Cenkner
a
PARAGON HOUSE
St. i
First Edition, 1997
Published in the United States by
Paragon House
2700 University Ave. W.
St. Paul, Minnesota 55114
© 1997 by Paragon House
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, in

any form, without written permission from the publishers,
unless by a reviewer who wishes to quote brief passages.
Cover Art: Art Resource, NY, Cain and Abel, Titian.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Evil and the response of world religion / edited by William

Cenkner.
-- Ist ed.
p- 256 cm. — -- (IRFWP Congress series : 1)
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 1-55778-758-1 (hardcover).
ISBN 1-55778-753-0 (pbk.).
1. Good and evil. 2. Religions. I. Cenkner, William, 1930-
II. Series.
BJ1401.E78 1997
291.2’ 118--dc21 96-37024
CIP
Manufactured in the United States of America

Contents
Introduction
William Cenkner =... JS QUORL he, at acer ee 1
PART ONE: RESPONSES FROM THE RELIGIONS

OF THE BOOK
1. The Priestly Conceptions of Evil in the Torah
GOR (OES oe he ays Ge see 5
2. From Myth to Psyche to Mystic Psychology:
The Evolution of the Problem of Evil in Judaism
SheldémRalsenberg ie ni Wl & OSU RRR eT 16
3. Providence and the Problem of Evil
in Jewish Thought
David J. Goldbergetinn C0 222,a ee 32
4. The Discovery of Christian Meaning in Suffering:
Transformation and Solidarity
Jane: Mary ZWEINer. Waa icusk te HeeyO Hints peo eee Fe ake 43
5. The Ambiguity of the Symbol of the Cross:
Legitimating and Overcoming Evil
MaRSATN SIGNET SSPAE. oo entene Ste Ont ue eee area 56
6. The Problem of Evil: An Islamic Approach
Maubammad Al.GhaZall. . wycccty eons ee eee 70
7. Feminist Theology as a Means of Combating Injustice
Toward Women in Muslim Communities and Culture
RUffOR TIGSSAIU BRT Vd biSsi. REE at eas Tope ne ae 80
PART TWO: RESPONSES FROM ASIAN TRADITIONS

8. A Theoretical Explanation of Evil
in Theravada Buddhism
Medagama Vajiragnana ............... RAVES. WMD Ss. 99
9. Mara as Evil in Buddhism
CRENGTAW RIGMASOMARE a <2 os Fee oa ok ees 109
CONTENTS
10. Three Levels of Evil in Advaita Vedanta

and a Holographic Analogy
SICDUCIKADUGY mest acd scare at eee) eae se everett
11. Hindu Understandings of Evil:
From Tradition to Modern Thought.
Wai CONNMON ek ee acs ycats Oe ee eee
12. A New Understanding of the Bhagavad Gita:
Trinitarian Evil
ETORCIS XSQUIET DD Sha «3 Se eeee he
PART THREE: RESPONSES FROM AFRICAN

TRADITIONAL RELIGION
13. Evilin Yoruba Religion and Culture
ESO. ONLAdEo a.a See tealight
a aceeeeearn a ae
14. Gods Versus Anti-Gods: Conflict
and Resolution in the Yoruba Cosmos
Wande:Abinbolawsat tn. Ra ee ee. x sss
PART FOUR: CONTEMPORARY RESPONSES

15. Prophecy and Contemplation: The Language
of Liberation Theology Against Evil
PESTA On, |C1ON gs On i ee ee ee
16. The Unification Understanding
of the Problem of Evil
ARELOTEVE Tos GRLCTNGD (ra Sn) Suthial estat a 316 sete agee Ae iene a
17. Ecological Evil and Interfaith Dialogue:
Caring for the Earth
WED GIT OU BINGE Sic ha0 da Po eyed tybiG eae Ry eee ne
18. Divine Goodness and Demonic Evil
DGHOR GY GHILON: ie ist Bence oe oe oe cant cS a
19. Towards a Global Theodicy
Patil Badhai os 052s. 5 2s BROS ee
Contributors © 550)5.tseu.s cdl he ce ere
INTRODUCTION
By William Cenkner
I.
he most widely read book on evil in modern times or pos-
sibly for all time, with over three million copies in several
languages, is Harold Kushner’s When Bad Things Happen to
Good People.’ Rabbi Kushner’s book in itself was not responsible for
igniting interest in the problem of evil, but he was responding to
an interest that has confounded in a special way modern society.
His book published in 1981 emerged from a generation that had
possibly written more on evil than ever before in history. In 1993
Barry L. Whitney, a specialist in theodicy, published a 650-page
bibliography on evil, covering the years from 1960 to 1990 with
titles only in English or translated into the English language.” He
selected what he calls the most relevant items, 1,500 of which he
annotated and another 2,600 categorized by theme. Other than
this body of literature, he estimates that tens of thousands of books
on evil have been written during this period in other languages.
Although a significant body of this literature reflects the present
conversations in philosophy, religion and theology, the conversa-
tion is not limited to this arena. As the outstanding nineteenth
century Russian novelist, Feodor Dostoevski, demonstrated in The
Brothers Karamazov, evil is a perennial subject in world literature.
This continues with the modern novel, short story, and even
poetry. The contemporary art world evidences the same interest,
for example, Anselm Kiefer and his captivating work, “Zim-Zum.”
Social and cultural historians, such as Michel Foucault, and post-
modern critics, such as Mark C. Taylor, focus upon evil in their
most relevant reflections.’ American television programming is
dominated by stories about crime and pain, with the courtroom and
the hospital emergency room serving as major stages of human
experience. Whether the professional world is academe or enter-
tainment, the same problem has captured the imagination: evil.
il EVIL AND THE RESPONSE OF WORLD RELIGION
One could attribute this to the enormity of world tragedy in this

century: wars, holocausts, oppression of peoples. One could also
attribute it to the atheism or humanism of this age which can be
traced to previous centuries. The technological revolution, a direct
offspring of the age of science, has taken giant strides in a few
decades, but neither technology nor science’seem to have mitigated
the presence of evil in the modern world. Technological power has
reached a level of domination that is unparalleled in the history of
the world as we know it.
David Ray Griffin, a contributor to this volume and a Christian
theologian, writes that the power to sin matches the power to dom-
inate.’ He believes that the greater possibility for good leads to
greater possibility for evil. As the arena for growth and the oppor-
tunity for good expand, the possibility for deviation and deformity
in life, nature, and progress equally increase. Many commentators
reflect a fundamental experience of society today; namely, over-
whelming power or radical evil is more frequently taking charge of
this world and of human life.
It would seem that evil is as problematic today as it was among
the founders of the world’s religions or the first philosophers of the
ancient world. This book is based upon the premise that the
wisdom traditions of religion can speak to the modern world. It
also implicitly advances the notion that the religions of the world
have as a primary task to address the problem of evil.” The women
and men who live within a religious tradition today encounter the
problematic of evil in their faith stance, their moral life, and even
in their life of prayer, worship, and mysticism.”
II.
The essays in this book emerge from a conference on “The
Reality of Evil and the Response of the World’s Religions,” held in
Seoul, Korea, April 28 to May 2, 1994, sponsored by the Inter-
Religious Federation for World Peace (IRFWP). Thomas G. Walsh
commenting on the conference quoted two presidents of the
sponsoring group:
No religion fails to attend to aspects of the human condition which
stand in contrast to goodness, enlightenment, or unity with the
divine reality. Without an understanding of evil—its origin, its
INTRODUCTION iii
essential nature, its characteristics, and its means of proliferation—

the pursuit of religious ideals is futile. As IRFWP President, Paulos
Mar Gregorios has said: “In our work for the unity of humanity,
we have to face the problem of evil, because evil is the great
obstacle to true unity.” In the words of IRFWP President, Chung
Hwan Kwak, “Our premise is simply that world peace cannot be
properly pursued without some clear understanding of the true
nature of our problem, its roots and its means for self-
perpetuation.” Recognition of the power, tenacity and, often
sovereignty of evil in our world is imperative for those committed
to world peace through interreligious dialogue.’
The conference included over sixty participants from many

nations, ethnic groups, and religions. Papers represented Jewish,
Christian, Islamic, traditional African and shamanic, Hindu,
Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian perspectives. The essays in this
book are nineteen representative participants from this group.
Under the broader title the conference was organized into three
distinct discussions: (1) theoretical explanations of and responses
to evil; (2) practical responses to evil; (3) activist responses to evil.
The first discussion focused on theological and philosophical
reflections on evil. Religions and philosophies, East and West, have
responded through their shamans, prophets and wisdom figures
with insight, knowledge and analysis. Each religious or philosoph-
ical tradition, either corporately or among individual thinkers, has
something distinct to say. The second discussion considered the
particular manifestations of evil, such as war, racism, consumerism,
and family fragmentation. The purpose here was to identify causes
and possible solutions, drawing upon the wisdom of the traditions.
Finally, a third discussion centered on concrete actions already
taken to combat evil. Programs such as Amnesty International,
Habitat for Humanity, the United Nations programs, and other
efforts in public service, whether religiously sponsored or not, were
considered.
The essays in this book are concerned with the first and second
discussion, namely, the theoretical and practical explanations of
and responses to evil. In editing this book I have made neither the
distinction between the theoretical and the practical explanations
of nor the theoretical and practical responses to evil. Although I
am somewhat responsible for these distinctions as a convener of the
iv EVIL AND THE RESPONSE OF WORLD RELIGION
conference, I found in the experience of interreligious dialogue

that these categories were not distinct and discrete in many
religious and philosophical traditions. If each tradition is to speak
with its own voice, it needs to stand within its own context. For this
reason I have arranged the essays according to area and geo-
graphic contexts and conclude with essays from the contemporary
period that have clear pancultural implications.
III.
Part One introduces responses to evil from the religions of the
book, that is, religions emerging out of the Middle East and the
biblical traditions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. In Chapter 1,
Gene G. James examines the creation story in the Hebrew Torah
narrated by the priestly author, the P account, who gives special
attention to prohibitions against the taking of life, eating meat, and
other dietary restrictions. Evil is understood as an ever present
tendency to chaos, a tendency within the creation stories, and
within creation and human nature itself. Modifications and actual
mitigation of the commandment against killing and meat eating is
in recognition of this human weakness and tendency.
Sheldon R. Isenberg describes the evolving aspects of the
problem of evil, beginning with the Hebrew scriptures, moving to
rabbinic Judaism, and culminating with the Kabbalah, the major
tradition of Jewish mysticism. Multiple insights emerged in this
development: pawer to overcome evil, human responsibility for
suffering, corporate suffering, and unfair distribution of suffering.
The Kabbalah, however, revealed the process from broken
harmony to the healing relationships with and between the human,
cosmic, and divine communities.
David J. Goldberg, in Chapter 3, focuses upon the medieval
Jewish philosophers of Abraham Ibn Daud, Moses Maimonides,
and again the Kabbalist tradition. He continues with modern
Jewish process theologians and the Holocaust but concludes with
the insight of the Christian thinker John Hick who draws upon the
poet Keats’ notion of “The vale of Soul-making.” According to
Goldberg, soul-making, a theme that is repeated in several of the
essays in this book, connects a contemporary response to evil with
medieval Jewish thought.
INTRODUCTION v
Two essays speak directly from the Christian biblical tradition,

both drawing upon the Christian symbol of the cross of Jesus as a
source for a theological response to evil. Jane Mary Zwerner
stipulates that suffering is the experience of moral or natural evil
as meaningless or hopeless. Following Irenaean theodicy, she
proposes that the transformation of the human person from mere
material existence to moral and spiritual life is essentially linked to
suffering. Within a Christian framework, we are called to accept
the suffering and redemptive death of Jesus on the cross as a
paradigm of communal solidarity.
Mary Ann Stenger, however, focuses on the ambiguity of the
symbol of the cross throughout Christian history. Just as there is
paradox in Jesus as the divine incarnate, so also there is paradox
in the symbolic understanding of the cross. The cross can be a
symbol of liberation from injustice and violence; it has also been
used not infrequently to legitimate violence and injustice against
women and those caught within slavery. For this reason the symbol
of the cross must be in conjunction with the resurrection for a fully
liberating image.
Two essays, Chapters 6 and 7, speak for and out of the Islamic
tradition. The first by Muhammad AlI-Ghazali is based solidly upon
the Qur'an which points to the innate duality within human nature,
a simultaneous capacity for good and evil. Since the root of evil is
human intentionality, there is need for constant vigilance in order
to reform and rectify such inherent evil tendencies. Yet personal
well-being is not the goal of human growth and development but
justice in the full course of social life. Islamic justice is to establish
and actualize the harmony and balance at all levels of relationship
with human beings and all God’s creatures.
Riffat Hassan in her essay attempts to establish a feminist
theology not only to liberate Muslim women but also Muslim men.
Cognizant of the inequality of women in Islamic social history, she
establishes from textual analysis of the Qur'an gender equality. She
shows that misreading and misinterpretation of Qur’anic passages
have been used to deny equality and justice to Muslim women.
According to her analysis, woman and man are equal creatures of
a just and merciful God whose pleasure it is for them to live
together in harmony and justice.
Part Two of this book introduces responses to the problem of
vi EVIL AND THE RESPONSE OF WORLD RELIGION
evil from Asian traditions, Buddhism and Hinduism in particular.

Beginning with Theravada Buddhism in Chapter 8, Medagama
Vajiragnana, drawing upon early Buddhist texts, articulates a tra-
ditional perspective by locating evil in ignorance, a typical Indian
response, and in anything opposed to the attainment of enlight-
enment. Although evil is symbolized in the notion of Mara, not as
some external force or demonic individual but as nature itself. He
not only interprets Mara according to early Buddhist scriptures but
also relates understandings from pre-Buddhist folklore. The pre-
Buddhist Mara legends, however, are given Buddhist interpre-
tation in early Buddhism and accordingly captured more readily
the imagination of believers than reflective understandings of evil.
Three essays speak within the context of the Hindu tradition.
Stephen Kaplan in Chapter 10 writes from the perspective of
India’s classical Advaita Vedanta and the medieval thought of
Sankara who posited three different levels of meaning in dealing
with the reality of evil: first, from a metaphysical level, the level of
the highest truth, a level of nonduality in which no evil exists;
secondly, from a phenomenological level where evil is the result of
rebirth and the law of karma; and finally, from an epistemological
level, where individuality and duality persist, evil is the result of
ignorance. Kaplan draws upon the modern philosophy of K. C.
Bhatacharyya for further insight into a Vendantic understanding
of evil. He concludes by making a holographic analogy in order to
exemplify how an Advaitin can maintain that evil does not exist
while at the same time say it is a datum of experience.
William Cenkner in another essay from the Hindu tradition
contextualizes the classical ways of dealing with evil and suffering
from the early ritual responses to the more reflective and
meditative disciplines and the high devotional and altruistic activity
of the Bhagavad Gita. Modern opinion from the middle of the
nineteenth century to the present is then highlighted with special
attention to Rabindranath Tagore and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan.
Both of these figures placed their responses to evil concretely in
the created world, not in an abstract metaphysical realm but in the
realm of political and social reality.
Francis Xavier D’Sa, in the final essay from Indian life, reflects
from the methodological framework of Raimundo Panikkar’s
triadic view of reality in examining the response to evil in the
INTRODUCTION vii
Bhagavad Gita. At the very least this is an attempt at comparative

theology in which Christian trinitarian thought gives definition to
both evil and its response within Hinduism. Similar patterns of
reality and similar insights are perceived in the Gita utilizing a
triadic grid.
Part Three presents two essays from African traditional religion,
specifically the Yoruba culture of Nigeria. In Chapter 13 E. O.
Oyelade describes the beliefs of Yoruba society in relation to evil
by drawing upon the wisdom oracle of Ifa and typical proverbs re-
flecting life-views. By distinguishing different types of evil as physi-
cal, moral, inflicted, and predestined, he demonstrates the equally
different responses of the Yoruba people. They will, for example,
have recourse to the tribal medicine man, the tribal king, and even
traditional sacrifice.
Wande Abimbola, relying upon the Ifa literary corpus of sacred
oral texts, identifies and examines the dynamic tension between
evil and good in Yoruba understanding. The Yorubas seek a
balance through a symbolic system of codes in communicating with
an elaborate pantheon of supernatural powers. Again, sacrifice is
frequently the principle of resolution leading to the restoration of
good order. Quoting from the Ifa sacred literature, he demon-
strates that the conflict between good and evil is in fact the per-
during tension between the gods/powers and the anti-gods.
The final section of this book, Part Four, consists of con-
temporary responses, most from Western perspectives but each
possessing significant global implications. For example, Peter C.
Phan selects the liberation theology of the Latin American
Christian, Gustavo Gutierrez, who deals explicitly with the problem
of evil to address the exploitation and oppression of suffering
peoples throughout the world. Gutierrez recasts the problem in
terms of orthopraxis and in demonstrating how the suffering
figure of Job eventually realizes God’s preferential love for the
oppressed and disenfranchised. By introducing the language of
prophecy and the language of contemplation, Gutierrez includes
worship, prayer, and mysticism as integral to the struggle for
justice.
In Chapter 17 Anthony J. Guerra articulates the source and
response to evil in the thought of Rev. Sun Myung Moon and the
practices of the Unification Church, a new religious movement
Viil EVIL AND THE RESPONSE OF WORLD RELIGION
begun in Korea but now spread throughout the world. For

Unificationists the original fault of Adam and Eve through sexual
sin prevented the establishment of the true family. Thus Rev.
Moon’s movement intends to restore a God-centered perfected
family by creating a new history of families united to reform world
society. The marriage ceremony, arranged marriages, especially
cross-cultural unions, and mass weddings raise up marriage and
family life as primordial sacraments in the modern world.
M. Darrol Bryant points to ecological evil as the critical source
of evil in the present, and caring for the earth, particularly within
interfaith dialogue, as an immediate and viable response. He shows
how mastery over nature, control of it, technological interventions,
and the creation of an industrial technological culture have all led
to a crisis that ignores nature as a living system. Such mastery is
hostile to religious cosmologies and world spiritual traditions. He
ultimately calls for the religions to take responsibility for the
problem and to inspire acritical analysis of the ecological situation.
The final two essays presume the modern conversation with
process theology, a major voice in theodicy and the problem of evil
today. David Ray Griffin, speaking as a Christian theologian, states
that the whole point of a theodicy is to show that the evils of this
world do not contradict the perfect goodness of the divine reality.
He addresses in particular demonic evil, that is, evil diametrically
opposed to divine power with such strength as to thwart divine
purposes and divine creations. Drawing upon Alfred North
Whitehead’s distinction between God and creativity, he not only
responds to the problem of evil in general but also to a
nonmythical notion of demonic evil in particular. Concluding that
religion should attempt to overcome evil in all its forms, he believes
that religion should serve especially as an agency of the divine in
overcoming demonic evil.
Paul Badham, concluding with Chapter 19, explores the
possibility of a world theodicy in responding to the problem of evil
that would embrace both nontheistic religions and even those
traditions denying the existence of a human soul. John Hick’s soul-
making theodicy is the context within which he asks whether such
a theodicy has anything to say to a religiously plural world. The
viability of a soul-making theodicy is examined in Judaism, Islam,
Buddhism, and Hinduism. The latter two traditions offer the
INTRODUCTION ix
greatest challenge to the author. Badham’s approach points to a
growing interest in doing global theology and the actual practice
of comparative theology.
IV.
I wish to thank the publisher and the editor of Dialogue &
Alliance for using those essays that in earlier drafts appeared in
their journal.” Appreciation is also expressed to Dr. Thomas G.
Walsh and Dr. Frank F. Kaufmann who organized and planned the
Seoul conference that gave birth to this book. I am grateful to
Paragon House for taking on this project. A word of special grati-
tude is extended to Mary Dancy who prepared the final manu-
script for publication.
This book is dedicated to those men and women who promote
and participate in interreligious projects whether in theoretical,
practical or activist forums. May they experience in their lifetime
the greater unity of the human family.
NOTES
1. Harold Kushner, When Bad Things Happen to Good People (New York: Avon
Books, 1981).
2. Barry L. Whitney, Theodicy: An Annotated Bibliography on the Problem of Evil
1960-1990 (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1993).
3. See Mark C. Taylor, Disfiguring: Art, Architecture, Religion (Chicago and
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992). For Taylor’s discussion
of Anselm Kiefer, see pp. 290-307.
4. See Chapter 18 below, David Ray Griffin, “Divine Goodness and Demonic
Evil.”
5. See Chapter 17 below, M. Darrol Bryant, “Ecological Evil and Interfaith
Dialogue: Caring for the Earth.”
6. See Michael Stoeber, Evil and the Mystics’ God (Toronto and London:
University of Toronto and Macmillan Press, 1992).
7. Thomas G. Walsh, “Seoul Congress Focuses on the Human Problem,”
IRFWP Newsletter, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 1994, p. 3.
8. See Dialogue & Alliance, Vol. 8, No. 2, Fall-Winter 1994. The authors who
published earlier drafts are: Wande Abimbola, Muhammad AlI-Ghazali,
William Cenkner, Francis Xavier D’Sa, David Goldberg, Anthony J.
Guerra, Peter C. Phan. I also thank Villanova University Press for the
article by Jane Mary Zwerner, whose article with revisions was published
in an anthology on social ethics by that Press in 1996.
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4 IR BIi
ay
PART ONE
Response from the
Religions of the Book
1
The Priestly Conceptions
of Evil in the Torah
By Gene G. James
M odern biblical scholars identify four writers whose work

forms the Torah, referring to them with the letters J, E, D
and P. There is also a final editor or redactor referred to
as R. The contribution ofP is usually thought to be the last of the
four writers. However, much of what he wrote constitutes the least
interesting aspects of the Torah for modern readers, such as long
discussions of sacrificial rituals, the making of priestly vestments,
and dietary restrictions. Because of his concern with such matters,
he is referred to as P, an abbreviation for priestly writer. The major-
ity of the narratives in P are variations of stories in JE. Thorough
exposition of his work would require an examination of both what
he omits and adds to their stories. This study is restricted to de-
monstrate that implicit in P’s work is a conception of evil which is of
great importance for understanding his worldview and ritual
practices. The most relevant sections of P’s work in this regard are
his creation and flood stories in the book of Genesis (1:1-2:3; 7:8-9,
11, 13-16a, 21, 24; 8:1-2a, 3b-5, 7, 13a, 14-19; 9:1-17), and the
dietary prohibitions in Leviticus (11: 1-47).!
4 THE PRIESTLY CONCEPTIONS OF EVIL IN THE TORAH
Creation
Neither the idea of creation by spoken word nor that of bringing
order to chaotic matter was unique to P. The former can be found
in the Egyptian Memphite Theology, the original text of which is dated
by scholars to the Old Kingdom and, therefore, composed at least
fifteen hundred years before P. In this account Ptah not only creates
both the other gods and the world by command, he is also described
at the completion of his work as satisfied with it and resting from his
labor. The idea of creation by command is also found in the “Story
of Ra and the Serpent” in which Ra the sun god says: “There was no
Heaven and no Earth, There was no Dry Land and no Reptiles in
Egypt. Then I spoke and living creatures appeared.” The idea of a
god bringing order to chaotic matter is present in numerous Near
Eastern creation stories, but the one with which the P story is most
frequently compared is the Babylonian “Enuma Elish” story, itself
modeled on an older Sumerian story. The similarities include a wind
or breath from God which stills the waters, the heavens and the
earth formed from preexisting material, the presence of subordinate
gods (indicated in P by the use of the plural word Elohim for God
and the remark, “let us make humans in our image,” Genesis 1:26).
Similarities also occur with the word Tiamat, the goddess from
whose dead body the heavens and earth were made in “Enuma
Elish,” and the word tehom, the deep from which they are made in
the P story.
There are ef course differences as well as similarities. For
example, in “Enuma Elish” the chaotic waters are personified in the
form of a primordial couple, Apsu (fresh water) and Tiamat (salt
water). They give birth to the heavenly court of gods, after which
Tiamat overpowers Apsu and takes a new mate, Kingu, one of her
own offspring. Frightened by Tiamat’s violent behavior, the other
gods agree to make Marduk their chief if he can slay Tiamat, which
he does by inflating her with his breath or wind and then piercing
her with lightning. He then kills Kingu and proceeds to make
heaven and earth from Tiamat’s body, and human beings from
Kingu’s.
Scholars who stress the uniqueness of P’s account find great sig-
nificance in the fact. that watery chaos is personified in “Enuma
Elish” and not in P. More important, in my opinion, is the fact that
GENE G. JAMES 5
water symbolizes both an element essential to life and one when out
of control in the form of floods posed the greatest threat to human
existence known to the civilizations of the Near East. From this
perspective, the most significant feature of both stories is that of a
god who controls the destructive aspects of nature, bringing about
the order on which human life depends. The fact that water is per-
sonified in “Enuma Elish” but not in P, is relatively insignificant,
especially since at other places in the Bible the chaotic waters are
personified. (See for example: Ps. 74:13, 104:9, 148:6; Job 26:12;
Isaiah 27:1, 51:9.)
Scholars who stress the uniqueness of P also find importance in
the fact that in P God creates by command. But, as pointed out
above, this is not unique to P. Nor is spoken command the means
God uses to overcome the primordial chaotic waters in P. In both
“Enuma Elish” and thePstory, the waters are stilled by the wind or
breath of god. It is only after God has subdued the waters in this
way that God brings other things into existence by command in the
P story.
Theologians often attribute the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo to the
P creation story. However, the primordial waters are clearly said to
exist before Elohim creates anything in the P story. The idea of
creatio ex nihilo is therefore not present. The central point of the
story is that God brought order to preexisting, chaotic material
symbolized by water and keeps it from returning to chaos. This idea
is also stressed in some of the Psalms and in Job. For example, God
is described in Job as having “shut in the sea with doors when it
burst out from the womb” and saying to it: “Thus far you shall come,
and no farther. . . here shall your proud waves be stopped” (Job
38:8-11). Such language suggests that if God were to relax divine
activity for a single instant, there would be a return to primeval
chaos, an idea similar to that of continuous creation in medieval
Christian thought, where creation is not a one-time event but an
ongoing activity sustaining the universe and keeping it from
reverting to chaos.
Underlying the P creation story is the idea of primordial chaos
which is a permanent threat to human existence but kept at bay by
the order that God has imposed on it. However, this doctrine is not
unique to P but is found in most Near Eastern creation stories. What
is unique to Pis the detailed way he describes the order of creation,
assigning the creation of the heavens, dry land, and the waters below
the firmament, to different days of creation. Also unique is the way
in which he divides the creation of living beings into three groups,
each assigned to a different realm of creation, the birds to the
heavens, animals and human beings to the dry land, and fish and
sea monsters to the waters. Thus, according to P, three basic types
of creatures were made to function within three quite different types
of environments. This seems to be part of what P means in saying
that each creature was created according to its kind. This remark
may also refer to more specific differences of anatomy and behavior
that bring about adaptation to more specialized environments.
Other features unique to P are God telling all living creatures to
be fruitful and multiply, and God giving them only plants and fruit
for food. According to P, then, it was God’s plan that all living beings
should be vegetarian. This presupposes that all life is holy, that is,
set apart as belonging to God only. It also presupposes that since
God alone gives life, God alone can legitimately take it away. Thus,
although there are no explicit prohibitions in the P creation story
analogous to the one in the J story in which Yahweh forbids Adam
to eat from the tree of good and evil, prohibitions against killing and
eating meat may be deduced from the fact that only plants and fruit
were given to creatures for their food.
An additional positive command is given to humans, now said to
be created in the image of the gods, the latter also not an idea
unique to P but found in earlier Egyptian thought.” The command
is that human beings are to subdue the earth and exercise dominion
over the animals. The Hebrew word translated as subdue is kabash,
and the one translated as exercise dominion is radah. According to
W. Lee Humphreys, the original meaning of both words is that of
treading or stamping upon something, for example, upon grapes."
However, both words are used in the Bible primarily in a military
sense to convey the ideas of forceful conquest and domination. This
has led some people to interpret the command to subdue the earth
and exercise dominion over the animals as giving humanity the right
to use the earth and its creatures any way they wish. If one takes this
commandment in conjunction with the immediately preceding text
in which prohibitions against killing and eating other creatures are
implied, it is unlikely that such license was intended. Given this con-
text, and P’s overall worldview, the commandment is more plausibly
GENE G. JAMES 7
interpreted to mean that humans should maintain the order God
has bestowed on the world, an order in which life is sacred. This
would not rule out domestication of animals and their use in agri-
culture, nor would it prohibit modifying the earth in ways necessary
to carry on agriculture. But it would hardly sanction doing whatever
one wishes to the earth and other species. It instead lends support
to doctrines of animal rights and preservation of the environment.
To put the matter in terms of contemporary debate, the command-
ment enjoins stewardship, not exploitation of animals and the
environment.
Disobedience, Destruction, and a New Beginning

The primary duties of humans in the P account are to refrain
from violence by not killing or eating meat. According to P the flood
occurs because humans did not abide by these prohibitions. Violence
became so widespread that God resolved to destroy all living crea-
tures and the earth itself. But the mind of God changed, and God
decided to spare two of all living creatures along with Noah and his
family, who apparently, unlike the rest of humanity, had kept the
prohibitions against taking life and eating meat. After instructing
Noah to build an ark and take two of all living creatures aboard,
God opened the windows of the heavens and relaxed control over
the springs of the earth, allowing torrents of chaotic waters from the
deep to flood.
When Noah and the other creatures emerged from the ark, God
once again told them to be fruitful and multiply as at the time of
creation. This command represents a completely opposite judgment
regarding the desirability of population growth to the one found in
the “Atrahasis Story,” the ancient Sumerian story on which the later
Babylonian “Gilgamesh Epic” was modeled. For in the Atrahasis
story the gods send a flood to destroy humans precisely because they
have grown too numerous and noisy. The opposed judgments may
be seen as reflecting the difference between a Hebrew author who
belonged to a small group of people, who throughout most of their
history were dominated by larger groups and hoped to grow in
number in order to make their existence more secure, and an
earlier author living in a more crowded urban environment.
God also stated that never again will the order of creation be
threatened with destruction by allowing it to return to chaos.

Humans are thereby assured that basic order will reign in the
universe, that day will continue to follow night and season follow
season. This promise is made not only to human creatures, but to all
creatures, and God sets the rainbow in the heavens as a sign of the
promise. ;
Noah took only two of each kind of animal aboard the ark in the
P story because he was a vegetarian who obeyed the law not to kill
and would therefore not be eating or sacrificing any of them. This
is one of the major differences between the P and the J accounts of
the flood, for in theJ account Noah is instructed to take two of all
unclean animals, but seven of the clean. Also at the conclusion of the
flood in the J account, Noah sacrifices animals in gratitude for
having been saved.
Reflecting on human conduct God concludes that the human
heart is evil from youth, that is, the murderous and carnivorous
nature of human beings cannot be eradicated. Knowing that Noah’s
descendants will resort to eating meat, God therefore institutes a
new command, less stringent than the old one. Humans may now
kill and eat animals, but only if they do not consume the blood
which is the sign of life and hence belongs to God alone (Gen. 9:3-4).
Thus, according to P, eating meat is a concession to the evil nature
of humanity. Although eating meat is now allowed, the human
situation after the flood represents a decline from the previous
period, and the long lifespans achieved by human beings before the
flood are no longer possible. Thus, in the lists taken from the “Book
of Generations,” human lifespans become progressively shorter after
the flood.
Holiness
Like JE, P also describes a covenant with Abraham in which he is

promised numerous descendants whom God will aid in conquering
the land of Canaan. In P the covenant with Abraham and his de-
scendants is interpreted as one in which God has set aside the
Israelites from all other people, thereby making them holy. For the
word translated as holy means that which is separate, in particular
that which is set aside by or for God. The sign of the covenant which
sets Abraham and his descendants apart from other people is
GENE G. JAMES 9
circumcision. This criterion, it should be noted, also conveniently
excluded females as incapable of holiness and therefore unqualified
for the priesthood. Since, according to Jeremiah, many of the people
living in proximity to the Israelites (including the Egyptians,
Edomites, Ammonites, and Moabites) also practiced circumcision,
the criterion was no doubt more useful in excluding women from
the priesthood than in setting the Israelites apart from their
neighbors (Jer. 9:25).” The covenant with Abraham is reaffirmed at
various points in P’s subsequent account of the Israelites, especially
at Sinai where an injunction to keep the Sabbath is added.
People who are set apart by God to become holy are required to
live by different rules than other people. The majority of P’s work
is concerned with specifying three basic types of rules: rules gov-
erning the conduct of sacrifices and rituals, dietary rules, and rules
governing moral behavior. P goes into greatest detail regarding
ritualistic rules. He also stresses that only Aaronic priests can
properly interpret and apply such rules, and that exact conformity
is required, a point made in a dramatic way when two of Aaron’s
sons are consumed by fire that shoots out from the altar because
they perform a sacrifice in an improper manner (Lev. 10:1).
However, it is the dietary rules that are of greatest relevance for
understanding P’s world view and the concept of evil implicit in it.
For modern scholars the dietary rules have been among the
most puzzling features of the Bible. Most have held that there are no
rational principles of selection underlying the rules that certain
animals should not be eaten, that perhaps some were prohibited for
health reasons, some because of their repulsive appearance, and
others because they played some role in Canaanite rituals. However,
at no point does P state that any of the animals are prohibited for
these reasons. To the contrary, he introduces each rule as a require-
ment of holiness.
To understand the dietary prohibitions one must begin with the
order imposed on the world in P’s account of creation. As pointed
out above, creation is there divided into three realms, dry land, the
heavens, and the waters below the firmament, with different crea-
tures assigned to different realms. The dietary prohibitions pre-
suppose this scheme, assuming in addition that each creature
ought to remain in the realm to which it was assigned. The animals
appropriate to dry land are those that have four feet with a divided
hoof and chew the cud. Those appropriate to the heavens are birds
with feathers and wings; those appropriate to the waters are fish
with scales and fins. There is also an appropriate form of locomotion
for each realm: walking for land animals, flying for birds, and
swimming for fish.
The criteria for land animals, having four feet with divided
hooves and chewing the cud, identifies only herbivores. The
paradigm cases of animals satisfying these criteria are domestic
grazing animals such as goats, sheep and cows. Although pigs have
divided hooves, they are ruled out because they do not chew the
cud, that is, they are not herbivorous ruminants, but are omnivores
that on occasion eat meat. The rabbit, on the other hand, is a
herbivore but does not have a divided hoof, so it too is ruled out.
Animals that do not have hooves but rather have claws to seize prey
are also ruled out. So are all animals that have more than four feet
such as the centipede; and those that crawl instead of walking, such
as insects and reptiles. All the birds that are ruled out are either
without proper locomotion such as the ostrich that cannot fly, or
spend a great deal of time outside their proper element (the
heavens) such as the heron, or are predatory such as eagles and
owls. The birds that spend a great deal of time outside of their
proper element are also predatory so they would also be eliminated.
Bats are ruled out because they lack feathers. Shell fish, likewise, do
not have scales and fail to exhibit the proper motion, swimming.
Eels are ruled out because they lack scales. Animals that hop or leap
pose a problem since their form of locomotion is neither a form of
walking nor flying in the full sense of the word. P apparently felt
that the movement of grasshoppers is nearer that of walking than
flying and classified them as clean. The D writer disagreed and
classified them as unclean (Deut. 14:19).
Provided blood was not consumed, killing and eating animals was
allowed after the flood. The dietary restrictions narrow the range of
animals that can be killed and eaten. The fact that it seems to be
primarily predatory and carnivorous animals that are judged to be
unclean should not be surprising, given P’s belief that they were not
included in the original plan of creation.” The necessity to maintain
the original order of creation is central to P’s worldview. The duty
to be holy requires most of all that the categories of creation be kept
separate and unmixed. Creatures that do not fit into any of the
GENE G. JAMES 11
categories mentioned byPin his creation account are considered to
be hybrids that bring about disorder in creation. They represent a
return to the chaos that God banished in bringing order to the
world. Consequently, P offers a number of rules to prevent such
inappropriate mixing. Cattle must not be allowed to breed with
other species; fields must not be sown with two kinds of seeds; an ass
and an ox must not be hitched to the same plough; a garment
cannot be made from two kinds of cloth.
Cleanliness and holiness are closely related features of P’s
worldview. To be clean animals must conform in every way to their
kind. They must be perfect specimens that are not in any way de-
fective. Animals that are disabled, mutilated, or have any discharge
or disease are not to be sacrificed or eaten. Priests who conduct the
sacrifices must also be free of all defects, such as open sores,
malformed limbs or crushed testicles. Leaven was apparently
forbidden in bread to be used in sacrifices because it is an agent that
introduces changes in flour. On the other hand, the use of salt on
meat sacrifices seems to have been mandatory because it tends to
preserve it in its original state. The underlying idea is that any thing
to be sacrificed should be as close as possible to the original form in
which it came from God. All bodily discharges, whether those of
animals or humans, were looked upon as a form of uncleanness.
Such discharges represent a loss of form or breakdown of the
organism. Sickness and death are thought of in the same way,
especially death which represents the total breakdown of the
organism. Thus the chief priest, who more than anyone else must be
holy, is forbidden to even go near the corpse of an unclean animal
or human being.
Morality
Morality is not a category separate from holiness, but means
simply respect for cleanliness and proper order in human conduct.
Killing is ruled out, except for slaying clean animals to eat and to
perform prescribed sacrifices. Some actions such as having sex with
a menstruating woman is ruled out because P believes it to be
unclean. Actions such as bestiality, cross dressing, homosexuality,
and racially mixed marriages are ruled out on grounds similar to
those forbidding different species to breed. They are unholy because
Az THE PRIESTLY CONCEPTIONS OF EVIL IN THE TORAH
they are cases of inappropriate mixing. If any instances of un-

cleanliness or unholiness do occur, they must be immediately atoned
for through blood sacrifice. Actions such as lying and stealing are
presumably forbidden because they introduce disorder into society.
Morality also demands proper respect for Aaronic priests, man-
datory sacrifices, and observing holy days, that is, days set aside by
or for God. As in the case of sacrificial and dietary rules, strict
adherence to moral rules is required. For God as portrayed byP is
described as a jealous God, punishing children of the third and
fourth generation for the iniquities of their parents (Ex. 20:5).
Evil
The reason given for the flood in the P account is that God
concluded that all flesh had become corrupt, presumably because
both animals and humans had abandoned a vegetarian diet and
were killing and eating others. Tendencies leading to hybrids and
inappropriate mixing were also present. Just as creation in general
is constantly threatened by chaos, so too there is a similar tendency
toward chaos within creation itself. The chaos which constantly
threatens creation in general may be described as external evil and
that which is found within creation itself as internal evil. Internal evil
is not limited to the tendency of animate life toward hybrids and
inappropriate mixing, but internal evil is found in the human heart
as well, resulting in violent and disorderly behavior that is contrary
to God’s intentions. The commandment that one be holy is a
demand that one purify oneself, prevent inappropriate mixing, and
control the evil tendencies of one’s heart, just as God controls the
external disorder that threatens the universe. Since the tendency
toward disorder is a universal and constant feature of creation, there
is no story in P analogous to the J story of Adam and Eve that
attempts to trace the existence of evil to a particular incident. Evil is
instead intrinsic to creation and human nature. It is God’s
recognition of the latter that causes God to modify the original
commandments prohibiting killing and eating meat. Evil as thus
understood is not synonymous with the punishment that God metes
out to humans for failure to attain holiness. It is rather an active
force which requires continuous resistance on the part of both God
and humans. The question of how such cosmic evil against God’s will
GENE G. JAMES 13
can exist is not raised. P does not engage in direct discussion of evil.
The account given here seeks to make explicit what P took for
granted.
Conclusion
The themes of creation by spoken word, humans created in the
image of the gods, and order imposed on preexisting chaotic
material are not unique to P but are found in earlier Middle Eastern
creation stories. However, the concept of God imposing order on
chaotic material is central in understanding P’s world view.
Especially important and unique toPis the detailed way in which he
describes creation, assigning different creatures to the heavens, the
earth and the waters. Each type of creature has unique charac-
teristics and modes of behavior adapted to a particular kind of life.
All living creatures were told by God at creation to be fruitful and
multiply and were given only plants and fruits as food. Humans
were given an additional commandment to subdue the earth and
establish dominion over animals. Although the primary meaning of
kabash and radah, in which this commandment was formulated is
forceful domination, it is unlikely that the commandment was
intended to sanction whatever one wishes to do to the earth and to
animals. Given P’s overall worldview and the context immediately
preceding the commandment, it is more probable that humans are
commanded to maintain the order God bestowed on creation, by
refraining from taking life, eating meat, and preventing inappro-
priate mixing of species. Thus, instead of sanctioning violence, the
commandment calls for respect for all living beings and the preser-
vation of nature. However, this does not rule out domestication of
animals and modification of nature in ways necessary for agri-
culture. The commandment is also later modified to allow the use
of animals in sacrifice and eating. This modification is presented as
a concession apparently to eradicate murderous and carnivorous
tendencies in human nature. A still later set of commandments, the
holiness code, limits the type of animals that can be sacrificed or
eaten. This code requires the Israelites to distinguish themselves
from other people by practicing circumcision, observing certain holy
days, and forbidding various types of mixing. The code also
establishes a totally male Aaronic priesthood.
The rules regarding sacrifices, prevention of inappropriate mix-

ing, and dietary prohibitions presuppose that the order of creation
is retained in close agreement with original creation. Morality is not
a separate category for P but is merely the avoidance of inappro-
priate mixing and maintaining of proper order in human behavior.
P’s worldview is one in which everything is highly ordered and
subject to rigid rules. Even P’s style reflects this exaggerated sense
of order. He assumes that there is a proper way of stating every-
thing, and one should not deviate from this way.
Implicit, therefore, in P’s worldview is a conception of evil as the
breakdown of order. Tendencies to evil are found both without and
within creation. External evil is represented by chaos which con-
tinually threatens the order of creation and is held back only by
God’s constant activity. Internal evil includes both tendencies within
creation which give rise to hybrids and inappropriate mixing, and
those that result in inappropriate human behavior. Holiness re-
quires that one prevent inappropriate mixing and control the evil
tendencies of one’s heart in the same way God controls the external
disorder that threatens the universe.
Evil is thus an ever present tendency for creation to return to
chaos. How can such evil, which requires constant activity on the
part of both God and humans to hold it in check, exist? Perhaps P
thought that the primordial material from which God fashioned the
world, was not merely lacking order but inherently opposed to it. If
so, his view of evil would be much closer to Neoplatonic dualism
than it is usually thought to be. If P did think of the primordial
material in this way, it would explain both why God has to struggle
to keep creation from reverting to chaos and why human nature
possesses an eradicable tendency toward violence. Assuming this to
be P’s view, then not only was God not conceived as creating the
world from nothing, but God was also conceived as limited in power.
The attempt of subsequent theologians to read the doctrines of
creatio ex nihilo and the omnipotence of God into P’s account is
therefore mistaken. However, since P’s conception of evil was an
implicit rather than explicit feature of his worldview, he does not
address the issues raised here. Attempts to raise and answer such
issues in systematic fashion came long after P’s time.
GENE G. JAMES 15
NOTES
1. Because of limited space it is assumed that the reader is familiar with these
accounts and no exposition of them is given. For the same reason little
attempt is made to compare P’s treatment of these matters with JE’s.
Finally, since the probability is overwhelming that P was male, masculine
pronouns have been used to refer to him.
2. Story of Ra and the Serpent, in Old Testament Parallels, ed., Victor H. Matthews
and Don C. Benjamin (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1991), p. 29. The other
creation and flood stories referred to in this article are also available in this
work.
3. See John A. Wilson in Henri and H.A. Frankfort, John A. Wilson, Thorkild
Jacobsen, Before Philosophy (New York: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 64.
4. See W. Lee Humphreys, “Pitfalls and Promises of Biblical Texts as a Basis
for a Theology of Nature,” in A New Ethic For a New Earth, ed. Glenn C.
Stone, (New York: Friendship Press in association with the National
Council of Churches, 1971).
5. Jeremiah’s reference to the practice of circumcision among the Israelite’s
neighbors is pointed out by Robert B. Coote and David Robert Ord in their
book Jn the Beginning (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), p. 68, a work I
did not discover until this paper was being edited for publication.
6. My discussion of the dietary prohibitions is greatly indebted to Mary
Douglas’ discussion in Chapter 3 of Purity and Danger (London: Penguin
Books, 1966) and Jean Soler’s in “The Semiotics of Food in the Bible,” in
Food and Drink in History, ed., Robert Forster and Orest Ranum (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979). The primary difference between
my interpretation and Douglas’ is that she claims that the predatory habits
of animals played no role in the formation of the restrictions, whereas I
follow Soler in arguing that avoidance of predatory animals is the most
fundamental principle involved in their formulation.
2,
From Myth to Psyche
to Mystic Psychology:
The Evolution of the
Problem of Evil in Judaism
By Sheldon R. Isenberg
M ystics and philosophers from many traditions have recog-

nized that whatever it is we mean by or call God, God is
beyond human description. Hence all descriptions of God
are, in a significant sense, human projections. But that doesn’t mean
that they are therefore fictional. It does mean that as we struggle
with our images, our feelings, our beliefs about God, we are also
exposing the depths of our awareness of whatever it is which tran-
scends us, whatever it is of which we are a part. Hence theology and
theodicy are expressive of our human awareness of the greater
whole of which we are a part.
Ideas about God, transcendence, and evil have changed in
response to changing life situations. We have created the possibility
of utterly destroying the planet, a possibility that Jewish and
Christian imagination had relegated to God alone. This is a unique
situation that has already stretched traditional theologies and
theodicies, often beyond the breaking point. Certainly one result of
the Holocaust has been that Jews have plunged into theological
crisis. The old images and beliefs do not satisfy the vast majority.
SAGs
SHELDON R. ISENBERG #7
The evolution of this millennia-old tradition requires that we move

into a new phase of conversation about God and evil. However, the
nature of Jewish conversation is that it always backs up before going
forward, looking at the lines drawn in the past to see what directions
are given for the future. Rarely does it reach agreement on those
lines, but it never stops including the voices of the past. The process
is called midrash. What follows is an outline of a story about the
evolution of Jewish moral consciousness.
Jewish conversation always begins from the Bible. Although the
Bible contains texts which originated over a period of a thousand
years or so, nevertheless we can characterize a majority perspective
on God and evil along with a strong minority dissent. The Bible
construes a moral universe: victories and defeats, bumper crops and
droughts, health and disease, happiness and misery result from God’s
evaluative judgment of human actions. Sacred myth and legend,
prophecy and prophetic readings of history reveal the hidden,
divinely directed moral connections. Disasters, long life and disease
demonstrate God’s pleasure and displeasure at human actions.
The fundamental story is told in the book of Genesis: What exists
is the good, just God and the good world God created. God deserves
our goodness, which means that we follow God’s revealed will, what
will come to be called torah (the teaching, the way). In response, God
grants rewards of a long, healthy, prosperous life; God punishes
disobedience with a short, unhappy, unhealthy life. Especially
responsible are the descendants of Abraham and Sarah, the Jews,
with whom God has covenanted. After God saved them from the
slavery of Egypt, according to the story, they pledged again at Sinai
and received detailed expectations for their behavior. Their collec-
tive fate is determined by the divinely established complex of
rewards and punishments.
What we now consider natural calamities and historical-political
disasters such as war, are interpreted as acts of God who responds
to the Jews’ adherence to their covenant with God. Droughts, floods,
plagues, infertility of flocks and women are understood as the effects
of divine curses which reflect back the inner twistings of disobedi-
ence, the rejection of covenant obligations. According to Yahweh’s
prophets, when the nation was conquered by Assyria and Babylonia,
it was not because of inadequate defenses or leaders, but because they
were sinful and impure. They didn’t care for the poor, they neglected
18 FROM MYTH TO PSYCHE TO MYTHIC PSYCHOLOGY
widows and orphans, and were unfaithful to God in their rituals.

The underlying myth is a personalized version of the impersonal
Indian karma system. The same God who creates the world defines
good and evil. Morality is defined by the will of the creator. The
very structure and functioning of creation responds to divine moral
judgment. Its description is revealed in the fabric of personal and
corporate events. When human actions contravene divine rules,
there are predictable results.
At this stage of thinking about God and morality, the male-
oriented Bible projects God relating to humans basically as a great
father/king. There are some mothering images, but they are rela-
tively rare. The laws derive their authority from what Peter Berger
calls a sacred canopy. That is, the laws that men make are spoken in
the name of God. The source of moral judgment is externalized.
From this widely shared perspective, the human experience of good
and evil is childlike, subject to the will of a perfect, eternal parent.’
To be sure, with the exception of later apocalypticism, Judaism
does not present people as helpless sufferers. Not only are they
responsible for their own suffering, they also have the power of
repentance to change themselves and their fate. As a just, compas-
sionate father, the God who punishes also forgives and redeems.
This theological construction remained basic until the modern
period: God is the cosmic father, the just judge, the ideal king who
sets clear, fair rules. Belief in God’s justice is so strong that God can
be held accountable to God’s own standards. For instance, the patri-
arch Abraham accuses God of injustice when God reveals the intent
to destroy a wicked city even if there are good people present. Moses
must persuade God not to destroy the people saved from slavery.
Psalms and prophets claim that God ought to have already saved the
people according to God’s own sense of justice. There is an added
level of abstraction that generalizes God’s goodness into principles
independent of God’s words and acts. Moreover, affirming God’s jus-
tice, these protests also call it into question. Seeded in the affirmation
is real doubt which finds simultaneous, subversive expression.
Deconstruction of the Fundamental Construction
Many narratives in Genesis directly and indirectly subvert the
biblical construction. Woven into the Bible’s beginnings is the myth
of the primordial human act of disobedience which foreshadows the
SHELDON R. ISENBERG 19
whole history of human transgressions. However, the consequences
of this primordial disobedience are not easily classified. There are
curses that result from Adam and Eve’s primal disobedience: sexual
desire that leads to the painful labor of childbirth and the hard,
sweaty labor necessary for physical survival. But as curses they are
ambiguous: sex and food bring pleasure, children provide the
blessings so crucial to the fulfillment of the covenant to come. The
forbidden fruit consumed was the knowledge of good and evil—the
knowledge revealed by the holy text itself.
The result of divine disobedience is, after all, life as we know
it—perhaps not an unmixed blessing, but certainly not an unmixed
curse. The first willful act bore witness to the first act of will, of
conscious separation from the cosmic parent, a rite of passage. The
second great act of willfulness results in the first death by fratricide.
In general, the legendary biblical heroes are presented as mixtures
of virtue and sin. The divine covenant is carried on from generation
to generation by means which include noble actions as well as
trickery and deception; even through Jacob’s cheating Esau of their
father’s blessing, God’s will for inheriting the covenant is fulfilled.
More subversive is the skeptical wisdom literature, particularly
the books of Job and Qohelet. Here too ambiguity reigns. The nar-
rative framework of the book of Job tells of a God-fearing, virtuous
man visited with horrendous misfortunes as a result of a cruel bet
between God and Satan which involves testing Job’s faithfulness to
God. Thus, from the beginning, the text delivers a strong message
about the arbitrariness of misfortunes, directly undercutting the
naive moralism of the majority perspective. Job’s response to his
situation is outrage. The key issue in wisdom literature is under-
standing: Job wants to understand his situation. He is convinced that
his plight arises from a misunderstanding.
The core poetry presents a cycle of dialogues between Job and the
comforters (all ignorant of the bet) who reassure him that, although
he may be suffering, he should not despair, for his suffering is
neither meaningless nor arbitrary. Since God is just, all knowing and
omnipotent, Job is surely being punished for something. Thus, they
argue, repentance is his best and only recourse. But Job stubbornly
insists on a hearing before the divine Judge, for he is certain that once
his situation is brought to divine attention, the errors will be rectified.
Job is heard; God’s response is stunningly ambiguous. God
repudiates Job’s comforters, the representatives of the simplistic

constructivist argument. Job is not being punished; however, God
continues, mere creatures should not expect to understand fully the
intentions and acts of the creator. To read all suffering as punish-
ment is to believe arrogantly that humans can comprehend God’s
mind. The fundamental biblical constructivist premise is subverted,
not destroyed, as it is transformed from mechanical clarity to mys-
tery. The paternalistic metaphor expands as the father-God tells the
child: you are too young, too small to understand—and you always
will be. This is the response of a parent being pressed by a child to
justify what the parent cannot justify. We cannot explain all
suffering, but that doesn’t mean that it is ultimately inexplicable.
After this great revelation, the story reverses once again: Job
receives back his health, wealth and more children. He has passed
the test with honors. Another message now emerges, affirming
divine control of human fate, denying the power of Job’s subversion,
while framing and reversing the message of what precedes: for now
we are reminded that suffering can be a test. The text, however, is
silent about justifying the deaths of Job’s earlier family.
God, for Job, is the cosmic father whose power is absolute, but
who also may appear arbitrary. There is no reliable instruction
manual for life to guarantee reward for good behavior or punish-
ment for bad. Yet the final step of denial is not taken, the assertion
that the world is lawless, that no one is in charge. The book of
Ecclesiastes, with little argument, even more radically disconnects
the moral mechanism. All life is trivial, without surplus meaning.
Since the cycles of life and death, joy and sorrow, pleasure and pain
are eternally repetitive, there are no deeper messages to be con-
strued. These subversive messages of Job and Qohelet accompany
the fundamental biblical perspective throughout the millennia.
The deconstructive impulse arises from awareness that suffering
often seems not to be fairly distributed. The rabbis will have avail-
able the belief in an afterlife for the appropriate balance to be made
for unwarranted suffering. They will also continue to develop the
conception found in the first chapter of Job that suffering may be a
test of steadfastness. In each case what appears to be evil is not evil
at all, for justified suffering and suffering as a test can hardly be
considered evil. The appearances are saved; God is still the good
father. Yet Job knows nothing of an afterlife, and none of his
complaints find a direct response. In addition, great suffering on the

part of others was used as part of Job’s test. The flaws in the biblical
constructivist mode remain constantly in view.
Apocalyptic Dualism
During the period when traditional Judaism develops from
biblical Judaism, another understanding of corporate suffering
arises. There arose a belief in an approaching cataclysmic battle
between the super-terrestrial and terrestrial forces of the good God
and the human and demonic forces of an evil realm. This develops
as a response to Jewish experiences of defeat and persecution. In the
apocalyptic myth, whose biblical expression is to be found in the
second half of the book of Daniel, the persecuted community con-
stitutes God’s forces on earth. In the language of the apocalyptic
Dead Sea Scrolls, they are children of light. Their enemies are God’s
enemies, the children of darkness, who are controlled by the
demonic realm of evil.
Evil is totally externalized. Both good and evil have their origin
in a supra-human realm. Membership as a child of light is predeter-
mined as is all of history. What humans do or do not do is irrelevant
to the process except insofar as their actions are predetermined. The
father-God is good, his family is good—all others are evil. While the
myth appears dangerously dualistic, the revelation, the apocalypse,
comforts the beleaguered community with the secret knowledge that
although they may appear to be suffering defeat, the real war
between God and Satan or Belial has already been won. In the end
the forces of evil never really had a chance. The father is the great
emperor who can defeat all comers. Being on his side is enough and
all is preordained.
Evil and the Rabbis

There is another developmental stage when we begin to take
responsibility for our own governance, or at least recognize that
people—in this case, men who are rabbis—are making the rules. No
longer are judgments of right and wrong identified solely with
obedience and disobedience to a supra-human parent. In a famous
Talmudic story two rabbis are struggling over a point of law. One
invokes miracle after miracle to prove that God approves of his
position. Even a heavenly voice affirms his view. Citing the Torah
itself, the second rabbi wins the argument with the words, “It is no
longer in the heavens.”
According to the ideology of the rabbis, their function is to spin
out in their dialectic the details of God’s revelation. Their systematic,
highly rational deliberations, they claimed, had the force of the
written Torah. The rabbis’ legal dialectic was a species of revelation.
There would be no more direct, prophetic revelations, for God had
given over his rule-making responsibility to humanity in the form of
the collective wisdom of this male, intellectual-spiritual elite. Thus,
the rabbis took a crucial step toward acknowledging that people
create their own laws and thus define for themselves good and evil.
Yet the rabbis’ self-understanding was nested in the earlier mythic
structure: their rabbinic reasoning could not bring them to a direct
contradiction of written Torah, and, as before, suffering was viewed
as God’s way of punishing infractions of the rabbis’ Torah.
Rabbinic explanations of suffering or evil emphasize that no
suffering is undeserved and no sin ultimately remains unpunished.
They went to extraordinary lengths to affirm God’s justice. They
even search diligently to find some small failure to fulfill a mizvah,
a divine commandment, to justify the suffering of the heroic martyr,
Rabbi Akiva. Akiva was tortured and killed by the Romans for refus-
ing to give up his devotion to Torah, the Torah revealed to Moses
on Mt. Sinai and the Torah which he was helping create as a rabbi.
Reward and punishment, in this life or the next, constitute the
cornerstone of the rabbinic moral-legal calculus. Their sense of the
rational, consistent ordering of a just reality required that punish-
ments and rewards follow human actions regularly. Punishment,
however, is not only a reflexive response to a past act, but also may
lead to redemption in the future. God is often portrayed as a just
father who punishes his children to turn them to better behavior.
Not that the rabbis believed that desire for reward or fear of punish-
ment constituted admirable motivations for fulfilling mitzvot. Torah
lishmah, fulfilling God’s will for its own sake and not for the sake of
a reward, was far more preferable.
The rabbis tighten the underlying biblical mythic structure. The
God who is king and father must be perfect in distributing judg-
ment. There are no arguments with God about judgment. It is the
rabbi’s duty to legislate and God’s duty to arrange life events to
respond. For the rabbis nothing that happens to a person or the

people can truly be evil. It all must fit within the calculus. Suffering
was punishment or test or would be balanced out in the world to
come.
Despite the permission to express serious doubts implied by the
inclusion of Job and Qohelet in the Bible, the rabbis seem to have
internally suppressed such speculation. The rabbis were relatively
free with their speculations about theological matters. But there
were boundaries. For instance, the denial of God was considered an
unjustifiable belief. Similarly, the denial that God is the ultimate
judge in the final judgment of one’s deeds during embodied life, was
the worst of sins. Such a belief would rule one out of a share in the
life-to-come that was otherwise the automatic right of every Jew.
The rabbis living in worldly defeat, in exile from their holy land,
would not openly admit the least doubt about the moral functioning
of the universe. They had to believe that evil would eventually be
punished and the good rewarded, if not during this life then after
leaving the body or in the world-to-come. In their rational consis-
tency, they had to believe that in some way the Jews had left them-
selves open to suffering, that they could not be suffering unjustly.
This is the position that finally became untenable for the vast
majority of Jews in light of the Holocaust.
Of course they questioned and doubted, but their most serious
doubts were put in the mouths of apostates or Godless pagans. Ha-
kofer ha-iggar, “the denier of the root (or essence),” is the term of
opprobrium reserved for one who denies that God observes or
responds to what people do. One may not deny God’s existence but,
as the Epicurean, simply believe that God doesn’t care, i.e., that
“there is no Judge, and there is no judgment” (Urbach 28).
Although this view parallels the basic message of the skeptical
wisdom canonized in Qohelet, the rabbis ruled it out of court.
Justice, however, is only one divine attribute; God could be a
stern father, but God was also forgiving and loving. God’s attribute
of justice was balanced with that of mercy. Therefore, forgiveness is
always available given a genuine turning of act and intent away from
the path of sin, teshuvah. For two thousand years traditional Jews
have in their daily prayers blessed the God who forgives and
redeems their sins. The most holy days in the Jewish calendar occur
during the ten days of Teshuvah which begin with Rosh Hashanah
(New Year) and end with Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement). The
annual drama includes time for self-examination and to ask for
forgiveness from fellow humans and God and ends with the divine
judgment that sets conditions of life to be contended with during the
coming year. In the Siddur, the prayerbook, we get the sense that life
is a test and that God sets our fate for the coming year based on our
behavior in the past. However, there is little belief exhibited in the
improvement of the world in which we are embodied.
There is a sense in which theology is always anthropology. What
we say about God reveals, sometimes very subtly and indirectly, what
we believe about ourselves. For the rabbis, just as God can be torn
between the divine attributes of justice and mercy about whether to
create a troublesome world filled with troublesome people, so too
are humans torn between contradictory desires. While dual apoca-
lyptic anthropology designates people as either children of light or
children of darkness, the rabbinic cosmos unifies and internalizes in
humanity all the qualities of being, including good and bad.
The Evil Inclination

In the legal segments of the Bible we find no speculations about
internal motivations for going against God’s will. Although the
narratives provide far more complex understandings of human
behavior, still we find little in the way of subtle, complex exam-
ination of the psyche. Even when God asks Abraham to sacrifice his
own son, the text makes no attempt to expose the tensions of the
inner workings of their thoughts and emotions. The rabbis, how-
ever, did speculate about the inner workings that result in good and
bad behavior. With an acute awareness of our inner struggle to do
the right thing, and of how easily we are seduced away, they taught
that we are created with a will that is not naturally unified, but
rather is split between the inclination toward good and the incli-
nation to sin, towards evil.
The rabbis believed that only humans (and the supra-human
denizens of demonic realms) are capable of evil. However, the rabbis
were sensitive to a key question of theodicy. If God created us with
the evil inclination, didn’t God bear some responsibility for the
results? The rabbis’ commitment to preserving God’s goodness was
absolute. So, they reasoned, God creates us with an evil inclination
(yetzer) for good reasons. In fact, some speculated that it is not really
intrinsically evil, but rather serves a divine purpose. Were it not for
the evil inclination humans would not build a house, take a wife, or
have children. One rabbi even suggested that the evil inclination
(yetzer) rejoices when someone can resist its temptations.
For the rabbis, ambivalence about whether such an evil impulse
is really evil is also entangled with their powerfully ambivalent views
on sexuality and women. The rabbis constituted an intellectual male
elite who, as they legislated, were continuing God’s revelatory
function. Israel, the bearer of Torah, exists to serve Torah; the
rabbis, in their scholarly and legislative functions, recreated Torah,
which already existed before the world was created for whose
fulfillment the world was created. Thus the rabbis believed that their
preoccupation with Torah was an activity sustaining all of creation.
This view gives cosmic significance to their intra-personal struggle
with the evil inclination which pits the desire to be connected with
God through study against the distractions of their passions. It is not
that the passions are per se evil; when the good impulse rules the evil
inclination, then both are united in doing God’s will.
The rabbis believed that no one can prevail over the evil
inclination (yetzer) alone. Although God created it, he also gave them
Torah as an antidote. Only with God’s help can one resist the innate
attraction to evil. The purity and intensity of the rabbi’s relationship
with Torah is threatened by the intensity of his passions, especially
sexual desire. On the one hand, men were commanded to procreate
and to give their wives sexual gratification. On the other, the intense
desires and pleasures associated with these commanded activities
were experienced as interference with the desire to serve God
wholly, especially through thorough occupation with Torah. This
internal male struggle was projected on the female who was often
objectified as a source of Lonp aber and seduction.” To be holy, to
be a tzaddik, was to conquer one’s passions—a victory that you could
never be sure you had won as long as you drew breath.
The function of the evil impulse cannot, however, be truly evil
since the good God created it. The perspective on human evil is
ultimately, in theologian John Hick’s categories, Irenaean. Even evil
serves God’s purposes, for it is there to be overcome with the help
of Torah. Ultimately it is the evil impulse which drives people
toward as well as away from Torah.
The underlying myth informing Jewish views of evil manifests a

duality between an unflawed God andaflawed creation. If God is
imagined as separate from creation, as a father is from children,
then the range of interactions is delimited. Judgments of good and
evil will always involve an external standard set by another kind of
being who is unflawed. There is a tension iri the myth of a perfect
father-king-God who authorizes earthly representatives, the rabbis,
to legislate on God’s behalf, and therefore to determine what is
good and what is not.
Evil in the Zohar

Kabbalah, the major tradition of Jewish mysticism, responds to
this dual tension with a profound recognition of a flawed God,
which reveals another stage in understanding the biblical claim that
humans are made in God’s image. Humans are another way of God
revealing God. The added dimension, the evolution in consciousness
in Kabbalah, is the unification of what had previously remained
utterly separate: God and creation. This was accomplished in
Kabbalah in at least two ways. The monistic vision that all mani-
festation proceeds from the same unmanifest source, such that
everything that exists is an aspect of God; and the teaching of the
identity of macrocosm and microcosm, i.e., that humanity is a replica
in miniature of God.
I will focus briefly on Zohar, the Book of Splendor, because it is
the central text of Kabbalah from the 13th century. Like the medi-
eval Jewish philosophers, Kabbalists recognized the potential for
self-idolatry inherent in the anthropomorphic tendencies of biblical
and rabbinic theology. Since idolatry is virtually the most cardinal of
sins for Jews, the Kabbalists teach about a God so far beyond the
capacity for the human consciousness to encompass as to be
ultimately and totally unknowable, indescribable, inexpressible—in
essence, unmanifest. The unmanifest source of all being is called Eyn
Sof, the Infinite.
The Infinite emanates all there is. The Infinite, in one sense, is
utterly transcendent, but all this complex, multi-leveled reality is in
some sense God manifesting God. The Infinite (En Sof) manifests in
stages as an interconnected system of divine potencies called seftrot,
most commonly symbolized as the tree of life. The sefirotic tree of
life is God manifesting in our universe; everything receives its being

from Eyn Sof pouring through the complex connections on the
power-net which is the immediate origin of all that we experience as
existing. The radical gulf between creator and creation characteristic
of biblical and traditional rabbinic cosmology is bridged. In one
sense worlds separate humanity from the world of divine potencies
(seftrot); in another sense the world is the divine potencies (sefirot) at
this level.
Kabbalists disagreed with the neo-Platonic view of evil as absence
of being, a view current in medieval Jewish philosophy. They did
not accept the belief that distance from God on the chain of being
implies proportionately less reality, so that evil was the utter absence
of God. While for Maimonides and others evil designated radical
unreality, lack of being, for Kabbalah the realm of evil, the other
side, was too real, too much a matter of Jewish corporate and per-
sonal experience, to be denied its reality by attributing the human
experience of evil merely to an intellectual deficiency.
Instead, in the daring mystical mythology of Kabbalah, evil is
taken to originate within God as broken connections within the
sefirotic system. The evil we experience is due to a break that pro-
hibits the exchange between the divine energies, especially those
designated love (chesed) and justice (din). The break results in suffer-
ing on all planes of being, for the power that limits and separates
(din) operates without love. The result is that the connections of love
cannot be made, and the interactions become negative, full of hatred
and destructive.
The break in the divine potencies (sefirot), and therefore evil,
originated with Adam’s sin which is uniquely conceived by Kabbalah.
Adam’s sin was neither disobedience of an external rule, nor the
result of an internal split will, but rather a fatal misperception. Adam
could have seen the tree of life, i.e., the total connectedness of
everything that exists as a divine system which unifies in a web of
knowing, loving, compassionate relationship. Instead, he focused on
only the dimension of manifestation, the tree of knowledge of good
and evil. Thus he saw—and this is the fatal flaw—himself as
separate.
That was the break; his awareness separated so that his own
internal microcosmic tree was broken. The resonance of the broken
harmony from his own consciousness resulted in a break in the
divine sefirotic macrocosmic consciousness. Healing comes when we

participate in a state of consciousness that realizes that in the depths
of reality, all beings are participants in higher wholes. In Kabbalah
evil results from breaking relationship, by not seeing, understanding
and valuing the interdependent relationships without which nothing
exists, including God. We break relationship as a result of intra-
personal breaks: misperceptions, emotional disconnections, hatreds
and so on. In that break, God-manifesting-as-Shekhinah joins the
people in exile. God is not only lord and master, God is also mas-
tered, if only temporarily.
In our evolution, we need to learn to play out all positions. At this
moment in Jewish history, for instance, after Jews spent 2000 or so
years learning about being powerless in the world, many Jews in
modernity are learning from the experience of having relative
freedom and power. We have experienced evil from one position,
horribly culminating in the Holocaust; now we are working out the
experience of having power over others. Those two roles, those
polar positions, have yet to be put together in our consciousness.
Situational evil has yet to be redeemed.
When sefirotic energy becomes mixed with that of the demonic
realm of evil, the break in relationship within God is commonly
described as a temporary divorce between the masculine and
feminine aspects of God. They are symbolized as the king and queen
or the father and mother turning away from each other. At that
moment the last Sefirah, Shekhinah who is the queen, is under the
control of the demonic realm. On the Sabbath, according to
Kabbalah, the powers of the realm of evil that keep them apart wane
and king and queen rejoin and rejoice in ecstasy. Kabbalists believe
that when they make love with their wives during the Sabbath, there
is a special healing, a tikkun, that occurs between king and queen
and therefore in the world. In fact husband and wife can experience
themselves and each other as the divine sefirot Tiferet, the Holy One
and Shekhinah in union."
Healing the Break

The king and queen do not become each other; they connect
across their differences. This is a crucial teaching of zoharic
mysticism, that unification within God means connecting different
powers, not isolating them and not homogenizing them. If this is

true for the divine system, it must also be true for the microcosmic
human systems. In one Zohar passage, Abraham who is the arche-
type of the energy of abounding love (hesed) is perfected by his
willingness to sacrifice his son Isaac, who is the archetype of din, the
energy of limitation (e.g., the ability to say no to a child). Merciful
love must be tempered by a sense of limits. At the same time, Isaac,
offering himself willingly as a sacrifice, is perfected by hesed. This
dynamic of connecting potencies so that they are modified by each
other illustrates the Zohar’s conception of unification. The text as-
serts that each of the seftrot is completed by virtue of its uniting with
other divine potencies (sefirot). Each is itself more than it had been
by virtue of its connection with the energy of its apparent opposite.
There is a comprehensive model of relationship being projected
here on God. For God is a number of relationships: husband/wife;
father/mother; brother/sister; king/queen, etc. This is how Kabbalists
projected their imagery of God, and also how they conceived their
internal states. Through the connections they made, the inner
healings, as well as the connections between them, the larger whole
of which they were a part also healed. Another way of putting it is
that all roles are ways of being human and as we interact with each
other we have the potential of learning more and more about the
possibilities, to more and more realize the whole.
The Zohar symbolizes the sefirotic system, i.e., God-manifest, in
many ways: as a divine couple, a divine family, a tree rooted in Eyn
Sof (the Infinite), a cosmic androgyne. For Zohar the primary
identification of God is not as a single person over against humanity
and the rest of creation. Nor does Zohar limit the alternatives to an
impersonal principle or nothingness. Rather God is an organic
system unfolding as the universe which encompasses all possible
processes and relationships, including those disruptions and
distortions which result in suffering and in evil. As part of what is
unfolding, we live on our plane with a mixture of good and evil
influences as we channel the continuing outpouring of that divine
energy grid—or distort it. When we are able internally to heal
ourselves as vessels for the divine flow, we reflect back healing to the
all-encompassing divine system.
There is here a different kind of reciprocity than other voices in
the Jewish conversation had imagined. The parent-child relationship
has become something else, something more complex, with the

power hierarchies far more ambiguous. We are prone to sin, the
divine energies are prone to disruption. We heal the divine system
and the harmonious, compassionate flow of being replaces the dis-
torted painful emanations of the realm of evil. We can do that
because we are of the same essence, we share the same structure.
This imagery seems to project a role reversal, an Oedipal-like
desire for control over parents: a child will heal them, even restoring
their sexuality with the child’s own. At a deeper level, however,
another image emerges. The healing of constituent parts are re-
quired for the healing of the whole. An implication, not expressed
in the mystical myth, is that as humans we are capable of healing, of
transcending the primordial struggle, of returning to or realizing
our Eden-like state not in ignorance and innocence, but with all the
wisdom of having traversed manifestation.
Another implication could not be drawn, I think, until this
century. Men and women have not lived together within a pattern
of complementary equality. Of course, Kabbalists lived within the
traditional Jewish patriarchal, hierarchical social system; they could
not themselves hear this particular teaching of the tree of life. The
Kabbalistic insight that the process of healing the world must
include a healing of male and female can be understood today as the
necessity to heal the wounds that put male and female at odds with
each other. If we cannot heal that relationship, we will not heal
relationships between peoples and between species. All these
healings are part of healing God. One way Zohar describes the
healing, the tikkun, is as the right containing the left, the demonic
realm is integrated with the sefirot, purified, redeemed, taking its
appropriate place.
For the Zohar, this revision in conceiving God is a deep, esoteric
truth, to be revealed to the rare adept. I believe that the power ofa
true symbol is that it continues to teach according to the changing
needs of the generations who absorb it. The seftrot constitute that
kind of symbol and, just as this vision of divinity has taught
Christians since the Renaissance, it can teach others. We must gift
with and receive from each other our highest symbols. And we must
give freely, understanding that others may have different things to
learn. It is no accident that we live in the only time in history when
virtually all sacred texts and symbols are universally available; it is
also the only time when we can learn together and from each other
without having to become each other.
NOTES
1. Ina very preliminary way I am attempting to trace this story of evolution
through an extended metaphor of maturation within a family context. The
total dependence of infancy gives way to a maturing internalization of and
identification with an externally imposed sense of right and wrong which
further develops into taking full responsibility for creating one’s values,
even if one chooses to remain within a traditional context. The final stage
of spiritual maturity is not easy to describe, of course. It includes, however,
a perspective that transcends the distinction between good and evil and
between God and evil.
In Jewish mysticism the transformation is described with a variety of
metaphors: healing (tkkun), rescuing the sparks, the right side holding the
left side, etc. The same consciousness—human and divine—whose mis-
perceptions result in evil may be healed. In the family metaphor, all the
roles of the family are understood to be contained within a single process.
The evil results from a break in relationship and is not the fault of the child
or the parent. Rather it is a property of the whole. From an evolutionary
perspective, evil may be seen as those phenomena, the healing of which
produces the next evolutionary stage. As humans we advance when we
learn from our mistakes. That is, good and bad have to do with how we
respond to our existential situation, how we learn.
2. The Bible already transmitted messages about Eve’s blame and Adam’s sin.
Legal codes considered women special sources of ritual pollution which the
rabbis later interpreted as evil, and in the wisdom literature the potential
wise men are warned against the seductiveness of women. Yet these
examples do not prepare the reader for the level of fear and mistrust
expressed in the post-biblical literature.
3. This analysis is, of course, simplistic. Yet I am drawn to it, for it asserts that
all of our experience has the potential to contribute to our evolution—
although it need not. In the Holocaust there were many acts of heroism,
many incidents that revealed nobility at the most surprising moments.
Even today as the Holocaust affects our consciousness fifty years later, good
and evil continue to collect around it. This is not to argue, of course, that
any suffering is worth it. Rather, that the judgment of good and evil is a
constant on-going process, relative to the evolution or Fegeentt ta of an
individual, a community, a species, etc.
4. This phenomenon deserves close comparison with tantric practices.
3
Providence and the
Problem of Evil
in Jewish Thought
By David J. Goldberg
here is no more agonizing problem of belief than the exis-

T tence of evil in a world allegedly created by a benevolent
God. What makes the problem all the more acute for
Judaism is that it cannot evade it by attributing evil to an ultimate
source independent of God, for that would be a denial of mono-
theism. It cannot, for instance, countenance the dualistic doctrine of
Zoroastrianism with its two deities, of light and darkness, from
which the good and the evil respectively emanate. Indeed, the
prophet of the Babylonian exile repudiated that notion when he said
in God’s name: “I am the Lord, and there is no other. I form light
and create darkness, I make peace and create evil, I the Lord do all
these things” (Isaiah 45:6f.).
All the biblical authors seem to have thought of goodness as
intrinsic to the character of God. By contrast, God creates evil and
tolerates its continued existence. God encourages humanity to fight
it and destroy it if it can, but evil has no part in the divine being.
Speculation of why God does allow evil to exist is not, however,
found in the Bible. Abstract speculations of this kind were foreign to
ancient Hebraic thinking. The biblical authors were concerned with
30
DAVID GOLDBERG 33
humanity and the kind of life it should lead. When the mystery of
evil is discussed in the Books of Job and Ecclesiastes, for example,
the argument centers around why the righteous suffer, not around
the deeper problem of why there is suffering at all, or why the
various manifestations of evil abound in God’s creation.
Insofar as biblical authors address the dilemma of theodicy, their
solution is usually to suggest a punitive or remedial purpose to evil.
It is a demonstration of God’s justice. The adversities of human life
are to be seen as aspects of God’s wider, educational concern for
God’s children. “Know then in your heart that, as a man disciplines
his son, so the Lord your God disciplines you” (Deuteronomy 8:5).
“For the Lord reproves him whom He loves, as a father the son in
whom he delights” (Proverbs 3:12).
Suffering, therefore, is a form of divine chastisement, a token of
God’s beneficence rather than God’s anger. It is this theory that is
boldly challenged by the author of the Book of Job. Job is a right-
eous man who has suffered unjustly. The conventional, simplistic
reward-and-punishment doctrine propounded so tenaciously by
Job’s friends is clearly an inadequate explanation for his suffering.
But having advanced the argument with eloquent daring, the author
of Job is then forced to concede that human ignorance precludes us
from knowing the answer. Faith in God’s ultimate purposes must
suffice. That is the import of God’s speech out of the whirlwind
when God says to Job: “Where were you when Ilaid the foundations
of the earth. . .2” (Job 38:4).
Rabbinic literature is similarly averse to speculation on the
mystery of evil, while accepting unquestioningly the doctrine of
divine providence; that whatever happens in this world happens by
God’s will. The Talmud expresses the belief in its most extreme
form in the statement of Rabbi Chanina that “no man bruises the
finger here below unless it has been so decreed for him above.”’ And
rabbinic bafflement about solving the riddle of theodicy is candidly
admitted by the second-century teacher who said: “It does not lie
within our power to explain either the well-being of the wicked or
the suffering of the righteous.””
It was not until medieval times that the metaphysical problem
regarding the very existence of evil was discussed by Jewish thinkers.
Abraham Ibn Daud (twelfth century, Spain) and Moses Maimonides
(twelfth century, Egypt) are two representative philosophers who
34 PROVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
attempt to grapple with the questions posed by the apparent reality

of evil, given the three basic propositions of theistic faith: that God
is wholly good; that evil is real; that God is all-powerful.
The acceptance of all three propositions as true would seem to
involve us in a contradiction. For if evil is real, then either God wishes
to remove it (or not to have brought it into being) and cannot do so,
in which case there are limits to God’s power; or God can remove it
(or need not have brought it into being) but does not choose to do
so, in which case God cannot be wholly good. The only way out of the
dilemma is to reject—or at least to qualify—one of these propositions.
No recognized Jewish thinker has ever sought to deny that God
is wholly good. Even those medieval philosophers” (e.g., Bahya Ibn
Pakudah and Joseph Albo) who hesitated to use attributes like good-
ness of God, because of the anthropomorphism involved, conceded
that at least this can be said of God: that God is not the opposite of
good. It is surely a sound religious instinct which refuses to ascribe
any evil to the nature of God. A being who desired evil in any
ultimate sense would not be worthy of worship, as it would be
morally inferior to the person it had created, who would banish evil
if it had the power to do so. ;
The solution for Ibn Daud and Maimonides was to deny the
reality of evil; that is, to reject the second proposition. Ibn Daud’
declares that our reason tells us that God cannot produce evil, and
this is taught by scripture and in the Jewish tradition generally.
Reason tells us that this is so because for God, who is wholly good,
to produce evil would be a contradiction in terms. Human beings
are both good and evil at the same time because the good stems
from one part of their character, the evil from another. But since
God is not composite, it is logically impossible for the divine nature
to embrace both good and evil.
Why, then, do we find evil in the universe? According to Ibn
Daud, most types of evil that we can imagine are merely the absence
of good. For example, poverty is the absence of wealth, darkness the
absence of light, folly the absence of wisdom. It is not correct to say
the God creates poverty or darkness or stupidity, any more than it
would be correct to say that God has made no elephants in Spain!
The absence of elephants in Spain is not something positive which
God has to make. The only logical way of stating the proposition is
to say that while God did indeed create elephants, God did not
DAVID GOLDBERG 35
create them in Spain; that is, God is certainly responsible for the fact
that there are no elephants in Spain, but this is not due to a no-
elephant creating process but simply because the scope of God’s
elephant-creating did not extend to Spain. By analogy, God does not
create evil—which is simply the absence of good—but God does
refrain from bestowing certain good things on certain people; that
is, God does not give wisdom to the fool.
Is not the absence of good in itself evil? To this Ibn Daud replies
that when we ask God to make the imperfect perfect, we are asking
for the world as we know it to be abolished. If plants were to be
made more perfect by becoming animals, animals by becoming
humans, humans by becoming like Moses, Moses by becoming like
the angels, then there would be no gradations in creation. Whereas
God’s goodness wishes to benefit a varied multitude of creatures,
and this is only possible in a world where there are imperfections as
well as perfections.
Maimonides’ follows more or less the same line of argument. All
evils are privations. Therefore, God does not create evil but is re-
sponsible, rather, for the privation of the good, that is, God cannot
be said to have created a blind man, but to have created a man to
whom no sight was given.
It has to be said that neither of these attempted solutions is
satisfactory. They are largely semantic games. To suggest that a per-
son racked by a cruel disease which torments body and soul is simply
being deprived by God of good health, is to come dangerously close
to abuse of language. Such an artificial distinction does not con-
tribute significantly to an understanding or acceptance of evil.
In defense of the medieval philosophers it could be argued that
they shrank at ascribing evil in any positive sense to the all-good
God. What they were doing, consciously or unconsciously, was to try
to minimize in a number of ways the power and force of evil. They
were trying to demonstrate that while we cannot deny the existence
of evil in the universe, it is not quite as bad as we imagine at first
glance. But they seem to have been unaware that any amount of
evil, even an evil minimized and expressed negatively, is still a major
obstacle to belief in a God who is wholly good.
Maimonides is not entirely oblivious of the difficulty. He argues
that God cannot make a material universe without the properties of
privation because—a view which goes back to Plato—matter must
have this property in order to be matter.’ To expect God to create

matter which is not matter is to ask God to do the logically
impossible.
Again we are back to Ibn Daud’s thought that the world as we
know it must have the nature it does have ifit is to be an imaginable
world at all. But what of moral evil? Maimonides replies that this,
too, is the result of ignorance. If human beings knew the truth,
there would be no wars or hatred or enmity. That is why the
promise is held out that one day: “They shall not hurt nor destroy
in all my holy mountain; for the earth shall be full of the knowledge
of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea” (Isaiah 11:9).
Maimonides denies that there is more evil in the world than
good. Most of the evils which befall humans are due to their wrong
exercise of free will. The free will defense—that humanity has
freedom to choose good or evil, blessing or curse, life or death—is
central to Judaism’s notion of the two inclinations, the yetzer tov, the
good inclination, and the yetzer hara, the evil inclination, which
constantly struggle for mastery of human nature. The kind of world
we have is the only one, Maimonides would have said, that can serve
as an arena for the emergence of moral worth.
In the Kabbalah, on the other hand, evil is treated as something
positive. Indeed, the Kabbalistic doctrine of the “other side” (sitra
achra), the demonic side of existence, comes very close to dualism,
although the Kabbalists warn against this repeatedly. They give the
illustration ofa wild dog controlled by its master’s chains even
though appearing to enjoy a certain degree of freedom to bite. The
Lurianic Kabbalah (named after its founder, Isaac Luria, 1534-1572)
in particular, deals at length with the subject of evil. According to its
theory of tzimtzum (self-contraction), God withdraws from the divine
self into the divine self, to make room for the world. The light which
pours into the empty space results in the “breaking of the vessels”
and even after the reconstruction of the sefirotic realms some of the
infinite light is spilled over, as it were, to form worlds in decreasing
order. Eventually the over-spill nourishes the denizens of the “other
side”—the k’lipot, shells or husks which surround the good, as the
bark of a tree or the rind of a fruit, and which parasitically take
nourishment from the good. Thus evil is the result of that cosmic
catastrophe known as the “breaking of the vessels.”
Some of the bolder Kabbalists tend to see this as a kind of
DAVID GOLDBERG 37
purging by God of the evil in God, which comes perilously close to
the notion of a finite and limited God, but is their attempt to
grapple with the problem of how the infinite can produce the finite.
Since God needs to have creatures so that God can benefit them,
God has to produce that which is not-God as the environment in
which they can exist, and this not-God is bound to contain
imperfections and evil. This is, in mythical terms, another statement
of the free will defense. A human being can only become God-like
by making the good its own through the exercise of free choice. This
requires a world in which there is evil as well as good.
In general, modern Jewish theology—like modern science—tends
to be relativist rather than absolutist in its assertions, reticent of
dogmatic assumptions and suspicious of resolved solutions. Two
factors in particular have contributed to this stance. One is post-
Enlightenment knowledge of the natural sciences and therefore the
workings of natural law. The rigid mechanical system of the
Newtonian universe is queried nowadays by quantum physics and
chaos theory in particular, which have revealed that chance and
indeterminacy are real aspects of the fundamental nature of things.
The contemporary theologian, aware of the proximate causalities of
modern science, is far readier than was his medieval counterpart to
question the scope of all-powerful in listing the attributes of God.
The concept known as process theology, of a God who is not yet
omnipotent and depends on human cooperation to become so; who
is, indeed, in the process of becoming has its Jewish adherents,
notably Levi Olan and Henry Slonimsky. Harking back to the
Kabbalistic theory of tzimizum, they posit a God who is limited by its
own nature, infinite in some respects but finite in others, and
dependent on co-partnership with humanity in the work of creation.
The second crucial factor is Jewish consciousness of the Holocaust,
which though it may not have been objectively different in kind from
all other historical episodes, has raised to new levels of sensitivity our
perception of the brutality of which human beings are capable and
of the agonies suffered in this world by the innocent. While the prob-
lem of why an all-good, all-powerful God can tolerate evil in creation
has always been the most difficult question for a theist to face, the
sheer scope and nakedness of the evil witnessed in the twentieth
century has rendered banal all earlier attempts at an answer.
Both factors have, moreover, impressed on us in a new way the
need to differentiate between natural and moral evils. Natural evils

are not caused by human action and may not even affect human
beings, since they include the cruelties observable in the animal
world—Tennyson’s “Nature, red in tooth and claw”—though those
which do cause human suffering are flood, famine, earthquake,
disease and death itself. :
In the past such happenings were regarded as acts of God (as
they are still termed in English law). Today we tend to look upon
the casualties not as individuals singled out for suffering by divine
decree, but as victims of an unfortunate conglomeration of circum-
stances within a system that operates according to general natural
laws. What calls for explanation is not why particular calamities
happen to particular people, but why they occur at all.
Here we can speculate that there must be death, so that the
generations may succeed one another; that pain is nature’s way of
alerting us to bodily danger; that accidents are unavoidable in any
logically possible world that is governed by universal laws, and do
not automatically negate the benevolence of its Creator; that all
these seeming evils serve at least the one good purpose of chal-
lenging human beings to learn to conquer or control them, and thus
of stimulating progress; and that they assume a different complexion
when viewed in the perspective of an evolving, rather thana static,
universe. The moral evils or evils committed by humans—crime, war,
oppression, persecution, torture, and genocide—present a different
problem. It is much harder to assert nowadays, as did Maimonides,
that there is more good than evil in the universe. Babies suffered
cruel deaths in former ages, but were not hurled alive into gas
chambers. The horrors of Hiroshima and the napalm bomb seem
too monstrous for theodicy to cope with, so that the more subtle (or
crude) the defense, the greater appears to be the affront.
For many believing Jews there is a strong distaste for even raising
the issue. Guilty at having been spared when six million perished,
and diffident about proposing any partial explanation for evil on such
a cosmic scale, these Jews take refuge in the natural and commen-
dable reticence which has ever frowned on tzidduk ha-din (justifying
God’s justice) when the suffering of others is involved. Nevertheless,
a number of Jews have written on the Holocaust and its theological
implications. From such writings several different attitudes emerge,
but where there is consensus is in rejecting as an insult to the
DAVID GOLDBERG 39
memory of the victims any solution which depends on the tidy

biblical scheme of reward and punishment. Even in former times the
measure for measure explanation had to contend with insuperable
obstacles. How did it resolve the suffering of the innocent and the
escape of the guilty? How did it understand the deaths of small
children? Were all these apparent instances of evil manifestations of
God’s retributive justice, or, as some explanations would have it,
punishment for sins committed in a previous existence?
After the destruction of the First Temple in 586 BCE, and again
after the Second Temple was destroyed in 70 CE, there was a ten-
dency for Jews to blame themselves, and say, in the words of the
prayerbook, mipne chata’einu, “it was because of our sins” that these
misfortunes came upon us. While admiring the pious humility of
our ancestors, after the Holocaust such self-castigation is no longer
intellectually or emotionally tenable. To suggest that the six million
men, women and children in any sense deserved their fate seems to
be sacrilegious. On the contrary, with a kind of spontaneous
religious insight, the Jewish people refer to Holocaust victims by the
term traditionally applied to martyrs, as k’doshim, “holy ones.”
Many of the Jewish thinkers who have presumed to write on the
subject in the aftermath of the Holocaust have come close to sug-
gesting that in the particular circumstances it is irreligious to probe
too deeply. Leviticus chapter 10, verse 3: “And Aaron was silent” (at
the death of his two sons, that is, he accepted the divine decree) is
a text hallowed by tradition.
For all that, and with the fullest appreciation of the need, on
occasion, of a theology of silence, it can be argued that the would-be
believer will not find repose in faith unless he can discover some
inkling of how to reconcile moral evil with the intentions of a
purposive mind. From this point of view, and despite existentialist
shudders, the quest for a theodicy is still valid if God is to continue
to be worshipped in any meaningful sense. One response has been
to jettison the time-honored belief that such happenings are acts of
God. How can they be, since they are by their very nature flagrant
violations of the divine will? God does not command, but on the
contrary, forbids the murderer to commit murder; therefore, God
cannot be said to cause either the act or the suffering that results
from it. However, God has created a universe in which such bar-
barities can and do happen. God allows them and does not prevent
them. It is in this sense that God can be held responsible for humans’
inhumanity to each other.
The most far-reaching and coherent treatment in recent years of
this problem of theodicy comes not from a Jewish, but a Christian
scholar, John Hick, in his Evil and the God of Love. To claim that
investigation of the problem of evil is religiously improper, that it is
ipso facto irreligious for one to seek to justify God, Hick responds:
In this formulation of the difficulty the word “justify” seems to cause
the trouble. But suppose we use instead the more neutral term
“understand.” Is it impious to try to understand God’s dealings with
mankind? . . .By what authority must we insist upon maintaining an
unrelieved mystery and darkness concerning God’s permission of
evil? Surely this would be a dogmatism of the least defensible kind.
It is, of course, permissible to hold, on the basis of an investigation
of the issues, that there is in fact no theodicy, no legitimate way of
thinking about the problem of evil that satisfies both mind and
conscience; but in view of the fallibility of human reasoning it would
be unwise to hold this with absolute confidence, and quite un-
justifiable to forbid others from making their own attempts. It may
be that what the theodicist is searching for does not exist. But, on
the other hand, even if no complete theodicy is attainable, certain
approaches to it may be less inadequate than others, and it may thus
be possible to reach some modest degree of genuine illumination
upon the subject and to discover helpful criteria by which to
discriminate among speculations concerning it. If so, efforts in this
direction need not be wasted.’
Hick’s own approach, in a Christian context, is to side with

Irenaeus (second century) rather than St. Augustine, who empha-
sizes the idea of the fall of the human and attributes the evil in the
world to this. Irenaeus, on the other hand, sees the world with its
hardships and its challenges as the appropriate arena for the
emergence of those values which make human beings God-like in
their struggle for the good and thus equip them for their role of
enjoying God forever. Irenaeus is anticipating by several hundred
years the famous phrase of the poet Keats that this world is not a
vale of tears but “the vale of Soul-making.” The myth of Genesis
represents the natural condition of a human being as a finite
creature remote from God; but this state is endemic to humanity
and is not the result of any fall. Only in a world in which there has
to be a struggle for the good, can human beings freely choose God.
DAVID GOLDBERG Al
Hick is thus presenting the classical free will defense, and its
parallels in Jewish thought are numerous. Both Ibn Daud and
Maimonides would have approved of Hick’s argument. Basically, the
free will defense considers what is the scope and extent of the
affirmation that God is omnipotent. Is it really true to say that God
can do anything? Can God, for example, create a stone which even
God cannot lift up? Can God create another God? Can God will the
divine nature out of existence? The answer to these questions will
surely be in the negative, but is that not a limiting qualification of
God’s omnipotence?
As the medieval Jewish thinkers repeatedly insisted, God cannot
do the absolutely or logically impossible, because this involves a
contradiction in terms. For example, it is absurd to ask God to make
five into ten without adding anything to the former, or to bring back
the day gone by in its original condition. Thus, even God cannot
give humanity free will and the opportunity of exercising it, of
choosing good and rejecting evil, if the human is placed in a world
where there is no evil and therefore no possibility of choice. Even if
we accept that this world is to be a vale of soul-making, it cannot be
at the same time a hedonistic paradise. We are still bound to ask why
God should allow creatures to suffer pain when it is not necessary
for their moral development: the sufferings of children and animals,
and all those physical evils which seem pointless. The theist has to
admit that it is a mystery impenetrable to the rationalizing human
mind. But, the skeptic would retort, if we have to fall back on the
idea of a mystery, this only means that the problem is insoluble. This
is tantamount to saying that God must have a morally sufficient
reason for allowing human suffering, but we do not know what it is.
That is acknowledging that we do not know the answer to the
problem of evil, and that there is, therefore, no theodicy.
The theist, defending his belief in a beneficient, voluntarily self-
limiting creator, might tentatively respond as follows: that the ap-
parently random element in nature is essential, for if it were always
possible to discover the theological necessity of each kind of suffer-
ing, this would interfere with free choice. This does not mean, as the
medieval philosophers would have proposed, that God sends the
earthquakes, diseases and so forth with a didactic purpose, to provide
opportunities for sympathy and help, but only that an environment
in which such things are possible can serve as a vale of soul-making.
The contingencies of the world process are genuine and frequently
perplexing. The existence of the whole process, with its contingen-

cies, represents a divine creative act, the purpose of which is to make
it possible for finite creatures to inhabit an autonomous world in
which their creator is not automatically evident and in which, ac-
cordingly, their moral and spiritual capacities may freely develop. In
and through and out of this religiously and morally ambiguous
situation—which is human existence as we now experience it—and
out of its continuation, variation and transformation beyond this
present life, the infinite good described in Judaism and Christianity
as the kingdom of God is finally to come.
The mystery and paradox for human reason lies in the fact that
if we lived in a world in which rewards and punishments were justly
apportioned to our deeds, our moral natures would never have an
opportunity to develop; and if in that world the ultimate construc-
tive use of evil was an established scientific fact, then the world
would not function as a vale of soul-making.
Such a tentative rationalization, haltingly offered by the theist,
affords no more than a glimpse through the darkness surrounding
the problem of evil. The person of faith knows better than most that
God hides the divine being. But for the person of faith, hard though
it is to believe in God, it is harder still not to believe. Or, as the
Chasidim were fond of saying, when you know that God is hidden,
then God is hidden no longer.
NOTES
1. The Babylonian Talmud (London: The Soncino Press, 1948), Hullin/ Chullin,
Viele pie. 7D:
2. The Babylonian Talmud (London: The Soncino Press, 1935), Aboth/Avot, Ch.
4:15, p. 52. The translation here is slightly different.
3. Bahya Ibn Pakudah, Sha-ar Ha-Yichud, Chap. 4; Joseph Albo, Ikkarim, II,
23. Further references are not available.
4. Ibn Daud, Abraham ben David Halevi, Emunak Ha Ramah En, VI, 2,
translated The Exalted Faith (Rutherford, NY: Fairleigh Dickinson
University Press; London: Associated University Press, 1986).
5. Moses Maimonides, The Guide to the Perplexed (New York: Dover
Publications, 1956), Part III, Ch. 10-12, pp. 265-71.
6. Issac Husik, The History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Philadelphia: Jewish
Publishing Society of America, 1941), p. 288.
7. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1977).
4
The Discovery
of Christian Meaning
in Suffering:
Transformation and
Solidarity
By Jane Mary Zwerner
T heodicists from Augustine to Hick have placed the fall at the

heart of their apologies for the existence of evil in God’s
creation. This strategy does seem logical since the creation
account in scripture does assign sole responsibility for the world as
we know it to the hands of God. But these theodicies and this
strategy leave a well known residual body of problems concerning
the existence of evil.
I find the Irenaean type of theodicy, especially Hick’s soul-
making thesis,’ more promising than the Augustinian, though I shall
leave the arguments to another time and place. But even that
theodicy does not answer the question: Why, if evil has positive
value,” should humans attempt to eliminate, prevent, or reduce evil?
In Hick’s context, the question would be framed as follows: If the
world as we know it is the environment best suited to soul-making,
why then should humans direct their efforts to changing it?
I believe that the most fruitful approach for answering this
waa.
44 THE DISCOVERY OF CHRISTIAN MEANING IN SUFFERING
question does not begin with the fall, but with the cross. It is only
through reflection upon and acceptance of Christ crucified that
Christians can truly understand that the existence of an omniscient,
omnipotent, and omnibenevolent divine being does not imply the
absence of suffering. After a brief look at the symbol and truth of the
cross I shall take a longer look at the dynamic of suffering in trans-
figuration reality, including its communal dimension; and finally,
examine the phenomenon of transfiguration.
The Cross
The cross on which Jesus of Nazareth was crucified is both the

reality and symbol of the personal experience of evil. I shall stipulate
the definition of evil as any actions or states of affairs which intend
and/or realize destructive effects for human persons, their rela-
tionships, and/or the natural environment. This stipulative defini-
tion presumes that there isa #elos or natural end for human persons
and natural objects. Actions or states of affairs which promote the
realization of that telos are good, and those which frustrate or defeat
that telos are evil. If those goods or evils are intended by rational
agents, those are moral goods or evils; and if they are the effects of
non-rational agents or events they are natural good or evils.”
I further stipulate that suffering is the experience of moral or
natural evils as meaningless or hopeless. This stipulative definition
implies that to experience evil is not necessarily to suffer evil. The
Christian understanding of evil is somewhat paradoxical, because
suffering has a positive element. Although the negative effects of evil
are not denied, the experience of evil is also an occasion for a
positive faith experience, in relation to an encounter with God.
The spiritual history of the community of faith,,both in the
history of the Hebrews and in the life of Christ, reveals that God is
present to the people of faith in the midst of suffering. Even so, God
very often does not reduce or eliminate that suffering. The human
expectation that God should reduce or eliminate evil is cogent
especially if one assumes that the purpose of creation is for creatures
to be happy. The soul-making theodicy, however, posits as the
highest good the transformation of human persons from bios
(physical or material existence) to zoe (personal spiritual and moral
life). That transformation or transfiguration is the telos, the summum
JANE MARY ZWERNER 45
bonum of creation, and the cross is the paradigmatic historical event

and metaphor for that transfiguration.
The life of Christ is a vivid account of the positive value of evil
and of transfiguration. In his earthly ministry Jesus did not elim-
inate all evils, did not cure every one in need, nor transform
institutions and governments. He clearly stated and indicated that
his mission was to accomplish the interior transformation or trans-
figuration of human persons. Those persons, by nature imperfect
and sinful, are called by Jesus to receive the Holy Spirit and to be
transfigured, to become the new man or new woman. This call to
rebirth in the Spirit resonates in Hick’s philosophical description of
transcendence from bios to zoe. The mission of Christ is not to
transform the vale but to transform persons.
As Hick explains, the ultimate value is not happiness or health,
though these are certainly good things which we rightly enjoy.
Rather, the ultimate purpose of human existence is to attain per-
sonal moral and spiritual life, to realize the likeness of God. The
death of Christ on the cross and his resurrection demonstrate that
transfiguration can occur, and perhaps must occur, within the
context of suffering.
The history of the Hebrews reveals a similar story. Although they
are the chosen ones of God, they are exiled, enslaved, dispossessed,
dispersed, exterminated. Yet it is throughout these hardships and
crises that God is ever present to them. The meaning of this nar-
rative lies not in whether God removes or relieves these trials, but
that God’s people are transformed throughout their history into a
community of faith. God is revealed to the faithful in these events.
One objection to this description of God’s presence in human
suffering is that God, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, is equally
revealed in joyous and beautiful events; and that God should be
revealed mostly or only in these joyous and beautiful events.
Philosophers often object that only a limited God would require
both the pleasant and the painful to accomplish holy purposes. But
this objection misses the mark for it originates in a misguided as-
sumption, namely, that happiness is a life with a greater balance of
pleasure than pain.
I agree that God created persons to be happy and to naturally
prefer pleasure to pain. But happiness abides in the process of trans-
figuration—in the process as well as in the goal achieved—which
requires both joy and sorrow. The happiness of transfiguration is

qualitatively different than the happiness captured by the con-
trasting hedonistic notions of pleasure and pain. It is a happiness
best described as peace, completion or joy, that is the rejoicing in
heaven and earth when the human heart affirms its true mission.
The peculiar mystery or paradox of Christian faith is that this peace
or joy is experienced vividly in the midst of suffering or great pain.
This paradox is repulsive to many who are raised within the
Christian tradition, especially if they also are influenced by the
culture of some Western philosophies such as utilitarianism or
pragmatism. This repulsion was recognized by the early followers of
Jesus. In 1 Corinthians 1:18-25, St. Paul instructs:
The message of the cross is complete absurdity to those who are
headed for ruin, but to those who are experiencing salvation it is the
power of God.
Scripture says, “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and thwart the
cleverness of the clever.”
Where is the wise man to be found? Where the scribe? Where is the
master of worldly argument? Has not God turned the wisdom of this
world into folly?
Since in God’s wisdom the world did not come to know him through
‘wisdom,’ it pleased God to save those who believe through the
absurdity of the preaching of the gospel.
Yes, Jews demand ‘signs’ and Greeks look for ‘wisdom,’ but we
preach Christ crucified—a stumbling block to Jews, and an absurdity
to Gentiles;
But to those who are called, Jews and Gentiles alike, Christ the
power of God and the wisdom of God. For God’s folly is wiser than
men, and his weakness more powerful than men.”
Paul acknowledges that what he is preaching is an absurdity and a

stumbling block to those who are not experiencing salvation.
The passage explicitly reveals that the world does not come to
God through wisdom as understood by the world. It is neither by
signs and augurs nor by logic and discursive argumentation that one
comes to know God. It is through believing in the absurdity of what
the gospel preaches that one comes to know God. Christ crucified is
precisely what the gospel preaches. Thus St. Paul’s preaching might
be recast as the following syllogism:
Those who are saved are those who believe through the absurdity of
the preaching of the gospel.
The absurdity of the preaching of the gospel is the preaching of
Christ crucified.
Thus, those who are saved are those who believe in the preaching of
Christ crucified.
Salvation demands belief in the crucifixion, not in the creation or

the fall.
Now some may argue that claims about creation and the fall are
part of a body of beliefs which include claims about crucifixion; and
that a necessary condition of being a Christian is acceptance of the
body of beliefs. That may well be, but I shall not argue for or against
that here. Rather, I shall focus on St. Paul’s acknowledgment that al-
though the crucifixion will be construed by some as an absurdity and
by others as a stumbling block, those who are saved will understand.
What, then, is the absurdity of the cross? It is essential to under-
standing the revelation of the cross that God did not rescue Jesus
from crucifixion. The resurrection surely reveals the power of God,
but so does the fact that Jesus suffered on the cross. Resurrection by
an omnipotent God, however, is not an absurdity. The absurdity is
the fact that Jesus had to suffer and die on the cross. The absurdity
is that he who is the Savior is one who is brought low by worldly
standards. The atonement interpretation of the crucifixion is cer-
tainly valid, and might explain why Jesus had to suffer and die on
the cross. But the crucifixion as atonement cannot exhaust its mean-
ing if we consider Mark 9:34-37:
He summoned the crowd with his disciples and said to them: If a
man wishes to come after me, he must deny his very self, take up his
cross, and follow in my steps.
Whoever would preserve his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life
for my sake and the gospel’s will preserve it.
What profit does a man show who gains the whole world and
destroys himself in the process?
What can a man offer in exchange for his life?®
The exhortation is issued not only to his disciples, but also to the
crowd with them. Thus, not only are Jesus and his disciples to ex-
perience the cross, but also every one who follows Jesus is called to
the cross. Thus, the meaning of the crucifixion is essentially linked
to experiencing salvation, and it is not exclusively dedicated to Jesus’
atonement for our sins. é
If the atonement interpretation were the whole story, and Jesus
accomplished that, then the individual assumption of the cross
would not be necessary. It is in the losing of self—the denial of self
and of the world—that the power of God is revealed and the indi-
vidual is saved. The cross represents both suffering and the denial
of self. Suffering and self denial are linked because suffering is a
response to evil. If one responds to evil as meaningless, or adopts an
attitude of hopelessness, then one renounces divine providence, and
that renunciation gives evidence to the legacy of original sin.
By denying one’s self, one acknowledges the divine hand in all
events. This is not to say that God causes or creates evil and so one
should gladly accept it. It is to say that God, rather than ourselves,
is our hope. Our reliance upon the power of God in all events, even
in the face of evil, to make all things work for good is a simultaneous
affirmation of God and the denial of self. To suffer evil, when
suffering is the experience of evil as gratuitous, is to renounce God's
power. The ultimate acceptance of God requires the ultimate denial
of self: namely, the cross. It is in this sense that suffering is essential
to salvation.
Suffering
I have stipulated that suffering is the response to evil as hopeless
or meaningless, and it is in that sense a negative experience. But in
Christian discourse suffering is the opportunity for God to be
revealed as the hope and meaning of humankind. The revelation in
suffering is our reliance upon God as the strength that allows us to
persevere in the face of evil. The affairs and states of the world are
the venue for experiencing evil, but God crafts the master. plan. It
is not necessary that specific instances of evil be instrumental in
some aspect of God’s plan. It is rather that in the face of evil we rely
upon God to be with us, assuring us that God’s love and wisdom
transcend the moments of human existence. Our response to evil
may not transform the evil into good, but our response to evil may
transform us if we encounter the power of God in solidarity with us
during that moment of our personal cross. In this sense suffering is
almost paradoxical, for it is at once the negative experience of evil
and, at the same time, the positive experience of God’s power in our
lives.
It is in the midst of desperation that humans often turn to God
for the first time. Let us shift our discourse to the positive aspect of
suffering, namely as an opportunity to acknowledge human depen-
dence upon |God and to deny the self-reliance of pride.
Suffering’ instructs and transforms for it confronts persons with
their limitations and dependencies upon God and other persons.
Many insights, for example, patience, tolerance, compassion and
mercy, are most truly revealed within the context of great personal
loss. Does this mean, then, that we should seek to suffer or cease our
efforts to decrease it? I think not. The value is not in the suffering
qua suffering but in the experience of suffering as a transforming
event. It is not good to experience pain or good to do without basic
needs; suffering is not an end to seek for its own sake. Rather, the
good which comes through suffering is the interior transformation
of the human person who suffers. We should not seek to suffer but
seek to suffer well. When suffering does present itself, we should
endeavor to experience it not at the level of bios but at the level of
zoe. The paradigmatic example of this experience is that of Christ on
the cross.
The agony in the garden reveals that Jesus did fear his suffering
but that he did not reject it. He accepted it in faith. This dual
characteristic of Jesus’ actions substantiates the claim made above
that we should not seek to suffer, and that we might even seek to
avoid it. But if our actions to eliminate or reduce suffering are not
successful, we must search for God’s revelation within that suffering,
and interpret that experience within the context of transfiguration.
A persistent objection to God’s goodness proceeds from the claim
that the value of suffering may be established if one grants that
certain lessons can be learned only by suffering. We could even
a that suffering is not a contrivance as Mill thought,’ since it is
“intrinsically impossible” that one gain these lessons or virtues
without suffering. Even so, the objection continues, God could
manage these instructions without gratuitous suffering. I believe I
have proven elsewhere’’ that it can never be shown that any instance
of suffering is gratuitous.
Briefly, the assumption that what appears to be gratuitous is in
fact gratuitous begs the question against the existence of God. It may
be that there is some non-apparent purpose to suffering, namely,
that God does exist and suffering serves God’s purposes. The most
reasonable position for both the theist and the non-theist, with
respect to gratuitous suffering, is that we simply do not know
whether any instance of suffering is gratuitous. The theist assumes
that it is not, while the non-theist assumes that it is; both sides beg
the question.
The cross illustrates that even apparently unmerited suffering, as
a specific type of gratuitous suffering, can have positive value. Many
non-theists would allow that merited suffering is consistent with the
existence of God (as understood in the Judeo-Christian tradition),
but object that it often seems that people who should not suffer do.
Is there a more striking and poignant case of unmerited suffering
than that of Jesus? The harsh injustice of Christ on the cross, the
absurdity of his punishment at the hands of human executioners
presents itself as intrinsic to his own transfiguration. It is a mystery
that we cannot comprehend but an exemplary cause which instructs
as to the transforming power of suffering."
Given that some instances of suffering are positively valuable
while others are questionable, we can return to the soul-making
thesis: the purpose of this creation is transfiguration from mere
physical or material life to moral and spiritual life. Transfiguration
requires some formation which occurs only through suffering.
Hence suffering is not incompatible with the existence of an
omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent divine being. The life
of Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ, and his death on the cross and his
resurrection, are vivid and searing demonstrations of this truth, and
continue to serve as the paradigm for our own transfigurations. The
story of his agony in facing the cross, his acceptance of the cross, his
crucifixion and resurrection, further reveal the paradoxical nature
of suffering: the genuinely negative effects of evil as the necessary
condition of our destined transfiguration.
Transfiguration: New But Old

Although the story of the transfiguration of Jesus in Mark 9:2-5,
describes a physical transformation of Jesus, it is clear that the
meaning of this physical appearance is spiritual: his physical change
is an outward manifestation of his spiritual union with God. It is
interesting to note that as Jesus, Peter, James and John descended
the mountain after the transfiguration the disciples ask Jesus, “Yet
why does Scripture say of the Son of Man that he must suffer much
and be despised?” (9:12). The connection between transfiguration
and suffering is immediate and inextricable. Though Jesus has un-
doubtedly attained zoe in the transfiguration he will not be released
from his suffering. On the contrary, the two are essentially linked.
The hedonistic objection that happiness, as a greater balance of
pleasure over pain, is the state that creatures should expect from an
omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent divine being is ob-
scene in the face of the cross. The greatest value, the summum bonum,
is the happiness which transcends the hedonistic calculus, namely
the transfiguration of human persons from bios to zoe.
The process of transformation does not alter the sinful or simply
human nature of persons. (An early heresy did claim that believers
were no longer capable of sin.) We retain our human nature which
is the condition for the possibility of sin. Faith transfigures because
it explains the purpose of human existence, and because it em-
powers human persons to attain zoe, the likeness of God.
The transformation from bios to zoe is a process which takes a
lifetime to accomplish. This is not to say that there is a determinate
space of time in which the process is complete or that every one will
accomplish the transformation in his or her lifetime. One’s entire life
is the opportunity for transformation. It is possible to interpret
every event or decision in one’s life in the context of this trans-
formation. It is true that some events lend themselves better than
others to this hermeneutic. For example, cutting the grass may not
inspire this interpretation as much as a family wedding. But cutting
the grass may indeed be an opportunity for reflection upon one’s
relationship with nature, place in the universe, and social respon-
sibilities. If human existence is intended for transfiguration, then
every human experience is a potential opportunity for interpre-
tation in the context of that truth. There are certain life experiences,
however, which affect us profoundly and irrevocably. These are the

moments that shape our lives and most demand, and paradoxically
may seem to resist, the transfiguration hermeneutic. The person
who is reborn remains a human being in the material world, thereby
affirming the fundamental existential paradox, that is, we are called
to live as moral and spiritual persons in a material and resistant
environment.
Transfiguration is a process whereby suffering may be endured
and valued even though it is not eliminated. The transfiguration
process reveals our individual relationship with God as dependent
creatures and the social nature of the self. Failure to take cognizance
of either aspect leads to the frustration which discourages faith. For
instance, if a community believes that it can accomplish the trans-
formation from bios to zoe through its own efforts, it relinquishes the
aspects of grace and intervention.” On the other hand, ignorance
of the social aspect of personhood can encourage individuals to rely
upon miraculous interventions while neglecting to accept real ma-
terial aid that is readily available through human agency. Perhaps
the failure to give one or the other of these aspects their due
explains why some persons do not experience suffering as a trans-
forming experience.
If we neglect the social revelation of suffering—that we are de-
pendent upon others and obligated by love to sustain one another
(materially and spiritually)—then it is easy for some to experience
only the negative characteristics of suffering. Or if we rigorously
meet the material aspects of a crisis and respond as a community
with great effort to remove a suffering that persists but forget that
divine wisdom prevails, then it is easy for some to experience only
the negative characteristics of suffering. In either case, the absence
of the transfiguration hermeneutic leads to individual or collective
despair. Our most serious mistake is to expect that suffering should
be removed in all cases. The cup was not taken from Christ’s lips,
and thus the transfiguration was completed.
The communal nature of the cross is witnessed in the many
exhortations of Jesus that we care for one another. Solidarity with
one another in suffering is an essential aspect of the hope to be
found in the face of evil. The hope of prayer is more often answered
in the acts of fellow persons rather than in extraordinary inter-
ventions. Persons who fail to encounter the hopeful power of God
in the midst of evil are often isolated from other persons or

abandoned by insensitive structures or institutions. The Christian
call is to shoulder the burden of the cross for others, as did Simon
the Cyrenean for Jesus. In fact, for some who are suffering the
negative effects of evil, the solidarity shown by others itself may be
the revelation of God’s power.
Conclusion
As moral and spiritual beings we are called to improve ourselves
and our material condition. We are called to alleviate the suffering
of others. This effort stems from an internal state of grace, namely,
compassion and love for and solidarity with others in the vale of
soul-making. Our continuous effort to right what is wrong exists
only by virtue of our faith in the community of persons and the
responsibilities which emerge from that reality.
Transfiguration theodicy provides the psychological benefit of
optimism, for when our efforts at righting what is wrong do fail we
can acknowledge the positive interior transforming effect of our
efforts. Though this may be weak solace for those who labor against
egregious evils, it is solace none the less. Transfiguration theodicy
informs our efforts with the positive knowledge that even if we fail
at the material level, our efforts are fruitful at the level of zoe.'”
The suffering of Christ on the cross, the laying down of his life
for us, is the paradigm of solidarity among persons. This divine and
universal act did not transform the material world at the level of bios.
It did not eliminate disease, poverty, injustice, or human nature. But
it did forever transform material reality by its revelation of God’s
presence in the midst of suffering.
Theodicy cannot hope to explain why Jesus suffered on the cross.
It can only accept the fact that God sent a son, an only son, and that
his suffering was not eliminated. Moreover, Jesus’ suffering was
essential to his transfiguration and to ours. A theodicy of any
promise must begin with this fact, for no matter how evil came to be,
God has pronounced loudly that it remains in the earthly lives of the
people of faith. A transfiguration theodicy establishes its positive
value, and thus provides a rational basis for the claim that evil is
consistent with an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent
God. The metaphor for a transfiguration theodicy is not the fall, but
the cross. My account of a transfiguration theodicy does not explain

the existence of evil, but attempts to derive meaning from its reality,
and relies ultimately upon a point of revealed theology rather than
natural theology.
NOTES
I. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1977).
2: The theory of positive value is developed in my book, The Co-Existence of
God and Evil (Peter Lang, 1991). Briefly, an event, object, or action may
retain its bad-making characteristics but have extrinsic value as a means
towards some greater good. The overall value of a thing, i.e., the judgment
that it is better that it obtain than that it not obtain, or worse that it obtain
than that it not obtain, is the weighing of its intrinsic and extrinsic good-
making and bad-making characteristics. If the vale has bad characteristics
but is necessary for soul-making, and soul-making is a good sufficient to
justify the vale, then the vale has positive, rather than negative value, even
though it retains all its bad-making characteristics.
. By non-rational agents I mean events such as earthquakes, hurricanes,
floods, etc.; or non-human beings such as members of the animal com-
munity. These remarks are intended to address the moral nature of actions
taken by irrational human persons, by angels, or by other non-human
persons whose capacity for intentionality is subject to discussion.
. John Stuart Mill, Three Essays on Religion (London: Longmans, Green and
Co., 1875), pp. 176-90, 194.
. The New American Bible (Nashville, Camden, New York: Thomas Nelson
Publishers, 1970), pp. 1228-1229.
. Ibid, p. 1094. |
. In addition to the stipulative definition I have given of suffering, it may be
helpful here to add these clarifications: suffering is the experiencing of
actions or events whose bad-making characteristics outweigh their good-
making characteristics. These actions or events may be intended or
unintended, and intentionality may be either a good- or bad-making char-
acteristic of the action or event. The suffering may appear to be unmerited
or merited, and this, too, may be a good- or a bad-making characteristic of
the action or event.
co. Mill, op. cit.
. C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1940), pp. 14-24.
. “Fallacies in the Argument from Gratuitous Suffering,” The New Scholas-
ticism, Autumn 1986, Volume LX, No. 4, pp. 485-89.
ne I do not mean that Christ is no more than exemplary cause, but that his
transfiguration functions as exemplary cause as well as revelatory and
redemptive act.
12. This is not to say that grace or divine intervention can be thwarted by the
human failure to seek them, but that over-reliance on human efforts can
lead to frustration because it ignores the action of the divine in historical
events. Cognizance of this fact is necessary for a peaceful acceptance of the
actual outcomes of one’s efforts.
13. I am grateful to Philip Quinn, University of Notre Dame, for his comment
on this point. Although his concern was that transfiguration theodicy might
lead to a pessimistic approach toward the alleviation of evil on the material
plane, I believe its result is quite the opposite.
5
The Ambiguity of the
Symbol of the Cross:
Legitimating and
Overcoming Evil
By Mary Ann Stenger
al he central Christian symbol of the cross has been given a

variety of meanings through the centuries. Some of these
meanings focus directly on the issue of evil, but the interpre-
tations can vary from overcoming evil to legitimating the endurance
of evil. This ambiguity in the symbol of the cross has been exploited
at times by dominant groups against the less powerful. I will explore
here the symbol of the cross in relationship to evil, with special
reference to violence against women and other oppressed peoples.
First, the structure of the symbol of the cross will be analyzed to
show how the diverse interpretations developed. Secondly, the use
of the cross to justify or allow violence will be explored. Finally, the
possibilities of using the symbol of the cross to help resist evil and
violence will be analyzed.
The Structure of the Symbol of the Cross

The cross was a Roman means of execution, and even before
Jesus’ death on a cross, it was used as a metaphor of suffering and
1 66 S ’ ” :
agony. The reference to “taking up one’s cross” (Matt. 10:38) in the
aes
MARY ANN STENGER 57
sayings of Jesus invokes images of self-sacrifice. In the Gospels,

taking up one’s cross signifies the ultimate demands of being a
disciple of Jesus. “And he who does not take his cross and follow me
is not worthy of me. He who finds his life will lose it, and he who
loses his life for my sake will find it” (Matthew 10:38-39).
Jesus’ death on the cross reinforces those meanings and adds
theological significance. Jesus’ self-sacrifice is connected with restor-
ing a right relationship between God and humans. Jesus is under-
stood as dying for human sins (not his own), as the ultimate sacrifice
and atonement before God. Jaroslav Pelikan argues: “The followers
of Jesus came very early to the conclusion that he had lived in order
to die, that his death was not the interruption of his life at all but its
ultimate purpose.” It is not surprising that the cross develops as the
central Christian symbol, used even by denominations that prohibit
any other symbols.
The apostle Paul develops a theology of the cross in his letters,
making the event the central event and tying its meanings to the key
ritual events in the life of a Christian—baptism and communion.
Meaning in baptism:
Do you not know that all of us who have been baptized into Christ
Jesus were baptized into his death? Therefore we have been buried
with him by baptism into death, so that, just as Christ was raised
from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we too might walk in
newness of life (Romans 6:3-4).
Meaning in communion:
The cup of blessing that we bless, is it not a sharing in the blood of

Christ? The bread that we break, is it not a sharing in the body of
Christ?” (I Corinthians 10:16).
For as often as you eat this bread and drink the cup, you proclaim
the Lord’s death until he comes” (I Corinthians 11:26).
In both baptism and communion, the Christian is sharing in the

death of Jesus: being baptized into his death, sharing in the body
and blood of Christ, and proclaiming the Lord’s death.
The death of Jesus on the cross could have brought an end to
Jesus’ religious movement. But instead it becomes the focus of
Christian faith. Of course, the interpretation of the cross cannot be
58 THE AMBIGUITY OF THE SYMBOL OF THE CROSS
separated from faith in the resurrection of Jesus. But for the

individual Christian, following Jesus is connected with taking up
one’s cross as a necessary prerequisite to participating in the resur-
rection. From Christians’ earliest theological reflections, the cross
carries the meaning of self-sacrifice. Discipleship entails sacrifice and
suffering. :
Another key interpretation given to the cross focuses on the love
of God for humans shown in God’s sacrifice of the only Son. “No
one has greater love than this, to lay down one’s life for one’s
friends” (John 15:13). Theologians argued that “nowhere else but
in Jesus and in his cross was the true nature of love visible.. . ‘True
love was self-sacrificing love, and God had demonstrated it uniquely
by giving up his own Son to the death of the cross.’
Already with Paul, a lifestyle of self-sacrifice is encouraged for
disciples. For example, he argues for not marrying as a way of
devoting oneself to religious affairs rather than family obligations (I
Corinthians 7). The Gospel of Mark shows Jesus issuing a clarion
call for disciples to sacrifice themselves: “If any want to become my
followers, let them deny themselves and take up their cross and
follow me” (8:34). The following verse suggests a connection with
martyrdom: “For those who want to save their life will lose it, and
those who lose their life for my sake, and for the sake of the gospel,
will save it” (Mark 8:35). For several centuries of the church, martyr-
dom was the primary model for taking up one’s cross, to the extent
that some people deeply desired the opportunity to become martyrs.
This desire for suffering was connected with the expectation of the
Kingdom of God; it was assumed that suffering was a sign and a
necessary precursor to the coming of the Kingdom.” Just as the cross
had to precede the resurrection, so also suffering for the sake of the
gospel, taking up one’s cross, had to precede the fulfillment of the
Kingdom.
At the same time that martyrdom was honored, others chose the
ascetic life as a way of self-denial. Eventually asceticism was struc-
tured into the monastic life, continuing specific practices of self-
denial and associating them with taking up one’s cross. St. Francis
of Assisi is the preeminent example, not only focussing his devotions
on Jesus Christ crucified but also receiving the stigmata, the marks
of the cross, upon his own body.
Twentieth-century theologian Paul Tillich interprets the symbol
MARY ANN STENGER 59
of the cross as Jesus sacrificing himself as Jesus to be the Christ, to

be transparent to God.
Jesus of Nazareth is the medium of the final revelation because he
sacrifices himself completely to Jesus as the Christ. He not only
sacrifices his life, as many martyrs and many ordinary people have
done, but he also sacrifices everything in him and of him which
could bring people to him as an “overwhelming personality” instead
of bringing them to that in him which is greater than he and they.”
Jesus dies to himself, sacrificing his finite human characteristics

(gender, religion, historical period, etc.). Jesus is not to be treated
as a divine hero or as an idol. Jesus’ sacrifice on the cross is the basis
of a central theme for Tillich, the Protestant principle which guards
against idolatry. This principle allows for ultimate truth to be ex-
pressed in finite forms and symbols but also states that no truth of
faith is ultimate except the truth which says that no human possesses
that truth.’ In other words, truth is expressed through forms and
symbols which sacrifice their own ultimacy in order to show
ultimacy, with the primary example as the cross of the Christ.
The theme of sacrifice as a central meaning of the cross pervades
Christian theology from its earliest days to the present. Its practical
implications call for self-sacrifice for disciples of Jesus as the Christ.
The two main sacraments of baptism and communion remind
people of Jesus’ sacrifice on the cross and invite people to share in
that sacrifice. Sacrifice is central in many religious traditions because
it is associated with effecting a better religious relationship. Whether
presenting specific offerings or altering one’s lifestyle to be more
ascetic (even for a period of time), sacrifice serves the purpose of
improving the connection between humans and the ultimate, divine
power. Within Christianity, the cross carries the meaning of libera-
tion and salvation along with the theme of sacrifice.
Paul’s theology of the cross emphasizes the liberation brought
about through Jesus’ death, focussing on freedom from sin and
freedom from death.
Freedom from sin:
While we were still weak, at the right time Christ died for the
ungodly. . . But God proves his love for us in that while we still were
sinners Christ died for us. Much more surely then, now that we have
been justified by his blood, will we be saved through him from the
wrath of God. For if while we were enemies, we were reconciled to
God by the death of his Son, much more surely, having been
reconciled, will we be saved by his life (Romans 5:6, 8-10).
Freedom from death:
. One man’s act of righteousness leads to justification and life for

all. . . Just as sin exercised dominion in death, so grace might also
exercise dominion through justification leading to eternal life
through Jesus Christ our Lord (Romans 5:18b, 20b-21).
The cross, then, is not only a symbol of sacrifice but also a symbol of
salvation. It is seen as the event which restores a right relationship
between humans and God, thereby freeing humans from the debt
of sin and from the punishment for sin which is death.
The liberation from sin and death wrought by Jesus on the cross
provided freedom from the detailed requirements of Jewish law.
Paul uses the imagery of the cross to defend his authority when he
argues that observance of Jewish law is not necessary, arguing that
he has died to himself and that Christ lives in him (Galatians 2:20).
For Paul, the sacrifice on the cross brings liberation.
The connection of the cross with freedom from evil and death
can be seen in the early church practice of marking oneself, other
people, or objects with the sign of the cross. Although making the
sign of the cross is not mentioned in the New Testament, it is spoken
of early in Christian history as being used to ward off evil powers.
For early Christians, the cross showed God’s power, connecting it
with the understanding that the power of evil had been broken
through the death of Jesus, the Son of God.”
In Cur Deus Homo? (1097 C.E.) Anselm of Canterbury attempts to
prove rationally what Paul had stated in I Corinthians, that what
would appear in human wisdom as folly is the wisdom of God."
Anselm concentrated on the interpretation of the crucifixion as
satisfying the debt that human sinners owed to God. Sinners could
not pay the debt, but the innocent, divine one, Jesus the Son of God,
could offer himself as payment for others. Anselm tries to show that
there is an underlying rationality to the incarnation and the cross.
Paul Tillich’s use of the cross also carries with it the underlying
theme of liberation. The paradox and sacrifice of the cross is seen as
MARY ANN STENGER 61
a guard against idolatry and injustice. Tillich recognizes that when

something or someone is absolutized, treated as an idol, the result
is injustice for others. One person or one group claims ultimate
power, implying the inferiority of those under that power. Tillich
speaks of justice as.a “criterion which judges idolatrous holiness.”””
The sacrifice on the cross avoids such idolatrous holiness. As its
structure becomes a criterion against idolatry, the cross can be seen
also as a criterion against injustice. Critiques of unjust laws or sys-
tems can be seen as efforts to liberate them from idolatrous iden-
tification with the divine or ultimate. Tillich’s Protestant principle is
rooted in the cross, working against absolutization of the finite and
against the injustice which results from such absolutization.
The cross, then, symbolizes the liberation from sin and death
made possible through Jesus’ sacrifice. Jesus’ death on the cross
made it possible for people to be brought into a right relationship
with God, a reconciliation no longer broken by sin. Tillich expands
this meaning in arguing that Jesus’s death on the cross symbolizes
freedom from idolatry and its resulting injustice.
Just as there is paradox in Jesus as the divine incarnation, so also
there is paradox in the symbolic meanings of the cross. The cross
carries two meanings: self-sacrifice and overcoming of sin and death.
Discipleship may entail sacrifice and suffering, but being a disciple
of Jesus Christ will free one from the powers of sin and death.
Extending that to the social world, the cross can be a symbol of
liberation from injustice.
Use of the Cross to Legitimate Violence

The cross as a symbol of self-sacrifice and sharing in the suffering
of Jesus can be a positive symbol for those who choose to undertake
a more disciplined or ascetic lifestyle. Countless numbers of Chris-
tians through the centuries have made that choice and have found
meaning in their self-sacrifice through the cross of Jesus. But a key
word here is choice. If people freely choose to inflict suffering on
themselves because of the higher meanings that it brings, most would
accept such practice (as long as the inflictions are not too severe, a
standard which changes through cultures and time periods).
However, there are those whose sufferings and self-sacrifice is not
chosen and where the infliction is done by others: abuse of women
and violence against African-Americans. The cross has sometimes

been used to encourage victims to accept and endure their pain and
suffering. The practical effect of such legitimation is to keep the vic-
tims as victims and to turn the cross into a symbol of oppression.
Within Christianity, women have been connected with evil
through the role of Eve in the story of the fall and for most of
Christian history have been considered inferior and subordinate to
men. But Christianity also posited a spiritual equality of men and
women (Galatians 3:28) and called on Christian men to love their
wives and never treat them harshly (Colossians 3:19). Yet feminist
critiques of Christianity have pointed out numerous examples of
Christian legitimation of violence against women, ranging from the
witch hunts of the past to present day spouse abuse.
The cross is a symbol in the church’s persecution of witches, not
as a symbol of self-sacrifice but as a symbol of the power of the
church over against the feared power of witches. One of the
methods that can be used to protect places, people or animals
against the power of witches is to write in four places in the form of
a cross the words that were posted on top of Jesus’ cross: “Jesus
Nazarenus Rex Iudaeorum.”"* The meaning of the cross underlying
such actions is that of freedom from sin, extended here to freedom
from the power of devils and witches. But since the majority of
prosecuted witches were women, the cross also served as a
legitimation of the violence of those prosecutions.
Feminist philosopher Mary Daly outlined the relationship
between the image of Jesus as a sacrificial victim on the cross and the
sacrifice imposed on women and other minority groups. She names
this relationship the scapegoat syndrome.’ She argues that people
are unable to imitate Jesus as the sacrificial victim and end up trans-
ferring their own guilt to another. In Paul’s theology that other to
whom the guilt is transferred is Jesus. But Daly argues that in fact
people transfer their guilt to others, that is, others are forced to be
the sacrificial victims.'* Others are blamed, and punishment for
one’s own guilt is inflicted on others. Instead of Jesus as the only
sacrificial victim who takes away all guilt through the cross, others
become the scapegoats and the new victims.
In Gyn/Ecology Daly extends this connection between Jesus’ sacri-
fice on the cross and the abuse of women, arguing that the glorifica-
tion of suffering on the cross has been extended into a secular
MARY ANN STENGER 63
sadomasochistic claim that female suffering is joy.’ Daly’s examples

include Hannah Tillich’s description of her theologian husband Paul
watching a pornographic film depicting females hanging on crosses
and covers of rock albums with *pictures of women chained, women
hanged, women gang-raped.”"” Daly is not arguing that Christianity
is responsible for sadomasochism but rather that “Christianity, with
its torture cross symbolism, has been one expression of this basic
pattern.’ ay
Psychologist of religion, William Beers, explores the connection
between the cross of Christ, sacrifice and women, noting that
Tertullian blamed women for bringing death into the world, includ-
ing the death of the Son of God. Beers argues, “The execution of
Jesus ofNazareth was rationalized into a myth in which women were
to blame.”’” Beers analyzes religious rituals of sacrifice, including the
Christian Eucharist rather than the abusive sacrifices imposed on
women which Daly describes. But he does argue for psychological
interpretation of the Eucharist in which the body and blood of
Christ replaces the nurturing body of the mother, part of a more
extensive process of diminishing the theological significance of
women.” The sacrifice of Jesus on the cross symbolized in the
breaking of the bread and pouring of the wine is connected subtly
to the sacrifice of women, their loss of central religious meanings
and roles.
Harder to document but relevant to the discussion here is a
related use of the cross to legitimate women’s sacrifice as victims of
abuse or even rape. How many priests and ministers told female vic-
tims that the violence was their cross to bear, invoking the bearing
of the cross as the necessary means to true Christian discipleship?
Although such advice may have been intended as consolation and
support for victims, it carried the not so subtle legitimation of
violence against women. Over against Jesus’ agony on the cross, how
could a woman complain? How could a woman ask that her cross be
removed since that cross might be her very means of showing her
true discipleship for Jesus? Enduring her plight passively and quiet-
ly, as Jesus endured the cross, was her lot and destiny. Sometimes
the overlay of the sacrality of marriage and the submissiveness of
wife to husband added to this legitimation. But the ‘cross, added to
the other legitimations, turned its meaning into domination by other
powers rather than liberation from those powers.
Although most Christian groups today would abhor racial vio-

lence directed toward African-Americans, they cannot ignore the
past history of slavery and white supremacist groups in the United
States. Christian theology was used (and still is by some groups) to
support racist attitudes and actions. We will look briefly at the
treatment of slavery within the New Testament and then consider
the role of the cross in legitimations of racism.
Slavery was an accepted institution within the Roman Empire at
the time when Christianity began as an organized religion. Socio-
logical studies of early Christianity show that slaves were among the
large numbers of dispossessed who joined the Christian movement. 7
Several early Christian texts do not attack the social institution of
slavery but rather exhort the slaveholders to treat their slaves justly
and fairly (Colossians 4:1). Paul’s letter to Philemon hopes for
positive treatment when Philemon’s slave Onesimus is returned, but
it does not call for freeing him. Yet Paul’s letters also contain this
famous verse, thought to have been a baptismal formula: “There is
neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is
neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus”
(Galatians 3:28). Paul goes on to use slavery as a metaphor for
bondage to the law, contrasted with freedom through faith in Christ.
Within the faith community, the social status of slave was rejected,
but that did not carry over to rejection of slavery as a social
institution within the Roman Empire.
The American form of slavery, rooted in racism, is particularly
repugnant to our modern sensibilities. But in exploring the evil of
slavery, one cannot ignore the fact that the slaveholders saw them-
selves as Christian and even legitimated their position as a means to
bring slaves to Christianity. Many slaves responded and were
allowed their own separate churches. Separate denominations or
separate churches for African-Americans developed rather than the
churches living out the baptismal formula of oneness in Christ Jesus.
The end of slavery as a legal institution in the United States did
not end segregation within Christianity or among Christians who
believed their racism against African-Americans was supported by
God. Nor did the civil rights movement and civil rights laws in the
1960’s and 1970’s end it. A personally memorable and chilling
moment from a national meeting of Christian youth in 1964 is rele-
vant here. The meeting was racially integrated, but some white
MARY ANN STENGER 65
southern participants raised the Confederate flag, spoke out for

white supremacy, and then announced that if they were wrong,
through Christ God would forgive them in the end anyway. The
doctrine of atonement, rooted in the cross, took a diabolical turn
here.
This climate of assumed Christian support for racism was
countered by the active involvement of many white Christians in the
marches against segregation and in efforts to integrate Christian
denominations and churches. Equality in Christ became the ideal
under which denominations once separated over race now unified.
For many, their Christian faith was the basis of their struggle for
civil rights throughout their communities.
But others continued to believe in the superiority of whites and
the inferiority of blacks and saw their beliefs as fitting with
Christianity. The Ku Klux Klan, a white supremacist organization
still active today, makes references to Christianity in its literature
and uses a burning cross as a sign of their responsibility for specific
acts of violence against African-Americans. A burning cross
represents hatred and arejection of the humanity and rights of
African-Americans. The Klan’s choice of the cross as their symbol
shows their connection of Christianity with racism and violence.
Womanist theologian Delores Williams analyzes the situation of
black women who were used as surrogate mothers, expected to love
other people’s children more than themselves and to bear pain and
hardship. She asks whether the atonement model that treats Jesus
as the surrogate for the sins of humanity can serve as a liberating
model to black women.” “If black women accept this image of
redemption, can they not also passively accept the exploitation
surrogacy brings? . . Can there be salvific power in Christian images
of oppression (for example, Jesus on the cross) meant to teach
something about redemption?” These questions point to the
negative side of the symbol of the cross. As a central symbol which
elevates suffering and sacrifice as divine, it can and has been used to
legitimate others’ self-sacrifice. But the cross also carries the
meaning of liberation.
Use of the Cross to Resist Violence

and to Liberate from Violence
The above discussions of the cross in connection with violence

against women and violence against African-Americans show that
some have used the cross to legitimate their,domination over others
and the accompanying evil acts against those others. But it is
intriguing to recognize that this has not resulted in a full-scale
rejection of the cross as a symbol to victims. Rather, Jesus’ suffering
on the cross often resonates with the oppressed who feel that Jesus
understands and knows their suffering. And the cross often works
as a symbol of liberation from oppression and violence.
Theologian Susan Thistlethwaite gives several examples of
abused women or minority women who have experienced the
symbol of the cross as Jesus empathizing with their suffering. As a
woman who had been raped “lay on the heap of trash, injured and
bleeding and wondering whether she was about to be killed, she had
a vision of Jesus as a crucified woman who said to her from the
cross, ‘You don’t have to be ashamed, I know what you are
suffering.” Thistlethwaite describes women who find healing in
statues of Christa, female figures in the form of a crucifix. “Christa
is not experienced by many women as legitimating violence against
them but as identifying with their pain and freeing them from the
guilt that somehow, because of the original sin of being female, they
deserved what they got.” Although these cases show the figure on
the cross as a female rather than Jesus, the image of the suffering on
the cross as redemptive has carried over to the Christa figures.
Themes from African-American spirituals also suggest that the
cross provideda liberating image to the oppressed. “Nobody knows
the trouble I’ve seen; nobody knows but Jesus” suggests that only
the suffering Jesus could identify with the pain and suffering of the
oppressed black, whether during or after slavery. Most of the verses
of “Were you there when they crucified my Lord?” focus on the
agony and suffering of Jesus rather than the resurrection. A
glorified image would offer little basis for identification with the
oppressed, but the cross symbolizes that identification and shared
experience of suffering.
Theologian Deotis Roberts notes that the privileged are more apt
to identify with a regal or otherworldly model of Christ while the
MARY ANN STENGER 67
oppressed and persecuted see Christ as a liberator. He argues that

that is why the cross is central in Minjung (Korean liberation) and
black theologies. “But the cross is not a symbol of escape; rather it
is a symbol of engagement with evil and suffering. Christ’s victorious
resurrection Is seen in relation to the cross as its sequel and ultimate
vindication.””” The cross does not stand alone but as the precursor
to the resurrection; but perhaps, it is more significant that the resur-
rection does not stand alone but receives its full meaning as victory
over the evil and suffering shown in Jesus’ death on the cross.
Delores Williams emphasizes Jesus’ life of right relationships with
the oppressed and his resurrection as the symbols of redemption
more than the cross. But she recognizes that the cross is important
as a reminder of collective destruction of people and movements
working for equality and transformations of the status quo.” She
argues that Jesus came for life, but she knows that black women
cannot forget the cross. The cross show God’s identification with the
oppressed, but it should not be glorified.
The cross of Christ as a liberating image, then, comes not in a
narrow focus on the cross alone but in its connection with the
resurrection. On the one hand, resurrection without the cross is not
a liberating image for the oppressed. The power of the resurrection
is in its vindication of the powerless, the symbol of life, not just over
death, but of life for the victim, the one who has suffered violence at
the hands of others. Thus, in spite of the use of the cross to
legitimate that very violence, the power of the symbol of the cross in
conjunction with the resurrection remains strong as an image of
liberation from violence.
Conclusion
The ambiguity of the cross shows how the same religious symbol
can be used as part of religious legitimations of violence and evil and
as an image of liberation from violence and evil. We humans find
meaning in religious symbols, but we are capable of manipulating
our interpretations to fit our own needs and purposes. Evil and
violence are not inherent in religion, but the power of religion as a
legitimator of evil and violence throughout history cannot be ig-
nored. People have recognized that religious legitimation connects
ordinary human action and ideas to the unchanging, transcendent
power of the sacred or God. That connection of the infinite to the

finite is inherent in religion, but the abuse of that connection is not.
The process of making religious legitimations can involve turning
the finite human event, person, ideas, or movement into an idol, an
absolutization of the finite. Such idolatry generally entails domina-
tion of one group over another, acted out in the injustice of evil and
violence against the other.
Paul Tillich’s use of the cross as a criterion against such idolatry
builds upon the ambiguity in the symbol or more accurately, the
paradox in the symbol of the cross. Idolatry and its accompanying
injustice can be guarded against by working to maintain the under-
lying paradox in religion, that religious symbols and actions can
express ultimacy but are not themselves ultimate. We always need
to be on guard against absolutizing our finite actions and ideas. The
sacrifice on the cross can symbolize the rejection of such absolu-
tization. Religious leaders and theologians need to make people
aware of the danger in religious legitimations and to encourage
them to challenge such abuses of religion.
NOTES
1. Benedict T. Viviano, O.P., “The Gospel According to Matthew,” The New
Jerome Biblical Commentary (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990), p.
660.
2. Jaroslav Pelikan, Jesus Through the Centuries: His Place in the History of Culture
(New York: Harper and Row, 1985), p. 95.
3. All biblical reference are from The Holy Bible, New Revised Standard
Version (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
4. Pelikan, op. cit., p. 106.
5. See Howard Clark Kee, Jesus in History: An Approach to the Study of the Gospels
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1970), p. 92 for a discussion
of this point in the gospels.
6. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago,
1951), p. 136.
. Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 98.
. Pelikan, op. cit., p. 96.
cow!
9. Ibid., p. 98. “The cross was believed to possess all of this victorious power
because it had been the instrument for the greatest victory of them all, the
cosmic victory of the power of God over the power of the devil in the death
and resurrection of Jesus” (pp. 99-100).
10. I Corinthians 1:22-24: “For Jews demand signs and Greeks seek wisdom,
MARY ANN STENGER 69
but we preach Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and folly to

Gentiles, but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the
power of God and the wisdom of God.” Also see Pelikan, pp. 106ff.
ut. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 216.
F2 Heinrich Kramer and James Sprenger, The Malleus Maleficarum, trans. by
Montague Summers (New York: Dover Publications, 1971), p. 92.
IS: Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women’s Liberation
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), p. 75.
14, Ibid., p. 76.
15. Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1978), pp. 93-94.
16. Ibid., p. 94.
res Ibid., p. 96.
18. William Beers, Women and Sacrifice: Male Narcissism and the Psychology of
Religion (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1992), p. 172.
19. Ibid., pp. 172, 176, 178-179.
20. See John Gager, Kingdom and Community: The Social World of Early
Christianity (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975),
chapter 4.
Zi Delores Williams, “Black Women’s Surrogacy Experience and the Christian
Notion of Redemption,” in After Patriarchy: Feminist Transformations of the
World Religions, ed. Paula Cooey, William Eakin, and Jay McDaniel
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991), pp. 8-9.
22: Ibid., p. 9.
233 Susan Thistlethwaite, Sex, Race, and God: Christian Feminism in Black and
White (New York: Crossroad, 1991), p. 93.
24. Ibid.
25: Deotis Roberts, Black Theology in Dialogue (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster,
1987), p. 109.
26. Delores Williams, op. cit., p. 12.
6
The Problem of Evil:
An Islamic Approach
By Muhammad Al-Ghazali
slam, which literally means submission, may be defined as

| voluntary subordination of human discretion to the will of God.
The divine will is embodied in the decrees of God articulated
in his revelation (Qur'an) and interpreted by his last Prophet,
Muhammad, (peace be upon him) through oral explanation and
practical example (Sunnah). Approval or disapproval of Islam is
accorded by the criteria of the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Since the
scope of explicit verdicts provided in these twin sources of guidance
is limited, there remains a wide area for human reason to
pronounce its judgment concerning such matters on which these
sources are silent. Such judgment must not violate the doctrinal
framework laid down in the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
Islam, according to the injunctions of God and instructions of his
Prophet (peace be upon him), is a commitment of the mind and
heart that is compatible with human nature.’ Islam, therefore, takes
a realistic and friendly attitude to human nature. It does not oblige its
adherents to follow a course of action decidedly incongruent with
the innate urges of human nature. These natural urges are identifi-
able in their universal manifestation in spite of all diversities of creed
and culture, genealogy and geography, socio-economics or history.
The Qur'an points to an innate duality within the human person.
This duality invests an individual with a simultaneous capacity for
Oe
MUHAMMAD AL-GHAZALI ut
good and evil. Where the Qur’an mentions the divine act of creation
in which God inaugurated human life in history, it also speaks of
God breathing into a human being the divine spirit together with
the earthliness of humanity.” This duality represents unlimited
opportunities to relate to matter, mind and spirit, all granted by
God to humanity. One is not, therefore, expected to dedicate
himself/herself exclusively to spiritual endeavors at the detriment of
an individual’s instinctive needs and aesthetic aspirations. Such a
person is not only authorized, but asked to satisfy legitimate physical
desires provided one does not lose balance in this process. Thus in
the very creation of human beings, God intended to combine the
possibility of evil with the prospects of good.
God created humanity in the best fashion.” God placed the
human person at the center of this cosmic order as his Khalifah,
vicegerent. This lofty locus of vicegerency implies that a person is
entitled to enjoy the treasures of this earth subject to the observance
of the terms and conditions of the office of vicegerency. It further
requires that one is granted freedom to accept or reject the terms of
this august office. Such freedom demands that evil opportunities
should always remain available along with the promise of good.
Hence, Islam does not contemplate a human condition in which evil
tendencies might be totally eliminated. For this would mean utter
disregard of human nature and distortion of its temperament. That
was why the angels who had been created with an exclusive capacity
for good, expressed bewilderment over the possibilities of evil being
placed at the disposal of humanity and rightly predicted that human
beings would fill the earth with mischief and bloodshed.”
The significant point to note here is that when a creature with
both options pursues the path of good and shuns the avenues of evil
by one’s own choice, such a person surpasses all angelic levels of
spirituality. The entire potential of human personality in all its
diversity is thus realizable through this essential duality. For
example, if there is no instinct for self-preservation or the fear of
death, there can be no bravery. If there is no greed, there is no
meaning of generosity. If there is no hunger, there is no use to fast.
If there is no lust, there would be no concept of chastity. Therefore,
in the Islamic view of things, duality is naturally ingrained in the
very constitution of human beings and should be preserved at all
times. The Qur'an or the Sunnah do not envisage any human
72 THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: AN ISLAMIC APPROACH
existential condition free from all elements of evil. For the very
realization of good is contingent upon the possibility of its opposite.
The definition of good involves positing the self-conscious human
subject at the center of this bipolarity.
At the same time the human person has been granted the higher
faculty of judgment whereby one is able to discriminate between
good and evil. This ability to distinguish good from evil is innate in
a person’s natural constitution. Their understanding of good and
evil and their mutual distinction is primarily derived from intuition.
It is further reinforced and elaborated by divine guidance com-
municated to an individual through the Prophet (peace be upon
him) and concretized in his ideal example. That is why the essential
values of good, for example, truth, mercy, generosity, justice and
gratefulness and their opposite evils, namely falsehood, cruelty,
miserliness, ungratefulness and oppression are universally recog-
nized for what they are by all. Thus a person enjoys immense
prospects of spiritual and moral elevation by realizing one’s vast
potential for good. At the same time, one has the option to gravitate
entirely to a baser level of behavior if one chooses to pursue the path
of evil. The challenge, which is quite formidable but at the same
time highly rewarding in terms of unlimited spiritual ascension and
perfect bliss, is that humanity is required to maintain an equilibrium
between the two urges. These urges are apparently opposite but
essentially compatible. They: are harmonious in the state of inner
balance but incongruent in a condition of disequilibrium. The
human person is required to be neither exclusively devoted to spiri-
tuality nor wholly dedicated to animality. One is asked to embrace
both and to shun neither. Therein lies the greatness of humanity. It
is a divine mercy that the realization of human greatness was made
possible through prescribing a course of action fully compatible with
human nature.
It is to be noted that unlike all other animals, a human being
remains dissatisfied despite the fullest satisfaction of one’s beastly
desires. One aspires toward constant improvement and refinement
in the quality of life. A person may undertake unlimited intellectual
endeavors to inquire, explain and innovate, and a large number of
people may benefit from the fruits of such intellectual and artistic
achievements. If human beings were selfish in a total sense, there
would have been no progress possible in human culture and
MUHAMMAD AL-GHAZALI 73
civilization. All developments of the past in the spheres of culture

and civilization afford ample evidence of this innate altruism of
humankind.
Islam did not leave the task of forging this formidable balance
between the higher and lower planes of personality to the whims
and vagaries of individuals. On the contrary, the prophets who have
been commissioned by God to preach Islam to humanity from the
genesis of humankind to the advent of the Prophet Muhammad
(peace be upon him) have exemplified in their own patterns of liv-
ing, the manners and modes of effecting this balance. These dis-
tinguished figures of wisdom, knowledge and piety also initiated
vigorous collective campaigns for promoting good and suppressing
evil at the level of society. They presented in their examples, a
pattern for balanced behavior in the individual and collective
dimensions of life. It is this balance effected in the inner self under
the guidance of prophetic example which alone is capable of
providing total fulfillment to human beings. One develops a natural
love for good and a personal abhorrence for evil. One is filled with
happiness by performing virtue and with remorse and repentance
when evil is committed. This identification of one’s will with God’s
will constitutes the essence of piety. But the criteria for distinguish-
ing between good and evil deeds is not their outer objective
manifestation but their inner subjective motivation which is fully
known to God. Thus God judges humans by their intentions and not
by the results of their efforts. This realistic aspect of Islam demon-
strates the mercy and compassion of God to creatures in that God
has charged them with obligations commensurate with their
capacity.”
Thus the great task for humankind under the Islamic agenda of
life is to constantly engage in reforming intentions and purifying
them of malice, avarice, and all vicious wishes. For this is surely
within the capacity of each human being. The rest is forgivable be-
cause God is all merciful and compassion overtakes God’s wrath and
envelops all things in existence.’
In the worldview of Islam, the human person is the goal of this
world and not vice versa. The material world is placed at the service
of humanity. Each person has been urged to serve God so as to
attain lasting bliss in the life of the hereafter.” For the immediate
world of matter, despite its charms and pleasures, is not worth one’s
while. In this worldview, life presents itself as a great challenge.

Either one should enthrone one’s higher self within the inner
kingdom of the body, mind, heart and spirit or establish in it the
supreme rule of the lower self. If a person sincerely pursues the
former path, such a one will be rewarded with inner peace and
tranquility here and with lasting bliss hereafter. If one willfully
follows the latter way, such a person might attain some timely
pleasure by an exhaustive satisfaction of baser desires but will surely
be deprived of inner peace and felicity here as well as of salvation
and success hereafter.
The main emphasis of the teachings of Islam is, therefore, a
constant concern and endless effort to purify the intentions of the
inner self. This, according to the Quran, constitutes one of the
cardinal functions of the Prophet (peace be upon him). Such inner
purification of the self is a fundamental objective because in Islam,
the root of all evil is the inner human intention.” Without contin-
uous vigilance over the evil tendencies of the self and an earnest
endeavor to reform and rectify its immoral ambitions, the problem
of evil cannot be redressed. Unless serious effort is made at various
levels and from different directions to check evil at its birth place,
namely, the human psyche, no external influence can be of much
avail. Use of coercion might yield some results in the form of
superficial drills of morality, but mere force can neither reform the
inner self nor motivate it to good instead of evil intentions.
Evil rampant in the world is begotten from a perversion of
human emotion, intuition and intellection leading to a corruption
of intentions. This perversion also diminishes one’s ability to per-
ceive truth because persistent pursuit of evil weakens the human
psyche. A sick psyche cannot distinguish truth from falsehood. As
the tongue tastes sweet as bitter in certain feverish conditions, so the
sick soul often fails to discern right from wrong. This inner per-
version gradually develops into an apotheosis of the ego. This
apotheosis is not made by any oral testimony or overt proclamation.
It is perpetrated by the inner attitude of an unbalanced and
exclusive pursuit of a selfish purpose in disregard of all norms and
canons of higher morality.
The ultimate purpose to which Islam aims is not, however,
confined to the personal well-being and inner peace of individuals
through effecting a balance between their bodies and souls. This
focus on individual purity and personal piety is no doubt a basic

concern of Islam. But its ultimate objective lies in the realization of
adl, justice at all levels of human endeavor and social concourse.”
Justice as Islam views it, is not something apart or independent
from the balance and harmony that we have thus far elaborated. For
the very quintessence of justice is harmony and balance. If harmony
is achieved in the psychic interiors and mindsets of individuals, it
should ipso facto lead to an outer balance between our attitude to a
variety of entities. From the Islamic point of view, justice effects an
equilibrium between a diversity of obligations. The general defi-
nition of adl (Islamic term for justice literally meaning balance) is:
placing something in its proper stead, and its opposite zulm would
be defined as placing something in an improper or wrong place
where it does not belong. Thus individuals who are charged with a
definite set of obligations are required by the dictates of the supreme
value of justice to perform their duties toward all entities without
disturbing the necessary balance. This provides us with a universal
meaning of justice: balance within and balance without. By the same
token the antithesis of justice also becomes easily definable with
universal significance.
If a human being invested with tremendous inner potential for
intellectual ingenuity and moral excellence, animal gratification and
spiritual upliftment, emotional contentment and chaos, peace of
heart and anarchy of mind, succeeds in striking a balance and har-
mony between these internal forces, then that individual is bound to
make substantive contributions to the outward and popular
ascendancy of justice. Thus the inner duality between animality and
spirituality within the human person manifests itself at all levels of
the human situation. It has been the primordial challenge to
actualize one’s natural inner harmony in order to realize justice at
all subsequent levels of relationships with fellow beings as well as
with other creatures of God.
Moreover, the above definition of justice affords a comprehensive
and total approach to the problem of good and evil in all conditions
of human existence. With this definition in view we may contend
that maintaining a balanced position vis-a-vis all the gravitational
pulls that characterize human reality constitutes good. And losing
this balance is evil. This conception of good and evil is valid in all
space-time conditions. Furthermore, the idea of balance as the
mainstay of all forms of justice and disequilibrium as the crux of all

mischief and miscarriages of justice extends beyond the human
sphere to the realm of the natural environment as well.
The whole pathogenesis of humankind is ultimately traceable to
a loss of balance between various demands of the body and soul. Any
slight or serious disorder in human physiology or psychic normalcy
is to be explained in terms of some excesses or omissions either in
nutrition, habit or exposure to nature or interaction with fellow
beings. In other words, all ailments of the body or maladies of the
soul result from some misappropriation of their properties.
More significantly, such a comprehensive concept of justice as an
all-pervading value can give proper orientation to one’s relation-
ships with nature. Any excess or omission in a person’s exploitation
of the treasures of nature results in the loss of balance and harmony
in their mutual relationship. This brings home the point that any
infringement or offense against the legitimate rights of others
whether humans, animals, members of the vegetable kingdom or
other entities of the natural world, is bound to bring evil conse-
quences for the imminent or ultimate well-being and survival of the
perpetrators themselves. Is this not also fully testified by the
incontrovertible empirical evidence of science?
To maintain harmony and balance in order to afford to all what
is legitimately their due assumes a greater significance to the human
social enterprise. This is so precisely because all evil known in
human history has arisen from humankind’s malice and ill will
against and among each other. This cardinal sin is a result of a
person’s willful loss of the necessary balance between animality and
spirituality. One becomes egocentric when animal desires dominate
the entire self and thus overpower the personality. When a human
being earnestly undertakes the effort to maintain the required
balance within one’s personal inner kingdom, such an individual is
able to overcome greed, grudge, malice and jealousy by a systematic
training of the self. Such a person no longer regards oneself to be
the sole master of one’s destiny and the molder of one’s inner and
outer world. This individual accepts the role as a trustee of life and
nature. In accepting one’s obligations to others, an individual
engages in an endless sincere effort to pursue the benefit, happiness
and welfare of others. This altruism need not be pursued at the cost
of one’s own vital interests; for throughout balance should not be
lost. A human being should neither be totally slanted towards

selfishness nor entirely tilted to selflessness.
This requires that a person acknowledges the rights of all those
humans with whom interaction might take place in existential life.
One is urged i in the first a to faithfully observe obligations to
parents. The obligation to one’s parents is so fundamental in Islam
that it comes only next to monotheism in the Qur’anic description of
the priorities of human moral conduct. This stress on the obligation
to parents implies that one is not authorized to cultivate the same
amount and intensity of love for others. This would be at the
expense of the natural balance in human relations. Similarly the love
and affection due to one’s real brothers and sisters should not be
showered upon others at the cost of one’s brothers and sisters. So
also the status of mother supersedes all other human relations. A
person is required to accord one’s kindest treatment to one’s
mother. Also the intimate love, sincerity and close companionship
due to one’s spouse is not due to anyone else. Otherwise one would
lose the essential balance of human relations and life would be
deprived of harmony and peace. Moreover, the society at large
would run the risk of facing such horrible consequences as it has so
far suffered in the form of rising divorce, broken hearts and homes,
matrimonial infidelity, incest and desecration of all human bonds.
The latest example of this desecration is the judgment of American
courts under which children have been allowed to divorce, so to
speak, their parents. With this judgment, the sanctity of the parental
bond has been reduced to mere contractual reciprocity. Similarly the
love of one’s children, so strongly rooted in humanity’s natural
disposition, should not be withheld from or offered to others rather
than to one’s own offspring. Disturbance of this balance results in
irreparable psychic abnormalities, damaging the inner health and
harmony of life. Such deviations from the natural course of life
invariably threatens human peace and tranquility in serious
proportions.
Any disturbance in the natural balance of human relations
tarnishes the temperament of humanity and as a result deprives it
of its inherent harmony and health. Eventually this disequilibrium
sows the early seeds of zulm (improper balance), the antithesis of adl
(proper balance), by dislodging the near and dear ones from their
rightful place in the human heart. This brings a rupture to the
composure and serenity in the interior of the human personality.

Moreover, misappropriation of one’s love and affection at the level
of the individual disturbs the overall integrity and solidarity of the
social situation. It engenders self-interest rather than the selfless
building of sincerity and altruism.
If the whole spiritual texture and moral fiber of society rests
ultimately on the primacy of justice as a norm of human conduct,
then the task of defining the meaning of justice cannot be left to the
whims of individuals. The centrality of justice as the main anchor of
human integrity, on the contrary, calls for a permanent set of norms
that must be universally acknowledged. These norms must be based
on immutable connotations of right and wrong. Hence, good and
evil cannot be defined by the arbitration of human desire nor
allowed to be defied by the selfish utilitarian caprice of individuals.
Rather, right and wrong, good and evil, virtue and vice ought to be
permanently settled by express divine decrees articulated through
the mediation of prophets and concretized in history by their
exemplary models.
Moreover, from the Islamic point of view, moral duties are classi-
fied into two broad categories: obligations to God and obligations to
humanity. Obligations to humanity precede one’s obligations to God
according to the consensus of Muslim scholars. This order of prece-
dence is justified by the fact that God is all merciful and compas-
sionate. But humankind by nature is tempered with reciprocity. A
human being is authorized to retaliate if wronged by others, but at
the same time strongly urged to forgive. When one finds both
options open but adopts the way of clemency and compassion, such
a person indeed achieves a great moral victory. If you have no
option but to forgive, there is no virtue in forgiveness.
In the sphere of human obligations to God, such as worship, the
individual is the gainer or loser. If one worships God with sincerity
and dedication, such a person is the gainer; if one omits anything in
that respect, that person alone is the loser. But in the case of human
rights, the adversity resulting from one’s evil act is incurred by
others. This individual thus becomes guilty of disseminating evil
which is a greater crime than that committed in the narrow personal
sphere.
Evil in its various categories cannot always be eliminated or sup-
pressed by an individual’s own limited efforts. There is an essential
evil, namely, the imbalance of the inner self which is the individual’s
own responsibility to curb and control. There is a kind of evil which
needs to be resisted at the level of the family. If this primary social
unit is strong enough, as it should be, then it would check and
possibly eliminate many forms of evil by the strength of the mat-
rimonial bond before they assume social proportions. There are
manifestations of evil at the social level. It is the collective duty of the
society to check and obstruct its expansion by a strong mechanism
of social censure. There is yet a higher evil perpetrated at the
political plane. Since this category of evil is often backed by naked
physical force, it must be checked by equivalent force. Because when
evil is spread in the land through the instrument of promethean
political power, mere passive preaching can hardly be of any avail.
It needs to be emphasized that in order to devise a viable strategy
to fight evil in all its forms, we must address ourselves to reform the
thought and behavior of humankind in order to restore balance and
harmony in human life at all levels. We should adopt all means to
impress upon individuals, societies and state, the dire need to revise
and rectify current attitudes, conventions and policies that may drift
more and more toward selfish pursuit of interests. While we do not
deny the natural right of a person to improve living by all legitimate
means, we need to underline the message that material progress
should not be myopically pursued at the cost of moral scruples and
spiritual norms. Is this not also the conclusion of the scientific
enterprise?
NOTES
. Qur’an:30:30.
. Ibid:15:29.
. Ibid:95:3.
. Ibid:2:30.
Ibid.
. Ibid:2:286.
. Ibid:'7:156.
. Ibid:2:25.
CO©ID
Crh
DO . Ibid:12:53.
. Ibid:57:25.
© . Ibid: 1723-24.
——_=
7
Feminist Theology
as a Means of Combatting
Injustice Toward Women
in Muslim Communities
and Culture
By Riffat Hassan
W omen such as Khadijah and ’A’ishah (wives of the Prophet

Muhammad) and Rabi’a al-Basri (the outstanding woman
Sufi) figure significantly in early Islam. Nonetheless, the
Islamic tradition has, by and large, remained strongly patriarchal till
today. This means, among other things, that the sources of the
Islamic tradition, mainly, the Qur’an (which Muslims believe to be
God’s Word transmitted through the Angel Gabriel to the Prophet
Muhammad), Sunnah (the practice of the Prophet Muhammad),
Hadith (the oral traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad),
and Figh (jurisprudence) have been interpreted only by Muslim men
who have arrogated to themselves the task of defining the onto-
logical, theological, sociological and eschatological status of Muslim
women. It is hardly surprising that until now the majority of Muslim
women who have been kept for centuries in physical, mental and
emotional bondage, have accepted this situation passively. Here it
- 80-
RIFFAT HASSAN 81
needs to be mentioned that while the rate of literacy is low in many
Muslim countries, the rate of literacy of Muslim women, especially
those who live in rural areas where most of the population lives, is
amongst the lowest in the world.
In recent years, largely due to the pressure of anti-women laws
which have been promulgated under the cover of “islamization” in
some parts of the Muslim world, women with some degree of
education and awareness are beginning to realize that religion is
being used as an instrument of oppression rather than as a means
of liberation. To understand the powerful impetus to “islamize”
Muslim societies, especially with regard to women-related norms
and values, it is necessary to know that of all the challenges con-
fronting the Muslim world perhaps the greatest is that of modernity.
Muslims, in general, tend to think of modernity in two ways: as
modernization which is associated with science, technology and
material progress; and as Westernization which is associated with
promiscuity and all kinds of social problems ranging from latch-key
children to drug and alcohol abuse. While modernization is
considered highly desirable, Westernization is considered equally
undesirable. An emancipated Muslim woman is seen by many
Muslims as a symbol not of modernization but of Westernization.
She appears to be in violation of what traditional societies consider
to be a necessary barrier between private space where women
belong and public space which belongs to men. The presence of
women in men’s space is considered to be highly dangerous for, as
a popular hadith states, whenever a man and a woman are alone, ash-
Shaitan (the Satan) is bound to be there. In today’s Muslim world,
due to the pressure of political and socio-economic realities, a signifi-
cant number of women may be seen in public space. Caretakers of
Muslim traditionalism feel gravely threatened by this phenomenon
which they consider to be an onslaught of Westernization under the
guise of modernization. They believe that it is necessary to put
women back in private space (which also designates their place) if
the integrity of the Islamic way of life is to be preserved.
Although I had begun my study of theological issues pertaining
to women in the Islamic tradition in 1974, it was not until 1983-84
when I spent almost two years in Pakistan that my career as an activ-
ist began. The enactment of the Hadud Ordinance (1979) according
to which women’s testimony was declared to be inadmissible in
82 FEMINIST THEOLOGY AS A MEANS OF COMBATTING INJUSTICE
Hadd crimes, including the crime of rape, was accompanied by a

wave of violence toward women and a deluge of anti-women
literature which swept across the country. Many women in Pakistan
were jolted out of their slumber by the “islamization” of the legal
system which through the promulgation of laws such as the Hadud
Ordinance and the Law of Evidence (1984); as well as the threat of
other discriminatory legislation (such as the law of Qisas and Diyat
or blood-money), reduced their status systematically to less than that
of men. It soon became apparent that forces of religious conserva-
tism were determined to cut women down to one-half or less of men,
and that this attitude stemmed froma desire to keep women in their
place, which means secondary, subordinate and inferior to men.
Reflecting upon the scene, I asked myself how it was possible for
manifestly unjust laws to be implemented in a country which pro-
fessed a passionate commitment to both Islam and modernity. The
answer to my question was so obvious that I was startled that it had
not struck me before. Pakistani society (or other Muslim societies)
could enact or accept laws which specified that women were less
than men in fundamental ways because Muslims, in general, consider
it a self-evident truth that women are not equal to men. Among the
arguments used to overwhelm any proponent of gender equality,
the following are perhaps the most popular: that according to the
Qur'an, men are gawwamun (generally translated as rulers or man-
agers) in relation to women; that according to the Qur'an, a man’s
share in inheritance is twice that of a woman’; that according 1to the
Qur'an, the witness of one man is equal tothat of two women’; that
according to the Prophet, women are deficient both in prayer sie
to menstruation) and 1 in intellect (due to their witness counting for
less than a man’s).’ (Elsewhere in my work I have shown how the
first three amongst the statements referred to above, are not
warranted by an unbiased, accurate reading of the Qur’anic texts on
which they are based.)
Since, in all probability, I was the only Muslim woman in the
country who had been engaged in a study of women’s issues from a
nonpatriarchal, theological perspective, I was approached numerous
times by women leaders (including members of the Pakistan Com-
mission on the Status of Women, before whom I gave my testimony
in May 1984) to state what my findings were and if they could be
used to improve the situation of Pakistani women. I was urged by
RIFFAT HASSAN 83
women activists who were mobilizing and leading women’s protests

in a country under martial law, to help them refute the arguments
that were being used against them. Though Ifelt eager to help, I
was not sure if the best strategy was simply to respond to each
argument that was being used to deprive women of their human (as
well as Islamic) rights. What had to be done, first and foremost, in
my opinion, was to examine the theological ground in which all the
antiwomen arguments were rooted to see if, indeed, a case could be
made for asserting that from the point of view of normative Islam,
men and women were essentially equal, despite biological and other
differences.
As a result of further study and reflection I came to perceive that
in the Islamic tradition, as well as in the Jewish and the Christian,
there are three theological assumptions on which the superstructure
of men’s alleged superiority to women has been erected. These three
assumptions are: that God’s primary creation is man, not woman,
since woman is believed to have been created from man’s rib, hence
derivative and secondary ontologically; that woman, not man, was
the primary agent of what is generally referred to as man’s fall or
man’s expulsion from the garden of Eden, hence all daughters of
Eve are to be regarded with hatred, suspicion and contempt; and
that woman was created not only from man but also for man, which
makes her existence merely instrumental and not fundamental. The
three theological questions to which the above assumptions may
appropriately be regarded as answers are: How was woman created?
Was woman responsible for the fall of man? Why was woman
created?
It is not possible, within the scope of this discussion, to deal ex-
haustively with any of the above questions. However, in what fol-
lows, an effort has been made to highlight the way in which sources
of normative Islam have been interpreted to show that women are
inferior to men.
How Was Woman Created?

The ordinary Muslim believes, as seriously as the ordinary Jew or
Christian, that Adam was God’s primary creation and that Eve was
made from Adam’s rib. While this myth is obviously rooted in the
Yahwist’s account of creation in Genesis 2:18-24, it has no basis
whatever in the Qur'an which describes the creation of humanity in

completely egalitarian terms. In the thirty or so passages pertaining
to the subject of human creation, the Qur'an uses generic terms for
humanity (an-nas, al-insan, bashar) and there is no mention in it of
Hawwa’ or Eve. The word Adam occurs twenty-five times in the
Qur’an, but it is used in twenty-one casés as a symbol for self-
conscious humanity. Here, it is pertinent to point out that the word
Adam is a Hebrew word (from adamah, meaning the soil) and it
functions generally as a collective noun referring to the human
rather than to a male person. In the Qur’an, the word Adam (which
Arabic borrowed from Hebrew) mostly does not refer to a particular
human being. Rather, it refers to human beings in a particular way.
As pointed out by Muhammad Iqbal:
Indeed, in the verses which deal with the origin of man as a living
being, the Qur’an uses the words Bashar or Insan, not Adam which it
reserves for man in his capacity of God’s vicegerent on earth. The
purpose of the Qur'an is further secured by the omission of proper
names mentioned in the biblical narration—Adam and Eve. The
term Adam is retained and used more as a concept than as a name
of a concrete human individual. The word is not without authority
in the Qur'an itself.”
An analysis of the Qur’anic descriptions of human creation shows

how the Qur'an evenhandedly uses both feminine and masculine
terms and imagery to describe the creation of humanity from asingle
source. That God’s original creation was undifferentiated humanity
and not either man or woman (who appeared simultaneously at a
subsequent time) is implicit in a number of Qur’anic passages. If the
Qur’an makes no distinction between the creation of man and
woman—as it clearly does not—why do Muslims believe that Hawwa’
was created from Adam’s rib? It is difficult to imagine that Muslims
got this idea directly from Genesis 2 since very few Muslims read the
Bible. It is much more likely that the rib story entered the Islamic
tradition through being incorporated in the Hadith literature dur-
ing the early centuries of Islam. In this context the following six
ahadith are particularly important since they are cited in Sahih al-
Bukhari and Sahih Muslim which Sunni Muslims regard as the two
most authoritative Hadith collections whose authority is exceeded
only by the Qur’an:
RIFFAT HASSAN 85
1. Treat women nicely, for a woman is created from a rib, and the
most curved portion of the rib is its upper portion, so if you would
try to straighten it, it will break, but if you leave it as it is, it will
remain crooked. So treat women nicely.
2. The woman is like a rib, if you try to straighten her, she will
break. So if you want to benefit from her, do so while she still has
some crookedness.’
3. Whoever believes in Allah and the last day should not hurt
(trouble) his neighbor. And I advise you to take care of the women,
for they are created from a rib and the most crooked part of the rib
is its upper part; if you try to straighten it, it will break, and if you
leave it, it will remain crooked, so I urge you to take care of women.”
4. Woman is like a rib. When you attempt to straighten it, you
would break it. And if you leave her alone you would benefit by her,
and crookedness will remain in her.”
5. Woman has been created from a rib and will in no way be
straightened for you; so if you wish to benefit by her, benefit by her
while ‘crookedness remains in her. And if you attempt to straighten
her, you will break her, and breaking her is divorcing her."°
6. He who believes in Allah and the hereafter, if he witnesses any
matter he should talk in good terms about it or keep quiet. Act
kindly towards women, for woman is created from a rib, and the
most crooked part of the rib is its top. If you attempt to straighten
it, you will break it, and if you leave it, its crookedness will remain
there, so act kindly towards women."
Elsewhere I have examined the above ahadith and shown them to be

weak with regard to their formal aspect (i.e., with reference to their
isnad or list of transmitters). As far as their content (matn) is con-
cerned, it is obviously in opposition to the Qur’anic accounts about
human creation. Since all Muslim scholars agree on the principle
that any Hadith which is in contradiction to the Qur’an cannot be
accepted as authentic, the above-mentioned ahadith ought to be
rejected on material grounds. However, they still continue to be a
part of the Islamic tradition. This is due certainly, in significant
measure, to the fact that they are included in the Hadith collections
by Muhammad ibn Isma’il al-Bukhari (810-70 C.E.) and Muslim bin
al-Hallaj (817-75 C.E.), collectively known as the Sahthan (from sahih
meaning sound or authentic) which “form an almost unassailable

authority, subject indeed to criticism in details, yet deriving an
indestructible influence from the ijma or general consent of the
community in custom and belief, which it is their function to authen-
ticate.”"” The continuing popularity of these ahadith among Muslims
in general also indicates that they articulate something deeply
embedded in Muslim culture, namely, the belief that women are
derivative and secondary in the context of human creation.
Theologically, the history of women’s inferior status in the
Islamic (as well as the Jewish and Christian) tradition began with the
story of Hawwa’s creation from a (crooked) rib. Changing her status
requires returning to the point of creation and setting the record
straight. Given the way the rib story has been used, it is impossible
to over-emphasize its importance. The issue of woman’s creation is
more fundamental theologically than any other. This is so because
if man and woman had been created equal by God who is the ulti-
mate giver of value, then they cannot become unequal, essentially,
at a subsequent time. On the other hand, if man and woman had
been created unequal by God, then they cannot become equal,
essentially, at a subsequent time. If one upholds the view that man
and woman were created equal by God which is the teaching of the
Qur'an, then the existing inequality between men and women cannot
be seen as having been mandated by God but must be seen as a
subversion of God’s original plan for humanity.
Was Woman Responsible for the Fall of Man?

Muslims, like Jews and Christians, generally answer the above
question affirmatively though such an answer is not warranted by
the Qur'an. Here, it needs to be pointed out that the Qur’anic
account of the fall episode differs significantly from the biblical
account. In Genesis 3 no explanation is given as to why the serpent
tempts either Eve alone or both Adam and Eve; in the Qur’an the
reason why ash-Shaitan (or Iblis) sets out to beguile the human pair
in the garden is stated clearly in a number of passages. The refusal
of ash-Shaitan to obey God’s command to bow in submission to Adam
follows from his belief that being a creature of fire, he is elementally
superior to Adam who is an earth-creature. When condemned for
his arrogance by God and ordered to depart ina state of abject
RIFFAT HASSAN 87
disgrace, ash-Shaitan throws a challenge to God: he will prove to God
that Adam and Adam’s progeny are ungrateful, weak and easily
lured by temptations and, thus, unworthy of the honor conferred on
them by God. Not attempting to hide his intentions to come upon
human beings from all sides, ash-Shaitan asks for and is granted, a
reprieve until the day of the appointed time. Not only is the
reprieve granted, but God also tells ash-Shaitan to use all his wiles
and forces to assault human beings and see if they would follow him.
A cosmic drama now begins involving the eternal opposition
between the principles of good and evil which is lived out as human
beings, exercising their moral autonomy, choose between the
straight path and the crooked path.
In terms of the Qur’anic narrative what happens to the human
pair in the garden is a sequel to the interchange between God and
ash-Shaitan. In the sequel we learn that the human pair have been
commanded not to go near the tree lest they become zalimin (im-
proper actors). Seduced by ash-Shaitan, they disobey God. However,
in Surah 7: Al-A’raf:23 they acknowledge before God that they have
done zulm (improper actions) to themselves and earnestly seek God’s
forgiveness and mercy. They are told to go forth and descend from
the garden, but in addressing them the Qur'an uses the dual form of
address only once (in Surah 18: Ta-Ha:123); for the rest the plural
form is used which necessarily refers to more than two persons and
is generally understood as referring to humanity as a whole.
In the framework of Qur’anic theology, the order to go forth from
the garden given to Adam or children of Adam cannot be consid-
ered a punishment because Adam was always meant to be God’s
vicegerent on earth (Surah 2: Al-Bagarah:30). The earth is not a
place of banishment but is declared by the Qur’an to he humanity’s
dwelling place and a source of profit to it.”
There is, strictly speaking, no fall in the Qur'an. What the Qur’anic
narration focuses upon is the moral choice that humanity is required
to make when confronted by the alternatives presented by God and
ash-Shaitan. This becomes clear if one reflects on Surah 2: Al-
Bagarah: 35 and Surah 7:. Al-A’raf:19, in which it is stated, “You
(dual) go not near this Tree, lest you (dual) become the ’zalimin.”” In
other words, the human pair is being told that if they go near the
tree, then they will be counted among those who perpetrate zulm
(improper actions). Commenting on the root zlm, Toshihiko Izutsu

says:
The primary meaning of ZLM is, in the opinion of many author-
itative lexicologists, that of “putting in a wrong place.” In the moral
sphere it seems to mean primarily “to act in‘such a way as to trans-
gress the proper limit and encroach upon the right of some other
person.” Briefly and generally speaking “zulm” is to do injustice in
the sense of going beyond one’s bounds and doing what one has no
right to."
By transgressing the limits set by God, the human pair become

guilty of zulm toward themselves. This zulm consists in their taking
on the responsibility for choosing between good and evil.
As pointed out by Iqbal:
Qur’anic legend of the fall has nothing to do with the first

appearance of man on this planet. Its purpose is rather to indicate
man’s rise from a primitive state of instinctive appetite to the
conscious possession of a free self, capable of doubt and
disobedience. The fall does not mean any moral depravity; it is
man’s transition from simple consciousness to the first flash of self-
consciousness. . .Nor does the Qur'an regard the earth as a torture-
hall where an elementally wicked humanity is imprisoned for an
original act of sin. Man’s first act of disobedience was also his first act
of free choice; and that is why, according to the Qur’anic narration,
Adams first transgression was forgiven. . .A being whose movements
are wholly determined like a machine cannot produce goodness.
Freedom is thus a condition of goodness. But to permit the
emergence of a finite ego who has the power to choose. . .is really to
take a great risk; for the freedom to choose good involves also the
freedom to choose what is the opposite of good. That God has taken
this risk shows His immense faith in man; it is now for man to justify
this faith.'°
Even though there is no fall or original sin in the Quran, the
association of the episode described in Genesis 3 with fallen
humanity and illicit sexuality which has played such a massive role
in perpetuating the myth of feminine evil in the Christian tradition,
also exists in the minds of many Muslims and has had extremely
negative impact on the lives of millions of Muslim women. The
following comment of A. A. Maududi, one of contemporary Islam’s
RIFFAT HASSAN 89
most influential scholars is representative of the thinking of many,

if not most, Muslims:
The sex instinct is the greatest weakness of the human race. That is
why Satan selected this weak spot for his attack on the adversary and
devised the scheme to strike at their modesty. Therefore the first
step he took in this direction was to expose their nakedness to them
so as to open the door to indecency before them and beguile them
into sexuality. Even to this day, Satan and his disciples are adopting
the same scheme of depriving the woman of the feelings of modesty
and shyness, and they cannot think of any scheme of “progress”
unless they expose and exhibit the woman to all and sundry.
Though the branding of women as the devil’s gateway is not at

all the intent of the Qur’anic narration of the fall story, Muslims, no
less than Jews and Christians, have used the story to vent their
misogynistic feelings. This is clear from the continuing popularity of
ahadith such as the following:
The Prophet said, “After me, I have not left any affliction more
harmful to men than women.””
Ibn Abbas reported that Allah’s Messenger said: “I had a chance to
look into paradise and I found that the majority of the people were
poor and I looked into the fire and there I found the majority
constituted women.”””
Abu Sa’id Khudri reported that Allah’s Messenger said: “The world
is sweet and green (alluring) and verily Allah is going to install you
as viceregent in it in order to see how you act. So avoid the allure-
ment of women: verily, the first trial for the people of Isra’il was
caused by women.”
Why Was Woman Created?

The Qur'an, which does not discriminate against women in the
context of creation or the fall episode, does not support the view
held by many Muslims, Christians and Jews that women were
created not only from man but also for man. That God’s creation as
a whole is for just ends (Surah 15: Al-Hyr:85) and not for idle sport
(Surah 21: Al-Anbiya:16) are major themes of the Qur'an. Humanity,
consisting of both men and women, is fashioned in the best of molds
(Surah 95: At-Tin:4) and is called to righteousness which requires

the honoring of haqug Allah (rights of God) as well as haquq al-’tbad
(rights of creatures). Not only does the Qur’an make it clear that
man and woman stand absolutely equal in the sight of God, but also
that they are members and protectors of each other. In other words,
the Qur'an does not create a hierarchy in which men are placed
above women nor does it pit men against women in an adversary
relationship. They are created as equal creatures of a universal, just
and merciful God whose pleasure it is that they live together in
harmony and righteousness.
In spite of the Quranic affirmation of gender equality, Muslim
societies, in general, have never regarded men and women as equal,
particularly in the context of marriage. Fatima Mernissi has aptly
observed:
One of the distinctive characteristics of Muslim sexuality is its

territoriality, which reflects a specific division of labor and a specific
conception of society and of power. The territoriality of Muslim
sexuality sets ranks, tasks, and authority patterns. Spatially confined
the woman was taken care of materially by the man who possessed
her, in return for her total obedience and her sexual and repro-
ductive services. The whole system was organized so that the Muslim
“ummah” was actually a society of male citizens who possessed
among other things the female half of the population. . . Muslim
men have always had more rights and privileges than Muslim
women, including even the right to kill their women. . .The man
imposes on the woman, an artificially narrow existence, both
physically and spiritually.”
Underlying the rejection in Muslim societies of the idea of gender

equality is the deeply rooted belief that women—who are inferior in
creation (having been made from a crooked rib) and in righteous-
ness (having helped ash-Shaitan in defeating God’s plan for Adam)—
have been created mainly to be of use to men who are superior to
them. The alleged superiority of men to women which permeates the
Islamic (as well as the Jewish and Christian) tradition is grounded
not only in Hadith literature but also in popular interpretations of
some Quranic passages. Two Qur’anic passages (Surah 4: An-Nisa’:34
and Surah 2: Al-Bagarah:288) in particular are generally cited to
support the contention that men have a degree of advantage over
RIFFAT HASSAN 91
women. Of these, the first reads as follows in A. A. Maududi’s

translation of the Arabic text:
Men are the managers of the affairs of women because Allah has
made the one superior to the other and because men spend of their
wealth on women. Virtuous women are, therefore, obedient; they
guard their rights carefully in their absence under the care and
watch of Allah. As for those women whose defiance you have cause
to fear, admonish them and keep them apart from your beds and
beat them. Then, if they submit to you, do not look for excuses to
punish them: note it well that there is Allah above you, who is
Supreme and Great.”
It is difficult to overstate the negative impact which the popular

Muslim understanding of the above verse has had on the lives of
Muslim women. Elsewhere I have done detailed analysis of this verse
to show how it has been misinterpreted. For instance, the key word
in the first sentence is gqawwamun. This word is most often translated
as hakim or rulers. By making men rulers over women, a hierarchy
akin to the one created by St. Paul and his followers in the Christian
tradition is set up in the Islamic wmmah. Linguistically, the word
gawwamun refers to those who provide a means of support or
livelihood. In my exegesis of this verse I have argued that the func-
tion of supporting women economically has been assigned to men
in the context of child-bearing, a function which can only be per-
formed by women. The intent of this verse is not to give men power
over women but, rather, to ensure that while women are performing
the important tasks of child-bearing and child-raising they do not
have the additional responsibility of being breadwinners as well. The
root word daraba, which has been generally translated as beating, is
one of the commonest root words in the Arabic language with a
large number of possible meanings. That the vast majority of trans-
lators (who happen to be all men) have chosen to translate this word
as beating clearly indicates a bias in favor of a male-controlled, male-
oriented society.
The second Qur’anic passage, which is cited to support the idea
that men are superior to women, is in the specific context of zddat,
a three-month waiting period prescribed for women between the
pronouncement of divorce and remarriage. The advantage men
have in this regard is that they do not have to observe this waiting
period due to the face that, unlike women, they do not become
pregnant (the three-month waiting period is to make certain that the
woman is not pregnant). That the intent of this verse is to ensure
justice is made clear by its emphasis that “women shall have rights
similar to the rights against them, according to what is equitable.”
The reading of the Qur’an through the lens of the Hadith is, in my
opinion, a major reason for the misreading and misinterpretation of
many passages which have been used to deny women equality and
justice. The following Hadith is often cited to elevate man to the
status of majazi khuda (god in earthly form):
A man came. . .with his daughter and said, “This my daughter

refuses to get married.” The Prophet said, “Obey your father.” She
said, “by the name of Him who sent you in truth, I will not marry
until you inform me what is the right of the husband over his wife.”
He said, . . .“Ifit were permitted for one human being to bow down
(sajada) to another I would have ordered the woman to bow down
to her husband when he enters into her, because of God’s grace on
her.” The daughter answered, “By the name of Him who sent you,
with truth I would never marry!”
A faith as rigidly monotheistic as Islam which makes shirk or associ-

ation of anyone with God the one unforgivable sin, cannot conceiv-
ably permit any human being to worship anyone but God. However,
this Hadith makes it appear that if not God’s, it was the Prophet’s
wish to make the wife prostrate herself before her husband. Since
each word, act or exhortation of the Prophet is held to be sacred by
Muslims in general, this Hadith has had much impact on Muslim
women. How such a Hadith could be attributed to the Prophet who
regarded the principle Tauhid (Oneness of God) as the basis of
Islam, is, of course, utterly shocking.
Conclusion
Reference has been made in the foregoing account to the fun-
damental theological assumptions that have colored the way in
which Muslim culture, in general, has viewed women. These as-
sumptions have had serious negative consequences and implications,
both theoretical and practical, for Muslim women throughout
Muslim history until the present day. At the same time, the Qur’an
RIFFAT HASSAN 93
does not discriminate against women despite the sad and bitter fact
of history in that the cumulative (Jewish, Christian, Hellenistic,
Bedouin, and other) biases existed in the Arab-Islamic culture of the
early centuries of Islam. Such biases infiltrated the Islamic tradition,
largely through the Hadith literature, and undermined the intent of
the Qur’an to liberate women from the status of chattel or inferior
creatures, making them free and equal to men. Not only does the
Qur‘an emphasize that righteousness is identical in the case of man
or woman, but it affirms, clearly and consistently, women’s equality
with men and their fundamental right to actualize the human poten-
tial that they share equally with men. In fact, when seen through a
non-patriarchal lens, the Qur'an goes beyond egalitarianism. It
exhibits particular solicitude toward women as also toward other
classes of disadvantaged persons. Further, it provides particular
safeguards for protecting women’s special sexual/biological functions
such as carrying, delivering, suckling, and rearing offspring.
God, who speaks through the Qur'an, is characterized by justice,
and it is stated clearly in the Qur’an that God can never be guilty of
zulm (unfairness, tyranny, oppression, or wrong-doing). Hence, the
Qur’an, as God’s Word, cannot be made the source of human in-
justice, and the injustice to which Muslim women have been sub-
jected cannot be regarded as God-derived. The goal of Quranic
Islam is to establish peace which can only exist within a just environ-
ment. Here it is of importance to note that there is more Qur’anic
legislation pertaining to the establishment of justice in the context
of family relationships than on any other subject. This points to the
assumption implicit in much Qur’anic legislation, namely, that if
human beings can learn to order their homes justly so that the
rights of all within it—children, women, men—are safeguarded,
then they can also order justly their society and the world at large.
In other words, the Qur’an regards the home as a microcosm of the
ummah and world community, and emphasizes the importance of
making it the abode of peace through just living.
The importance of developing what the West calls feminist
theology in the context of the Islamic tradition is paramount today
in order to liberate not only Muslim women, but also Muslim men,
from unjust structures and systems of thought which make a peer
relationship between men and women impossible. It is good to know
that in the last hundred years there have been at least two significant
94 FEMINIST THEOLOGY AS A MEANS OF COMBATITING INJUSTICE
Muslim male scholars and activists: Qasim Amin from Egypt and
Mumraz Ali from India. Both have been staunch advocates of
women’s rights. It is profoundly discouraging, however, to contem-
plate how few Muslim women there are in the world today who
possess the competence, even if they have the courage and
commitment, to engage in a scholarly study of Islam’s primary
sources in order to participate in the theological discussions on
women-related issues which are taking place in most contemporary
Muslim societies. Such participation is imperative if Qur’anic Islam
is to emerge in Muslim societies and communities.
NOTES
. Reference is made, here, to Surah 4: An-Nisa’: 34.
. Reference is made, here, to Surah 4: An-Nisa’:11.
. Reference is made, here, to Surah 2: Al-Baqarah:282.
He
—
NO
09 . Reference is made, here, to ahadith (plural of hadith meaning an oral
tradition) cited in Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim; see footnote 6 and 9
for translations.
5. Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore:
Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1962), p. 83.
6. M.M. Khan, translation of Sahih Al-Bukhari (Lahore: Kazi Publications
1971), p. 346.
. Ibid., p. 80.
NI .
oO Ibid., p. 81.
9. A.H. Siddiqui, (translation of Sahih Muslim, Volume 2 (Lahore: Shaikh
Muhammad Ashraf, 1972), p. 752.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., pp. 752-753.
12. Alfred Guillaume, The Traditions of Islam (Beirut: Khayats, 1966), p. 31.
13. For instance, Surah 15: Al-Hijr:26-43; Surah 17: Bani Isra’l:61-64; Surah
18: Al-Kahf:50; and Surah 38: Sad:71-85.
14. Muhammad Iqbal, p. 84.
15. Toshihiko Izutsu, The Structure of Ethical Terms in the Koran (Mita, Siba,
Minatoku, Tokyo: Keio Institute of Philosophical Studies, 1959), pp. 152-
153.
16. Muhammad Iqbal, p. 85.
17. A.A. Maududi, The Meaning of the Qur'an, Volume 2 (Lahore: Islamic
Publications Ltd., 1976), p. 16, n. 13.
18. This well known expression comes from Tertullian, a North African
Church Father.
19. M.M. Khan, of. cit., p. 22.
RIFFAT HASSAN 95
20. A.H. Siddiqui, op. cit., p. 1431.
21. Ibid.
22. Mernissi, Fatima, Beyond the Veil (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing
Company, 1975), p. 103.
23. A.A. Maududi, The Meaning of the Qur'an, Volume 2 (Lahore: Islamic
Publications Ltd., 1971), p. 321.
24. Sadiq Hasan Khan, Husn al-Uswa (Publication details unavailable), p. 281.
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PART TWO
Responses from
Asian Traditions
8
A Theoretical
Explanation of Evil
in Theravada Buddhism
By Medagama Vajiragnana
EB vil in Buddhism means that which is opposed to the attain-

ment of enlightenment or nibbana. Nibbana is ultimate reality,
the highest state which lies beyond both good and evil. It is
the cessation of craving and attachment. Whatever leads to that aim
is good; whatever keeps one away from it is evil. Evil disturbs the
mind of the individual and prevents the knowledge of enlighten-
ment from being communicated to others.
“The root of all evil is ignorance (especially of the four noble
truths) and false views.”' In the parable of the deer? ignorance is
the decoy by which the enemy, Mara, leads the deer (humankind)
astray into dangerous ground. The Buddha himself said, “I do not
perceive any single hindrance other than the hindrance of ignorance
by which humankind is so obstructed.”*
According to Buddhism, basic ignorance is one’s failure to see
that the world is unsatisfactory. Samsara is the word used to describe
the sum total of conditioned existence, the round of cyclic existence
or rebirth. “Ignorance is the deep delusion wherein we here so long
are circling round.”* The very nature of samsara is non-satisfaction,
and the realization of this is regarded as the first noble truth, which
- 99-
100 A THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF EVIL
must be understood if one hopes to realize nibbana.

The state of ignorance is universal. Only an enlightened being
has eliminated ignorance completely. Evil is a matter of degree.
Nothing is absolutely good or absolutely bad. In the world both
good and evil exist as relative to each other. Buddhism maintains
that evil is ultimately in the mind. Therefore, Buddhism is essential-
ly a mind-culture. Any improvement must occur initially in the mind
of the person. The importance of being aware of, and controlling,
one’s thoughts is continually stressed.
“Good is that which is the outcome of unselfishness, or absence
of craving, while evil is that which is produced by craving and is
rooted in self.”” A person is, by nature, good. At birth the mind is
pure and self-luminous in its nature, but it is stained by defilements
which come through the sense doors. Therefore, a person does evil
things not because of an inherent propensity for wickedness but
because of ignorance. Thus the ideal way to combat evil is through
correct knowledge.
The Buddha gave neither an explanation of the ultimate source
of the world nor of good and evil. He saw no beginning to the pro-
cess of samsara. He was more interested in teaching the way to obtain
release from suffering than in giving philosophical explanations of
the beginning of the universe. “Just as the mighty ocean is of one
flavor, the flavor of salt, even this dhamma [my teaching] is of one
flavor, the flavor of deliverance.”
The Buddha taught that goodness has the power to overcome
and defeat evil, because goodness is an aspect of the nature of
ultimate reality. Therefore, evil should be treated as educative.
Without the existence of evil, the realization of the ultimate goal is
not possible. It is attributed to Nagarjuna that without contacting or
associating with samsara, one cannot realize nibbana. Evil is a neces-
sary ingredient on the path to nibbana; without it there would be no
need to strive for spiritual progress.
The Concept of Mara

In order to understand the pervasive nature of evil, Buddhists
employ the concept of Mara. Mara is a symbol for evil, death, and
the whole of cyclic existence. Mara is everything that binds one to
realms of birth and death, capturing and ensnaring the mind, and
MEDAGAMA VAJIRAGNANA 101
keeping it from enlightenment. Mara’s voice appears entirely

reasonable.
There are five manifestations of Mara: deity Mara, defilements,
kammic activities, aggregates, and death.
The defilements or passions are greed, hatred and delusion. All
unwholesome actions of body, speech and mind are rooted in at
least one of these three. “There is no fire like lust, no grip like hate,
no net like delusion, no river like craving.”’
Khanda is a word used by the Buddha to define the five grasping
groups or aggregates which constitute an individual. These are com-
binations of ever-changing physical and mental forces or energies.
The five are form, feeling, perception, mental formations and con-
sciousness. According to Buddhism there is no such thing as an indi-
vidual apart from these five aggregates. If we say that Mara is these
five aggregates, we are saying that the individual is Mara. Mara
symbolizes the entire existence of unenlightened humanity.
Death is the supreme form of Mara. It is a fundamental tenet of
Buddhist doctrine that life is duhkha. This is a Pali word which is
difficult to translate into English, but which has the sense of un-
satisfactoriness or imperfection. The Buddha said, “Birth is duhkha,
decay is duhkha, sickness is duhkha, death is duhkha. . . association
with the unpleasant is duhkha, dissociation from the pleasant is
duhkha; not to get what one wants is duhkha—in brief, the five aggre-
gates of attachment are duhkha.”* Death may be regarded as an
example of duhkha in its most extreme form. Mara is, therefore, not
simply a kind of force which operates outside and upon oneself, but
it is part of one’s very existence. Mara is the whole of life apart from
nibbana, that is, the whole of samsaric existence. Mara’s realm is
equated with birth and death and the fear that is associated with
them.
Evil Actions
There is no one word in Pali which is the exact equivalent of the
English word evil. The word which is frequently used in Pali is papa,
which means that which defiles the mind. It is associated with the
three immoral roots: greed, hatred, and delusion. All evil actions are
rooted in one or more of these three qualities. Greed and hatred are
not found together, but they both occur together with delusion.
Delusion can also be found by itself. The opposite of papa is punna,

which is associated with the three moral roots: generosity, love and
wisdom. The other terms which are used mean skillful and unskill-
ful, or wholesome and unwholesome.
There are ten kinds of evil action. Three of these are deeds of
body (killing, stealing and sexual misconduct); four are deeds of
speech (lying, slandering, harsh speech and frivolous talk); three are
deeds of mind (covetousness, ill-will and false views). There are
three kinds of false view: denying the result of kamma, denying the
cause and the result, and denying action and the result.
This brings us to a discussion of the word kamma as it is used in
Buddhism. It is simply the law of cause and effect. Wholesome
actions produce wholesome effects, unwholesome actions produce
unwholesome effects. Above all it is volition that precedes the action
that determines whether it is wholesome or unwholesome. The
Buddha’s teaching on volition and kamma has been beautifully ex-
pressed in the opening stanzas of the Dhammapada:
All (mental) states have mind as their forerunner, mind is their chief,
and they are mind-made. If one speaks or acts with a defiled mind,
then suffering follows one even as the wheel follows the hoof of the
draught-ox.
All (mental) states have mind as their forerunner, mind is their chief,
and they are mind-made. If one speaks or acts with a pure mind,
happiness follows one as one’s shadow that does not leave one.”
Elsewhere in the Dhammapada it is also said, “By oneself is evil done,

and by oneself one becomes pure. The pure and the impure come
from oneself; no man can purify another.”"” This position has also
been likened to one building a wall or digging a ditch: one goes up
or down strictly in accordance with one’s own effort. Just as a seed
that has been sown in soil produces plants according to its intrinsic
nature, so too each action will produce its appropriate effects. “All
beings have kamma as their own, their inheritance, their congenital
cause, their kinsman, their refuge. It is kamma that differentiates
beings into low and high states.”".
Kamma operates without the intervention of an external, inde-
pendent or ruling agency. It is a natural law of justice. It has
nothing to do with the idea of punishment or reward meted out by
an omniscient and omnipotent law-giver, or even an all-compas-

sionate Buddha. The cause produces the effect; the effect explains
the cause. Action causes reaction. “So, when a fool does wrong
deeds, he does not realize (their evil nature); by his own deeds the
stupid man is tormented, like one burnt by fire.”””
Ultimately, one’s aim is to become enlightened, that is, an
arahant, which may be translated as a saint. The deeds of a saint are
said to have gone beyond both good and evil; such actions are pure
and do not produce kammic effects. The Buddha said, “Righteous
things you have to give up: how much more the unrighteous
things.”””
Response to Evil
In general, the way to overcome Mara is the same way that leads
to liberation in the Buddhist sense. When he was being tempted by
Mara, immediately prior to his enlightenment, the Buddha said he
possessed the following qualities which made him victorious: con-
fidence, self-control, perseverance, and wisdom. The Buddha’s en-
lightenment has been portrayed as a triumph over Mara by
dispelling the darkness of ignorance. The way to defeat Mara is by
following what we call the Noble Eightfold Path.
This path has been divided into three parts: morality, mental
discipline and wisdom. In terms of the Noble Eightfold Path, moral-
ity refers to right speech, right action and right livelihood. It is often
thought that Buddhists are concerned solely with matters such as
concentration or meditation, but it is impossible to train the mind
unless one has first purified one’s actions by carefully observing a
moral code. ’ ‘What is the basis of higher states? Morality of perfect
purity.”"* Moral precepts are, therefore, the preliminaries and
accompaniments to attaining the highest state.
The Buddhist must conduct life on an ethical basis, which means
controlling all actions of thought, word and deed. For the lay
Buddhist, this means observing five precepts: to refrain from taking
life; to refrain from taking that which is not freely given; to refrain
from sexual misconduct; to refrain from harsh or false speech; and
to refrain from taking intoxicating drinks or drugs. On certain days,
the number of precepts may be increased to eight or ten.
The precepts are not commandments issued on the authority of
the Buddha, and the Buddha does not assign either punishment for
breaking them or reward for keeping them. The Buddha counseled
his followers to act properly by pointing out to them the conse-
quences of their actions and encouraged them to live their lives in
a skillful fashion if they wished to avoid experiencing the undesir-
able effects of unskillful actions.
It should not be thought that the Buddha concerned himself
solely with humanity’s spiritual well-being and disregarded the lay-
person’s concern with the more mundane affairs of everyday life.
The Buddha stated that vice breeds in society owing to poverty, and
that poverty is due to the maldistribution of economic goods. The
Buddha did not condemn the creation of material wealth by legiti-
mate means, but he did say that it should be spent liberally and
wisely on one’s relatives and friends. He condemned the miserly
hoarding of wealth as well as squandering it carelessly.
In the Noble Eightfold Path, right effort, right mindfulness and
right concentration constitute mental discipline. Right effort is the
energetic will (i) to prevent evil and unwholesome states of mind
from arising, (ii) to eliminate such evil and unwholesome states that
have arisen, (ili) to cause good and wholesome states of mind to
arise, and (iv) to develop and bring to perfection the good and
wholesome states of mind already arisen. One element of this effort
is said to be the development of the factors of enlightenment as a
method of overcoming Mara’s forces. These factors are: mindful-
ness, investigation of the doctrine, energy, Joy, relaxation of body
and mind, concentration, and equanimity. Of these seven factors of
enlightenment, two are especially important: mindfulness and
concentration.
It is principally by mindfulness that Mara can be defeated. This
awareness leads to the recognition of Mara. The Buddha said that
this method of vanquishing Mara can be verified experientially. For
example, a bad or disturbing thought will not be able to have any
sway over you once you become aware of it. Such awareness leads to
the recognition of Mara. The Buddha is unassailable by Mara
because the Buddha recognizes Mara as soon as the latter appears,
and to recognize Mara is to deflate Mara. In his encounters with the
Buddha, Mara repeats constantly the refrain, “The Lord knows me!
The Righteous One knows me!”"’ The Buddha emphasized the im-
portance of mindfulness as the way to resist Mara. He said, “Keep
to your own pastures, brethren, walk on your native haunts. If you

thus walk in i them, then Mara will find no landing place, no basis of
attack.”'” One’s proper range is explained as the practice of the four
foundations of mindfulness, that is mindfulness of body, mindfulness
of feeling, mindfulness of mind, and mindfulness of mental objects.
Mara gains access to the monk who has not developed mindful-
ness of body, just as a heavy stone thrown into a mound of moist
clay would have easy entrance or as a dry stick easily ignites and
burns.'’ Where, however, a monk has developed mindfulness of
body, then Mara is repelled. By constant mindfulness one should be
aware of one’s actions and so strive to eliminate those rooted in the
three negative roots of greed, hatred and delusion, and to develop
those rooted in the three wholesome roots of generosity, love and
wisdom.
The Buddha gave the following instructions to his own son,
Rahula, “Rahula, for what purpose is a mirror?” “For the purpose
of reflecting, Lord.” “Similarly, Rahula, after reflecting should
bodily action be done; after reflecting should verbal action be done;
after reflecting should mental action be done.”'* The Buddha goes
on to say that such reflecting must be done before, during and after
performing any bodily action. He then gives the same admonitions
with regard to verbal and mental actions. One has to reflect on how
the results of any action will affect not only other people but also
oneself. Buddhism does not counsel us to act in a way that might
cause harm to ourselves even though the consequences for other
people might be beneficial. Acts of so-called self-sacrifice are not
necessarily skillful.
Right concentration has three stages: preparatory concentration,
approach concentration and attainment concentration. The third
stage is marked by the attainment of jhana, absorption. This is a high
degree of concentration which is achieved through meditation prac-
tice on one of forty subjects of tranquility meditation. It is a unified
state of the normally scattered mind; it centers upon a single object
by the inhibition of certain unwholesome mental states. There are
eight jhanas that are emphasized as important for the defeat of
Mara.
The remaining two factors of the Noble Eightfold Path are right
understanding and right thought. Right understanding refers to
understanding of the Four Noble Truths. These are: the truth of
duhkha; the truth of the cause or the origin of duhkha; the truth of
the end of duhkha; and the truth of the way to the end of duhkha.
This understanding leads to seeing things as they really are, that is,
ultimate reality, which is the end of ignorance and the attainment of
true wisdom.
We have already observed that it is one’s thoughts that either
defile or purify a person. Evil thoughts tend to debase one, just as
good thoughts tend to elevate one. Right thought eliminates evil
thoughts and develops pure thoughts.
There are four modes of living which are essential to Buddhist
practice. The first of these is called loving-kindness. “There, O
monks, the monk with a mind full of loving-kindness pervading first
one direction, then a second one, then a third one, then a fourth
one, just so above, below, and all around; and everywhere iden-
tifying himself with all, he is pervading the whole world with his
mind full of loving-kindness, with the mind wide, developed,
unbounded, free from hate and ill-will.” The Buddha continued in
the same vein to describe compassion, altruistic joy, and equanimity.
Thus the correct response to evil is to strive to remove ignorance
from one’s own mind. One’s primary responsibility is to purify one’s
own actions. This process will naturally lead to an improvement in
the ills which pollute society. As long as people leave unresolved
actual or potential sources of evil within themselves, social activity
will be either futile or incomplete. Preoccupation with social activ-
ities must not be made the excuse to neglect one’s first duty to tidy
up one’s own house.
In formulating a response to evil there are two moral qualities
which should be mentioned. They are so highly regarded that they
were described by the Buddha as world protectors. These are moral
shame and moral dread. The proximate cause of moral shame is
said to be self-respect, and the cause of moral dread is respect for
others conscience and accountability. One who has moral shame
recoils from evil just as a cock’s feather shrinks in front of fire.
However, a person without moral dread is like a moth that is singed
by fire. A moth, unaware of the consequences, is attracted by fire
and will get burnt. In the same way a person without moral dread
will commit evil actions. Moral shame comes from within, moral
dread from the outside.
There are three criteria for distinguishing between good and evil.
First, in deciding if the result will be good one must reflect on it
personally, weighing matters for oneself and making oneself the
Judge. This is equivalent to respect for self. Second, public opinion
is taken as the judge. This is equivalent to respect for others. Finally,
the dhamma, the teaching, is taken as the means of reaching a
decision. Of these three criteria, the first is regarded as the most
suitable.
On the level of day-to-day living, the Buddhist counters evil by
“going for refuge.” Refuge is used here in the sense of that which
protects, defends or preserves. This procedure consists of simply
repeating three times the statement: I go to the Buddha for refuge;
I go to the dhamma for refuge; I go to the sangha for refuge. This is
the fundamental act of a Buddhist, committing him/herself, with
body, speech and mind, to follow the Buddha, his teachings (the
dhamma) and the noble disciples (the sangha), collectively called the
triple gem. “I go to the Buddha for refuge” means that I take the
Buddha as an ideal, and I commit myself with resolution to follow
him to gain supreme wisdom (enlightenment), that will enable me
to overcome evil.
The dhamma is the teaching of the Buddha embodied in the
Noble Eightfold Path, consisting of ethical conduct, mental discipline
and wisdom. This is the path leading to enlightenment. “I go to the
dhamma for refuge” means that I commit myself with resolution to
follow the dhamma to gain supreme wisdom (enlightenment), which
will enable me to overcome evil.
The sangha is the spiritual community of disciples. The sangha
which is referred to in this context is the spiritual sangha, rather
than the institutional sangha of monks and nuns. The term spiritual
sangha applies to those who have attained the spiritual height of the
path of sainthood and its fruition, whether they are ordained or not.
“I go to the sangha for refuge” means that I commit fully with
resolution to develop myself with my own effort to attain the
spiritual heights attained by the spiritual community of disciples,
and thus gain supreme wisdom that will enable me to overcome evil.
NOTES
. W. Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (London: Gordon Fraser, 1985), p. 3.
nO . Mahasaccaka Sutta, Majjhima Nikaya 1, 240. Page and volume numbers
refer to the Pali Text Society editions.
. Itivuttaka 14.
. Sutta Nipata v. 730.
. Francis Story, The Buddhist Outlook (Sri Lanka, 1973), p. 79.
Udang. 5, 5,.12.p,.56,
. Dhammapada v.251.
OO
#
Or. Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta,
COn~TI®D Samyutta Nikaya, LVI, 11.
©. Dhammapada v.1-2.
10. Dhammapada v.165.
11. Majjhima Nikaya, II, 135.
12% Dhammapada v.136.
¥3. Majjhima Nikaya 1, 22, p. 135.
14, Samyutta Nikaya v.143.
Lb. Mara Samyutta, Samyutta Nikaya.
16. Cakkavatti-sihanada Sutta, Digha Nokaya, 111.58.
17. Mahima Nikaya 111.88.
18. Majjhima Nikaya 11.88.
19. Tevijja Sutta, Digha Nikaya 13.
9
Mara as Evil
in Buddhism
By Chandra Wikramagamage
r \ he Buddhist canon and post-canonical literature use the term

Mara, which in English could be rendered as evil.’ This
terminology seemed to have been borrowed by the Buddhist
from the Brahmana texts where the word much used is Papma
Mrtyh.” Again the term Papima Mara’ seen in the Buddhist canon
could be an adaptation from the above word. This evidence shows
that the belief in Mara was prevalent in India even before the birth
of the Buddha. Thus the belief in Mara is by no means folklore but
a traditional religious belief. Mrtyh which means Maccu in the Pali
texts refers to death, and death is interpreted as the messenger of
Yama, the lord of death, according to the Vedic literature. In
Buddhist literature Maccu is used for death as well as Mara.’ The
word Namuci in Hindu literature cannot and does not refer to the
same Mara but to something else, since we know that Namuci is the
demon responsible for drought and was put to death by Indra, the
king of gods.” The Buddhists and the Buddhist literature use the
word Namuci as a synonym for Mara which has a different root and
nomenclature and which in English could mean evil. The above
words were well established in the pre-Buddhist era in India, and all
these words stress the meaning and explanation of death and the
forces of death. .
- 109-
110 MARA AS EVIL IN BUDDHIST LITERATURE
The Buddha propagated his philosophy with Magadha as its

center and no doubt he would have used the language prevalent
then for this purpose. Buddhists in Sri Lanka believe the language
used by the Buddha is Magadhi which is a close dialect of Pali. It was
imperative that this new philosophy was projected to the people in
a language much older for it to be more effective and forceful and
to be held in reverence. In this attempt to popularize, the Buddha
used familiar words, examples, similes, and folk tales to bring out
new meaning and emphasis to the dhamma (the teaching). Popular
words then could be given new meanings and different inter-
pretations. In this attempt certain beliefs and ideas of the people
entered into the new religion or the new philosophy. Hence even
the Buddha in his preaching the dhamma could have used then
relevant terms or words such as, Mara, Maccu, Namuci, and Kanha
in his sermons to give meaning to evil. This usage was due to an
acceptance of old beliefs and traditions. However, the Buddha, in
keeping with the existing beliefs of the people, had adapted them
into more effective means to explain his own philosophy.
According to Buddhism, evil is not an extraordinary force or per-
son, but something that any intelligent being could understand or
something that one could perceive through one’s own intelligence.
The Buddha interpreted the six faculties, namely, the eye, ear, nose,
tongue, body, and mind as Mara and that which arises as a con-
sequence of this contact also as Mara.’ According to the theory of
causality, craving, hatred, and ignorance lead to grasping external
objects such as matter, sound, etc., resulting in becoming which
leads to new birth. Hence this series would continue until the last
stage of decay, death, sorrow, lamentation, grief and despair are
reached. Thus all conditional things could be regarded as Mara.
The deeds (kamma) as referred to in Buddhist teachings could
also be taken as Mara, especially the merits and sins or good and
bad deeds which contribute to the continuation of life in this
universe. Accordingly, they are the world of desire, world of form,
and the plane devoid of any material body. During their lifetime,
beings are subjected to becoming, birth, decay, and death. Hence
life is referred to as samsara or existence which in turn is the subject
of Mara. Good or meritorious deeds in this world help us to achieve
worldly happiness, and bad deeds or worldly sins lead us to the
underworld; both are subjected to suffering because even worldly
CHANDRA WIKRAMAGAMAGE 111
happiness leads to suffering.’ The good and bad deeds are the
results of craving, hatred and ignorance. The Buddha, one who had
renounced the good as well as the bad, was distanced from these
worldly things, desire, form and the material body. All beings during
their lifetime accumulate merit and demerit. Their lives are en-
riched by their own deeds and acts, and they continue their
existence in this universe. Sins are ten-fold. Taking away the life of
a being, killing, theft, adultery, lying and sneaking, acts of sin caused
by a word or verbal commitments, stinginess or being miserly, and
the thoughts of hatred are the sins caused by the mind. These acts
could be referred to as Mara or the binding forces of Mara.
In the deeper context of life there is no individuality, though
traditionally reference is made to a person as an individual.
Buddhism is a philosophy devoid of individualism, but in common
usage the individual means the five aggregates or the five skanda,
and all these in turn could be referred to as Mara, the root cause of
death and suffering. We are not able to go beyond this force of
death.
Mara is no extraordinary force or individual but nature itself.
This fact will help one to realize that the individual who makes such
a statement, and the one who responds to this statement are both
Mara. Can I avoid death? Or can you? Neither of us could. This is
the bitter truth that all know for certain. This is the truth and the
natural end of all living beings or things, the common and the
inevitable result of all causes and their effects. At this very moment
one may have many odd ailments such as physical aches and pains.
Old age is the common legacy of humanity, a natural force, an
inevitable thing, the tragedy of truth that none can avoid. That
again is the force of nature, birth and death, the formation and
destruction of what is happening all around us. Being or non-being,
everything ends and hence everything is Mara.
This raises an enigmatic question. What happens to us after
death? Do we escape from Mara after death? Different religions at
different times, in different ways have put forward various explana-
tions. Does death terminate or relieve us from the path of Mara?
There is no known universal answer to this. None can say for certain
what happens after death. This is our ignorance.
Ignorance is also Mara. Ignorance is sin. The good or the bad
deeds stimulate consciousness and consciousness in turn creates
names and forms or living matter; this in turn creates the six
aggregates of senses and mind, the psycho-physical phenomena of
living beings, the formation and the reaction of the sense organs and
the senses. These contacts create feelings and the feelings lead to
craving and grasping, resulting in new birth. Birth leads to disease,
decay and to death. Hence where one encounters decay and death
there dwells Mara. Where there is suffering there dwells Mara. Thus
the only liberation from Mara is one’s own conquering of birth,
decay, disease, and Mara or death, through one’s own under-
standing of the root causes and conquering of ignorance, that is,
ignorance of the aforesaid causes and their effects.
Thus far I have interpreted Mara according to early Buddhist
scriptures. It is necessary, however, to indicate what has been added
through popular beliefs and folklore. This will help one to under-
stand and differentiate the Buddhist concept of evil from other
concepts that have entered Buddhism throughout history.
Vasavatti Mara
The existence of a heaven under the rule of a cruel god called
Vasavatti Mara is common in the folklore of the Southeast Asian
Buddhist community. This god cherishes sins and sinners and
harms the good and acts against those who seek or work towards
liberation from this world.
In the Buddhist scripture legends were included in compiling the
life of the Buddha. One story relates that on the day that Prince
Siddhartha renounced worldly life and left the palace, Vasavatti
Mara beseeched him to abandon the quest. And as the story goes, we
know that Prince Siddhartha renounced the world and donned
robes on the bank of the river and with deep devotion and deter-
Mination, meditated and achieved his ambition. It is said that
Vasavatti Mara, knowing that Prince Siddhartha would attain
Buddhahood in seven days had come again to dissuade him and
pleaded, knowing that he was weak in body but not in mind said:
Death hath come so close upon you and why not attempt to live, for
by living one could achieve more in life. By living and living as a
layman only, you could gain the bliss of life. The path and
attainment of nirvana is very arduous. Sage Siddhartha thus hearing
these sentiments of Mara replied “Have you come to weaken my
attempts and desires Papima Mara. I am not swayed by those

morsels of happiness and contentment, your promises of the bliss of
life. Do you know that I have forsaken a kingdom and a throne,
therefore it would be more worthy if you could encourage someone
who desires to attain the ultimate bliss through one’s own
meritorious acts; this would certainly be more fruitful. What ask
thou of me, who has sacrificed and renounced all the worldly
happiness to attain Buddhahood? It is frivolous to entice me with
your morsels. I do not desire worldly happiness anymore, I have
renounced this worldly happiness and the cravings. I have
conquered all your forces, such as desire, aversion, hunger and
thirst, craving, sloth and torpor, fear, doubt, self-will and cant, gains,
flattery, ill gained honors, exciting oneself and despising others.
This Namuci is your army; this is Kanha’s fighting forces. . .””
It is further said that sage Siddhartha was meditating at Bodh

Gaya under the tranquility of the Bo-tree, when Vasavatti Mara was
supposed to have come on an elephant with his retinue of followers
and attempted to entice and dissuade him from attaining Buddha-
hood. The three daughters of Mara, Tanha, Rati and Raga, sym-
bolizing desire, avarice and lust respectively, seeing the father so
disappointed, dejected and grieved, came to entice sage Siddhartha
back to mundane things in life. Their attempts bore no fruit, as he
was above all desires. Thus the conquering of Mara gave rise to very
meaningful and intensely popular folklore called the defeat of Mara.
One can easily differentiate or extract the truth about the
Vasavatti Mara from traditional folklore. Clearly the tenfold forces
of Mara are the sins of mortals, and the allusion to the daughters of
Mara refers but to these sins. Tanha or the craving is one of the
three main sins; rati represents aversion and raga represents lust. If
the existence of Vasavatti Mara according to folklore could be
believed, then undoubtedly he could have had a more forceful army
and weaponry of war and not mental forces alone. The forces of
Mara could be alluded to as the weaponry of attack. The Pali text
clearly states that what Prince Siddhartha overpowered under the
Bo-tree were the sensual forces of sins. Therefore, Vasavatti Mara
is a mythical figure; his army, his daughters are creations of the
imagination. The higher doctrine of Buddhist philosophy does not
give emphasis to Vasavatti Mara.
Classification of Mara
The single word dhamma in Pali could be said to contain eighty-
four thousand parts or all of the Buddhist philosophy. Likewise, the
single word Mara has a plurality of meanings. This single word
could mean the stimulation of the sensual organs like the eye, ear,
nose, tongue, and skin to matter, sound, smell, taste, touch and their
responses. Hence we could differentiate twelve Maras. The higher
doctrine classifies them as skanda, (aggregates) dhatu (elements), and
ayatana (spheres), which could be treated as the threefold division of
Mara. This is the oldest classification and the addition of Vasavatti
Mara must have come ata later era from a legend then popular in
society.
In the beginning, the new Buddhist philosophy was grasped and
understood only by the intelligentsia. When it was later accepted as
a world religion, thriving among other believers, it also absorbed
many new elements, new interpretations even to the concept of
Mara. Mara and the forces of Mara became more popular and ac-
ceptable among the common people. The Buddha often said that
there is no force greater to overcome than the force of Mara. The
Buddha explicitly indicated that the path to avoid Mara is most
strenuous and arduous, and to destroy it completely without recur-
rence is to destroy skanda (aggregates), dhatu (elements), and ayatana
(spheres).
Mara as depicted and interpreted in Buddhism is not only a
feature of human life, but also embraces the cause and the effect of
all the living and the non-living. If desired one could be relieved
from this force of nature, and such relief would be the status of a
supramundane state, the only absolute reality. What is the real need
for this relief? It is to avoid the circle of suffering, birth, decay,
disease, and death, the natural process. The only escape or relief
from this cycle is to understand the cause and effect and to relin-
quish attachment.
The legends of Mara presented in the pre-Buddhist era were
adapted according to Buddhist concepts. The exclusive Buddhist
concept of Mara refers only to nature itself and is developed in
accordance with the theory of natural evolution. Hence it is Mara,
evil. Yet pre-Buddhist Mara legends with Buddhist interpretations
have been more popular among the people.
NOTES
- Morally bad; wicked, harmful or tending to harm, esp. intentionally or
characteristically; disagreeable or unpleasant; unlucky; causing misfortune.
The Concise Oxford Dictionary; new edition (Delhi, 1990), p. 405. Sinhalese
Buddhists interpret the term Mara as something which makes people
unwholesome.
. E. Windish, Mara and Buddha (Leipzig, 1859), p. 185.
. Majjhima Nikaya, 1, ed. by Trenckner (London: Pali Text Society, 1888), pp.
327; 332-333; Digha Nikaya, ed. by T.W. Rhys Davids and J.E. Carpenter
(London: Pali Text Society, 1890-1911), vol. II, p. 112. Papima Mara is
synonym of Vasawatti Mara.
. T.O. Ling, Buddhism and the Mythology of Evil (London, 1962), p. 57.
. T.O. Ling, op. cit., p. 55. Namuci in one Buddhist canon is also a synonym
of Vasawatti Mara. Kanha, Antaka, pamattabandhu are other synonyms of the
same.
. Samyutta Nikaya (Buddhajayanti, ed.) (Colombo, 1960), p. 218.
. Itwvutiaka Pali (London: Pali Text Society, 1948), pp. 56, 92.
. Samyutta Nikaya, op. cit., Radha Sutta.
Oo . Sutta
O~TMD Nipata (London: Pali Text Society, 1965), pp. 74-78.
10
Three Levels of Evil
in Advaita Vedanta and
a Holographic Analogy
By Stephen Kaplan
A dvaita Vedanta, one of the leading schools of Hindu

thought, presents a complex of ideas directed toward the
subject of evil. On the one hand, the evil an individual
endures is consequent upon the evil an individual has done in the
past. On another hand, Advaita Vedanta attributes suffering, evil,
and the problems of the world not to actions but to ignorance
(avidya). This tactic reduces human problems to an epistemological
mistake that is to be understood within the context of maya (illusion).
For Advaitins such as Gaudapada, the epistemological treatment of
evil is concomitant with the metaphysical doctrine of non-origination
which informs us that Brahman is eternal, unchanging, being; and
therefore, all change is unreal (maya), produced by ignorance. Thus
in this sense, evil as maya does not exist. Nonetheless, Advaitins also
tell us that evil is phenomenological; it is experienced.
This cursory overview of the Advaita Vedanta notion of evil raises
much that is unsettling. First, we must ask ourselves what does it
mean? What does it mean to say that evil is not real; it is only experi-
enced? How can one say that evil is the consequence of what one has
- 116-
STEPHEN KAPLAN Te
done in the past and then proceed to say that there are no indi-
viduals nor any past?
We must also ask ourselves a second question which while distinct
from the former is related to it. I would like to ask whether the
Advaita notion of evil can address the senseless violence and suffer-
ing that we uncover in our world. Can any of the theories about evil
that we discuss make the thousands of such cases throughout the
world palatable, justifiable, explainable, acceptable?
While I can make no pretense to answer the second question, I
would at least like not to forget that it is the reason that we seek an
answer to the first series of questions about Advaita Vedanta. I in-
tend here to highlight three different strands within Advaita think-
ing on the problem of evil. These strands are simultaneously existing
proposals, not historically sequential proposals. Historically, these
three levels of explanation can be traced to Gaudapada, the teacher
of the illustrious Sankara. The thoughts of Gaudapada, alleged to be
the first person after the Upanisads to present the notion of advaita
(non-dualism), have been crucial in the formulation of this presen-
tation. The thoughts of Sankara will also be invoked giving one
some sense that from its inception Advaita Vedanta has tackled the
problem of evil in this multifaceted manner.
I am also including a review of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya’s
presentation of evil. Bhattacharyya, a modern philosopher, has
pondered Advaita notions through centuries of Indian and Western
philosophy to present to us a modern phenomenological under-
standing of evil that is rooted in the problem of ignorance and
embodied in the experience of pain.
Finally, I will try to illuminate the diverse answers that Advaita
gives by utilizing a holographic analogy. Holography is the tech-
nique by which one produces three dimensional optical images from
a film that contains no images. These images will appear to be real,
but they are only experiences created by a duality of subject and
object. The holographic film, an analogous reality, lacks this
diversity of images.
118 THREE LEVELS OF EVIL IN ADVAITA VEDANTA
The Three Levels of Evil

The late Professor B.K. Matilal observed:
Theodicy is an old and worn out issue. Probably nothing new can be
said about it. It is also believed that theodicy was not a problem for
the Indians, specially for the Hindus, because evil was, according to
them, an illusion. Particularly, it is urged, in Sankara’s Advaita
Vedanta, the whole world is an illusion along with its evils, and
hence the problem of evil is resolved. This belief is partly based
upon a misconception. . .Besides, the rather pervasive, but uncritical
and unexamined assumption that in Sankara’s philosophy the world
along with its evils is simply an illusion, leads to the misconception
and false ideas about Indian philosophy in general and Sankara’s
philosophy in particular.’
The Advaita discussion of evil, like its discussion of other subjects,

is multileveled. Advaita approaches numerous topics from creation
to evil to maya from a number of different levels of truth and with a
number of different types of philosophical discourse. The Advaita
approach to a given topic is often the intermingling of these factors.
One can see a subject such as maya treated from the different levels
of truth found in the Advaita schema, namely, the highest truth
(paramartha) and relative truth (samvrtt), and also from a number of
different modes of philosophical discourse such as metaphysical,
epistemological and phenomenological.” The Advaita analysis of evil
takes similar twists and turns. One must be cognizant of the entirety
of the discussion as well as the specific nature of the discourse if one
wishes to avoid one sided presentations and the misconceptions that
Professor Matilal referred to above.
Advaitins present three levels of explanation for evil. On the one
hand, one may look at evil from the metaphysical perspective, from
the perspective of the highest truth. Succinctly put, from this per-
spective all is Brahman, all is the one unchanging being (sat), con-
sciousness (cit), and bliss (ananda). This being is without measure
and without end to measure; it is without beginning or end; it is
eternal, unborn and unchanging. Ultimate truth is that there is no
change, no birth, no causation, no coming into being nor any
passing out of being. There is no duality (advaita). From this per-
spective, presented by Gaudapada under the notion of the doctrine
STEPHEN KAPLAN 149
of non-origination, there can be no evil because there are no

individuals, no jivas. If no individuals ever come into being or pass
out of existence, then evil has no ground upon which to take root.
To this point Gaudapada says: “There is no destruction, nor
origination. There is no bondage, nor anyone who seeks liberation.
There is no desire for liberation, nor anyone liberated. This is the
highest truth.””
This highest perspective reduces the world to illusion that is
absolutely nought. Here the world of experience with its pain and
evil is not only not given, it is not even denied as having once been
experienced as real. Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya depicts this as
a third level of maya.” If there is no world, nor even maya, there
certainly can be no evil. Thus, one may say that, from this per-
spective, calling evil an illusion is both true and not true. It is true
because evil is not what we think it to be; it is therefore an illusion.
It is not true because there is no illusion, no maya. Even the illusion
is reduced to nought.
The second type of explanation offered by Advaita proceeds in a
very different direction. This level of explanation invokes the
notions of karma and rebirth. This type of explanation is found in
almost all forms of Indian thought in various ways. The notions of
karma and rebirth inform us that the fortunes and misfortunes that
presently befall an individual are the consequence of previous
actions that an individual undertook. These previous actions may
have taken place in i a previous birth and the fruits of one’s present
action may ripen in this or some future life.” This cycle is without
beginning. The confluence of the notion of karma and the notion
that there is no beginning to the cycle of birth is inextricably inter-
twined with the Advaitin understanding of God and the related issue
of theodicy. Sankara in the Brahma Sutra Bhasya makes the following
points:
The Lord, it is said, cannot be the cause of the world, because, on
that hypothesis, the reproach of inequality of dispensation and
cruelty would attach to him. . .To a Lord bringing about such an
unequal condition of things, passion and malice would have to be
ascribed. . .The Lord, we reply, cannot be reproached with in-
equality of dispensation and cruelty, ‘because he is bound by
regards’. . .the fact is, that in creating he is bound by certain regards,
i.e., he has to look to merit and demerit. Hence the circumstance of
the creation being unequal is due to the merit and demerit of the
living creatures created, and is not a fault for which the Lord is to
blame.”
In the commentary to the next verse, Sankara replies to the fol-

lowing objection to his position, namely, that the Lord had to create
the world, at some beginning moment, without consideration to
good and bad karma and therefore the Lord must be responsible.
Sankara responds to this objection by saying:
. . .the transmigratory world is without beginning. The objection
would be valid if the world had a beginning; but as it is without begin-
ning, merit and inequality are, like seed and sprout, caused as well as
causes, and there is therefore no logical objection to their operation.’
In these passages we do not find evil reduced to nought. In fact, evil

is the paradigmatic issue from which the notion of Isvara (Lord) and
creation are to be discerned. In order to extricate the Lord from the
tangles of evil, Sankara is willing to argue that Isvara is not the sole
force or factor in creation. Since the Lord would not create a world
with such inequities, there must be other factors, in addition to
Isvara’s power, at work in the creation of the world. These other fac-
tors must have existed before the creation of any given world. Thus
the transmigratory world must be beginningless. The other factors
that establish the course of creation are the previous deeds, both
meritorious and demeritorious, that individuals have undertaken.
God is not the cause of evil. The evil that one encounters has no
beginning except to say that it is traced to individuality. As we will
see, tracing it to individuality leads us back to maya. Gaudapada
informs us that the problems of the individual are the results of
beginningless maya.”
The third perspective on evil found in Advaita Vedanta focuses
on the nature of individuality. The structure of individuality with its
concomitant notion of duality—subject and object—is for the Advaitin
problematic. Both Gaudapada and Sankara follow the Upanisadic
declarations that inform us that:
For where there is duality as it were, there one sees the other, one
smells the other, one tastes the other, one speaks to the other. . .But
where everything has become just one’s own self, by what and whom
should one see, by what and whom should one smell, by what and
STEPHEN KAPLAN Tt
whom should one taste. . .He (Self) is indestructible for He cannot

be destroyed. He is unattached for He does not attach himself. He
is unfettered, He does not suffer.”
Duality obscures knowledge of the self (atman) and that is certainly

problematic for the Advaitin. Sankara in the opening to the Brahma
Sutra Bhasya also informs us that we impose the characteristics of the
self upon the not self and the not self upon the self. This beginning-
less superimposition is correlated with ignorance and this, Sankara
says, is “. . the cause of all evil.”"”
Radhakrishnan presents a definition of evil that follows along the
same lines:
Evil is the free act of an individual who uses his freedom for his own
exaltation. It is fundamentally the choice which affirms the finite,
independent self, its lordship and acquisitiveness against the univer-
sal will. Evil is the result of our alienation from the Real. If we do
not break with evil, we cannot attain freedom."
This definition stresses the notion that evil is the responsibility of the
individual—the individual’s free act. Here also, it is not the respon-
sibility of Isvara, the Lord. The problem is a human problem, not a
problem of divinity. Evil is associated with the individual’s failure to
know the Real, Brahman, and it is thus antithetical to liberation.
From this third perspective evil is not reduced to nought; nor is it
attributed to retribution for particular acts that one has undertaken;
but rather, it is associated with our ordinary way of knowing the
world—a mistaken way.
Pain as Evil
Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya illuminates this third notion of
evil by locating it within the context not only of moksa but also of
pain. He says: “Mukti (liberation), whatever else it implies, is under-
stood as absolute freedom from pain.”'” Freedom from pain would
be freedom from evil.
Bhattacharyya’s explanation builds upon the discussion of indi-
viduality and duality. Pain as a fundamental fact of suffering has a
duality about it. Pain is at once both self and other. While impinging
upon the consciousness of the subject as other, pain must always be
appropriated as part of the subject to be felt as pain. Pain not
impinging upon the subject as a foreign element would be

indistinguishable from the self and therefore not conceived to be a
threat to the self. If it were no threat to self, it could not be
conceived of as painful nor as evil. Thus, Bhattacharyya states that
pain, is known to be as much myself as eee to or foreign to
FRAN, a
Bhattacharyya’s explanation of evil focuses our attention upon
two types of wishes. He distinguishes a “secular wish” for freedom
from pain and a “spiritual wish” for freedom from the “secular wish”
that wishes to be free from pain. The secular wish to be free from
pain appears rather natural and healthy. One who does not wish to
be free from pain we assume desires to endure pain. Thus the desire
to be free from pain is the prescribed route that one expects to take.
Bhattacharyya’s analysis leads us to reexamine this understanding
of the wish to be free from pain, the secular wish. He points out that
this wish to be free from pain has the concomitant effect of establish-
ing the reality of the experienced pain. With regard to this wish for
the release from pain, he states:
The wish presupposes the belief in the facthood of pain and yet if
the wish were absent there would be no feeling of pain, for what is
not wished to be terminated is not felt pain. The wish for freedom
is the reflective self or reason itself which thus has to be regarded as
conditioning the facthood of pain and as, therefore, acting suicidally.
Reflection on pain, though implying the possibility of freedom from
it, is in this sense an evil, the potentiality of pain. Reflection thus
develops into reflection on itself as evil, freedom from which too is
necessarily wished. The wish for freedom from the reflective wish to
be free from pain is spiritual wish, the latter wish being secular.'*
Several points are made that need to be explicated. First,

Bhattacharyya is informing us that pain would not be pain if one did
not desire to terminate it. The desire to terminate pain confirms the
reality of the experience as pain. However, he also informs us that
there can be no freedom from pain without the wish to be free from
pain. Without this wish one cannot extricate oneself from pain. The
wish to terminate the pain while giving hope that the pain can be
terminated in fact confirms the feeling as pain. Thus, Bhattacharyya
says that the wish to remove the pain is suicidal since it simul-
taneously establishes the experience of the pain. This first level of
STEPHEN KAPLAN 123
reflection he says “. . .is in this sense an evil, the potentiality of pain.”

If the first level of reflection, namely, the wish to be free from
pain, establishes the feeling as pain and is thus associated with evil,
then freedom from pain and evil can only come in a second level of
reflection. This second level of reflection is the wish to be free from
the first wish. This second wish is the spiritual wish. It is the wish
that seeks freedom from all pain because it does not wish to be free
from any particular pain. This wish only wishes to be free from the
wish for freedom from pain. It does not confirm the reality of that
which it seeks to remove in the hope of removing it. Rather, the
spiritual wish seeks to remove the conditions that affirm the
experience of pain, namely, the secular wish for freedom from pain.
Bhattacharyya’s analysis of evil into two wishes allows us to re-
examine the notion that evil is an illusion. From this perspective,
evil, associated with the particular experience of pain of an
individual subject, is not a transcendental illusion imposed by an
external deity, nor is this account of evil to be passed off as a cosmic
illusion. Rather, here we see that evil is an illusion because it can be
removed by removing the wish to remove it. It is an illusion
precisely because it is based upon a wish. But neither the wish nor
the illusion are transcendental in this account. Bhattacharyya says:
“The illusion is to all an evil in itself, not as transcending or
superseding the natural evil of pain but as wholly immanent in ioe
Bhattacharyya’s analysis discloses that which allows individuality
and duality to be correlated with evil. Individuality and duality, the
normal standard bearers of the Advaita explanation of evil/suffering,
are unquestionably to be associated with a lack of understanding of
being, Brahman. Certainly for the Advaitin, one cannot gain liber-
ation while under the influence of these two intoxicants. However, |
Bhattacharyya leads us to see that by themselves they do not present
the reality of evil. In a world of complete pleasure—in a paradise of
delights—one may not have liberation, but neither would one
encounter evil. Bhattacharyya points out that evil is experienced,
even for the metaphysically minded Advaitin, when pain enters into
the consciousness of the individual. To remove pain is to remove evil
and to do that one must attain liberation (moksa). He concludes his
discussion by saying:
Pain as evil, therefore, is correlative to absolute freedom which

implies freedom from pleasure also as good. It is because evil is
correlated in the last resort with freedom and not with the good that
freedom from pain is understood as the spiritual goal.’
Thus, we can see that Bhattacharyya’s notion of pain as evil is not

descriptive of one characteristic of evil, but rather this notion is
characteristic of evil itself.
Structural and Comparative Analysis

Certainly, it is possible to say that evil is an illusion in Advaita
Vedanta. However, one can now see that this has different conno-
tations and, as Professor Matilal implied, it would be problematic to
conflate these three levels of explanation.
On the one hand, the Advaitin says evil is an illusion because it is
nought—not even experienced. All is Brahman and there is no
change, birth, individuality, or suffering. On another hand, evil is an
illusion that is experienced because an individual in knowing itself
as individual experiences an object that impinges on its well being.
Here Advaitains do not deny the experience of pain/evil; they only
deny that it is ultimate reality—that it can be identified with
Brahman, with liberation. Evil is associated with the (mistaken) way
we know the world. It is the structure of experience that is associ-
ated with evil. This second approach is a systematic approach to evil.
Like the second approach, the third perspective does not deny the
experience of evil; however, this approach focuses on particular
actions and their consequences. Here the problem is not systematic;
it is particularistic. From this perspective, meritorious actions are
distinguished from demeritorious actions. It is the particular actions
that may lead to evil and not the ways of knowing in general that
lead to evil.
We may say that these three approaches to evil offer 1) a sys-
tematic approach that focuses upon the structure of knowing and
does not distinguish the particular merits of an action; 2) an analysis
that focuses on particular merits/demerits of specific actions; and 3)
an analysis that denies that there is any individuals, any particular
actions and any evil.
These three levels of explanation of evil share a common feature
and one that may be distinguished from some of the approaches to
STEPHEN KAPLAN 425
evil taken in Western theology. In the three levels of the Advaita

analysis, the discussion focuses upon the subject—the experiencer
of evil—not the agent who inflicts evil upon an other. Even with
regard to the Advaita explanation of karma, the disucssion focuses
upon what the individual has done in the past to merit his or her
present suffering/evil. While this discussion begins with the agent of
the good or bad deeds, the Advaita presentation quickly moves to
the future subject who experiences the fruits of his/her own deeds.
This discussion of evil actions is self-referential. It does not entail
one person acting upon another person, but rather it focuses upon
the consequence of the individual’s action on their own self.
The second level of the Advaita discussion also focuses upon the
individual who is the sufferer of the evil deed. Here evil is
understood in terms of the way that the self knows itself. A mistaken
way of knowing oneself is the root of suffering and evil. There is no
reference to an independent agent who inflicts evil upon the in-
dividual. The third level denies the reality of a self that can suffer or
experience evil. In these explanations the primary emphasis is not
upon an agent who imposes evil, but rather upon the experiencer/
subject of evil.
The Advaita approach can be distinguished from those approach-
es found within Western theology that focus on the agent who
causes evil to another or permits evil to occur to another. For exam-
ple, the Advaita approach can be distinguished from those positions
that maintain that evil is the handiwork of a demonic/satanic figure
or the testing of an individual by God. In addition, the Western
discussion of natural evil places emphasis on the agent causing evil,
rather than the subject experiencing evil. Natural evil, understood
to be the evil that is inflicted upon humans and/or living systems, is
attributed to natural processes. A discussion of natural evil may
include the adverse effects that a subject has incurred but the
experiencer of evil is now placed in the passive voice. The active
voice is reserved for the natural process—the agent of evil. There is
a similar twist in the Western discussion of moral evil. Discussions of
moral evil focus upon the evil/sinful acts that one individual does
that effect another individual or effect the evildoer’s relationship
with God. For example, we speak of the evil act that a murderer
commits—the evil of the murderer. Certainly, we speak about the
victim and the evil that the victim experienced, but the victim is the
recipient of the evil. In such situations, evil is not defined by the

subject of the experience but by the agent who inflicts the
experience.
The Western emphasis on the agent can be highlighted by con-
trasting Bhattacharyya’s approach. From the latter’s perspective, evil
exists only if the subject wishes it into experience. In the words of
the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad: “He who sees all in the atman, evil does
not overcome him; he overcomes all of evil.”'’ This text is the root
of Bhattacharyya’s thought and it falls far from those traditions that
demand that the experiencer of evil must also always be the captive
of evil—once a victim, always a victim. From the Western perspec-
tive, evil is imposed upon an other and there is no escape from this
imposition. The thought of an inescapable imposition is the ultimate
evil for the Advaitin.
Three Levels of Evil and a Holographic Analogy

At this point, I offer a holographic analogy to this multileveled
approach. Like all analogies it has its limitations and strengths.
(Here I can do no more than highlight some aspects of this anal-
ogy.) As indicated, holography is the technique by which one
reproduces three dimensional optical images. Holography should be
distinguished from both photography and sculpture. Unlike pho-
tography, the images that are produced are three dimensional—
they have height, width, and depth. In this sense they have the three
dimensional optical properties of sculptures. They are suspended in
space like three dimensional objects. However, unlike sculptures,
holographic images are not objects. They cannot be touched. They are
not projected onto a wall or a piece of paper like a two-dimensional
photographic image. They are optical appearances.
Holography is unique not only because of the unusual three
dimensional life-like images that it produces, but also because the
film from which these images are produced is rather distinct. Holo-
graphic film does not contain the images that it reproduces.
Photographic film—the negative—contains the images that it
reproduces. One can see these images when one holds the film to
the light. There are no images on the holographic film. Technically,
the hologram contains. interference patterns from two interfering
beams of coherent light. One of these beams of light from a laser
STEPHEN KAPLAN 1 9)
reflects off a mirror. At the film these two beams of light converge
and the interference patterns spread across the entirety of the film.
This procedure does not result in discrete images on the film. In
fact, rather astonishingly, because the film contains only interference
patterns, each piece of the film is able to reproduce the entirety of
the image. Cut the film into ten pieces and you can reproduce ten
complete images. Put the film back together and only one scene
reappears.
One can utilize the holographic film and the images it produces
as an analogy for the Advaita understanding of reality and their
concomitant analysis of evil. The film, like Brahman, does not have
subject-object dichotomies, nor does it have the normal spacial-
temporal relations of the world that it reproduces.” On the film
each piece contains the whole. The film does not have individuals in
the way that we experience it. On the film, like Brahman, there is no
subject encountering evil, nor producing evil, nor encountering
good, nor producing good. Again, each piece of the film is like all
other pieces of the film in that there are no individual images and
each piece can reproduce the entirety. In this sense, on the film like
in Brahman, there is no change from one part to another part. If we
compare the film to Brahman, then individuality and duality with
their concomitant notions of good and evil do not exist.
To complete this holographic analogy, I would like to return to
one of the questions that I initially asked: How can Advaita tell us
that 1) evil does not exist, but 2) it is nonetheless experienced? How
can the Advaitins assert the validity of both statements simulta-
neously? By analogy to holography, it can be stated that at the same
time and in the same place as the film exists, the holographic images
appears.” Likewise, the Advaitin says that at the same time and in
the same place as the nondualism of being (Brahman) exists there
is the experience of individuality and evil. While the Advaitin
considers Brahman the only reality and the realization of Brahman
is identified with liberation, phenomenologically one still encounters
individuals and evil. For Advaita the nonduality of Brahman is
simultaneous with the phenomenological experience of individuality
and evil. Brahman and the world are not separate nor are they
sequential. The holographic film with its lack of subject-object
relations is simultaneous with the subject-object relations of the
holographic images. Thus by analogy with holography, one can see
how nonduality and duality can exist simultaneously. By analogy, if

one defined for soteriological purposes the film as real, one can say
that the holographic images are unreal. These images appear, but
they have no substance. They cannot be touched but they are de-
finitely experienced. They are in fact only experienced when an
individual perceives these experiences. They have no existence apart
from their being experienced. The images do not exist on the film
and they do not exist where one imagines them; namely, they do not
exist suspended in space in front of the individual. They do not exist
but they are experienced. This is similar to what Advaita says about
individuality and evil. It is not real, but it is experienced.
I cannot pretend that the holographic analogy solves the problem
of evil. I cannot assert that it makes evil and suffering more palat-
able. The intention here is to illuminate the relationship between the
different levels of evil in the Advaita analysis.
NOTES
1. Bimal K. Matilal, “A Note on Samkara’s Theodicy,” Journal of Indian
Philosophy 20: (1992), 363. Arthur L. Herman in The Problem of Evil and
Indian Thought (Delhi: Motilal Barnasidass, 1977), makes a similar point:
“The contention that evil is unreal is bandied about primarily by Vedantins
like Samkara, or at least the position has been attributed to him. . .I am not
convinced that Indians, even, are prepared to say that suffering is unreal.
Surely one can grant them that it is not metaphysically, ultimately,
absolutely really; real. . .But from the ‘other’ point of view evil, suffering,
waste, terror, and fear are real enough.” (p. 246).
2. For a similar description of Advaita philosophizing, see Eliot Deutsch,
Advaita Vedanta: A Philosophical Reconstruction (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 1973), p. 29. For an example of such a multileveled analysis
of maya in Advaita thought see, by this author, Hermeneutics, Holography, and
Indian Idealism (Delhi: Motilalal Banarsidass, 1987), Chapter 4.
3. Gaudapada, Mandukyopanisad, Gaudapadiya Karika and Samkarabhasya
(Gorakhapur: Gita Press, Samvat 2026), 2:32. (Hereafter listed as MK, and
all translations the responsibility of this author.)
4. Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, Studies in Philosophy, Vol. I (Calcutta:
Progressive Publishers, 1956), p. 101.
5. For an excellent discussion of the development of the notion of karma,
specifically as it relates to Advaita see: Karl H. Potter, “The Karma Theory
and Its Interpretation in Some Indian Philosophical Systems,” in Karma
and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions, Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, ed.
STEPHEN KAPLAN 129
(Berkeley: University of California, 1980), pp. 241-267.

. Sankara, The Vedanta Sutras of Badarayana with the Commentary by Sankara,
translated by George Thibaut (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962),
2-1-34, p. 358. (Hereafter listed as BSB.)
. Ibid., 2-1-35, p. 360.
. See MK, 1:16. Gaudapada’s point in this verse is that the individual
sleeps—does not comprehend the reality—because of beginningless maya.
. Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 1V.5.15. quoted from The Principal Upanisads,
edited with Introduction, text translation and notes by S. Radhakrishnan
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1969), p. 286.
10. BSB ip: ional tole
Li: Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, Studies in Philosophy, Volume I, p. 104.
12. Ibid., p. 135.
a, Ibid., p. 136.
14: Ibid., p. 135.
hes Ibid., p. 140.
16. Ibid., p. 142.
17. Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, IV .4.23, Sanskrit quoted from S. Radhakrishnan,
The Principal Upanisads.
18. It may be helpful to note that Advaitins, like Gaudapada, often invoke two
analogies to convey these three levels of explanation. Gaudapada utilizes
the analogy of a “barren woman’s son” to convey the notion of illusion that
is absolutely nought. There is no such experience as a barren woman’s son
like there is no individuality. He utilizes the rope-snake analogy to convey
the idea of an experience based upon subjectivity that is not real. When
passing a rope in the dark one may experience a snake and fear it, but
there is no snake. (See: MK: 3:27-28.)
12. For a more detailed discussion of some of these issues, see, by this author:
“A Holographic Analysis of Religious Diversity: A Case Study of Hinduism
and Christianity,” Jowrnal of Religious Pluralism, 2, 1993, 29-59.
20. For further elaboration and more technical explanation of these issues see
by this author “A Holographic Alternative to a Traditional Yogacara
Simile,” Eastern Buddhist, XXIII, 1990, pp. 72-78; and David Bohm,
Wholeness and the Implicate Order (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1980), chs. 6 & 7.
oi There are many types of holograms and the specifics vary from type to
type. I have in mind a transmission hologram producing virtual images.
For a discussion of holography see: Howard Smith, Principles of Holography
(New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1969).
11
Hindu Understandings
of Evil:
From Tradition
to Modern Thought
By William Cenkner
Pp hilosophical reflection in ancient India arose neither from

wonder nor curiosity as was so frequently the case in the West
but as a response to moral and physical evil in human life and
in the world at large. The philosophical problem and the religious
problem were the same: How to remove evil from human life. Libera-
tion (moksa) or human freedom meant the removal of evil experienced
as such. This was true in the classical traditions of India—Hinduism,
yoga, Buddhism—since the basic perception of reality was the
suffering of all (sarvam duhkham). Deliverance from suffering became
the project of each Indian religious tradition.
The earliest Vedas and much of classical mythology in Hinduism
reflect the conflict and tension among the gods, between the gods
and demons, and between the divine and human orders of reality.
Suffering or evil was a result of an inherent conflict in creation
wherein the cosmic process was one of continual change and battle
between the gods and anti-gods. This was not an eternal conflict
between two opposing principles; it was not a dualism as frequently
perceived in classical traditions. The two principles were in fact
- 130-
WILLIAM CENKNER 131
within the same frame of reference or within the same entity. Yama,
the Lord of death, may be fearful, frightening and abhorrent for
one person, but for another Yama was a gracious and inviting guest:
“His sacred string is of gold. His face is Saran smiling. He wears
a crown, earrings, and a garland of wild flowers.” ' The same is true
for other gods who personify both good and evil. In the cosmic
battle between good and evil, evil consistently lost to the power and
ingenuity of the forces of good.
The above indicates that suffering is an experience that needs to
be seen in perspective. Achieving such perspective will differ in the
Vedas and throughout the Hindu tradition. Asceticism is critical to
Hindu development because it attempts to set evil and suffering into
perspective. Asceticism seeks to place evil in relation to the whole,
into the greater picture of reality. One of the earliest forms of
asceticism was sacrificial ritual. Ritual was intended to restore the
good order of reality. In the conflict, for example, between the gods
and the anti-gods, the gods always conquered in battle but the battle
was never definitive for in time evil would again emerge. The gods
would sacrifice and the human world would also imitate such sacri-
ficial rituals in order to restore the reign of goodness. The descent
of a god into history (avatara), likewise, was to restore goodness to
the human order.
Two major developments advanced the notion of asceticism. The
Upanishads, the final section of the ancient Vedas, realized that ritu-
al had only a limited value. The major perception of the Upanishads
was the essential unity of all reality; reality is undifferentiated, one,
nondual. This perception can be experienced through meditation,
reflection, self-transcendence. Evil is not denied. It is experienced.
However, it is not final but transitory, passing. The world of ap-
parent opposites—good and evil, pleasure and pain, healing and
suffering—is a problem only as long as it appears as final and
permanent. * The new Upanishadic asceticism, reflection and medita-
tion, offers means for detachment from those objects that cause
suffering and detachment from an ego that binds one to a world of
limited perspective.
A second significant development iin advancing the Hindu notion
of asceticism in overcoming evil, other than ritual and meditation,
takes place in the popular Bhagavad Gita where a particular form of
action, action with nonattachment, becomes the new response to evil
132 HINDU UNDERSTANDINGS OF EVIL
and suffering. Here one must act without being bound to the action:
“To action alone hast thou a right and never at all to its fruit; let not
the fruits of action be thy motive; neither let there be in thee any
attachment to inaction. Fixed in yoga, do thy work, O Arjuna,
abandoning attachment, with an even mind in success and failure,
for evenness of mind is called yoga. ”® One has the capacity to act in
such a way if one follows completely the inner law of one’s own
being (dharma) by recognizing value in the action itself regardless of
its success or failure. Or one has the capacity to act without attach-
ment to the fruits of the action if one is given fully to God in love
(bhakti) and devotion.
Consequently, the traditional responses to evil have been ritual,
reflection and meditation, detachment from the fruits of action, and
love of the divine. The problem in the history of Hinduism, how-
ever, was to allow detachment to fall unknowingly into a form of in-
difference. A major task in modern times is to explore ways to avoid
such indifference.
Range of Modern Opinion

Modern opinion in 19th- and 20th-century Hinduism is looked
upon as a renaissance of thought and life. Traditional notions that
the world in not inherently evil but that good and evil are present
hand in hand, nevertheless, persist. The popularity of selfless action
advanced by the Gita may now express itself in terms of social service
or dedicated action against injustice. Ramakrishna, a traditional
mystic figure of the late 19th century, speaks of the world as part of
God’s play (lila), God’s cosmic and sportive activity: “That is His will,
His play. In His maya there exists ignorance and knowledge. Dark-
ness is needed too. It reveals all the more the glory of light. There
is no doubt that anger, lust and greed are evil. Why, then, has God
created them? In order to create saints.. .There is need of every-
thing.”* For Ramakrishna evil exists from a relative perspective, an
unenlightened perspective, but from an absolute perspective there
is no evil. He takes a traditional position in saying that evil does not
exist with God-realization or self-realization.
The erudite disciple of Ramakrishna, Vivekananda, was also to
reiterate traditional notions. He writes: “We have no theory of evil.
We call it ignorance.”” He follows much of Upanishadic thought by
WILLIAM CENKNER 133
placing good and evil in the mind, looking upon good and evil as
different manifestations of the same thing, and by viewing both as
God’s play in order to bring change to the very subject of evil, the
human person. It is only with the fully 20th-century figures of
Mahatma Gandhi, Sri Aurobindo Ghose, Rabindranath Tagore, and
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan that significant growth in the tradition
takes place. Even these, however, are preceded by the 19th-century
socio-religious reformers, Ram Mohan Roy and Keshab Chander
Sen, who responded to social evil by seeking a total renovation of
the social order. A renewed social consciousness becomes a major re-
sponse to evil in modern times. This is true even among highly
traditional groups and figures. The Sankaracarya of Kanchi, for
example, has called for social reconstruction as a priority over
spiritual renewal in these present times.
Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948), set the pace and goal in the
restoration of a just and honest social and political order as a re-
sponse to what he attributed so much of the suffering and evil of
modern India. His most memorable contribution was nonviolence
(ahimsa) in the face of evil. Ahimsa is present in Indian literature and
tradition from earliest times but it receives a dominant role only in
the Jain tradition which significantly influenced Gandhi in his youth.
Nonviolence was meant not merely for saints and social leaders but
for ordinary peoples reflecting their strength of spirit, following the
ancient law of self-sacrifice. It is not resignation to evil or suffering
but “the non-violence of my conception is a more active and more
real fighting against wickedness than retaliation whose very nature
is to increase wickedness. I contemplate a mental, and therefore a
moral opposition to immoralities.”” Thus Gandhi attempted to
neutralize evil through nonviolence, not by coersion but through
conversion and transformation of the human spirit. It became a call
to suffer in the face of evil for the sake of truth.
One of the most creative thinkers of modern India was Sri
Aurobindo Ghose (1872-1950), who built a whole vision around the
context of the involution and evolution of the divine in the creative
process. For him the world process is fundamentally good but
frequently its goodness is ina state of latency with evil or suffering
seemingly more evident. Evil is a moment in the evolutionary and
transformative process in which the human person finds himself/
herself. It is due to ego-attachment in a stage of what Aurobindo
calls the “surface mind.”’ What is new and significant in Aurobindo’s

thought is the evolution and inevitable divinization of nature and
humanity since there exists no opposition between matter and
spirit.” In creation spirit is latent matter, the inconscient of supreme
consciousness. The response to evil from process philosophy in the
West would find Aurobindo’s thought highly compatible. It is my
intent here, however, to highlight the contribution of Rabindranath
Tagore and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan.
Tagore on Evil
Tagore (1861-1941) is probably the most universal and compre-
hensive figure of modern India. He saw himself primarily as a poet
but he also wrote novels, short stories, dramas, and philosophical
essays. He was an accomplished musician, writing both music and
words, and painter with over 2500 pieces credited to him. Not only
was he a world traveler and lecturer but also the founder of experi-
mental education on both school and university levels. In a more
practical vein he established reconstruction of village life through
experimental farming, crafts, and other self-help programs.
Tagore’s fullest treatment of evil can be found in a book of essays
titled Sadhana, most of which were lectures at Harvard University.”
For Tagore the problem of evil reveals the limited, incomplete, and
imperfect nature of creation itself. The human person is especially
incomplete and human life is to seek greater completeness, greater
fullness. The creative process in both its cosmic and human phases
is the shedding of its incompleteness, its limited and imperfect
nature. Imperfection reveals itself in limited power, limited will,
intellect, and creativity. Such imperfection must pass through stages
of realization, stages of greater growth. Existence tries to prove it is
not inherently evil. Tagore writes: “An imperfection which is not all
imperfection, but which has perfection for its ideal, must go through
a perpetual realization.”"”
In conformity with Indian thought, ancient or modern, Tagore
calls for a greater awareness, a greater consciousness of the inner
self, the real person. He writes:
To the man [sic] who lives for an idea, for his country, for the good
of humanity, life has an extensive meaning, and to that extent pain
becomes less important to him [sic]. To live the life of goodness is to
WILLIAM CENKNER 135
live the life of all. Pleasure is for one’s own self, but goodness is
concerned with the happiness of all humanity and for all time. From
the point of view of the good, pleasure and pain appear in a
different meaning; so much so, that pleasure may be shunned, and
pain be courted in its place, and death itself be made welcome as
giving a higher value to life. From these higher standpoints of a
man’s [sic] life, the standpoints of the good, pleasure and pain lose
their absolute value."
Tagore’s call to moral life is really a call to a more universal life.

At the heart of Tagore’s thought is the traditional notion of the
individual seeking universality. This is true for him in every aspect
of creation and the creative process. This, in brief, is the meaning of
the spiritual journey for Tagore. The lesson to learn is how to turn
pain into love, how to transmute suffering into joy. None of this is
original to Tagore. His originality lies in the discovery of the
principle of relatedness. Relationship is the means to the greater
self, real personhood, a more universal life and ultimately a more
universal self. In studying the life of Tagore one has to ask why he
moved from one literary experience to another. If he saw himself
primarily as a poet, as he did, why did he continue throughout his
life to write novels, short stories, dramas, and songs? He was trying
with each new genre to relate to greater reality by relating through
and in other forms of literary expression. If he saw himself primarily
as poet, why did he become an educationist, a painter, an experi-
mental villager, a world lecturer and essayist? He was trying with
each new venture to relate to diverse humanity and problems of
modern life both in India and the world. The principle of re-
lationship is Tagore’s contribution in responding to the problem of
evil in our time. In his own words: “Thus we find that, just as
throughout our bodily organization there is a principle of relation
by virtue of which we call the entire body our own, and can use it as
such, so all through the universe there is that principle of
uninterrupted relation by virtue of which we can call the whole
world our extended body and use it accordingly.” There is no
negation of the world or humanity in Tagore’s thinking. Evil exists
to measure the good; pain is to measure the value of joy; suffering
is to draw attention to one’s destiny. Purification as an aid to
spiritual progress, from suffering to wholeness, is the typical and
traditional element in Tagore’s thought.
From a philosophical perspective evil is alienation, isolation and

unrelatedness for Tagore. He seeks the infinite and universal in the
finite and the particular. His response to evil is not to transcend the
finite and the particular but to respond to evil in greater relatedness
to the finite and the particular. It is at this point that Tagore sep-
arates himself from the idealist traditions of India. However, literary
critics look upon Tagore as a humanist, naturalist, and idealist. He
views humanity and nature interdependent and interrelated. He is
considered an idealist because he always responds to evil and
suffering within the context of society and the world. In this he is
untypical of the traditional Hindu world and very much afigure of
modernity. Similarly different from traditional thinkers is Tagore’s
active life in experimental education, village reconstruction, and
international relations both in Asia and the West.
Radhakrishnan on Evil
Sarvepalli Radakrishnan (1888-1976) was born in South India
within an orthodox Brahmin family but educated in Christian
missionary schools and even a Christian college. Although known as
an interpreter of traditional Indian philosophy, he was to some
degree a comparative philosopher at home both in Indian and
Western philosophical traditions. He wrote a classic history of
Indian philosophy and became for a generation the interpreter of
Hindu thought to the West. He was the first Asian to give the
Gifford Lectures in the United Kingdom. He was also active in the
social and political life of India. Radhakrishnan would begin each
day translating or writing commentaries on Hindu scriptures while
serving as ambassador to Moscow in the post-war years, or chairman
of UNESCO, or president of India during the Nehru years. We
discover again a factor of significance among modern Indian think-
ers: persons of profound reflection with highly active public lives.
More than most Indian thinkers, Radhakrishnan was fully knowl-
edgeable in both traditional Christian explanations and Western
philosophical understandings of evil. What he seems to take from
these traditions is the role of human freedom in handling the
problem of evil. He writes that “The world is moving to the mani-
festation of free spirits into whom the souls of men [sic] are evolv-
; 13 z aris :
ing.” The alternative to a mechanistic world is a world of freedom
WILLIAM CENKNER TsZ
in which error, ugliness, and evil are not excluded. Evil for him is an
evolutionary by-product. The world and humanity move from
imperfection to perfection through the spiritual ascent from matter.
Such growth takes place through pain and suffering, through
creativity. Creativity occurs in and through evil and pain.
Like most Indian thinkers, Radhakrishnan accepts evil as a fact
of experience but not as an ultimate fact of existence. In typical
Vedantic fashion, he draws upon the distinction between the world
of appearance and the world of reality. Namely, in the world of
appearance, the temporary and existential world of ordinary ex-
perience, evil surrounds human life; but in the world of reality, the
permanent and transcendent world of self-realization, evil is
transformed into bliss. Some would attribute Radhakrishnan’s in-
sight to the Western philosopher Bradley but the same insight,
according to this writer, may be found in both contemporary and
medieval interpretations of Vedantic philosophy.” Nevertheless, the
purpose of evil is to serve as an incentive or signpost to progress and
growth. In Radhakrishnan’s language: “Pain and trouble purify the
soul. The met shines the brightest when it passes through the
furnace.. .”" All seeking of the true, good and beautiful is in re-
sponse to the false, evil and ugly. In this sense evil is the cause of a
human dialectic from which creativity and growth emerge. Human
ideals can only be attained through sucha dialectic. Radhakrishnan
writes: “The most poignant pain can be soy oust accepted if it is
recognized as contributory to the realization of one’s ideals.”'” None
of this is necessarily new or novel to traditional Indian under-
standing. What is new is the insertion of human freedom and its
significance, an insight from the West, that he introduces into the
discussion.
All the above could be argued by any theist, East or West. How-
ever, Radhakrishnan does depart from afully theistic understanding
on the issue of God’s foreknowledge as a result of human freedom.
If there is divine foreknowledge, human freedom is not fully free;
if there is divine foreknowledge, God must be held responsible for
not preventing such evil and suffering. Radhakrishnan believes that
Isvara (the Lord) is responsible for evil in only an indirect way.
Radhakrishnan remains very much an idealist in the Vedantic school
of Hinduism, closer to Ramanuja than Sankara, but certainly in-
fluenced by Hegel and Western idealism.'’ His own philosophical
understandings are best found in his book, An Idealist View of Life.

Still very much a traditional thinker, he looks to the Gita and its
dramatic struggle between the forces of good and evil as the drama
of human life.
Contrast of Tagore and Radhakrishnan

Both Tagore and Radhakrishnan affirm the reality of evil as a fact
of human experience because they affirm the reality of the world, an
imperfect and limited world. They, likewise, maintain that such a
fact has no ultimacy, namely, evil is overcome by the good as the
classical myths demonstrated.'* They also follow the Indian tradition
by looking upon evil as a stage leading to the perfection of
humanity. Tagore writes: “In fact, imperfection is not a negation of
perfection; finitude is not contradictory to infinity: they are but
completeness manifested in parts, infinity revealed within bounds. ae
Tagore and Radhakrishnan articulate the problem of evil in simi-
lar but not exactly the same ways. India has consistently considered
the problem of evil as an existential problem and not as an in-
tellectual problem. These two modernists comprehend the problem
from both perspectives. It is an existential problem because life is
suffering; human life is bound to the cycles of rebirth. It is an
intellectual problem because their theistic tendencies must reconcile
evil with the goodness of God. In the final analysis they look upon
evil as a spiritual problem, a problem of salvation/liberation, again
a basic traditional response.
At first glance both seem to be in continuity with tradition when
they point to the transcendence of ego or the overcoming of egotistic
attitudes as the solution to the spiritual problem. However, since
both place evil firmly in the created world, an imperfect and finite
world, the solution of evil is sought concretely within the par-
ticularities of creation. Radhakrishnan speaks of the freedom one
has in creation as does Tagore.” * Tagore’ s contribution rests in the
notion of relatedness and how this human dynamic advances growth
and development and ultimately overcomes the evils of created life.
What may be the most significant factor in their realization of
placing evil firmly in the created world is not so much in their
theoretical or intellectual response to evil but in their practical and
social response to it.
WILLIAM CENKNER 139
Radhakrishnan’s leadership in the political destiny of India and

the world did not deter him from his consistent life of philosophical
reflection. Political work was his practical response to the public evils
of his day. Likewise, Tagore’s forty year effort in experimental edu-
cation, village restoration, and his life-long effort to bring the West
and Asia into greater dialogue did not deter him from his prolific
life as a man of letters. It was his public work that was his most
concrete response to evil.
Conclusion
Several clarifications have emerged in discussion of modern
Indian understandings of evil.”” What frequently appears as good or
evil depends on the perspective, stance, or mentality of the one
receiving the perception. The consistent example of this is death.
“What changes is not evil but what appears as evil.”
Throughout this discussion aclassic distinction has been drawn
between facts and ultimate facts. Evil is an experiential fact and as
such is relative. Evil as nonexperiential is an abstraction and as such
has little meaning in Indian thought. This is why the distinction
between fact and ultimate fact is vital to the Indian perception.
Both Tagore and Radhakrishnan looked upon evil as error. This
is also a typical Indian perception, namely, ignorance (avidya) and
the progression toward the good is through the recognition of ig-
norance or errors. Consequently, progress in human growth and
development, much like scientific progress, is through the recog-
nition of error, ignorance, and evil.
It should be finally noted that neither thinker had a theoretical
response to the modern holocausts. The wars in the West and in the
Far East left Tagore depressed and without solution. The termin-
ation of the lives of European Jews and the atomic disasters in Japan
began a new phase in the understandings of evil. No adequate
theoretical response has come from India. What has emerged from
these two modernists is their greater role in public affairs with
advancing age and the increasing holocaust disasters.
NOTES
1. John Bowker, Problems of Suffering in Religions of the World (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 203. The most thorough study of
this subject by a Western thinker is: Arthur L. Herman, The Problem of Evil
and Indian Thought (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976, 1993). In somewhat
eccentric scholarship, Herman establishes that rebirth/transmigration
resolves the theological problem of evil in Indian religion whether in
Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and the medieval philosophical schools.
Under the rebirth solution and the principle of karma, there is a definite
response to what happens by chance or accident and the emergence of
universal/demonic evil and suffering. The rebirth/transmigration option
should also please the theist for there is then no one chance or eternal
damnation response to the spiritual journey. My concern in this article is
not the nature of evil as much as the management of evil/suffering. This,
I believe, is what traditional Hinduism was about in doing religion, that is,
in ritual, meditation, selfless activity, and devotion. My intent is to show the
experiential response to the fact of evil. This is what the Indian traditions,
orthodox or heterodox, are working out in their spiritual journey.
2. Ibid., p. 214.
oo. Ibid., p. 227. Bhagavad Gita 2. 47-48.
4. K.P.S. Choudhary, Modern Indian Mysticism (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,

1981), p. 108.
5. Swami Vivekananda, Vedanta, Voice of Freedom (New York: Philosophical
Library, 1986), edit. Swami Chetanananda, p. 61; also confer pp. 137-38,
143, 168, 225, 246, 264.
6. Mahatma Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and War (Ahmedabad: Navajivan,
1942 & 1949), edit. Bharatan Kumarappa, 2 vol., Vol. 1, pp. 1-2.
7. Choudhary, Modern Indian Mysticism, pp. 238-241.
8. Rama Shanker Srivastava, Contemporary Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Munshi
Ram Manohar Lal, 1965), p. 147.
9. Rabindranath Tagore, Sadhana: The Realisation of Life (London: Macmillan
& Co., 1913), pp. 47-65.
10. Ibid., p. 53.
11. Ibid., pp. 56-57.
12. Ibid., p. 62. Also refer to the chapters on Tagore in this author’s The Hindu
Personality in Education: Tagore, Gandhi, Aurobindo (Columbia, MO: South
Asian Books, 1976).
13. S. Radhakrishnan, Religion in a Changing World (London: George Allen and
Unwin Ltd., 1967), p. 92.
14. Harendra Prasad Sinhya, Religious Philosophy of Tagore and Radhakrishnan
(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993), p. 94.
15. Ibid., p. 95.
16. Ibid., p. 96.
WILLIAM CENKNER 141
17. Srivastava, Contemporary Indian Philosophy, pp. 257-336.

18. Sinha, Religious Philosophy of Tagore and Radhakrishnan, pp. 96ff.
19. Ibid., quoted on p. 99, from Sadhama.
20. Ibid., p. 103.
21. Ibid., pp. 104ff.
22. Ibid., p. 105.
12
A New Understanding
of the Bhagavad Gita:
Trinitarian Evil
By Francis Xavier D’Sa
A theoretical reflection on any topic has its ultimate base in a

person’s world- “view or universe of meaning (a horizon of
understanding, a mythos, a language, the world of being-
and-understanding’). The world-view understood as the conscious,
though not self-conscious, world-of-being-and-understanding is that
space in which the human exists, that is, one stands among other
entities but also stands apart from them. Outside this space no con-
sciousness is possible for the human. When we speak of the human,
the referent is not just the human but the human-in-the-world.
Merely to speak of the human without the world is to speak of an
abstraction.
This is a world of relationships. There is nothing in the world of
the human which is not related and interrelated, dependent and
interdependent. Hence world here refers not only to the physical
world but also to the spiritual and moral world in which we are
born, grow up and function in different capacities. The world of the
human is a complex world which is animated by the universe of
meaning. When we speak of reality it is this comprehensive world of
which we speak. Our understanding of evil too will be of a piece
with our understanding of reality itself.
=149
FRANCIS XAVIER D’SA 143
This implies that each world-view has its own way of looking at
evil. The understanding of one world-view needs to be qualified,
corrected and complemented by the perception of evil from other
world-views. From this flows the need of dialogue between the
diverse world-views in order that a transcultural view of the reality
of evil may emerge.
For an intercultural dialogue there is the prior need of acommon
space where the different world-views can meet. With this in mind,
I am putting forward Raimundo Panikkar’ s theanthropocosmic view
of reality as a possible place of encounter.’ Panikkar is of the opinion
that all cultures and religions have either explicity or implicitly at
some time or other contained such a view of reality though they may
have expressed it or hinted at it in their own way. In other words
wherever there has been an integral experience of [ultimate] reality,
it has taken place on a theanthropocosmic foundation. Because of
the ethos of the age, more often than not each culture has had to
express such an integral experience more in terms of its own
(anthropocentric or cosmocentric) focus rather than in theanthropo-
cosmic terms. In Panikkar’s view it is the kazros of our age to gather
together the fragments so that an integrated and integrating thean-
thropocosmic vision of reality may be born.
On such a backdrop I would like to sketch the Bhagavad Gita’s
way of looking at the problem of reality. The intention is to prepare
the Gita’s perspective on evil for a dialogue with other views of evil.
I would like first to clarify my position.
Blindness to the Real means forgetfulness of the roots of one’s
being; this in turn refers to the forgetfulness of the unlimited in
which all existence is grounded. In other words the ontological for-
getfulness of the unlimited roots of existence reduces existence to
limited, finite existence, and this is the source of evil. Finitude as
such, that is, the finite without reference to the infinite, is the
beginning of evil. The finite is merely the finite’s way of looking at
existence without reference to the infinite. But the finite grounded
in the infinite is no more finite.
One might pursue the question further and ask, what is the onto-
logical status of bondage i in which evil is a reality? Methodologically
the question arises from the fact of bondage, the fact of limitation.
Standing within the realm of limitation, we cannot answer the ques-
tion of the origin of limitation. Being unable to pose this question
144 A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF THE BHAGAVAD GITA
from outside the realm of limitation, the question cannot be meth-

odologically justified. Our starting-point and our understanding of
it are finite. But what we can do is to question our understanding of
finitude. Is the finite what we think it to be or is it another way of
expressing the fact of ontological blindness, the ontological forget-
fulness of the infinite? ;
This view will not satisfy the naive realists who experience their
limitation and which they believe cannot be explained away. This
brings us back to the fact of ontological blindness. What does one say
to the blind who insist that there are no colors because they do not
see them? Our situation is similar to that of the blind. Are we not
blind to the infinite side of our being?
The origin of evil in the comprehensive sense is to be sought first
and foremost in the finitude of the human and one’s world. The
finite is what is not finished, not perfect, not integrated until it
comes in contact with the infinite. Ultimately the finite as finite is
that which is reified; reification is possible when finite beings have
lost their moorings in and become alienated from the infinite. This,
I submit, is the source of evil.
If evil is inescapable for the finite, evil has a totally different
significance for the infinite. Or to put it differently, what we call evil
from our perspective need not be evil from the perspective of the
infinite. If we take the example of the holocaust does this imply then
that it is evil only from our perspective but not so from that of the
infinite? What is undeniable in the eyes of the finite and the infinite
is the fact of the extermination of millions of people. The point,
however, is about the aspect of evil that is predicated of this exter-
mination. More specifically it refers to the evil intention which lies
at the root of such an enormity. Can the divine be blind to it? Here
we must remember that we can at the most speak of God in pictures.
God is not blind to it as a human is not blind to the fact of a fellow
human who has no eyes. Moreover, both the meaning and the sig-
nificance of darkness in the case of a blind person cannot be
understood in terms of the blind person alone; the experience of the .
non-blind is also essential.
There is more to it than mere privation. If the divine is really
divine it must know not only evil in the form of privation but also its
purpose, place and significance in the mosaic of history and sal-
vation. Hence without equating the two examples, it could still be
asserted that the experience of evil in the case of human history

cannot be understood in terms of human history alone. For if the
significance of evil is not to be interpreted entirely negatively we
need to postulate someone in whose hands the happenings of
history rest and who alone can redeem evil on the canvas of history
and salvation. Thus evil for a believer, far from being an argument
against the divine, is an argument in favor of its existence.
What does this mean for us who do not have God’s view and
vision of things? It means that we cannot understand the signifi-
cance of evil unitl we discover our real Self, the infinity of our being.
Bede Griffiths, commenting on the Bhagavad Gita, writes:
That means that we enter into the inner center of our being and at
that center we realize that we are cone with all people and with all
things. This is the essential vision.”
Will such a line of thinking not lead to disastrous implications? If

evil has ultimately a significance different from what we perceive,
why should we not engage in evil provided that we can make sure
that ultimately good will come out of it? What is the point of over-
coming evil if ultimately all evil will be redeemed?
Without going into great detail we could briefly state the
following. One, human consciousness has worked out some instances
where evil is done so that good can come out of it. The history of
surgery is one example; and the principle of a just war is another.
Two, the point of the ultimate redemption of evil is to highlight the
principle that human evil however colossal will never be able to
overcome God’s goodness. And the point in fighting evil is that we
have to discover our real Self, the infinity of our being. This we
cannot do unless we become free from all that blinds and misleads
us. Hence fighting evil implies that we engage in working selflessly
for the welfare of all (Bhagavad Gita 5.25; hereafter all references are
to chapter and verse of this text).
But how can God, the good and the merciful, permit this? Evil
can never become an argument against God’s goodness and mercy
for two reasons: one, we-can never fathom God’s goodness and
mercy and two, our understanding of goodness and mercy is incap-
able of understanding God’s goodness and mercy. The implication
of this is that religious beliefs and metaphors (God as father, mother,
etc.) have a different function, namely, to help us recognize our

finitude and alienation and discover our roots in the infinite. Reli-
gious metaphors cannot be pressed too far; one metaphor cannot be
made to answer all possible questions. In this regard the whole
family of metaphors ofa religious tradition should be of service in
locating the specific function of a metaphor. It is here that the
dialogue between religions and traditions as a corrective to the
danger of anthropomorphism that is inherent in all religious lan-
guage has its proper place.
Finally, a genuine religion must remind us constantly and contin-
ually that eternal life does not mean life without death! Eternal life
is the integration between the temporal and the eternal, namely, the
tempiternal.’ From a tempiternal perspective evil, suffering and
death have an altogether different significance.
Reality is Trinitarian
We have to revise our notions of reality. We have to begin with
any everyday experience. If I say, for example, I see a tree from my
window, there is something (the tree from my window) that I am
drawing attention to. This is true of all discourse. Whatever may be
the content of my discourse, there is something that I am asserting,
denying, something that I am drawing attention to. Panikkar calls this
the ‘cosmic,’ ‘material,’ ‘objectifiable’ dimension of reality. It is such
an aspect of reality which lends itself to objectification. Everything
has an objectifiable aspect. Even God has an objectifiable aspect.”
Coming back to our assertion, I see a tree from my window, I
perceive that besides the cosmic dimension of reality, there is the
objectifying dimension. Not only do I speak of the tree but there is
also someone who is conscious of the tree. This is the dimension of
consciousness that does the objectifying. Panikkar calls this the
human dimension of reality. In as much as we speak of even the un-
known, our very speaking of the unknown is its human dimension.
For anything to be—phenomenologically—the dimension of human
consciousness has to be connected with it.
Finally there is a depth-dimension to reality which connects the
objectifiable aspect of reality with its objectifying aspect. This implies
that both the objectifiable and the objectifying dimensions have a
kind of unfinished, infinite character. The objectifiable can be
objectified without any limit; water can be objectified from different

angles. Similarly there is no limit to the human’s objectifying
capacity. The human’s infinite capacity to objectify corresponds to
the infinite objectifiablity of the cosmic. Panikkar calls this the depth-
dimension, the spiritual or the divine dimension.”
Reality, that is, everything, is made up of these three dimensions.
The cosmic, the human and the divine are not nouns but con-
stitutive dimensions, aspects of reality. The cosmic dimension does
not refer to the cosmos, nor the human dimensions to the human
being nor the divine to God. The cosmos is made up of all three
dimensions but stresses the cosmic dimension; the human being is
made up of all three dimensions but stresses the human dimension
and God is made up of all three dimensions but stresses the divine
dimension. Each being is different because of the different ways in
which it integrates the three dimensions. Accordingly the Real is the
integration of all three dimensions.
The three dimensions of reality are in fact three communities
interpenetrating each other and thus forming one trinitarian com-
munity of reality. This means the cosmic dimension in you, in me,
in the tree, in everything is a community in which everything par-
ticipates. The same is to be said with regard to the human and the
divine dimensions. All three communities (cosmic, human and di-
vine) together constitute the trinitarian community of reality. Reality
is not a conglomeration of disconnected objects but one organic
community in which the three communities participate. Each being
is connected with every being. It is real in as much as it is connected
with every being. Wholeness is what constitutes the measure of a
being’s reality. In as much as it lacks wholeness it is not real.
Trinitarian Evil
It is not surprising that our world is no longer asafe place to live
in. The human is becoming less human, and the divine no longer
holds primary significance, at least as far as our universe of meaning
is concerned. Reality is becoming less real. Is it surprising then that
meaning in life is in short supply? My aim is to point to the constant
danger of the human being, the cosmos and the divine becoming
less and less real because of blindness to each of the three
dimensions of reality.
Clearly blindness to each of these aspects is different. Blindness

to the cosmic turns the cosmos into a world of objects, a world of
manipulation, a world with no significance. Blindness to the human
makes the human beingaliving body with a dead spirit. One’s so-
called. interpersonal relationships are in effect inter-living-object
relationships. Blindness to the divine is manifested in the lack of
depth in the relationships to the cosmic and the human. There is no
depth in the world of objects nor in that of living objects. The fatal
conclusion is that the human is becoming a mere human and the
world is becoming mere matter; in neither of them can one find real
meaning or mystery.
This is what I call trinitarian evil. It means that all evil has a
trinitarian consequence: that is to say, neglect of the divine dimen-
sion is at the same time neglect in some way of the human and the
cosmic; neglect of the human dimension is at the same time neglect
of the divine and the cosmic dimension; and neglect of the cosmic
dimension is at the same time neglect of the divine and the human.
Trinitarian evil implies that whatever be the partiality we are
involved in, it always affects the three dimensions of reality.
Accordingly we have evil wherever there is partiality. Evil is
wherever one or the other dimension of reality is overlooked or
denied. Where wholeness is rejected or neglected and partiality is
the norm, there evil makes its appearance. What we usually call evil
(crime, criminals, intention; motives, etc.) are all symptoms of the
larger evil of blindness and partiality to one or the other dimension
of reality. This is the base of all evil whether it is seen anthropo-
centrically (as sin, i.e., disobedience to God’s will) or cosmocen-
trically (as evil [adharma, papam], i.e., lack of harmony with reality).
What is evil ontologically speaking? Evil is the movement against
reality. Whereas the movement of being is towards fullness, evil is
the attempt to empty reality of its meaning and significance. Mean-
ing and significance emerge only from the direction of wholeness
and fullness. Indeed where meaning and significance are missing or
neglected, there is no fullness or wholeness possible. Reality is not
to be understood statically. That which moves toward fullness and
totality is the real. As something moves in the direction of fullness it
is real, and as it moves away from it, it is evil. The question is not
how evil is in the world but in what direction it is moving, in the
direction of the real or its opposite, the non-real.
The ontological order is the order which comprehends whole-

ness; wholeness cannot be restricted to the moral order alone. The
moral order is not independent of the ontological perspective; it has
its foundation in the ontological order of harmony of the three
constituents of reality. This implies two things: Not only is good and
evil determined from an ontological perspective but also all notions
of good and evil are of a piece with the ontological perspective. In
the last analysis all notions of good and evil, if they are to have any
basis, have to be intelligible in terms of their respective ontology.
Evil in the Bhagavad Gita

To understand the Bhagavad Gita’s insight into evil we need
briefly to study its view of reality. Reality has two aspects: the
perishable and the imperishable. We begin with the imperishable
(8.3), the immutable (9.14), the highest person (8.8; 15.17-19) and
the Supreme Spirit (15.17b,31b) who embraces all that is. The
Supreme Person, purushottama, is the beginning, middle and end of
all things. Whatever is, is in and through the purushottama.
Purushottama is the One-who-is-the-All because the All is sustained
and held in being by the purushottama (11.40).
In the background of such a view is the metaphor of the cosmic
person of the Rigvedic hymn X.90 (13.13-14). This is an analogy
which the Indian tradition (especially Ramanuja of the Vaishnava
tradition) has canonized: the universe as the body of the Supreme
Spirit of the universe.'’ But unlike the everyday notion of spirit
which is embodied in the body, the Indian analogy stresses the
animation of the universe by the Supreme Spirit. The universe is in
the Supreme Spirit (9.5) which is the anima animating the universe.
The universe is animated by the Supreme Spirit.
However, we can speak of the Supreme Spirit only in terms of its
body, the animated universe called prakriti. Prakriti is the cosmic
process of change and becoming.'' Prakriti is constituted by three
constituents (gwnas) called sattva, rajas and tamas."* Sattva accounts
for what is light and bright, rajas for what is dynamic and tamas for
what is dark and heavy. All three are to be understood primarily
ontologically and only secondarily psychologically. Hence sattva has
to do with what is light, namely, that which enlightens and is good;
rajas has to do with what is dynamic, with the passionate, pleasing,
and repelling; similarly tamas refers both to what is dark, dull and
heavy, and to the stubborn and the stupid. The three basic move-
ments of prakriti are the upward movement of sattva, the sideward
movement of rajas and the downward movement of tamas. We could
perhaps compare the threefold movement to the forces of an orbital
movement wherein the centrifugal force is‘saitva, the centripetal is
tamas and the orbital movement itself is rajas. All three go together,
none can exist by itself and only when the three harmonize do we
have the movement of an orbital process (14.18).
This analogy which is primarily applied to the macrocosm (.e.,
the universe) is also applicable to the microcosm, namely, the human
being. The microcosm is neither separate nor different from the
macrocosm.
The smooth and harmonious orbital movement that human
existence is meant to be is neither smooth nor harmonious because
each of the three forces pulls in its own direction without reference
to the others. The result is that human existence is scattered and
fragmented and so humans are unable to find their real identity in
the Supreme Person. Bedeviled by a false sense of identity human
beings cannot realize their true Self (3.27). This is bondage, the state
where evil starts to raise its head as a matter of course.
With this background we are at the core of the problem of evil in
the Bhagavad Gita. The state of evil in which humans find themselves
is bondage. In the language of our analogy, bondage means the state
in which we allow ourselves to be pushed and pulled by all the forces
of the prakriti—a process which in effect alienates us from our real
source and space, the purushottama. Bondage through attachment to
each of these three constituents has a different effect. Sattva binds by
attachment to happiness and knowledge; rayas to action and tamas to
heedlessness, indolence and sleep (14.6-9).
What needs to be noted is the following: The movements towards
happiness, knowledge, action, heedlessness, indolence and sleep are
present wherever we have the three gunas; that means, as constit-
uents of prakriti they are ubiquitous. This, however, is not the
problem. Their movements are natural and one has to make use of
them in order to discover the real roots of human existence, namely
the Supreme Person.
Bondage enters the scene once we begin to give in to these
movements; they then rule over us and our freedom disappears. We
become the victims of these forces. We are ruled by the false sense
of identity and are alienated from our true Self when these onto-
logical (and not merely psychological) forces (of passion, greed, and
delusion) lord it over us. Passion, greed and delusion are not so
much psychological as ontological movements. To be in charge of
them means to be led by the realm of the spirit (purusha); but to be
led by them is to be blind to the realm of the spirit. Such blindness
is existential blindness, the privation of existential openness.
Bondage is the movement that arises from the ego faculty
(ahamkara) and liberation (moksa) is the movement that leads to the
discovery of the true Self (pwrusa). In the language of the Bhagavad
Giia bondage is the movement towards the non-real and liberation
towards the Real. Consequently, if one follows the movement
towards the non-real, the orbital movement of existence will turn
out to bea vicious circle (samsara), a going in circles with no way out;
and if one follows the movement towards the Real, one will be
opened up to the infinite, to one’s infinite capacity for fullfillment,
which is another way of saying, one will be opened to the Real.
To quote the Bhagavad Gita:
SAT - it means what is real and what is good, Arjuna; the word SAT
is also used when an action merits praise. SAT is steadfastness in
sacrifice, in penance, in charity; any action of this order is denoted
by SAT. But oblation, charity, and penance offered without faith are
called ASAT, for they have no reality here or in the world after death
(17. 26-28).
One has to remember that in the Gita’s context sacrifice (yajna) is

understood primarily ontologically, not ritualistically, much less
psychologically (3. 4-19).'* In the Gita, it must be remembered, faith,
oblation, gift and austerity are primarily to be seen from the onto-
logical and not from the moral viewpoint. The sequence is striking:
reality, goodness and good work. And even good work is under-
stood as action undertaken for the sake of the Supreme Person.
Furthermore sat (being), the present participle of the verb ‘to be’ is
contrasted with asat (non-being); the real vis-a-vis the non-real.
Whatever i 1s done without faith, oblation, is asa, it is nought, here or
hereafter.’ Indeed, the non- reality of such action is the precise
point of the quotation.
Belief and unbelief are in the view of the Gita ontological cate-
gories. ° The kind of being one is depends on the nature of one’s
faith.'’ Faith isontological or existential openness. Without openness
one stands on the moving sands of the non-real; accordingly, what-
ever one builds on will be built on the non-real. The openness of
being means openness to the Real, to the infinitely Real. If the Gita
speaks of three kinds of faith, sattvic, rajasic and tamasic, it is, in my
interpretation, because the sattvic stresses the divine dimension, the
rajasic the human and the tamasic the cosmic. An integral faith
requires an integration of all three dimensions.
To put this more systematically: the real and the good are
connected with faith, and the non-real and evil with the lack of faith.
To believe is to see things as they really are; not to believe is to be
unable to see reality as it is. Not to believe then is not to be in touch
with reality. In the view of the Gita, this is the lowest form of evil
since it is the same as having no reality here or in the world after
death.
Overcoming Evil
Trying to overcome the triple evil is what the Gita tries to achieve
through its triple yoga of knowledge, devotion and action.» Jnana-
yoga (knowledge) challenges our notion of the divine; bhakti-yoga
(devotion) purifies our understanding of the human and karma-yoga
(action) questions the authenticity of our commitment to the cosmos.
Genuine integral faith implies a notion of the divine that is neither
rationalistic nor idealistic; an understanding of the human that is
neither merely cosmic nor purely divine, and a commitment to the
cosmos that is neither exclusively object-oriented nor exclusively
other-worldly.
Overcoming evil is neither merely a subject of grace nor a totally
human initiative. It is not a question of relying only on grace. There
is need of human response. But neither is it a question of what we
can do about this. The question we have to ask is this: Is wholeness
a matter of doing or of discovering? Has not the paradigm of doing
brought us to this impasse in the first place? It would be a fallacy to
suggest that doing is part of our responsibility. Looking at doing in
this way ignores that prior to doing there is need to listen and to
discover something that is given. The Bhagavad Gita’s view of doing
is that all doing leads to bondage except selfless activity which is for
the welfare of the whole (3.9). The Gita coordinates the centripetal
force of selflessness with the centrifugal force of the welfare of all
beings. What emerges from this is not so much action as partici-
pation in the natural orbital movement of reality where one is not
different from reality. This is the experience of nonduality of the
later Advaita schools.
The answer to evil, I submit, is to be sought in a fresh discovery,
in a revision (metanoia) of reality. For this we need a mystagogy (in
Indian terminology, a sadhana) like that of the Gita which will lead
us from the unreal of instrumentalization to participation in the
Real, from the darkness of fragmentation to the light of unity-in-
diversity and from the death of limitation to the life of the unlimited.
NOTES
1. G. Oberhammer, “Begegnung” als Kategorie der Religionshermeneutik (Vienna:
Publications of the De Nobili Research Library, 1989).
2. R. Panikkar, Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics (New York: Paulist Press, 1979),
p. 3.
3. H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Sheed and Ward, Reprint,
1985), pp. 269-274.
4. This is my own way of putting together these different aspects. I am in no
way intending to equate world-view with the horizon of understanding or
with mythos or language. These are to be understood not as equivalent but
as homologous.
5. “Colligite Fragmenta. For an Integration of Reality,” in: Alienation to At-
Oneness, ed. by F.A. Eigo (Philadelphia: The Villanova University Press,
1977).
6. B. Griffiths, River of Compassion. A Christian Commentary on the Bhagavad Gita
(New York: Amity House, 1987), p. 85. Comment on Bhagavad Gita 5.7
which speaks of one “whose soul is one with the soul of all.”
7. See R. Panikkar, “Time and Sacrifice—The Sacrifice of Time and the
Ritual of Modernity,” in The Study of Time, ed. byJ. T. Fraser, N. Lawrence
and D. Park (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1978), pp. 711 ff.
8. See R. Panikkar, “The Cosmotheandric Intuition,” Jeevadhara, 79 (January
1984), pp. 27-35.
9. Ibid.
10. See Bhagavad Gita, Ch. 12.
11. See Bhagavad Gita, Ch. 13.33; 14.3-4; 15.17-18.
12. See Bhagavad Gita, Ch. 14.5ff.
13. The weakness of the analogy is obvious: in an orbital movement the centri-
petal force has to be equal and opposite to the centrifugal movement which
is not the case here. The point of the analogy is that just as all three forces
in an orbital process are constitutive so too are all three gunas constitutive
of the cosmic process.
14. R.C. Zaehner, The Bhagavad-Gita: With a commentary based on the original
sources (London/Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).
15. The Aitareya Brahmana 7, 10, 4 couples faith with truth which in the
Upanishadic tradition is ontological truth. Truth (satya) is the abstract form
of sat (being). In some philosophical traditions of India faith is said to be
a positive attitude toward reality. See Paul Hacker, “Uber den Glauben in
der Religionsphilosophie des Hinduismus,” Zeztschrift ftir Misstonswissen-
schaft und Reigionswissenschaft, 38 (1954), pp. 51-66.
16. Bhagavad Gita, 17.3: “A person is made of faith: as a person’s faith so the
person.”
17. R. Panikkar, “Faith as a Constitutive Human Dimension,” in Myth, Faith
and Hermeneutics (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), pp. 188-229.
18. See F. X. D’Sa, “The Yogi as a Contemplative in Action,” in Studies in
Formative Spirituality, Vol. X1:3 (1990), pp. 289-302.
PART THREE
Responses from
African Traditional Religion
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13
Evil in Yoruba
Religion and Culture
By E. O. Oyelade
a he Yoruba who occupy the western region of Nigeria are a

homogeneous community. Although they speak varying dia-
lects, they do understand one another. They are presently
divided into five states: Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Oshun and Ondo. This
is a deeply religious community whose ways of life are essentially the
products of religion. Religion and culture or religion and morality
are inseparable. Separation attempts have been made and are still
being made through foreign religions such as Islam and Chris-
tianity. But the cord of the extended family, described as the Ebi
commonwealth,’ is so strong that no individual, despite a new reli-
gion, can claim total separation from the traditional community.
This community is a veritable platform where all kinds of evil forces
disrupt the life of individuals. The Yoruba are ever aware of the
presence of evil. Instead of running away, they simply live with it,
seeking whatever solutions are possible and accepting with little or
no complaints whatever cannot be overcome, as their lot in life.
In light of the above I have four objectives in this discussion. The
first is to describe the beliefs of Yoruba traditional society to the
problem of evil. The second is to examine four types of evil. The
third objective is to examine critically how the Yoruba in their
- 157-
158 EVIL IN YORUBA RELIGION AND CULTURE
traditional settings seek to deal with the problem of evil. The fourth
is to assess the value of evil and examine its future role in a society
that is becoming quickly literate and mobile.
The Origin of Evil |

Several words are used in Yoruba language to express the word
evil. Among these are ibi—evil, bubuwru—wickedness, aidara—bad,
aito—unrighteousness. It is the word 1b1 which corresponds most
closely with the English word evil. There are several understandings
about the origin of ib7 in our world. For instance, one theory says
that when a woman gives birth, the baby is omo; the placenta is 1bi-
omo, i.e., the evil of the baby. According to Chief Olumuyide
Ogunyemi-Falua’ both the placenta and the baby are omo; one is omo
that can speak or make sounds, and the second is omo that is silent
and cannot speak. The second is the caretaker of the human omo
with whom all things are kept. But it is also the evil-Esu that
followed omo from heaven. The Yoruba refer to it as a delicate thing
that must not be broken. Because it is also a person; it has ears and
can hear but it does not have a mouth to speak.
During labor the baby may decide to return to heaven. This is the
time when the herbalist may speak to it through incantations.’ They
will plead with it to rethink and come out peacefully in order to
complete its assignment. They will remind it that “the dog returns
home with the person who takes it out.” Then it will come out. After
delivery, <bi-omo, the placenta or the silent child is put in a pot and
buried in a cool place. It is generally believed that the spirit of ibi-
omo is continuously revolting against the child and never departs
until death separates them.
Bolaji Idowu identifies Esu as one of the sources of evil.
According to him, the Yoruba believe that there is “an unmistakable
element of evil in Esu. As a result all things evil are said to be the
manifestation of his powers. Because of his wickedness he was feared
by both humans and divinities. He is described as Esu, the enemy of
the divinities. No wonder the Yoruba attributed every evil tendency
in man to his agency.” For instance, when a man slapped his wife,
it is the work of Esu; when a man got drunk and broke his leg, it is
Esu; and when a man committed adultery with his brother’s
wife—surely it is Esu! So all wicked thoughts are given by Esu. A
E. O. OYELADE 159
wicked child is called the son of Esu. When a person is resolute

about initiating an action calculated to have evil effect, he is asked:
“Is Esu manipulating you?” Esu is described as Agbako who causes
accidents and misfortunes to travellers. A very cherished prayer is:
“You shall not meet with Agbako on your way.”
But Esu is not totally characterized as the biblical Satan. Evil, for
Esu, is a hobby “just as any person corrupted by power which seems
uncontrolled may find sadistic relish in throwing his weight about in
unsympathetic, callous ways.”” The worshippers of Esu are proud of
bearing names with Esu as prefix: Esubiyi, the scion of Esu;
Esugbayi, claimed by Esu; Esubunmi, Esu offers me a gift; Esudara,
Esu does wonders; Esudiya, Esu avenges me.
It appears that there are two sides to Esu in Yoruba religious
culture. Esu causes evil by giving misleading suggestions which end
in sadness or destruction. On the other hand Esu is a good divinity,
very close to Olodumare. Esu is able to obtain good things for its
worshippers. Esu may be made angry for the purpose of inflicting
injury on someone by using adi, (palm kernel oil) as a libation,
usually poured on the Esu rock. When the blessing of Esu is
required, epo (palm oil) is poured on the rock.
From Ifa records, the Yoruba believe in the existence of super-
natural powers. According to Chief Olumuyide Ogunyemi-Falua
after the earth was created by Orunmila, Olodumare allowed the
earth to mature and expand. For more than atrillion years the
earth was inhabited by powerful beings, the divinities. There are two
types, the good and the evil. The good are also twofold, namely, the
gods and the ancestors. These good supernatural powers assist
humans in their daily activities if they are kind to their neighbors
and faithful to their god. On the other hand, the evil supernatural
powers are said to be two types: the belligerent enemies and the
witches. These supernatural powers work against human interests
by trying to disrupt human destiny. The most dreaded are death,
disease, infirmity or paralysis, and a loss that destroys or carries
away one’s belongings. Another group are the witches or birds. The
witches are capable of assuming the form of birds whenever they
wish to attack or work against human interests.”
The wicked people who receive powers from the witches or the
divinities or other spirits are classified as part of the belligerent
powers. The main characteristic of these wicked beings is that they
always pretend to be helpers and admirers in order that they not be

suspected for the evils they do.
These theories of the origin of evil are given realistic interpre-
tations. Humankind lives in the midst of enemies seen and unseen.
One must struggle to find safety in order to achieve goodness en-
shrined in one’s destiny.
Types of Evil
The Yoruba divines have, however, tried to classify evil into four
types: physical evil, moral evil, inflicted evil, and predestined evil.
The most disturbing manifestations of physical evil include the
destruction of houses, property or persons by lightning or thunder.
The Yoruba regard this as the function of Sango, historically, a
powerful Oyo king who became adivinity after his death. He now
resides in heaven and became in the apt words of Leo Frobenius
“the Hurler of thunderbolts, the Lord of the storms, the God who
burns down compounds and cities, the Render of trees and Slayer
of men; cruel and savage. .. .”
Another manifestation of evil is seen in the epidemic caused by
Sopona, the god of smallpox. To illustrate how dreadful this disease
is regarded, the late Obafemi Awolowo reported the outbreak of an
epidemic of smallpox in 1920 in his hometown, Ikenne. The priests
and their devotees had to observe a twenty-one-day purification
ceremony to appease Sopona.» Among the titles assigned to Sopona
are: Lord of the-earth or world, hot earth, meaning that he is an
earth divinity. During the outbreak, women must not sweep their
houses and premises. Sopona is also referred to as the Lord of the
open. For example, when one throws out water from inside the house
one must say, excuse me or permit me, Lord, to throw out this water.
It is reported that Sopona can be employed against an enemy or
as a source of income for priests. H. J. Elis (1892), a Wesleyan mis-
sionary, once had to plead with the Ogbonis (tribal elders) who
arrested a person and charged him for murder because after he was
healed of smallpox, his aunt became afflicted with it and died. The
Ogbonis believed the healed person had transferred the disease to
his aunt.’ An unscrupulous priest may also exploit the situation by
secretly spreading the infection in order to collect sacrificial objects
and money from the relations of the victims.
E. O. OYELADE 161
Chief Olumuyide Ogunyemi-Falua claimed that one of the most

devastating supernatural powers causing physical disasters is the god
of the wind. He controls his messenger, whirlwind, and sends him
to destroy all the obstacles that stand in his way as he journeys
through forests and cities. The main task assigned to him by
Olodumare is to transfer plant seeds from place to place, preserving
the forestation of the earth. But the god of the wind is also a wise
and powerful magician who often took people away, and having
enslaved them, taught them magical powers. A popular Yoruba
magician claimed that he spent seven years with the god of the wind
[between heaven and earth]."”
The general moral response of the Yoruba to physical evil is
usually that of resignation and acceptance although efforts may later
be made to prevent future occurrence. The usual greeting is: Greet-
ings to you, the way things are around us, God will deliver us.
Bolaji Idowu asserts rightly that morality is the fruit of religion.’
The Yoruba do not make any attempts to separate religion from
morality, and it is impossible to do so without disastrous conse-
quences. In the view of the Yoruba certain actions are morally ap-
proved and others are disapproved. Those that are forbidden are
tabu. The expression “It is a tabu, it is not done” expresses the belief
that if such a tabu is not observed, terrible consequences should be
expected. The tabu is in consonance with the expressed injunctions
of the deity or the divinities. Usually, these injunctions are made
known through divination and the voice of the oracle. Therefore,
the consequence of disobedience is believed to arrive some day when
the avenger or other powers begin to act. It is a common saying:
The Avenger will avenge, he cannot but avenge.

He who queries will query, he cannot but query.
This oracle to Orunmila made him give strict
warnings to his male and female children.”
The Yoruba believe that Orunmila is the secret agent who

discovers all the hidden behaviors of people and judges justly. He is
referred to as the retributor who knows and judges the secrets of
one’s heart. It is expected that a family source of power given by the
family divinity is secret and is not to be disclosed to an outsider. Any
member of the extended family who is guilty of revealing the secret
may be severely punished and ostracized. If two friends enter into

an oath of agreement or a covenant, it is tabu to break the covenant.
The defaulter is referred to as one who turns the earth upside
down. If a person has sexual affairs with another man’s wife, he is
said to have eaten the tabu. All these unhealthy behaviors are dis-
approved of not only by the community, but they also stir up the
anger of the divinities even Olodumare himself.
Inflicted evils are the result of the wicked activities of witches and
medicine men. In this case the victim may not have committed any
offense. One may be tempted to behave in a certain way in order to
be punished for it. One may be punished simply as a demonstration
of power. The powerful people of the earth are usually referred to
as Aye.
I have no pride before aye.

I prostrate before young and old.
I prostrate before you my fathers
and mothers. I prostrate, let my
humility be acceptable.
The Yoruba consider witches as the most dreaded group of Aye.

Ifa poems describe the powers of the witches as more powerful than
human beings, the divinities, or the ancestors. The creation divin-
ities were humiliated by the witches.’ Akin Omoyajowo has iden-
tified three methods of becoming a witch, namely, by inheritance, by
swallowing witchcraft substances which are sold cheaply by women,
or it may be imposed on people by demons.'" According to Chief
Olumuyide Ogunyemi-Falua, the witches are given power to do
many things. They may make marks ona child’s body or may cause
a physical deformity while the baby is in its mother’s womb; they
may prevent delivery and cause the death of the child and its
mother. Whatever one succeeds in doing is done by the witches and
whatever fails is caused by their actions. The control of the earth is
in the hands of the witches, so they can penetrate into any place they
wish. Since they are to continue eternally, they must continue to
initiate beloved ones into their cult.
It may be implied that the presence of the witches in the midst of
human society is the proof of the reality of evil. Their presence also
suggests the fact that the Yoruba believe that Olodumare is almighty
E. O. OYELADE 163
and all-powerful, yet there is almost nothing society can do with the
witches. Could this be regarded as self-limitation or does Olodumare
allow the witches to operate in order to maintain God-consciousness
in human societies? If the second suggestion is the case, then we
may say that the end justifies the means.
Witches may have no guilty consciences. But the community has
always been their judge. Witches, when discovered, are regarded as
enemies who must be punished and sometimes destroyed. It is
common belief that they cannot escape punishment since they must
confess all their sins before death.
One of the strongest religio-cultural beliefs among the Yoruba is
the doctrine of predestination. According to this general belief
humans obtain their destiny in one of three ways: that to which one
kneels and chooses; that to which one kneels and receives; and that
which is imposed on one. In consequence of this the Yoruba believe
that all events in this world whether good or bad are the outward
manifestation of a person’s destiny."
The Yoruba, following the revelation in Ifa poetry, believe that
“a man’s destiny, that is to say his success or failure in life, depends
to a large extent on the type of head (ori) he chose in heaven.” In
this context, everyone’s ori is regarded as one’s personal god who
cares intimately about one’s affairs. The ori is worshipped and propi-
tiated.'° Once a person arrives here on earth as destined, nothing
can be changed. But unlike predestination in Islam which cannot be
altered, the Yoruba allows room for modification for the better or
for the worst.
Methods of Dealing with Evil

Evil is a reality in Yoruba society. Some of it cannot be controlled
while most of the forces of evil may be prevented. The Yoruba are
active in the search for preventive methods. Among the popular
methods used are: sermonization, the medicine man, sacrifice, and
the king. All traditional priests emphasize the results that follow evil
deeds. The Ifa poems preached sanity and good will. The wicked
should consider their sufferings in the afterlife. A popular Ifa lyric
is as follows:
Perpetuate no evil in this world

for heaven’s sake (repeated twice).
For when you get to the gate of heaven,
you will give account (of your stewardship)."”
Preventive sermonization is especially popular during the various

religious festivals. The drummers and the musicians emphasize the
concept of retribution here on earth and yonder in heaven. The
diviners are also preachers of divine retribution. When a medicine
man is consulted, he assures the client that the penalty is sure to
come as a result of wickedness. ©
According to R. J. Gehman, a medicine man functions similarly
to a traditional doctor who seeks to help the sick and needy who are
troubled by witches. In this regard a medicine man is not a herbalist
in Gehman’s view. This is not completely true among the Yoruba.
The babalawo, the diviner connected with the cult of Orunmila very
often is also oloogun, the medicine man; he is also onisegun, the
herbalist. This is notwithstanding the fact that there are inde-
pendent herbalists who specialize in curative medicine only. Even
they sometimes consult diviners. The medicine man is the “doctor
of traditional African culture endowed by his ancestral spirits with
the power of counteracting witchcraft—hence called a witch
doctor.’
The belief in the efficacy of traditional sacrifice can be confirmed
by the fact that every morning in Ile-Ife, one of the well-known
modern societiés, you can find in many quarters remnants of sacri-
fices. According to the Yoruba sacrifice is a religious act which in-
volves the rendering of something to a supernatural being or beings.
The practice of sacrifice varies from religion to religion but
essentially is similar. It has various intents and purposes.” Awolalu
having observed various sacrificial rites affirms that it is not possible
to speak of one purpose of sacrifice. It may be made to propitiate
the angry spirit whose land or trees have been destroyed or to
substitute for a sick human’s life; or to seek the support of the
divinity for one’s community or farm or business; or to change an
unfortunate situation into an auspicious one.” Offerings may be
made to control and prevent the evil machinations of mysterious
powers or to implore one’s fate divinity to bring good things in life.
Or sacrifice may invite the invisible spirits (the ancestors) to partake
E. O. OYELADE 165
in the offered food and drink in order that they may be well-
disposed to the living. This is a communication between the living
and the living dead or to express gratitude to spiritual beings for the
benefits received from them and in order to fulfil the vow made to
theirparticular divinity who provided for their needs in a surprising
way.
Although Metuh agrees that sacrifices have varying purposes, he
claims that no compulsion is put on the gods. “In the final analysis
the believer knows that the gods will do as they like, no matter the
cost of the sacrifice.” Like Kristensen, Metuh sees sacrifice as a
material corporal prayer, a form of communication with God. The
gift or offering thus becomes a means off expressing the intensity of
one’s desire to communicate with God.”
This may be what sacrifice means in the Igbo community context.
In the Yoruba view of life sacrifice must be dictated by the oracle.
Once the oracle specifies, the result is assured. The oracle, especially
Ifa divination, is the liaison between the enquirer and the divinity in
charge. If it is a form of prayer, it is a realized prayer, a shout of
victory.
When there is a physical disaster or the witches are becoming too
outrageous, community representatives will visit the king and place
before him their problems. The king in turn will, in consultation
with his chiefs, send a special message to the head of all the babalawo
or send a message to the mother of the town, the head of the
witches. They will then make demands in order that the problems
may be suppressed or removed completely. The king is usually all
too pleased to provide the objects required to ward off the evils in
society. Kingship rituals become the sacred canopy under which the
entire society takes refuge.”
Conclusion
A final question to be asked is what are the advantages of evil in
Yoruba religious culture? In the Yoruba view evil means suffering.
To endure suffering is to be a real man or a real woman. This
attitude toward evil has limited psychological effects. In the words
of Fela Anikulapo, the great Nigerian musician, the African man is
always suffering and smiling. A Yoruba proverb says, “He who
prevents your good from reaching you, has taught you courage or
strength.” The presence of evil in society also teaches wisdom. It also

teaches a person how to live and deal with the powerful people of
this world. There is a proverb which says, “An adult who refuses to
run away from a snake, awaits death.” It is also said, ° ‘If you claim to
be wise without suffering, who is your teacher?”
Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of evil is the persistent fear
planted in the hearts of Yoruba people. In most cases, one’s home-
stead is the seat of evil. Many people have migrated to other towns
and cities where their origins are unknown. It is believed that the
wicked and the witches must know one’s genealogy to do any harm.
From this study we have seen that evil is a practical phenomenon,
not a theoretical or philosophical ideology. It is manifested in the
daily life of the Yoruba community. The Yoruba people in a tradi-
tional society may have to live with evil for many more years. How-
ever, the advancement of Western education, philosophy and way
of life are likely to reduce the fear associated with evil. For example,
thunder does not really have any connection with Sango, a kingly
divinity. It is a physical manifestation explained by scientists.
Looking more closely at the influence of Western education in
traditional communities, one can see already a tendency to appro-
priate more and more scientific attitudes. Witchcraft is concentrated
in the female community. Women’s education is now very popular.
Here we can expect two possibilities: first, there may emerge a new
set of educated witches whose activities will be positive. There is a
common belief in Africa that witches in Europe are recognized
contributors toward scientific discoveries. If this is true, a similar
advantage may be expected among the Yoruba. Second, the newly
educated and elite women may reject witchcraft as a traditional folly
which has caused underdevelopment. Presently, there is no positive
contribution which witchcraft makes among the Yoruba.
In Yorubaland, we are also experiencing the establishment of
new and elite urban communities, removed from traditional society.
About ten kilometers away from Ibadan, an urban community called
Ajoda New Town is developing. Most of the inhabitants are well-
placed officials in government and private sectors. The children who
grow up in this town may hear nothing about witches or evil spirits
or wicked men of charms. Similar communities are growing up
around the centers of higher learning especially, polytechnic in-
stitutes and universities. For example, Obafemi Awolowo University
E. O. OYELADE 167
may be well described as a modern site where people are seldom

exposed to the traditional ways of life, except for research purposes.
The growing number of medical centers is another hope of the
future. The Yoruba communities have passed through an era called
the Abiku plague where children in the womb are switched and
replaced by witches or spirits. Such forces have the power to chase
out the real natural children and occupy the wombs as abiku
children. After birth they bring unrest to the family. The children
are sickly, very expensive to nurse and frequently die. But they keep
returning to the same mothers. With the advent of medical science,
it was discovered that most of the children described as abiku were
killed by diseases. Presently if there are any such children, they are
very few in number. Medical science has also shown that so-called
inflicted evils can be cured in the hospital. The preventive activities
of hospitals and primary health care services are becoming more
and more effective.
There is a new factor growing out of the established churches of
the Western European missionary tradition. This is the new Pente-
costal movement. Educated youths are very much involved in this
movement. Apart from the emphasis on spiritual gifts, there is great
opposition to what they describe as satanic forces. They are opposed
to all forms of secret societies, moral laxity and the use of black
magic. The emphasis is on the reality of Christ’s miracles as a way to
overcome such satanic forces. Coupled with these beliefs is a vig-
orous evangelistic movement, not only in the city communities but
also in the village communities. They go about denouncing all forms
of evil in traditional society.
For the last three decades there have been strong voices calling
for the revival of African religions and cultures. For instance in
February 1977 a Festival of Arts and Culture was held in Nigeria to
highlight the contributions of the black race to world development.
This was internalized i in many African societies especially among the
Yoruba people.” The Orisa traditional movement has become an
international movement. The main objective is to revive the Yoruba
traditional religions and cultures with a view to replanting them
among blacks in the diaspora. Will these movements actively sup-
porting traditional heritage result in a more sophisticated amalgam
of the past and present? Whatever is done will not only determine
the nature of survival from the evil forces surrounding the Yorubas,
but it will also determine the rate of development in Yorubaland in

particular and in Africa in general.
NOTES
1. 1.A. Akinjogbin, Dahomey and Its Neighbours, 1708-1818 (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 9.
2. Chief Olumuyide Ogunyemi-Falua, is a traditional healer from Osi-Ekiti,
the Apena of the Ogboni cult, and he is the Chairman, Research Network
on traditional medicine based in the Faculty of Pharmacy at Obafemi
Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, interviewed March 15, 1994.
3. Incantation is magical language making references to the origin of related
things and ending with a command.
4. E. Bolaji Idowu, Olodumare: God in Yoruba Belief (London: Longman, 1962),
pp. 83f.
5. vids, p. 83.
6. Wande Abimbola, Ifa: An Exposition of Ifa Literary Corpus (Ibadan, Nigeria:
Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 151f.
7. Op. cit., B. Idowu, p. 91.
8. Modupe Oduyoye, “The Spider, The Chameleon, and the Creation of the
Earth,” in Traditional Religion in West Africa, ed. E.A. Adegbola (Ibadan:
Daystar Press, 1983), p. 381.
9. James Johnson, “Civil Leadership: Confrontations with the Ogboni, 1892,”
in Traditional Religion in West Africa, ed. E.A. Adegbola (Ibadan: Daystar
Press, 1983),"p: 104.
10. Unfortunately Aladokun, the magician, was slain by one of the mad men
he was trying to heal.
11. Op. cit., Bolaji Idowu, pp. 146f. Also see p. 198.
12. Ibid., p. 198, in the original language.
13. Wande Abimbola, Sixteen Great Poems of Ifa (Zaria: UNESCO and Abimbola
Pub., Gaskiya Corporation, 1975), pp. 292, 309.
14. J. Akin Omoyajowo, “What Is Witch-Craft,” in Traditional Religion in West
Africa, Ed. E.A. Adegbola (Ibadan: Daystar Press, 1983), pp. 317-318.
15. Op. cit., Bolaji Idowu, p. 173.
16. Op. cit., Wande Abimbola (Corpus), p. 113.
17. J.A. Ayorinde, in Religion and Ethics in Nigeria, Ed. S.O. Abogunrin (Ibadan:
Daystar Press, 1986), p. 17.
18. RJ. Gehman, African Traditional Religion in Biblical Perspective (Kijabe,
Kenya: Kesho Pubs., 1987), p. 75. For the activities of the Bamucapi of
Malawi (1934) and the Atinga of West Africa (1957). Op. cit., Omoyajowo,
pp. 323-324.
19. J. Omosade Awolalu, Yoruba Beliefs and Sacrificial Rites (London: 1979), pp.
134f.
E. O. OYELADE 169
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., pp. 138-141.
22. Emefie Ikenga-Metuh, African Religions in Western Conceptual Schemes: The
Problem of Interpretation (Bodija, Ibadan: Pastoral Institute Pub., 1985), p.
68.
23. J.K. Olupona, Kingship, Religion, and Rituals in a Nigerian Community: A
Phenomenological Study of Ondo Yoruba Festivals (Stockholm, Sweden:
Almavist & Wiksel International, 1991), pp. 21, p. 4, 9, 43.
24. J.O. Ajibola, Owe Yoruba (Yoruba Proverbs) (Ibadan, Nigeria: Oxford
University Press, 1976 ed.), pp. 1, 3.
25. Colin Legum (ed.), African Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and
Documents, Vol. 9, 1976-1977 (London: Rex Collins, 1977), pp. B 676-B
577.
14
Gods Versus Anti-Gods:
Conflict and Resolution
in the Yoruba Cosmos
By Wande Abimbola
T he Yoruba are a West African people who live in Nigeria,

where they are about 20 million people, Benin Republic and
Togo, with some villages in Ghana. The Atlantic slave trade
brought thousands of Yoruba-speaking people to Brazil, Cuba and
other Caribbean islands from where a second wave of migration of
Yoruba descendants went to the United States. Today millions of
people are to be found in the Americas who are direct descendants
of the original Yoruba slaves or who have embraced Yoruba religion
in the form of Santeria, Candomble, Umbanda or Macumba. Haitian
Vodum also has a very strong Yoruba literary, iconographic, ritual
and philosophical base.
The aim here is to examine the Yoruba concept of evil and its
inevitable conflict with the idea of good, and how the Yoruba have
been able to maintain a balance or resolution through a symbolic
system of codes of communication with their elaborate and elastic
pantheon of supernatural powers. I will rely on the Ifa literary cor-
pus which is by far the most important of the hundreds of sacred
oral texts of the Yoruba, some of which have already gone into
oblivion.’ A study of the sacred texts of any religion, whether oral or
written, is the primary way to understand the theology of a religion
1704
WANDE ABIMBOLA 17)
rather than the modern preoccupation of scholars of religion and

anthropology with interviews of people. Interviews should come at
a secondary level mainly to throw more light on the texts or to
elucidate or explicate already collected data.
The Yoruba pantheon consists of six hundred and one super-
natural powers, not four hundred as we often read in books. Ifa
literature divides them into two categories: “Four hundred super-
natural powers of the right; and two hundred original supernatural
powers of the left.”” The four hundred supernatural powers of the
right are the Orisa who are sometimes said to be four hundred and
one. The present writer is now of the view that the one on top of the
four hundred does not refer to any particular divinity as such but
rather to the principle of elasticity embedded in the pantheon.
According to the words of Ifa quoted above, the universe is
divided into two halves, left and right. On the left of the universe is
to be found the two hundred supernatural powers otherwise known
as Ajogun (warriors), and on the right side are the four hundred
supernatural powers known as Orisa. The Ajogun represent the
principle of evil since they are completely malevolent without any
redeeming features whatsoever. We employ a Portuguese term at
this point and call them deus de mal. The four hundred and one
supernatural powers are the Onsa or divinities. They are by nature
benevolent even though they may fight a human being who sins
against, prevents or corrupts the ethics, norms or taboos of society.
They usually have no protection for any human being who does not
offer sacrifice. We use the opposite Portuguese term deus de ben to
describe these essentially benevolent supernatural powers.
There is, however, one particular supernatural power who strad-
dles the right and the left of our universe. He is Esu who is an Orisa
but who is also the lord and master of the Ajogun. A line from an Ifa
verse puts the matter as follows: “Death, Disease, Loss, Paralysis, Big
Trouble, Curse, Imprisonment, Affliction, They are all errand boys
of Esu.”
A simple sketch of this divided world of the Yoruba can be made,
showing where each supernatural power functions. In this sketch is
Olodumare, the Yoruba High God, who has no cult of his own
among humans. He also has no temples or shrines. Sacrifices are
never made to him. Consequently, he has no liturgy, iconography,
or priesthood. He is the supreme example of an abstract divinity too
B72 GODS VERSUS ANTI-GODS
mighty to be captured by any artistic, literary, or idealistic simpli-

fication. Yet he is believed to be the creator of the universe. He
created the Ajogun and the Orisa with the possible exception of Esu
(the trickster) and Jfa who are believed to co-exist with him.
OLODUMARE >
AJOGUN ———————_—_ ESU ——————— ORISA
Death, Disease, Loss,

Paralysis, Big Trouble,
Curse, Imprisonment,
Affliction
AJE ENIYAN
In the sketch above, the Orisa (deus de ben) are on the right side of
the universe. They are, as mentioned before, 400 plus one in num-
ber. They are benevolent to humans, and one can pray to them, and
what is more important, offer sacrifices to them in order to achieve
one’s desires, such as money, a wife or husband, children, good
health, long life, employment, and protection from one’s enemies.
When one offers a sacrifice to any Orisa, the sacrifice will be com-
municated by ones On (spiritual or inner head) to the Orisa in the
spiritual realm. The sacrifice will eventually be presented to Esu who
will in turn communicate one’s wishes to Olodumare so that one’s
prayers or desires may be accepted or come to pass.
In the case of a negative force generated by one of the evil super-
natural powers, Esu will present the sacrifice to the Ajogun respon-
sible for the affliction or evil concerned. As soon as the sacrifice is
accepted by the Ajogun, he (the Ajogun concerned) will leave the
victim alone or let the person off the hook. A balance or reparation
will then be restored in the life of the individual, family, or com-
munity concerned. The important point to remember is that the
individual must first of all perform sacrifice, otherwise Esu cannot
perform his mediating role. This is the import of the statement often
WANDE ABIMBOLA 173
found in Ifa verse: “It is the person who performs sacrifice who
receives the support of Esw.”
The Eniyan indicated at the bottom of the right side of the
diagram are the human beings of any social or economic class. They
too harbor a germ of divinity in that each human being has a spiri-
tual aspect known as On who is also regarded by the Yoruba as an
Orisa. The communication process of a human being with the spiri-
tual world starts with his own Ori. Anything which has not been
accepted by a person’s Ov cannot be approved by the Orisa. An Ifa
verse puts this clearly as follows:
On we salute you
Who quickly remembers your own.
You who blesses a person more quickly than the Orisa.
There is no Orisa who by himself blesses a man
Without the consent of his O77.
On we salute you.
You who allow children to be born alive.
A person whose sacrifice is accepted by O71
Should rejoice exceedingly.”
The Aje, who are sometimes known as Enzyan (negative people),

play an important part in the Yoruba cosmos. Like witches in other
cultures, they suck human blood, eat human flesh, and afflict human
beings with diseases like impotence, stomach disorders, blood and
liver diseases. They are therefore allies of the Ajogun in this respect.
Their important messenger is a bird known as ehuru. They often
take the form of this bird especially at night when they hold their
nocturnal conferences and plan their attacks on human society. That
is why they are known as eleye (owner of birds).
There are certain peculiarities about the Aje which we should
briefly point out. In the first place, the Aje are believed to be women.
In Yoruba thought only women can be Aye. A man, however nega-
tive or evil cannot be an Aje. Secondly, an evil force afflicting a
human being and which is diagnosed as emanating from the Aje
cannot be resolved by the offering of a normal sacrifice. Only a
special type of sacrifice can partially affect the Aje. Moreover, only
a human being’s On can ultimately save that person from an attack
emanating from the Aye. Hence, the following Ifa verse:
174 GODS VERSUS ANTI-GODS
Travellers on the road to Ipo,

Travellers on the road to Ofa,
Only your Om (spiritual heads)
Can save you from the Eleye.
Thirdly, the Aje are sometimes benevolent, and that is why they are
regarded as humans in spite of their negative aspect. They can bless
a human being by making the individual rich or successful in life.
They therefore straddle both the left and the right side of the
universe.
The left side of the universe is the abode of the Ajogun, the evil
supernatural powers. As mentioned above, the Ajogun are negators
of the Onsa. They are completely evil without any redeeming fea-
tures. There are two hundred Ajogun and their eight principal war
lords are those listed in the diagram above. They attack human
beings and the Onsa without any reasonable cause, but sometimes
the Orisa themselves are the aggressors.
A good number of Ifa verses deal with the idea of conflict and
resolution in the Yoruba cosmos. Ifa Elepe (the King of Epe) was
asked to perform sacrifice with an animal in order to ward off an
impending attack of Jku (Death) and other evil supernatural powers.
Elepe performed sacrifice and as a result he was able to exchange the
animal for his own life. This verse tells us that sacrifice is an act of
exchange. When one makes sacrifice, one exchanges something
dear, or something purchased with one’s own money, in order to
sustain personal happiness. Sacrifice involves human beings in a
process of exchange or denial of oneself, or giving of one’s time,
forsaking one’s pleasure, food, etc., in order to be at peace with both
the benevolent and malevolent supernatural powers as well as to be
at peace with one’s neighbors, family, the entire environment and
ultimately to be at peace with oneself.
Sacrifice is the principle of resolution of a would-be conflict, or
cessation of a conflict which has already begun, therefore leading to
a restoration of peace and reparation of whatever damage, real or
imaginary, has already occurred. Below is the Yoruba version of the
Ifa verse which is taken from Osa Meji, the tenth Odu of Ifa, and an
attempt in English of a very difficult verse:
WANDE ABIMBOLA 175
The old man who strolls gracefully like an elephant.

The old man who gallops like a buffalo.
When a wooden pestle falls on the ground,
it makes the sound ogbonrangandan.
Help me catch my chicken with broken wings.
One room cannot adequately contain two sick people
with different diseases.
Exchange-exchange, Ifa priest of the household of the
king of Epe.
Ifa divination was performed for Elepe
When he was told to use an animal for sacrifice
As an exchange for his own life
Because of imminent death.
He listened to the prescription of sacrifice.
And he performed the sacrifice.
He was told to offer sacrifice to Esu
And he complied.
He then heard the Ifa priests tell him that his
sacrifice was accepted.
He praised his Ifa priests,
And his Ifa priests praised Ifa.
Death then left Elepe untouched
But took away the head of the animal.
Exchange-exchange, Ifa priest of the household of Elepe.
Loss left Elepe untouched,
All evil spirits left Elepe untouched
In the following verse, Olomo (the mountain) was besieged by all

the Ajogun. Olomo was told by his Ifa priests to perform sacrifice with
yam-flour. After he had performed the sacrifice, Esu, the trickster
divinity, went ahead of the Ajogun to the front of Olomo’s house.
Whenever the Ajogun tried to enter the house, Esu poured yam-flour
into their mouths knowing that it was forbidden for the Ajogun to
taste yam-flour. When they tasted yam-flour, some of the Ajogun died
and some of them were sick. As a result they could no longer affect
Olomo. He then started to sing in praise of his Ifa priests saying:
Death who boasted that he would kill the Ifa priest

Can no longer kill him.
Death has shifted away from the head of Ifa priest
Death does not eat yam-flour.
If Death attempts to eat yam-flour,
His mouth would be terribly shaken.
His mouth would be tightly compressed.
The full excerpt in translation which is taken from Oyeku Mej1, the
second Odu of Ifa, follows:
The Ifa priest known as Atata tun-in tan-in

Performed Ifa divination for Olomo, the mighty one.
All the Ajogun surrounded Olomo
In order to kill him.
He was told to perform sacrifice.
And he performed it.
It happened one day,
Death, Disease and Loss stood up,
And went to attack the house of Olomo.
They met Esu outside the house.
As they were trying to enter the house
Esu poured yam-flour into their mouths.
Since the Ajogun must not taste yam-flour,
Some of them died, and some became sick.
But none was able to enter the house of Olomo.
When Olomo became happy,
He started to chant the song of Ifa priests.
He said, “Death who boasted that he would kill Ifa priest
Can no longer kill him.
Death has shifted away from the head of Ifa priest.
If Death attempts to eat yam-flour,
His mouth would be tightly compressed.
All the evil spirits who wanted to attack Ifa priest
Can no longer attack him.
If death attempts to eat yam-flour,
His mouth would be. tightly compressed.”
WANDE ABIMBOLA WF
In the following translated excerpt from Obara Meji, the seventh

Odu of Ifa, Aghigboniwonran, a bird believed to be a messenger of the
Ajogun and who is believed to be a carver of coffins because of the
tuft of hair on his head, carried his coffin to the front of Orunmila’s
house. Since Orunmila had performed sacrifice, Agbigbo met Esu in
front of the house. Esu asked Agbigbo the evil messenger of Death
what he would take so that the life of Orunmila might be spared.
Agbigbo said he would takea rat, a bird and an animal. Esu replied
that all those things were included in Orunmila’s sacrifice. Esu then
brought those things out for Agbigbo, who gathered the materials
hurriedly, lifted up his coffin, and went to another place.
Water inside a spring cannot completely immerse

a water gourd.
Ifa divination was performed for Agbigboniwonran,
The carver of coffins.
After Agbigbo had finished carving a coffin,
He would go and place it outside a man’s house.
The result would be that that man would die.
When Agbigbo finished carving a coffin,
He carried it,
And went to Orunmila’s house.
That night, Orunmila dreamt of death.
He took his divination instruments,
And inquired about his dream.
Ifa warned Orunmila to perform sacrifice immediately.
After he performed the sacrifice,
He carried the sacrifice to the shrine of Esu.
Before long, Agbigbo arrived in Orunmila’s house
with his coffin.
And he met Esu outside the house.
Esu asked him what he intended to put inside
the coffin.
And Agbigbo replied that Orunmila was the one.
Then Esu inquired further from him
What things he would like to have
So that he would leave Orunmila untouched.
He said that he would take a rat, a bird, and an animal.
Esu replied that all those things
Had been included in Orunmila’s sacrifice.
Esu then brought those things out for Agbigbo,
Who gathered the materials hurriedly,

Lifted up his coffin,
And went to another place.
When he was out of sight,
Esu issued a command that he should never be able to
remove the coffin from his head.
Up till this day,
The coffin is still on Agbigbo’s head.
Sometimes the Orisa themselves were the aggressors, attacking

the Ajogun, their avowed enemies. Provided sacrifice was offered and
accepted by Esu before the attack, the Orisa concerned would be
victorious. In the following translation taken from Ogunda Meji, the
ninth Odu of Ifa, Orunmila was frightened on his farm by an un-
known thing. He therefore returned home to cast Ifa. His Ifa priests
gave him three arrows to shoot about on his farm. One of the arrows
hit Death on the chest, and he temporarily died or disappeared
from the earth.
The Ifa priests known as Pomu-pomu-sigi-sigi-sigi-pomu-pomu,

Performed divination for Orunmila
When he shot an arrow and killed Death on his farm.
Something frightened Orunmila on his farm
He therefore returned home,
And inquired about it from his Ifa priests.
He was told to perform sacrifice,
And he performed it.
After he had performed sacrifice,
His Ifa priests gave him three arrows,
And asked him to shoot them all about his farm.
When one of the arrows was shot,
It hit Death.
It hit Death on the chest.
Death fell down with a loud noise,
And he temporarily went out of the earth.
It was from the farm that Orunmila danced homewards.
He said that was exactly what his Ifa priests predicted.
Oloniumoro shot an arrow
And killed Death on his farm
We praise Pomu-pomu-sigi-sigi-sigi-pomu-pomu.
WANDE ABIMBOLA ve
The forgoing excerpts from verses of Ifa, the sacred literature of

the Yoruba, present us with a clear picture of the nature of the con-
flict and resolution in the Yoruba cosmos. In the Yoruba belief sys-
tem, conflict rather than peace is the order of the day. Resolution
can only be achieved through the offering of sacrifice via the inter-
vention of Esu who is at the same time an Orisa and a master of the
Ajogun. But we must always remember that resolution is temporary.
It is not unlike conflict, a permanent feature of the universe. Hence
the need for constant divination leading always to the performance
of sacrifice.
We, therefore, have a God and anti-god as a permanent feature
of the world in which we live, leading to conflict between the forces
of good and the forces of evil. It seems that to sustain the concept of
God (or gods), there must always be an anti-God (or anti-gods). So,
when humans created the idea of God, they also at the same time
created its negator. God is responsible for the good while the anti-
god is responsible for the evil. The one can hardly exist without the
other, A well ordered universe or value system must have a sufficient
trace of both ideas. The issue, therefore, is not whether evil is real
but whether or not human beings in their thought systems, religions
and societies can always resolve the inevitable conflict between good
and evil. Such resolution alone can lead to peace, understanding,
harmony, progress, community and civilization in the ideal and real
world that human beings as individuals and societies have created
and will always create for themselves.
NOTES
1. See Wande Abimbola, Jfa: An Exposition of Ifa Literary Corpus (Ibadan,
Nigeria: Oxford University Press, 1976).-
2. The original language of this translation and others in this article, along
with the long verses, can be found in this author’s, “Gods Versus Anti-
Gods: Conflict and Resolution in the Yoruba Cosmos,” Dialogue & Alliance,
Vol. 8, n. 2 (1994), pp. 75-87.
3. See Wande Abimbola, Sixteen Great Poems of Ifa (Zaria: UNESCO and
Abimbola Publishers, 1975).
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PART FOUR
Contemporary Responses
15
Prophecy and
Contemplation:
The Language of Liberation
Theology Against Evil
By Peter C. Phan
| f God is able but unwilling to prevent evil, God is malevolent;

on the other hand, if God is willing but unable to do so, God is
weak. In either case, God is not God. But if God is both omni-
potent and benevolent, as believers say, whence is evil? Ever since
Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) argued that it is not possible to uphold
God’s power and goodness simultaneously in the face of evil, an
argument repeated by David Hume in the eighteenth century,
philosophers and theologians have been busy devising a theodicy to
defend both divine goodness and power.:
In general terms, this theodicy has taken three basic forms. The
first explains evil in terms of its causes, either positing two inde-
pendent principles of being, one good and the other evil, each
responsible for the good and evil realities in the universe’ or af-
firming only one creative being (the good God) and maintaining that
evil is not being but a lack of being.” The second form explains evil
in terms of the purposes it may serve such as character formation
and spiritual development of the human person.’ The third form
redefines the notion of divine omnipotence in order to avoid
- 183-
184 PROPHECY AND CONTEMPLATION
Epicurus’s dilemma. Process theologians suggest that divine power

is one of persuasion and attraction, not of coercion. God does not
create the world ex nihilo; rather, God creates it out of pre-existent
actualities, luring them into greater self-realizations. Evil, both phys-
ical and moral, is an unavoidable price for this process of self-
actualization in response to the divine lure. We are assured that evil
is ultimately not absurd because God, who is, in Whitehead’s mem-
orable words, “the fellow sufferer who understands,” suffers along
with us.”
These three strands of theodicy have been subjected to stringent
criticism and have all been found wanting in one aspect or another.”
Perhaps this is to be expected, since evil seems to be a surd defying
rational explanation. In despair of ever finding a satisfactory ac-
count of the origin of evil, some suggest that instead of trying to
understand evil, one should develop mechanisms to cope with it.’
Others argue that evil is neither a problem susceptible of rational
explanation nor simply a disaster to be coped with on an individual
basis; rather it is something that must be faced and overcome
collectively. Sull others contend that theodicy as a discourse practice
must be abandoned because it does not solve the problem of evil and
itself creates evil.”
The intention of this essay is to examine how Latin American
liberation theology approaches the problem of evil.” I will focus on
Gustavo Gutierrez, both because he is widely regarded as the
progenitor of liberation theology and because he has explicitly dealt
with the problem of evil. I will first examine how liberation theology
understands the nature of evil. Secondly, I will look at the strategies
it proposes to speak of God in the midst of evil. Finally, I will
attempt an assessment of the approach of liberation theology to the
problem of evil as a whole."
Evil as Poverty and Oppression
One searches in vain for atreatise in liberation theology which
deals with the problem of evil in the terms framed by Epicurus and
David Hume. Though fully conversant with the classical responses
to these skeptics (e.g., the distinction between physical and moral
evils, between God’s causing and permitting evil), liberation theo-
logians do not make use of them. The reason for this is that for
liberation theologians these arguments were devised for an entirely
PETER C. PHAN 185
different audience than the one they speak for and to. Traditional
theodicy addresses nonbelievers; liberation theology addresses non-
persons. Gutierrez points out the difference:
Ever since the Enlightenment a large sector of modern theology has
taken as its point of departure the challenge launched by the
modern (often unbelieving) mind. . . . But in Latin America the chal-
lenge does not come first and foremost from nonbelievers but from
non-persons—that is, those whom the prevailing social order does
not acknowledge as persons: the poor, the exploited, those system-
atically and lawfully stripped of their human status, those who
hardly know what a human being is. Nonpersons represent a chal-
lenge, not primarily to our religious world but to our economic,
social, political, and cultural world; their existence is a call to a
revolutionary transformation of the very foundations of our de-
humanizing society. m
To put it differently, whereas traditional theodicy attempts to over-

come the crisis of meaning produced by the first phase of the
Enlightenment (Kant) by explaining and defending the orthodoxy
of Christian belief in God’s omnipotence and goodness, liberation
theology, as Jon Sobrino has argued, takes up the challenge of the
second phase of the Enlightenment (Marx) by transforming the
sinful situation of exploitation and oppression and by emphasizing
orthopraxis. This new task requires what Sobrino calls an epis-
temological break in theology, that is, instead of constructing a
natural theology in which the God-question begins from what is
positive in the world (by way of analogy), liberation theology answers
the question of theodicy by starting from what is negative (by way of
dialectic): How is the existence of God to be reconciled with the real
wretchedness and evil in the world?
This different situation of Latin America effects a new approach
to the problem of evil. Rather than using philosophical analysis to
grasp the nature of evil, liberation theology, whose interest is socio-
political and economic transformation, makes use of the social
sciences to decipher its historical roots. In liberation theology’s
social analysis, evil is seen-not as the ontological privatio bont, or part
of a good whole, or a necessary stage in the evolutionary process, or
a penalty for sin. Rather it is regarded as the result of inhuman
social structures. Evil is primarily the twin phenomena of poverty
and oppression. Poverty is neither vice or ignorance to be remedied

by alms-giving (the empirical explanation) nor backwardness to be
reformed by means of economic development (the functional ex-
planation). Rather it is the fruit of oppression, that is, the actual
economic organization of society which exploits some (workers) and
excludes others (the underemployed, thé unemployed, and the
whole mass of the marginalized) from the system of production (the
dialectical explanation). This kind of poverty is rooted in the
primacy of capital over labor and can be transformed only by an
alternative social and economic system.
In this way liberation theology has redefined the notion of evil.
First, the distinction between physical and moral evil, essential for
traditional theodicy, is no longer operative. More precisely, there
has been a shift in focus from moral to physical evil. The former is
subsumed under the latter to which, however, a moral quality is
attached. Indeed, for Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, C.S. Lewis, and
John Hick, most of the world’s evil is brought about by the sins
(moral evils) of human beings themselves, and physical or natural
evils (e.g., poverty, squalor, malnutrition, diseases, death, and eco-
logical disasters) are acts of God for which humans are not directly
responsible (except as punishment for their sins). On the contrary,
for liberation theology, evil is primarily what is traditionally re-
garded as physical evil, that is, oppressive and exploitative struc-
tures. While not neglecting the personal dimension of sin, since
“behind an unjust structure there is a responsible individual or
collective will, a will to reject God and others,”"” liberation theology
emphasizes what has been called social sin or structural sin. It is evil
as embodied in institutions, whether secular or ecclesiastical, in legal
structures, in sociopolitical and economic systems that perpetrate
what has been referred to as “institutionalized injustice.”
Secondly, physical evil is cast primarily in terms of suffering,
especially when caused by poverty and oppression. Poverty becomes
the comprehensive category for interpreting evil in general:
Poverty means death. Death, in this case, is caused by hunger,
sickness, or the oppressive methods used by those who see their
privileges endangered by any and every effort to free the oppressed.
It is physical death to which cultural death is added, because in a
situation of oppression everything isdestroyed that gives unity and
strength to the dispossessed of this world.’
PETER C. PHAN 187
The emphasis on the socioeconomic aspect of oppression is, how-

ever, not exclusive. Other forms of oppression are also taken into
account, such as those based on racial, ethnic, and gender discrimi-
nation. Nevertheless, socioeconomic oppression, which produces
social classes and class conflicts, is, in liberation theologians’ view,
the more radical, infrastructural form of oppression of which the
other forms are but superstructural expressions.
Having underscored the importance of unjust structures in
liberation theology’s understanding of evil, I find it imperative to
point out at this point, lest we distort liberation theology entirely,
that Unjust structures are but one of three forms of evil. The other
two are the power of fate and personal sin and guilt. By the power
of fate is meant the sense that one’s station in life is foreordained
and that one should accept it as God’s will. Under this power,
oppressed people fail to see that the world they live in should not be
the way it is and therefore must be changed. Liberation from pov-
erty presupposes liberation from this fatalism. With the destruction
of the evil of sin and guilt, liberation theology emphasizes the gratu-
itousness of grace and of God’s kingdom, which no human work can
ever produce but for which humans must prepare the way. There
is no contradiction between liberation from unjust structures and
forgiveness of sin because acceptance of the gift of God’s kingdom
calls for a certain behavior, namely, commitment to work for other
human beings, especially the poorest and most helpless.
The third way in which liberation theology recasts the problem
of evil is to frame it in terms of innocent suffering. It is not evil as
deserved suffering (the evil of guilt) that liberation is concerned
with; rather it considers the challenge of what Gutierrez, following
Adolphe Gesche, calls the evil of misfortune, that is, the evil suffered
by the innocent. The prototype of the innocent sufferer is, in
Gutierrez’s judgment, Job, who refuses to curse God even in the
depths of his suffering and who stubbornly maintains his innocence
against the accusations of his friends. It is innocent suffering that
poses the question of how to talk about God: “[T]he suffering of the
innocent and the questions it leads them to ask are indeed key
problems for theology—that is, for discourse about God. The
theology of liberation tries to meet the challenge. wpe
Speaking to God in the Midst of Suffering

The problem of how to speak of God to nonpersons (not un-
believers) has been sharply formulated by Gutierrez:
How are we to talk about a God who is revealed as love in a situation

characterized by poverty and oppression? How are we to proclaim
the God of life to men and women who die prematurely and un-
justly? How are we to acknowledge that God makes us afree gift of
love and justice when we have before us the suffering of the
innocent? What words are we to use in telling those who are not
even regarded as persons that they are daughters and sons of God?"*
Speaking about God or God-talk in liberation theology is never just

verbal, whether oral or written. Antecedent and intrinsic to such talk
is an effective commitment to and solidarity with those who suffer
from poverty and oppression. Such a praxis for liberation, as has
been said above, is an essential component of theological method. As
Gutierrez repeatedly remarks, theology is only the second act which
reflects critically on praxis: “The Christian community professes a
faith which works through charity.’ It is—at least ought to be—real
charity, action, and commitment to the service of others. Theology
is reflection, a critical attitude. Theology follows; it is the second
step. a
With such a prior solidarity with the poor and the oppressed,
how does one proceed to speak of God in the midst of innocent
suffering? Gutierrez’s answer to this question takes the form of a
commentary on the book of Job. It is not, strictly speaking, an
exegesis of the book of the Hebrew Bible, though the author’s
knowledge of relevant biblical literature is extensive. Rather, it is a
theological interpretation in the context of massive innocent suf-
fering in Latin America because “the innocence that Job vigorously
claims for himself helps us to understand the innocence of an
oppressed and believing people amid the situation of suffering and
death that has been forced upon it.”””
Gutierrez suggests that the fundamental thrust of the book of Job
is to raise a wager: Can human beings have adisinterested faith in
God? Can they, in the midst of unjust suffering, continue to
maintain their faith in God and speak of God without looking for
rewards? Clearly Satan and those who have a barter conception of
PETER C. PHAN 189
religion deny that they are capable of doing so, whereas the biblical
author affirms that they are and uses the experience of his hero to
make his point. It would be instructive therefore to follow the story
of Job and gather from his reactions to suffering hints on how to
speak about God.
It is interesting to note that in the book of Job the wager is not
between the existence or nonexistence of God, as is in Pascal’s
famous wager, but “between a religion based on the rights and
obligations of human beings as moral agents, and a disinterested
belief based on the gratuitousness of God’s love.””' In other words,
whereas Pascal’s wager is made to unbelievers, the book of Job’s is
made to non-persons, and is therefore appropriate to the suffering
innocent.
One kind of God-talk that is excluded by Job is that based on the
doctrine of retribution as expounded with conviction and vigor by
his three friends, Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar. The core of this
doctrine is that God punishes the wicked and rewards the upright.
At the theoretical level, Job accepts the logic of this doctrine, but at
the existential level, he knows that there must be something amiss
with it, because he is deeply convinced of his innocence. Gutierrez
carefully points out that in his resolute defense of his innocence, he
does not make the mistake of considering himself sinless: “The
question for Job is not whether or not he is a sinner; he knows well
that as a human being he is indeed a sinner. The question rather is
whether he deserves the torments he is SS His answer is
unambiguous: no, he does not deserve them.”
Job’s ambivalence toward the doctrine of retribution, Gutierrez
suggests, is to be attributed to two different ways of doing theology.
One starts from abstract principles, in this case God’s justice, and
applies them to concrete cases, in this case, Job’s suffering. The
other begins with concrete experiences, especially that of innocent
suffering: “Over against the abstract theology of his friends he [Job]
sets his own experience (and, as we shall see later on, the experience
of others, especially the poor). On the basis of this experience, and
motivated by the faith he has received from his forebears, he is
trying to understand the action of God.””” He rejects his friends’ way
of theologizing which does not take account of concrete situations,
of the sufferings and hopes of human beings and forgets the
gratuitous love and unbounded mercy of God. Gutierrez puts it
tersely: “The friends believe in their theology rather than in the God
of their theology.”” Job knows that he is innocent and that his
suffering is undeserved, but he refuses to follow the facile logic of his
sorry comforters that says that his protestations of innocence would
convict God of injustice. Instead of speaking ill of the God in whom
he believes, he challenges the foundation of the prevailing theology.
So the question remains: How should one speak of God in the midst
of innocent suffering?
The Language of Prophecy

The answer to this question Gutierrez finds in Job’s gradual shift
from an individualist ethics to a social one: Job begins to see his
suffering in relationship to other sufferers, especially the poor. As a
result he realizes that relatedness to God implies relatedness to the
poor:
The question he asks of God ceases to be a purely personal one and
takes concrete form in the suffering of the poor in this world. The
answer he seeks will not come except through commitment to them
and by following the road—which God alone knows—that leads to
wisdom. Job begins to free himself from an ethic centered on per-
sonal rewards and to pass to another focused on the needs of one’s
neighbors.”
This speaking of God in the midst of innocent suffering by

commitment to the poor and by doing justice Gutierrez calls the
language of prophecy. In this language Job realizes that he is not
the only one who suffers innocently and that “poverty and abandon-
ment are not something fated but are caused by the wicked, who
nonetheless live serene and satisfied lives.””” In chapter 24:2-14,
poverty is described not as the result of destiny or God’s punishment
but of the exploitation and oppression of the poor by the wicked.
This realization forces Job to examine his past conduct and he
affirms that he has always practiced justice and compassion:
attention to the needs of the poor, guidance for the orphan, food for
the hungry, counsel for the afflicted, clothing and shelter for the
destitute, justice for the innocent (31:16-22).
At this point, the biblical author introduces a young man by the
name of Elihu who delivers a speech in which, according to
PETER C. PHAN 191
Gutierrez, two major points are made: first, God is great and the
human mind can never comprehend him; God can manifest himself
in unexpected ways, even suffering can be a divine pedagogy by
which one is disposed to hear and accept God’s word. Secondly, and
this is the prophetic language, in God’s eyes, all human beings are
equal but the poor are God’s favorites; God makes no distinction
between rich and poor but God favors the most helpless. “This
relationship of God and the poor is the very heart of the prophetic
message. The Lord is ever watchful and ready to hear the voice of
the poor, even though attentiveness to them may at times take unob-
trusive forms.”””
The language about God in the midst of innocent suffering then
must be a prophetic one. It is a language of both denunciation and
annunciation. It denounces, by deed and word (in that order), every
dehumanizing situation and every form of oppression. And it an-
nounces that God wants justice and favors the poor and the op-
pressed.” The prophetic language preserves the ethical dimension
of the traditional doctrine of retribution, but places it in a new and
different context, namely, that of solidarity with the poor. However,
prophetic language is only the first step. It is necessary but still
inadequate: “Job’s thirst for understanding, which his trials have
awakened and inflamed, is not satisfied. Gropingly, and resisting
false images, he looks insatiably for a deeper insight into divine jus-
tice and an unlimited encounter with the God in whom he believes
and hopes.”””
The Language of Contemplation

Gutierrez notes that Job’s theologian friends speak about God but
not to God. Job feels the need to speak to God himself. His full en-
counter with God is a real spiritual struggle with God. Gutierrez
summarizes Job’s dramatic inner development as a three-stage
movement:
From a nebulous request for the presence of an arbiter he has ad-

vanced to the need of a witness and thence finally to an expression of
confidence in a liberator who will come to rescue him. Each affirma-
tion of hope is immediately preceded by a renewed expression of
angry complaint and protest. The spiritual struggle with himself,
with his friends, and, above all, with God brings him to a conviction
that for the time being amounts to no more than a cry of hope: that
he will see, and with his own eyes, his liberator, his go’el, and be able
to look upon him asa friend.”
When, finally, God comes face to face with Job and answers him
“from the heart of the tempest,” speaking of his plan and just
government of the world, what does Job learn from the encounter?
Gutierrez suggests the following. First, God’s absolute freedom:
“God will bring him to see that nothing, not even the world of
justice, can shackle God.””' This means that even if God has a plan,
it is not one that the human mind can grasp so as to make calcu-
lations based on it and foresee and judge the divine action. God’s
freedom finds expression in the gratuitousness of divine love that
refuses to be confined within a system of predictable rewards and
punishments.
Secondly, human freedom: though human beings are insigni-
ficant and not the center of the universe, they are free. Their free-
dom is respected by God, and therefore the wicked cannot simply be
destroyed with a glance:
God wants justice indeed, and desires that divine judgment (mishpat)
reign in the world; but God cannot impose it, for the nature of
created beings must be respected. God’s power is limited by human
freedom; for without freedom God’s justice would not be present
within history. . . .The mystery of divine freedom leads to the mys-
tery of human freedom and to respect for it.”
Thirdly, and most importantly, the true relationship between

divine justice and divine gratuitousness:
What is it that Job has understood? That justice does not reign in the
world God has created? No. The truth that he has grasped and that
has lifted him to the level of contemplation is that justice alone does
not have the final say about how we are to speak of God. Only when
we have come to realize that God’s love is freely bestowed do we
enter fully and definitively into the presence of the God of faith.
Grace is not opposed to the quest of justice nor does it play it down;
on the contrary, it gives it its full meaning. God’s love, like all true
love, operates in a world not of cause and effect but of freedom and
gratuitousness.
PETER C. PHAN 193
It is important to note that for Gutierrez the language of contem-

plation, in which God’s freedom and gratuitousness is discovered,
does not in any way diminish the language of prophecy. Rather it
situates divine justice within the framework of divine gratuitous love,
and in this way makes it possible to affirm God’s predilection for the
poor. The preference for the poor, now Job understands, is a key
factor in authentic divine justice. Job’s rejection of the theology of
retribution does not free him from the necessity of practicing justice,
but only from the temptation of imprisoning God in a narrow
conception of justice. Gutierrez tantalizingly concludes: “The world
of retribution—and not of temporal retribution only—is not where
God dwells; at most God visits ite
How does one speak of God in the midst of innocent suffering?
By the language of prophecy and the language of contemplation.
Both languages are necessary; they are mutually complementary
and must be fused into one. The former is the language of deliver-
ance, the latter the language of song. Mystical language expresses
the gratuitousness of God’s love; prophetic language expresses the
demands this love makes on us.
Prophecy and Contemplation: Adequate Language?
A language is as good as its power to communicate what is in-
tended. To assess liberation theologians’ language of prophecy and
contemplation fairly one must, of course, take into account their
express purpose. It is important to recall here that they do not
intend to defend the existence of God or God’s attributes of omni-
potence and goodness against unbelievers who reject these doctrines
on account of evil. Rather they ask how they can talk meaningfully
and convincingly about God to believing (in this case, Christian)
nonpersons who suffer massive poverty and oppression unjustly.
Presumably these people do not need to be convinced that God
exists and that God is both good and powerful; they already accept
these truths. Their question is not a philosophical one that demands
rational arguments, namely, whether God exists and whether God
is both powerful and good in the face of evil. Rather, theirs is a
spiritual and pragmatic one: Why do we suffer- unjustly? What can
and should we do about poverty and oppression? And, as far as
theologians are concerned, how can they speak of God amidst
innocent suffering?
By taking Job as the prototype of the innocent sufferer and by

tracing his painful journey from aself-absorbing obsession with his
own suffering to altruistic actions to redress injustices on behalf of
his fellow innocent sufferers, from self-righteous protestations of his
innocence to a humbling encounter with the mysterious and free
God, from a demand for justice to a recognition of God’s gratuitous
love, Gutierrez accomplishes several important things. First, he raises
the consciousness of the poor and oppressed about the innocent
character of their suffering.
Secondly, by insisting on the language of prophecy, he makes it
clear that God-talk amidst unjust suffering has no ring of truth and
no persuasive power unless it is accompanied by concrete deeds of
Justice.
Thirdly, by requiring the use of the language of contemplation
Gutierrez prevents the struggle for social justice from being reduced
to being just that—social service. In this way he effectively refutes
the oft-repeated charge that liberation theology is nothing more
than secular or Marxist ideology couched in theological dress.”
More importantly, he prevents the language of prophecy from
degenerating into fanaticism and makes gratitude and hope central
virtues for those engaged in the struggle for justice, especially when
the going gets tough and concrete results are slow in coming. In this
way too he makes worship, prayer, and mysticism an integral part
of the struggle for justice.”
Finally, by making Job’s argumentation against the traditional
theology of retribution a model for theologizing, Gutierrez indirectly
challenges the deductive approach to the problem of evil. Perhaps
this is Gutierrez’s most significant contribution to the debate on evil.
What is wrong with most philosophical approaches to the problem
of evil (as illustrated in the Epicurus-Hume line of reasoning) is their
starting point: they begin with abstract principles about God’s justice
and goodness on the one hand and evil on the other and then de-
duce their mutual incompatibility. What they fail to take into
account is the concrete ways in which God’s justice and goodness are
embodied in history. Had they done so, they would have noticed
that God’s justice is realized not in a rigid system of punishment and
reward (the philosophy of Job’s theologian comforters) but in God’s
preferential—not exclusive—love for the poor and oppressed (Job’s
eventual realization). They would also have realized that God’s
PETER C. PHAN 195
omnipotence is not arbitrary power but manifests itself in the help-

lessness and powerlessness of the poor. This notion of preferential
love does not, of course, resolve the problem of evil outright, but at
least it makes the apparent contradiction between God’s justice and
goodness in the face of evil much less acute.
The problem, of course, remains: How do we speak of God to un-
believers in the face of evil? Clues can be garnered from Gutierrez’s
writings on the language of prophecy and contemplation to reveal
what liberation theologians think of traditional theodicies.
By appealing to the absolute freedom and mystery of God in his
language of contemplation, Gutierrez effectively rules out the kinds
of theodicy (e.g., Augustine’s) that explain evil as punishment for
sins. After all, he is speaking about innocent suffering. He does ack-
nowledge that no human being, including Job, can say that he or
she is not a sinner. The question, however, is not whether the poor
are sinful or not, but whether their suffering is merited. Gutierrez’s
answer is no, or at least, he says one cannot be certain because God’s
plan is unfathomable. Those who say that suffering is God’s punish-
ment must claim that they can grasp God’s design in history, a
dubious pretension at best. There is another reason for Gutierrez’s
negative answer to the question of whether the poor’s suffering is
unmerited, and that is, it is caused by the exploitative and oppres-
sive structures imposed by the powerful.
By invoking God’s incomprehensible freedom Gutierrez also
implicitly questions the time-honored distinction between God’s
causing and merely permitting evil (e.g., Thomas Aquinas). This dis-
tinction, it may be recalled, serves to exonerate God of moral evil
and to preserve human freedom.
It seems also that liberation theologians would look askance at
what has been called the aesthetic theory of evil, according to which
the world as a whole is good; even if its several parts may appear to
fallible human minds as evils, in fact they are good either because
they are means to good ends or parts of a good whole. Liberation
theologians would argue that such a view, espoused by process
philosophers among others, does not take seriously the reality of evil
which is massive and overwhelming in Latin America.
There is, however, an aspect of process thought which liberation
theologians would find congenial, namely, the notion that God’s
power is not absolute, at least as it is exercised in history. As has
been pointed out above, for Gutierrez, God’s power is limited by

human freedom whose decisions God respects. God’s limitation,
however, is self-imposed because he freely and gratuitously creates
human freedom.
Finally, liberation theology would not be averse to the theory that
evil is the absence of a due good (Augustine’s privatio boni). For
them, the situation of poverty and oppression is something that
ought not to be and ought to be changed. The theory of privatio boni,
if understood not negatively but as a positive reminder of something
that ought to be, can be a mobilizing factor propelling the poor
toward utopia through the historical praxis of liberation. Poverty
and oppression as privatio boni can be contrast experiences, to use
Schillebeeckx’s expression, which, by a sort of negative dialectics,
point to their opposites of abundant life and freedom for all and
ultimately to the reign of God.
For those who favor discovering ways to cope with evil rather
than to understand it, liberation theology provides a fresh approach
and a useful corrective to other predominantly individualist and
psychological solutions. Indeed, it may be argued that the best way
to overcome one’s own suffering is by attempting to alleviate the
suffering of others. Here the goal is not simply how to deal with
suffering but to remove it. Like Job, innocent sufferers of our time
must also vigorously denounce and protest against injustice, commit
themselves to the poor and those who suffer unjustly, face up to the
incomprehensible God, and discover God’s gratuitous love for all,
especially the poorest and weakest. In the long run, this is perhaps
the most convincing answer to the challenge of evil.
NOTES
1. For a helpful survey of various theodicies, see Barry L. Whitney, What Are
They Saying about God and Evil? (New York: Paulist Press, 1989) and
Terrence W. Tilley, The Evils of Theodicy (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown
University Press, 1991). For a survey of contemporary theologies of
suffering, see Lucien Richard, What Are They Saying about the Theology of
Suffering? (New York: Paulist, 1993).
2. The dualist teaching of Manes (c. 215-275) is a typical case in point.
3. Besides Augustine’s well-known theory of privatio boni, others argue that
divine goodness cannot be adequately represented by one grade of
PETER C. PHAN 197
perfection alone and therefore there must be created beings less perfect
than others with the ability to fall from the good (Austin Farrer) or that the
world as a whole is good while its individual parts may appear to limited
human minds as evil in themselves (Jacques Maritain), or that God does
not cause evil but only permits it (Thomas Aquinas), or that evil is God’s
punishment for our sins (many Christian theologians).
. Proponents of this theory include Irenaeus, F. R. Tennant, Teihard de
Chardin, Richard Swinburne, and John Hick.
. See David Ray Griffin, God, Power, and Evil (Philadelphia: Westminster,
1976) and Charles Hartshorne, Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984).
. For a succinct presentation of criticisms of these three types of theodicies,
see Barry Whitney, What Are They Saying about God and Evil?
. Brian Hebblethwaite discusses such coping strategies as the renunciation
of the world, seeking mystical knowledge through a variety of meditation
techniques, religious worship, performing morally valuable acts, and self-
sacrifice. See his Evil, Suffering, and Religion (London: Sheldon Press, 1976).
.See Terrence Tilley, The Evils of Theodicy (Washington: Georgetown
University Press, 1991).
. For an excellent comprehensive introduction to liberation theology, see
Ignacio Ellacuria and Jon Sobrino, eds. Mysterium Liberationis: Fundamental
Concepts of Liberation Theology (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1993); Marc H. Ellis and
Otto Maduro, eds., The Future of Liberation Theology: Essays in Honor of
Gustavo Gutierrez (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1989). For a survey of the most recent
literature on liberation theology, see Peter C. Phan, “The Future of
Liberation Theology,” The Living Light, 28/3 (Spring 1992), pp. 252-71.
10. An extended version of this essay has been published in Louvain Studies,
No. 20 (1995), pp. 3-20, under the title “Overcoming Poverty and
Oppression: Liberation Theology and the Problem of Evil.”
Ly The Truth Shall Make You Free: Confrontations, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell
(Maryknoll: Orbis, 1990), p. 7. See also his The Power of the Poor in History,
trans. Robert Barr (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1983), pp. 56-58.
12. On the use of the social sciences by liberation theology, see Gustavo
Gutierrez, “Theology and the Social Sciences,” in his The Truth Shall Make
You Free, pp. 53-84.
13: Gustavo Gutierrez, The Truth Shall Make You Free, p. 15. Also see, pp. 132-
133.
14. Gustavo Gutierrez, The Power of the Poor in History, p. 132.
15; Gustavo Gutierrez, The Truth Shall Make You Free, pp. 9-10.
16. See Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, trans. and ed. Caridad Inda
and John Eagleson, revised edition with a new introduction (Maryknoll:
Orbis, 1988), p. 104. In response to the charge of reductionism and
horizontalism, Gutierrez repeatedly emphasizes the three dimensions of
liberation: from socioeconomic and political oppression, from fatalism, and
from sin. See, for example, The Truth Shall Make You Free, pp. 13-14; 34-36;
127-40.
Wh Gustavo Gutierrez, On Job: God-Talk and the Suffering of the Innocent, trans.
Matthew J. O’Connell (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1987), p. xv.
18. Gustavo Gutierrez, On Job, p. xiv.
19. Gustavo Guitierrez, A Theology of Liberation, p. 9. See also chapter 7:
“Theology from the Underside of History,” in The Power of the Poor, pp:
169-221.
20. Gustavo Gutierrez, On Job, p. xviii.
Zeke Ibid., p. 15.
22. Ibid., p. 24.
ee Ibid., p. 28.
24. Ibid., p. 29.
205 Ibid., p. 31.
26. Ibid., p. 32.
273 Ibid., p. 47.
28. See A Theology of Liberation, pp. 150-56. For Gutierrez’s further elaboration
of the God of justice and gratuitous love, see his The God of Life, trans.
Matthew J. O’Connell (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1991).
29, Gustavo Gutierrez, On Job, p. 49.
30. Ibid., p. 66.
oe Ibid., p. 72.
a2! Ibid., pp. 77-78.
33: Ibid., p. 87.
34. Ibid., p. 88.
35; For these charges, see “Instruction on Certain Aspects of the ‘Theology of
Liberation,” Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (August 6, 1984)
in Liberation Theology: A Documentary History, ed. Alfred T. Hennelly
(Maryknoll: Orhis, 1990), pp. 393-414. For an evaluation of the connection
between Marxism and liberation theology, see Arthur McGovern, Liberation
Theology and Its Critics: Toward An Assessment (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1989).
36. For a study of liberation spirituality, see Peter C. Phan, “Peacemaking in
Latin American Theology,” Eglise et Theologie, 24 (1993), pp. 25-41.
16
The Unification
Understanding of the
Problem of Evil
By Anthony J. Guerra
A s with other world scriptures, the Divine Principle’ contains

‘a number of striking, paradoxical and even radical state-
ments. Take, for instance, the chapter entitled “The Fall of
Man.” In one statement it seems to affirm the revolutionary’s call to
insurrection:
As man’s volition for the restoration of freedom is cultivated, he

naturally seeks to create the social circumstances in which he can
realize freedom. Social revolution is unavoidable when the circum-
stances of the age cannot satisfy the desires of the men belonging to
the age. The French Revolution in the 18th Century is a represen-
tative example. Revolution will continue until the freedom of the
original nature of creation is restored completely.”
Then, in another statement it seems to propagate a conservative,

loyalist view of citizenship obedient to the governing authorities: “Any
act that is performed apart from one’s own position and limit, out
of an unrighteous desire, is without exception a manifestation of this
original nature of the Fall... Human society was thrown out of
order by those who left their positions and reversed their
- 199-
200 THE UNIFICATION UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM
dominions.”” Similarly, Jesus in the New Testament has been

characterized by some as a militant and by others as a pacifist.
Compare, for instance, Matthew 10:34, “Do not think that I have
come to bring peace to the earth: I have not come to bring peace,
but a sword,” with Matthew 26:52, “Then Jesus said to him, ‘Put
your sword back into its place: for all who take the sword will perish
by the sword.” Although one may ask any question of a text,
including scriptural texts, it is often less productive when such
questions are tangential to the central concerns of the text under
consideration.
The religious worldview finds the political perspective a partial
one in that it does not perceive the fundamental reason for human
misery and suffering. From the religious perspective, everyone is
spiritually ill and in need of a path to perfection, achieving unity
with God and self-realization. Unlike nationalistic or racist ideol-
ogies, a world religion provides a perspective which finds all hu-
manity with the same basic need: salvation, enlightenment, and
liberation. Such global religions often developed from particularistic
origins and confronted hostile communities informed by tribal
religious traditions. Thus, Islam’s prophetic faith transformed the
independent city states into larger coalitions, giving rise to more
comprehensive regional societies. Beyond the expanded social and
political collectives a world religion may generate, its worldview
seeks to offer an explanation of the human condition, human nature,
pertinent to every person. It is such a universalist worldview that
gives a religion‘its global evangelical reach. Although a given reli-
gion may be dominant in one area, it may also appeal to individuals
in another part of the globe as, for example, Buddhism in America.
For Judaism, Christianity, Islam and Unificationism, the symbols
of Adam and Eve are significant vehicles by which these traditions
articulate their understanding of the human condition. Although
recent scientific theories about the origin of the human, specifically
the “Mitochondrial Eve” hypothesis. would seem to affirm the
possibility of a common ancestor for all human descendants, the
religious significance of Adam and Eve cannot be exhausted by
understanding an Eve and/or Adam as the progenitor of the human
race, for their story is meant to reveal something about the potential
as well as the experienced frustration of all humankind. However
ambiguous the merits of the scientific rationale for affirming the
ANTHONY J. GUERRA 201
monogenesis of the human, the ethical imperative for the position

is unmistakable. The affirmation of common human ancestors makes
preposterous racism, ultra-nationalism and other insidious and
socially divisive ideologies. We should want conclusive scientific
evidence if we abandon the notion of monogenesis, given its salutary
social and ethical implications.
As with Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, the Unification discus-
sion of the origin of evil or the human fall, is set within a wider
revelatory and/or theological framework. This larger context is the
creation, fall, salvation, history, and eschaton wherein the fall is the
decisive moment which separates humanity from God; it also sep-
arates humanity from God’s purpose of creation necessitating a
providence of salvation in order to prepare for a final culminating
moment in which the original purpose of creation is to be achieved.
The fundamental theological affirmation is that God is an absolute
being whose purpose of creation, although temporarily frustrated,
shall ultimately be consummated. The fall is, indeed, the cause of the
long-suffering and painful history of humanity. Further, God is also
suffering: a divine passion caused essentially by the deep disap-
pointment in not being able to share divine life and love with God’s
children.
The Problem
It may indeed beacliche that the fundamental problem of
humanity is the failure of love but it is also a profound theological
dilemma. If, as the main Western religions, Judaism, Christianity
and Islam affirm, God is the all-good, omnipotent creator, then the
problem of human sinfulness appears to call into question one or the
other of these divine attributes. The traditional recourse to free will
in response to this problem is less than satisfying because it is not
clear how something desired by a created being should be contrary
to the will of its creator and in effect contrary to its own endowed
nature. The founder of the Unification Church, Sun Myung Moon,
confronted this question as he read the Genesis story of Adam and
Eve which is known to Jews, Christians and in a somewhat modified
form to Muslims.
In the context of the Genesis narrative, the abstract question just
mentioned becomes, how is it that Adam and Eve, without a sinful
heritage, came to disobey God’s commandment? What is the nature

and process of the fall of humankind? Partly as a reaction against the
Marcionite dualistic conception of an evil creator God, the early
Christians stressed that Adam and Eve were good, perfect beings.
This understanding enhanced the problem in accounting for the
wrongful act attributed to the first human ancestors. Irenaeus, the
early Christian theologian, stands as an exception in proposing that
Adam and Eve were created as infants and developed through natu-
ral stages to adulthood. According to Irenaeus, Jesus who was the
antitype of Adam and Mary that of Eve, also had to be born and
grow through stages of natural human growth. The view is con-
sonant with the Unificaticnists’ notion of restoration as a reversal
course necessitating Adam and Eve type figures to trod the path of
the original ancestors, indemnifying the mistakes of the original
ancestors.”
The biblical text is not subtle in indicating that the original sin
was a sexual act. As in several modern languages, ancient Semitic
languages used the expression picking or eating fruit to refer to
sexual intercourse as is also the case with the expression to “know”
a woman. The Genesis narrative indicates that before the fall, Adam
and Eve were naked and unashamed but after it they became aware
of their nakedness and covered the lower parts of their body.
Accordingly, the Genesis account narrates that Eve is to be punished
by experiencing pain in childbearing. Interestingly, modern biblical
criticism confirms the sexual nature of the fall adducing a number
of extra-biblical parallels, including the Mesopotamian epic of Gilga-
mesh wherein the figure Enkidu is seduced by a prostitute. Fol-
lowing this act, Enkidu is forced to leave his wilderness paradise and
puts on clothing for the first time.”
Although Gnosticism may be perfectly content with a sexual
interpretation of the fall, as it seeks to deny the material world as
entirely evil, for Judaism, Christianity and especially Unificationism,
it presents a paradox. Namely, God is understood to have ordained
marriage as a blessing to humankind as well as for the procreation
of children. How then can the sexual relationship of the first human
parents be the cause of the human fall? Reverend Moon’s teachings
emphasize that God is a being of love and the motivation for crea-
tion is to complete God’s love by allowing God to have reciprocal
relationships with God’s children. It is this motive of divine love that
explains God’s risk-taking in creating beings who could thwart God’s

own desires. Love allows for the possibility of pain as well as
happiness: “God is an absolute being, however, He needs to have a
being which can eas His object of love. God’s object of love is
man and woman.”’ God’s own fulfillment of love, according to
Unificationism, awaits the uniting of man and woman in true love:
“Male was created for the sake of female, and female was created for
the sake of male. God cannot dwell in places where one insists on his
own being. But God dwells where one values the other.” * Such love
takes time to develop and the prohibition on sexual relationship
between Adam and Eve was to assure the proper development of
unselfish emotions which were to accompany their physical intimacy
and also assure that they were capable of fulfilling their parental
responsibility to offspring:
If Adam and Eve had reached perfection without falling, they would
have become perfect not only individually but also on a universal and
historical level and they would have been able to start a new family
centering on God’s love. From this family, a society, tribe, nation and
world would have been realized in which God could have dwelt.”
The significance of Adam and Eve and this first family becomes clear
in Unification theology. It is the equivalent of the incarnation in
Christianity coupled with a federal theology.’ * Adam and Eve should
have formed their union centered on God and assumed the position
of true parents reflective of God’s loving heart towards humankind.
The Solution
Given the Unification understanding that original sin prevented
the establishment of a true family, it follows that the central efforts
of Reverend Moon and his movement have been devoted to the
restoration of a God-centered, perfected family. Indeed, Reverend
Moon teaches that God shall only be liberated from God’s own
suffering, disappointment and frustration—as a result of human-
kind’s failure to achieve the purpose of creation—with the establish-
ment of this family. Thus, the Unificationist attitude in prayer is first
and foremost to comfort the suffering heart of God, believing that
however deep the pain and suffering of humanity is, God’s sorrow
remains greater. Although Unificationists’ prayer services may often
be experienced as highly affective, including intense weeping, self

pity is explicitly eschewed. We learn from the official biography of
Reverend Moon that even when he was imprisoned in a Communist
concentration camp, he prayed with the intention of relieving God’s
sorrow rather than pleading that his own burden be lifted.
Unification spirituality seeks to reorient the center of emotional
concern from the self towards the other and to ground this concern
in divine love: “The most important subject is how we can reform
our self-centered love, transforming it into a love for others. God
absolutely does not have self-centered love. His love is only centered
on others. If love is not for the sake of others, no matter what kind
of love it is, it is not true love.”’' Reverend Moon’s construal of the
fall of humankind shapes not only his understanding of his own
mission but also his reading of the ministry of Jesus. If, as the
apostle Paul said, Jesus is the last Adam (I Cor. 15:45), then he
should have accomplished that which God willed Adam to have
achieved. Accordingly, Jesus, as the second Adam should have mar-
ried a woman who would fulfill the role of second Eve. Following
this pattern of a restoration course reversing the Adamic family fall,
Reverend Moon teaches that representative Cain and Abel figures
should have united in love, reversing the hateful history of the first
siblings of the old Adamic family. Thus, John the Baptist and the
official Jewish leadership should have united together and cooper-
ated with Jesus. The failure to do so prevented Jesus from restoring
the position of the first true husband and parent. Instead, Jesus
undertook a secondary, alternative course in enduring the cruci-
fixion and provided apartial salvation necessitating the return of the
Lord of the second advent.
It should certainly be unsurprising that a central topic of
Reverend Moon’s spiritual guidance is marriage and family. He
encourages individuals to transform the self-concern in approaching
marriage so as to embrace the divine intention: “For what reason do
we marry? It is in order to fulfill the ideal of creation, i.e., to realize
the purpose of creation. Then, what purpose is this purpose of
creation? Before it is the purpose of Adam, it is the purpose of
God!” Accordingly, Unificationists refer to the marriage ceremony
as the blessing because it represents God’s original intention to
provide the opportunity for Adam and Eve to realize the divine
intention for true love. Self-sacrifice is essential: “You must believe
that marriage is not for your sake, but for your partner. . .If you
have understood the basic principle that people are to live for the
sake of others, you should know that you will get married for the
sake of your spouse.” Single members of the church are dis-
couraged from pursuing romantic love marriages and instead are
matched by Reverend and Mrs. Moon. Adam and Eve’s diso-
bedience is restored by obediently following the advice of the True
Parents as to one’s marriage partner. This creates a condition for
centering the marriage relationship beyond self-concern and to
make room for agape, sacrificial true love. Marriage is not an egoistic
opportunity for self-gratification but the opportunity to exercise
unselfish love and to recover our original identity as children
reflecting the love of God. Reverend Moon’s spiritual guidance
concerning the sexual relationship challenges conventional wisdom.
A recurrent motif in his sermons is that the wife is the owner of the
husband’s sexual organ and the husband of the wife’s: “The sexual
organs enable man and woman’s bodies to unite and provide a path
through which mind and body can unite completely centering on
love. The sexual organ of man is not for the sake of man, and the
sexual organ of woman is not for the sake of woman. You were not
born for the sake of yourself. ”' Reverend Moon clearly seeks to
sacralize the sexual relationship within the marital union: “Where
is God’s holy of holies? It is where love dwelt before the fall—the
sexual id Saha of man and woman. This is the holy of holies of
heaven.”
This intention to resacralize marriage grows out of Reverend
Moon’s understanding of his own mission and the providential sig-
nificance of his acts. Because Jesus was not able to restore the old
Adamic family by virtue of the failure of those surrounding him, the
Lord of the second advent should establish the true family which will
become God’s mediator for dispensing a blessing on the rest of
humanity. Thus, Reverend Moon understood, apparently from a
very early stage in his ministry, that his own marriage would have
messianic significance. For Unificationists, the marriage of Reverend
Moon and Hak Jan Han in 1960 represents an eschatological
moment in which God’s purpose that should have been fulfilled at
the beginning of human history by Adam and Eve is at last realized.
It thus makes available in human history the God-centered love of
true parents.
Soon after their blessing (wedding), the Reverend and Mrs. Moon
initiated and officiated at the first of what was to be a continuing
series of mass marriages. Each successive marriage has seen an
increase in the number of participating couples; at the last such
marriage in summer, 1995, 360,000 couples were in attendance.
Reverend Moon provides a rationale for such mass marriages that
refers back to the old Adamic family and the mission of Jesus:
If the Blessing event had happened in the Garden of Eden, it would
have been the big cosmic event. However, due to the human
ancestors’ fall, in order to indemnify the failure to accomplish the
heavenly standard in the garden of Eden, we are holding the mass
wedding ceremony. Jesus should have held such a marriage
ceremony on the level of all the Israelites, at the least. However, no
one was even concerned about Jesus’ marriage.’
Reverend Moon has also given a two-fold explanation of the main

mass wedding ceremonies pointing backwards to the primordial
history to be restored and forward to the present and immediate
providential missions of the participants. The first such mass mar-
riage of the 36 couples in 1961 represented the restoration of the
historical ancestors. The 36 couples consist of 3 groups of 12 couples
based on their previous marital status and stand as the closest
disciples of the True Parents (Reverend and Mrs. Moon), similar to
the position of Jesus’ 12 apostles. Likewise, the next blessing group
was the 72 couples representing the restored Cain and Abel or the
children of the first ancestors and also standing in the position of
Jesus’ 70 disciples. A third mass marriage consisted of 120 couples
symbolizing the restoration of all nations of the world as well as the
disciples of the post-resurrection Jesus.'”
Successive blessings (mass marriages) of 430, 777, 1800, 2000,
6000, 30,000 and as already mentioned 360,000 couples were pre-
sided over by Reverend and Mrs. Moon. The participants in the 430
couples blessings as well as the earlier mass weddings were
exclusively Korean.’ The 430 couples blessing was understood as a
national level condition to indemnify Korea whose legendary history
is said to be 4300 years long. The 777 couples mass wedding in-
volved peoples from several Eastern as well as Western nations and
explicitly marked the moment when the blessing was made available
to all humankind. Indeed, in this as well as all later marriages, there
was a significant emphasis on international and interracial marriages

encouraged by Reverend and Mrs. Moon as an important condition
for unifying the world community.” The 1800 couples blessing that
followed continued this focus on the Unificationist’s world wide
providential mission. Many participants from this blessing were sent
as foreign missionaries to initiate the Unification Church in coun-
tries around the globe. Each blessing group (36, 72, 120, 430, etc.)
has a sense of common purpose that results in the formation of
Blessing Associations that not only provide spiritual support for
individual couples in need but also promote the shared providential
mission that allows individuals and families to transcend private
concern and often to make heroic sacrifices for humanity and God.
In Unificationism marriage is the central sacrament and encom-
passes both a personal spiritual dimension as well as a universal
providential significance. The blessing or marriage in Unificationism
reverses the primordial fall of the first ancestors and creates a new
history of families united ina spiritual and social quest to reform
world society. For Unificationists, the blessing offers both deep per-
sonal meaning as well as a sense of historical and even cosmic signifi-
cance to marriage and family.
Conclusion
In a religious worldview, one is looking for a comprehensive

vision that is internally logical, consistent, and perhaps most im-
portantly, elevates human life, offering a perspective enabling an
individual and society to feel that life is meaningful. Moreover, such
a religious worldview empowers those embracing it to transform
their lives and the world around them, generating new cultures and
civilizations. Intellectually, a religious worldview cannot transcend
the hermeneutical circle, cannot be proven, but is a generative pre-
supposition. Its first premise, as is the case with all human thought
including skepticism, is not rationally deduced. The difference
between philosophical schools and religious movements is that the
latter have the capacity to radically transform society as well as
individuals. Stoicism had its moments of prominence as in the time
of Marcus Aurelius, but it was the mystery religions and later
Christianity that moved the masses as well as the most influential
and wealthy of the Roman Empire. In our present time, a plethora
of new religions have emerged to satisfy a felt need for a new

spiritual vision. For believers, Unificationism has the depth of
spirituality and breadth of intellectual vision, in responding to evil,
to generate the future global civilization.
NOTES
1. The Divine Principle contains the essential teachings of Reverend Sun
Myung Moon and is considered also to be the Completed Testament or a
part thereof. The English version of the same is: Divine Principle (New
York: Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christian ity,
1973).
. Dine Principle, op. cit., 1977 edition, p. 45.
NO
©9. Ibid.
4. For a concise summary of the pros and cons of the ‘Mitochondrial Eve’
hypothesis see, James Shreeve, “Argument Over a Woman,” Discover,
August, 1990, pp. 52-59.
5. Indemnity is a term used in the Divine Principle to refer to the process re-
quired of humankind to recover the original heart, attitude and relation-
ships appropriate to children of God.
6. See Andrew Wilson, “The Sexual Interpretation of the Human Fall,” in
Anthony J. Guerra, Unification Theology in Comparative Perspectives (Barry-
town: Unification Theological Seminary, 1988), pp. 51-70.
7. Blessing and Ideal Family (New York: Holy Spirit Association for the
Unification of World Christianity, 1993), p. 7. This book also contains
many basic teachings of Reverend Sun Myung Moon on the topic of
marriage and family.
8. Blessing and Ideal‘Family, p. 35.
9. Ibid, p. 21.
10. For an insightful exploration of Unificationism as a federal theology, see
Herbert W. Richardson, “A Brief Outline of Unification Theology,” in M.
Darral Bryant, A Time for Consideration: A Scholarly Appraisal of the Unification
Church (N.Y.: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1978), pp. 133-140.
11. Blessing and Ideal Family, p. 88.
12. Ibid., p. 56.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 36.
15. Ibid., p. 43.
16. Ibid., p. 223.
17. Ibid., pp. 415-416.
18. A separate much smaller mass wedding of 43 couples including Japanese
as well as Westerners was held shortly after the 430 couples mass wedding.
It should be noted that except for Korea the movement was still young and
small in all countries in the 1960’s when these first several mass marriages
were taking place.
19. Indeed, one of the most significant factors in the widespread persecution
of the Unification Church has been the disgruntlement of parents whose
children married partners of an unacceptable race or nationality.
hy.
Ecological Evil and
Interfaith Dialogue:
Caring for the Earth’
By M. Darrol Bryant
N O greater imperative faces us than that of the environmental

or ecological crisis. It is a crisis that has revealed a particular
face of evil in our time. Let us be clear about what this crisis
means. There is nothing the matter with the planet earth; it unfolds
in its own remarkable way following the evolutionary patterns, inter-
active processes and cycles that order the natural world. There is an
ecological crisis today not because there is something wrong with the
ecological order of planet earth or the cosmos. Rather, the ecological
crisis is caused by a distinct form of human intervention and inter-
action with nature. This is not to say that the human is not part of
nature. But human beings are a part of nature who can intervene in
nature in ways that no other species can. In the course of human
unfolding and history, there has emerged an attitude towards the
natural world as well as sciences of mastery and technologies of
intervention that are remarkable in their power but devastating in
their impact upon the natural world. It shall be the burden of this
essay to say something about the nature of the environmental crisis,
the contributions to addressing that crisis that need to emerge from
the dialogue between faiths, and to conclude with a plea.
- 210-
M. DARROL BRYANT 211
The Crisis
The problematic human attitude that arose in Western society at
the beginning of the modern era (or the end of the medieval world,
if you prefer) has been described in many ways. The Canadian
philosopher, George Grant, described it in a memorable phrase as
mastery over nature.’ This attitude was new. It replaced the atti-
tudes toward nature that had preceded it: the magical (nature was
something to be appeased), the contemplative (nature as something
to contemplate for the sake of understanding its dynamics and
patterns), and the enduring (nature is something we suffer and
endure). It also implicitly rejected the attitudes towards nature that
were found in traditional religious cosmologies East and West.
Causally linked to this new attitude of mastery over nature were
sciences that gave us control over nature and technologies of
intervention that allowed us to intervene in nature and bend it to
human will. The story of this attitude, the sciences of mastery, and
these technologies of1intervention is a long and complex one that I
cannot recount here in detail.” But its unfolding has generated the
predicament in which we now find ourselves. At a New Delhi con-
ference on “Ecological Responsibility: A Dialogue with Buddhism”
in 1993, Jose Lutzenberger, former Environmental Minister in the
federal government of Brazil, put the predicament in this way: “The
ecological crisis is a direct result of progress. This is the contra-
diction we must acknowledge.”*
Though recounting the story of the emergence of the sciences of
mastery and the technologies of intervention exceeds our purposes
here, it is essential to understand two aspects of that progress. First,
it is built on a perception of nature that regards the world, in ver-
nacular terms, as mere stuff rather than as a living system. As dead
matter, nature and all the things of the earth (including the human)
need not be approached with respect for their intrinsic value or the
integrity of their processes. Rather, they can be measured, quanti-
fied, and used for whatever purposes we desire. It is another exam-
ple of what C. Badrinath calls the either/or mentality of modernity,
in this case it is the either/or of living or non-living.” When the earth
is made non-living, then it is removed from the sphere of those
things that we have an ethical relation to and placed in the sphere
of mere stuff. Secondly, this attitude has deprived us of a
212 ECOLOGICAL EVIL AND INTERFAITH DIALOGUE
comprehensive vision of nature and our place within it. This point
has been eloquently argued by the ecologist Thomas Berry in his
book The Dream of the Earth. Berry observes that, “even the most
primitive tribes have a larger vision of the universe, of our place and
functioning within it, a vision that extends to celestial regions of
space and to interior depths of the human in a manner far exceed-
ing the parameters of our own world of technological confinement.”
From these developments has emerged a form of industrial-
technological culture that has had a disastrous impact on nature.
This merging of techne with logos, knowing as technique rather than
contemplation, that emerged in the West has become the new uni-
versal of our time. It is enveloping the whole earth. In its onslaught,
industrial-technological culture has overwhelmed more traditional
cultures and civilizations West and East.’ No culture seems able to
either resist it or even to significantly qualify it. It is symbolized in
the industrial smokestack that spews out its waste into the air, its
effluents into the water, and endlessly transforms dwindling natural
resources into products for consumption. It would be better to sym-
bolize this development in the automobile: a mode of transportation
that is much valued but is polluting the air we breathe to remarkable
degrees and degrading the environment. While we all can generate
opposition to smoke stacks, the automobile is another matter. The
image of the automobile discloses the ambiguity of the resultant
technology made possible by this new attitude towards and relation-
ship with nature. In the past, humans had to either cooperate with
horses, camels, bullocks or some other species in order to move
across the landscape. With the new sciences of mastery, we learned
how to transform iron ore into steel, oil into gasoline, rubber into
tires. To create a machine that has captured the desire of human-
kind allows us to overcome space and time and the limits of inter-
species cooperation. It grants us mastery and at the same time is
polluting nature, including our own human nature in unprece-
dented ways. As Lutzenberger baldly and rightly remarked, “indus-
trial culture is destructive of the earth.”
The irony is that the ecological crisis, the destruction of the earth,
is unintended. Lutzenberger called this destruction the contra-
diction at the heart of progress. No one has set out to despoil
nature, to eradicate species, to pollute the water we drink and the
air we breathe. These consequences simply flow from the nature of
what has been created. This reveals the peculiar face of evil that we
are confronted with in the ecological crisis. It is the evil, we might
say, that arises in Augustine’s terms from the absence of good. Evil,
Augustine rightly saw, is often the consequence of an absence. In
this case, it is the absence of the good of our relationship to the
living earth. It also reveals the suprapersonal character of ecological
evil: it is built into the very nature of industrial institutions and no
one is responsible.
Chemical companies never intend to pollute the water; industries
never intend to dump tons of toxic waste into the environment,
logging operations never intend to destroy species. Environmental
degradation is simply the unintended byproduct of pursuing our
mastery over nature with the technologies of intervention that we
have created. The whole enterprise is justified by products that en-
hance human life: healing chemicals, newsprint and books, bridges
and automobiles, dams and hydroelectric power, and even, genetic-
ally programmed children free of defect.
The effect of this industrial-technological culture is a profound
ecological crisis. We are now starting to understand its devastating
impact on nature. We are destroying the ozone layer which protects
human life from the damaging effects of ultraviolet light, effects which
can create cancer. We have despoiled the earth’s rain forests and
continue to do so every day. We are devastating the forests of the
world and have created barren and eroding mountain sides where
life-giving forests used to stand. We are polluting the water we drink
and the air we breathe with toxic chemicals inimical to human life.
We are polluting the earth with pesticides, insecticides and fertilizers
that enhance productivity but at the same time killbirds and animals
and introduce toxins into the soil and the food chain.” Some of those
chemicals are mutagenic and may alter the very genetic structures
of a new generation. Edward O. Wilson, the noted Harvard biol-
ogist, observes that even if all further destruction of nature were to
be halted today it “will take millions of years to correct. . .the loss of
genetic and species diversity by the destruction of dated habitats.”
It is this crisis and this evil that we must address. It is this crisis that
has revealed a fundamental face of evil in our time.
Ecology and Religious Dialogue

I propose to relate the ecological crisis to the dialogue between
religions. The primary aim of such dialogue is mutual respect and
understanding in order to overcome the antagonism that has been
with us far too long in the history of human religious life.” In the
midst of dialogue towards mutuality, the religious traditions need to
come together to address fundamental human, social, and ecological
issues. It is not only a matter of respect for the diverse traditions,
rituals and beliefs of various religious ways, but finding within these
traditions the inspiration, insight, and wisdom that can address pres-
sing human and world problems, especially the evils that confront
us in life. Many of these are issues and problems that were not even
on the distant horizon when the religious traditions emerged. First
on that agenda, I believe, is the ecological crisis, or if I may speak in
the language of Buddhism: the suffering earth.
The dialogue between religions can contribute, if they are to
exercise their ecological responsibility, first, a critique of the men-
tality of mastery, the sciences of mastery and the technologies of
intervention. To lay the blame for an industrial-technological men-
tality at the feet of any specific religious tradition, as Lynn White
does, is not only profoundly misguided but nefarious as it deflects
our attention from the real issues.’ The mentality of mastery and
the technologies of intervention are hostile to the traditional cosmol-
ogies of all religions and spiritual traditions East and West. The rela-
tionship of the.religious traditions to the mentality and technology
of mastery ranges from complicity (Christianity, as it contributed to
the desacralization of the earth in the name of an excessive transcen-
dentalism) to sheer incomprehension and silence (most religions). It
is quite clear that no religion has truly stood in opposition to the
mentality of mastery that has fueled the industrial-technological
behemoth; nor has any religion effectively critiqued the sciences of
mastery and the technologies of intervention. Religion cannot and
should not reject sciences that seek to know and understand things,
but it must reject the hubris that assumes that knowledge bestows
the right and the necessity to intervene.
Secondly, the religious traditions must come to understand that
the industrial-technological behemoth knows no boundaries. It is as
present in the East as in the West. Where it is not yet fully present,
it is sought and longed for and identified as progress and develop-

ment. Industrial-technological culture belongs as much to Shinto-
Buddhist Japan as it does to Evangelical Christian America, as much
to the aspiration of contemporary communist China as to an in-
creasingly post-Christian European Common Market. It is seen as
the way out of poverty for the Third World and as the source of
endless material benefits for the so-called First World. It has been
enshrined in capitalist, communist, and socialist ideologies and
championed by those who seek a mixed economy. Shinto may ack-
nowledge the kami in every tree and brook and natural phenom-
enon, but this acknowledgement has not fundamentally altered the
industrial-technological way in Japan. While some Muslims may
abhor modernity and seek to create Islamic states, they still send
their sons and daughters to be educated in the mentality of mastery
and the technologies of intervention as doctors, engineers and scien-
tists. Taoists have simply been overwhelmed as have the Confucian
traditions.’ Hindus may see the entire cosmos as sacred, but their
view has not prevented their embracing of the mentality of mastery
or the technologies of intervention. Witness that the most sacred
rivers in India are among the most polluted in the world. Some
Christians may have spoken against the new way, but they have been
reduced to conspiratorial silence by the powerful products and
proponents of mastery. It seems that Christianity is reluctant even
now to say anything critical of science and technology. Religion is
generally still portrayed as the opponent to science and thinking.
People seem to be mesmerized by the very evil that is destroying the
earth and possibly the very ecological processes on which life
depends.”
In the industrial organizations of our industrial-technological
culture we have embodied a face of evil that discloses what Walter
Rauschenbusch, the nineteenth century American founder of the
social gospel movement in Christianity,’ might have called evil’s
suprapersonal character. It is evil embodied in industrial organiza-
tions that by their very character wreak havoc on the environment;
yet no one is personally responsible. Thus we have the anomalous
situation of widespread evil, yet a failure to take personal re-
sponsibility. It was, for example, a precedent setting judgment in the
Canadian legal system when an owner of a local Elmira, Ontario,
industry was found guilty and sent to jail for the ecological damage
done by his company. Even here, when the case is examined more
closely, one discovers that he is never really charged with harming
the water or polluting the ground, but rather a failure to file certain
papers in regard to the handling of toxic wastes. The question is
whether nature—water, trees, air—has rights. Within a legal system,
it is difficult to raise the issue of ecological evil. Evil in the ecological
sense I am proposing here means simply the failure to respect the
dignity or dharma of things. Could a legal system acknowledge this
kind of evil as a legal wrong?
For the religious traditions to take seriously the ecological crisis,
they must begin with a religiously inspired critical analysis of the
roots of the ecological crisis. That analysis must not be content with
an indictment of human grasping or greed, as important as it is to
indict such desires. It must also seriously analyze the structures and
dynamics of modern industrial-technological civilization which has
enfolded us all. We cannot be content with the easy formula: Tech-
nology is neutral—it is only a matter of how we use it. Religious
traditions must turn their intellectual and moral effort to the cri-
tique of modern industrial-technological culture. Such a critique
must be grounded in a profound sense of the sacredness of our
living planet, in compassion for all sentient beings, and in the best
scientific information available on the devastating effects of indus-
trial culture on the planet earth. It must face the evils that result
from the absence of good—a relationship to the living earth, an
awareness of the interdependent character of all things, respect for
the inherent dharma (order) of all things—as well as the actuality of
evil present in institutions and the devastation of species and the
environment.
David Ross Kormito in an article “Madhyamika, Tantra, and
‘Green Buddhism” sees a “tremendous similarity between dharmic
and ecological attitudes.”"” Specifically, he sees the theoretical con-
nection to lie in dependent origination and selflessness, two pro-
found Buddhist concepts of reality. Finding theoretical links
between a religious tradition and ecological responsibility is typical
of a religious tradition, if the issue is to be addressed. While there is
some value to this approach, it is not adequate, as Kormito ack-
nowledges, if it is not linked to transformative practice.'” Nor is the
approach adequate if it fails to identify the historical-cultural forms
that have generated the crisis. To move from the philosophical to
M. DARROL BRYANT ALZ
the psychological, a general religious tendency, while ignoring the

social/institutional forms that embody the prob-lem, is also not
adequate. Things do not move only from the inner to the outer.
Rather, the outer social forms have themselves a life and a logic that
we must grasp if we are to adequately respond to the crisis. We may
also discover that our traditions do not have all the answers,
theoretical or practical, to the crisis.
We can begin to act responsibly on the basis of an adequate
analysis, one that both understands the social institutions and prac-
tices that generate the problem and begins to rearticulate the
wisdom of our respective traditions concerning the natural order.
The religious traditions need to inspire us to think globally, but act
locally to address the environmental crisis.'’ While we need to
understand some of the larger philosophical issues and the cultural
forces that have given rise to the ecological crisis, we need to act
locally in relation to the suffering earth. It is not possible to redress
the ecological crisis in general, but only in the specific places where
we live. We cannot wish away our industrial-technological era nor
can we wait to take action until we all become enlightened or liber-
ated or saved. Rather, it is essential that now, in the name of this
sacred earth, or the interdependence of all things, or the Tao, or
Allah’s creation, or whatever we name this remarkable earth, we act
to preserve nature in all of its wondrous diversity and to reverse the
process of destruction. That may mean, as it did in the case of our
small town of Elmira, Ontario in Canada, that we have to do battle
with a local chemical company that has polluted the water supply."
We must insist that the company simply not produce what pollutes
and that it begin the process of cleaning up its own waste. In the
Elmira case, this will mean 30 to 40 years of continuous effort to
reverse the 50 years of continuous violation of water, air, and soil.
But while this is going on, we continue to create hundreds of new
chemical compounds each year and only a handful are tested for
their effect on human and animal life, let alone there impact on air,
water, and soil.
In these efforts we must also become literate in the language of
science and know how to read its findings. It is, for example, pos-
sible to have nonpolluting chemical plants or paints that are not full
of lead. It is not necessary to destroy the remaining rain forests.
There are alternatives to fluorocarbons that destroy the ozone layer.
We need not drive whales to extinction, nor dump tons of toxic

waste into the atmosphere.
We must recover or develop alternative cosmologies that reject
the mentalities and technologies of mastery. The religious traditions
have failed to fulfill their ecological responsibility. Few within any of
the traditions are even aware of the problems that confront the
suffering planet. Traditional analyses will not be sufficient; we will
have to find ways to formulate adequate directions, calling upon the
deepest resources and insights of our respective traditions. For
example, it will not be adequate for Christians simply to speak of
stewardship but we must recognize and overcome our complicity in
the emergence of the sciences and technologies of mastery and insist
on the glory and integrity of creation. Nor will it be adequate for
Buddhists to assert the interdependence of all things without finding
ways to effectively act to preserve the integrity of the natural world.
We must seek to inform our communities of faith of the crisis with
which we are confronted, formulate effective acts of compassion for
the suffering earth, and inculcate habits of ecological living that
embody a sense of unity with all living things.
We must mount religiously inspired campaigns to preserve the
ecological integrity of the planet. Different religious traditions have
different languages for nature. For example, the theistic traditions
speak of the earth as divine creation; the primal traditions speak of
mother earth; ”” the non-theistic traditions speak of the interdepen-
dence of all things. These diverse languages should not be seen as
mutually exclusive but as giving us diverse access to and aspects of
what is. They should lead us to stand with the suffering earth
against the onslaught of industrial-technological culture. Such a
stand will inevitably be perceived as religion involved in politics. But
it is a religious duty that emerges from the respective traditions as
a love for the earth. It is a duty that exceeds politics; it is a matter of
the future of the earth itself.
A Plea
Let me indulge in a moment of madness, a kind that I hope is
touched by some wisdom. Wouldn’t it be marvelous if His Holiness
the Dalai Lama were to call Buddhists and men and women of other
faiths to join him in nonviolent protest at the plants of the leading
producers of fluorocarbons in the USA and Europe? Or Pope John
M. DARROL BRYANT Zh0
Paul II to call on Catholics in Latin America and people from other

faiths to join him in a vigil at the edge of the Amazon rain forest
until its destruction is halted? Or if the Grand Muftis of Syria and
Saudi Arabia would call, in the name of Allah, the creator, on all
Muslims and other believers to join them in protest against the
destruction of the fragile ecology of the desert by the oil industry?
Or, if the Head of the Grand Shrine at Ise (the foremost Shinto
shrine in Japan) were to join hands with the Head of Eiheiji (one of
the foremost Soto Zen Monasteries of Japan) to cry out on behalf of
the earth, for an end to the pollution that daily envelopes the cities
of Japan? Or, if Reverend Moon would invite leaders of other
religious communities to join him in opposing dragnet industrial
fishing in the oceans of the world, a practice that is not only destroy-
ing the spawning grounds of numerous species but is also resulting
in the deaths of fish and mammals (dolphins and small whales)
caught in the nets? M. Varadarajan suggested at Tibet House in
New Delhi that it would even be better to have such acts initiated by
an interreligious group of religious leaders. Such scenarios are not
frivolous suggestions. They would awaken and enhance our
consciousness to the evil of what we are doing to nature, inspire us
to seek alternatives and begin to reverse a process that is destroying
living things and the earth.
I have argued that we must see the ecological face of evil in our
times. The roots of the ecological crisis and ecological evil lie in a
particular human attitude towards and intervention in the natural
world. That complex of attitudes, sciences, and technologies of
mastery that I have here called industrial-technological culture is the
primary source of the ecological crisis that has enveloped our planet.
It is ecological evil. The consequence is a suffering planet.
I then urged the religious traditions in the context of the dia-
logue of faiths to confront the face of ecological evil and exercise
their ecological responsibility through (1) a critique of the ways of
mastery, (2) rearticulations of their visions of nature and the place
of the human within it, (3) actions which think globally and act lo-
cally to redress the particular suffering that our place on the earth
is currently undergoing, and (4) arm ourselves with the requisite
spiritual disciplines ° and scientific knowledge. Religious people
must become effective actors in addressing the healing of our
suffering planet.
NOTES
1. This essay has two sources. The first is my experience ina local environ-
mental group dealing with environmental issues in Elmira (population
8,000), Ontario, Canada. In 1989, the citizens of Elmira learned that the
water supply had been contaminated by chemicals from the local chemical
company. Thus began my own awakening to environmental issues.
Secondly, this essay grows out of a conference on ecological responsibility
and a dialogue with Buddhism that was organized by the Venerable
Doboom Tulku of Tibet House in New Delhi, September 30 to October 4,
1993, that I was able to attend. Thus, the essay is a contribution to matters
raised in the New Delhi conference as part of my effort to understand the
sources of the crisis that has presently emerged.
2. See George Grant, Technology and Empire (Toronto: Anansi Press, 1968),
Time as History (Toronto: CBC Publications, 1972), and Technology and
Justice (Toronto: Anansi Press, 1986).
3. See, for example, S. H. Nasr, The Encounter of Man and Nature: The Spiritual
Crisis of Modern Man (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968). This ne-
glected gem by an Islamic philosopher is worth noting. More recently, see
Phillip Sherrard, The Rape of Man and Nature (Ipswitch: Golgonotha Press,
1987), where he says that what “the building of our modern technological
and economic order demonstrate is the triumph of precisely the view in
which the world is seen asa self-contained entity, existing in its own right,
apart from God, and consequently as something that man is quite entitled
to explore, organize and exploit without any reference to the divine,” p.
94. Sherrard also rightly notes the complicity of Christianity, especially
Latin and Protestant Christianity, in the “desacralization of nature.”
4. These quotes from Mr. Jose Lutzenberger are from my own notes taken
during his address to the conference. “Progress” is here used ironically
and, as Lutzenberger made clear, to mean the modern way of science,
industry, and technology. There are now many studies that see the nega-
tive underside of industrial-technical culture and that chronicle the
environmental crisis. I mention two further studies: Jonathan Schell, The
Fate of the Earth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), and William
McKibben, The End of Nature (New York: Random House, 1989). One
should also note Carl Sagan, “Preserving and Cherishing the Earth—an
appeal for joint commitment in science and religion,” American Journal of
Physics (July, 1990). Sagan’s appeal is moving but fails to address the
problem of industrial culture, the sciences of mastery, and the technologies
of domination.
5. See Chaturvedi Badrinath, Dharma, India, and World Order (Edinburgh: St.
Andrews Press, 1993).
6. Thomas Berry, The Dream of the Earth (San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1990),
pro
we Jacques Ellul already saw this in his still unheeded and important analysis
called Technological Society (New York: Vintage, 1964). Ellul was one of the
first to see the full meaning of “technique.” Although it does not deal with
the environmental crisis, it remains a book to read.
. See Rachael Carson’s classic, Silent Spring (Cambridge, MA: Riverside Press,
1962).
. Edward O. Wilson, Biophilia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1984), p. 76. While the volume contains shocking information on our
destruction of species, it is remarkable for its lack of awareness of the
negative role played by science and industry and its naive view of human
beings.
10. See M. Darrol Bryant and Frank Flinn, eds., Interreligious Dialogue: Voices
from a New Frontier (New York: Paragon Press, 1985) and M. Darrol Bryant,
Religion in a New Key (New Delhi: Wiley Eastern Ltd., 1992).
bh See Lynn White’s often reprinted article, “The Historical Roots of our
Ecological Crisis,” Science (March, 1967), that lays the blame for the eco-
logical crisis at the feet of Christianity even though he does acknowledge
that St. Francis may be the appropriate ecological saint. What is especially
appalling about White’s proposal is the way it obscures the extent to which
the industrial-technological culture is fundamentally contrary to all the
religious traditions of humankind.
be Taoism probably best illustrates the irony found throughout the religious
traditions: a deep and profound sense of nature yet overwhelmed by the
industrial-technical culture with nary a word of protest. For the relevance
of Taoist wisdom to the ecological movement see Huston Smith’s “Tao
Now: An Ecological Testament,” pp. 71-92 in Huston Smith: Essays on World
Religion, edited by M. Darrol Bryant (New York: Paragon Press, 1992).
13. To see the ecological crisis in terms of the categories of good and evil is
both helpful and problematic. The problem here is the “either/or”
mentality of so much ethical thought in which labeling substitutes for
analyzing. I hope to avoid that danger here. Also it is important to
recognize the different aspects of evil. I agree with Augustine that
ontologically evil is an absence, the absence of good. Many reject this view
because it is felt to minimize historical evil. I think not. Ontological absence
has historical reality; it has analogs to the notion of maya in the Hindu
traditions.
. See Walter Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel (New York:
Macmillan, 1917), pp. 69ff.
iD: See David Ross Komito, “Madhyamika, Tantra, and ‘Green Buddhism,”
Pacific World, Institute of Buddhist Studies (Fall 1992), p. 48. This is an
example of the growing literature that is now aware of ecological issues.
16. Ibid., p. 49. :
17 I think, for example, of the Chipko movement in India.
18. In 1989 a few citizens in Elmira founded APT Environment (Assuring
Protection for Tomorrow’s Environment) and three months later found

itself confronted with the Uniroyal crisis. We have been carrying on the
efforts to address this local environmental issue ever since. For more
information on our work, write to Susan Bryant, APT Environment, 5 Park
Ave. West, Elmira, Ontario, N3B 1K9, Canada. See also Susan Bryant,
“Confessions of an Unwitting Environmentalist,” Environments (University
of Waterloo, Spring, 1993), and M. Darrol Bryant, “Notes Towards an Eco-
Spirituality” available from the author. Most of what I have said here is
informed by our experience over the past five years.
19. See, for example, Ed McGaa, Eagle Man, Mother Earth Spirituality, Native
American Paths to Healing Ourselves and Our World (San Francisco: Harper
and Row, 1990).
20. I have not emphasized here the importance of spiritual disciplines for the
inward transformation that is necessary to transform the heart and mind
and develop the requisite virtues of compassion, love, and courage. I see
this as essential, but I felt it was important in this essay to focus on the
social/institutional forces that have given rise to the ecological crisis.
18
Divine Goodness
and Demonic Evil
By David Ray Griffin
R wees has to do primarily with the desire to overcome evil

through proper relation to the supreme power of the uni-
verse. This characterization of religion reflects my own per-
spective, which is theistic, but I believe that it applies. more broadly.
To the extent that it does, religion in general presupposes belief in
both worldly evil and divine goodness. In any case, in this essay I
will suggest a solution to the theoretical problem of evil, including
that form of evil that I call “demonic,” from my perspective as a
Protestant Christian process theologian, hoping that this suggestion
will prove helpful to those within other traditions as well.
What is the (theoretical) problem of evil and why does it arise?
The problem, in most general terms, is how to reconcile what we be-
lieve about the goodness and the power of the divine reality of the
universe with the evil of our world. At one level of belief, there is no
inconsistency: To be religious is to believe both in the reality of evil
and in a divine reality that, because of its power and goodness, can
and will provide salvation from this evil. Religious belief, in other
words, presupposes that worldly evil is compatible with a divine
reality.
However, attempts to provide more precise accounts, especially
of divine power, often lead to difficulties. Not being content merely
- 223-
224 DIVINE GOODNESS AND DEMONIC EVIL
to affirm that the divine reality has power, at least sufficient power
to save us from evil, devotees go on to speak of it as all-powerful,
omnipotent. To some extent such a move is required by the very
nature of religion, because religion, at least arguably, involves the
desire to be in harmony with the supreme power of the universe.
This religiously motivated move is supported, furthermore, by the
fact that the idea of a supreme power of the universe arises also
from another interest: the cosmological interest in understanding
the existence of our world, the remarkable order of which seems to
require assuming the existence of a cosmic power with vastly more
power than any creature. If the term all-powerful (omnipotent) were
taken to mean only this—that the divine reality is the supreme
power of the universe and vastly more powerful than all others—an
insoluble theoretical problem of evil would not necessarily result.
The same is true even if one accepts a more stringent definition,
according to which the divine reality has perfect power, meaning all
the power that a supreme reality could conceivably have (with what
is [consistently] conceivable not simply equated with what is verbally
assertable). Quite often, however, the attribute of all-powerfulness
has been taken to mean literally having all the power, at least essen-
tially, so that any power possessed by creatures is merely on loan, as
it were, so that it could be taken back or overridden at will. With this
move, monotheism, the doctrine that there is ultimately only one
power that is worthy of worship, turns into monism, which is the
doctrine that there is essentially only one power.
Once this transition has been made, there is a contradiction be-
tween belief in worldly evil and divine goodness. If the divine reality
essentially has all the power, there is, by definition, no power to
resist it. There is, accordingly, no way satisfactorily to explain the
existence of genuine evil, meaning things that not only appear to be
evil at first glance but that really are evil, so that the universe as a
whole would have been better had some other possibility occurred
instead. There are only two ways to overcome the contradiction:
Either deny that any of the prma facie evil is genuinely evil; or else
say that the divine reality is not perfectly good. Neither of these
solutions is, I believe, acceptable.
The denial of genuine evil, which has been the most prevalent
solution accepted by traditional Christian theologians, is not one that
I can accept. At the most basic level, I cannot but consider the idea
DAVID RAY GRIFFIN 225
obscene, that all cases of prima facie evil—from the Nazi holocaust to
the rapes and murders of little children that occur every day—are
somehow necessary to bring about a great good that would not have
been possible without them, or at least that such things in no way
detract from the overall goodness of the world. It is for me, in the
strictest sense of the term, incredible.
In calling it incredible in the strictest sense, I have in mind what
I call hard-core common sense beliefs. These are beliefs that we all
presuppose in practice, even if we deny them verbally. To deny
them verbally, therefore, involves one in contradictions with one’s
own presuppositions. I use the adjective hard-core to distinguish
such beliefs, which are truly common to all people, from those be-
liefs that are often called commonsensical but are not truly universal
and can, accordingly, be denied without necessarily contradicting
any presuppositions of one’s practice. Examples of soft-core com-
mon sense are the belief that the earth is flat and that molecules are
wholly devoid of sentience and spontaneity. One example of hard-
core common sense is the belief that there is a real world beyond
our own experience: One can verbally claim to be a solipsist, but in
the very act of making the claim, one shows that one does not really
believe it. Belief that some events are genuinely evil belongs, I claim,
in this class of beliefs: No one can in practice consistently live
without presupposing that some events are genuinely evil. Without
this presupposition, many of our most basic emotional reactions,
such as remorse, guilt-feelings, blame, and gratitude (to those who
have prevented what would have been genuine evils), would not
make sense.
Besides not being able to accept solutions to the problem of evil
that deny the ultimate reality of evil, I also cannot accept those that
deny the perfect goodness of the divine reality. The whole point of
a theodicy is to show that the evils of our world do not contradict the
perfect goodness of the divine reality. To speak of the divine reality
as beyond good and evil, or as having evil as well as good ten-
dencies, is not to provide a theodicy but to say that none is pos-
sible. A pragmatic reason for rejecting this type of solution is my
belief that religion involves the desire to be in harmony with the
divine reality. If the divine reality is conceived to be evil as well as
good, then religion sanctions our worst as well as our best impulses.
In any case, as a Christian theologian I take the perfect goodness of
God, as pure unbounded love, not to be negotiable.

Having stated my beliefs about both evil and divine goodness, I
need to explain what I mean by demonic evil in particular. With this
term I point to evil that diametrically opposes divine power and
does so with such strength as to destroy divine creations in a way
that threatens divine purposes. Because this definition puts the
demonic in direct opposition to divine power, fleshing out this
purely formal definition requires a positive characterization of the
divine power. And doing this requires that I anticipate the crucial
aspect of my theodicy to be given below, which is the idea that divine
power is strictly evocative, persuasive power, meaning that it is not
power that can be used coercively and destructively. My threefold
characterization of divine power is power that is (1) always employed
persuasively and creatively, that is (2) always based on responsive
love for the creatures, and that is, therefore, (3) always informed by
creative love, which means that it always intends the good of those
upon whom it is exerted. Given this idea of divine power, we can
characterize the demonic as power that is (1) employed coercively
and destructively (as well as perhaps persuasively and creatively),
that is (2) based on hate and/or indifference towards at least some of
those upon whom it is exercised, and that is, therefore, (3) not
aimed at the good of all those upon whom it is exercised. This
threefold characterization explains how demonic evil is diametrically
opposed to divine power. The other condition for its being truly
demonic is that it be strong enough to destroy divine creations in a
way that threatens divine purposes.
The New Testament contained a realistic but mythical view of
demonic evil. It must be considered mythical, because the demonic
was portrayed in terms of an actual individual—Satan, the devil—
who rivals God in cosmic scope, knowledge, and power, thereby hav-
ing powers that no creature could have. This picture was realistic,
however, in that it did justice to the extent to which the world seems
to be under the sway of a demonic force. Rather than sanguinely
regarding divine goodness as in control of all events, the New
Testament speaks of the devil as “the ruler of this world” (John
14:30, 16:11) and “the god of this age” (II Cor. 4:4), says that “the
whole world is in the power of the evil one” (I Jn. 5:19), and has the
devil say that the kingdoms of the world are under his control (Luke
4:5-6). The battle between the divine and the demonic powers is
regarded asa real battle, upon which the fate of the world depends.
To be sure, the New Testament also believed that “the present
evil age” (Gal. 1:4) was coming to an end, thanks to the inbreaking of
the rule of God in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. But, in
whatever sense we may regard the divine reality’s activity in Jesus as
the beginning of the end of demonic control of our planet, it is em-
pirically obvious that this was at most only the beginning of the end.
Indeed, demonic control of the planet has increased qualitatively
during the intervening 2000 years, especially in the past four
centuries, which we call the modern age. War in the 20th century
has involved unprecedented slaughter of human beings. And this
slaughter could have been much greater, thanks to the primary
manifestation of demonic power in our century, the building of
thousands of nuclear weapons, through which all human life and
much of the rest of the planet’s life could have been destroyed in
hours—a threat that has by no means been removed. Furthermore,
even if we do avoid nuclear holocaust, the present trajectory of civili-
zation, with its increasing population, consumerism, and depleting-
and-polluting technologies, promises unprecedented sufferin
through scarcity and climate change sometime in the 21st century.
The projections based upon purely ecological matters are bad
enough; when this growing scarcity of land, food, and other re-
sources is combined with increasing ethnic and cultural animosities,
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and arms sales generally, any
realistic picture of the future based on present trends is completely
terrifying. We live in a world that is essentially good, created by
divine power. But it is a world that is, even more fully than was the
world in New Testament times, presently in the grip of demonic
power.
To have a theology that is adequate to this reality, we need a way
of formulating the New Testament’s realistic portrayal of the de-
monic while discarding its mythology. We have not inherited such
an account, however, because traditional theology did just the op-
posite: It retained the mythical aspect of the New Testament’s
portrayal of the demonic while giving up its realism.
In Augustine’s theology, for example, Satan is an individual
center of consciousness and will. Given Augustine’s view of divine
omnipotence as actually causing everything that occurs, however, he
could not allow for any creaturely center of power that could truly
act counter to the divine will. He says: “Nothing. . . happens unless

the Omnipotent wills it to happen.” Augustine does not flinch from
applying this doctrine to sinful thoughts and actions, saying that
God “does in the hearts of even wicked men whatsoever He wills.”
Augustine explicitly applies this doctrine to the devil. In speaking of
the afflictions of Job and the temptations of Peter, he says: “God
himself. . . did all things justly by the power he gave to the devil.””
The battle between the divine and the demonic is, accordingly,a
mock, not a real, battle. The demonic is entirely under the divine
thumb. The realism of the New Testament image of the demonic is
lost in the theology of Augustine and other classical theologians
because of their monistic monotheism, according to which there is
only one center of power.
The New Testament’s view, by contrast, was what Jeffrey Russell
has called “semidualistic monotheism.”” Semidualism, in contrast
with full-fledged dualism, does not hold that the demonic is fully
autonomous from God and equal in cosmic scope and power. But
it does allow some real autonomy to the demonic. We can express
this semidualism by saying that the demonic is a creature and yet
more than a creature. That is, the demonic, unlike the divine, does
not exist eternally, but comes about only through the creative power
of the divine. It is a creature. Once it has been created, however, it
is not merely a creature, in the sense of being totally under control
of the divine power. Rather, it can really oppose the divine power
and threaten its purposes. The demonic has potentially deadly con-
sequences.
What we need now is a way to formulate philosophically the New
Testament’s semidualistic monotheism. And we do now have a way
to do this, thanks to one of Alfred North Whitehead’s greatest gifts
to theology, his distinction between God (the ultimate actuality) and
creativity (the ultimate reality).* I will show how the distinction
between God and creativity solves the problem of evil in general. I
will be simply summarizing ideas that I have previously published.’
However, I will develop the notion of demonic evil in particular.
Finally, I will offer a suggestion as to how demonic evil came to
dominance on our planet.
Creativity and the Problem of Evil

The distinction between creativity, as the ultimate reality em-
bodied in all actualities, and God, as the ultimate actuality, provides
the basis for a solution to the problem of evil that was impossible for
classical theology, with its monistic monotheism. That kind of theism
equated God with being itself, and thereby power itself, by saying
that God was somehow both an individual being and yet also the
being-ness of all things. Even some theologians who have rejected
classical theism, such as Paul Tillich, have retained the identification
of God with being itself, and thereby power itself. If all power is
divine power, creatures cannot really oppose the divine reality.
Whitehead, using the term creativity to point to what Tillich called
being itself or the power of being, broke with this identification,
saying that God is not simply creativity as such but the primordial
embodiment of it. This distinction between power as such and divine
power in particular allows us to understand how there can be evil in
this world, even though it is God’s creation.
Creativity involves two kinds of power: the power of self-
determination and the power to influence others. The distinction
between God and creativity means that this twofold power is neces-
sarily embodied not only in God, but also in a plurality of finite
beings. It is not the case, accordingly, that God can unilaterally
bring about events in the world. God cannot, for example, de-
termine when and where earthquakes will and will not happen, or
when and where cells will and will not become cancerous. God can-
not deflect a bullet heading toward a heart too young to die, or, for
that matter, unilaterally convert the distorted heart of a person bent
on sending millions to the gas chamber. The divine power is the
power to evoke and to persuade, not the power to coerce and
compel. The fact that the world is filled with evil, even unspeakably
horrible evil, provides no evidence, therefore, against the perfect
goodness of God.
According to this view, God did not create the universe ex nihilo,
in the sense of absolute nothingness, as if God once existed all alone
and thus as the sole embodiment of creative power. Rather, creation
is creation of order out of chaos, a chaos of events with some creative
power of their own. God is not essentially the sole power, but the
soul of the universe, a power essentially in relation with other
powers, even if their power at certain stages is extremely minimal.

One crucial implication of this denial of creation ex nthilo is that
it removes the basis for assuming that all the basic principles of the
universe were arbitrarily established by God. If what exists neces-
sarily and eternally is not simply God, but God-and-a-world, then we
should assume that there are some general principles that are
metaphysical, being inherent in the very nature of things. Such
principles would, like the fact that God exists and that God is loving,
be beyond all decision, even God’s. They would necessarily hold true
of any world that God could create.
A most important example would be the principle that every
increase in the capacity for good means a similar increase in the
capacity for evil. This principle is certainly true of human society.
For example, cities make possible all sorts of good that are not
available in rural life; but they also greatly increase the possibilities
of evil. The principle is also true of cultural evolution. For example,
both modern transportation and communications systems have
greatly increased the possibility for human enrichment; but they
have also greatly increased the possibilities for evil, as they make
possible world war and unprecedented invasions of privacy.
The principle that the possibilities for good and evil increase pro-
portionately is also true of evolution in general, which is the main
point here. The earth prior to the emergence of life was a much
poorer world. Because there was experience, there was some intrin-
sic value, but it was trivial. The emergence of life, however, in bring-
ing forth beings with greater intrinsic value, also brought with it the
possibility of pain and thus the first significant evil. A similar
increase in the possibilities for both good and evil occurred with the
emergence of animals with central nervous systems, and then again
with the emergence of primates. Surely the most dramatic example,
however, is the rise of human existence. Prior to the appearance of
human beings, there was, to be sure, much intrinsic value in the
world, but it was all of a degree that is qualitatively different from
the values that are distinctive of human life, such as the creation and
enjoyment of great works of art, mathematics, and philosophy, the
experience of religious ecstasy, the realization of moral beauty, and
the enjoyment of human friendship and love. And yet, when we
think of evil, especially really horrendous forms of evil, we realize
that, if human beings did not exist to cause and suffer evil, most of
the worst forms of evil would not exist. Human existence made
possible qualitatively new forms of evil as well as good.
This principle, that every increase in the capacity for good brings
with it an equal increase in the capacity for evil, is clearly an em-
pirical fact. What is suggested by the distinction between God and
creativity, and the correlative rejection of creation ex nihilo, is that it
is not merely an empirical fact about our world. It is also a meta-
physical principle, which necessarily holds of any world that God
could have created. If this is so, we do not have to ask why God
created the world so that it conforms to this principle. We do not
have to ask, for example, why God created the world so that cancer
and AIDS were possibilities; any world with animal life would have
contained such risks. We do not have to ask why God created the
world so that chemical and nuclear weapons were possible; any
world God could have created would have contained such risks. We
do not have to ask why God did not make human beings rational
saints, meaning beings who would have our capacity for reason and
yet would be guaranteed always to do good. Any beings with the
capacity for human-like rationality would have had the capacity for
human-like depravity.
Assuming that this principle is metaphysical in character is of
utmost importance for the problem of evil. While the distinction
between God and creativity explains why there should be some evil
in the world, this additional principle explains why there is so much
evil, especially now that human beings exist. God could not have
created beings with our capacity for good who would not also have
had our capacity for evil. Not all the evil that has in fact occurred
was necessary, to be sure; but its possibility was necessary. The only
way that God could have guaranteed the absence of the kind of evil
that has occurred in human history would have been not to have
brought forth human beings at all. Accordingly, we cannot indict
God for the evils of this world, Auschwitz and all. These evils do not
contradict God’s perfect goodness and wisdom.
Creativity and the Possibility of Demonic Power

Having prepared the way by explaining how the distinction be-
tween creative power as such and divine power in particular
provides the basis for a realistic theodicy, I now turn to my main
concern, which is to develop a nonmythical but realistic idea of the

demonic.
Demonic power became possible with the rise of human beings.
Because of the human being’s dual power to grasp things, both
physically and conceptually, the rise of human beings meant the rise
of a kind of creaturely power that could for the first time diametri-
cally and strongly oppose the power of our creator. Because of our
unprecedented power of self-determination, we can make decisions
that run strongly counter to the divine influences upon us, which
are always calling us to truth, beauty, and goodness. With humans,
the power to know the difference between good and evil, and
thereby the power of sin, entered the world. Because of our power
to manipulate symbols with our minds and physical objects with out
hands, we also have far more power to exert coercive power than do
other creatures. Our power to sin is matched by an equally unpre-
cedented power to dominate. Our unprecedented power of influ-
ence is not limited, however, to coercion: Our linguistic power has
given us an unprecedented form of persuasive power as well, a form
of power that was greatly augmented with the invention of writing.
These unique abilities of human beings are necessary conditions for
the rise of demonic power.
I had earlier characterized demonic power not merely in terms
of its nature and strength, but also in terms of its being employed on
the basis of hate or indifference, and therefore in a destructive way.
This aspect of the possibility for the emergence of demonic power
is rooted in our nature as creatures. Because we, unlike God, are
local rather than all-inclusive beings, our sympathies tend to be very
restricted. We can be indifferent about the welfare of most other
creatures and positively antagonistic to the welfare of those whom
we perceive to be threats to our own welfare. We do, to be sure,
have the capacity to objectify ourselves, to realize thereby that we are
simply one among many creatures, all of whom are creatures of the
same creator, all of whom have feelings and interests. And we have
the capacity to be aware of moral norms, such as the principle that
equals should be treated equally, that we should do to others as we
would have them do to us. But we, likewise, have the capacity to use
our same intellectual capacities to ignore these norms when
convenient, or so to qualify and circumscribe them that they become
virtually inapplicable to all except those with whom we naturally
sympathize. Rather than using these capacities to overcome our

natural indifference or antagonism to others, in fact, we can use
them to create a hostility towards others that greatly surpasses in
intensity, extent, and duration anything found in the nonhuman
world. It is our very humanity, in short, that creates the possibility
for the emergence of demonic power.
I have indicated, in rejecting the mythical idea of the demonic as
a devil, that the demonic is not an individual being. There is no evil
soul alongside the divine soul of the universe. But the demonic is
not, on the other hand, simply the aggregated power of individual
human beings. It consists, instead, of what can be called a quasi-soul.
The Whiteheadian idea of creativity on which I am building
provides a way to explicate what Walter Rauschenbusch, in giving
a nonmythical account of original sin, called the suprapersonal
power of evil.” Rauschenbusch described the structures and habits
that promote sin, describing how people are seduced into sin,
through the power of authority and imitation, long before they have
reached the age of accountability. To all that Rauschenbusch says,
we can add a form of influence that works at a presensory level and
at a distance.
The science of psychical research, or parapsychology, has amply
demonstrated that such influence occurs. Evidence for telepathy
and clairvoyance show that we have the capacity to receive causal
influence at a distance. Evidence for psychokinesis shows that we
have the capacity to exert this kind of causal influence. Modern
science, philosophy, and theology have, however, largely ignored
this evidence, because it did not fit with the reigning worldview. The
early modern worldview, with its mechanistic view of nature and its
sensationist view of perception, said that such influence cannot occur
except through supernatural intervention. The late modern world-
view, by retaining early modernity’s view of nature and perception
while rejecting its supernaturalism, has said that such influence
cannot happen at all. This late modern worldview has made extra-
sensory perception and psychokinetic influence seem all the more
impossible by regarding the mind as epi-phenomenal, that is, as a
mere byproduct of the brain without any autonomous power to
exert power or to perceive. Modern theology, accepting the modern
worldview’s veto, has ignored parapsychology’s offer of empirical
evidence supporting the reality of spiritual influence.
A postmodern form of naturalism, however, allows for the reality

of this spiritual influence at a distance. Because the world is made of
events of creative experience, rather than bits of insentient matter,
there is no reason to suppose that causal influence can be exerted
only by contact and, therefore, only on contiguous things. Also, the
idea that all individuals enjoy a nonsensory form of perception, so
that sensory perception is derivative from this more primordial,
nonsensory mode of perception, means that extrasensory percep-
tion, whether telepathic or clairvoyant, does not need to be regarded
as a violation of the laws of nature. Reports of such occurrences
need not, accordingly, be regarded as either fraudulent or as evi-
dence of supernatural intervention. Rather, events in which people
become aware of extrasensory perception can be regarded as simply
the consciousness of a kind of nonsensory perception that is occur-
ring all the time. What is exceptional about such perceptions is not
that they involve nonsensory perception, but only that a form of per-
ception that usually remains unconscious has risen to the conscious
level of experience. Furthermore, this postmodern worldview, far
from regarding the human mind or soul as impotent, regards it as
the most powerful creature on the face of the earth. The parapsy-
chological evidence that the human mind can directly exert far more
influence on other things beyond its body, including other minds,
than can other animals is, accordingly, what would be expected.
Cases of reported psychokinesis can be regarded as merely conspic-
uous instances of a kind of pervasive psychic influence that is
radiating from our minds all the time.
From this perspective, we can suppose that we are influencing
each other directly, soul to soul, all the time. We can suppose that
through the enormously complex web of psychic influence that
results, we are born into a kind of quasi-soul, which shapes our souls
for good or for ill, and to which we in turn contribute, thereby
adding our influence, for good or for ill, to the psychic ether that
will shape other souls.
This influence at a distance is, of course, usually quite weak in
comparison with physically mediated influence. There is a factor,
however, that somewhat balances out the power of these two kinds
of influence on us. The distance over which this kind of influence
operates can be temporal as well as spatial distance. Because of this
influence over time, repetitions of a certain form of activity can have
a cumulative effect. For example, if a certain image has been focused

on by devotees of a particular religion for hundreds, perhaps thou-
sands, of years, this image will be impressed upon the unconscious
portion of the psyches of present-day individuals with considerable
power. This, incidentally, is a way of explaining the reality and
power of Jungian archetypes, a way that Jung himself sometimes
employed.”
Through this idea, we can see how the demonic could be an even
stronger power than Rauschenbusch thought. Everything he said
about the power of the written word, pictures, patriotic songs,
history books, examples, stereotypes, ideologies, and so on, would
stand. To all this we can add the reinforcing power that comes from
the hate and other violence-inducing attitudes, emotions, and
images that have been repeated countless times down through
human history. We are born into a kingdom of evil, a demonic
quasi-soul, that not only influences us indirectly, through our
sensory experience, but also directly, through spiritual influence.
The Demonic’s Historical Rise to Ascendancy

My ideas in this section have been inspired primarily by Andrew
Bard Schmookler’s The Parable of the Tribes.’ Schmookler’s view of
the central importance of the war-system in shaping the direction
taken by civilization over the past 10, 000 years has been reinforced
by writings of William H. McNeill.” A position on the demonic
similar to mine has been developed in Walter Wink’s trilogy on the
powers, especially the third volume, Engaging the Powers.’ 1 know of
no more important work on the contemporary theological scene.
The basic idea of this new perspective is that the war-system,
along with the more general domination system (to use the term
Wink has appropriated from Riane Eisler’s The Chalice and the Blade),
began within the past 10,000 years. It was occasioned by the rise of
civilization, with its cities and agriculture. During the prior 40,000
years of the existence of homo sapiens, life was surely filled with evils
of various sorts. Desires of revenge and other motives would have
led tribes to carry out savage raids on each other from time to time.
But the hunting-and-gathering mode of existence would have
provided no motive for a war-system as such. For example, captives,
who could not be entrusted to share in the hunt, would simply
provide more mouths to feed. But the rise of civilization changed all
this. Slaves could be assigned the drudge work involved in agri-
culture and the building of walls and water canals. Women captives
could, besides working in the homes and the fields, bear children to
build up the city’s defensive and offensive capacity. The cities, their
cultivated lands, and their domesticated herds also provided mo-
tives for attack. The rise of civilization brought the institutionaliza-
tion of war.
Once the war-system began, everyone was forced to participate.
Even if most societies wanted to be peaceful, any one society could
force the rest to prepare for war or risk being subjugated or anni-
hilated. As Schmookler says, “Nice guys are finished first.”””
In this war-system, it is power, not morality, that determines the
relations among the states. As stated in the Hobbesian analysis, the
interstate realm is a state of anarchy: There is no superior power to
declare and enforce any moral norms. Might rather literally makes
right. The classic formulation is provided by Thucydides, who has
the Athenian general limit the Meletans’ choices to being taken over
peacefully or violently, adding that if they had the superior power
they would do the same to the Athenians. In this Hobbesian situa-
tion of the war of all against all—which means not that you actually
fight against everyone else, but that every other society is at least
potentially your enemy—war is not brought on only by the desire of
one society’s leaders for additional power, riches, and glory, but also
by the fear that another society is amassing enough military power
to attack them. Thucydides again provides the classic statement,
having Alcibiades say, with regard to taking Sicily: “If we cease to
rule others, we are in danger of being ruled ourselves.”
In this anarchical state of civilization, coercive power inevitably
grows. Each advance by any one state must be matched by advances
by the others within striking distance. A move that may be intended
defensively will often look offensive to others, evoking further efforts
by them to increase their power. There is no stopping point. Al-
though the development of nuclear weapons might have occurred
either sooner or considerably later than it actually did, the fact that
it did eventually occur was made virtually inevitable by the dynamics
of the system.
The development of coercive power does not, however, involve
only the development of new forms of weapons and defenses. The
most obvious other element is military strategy and tactics. But a

society’s ability to wage war is also to a great extent a function of its
political and economic systems. Any development (such as the rise
of capitalism in the Italian city-states in the 14th century) that gives
a society a temporary military edge will tend to spread to the neigh-
boring societies.
The main point of this analysis is that the evolution of civilization
in the state of anarchy is necessarily shaped in large part by a prin-
ciple similar to that of survival of the fittest based on natural
selection in Darwinian evolution. Schmookler calls this principle the
“selection for power.” This analysis is not reductionistic, as if the drive
for power were at the root of all cultural developments. The point
is, instead, that of those developments that do occur, those that
increase a society’s power vis-a-vis other societies will tend not only
to survive but also to spread. In the long run, the direction of
civilization is shaped most decisively by this selection for power. As
civilization evolves, the need for power increasingly shapes every
aspect of a society. In recent decades, for example, something like
half of our nation’s science has been devoted to military-related
research. Anarchical civilization, with its war-system, results in a
reign of power.
Implicit in this analysis is the idea that the reign of power in the
interstate arena leads to the reign of power within each state. ‘This
is not to say that the rise of patriarchal, hierarchical, domination
societies was motivated entirely or even primarily by the demands
of the war-system. That interstate system did, however, provide the
context in which hierarchical societies were virtually inevitable. As
Gerda Lerner points out, non-hierarchical societies for the most part
did not survive, and it is hard to argue with the claim that survival
must take priority over all other considerations. The argument from
necessity in relation to external dangers has always, probably from
the outset of the war-system, provided the excuse for the worst kinds
of internal inequalities. The war-system has also provided an ever-
increasing basis for the human domination of nature.
This is my suggestion as to how demonic power, which the rise
of human existence made possible, actually came to dominance on
our planet. Over the past 10,000 years, human civilizations have
increasingly been oriented around the drive to increase human
power, in the sense of the power to control, the power to destroy,
the power to intimidate. Human beings in this context have wanted

more power over nature in order to increase their power over other
human groups in order to give them more power over nature.
Civilization has been largely shaped by the drive to produce coercive
power that would be used with hate or at least indifference—and
this is our concept of the demonic. Civilization has increasingly been
in its grip for the past 5,000 years.
The power of a society is determined not only by the size of its
armies, its military technology, strategies, and tactics, and its political
and economic systems. Undergirding all of these dimensions is the
ideology of a society, its theology. (Any all-inclusive ideology is a
theology insofar as it involves, at least implicitly, a notion of that
which is holy or sacred.) Just as the selection for power operates
with regard to all other dimensions, so too it operates in relation to
ideologies." We should expect, accordingly, that the history of
anarchical civilization’s theologies and philosophies will involve the
gradual ascendancy of those ideologies that are most effective in
producing a warrior-mentality and thereby a warrior-society. An
effective ideology of power will, for example, make people unafraid
to die in battle and may even lead them to desire such a death; it will
lead them to believe that by being warriors they are obeying the will
of, and even imitating the behavior of, the deity of the universe; it
will lead them to hate, or at least be indifferent to the welfare of
people in other societies; it will convince them that they are a chosen
people, so that by subjugating others they are actually bringing
about divine rule on earth. An effective ideology of power will also
tend to promote political and economic systems that increase a
society's military capacity; it will also tend to promote philosophies,
sciences, and technologies through which nature can be effectively
dominated. The growth of such ideologies of power has been an in-
tricate part—in many ways the most important part—of the growth
of demonic power over the past few thousand years.
By the demonic, I mean the whole complex of belief-systems,
symbols, images, stories, habits, attitudes, emotions, sciences, tech-
nologies, institutions, webs of direct and indirect psychic influence,
and everything else that is oriented around the production and
deployment of destructive power, used with hate or indifference, to
dominate and destroy fellow creatures of God. This demonic power
is now, even more completely than in New Testament times, in
effective control of the trajectory of civilization.

Although religion should seek to respond in various ways to evil,
and should respond to evil in all its forms, its primary concern, I
believe, should be to serve as an agency of the divine reality to
overcome demonic evil. The above analysis of demonic evil implies
that the effort by religious leaders to overcome demonic evil would
have two primary foci: eliminating those aspects of our own religious
traditions’ theology that give support to the demonic, and working
for the transcendence of global anarchy.
NOTES
1. See my “The ‘Vision Thing,’ the Presidency, and the Ecological Crisis, or
the Greenhouse Effect and the “White House Effect,” in David Ray Griffin
and Richard Falk, ed., Postmodern Politics for a Planet in Crisis: Policy, Process,
and Presidential Vision (Albany: State University of New York, 1993), pp. 67-
102.
2. These statements by Augustine are from the Enchiridion XIV: 96, XXIV:95,
and Grace and Free Will XLII, which can be found in Basic Writings of St.
Augustine, ed. Whitney J. Oates (New York: Random House, 1953).
3. Jeffrey Burton Russell, The Devil: Perceptions of Evil from Antiquity to Primitive
Christianity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 228, 248.
4. This distinction is made in John B. Cobb, Jr., Beyond Dialogue: Toward a
Mutual Transformation of Christianity and Buddhism (Philadelphia: Fortress,
1982), pp. 110-14.
5. See God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy (Philadelphia: Westminister
Press, 1976; Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 1991 [reprint with
new preface]); “Creation out of Chaos and the Problem of Evil,” in Stephen
T. Davis, ed., Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy (Atlanta: John Knox,
1981); and Evil Revisited: Responses and Reconsiderations (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1991).
6. See Walter Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel (New York:
Macmillan, 1918), especially the chapters on “The Super-Personal Forces
of Evil” and “The Kingdom of Evil.”
7. For excellent surveys of parapsychological studies, see Benjamin Wolman,
ed., Handbook of Parapsychology (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1977);
Hoyt L. Edge, Robert L. Morris, John Palmer, and Joseph H. Rush,
Foundations of Parapsychology (Boston and London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1986); and the series, Advances in Parapsychological Research, ed.
Stanley Krippner (New York: Plenum Press), especially Vol. I, Psychokinesis
(1977) and Vol. II, Extrasensory Perception (1978). For evaluations of the
evidence by capable philosophers, see Essays on Psychical Research in the
Harvard edition of the writings of William James, ed. by Robert

McDermott, C.D. Broda, Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953; New York: Humanities Press, 1969); and
Stephen Braude, ESP and Psychokinesis: A Philosophical Examination
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978) and The Limits of Influence:
Psychokinesis and the Philosophy of Science (New York and London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1986). See also my “Parapsychology and Philosophy: A
Whiteheadian Postmodern Perspective,” The Journal of the American Society
for Psychical Research 87/3 (July 1993), pp. 217-88.
8. See my introduction to David Ray Griffin, ed., Archetypal Process: Self and
Divine in Whitehead, Jung, and Hillman (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1989), esp. pp. 39-44.
9. Andrew Bard Schmookler, The Parable of the Tribes: The Problem of Power in
Social Evolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986).
10. See especially William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the
Human Community and The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and
Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982).
11. Walter Wink, Engaging the Powers: Discernment and Resistance in a World of
Domination (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992).
12. Schmookler, The Parable of the Tribes, p. 45.
13. Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986), p. 35.
14. Schmookler suggests that the selection for power would have also operated
with regard to religious ideologies (The Parable of the Tribes, pp. 73, 80), but
he does not develop this idea at length.
19
Towards a
Global Theodicy
By Paul Badham
wif heodicy is a technical Christian term, used to describe at-

tempts to justify belief in the limitless goodness of God in the
face of the manifest suffering and evil in a world that God is
believed to have created. One theodicy frequently discussed in
western philosophy of religion is the soul-making theodicy classically
expounded in John Hick’s early work, Evil and the God of Love.’ More
recently Hick has championed the view known as religious plu-
ralism, namely that all the great religions are culturally different
human responses to the one divine reality.. What I want to explore
here is whether the two strands in Hick’s thinking can be brought
together. Has soul-making theodicy anything to say in a religiously
plural world? In particular can it relate to religious traditions that
have no concept of a creator God whose ways need justifying, and
that explicitly reject the idea of human persons having souls which
can be thought of as being made?
The fact that evil and suffering undoubtedly exist poses a chal-
lenge to the Christian supposition that this world was created by an
all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-benevolent God. Either God
cannot abolish evil in which case God is not all-powerful, or God
chooses not to, and cannot therefore be all-benevolent. Many
attempts have been made to meet this challenge. Process theology
~DAl.~
242 TOWARDS A GLOBAL THEODICY
suggests that God is not all-powerful. The Church of Christian

Science sees evil as an illusion. Traditional theology explains evil as
the product of the fall of the first man and woman. Popular piety
suggests that though the problem cannot be resolved philosophi-
cally, it was resolved religiously in the crucifixion of Christ perceived
as God incarnate, identifying with and sharing in the depths of
human suffering. But serious problems face all these solutions. To
deny either the competence of God to end suffering or to deny the
existence of evil seem evasions of the issue. A historical fall is too
much at variance with the discoveries of archaeology, anthropology
and evolutionary history to be a live option. And I have never
understood how the problem of evil is supposed to be helped by the
notion that God also experiences it. We welcome the sympathy of
friends whom we know are powerless to help us. But we would feel
mocked by expressions of concern from those who had it comfort-
ably in their power to save us but chose not to do so. The problem
of evil is certainly not solved by saying that God chooses to suffer
with us rather than rescue us from our plight.
Some philosophers have put forward the so-called free-will
defense which argues that the possibility of evil and the existence of
an objective world with stable laws of nature are necessary for the
emergence of free and responsible agents. This view forms an im-
portant part of the soul-making theodicy and although it can to a
certain extent stand on its own, I shall consider it simply as part of
the wider thesis. For if the free responsible agents who are created
through their interaction with the stable environment face a future
terminated by suffering, disease, death and extinction, then the
question of why God allows evil remains unanswered. Hence the
free-will defense needs the wider perspective of the soul-making
theodicy.
Soul-making Theodicy
The soul-making theodicy fully accepts that looking at life simply
from within the transitory limits of human existence, the case against
belief that the world was created by a wholly benevolent, all-powerful
and all-knowing God is overwhelming. This world is not a hedonist’s
paradise. It is a struggle for existence where we earn our bread by
the sweat of our brow. We face innumerable challenges, hardships
PAUL BADHAM 243
and difficulties. Ultimately we will age and die, unless we experi-

ence premature death through accident, microbe or virus. But the
Christian perspective is not confined to this life only. If it were so
confined, Christians would, according to St. Paul be “of all people
most to be pitied.”” However, from its foundation Christianity has
been a religion committed to belief in heaven, a divine kingdom in
which sorrowing and sighing have no place and in which God
becomes the most central feature of our experience. Yet Christians
have always intuited that such a world could only be appreciated
and experienced by fully formed persons. We have to become
“fitted” for heaven by what we do here. Free responsible beings
cannot simply be created by divine fiat. Rather we develop our
characters and personalities through facing up to the difficulties and
challenges of life and thereby becoming persons capable of an
eternal relationship with God. John Hick expresses the principle
behind this concept thus:
Virtues formed within the agent as a hard-won deposit of his own

right .decisions in situations of challenge and temptation are
intrinsically more valuable than virtues created within him ready
made and without any effort on his part. . .If God’s purpose was to
create finite persons embodying the most valuable kind of moral
goodness, he would have to create them, not as already perfect
beings but rather as imperfect creatures who can then attain to the
more valuable kind of goodness through their own free choices."
This way of thinking was classically articulated by the poet John

Keats when he wrote to his brother and sister in April 1819, “Do you
not see how necessary a world of pains and troubles is to school an
intelligence and make it a Soul?. . .Call the world if you please “The
vale of Soul-making.”” In this schema we shape our personhood by
the way we engage with the responsibilities and duties we face in the
everyday tasks of life in a world subject to natural laws where what
we do or fail to do has consequences. It is no part of the soul-making
theodicy that suffering in itself is ennobling or character-forming,
for there would be very strong evidence against so simplistic a view.
But what this theodicy does say is that a real objective physical
world, governed by regular physical laws, provides an environment
more suited to the development of responsible agents than would an
environment in which divine intervention saved humanity from the
consequences of its folly, or from the heartache and challenge

implicit in any finite and physical existence.
After personhood has been fully formed, then it may well be that
life in a heaven of eternal rest, peace and bliss would become con-
ceivable. But it could only be appreciated and experienced by those
who have first undergone the person-forming experience available
to them in this world. Moreover, it is likely that we may need to
undergo further growth inalife after death. John Hick envisages
many lives in many worlds’ and this view has antecedents in earlier
Christian writings. Within Catholicism there is the tradition of pur-
gatory and many Protestants also talk of an intermediate state.
Hence the soul-making theodicy does not require that the necessary
growth is completed within this life. It merely claims that this life
provides a good environment for spiritual growth which may well
need further development beyond the grave as the person journeys
into God.
It is integral to this view that our soul, character, or identity as
persons is not innate. We shape our personhood by the way we live
and in response to the challenges and stimuli of life. From a philo-
sophical standpoint this view requires a concept of soul as an
emergent property. Any view of the soul which takes serious note of
modern genetics and neurophysiology has to accept that the soul is
shaped and influenced by the way our brains and bodies develop
and is molded by the experiences of life and our responses to them.
Consequently, I see soul-making theodicy as literally descriptive
language of how human identity is shaped. Such identity is clearly
shaped in and through our bodily existence, but Christians believe
that the ultimate destiny of the human subject will transcend this
bodily form of existence. Keith Ward expresses this larger vision
well:
God is the true end of the soul, and in this sense, its goal, its proper
purpose and true nature, lies beyond the physical universe. That is
a strong reason for thinking that the subject which is embodied in
this world may properly find other forms of experience and action,
in contexts lying beyond this universe. . .Of course the soul depends
on the brain. . .but the soul need not always depend on the brain,
any more than a man need always depend on the womb which
supported his life before birth.’
PAUL BADHAM 245
Soul-making in Judaism
The problem of evil, particularly in the form of the question,
“Why do the righteous suffer?” has constantly been asked in Jewish
history. Hebrew psalms and proverbs frequently raise the issue. One
common response has been in the book of Job, namely that human
beings have no right to question the ways of God, but must simply
acknowledge God’s divine wisdom. But the inadequacy of such a
response became apparent during the persecution of Antiochus
Epiphanes, the first of the devastating persecutions to which the
Jews have been subject throughout history when thousands of the
most faithful perished. Faced with such a disaster the only way belief
in God’s love could remain at all credible was to affirm faith in the
power of God to raise up the dead. In our day the Holocaust has
had a comparable effect leading some Jews to feel that belief in
God’s goodness is no longer possible and that, to use Stendhal’s
epigram, “The only excuse for God is that he does not exist.” But
for those whose faith has held, a belief in a life after death has been
reemphasized as an essential component of an intelligible faith.
Rabbi Chon Sherbok writes: “The belief in the Hereafter has helped
Jews make sense of the world as a creation of a good and all-
powerful God and provided a source of great consolation for their
travail on earth.” Without such a belief Jews would “face great
difficulties reconciling the belief in a providential God who watches
over his chosen people with the terrible events of modern Jewish
history.”” A future hope is thus an essential component of an
intelligible theism, due to both the problem of evil and for the
fulfillment of the life of the righteous individual. As Cohn Sherbok
makes clear, the “qualification for entrance to heaven (Gan Eden) is
to lead a good life in accordance with God’s laws.””” Life, therefore,
has meaning both for the individual and the community because it
is directed towards the transcendent goal of the kingdom of God.
Theodicy in Islam
Islam shares with Judaism and Christianity the belief in an all-
powerful, all-knowing, and all-compassionate creator God. From a
philosophical standpoint the existence of evil is as much a challenge
in Islam as in the other Abrahamic faiths. Religiously, however, the
issue is far less pressing. A key requirement for one to be a good
Muslim is an attitude of submission (Islam) to what God has deter-

mined. Hence to question what God has done, or to feel a need to
Justify God in the face of evil indicates a non-submissive, non-Islamic
attitude. If the problem is raised as an issue by a non-Muslim, a
defense of God’s ways can certainly be permitted. In constructing
such a defense a Muslim would take for granted that the frame of
reference would include the hereafter (al-akhirah). There is scarcely
a chapter in the Qur'an which does not refer to the hereafter, and in
the book as a whole there are no fewer than one-hundred and
thirteen references to it. As Sulayman Nyang argues, “It is necessary
to see the belief in a future life as integrally related to the total
Islamic view of life in the sublunar world including man’s role in this
world and the significance of his faith.”'' The Qur'an makes clear
that the human person was not created for sport but has a serious
mission to undertake.’
In the Islamic tradition human life in the sublunar world is
explicitly seen as a preparation for the hereafter. We will ultimately
be accountable to Allah for the way we have lived; so what we do
matters because it shapes the persons we become. The distinguished
Islamic theologian Salih Tug expresses the matter thus:
Just as from dust man has evolved, from the deeds he does the
higher man is evolved. . .The human frame is only a vehicle by
which the soul must develop itself. The soul has to evolve by its own
effort from the crude form of simple consciousness toa certain stage
of spiritual development. . .Our present life is a preparation. It is
necessary to bring out our faculties and raise them toa certain stage
of evolution during our earthly sojourn. Then alone shall we be fit
for progress in the life after death. . .but we can enter that life only
if we have made ourselves fit for it in our physical lifetime.’
This seems a clear expression of a soul-making theodicy.
Buddhist Responses to the Existence of Suffering

For Buddhism the existence of suffering does not constitute any
kind of challenge. Rather the fact that the world is full of suffering
is the essential starting point of all Buddhist thought and the
essential presupposition of each of the Four Noble Truths from
which the Buddhist philosophy of life derives. Buddhism does not
PAUL BADHAM 247
believe in a creator God whose ways need to be justified, nor does

Buddhism think in categories of a soul which needs to be developed.
At first sight, therefore, to suggest that a soul-making theodicy might
relate in any way to Buddhist insights seems perverse. However, I
hope to suggest that if we look more deeply into the question we will
see some striking parallels.
The Buddha was totally clear that to seek fulfillment through a
materialistic or hedonistic approach to life was thoroughly mis-
guided. Old-age, disease and death bring to naught all worldly
hopes. The Buddha’s primary response to the reality of suffering
was to teach humans to overcome their fear of the unsatisfactoriness,
suffering, or duhkha of life by recognizing the transience and imper-
manence or anicca of all things. He believed that if we really under-
stood our situation, and achieved true enlightenment about the
nature of reality, we would not attach a sense of identity or our
search for meaning to anything as transitory and insubstantial as the
present experience of selfhood or the fleeting desires which flow
from sensory awareness in the present. Much of the Buddha’s
teaching is essentially concerned with helping people to cope with
suffering in the here and now by gainingatruer insight into the
reality of the human situation. This has led many to interpret the
original Buddhist message as essentially practical and unconcerned
about the nature of future life of which we can have no reliable
knowledge. The Buddha urged his followers to avoid such
speculation.
However, I think it is mistaken to suppose that the Buddha’s
thought was limited to this life alone. As Edward Conze points out
in his preface to the section of his edition of Buddhist scriptures
which deals with other worlds: “The horizon of Buddhism is not
bounded by the limits of the sensory world, their true interests lie
beyond it.”"* The Buddha himself saw human life within a cosmic
perspective in which humans pass through a succession of lives on
their journey towards enlightenment. The ultimate deathless state
of nirvana will be reached only when we transcend the cycle of
rebirth and finally rise above the self-centeredness of our present
condition.
Anatta in Buddhism
and the Hindu Concept of Atman
One of the basic Buddhist understandings is the doctrine of
anatia, usually translated as the no-self doctrine and interpreted as
a total repudiation of the concept of the soul. However, every denial
has to be understood in relation to what is being denied. The
Buddha made it absolutely clear that what he opposed was the
Hindu notion of a soul or atman as an eternal, unchanging essence,
existing independently of others, unaffected by the traumas of life
and proceeding through a succession of lives. The atman should
ideally be unaffected by the claims of bodily nature. Ascetic practices
and an ideal of keeping apart from society have evolved to aid such
independence. This picture of an immortal changeless self at the
heart of our being was anathema to the Buddha. “The speculative
view that. . .I shall be atman after death, permanent, abiding, ever-
lasting, unchanging, and that I shall exist as such for eternity, is not
that wholly and completely foolish?””’ It seems to me that the
Buddha was right in his denial. Modern philosophy of mind has
increasingly moved in the direction pioneered by the Buddha over
two thousand years. For example, Derek Parfit’s influential work,
Reasons and Persons, concludes with a chapter on the Buddha’s
views.’ It has become increasingly clear that we cannot identify our-
selves with an unchanging self. But as John Hick has pointed out, it
is not realistic to argue “no immutable, eternal, independent self,
therefore no self.” In the soul-making hypothesis it is axiomatic
that there is no unchanging soul, but rather that we are constantly
changing and developing as we respond to the challenges and
stimuli of life. Only a dynamic concept of selfhood does justice to
experience or empirical reality. It seems to me, therefore, that there
is no necessary clash between a soul-making theodicy and the no-self
doctrine when we examine the terminology of both theories
critically. Both repudiate an unchanging selfhood, and both affirm
that what we become is the product of what we do. Ironically,
therefore, I would argue that in real terms there are greater prob-
lems with fitting Hinduism into a soul-making theodicy than
Buddhism. Since Hinduism undoubtedly attaches great importance
to the soul, atman, the picture of it as an unchanging entity raises
fundamental problems. If we move on to consider the concept of
PAUL BADHAM 249
karma in both Hinduism and Buddhism, we may discover a

resolution of this difficulty.
Theodicy and Karma

Neither Hindus nor Buddhists are concerned with theodicy in its
classical form since justifying the ways of a creator God lies outside
their frame of reference. Both are concerned with belief in a moral
order underlying all things which finds expression in the doctrine
of karma. The essence of the law of karma is that what we are is the
product of what we have been, and what we shall be depends on
what we do and think now. Historically this doctrine was shaped in
a context of belief in rebirth or reincarnation leading through a suc-
cession of lives to the ultimate goal of being one with the ultimate
(moksha) or entering the deathless state of nirvana. Hence, our be-
havior in this life has cosmic significance and meaning since it deter-
mines our future destiny. I suggest that this doctrine is in its
practical effect analogous to soul-making theodicy. Both doctrines
see life as having significance within a wider frame of reference than
this life alone; and both possess a keen commitment to an under-
lying moral order so that what we do matters, whether to prepare
us for heaven or to fulfil our karmic destiny. In each religion the
ultimate goal which gives significance and meaning to human striv-
ing is a transcendent one. In Judaism, Christianity and Islam it is to
find ultimate destiny in the hereafter with God. In Buddhism it is to
achieve the deathless state of nirvana, and in Hinduism ultimately
the hope is to achieve liberation or moksha from the cycle of rebirth.
In all cases the ways in which humans respond to the challenges of
life in this world are the means whereby they shape personhood or
create and fulfil karma and hence grow more towards what they
ought to be.
Affirming This World

It is frequently suggested that belief in a transcendent destiny
leads people to despise this world or take it less seriously. This can
sometimes happen; world renunciation is found in many religious
traditions. But the central thrust of any soul-making theodicy or any
doctrine of karma is to affirm the importance of what we do now. For
although what the religions teach is directed towards the fulfillment

of a transcendent destiny, what is actually prescribed as the means
to that end is, at least for the lay-person, the conscientious ful-
fillment of the duties and obligations of everyday life. Saints in all
three theistic traditions have warned against the idea that one ought
to do good in order to win heaven. Rather, virtuous actions should
be done for their own sake, because they are themselves good and
contribute to the well-being of the individual and society in the here
and now. If God is perceived to be a loving and good creator, one
ought to be able to conclude that creation is for the benefit of the
creature. Consequently, exploring what is natural to humanity
becomes an appropriate basis for moral judgement, and attending
to what can be shown empirically to enhance human fulfillment is,
likewise, legitimate. Although there is often in practice a clash
between the ethical thinking of ecclesiastical hierarchs and secular
thinkers, in principle such clashes should not occur. As Grotius
argued long ago, a true natural law ethic ought to be capable of
being worked out “ets: Deus non daretur” (as if God were not a
premise). If we turn to Buddhism to exemplify the religious wis-
dom of the East, we note that the way the householder (as distinct
from the monk) can obtain good karma is to follow the basic ethical
principles of the dharma and fulfill one’s obligations to family and
society. In practical terms the behavior necessary for gaining
heaven, or fulfilling one’s karma is also the behavior best suited to
the full realization of one’s potential as a human person.
If we believe that what we do matters because it shapes what we
become, we will have a positive attitude towards the challenges of
life. These are the means by which we grow and develop. At
different stages of life one seeks to throw oneself into the tasks and
duties appropriate to any given stage. A conscientious person will
take education seriously in youth, not simply in terms of academic
achievement but hopefully the challenge of nurturing whatever
talents one has. These may include the development of athletic,
musical, aesthetic or organizational abilities as well as intellectual
skills. Then one may move on to the tasks entailed by one’s job or
profession and perhaps also take on additional civic or social con-
cerns. For many there will come family responsibilities and the cares
and responsibilities of children and aged parents. For some there
may be office in a voluntary society, cultural or political organization
PAUL BADHAM 251
or church. These things provide people with a sense of meaning to

their individual lives and give them their sense of worth and dignity.
Sucha positive attitude to life is a good in itself and from a humanist
perspective might be self-chosen as a way to attribute meaning to
one’s daily activity. From a religious perspective the meaning is all
the richer for being set in a cosmic framework, leading onwards to
the fullness of life in a world beyond.
NOTES
1. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (London: Macmillan, 1966).
2. John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (London: Macmillan, 1989).
3. 1 Corinthians 15:19.
4. John Hick, “An Irenaean Theodicy,” in Paul Badham, A John Hick Reader
(London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 94.
5. M.B. Forman, The Letters ofJohn Keats (London: Oxford University Press,
1952), p. 334-5.
6. John Hick, Death and Eternal Life (London: Macmillan, 1976), Part V.
a Keith Ward, The Battle for the Soul (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985),
pp. 149-50.
8. Job 42:1-5.
9. Dan Cohn Sherbok, “Death and Immortality in the Jewish Tradition,” in
P. and L. Badham, Death and Immortality in the Religions of the World (New
York: Paragon House, 1987), p. 34.
10. Cohn Sherbok, p. 26.
Pi. Sulayman Nyang, “The Teaching of the Qur’an Concerning Life after
Death,” in P. and L. Badham, Death and Immortality in the Religions of the
World (New York: Paragon House, 1987), p. 72.
12; Sulayman Nyang, p. 73, citing the Qur'an, 21:16-17.
13. Salih Tug, “Death and Immortality in Islamic Thought,” in P. and L.
Badham, Death and Immortality in the Religions of the World, op. cit., pp. 87-88.
1a Edward Conze, Buddhist Scriptures (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics,
1959), p22),
£5. Cited in W. Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (New York: Group Press,
1959), p. 59.
16. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
17. John Hick, “Response,” in Stephen Davis, Death and Afterlife (London:
Macmillan, 1989), p. 178.
18. Cited in F.C. Copleston, History of Philosophy (New York: Image Books,
1963), Vol:3;-Pt./2;\pal4s5,
CONTRIBUTORS
Wande Abimbola: His Excellency Dr. Abimbola is a Paramount

Chief and Priest in Nigeria. He is also President of the International
Congress of Orisa Tradition and Culture. Under a previous govern-
ment he was a senator in the Nigerian House of Representatives. He
is author and translator of: Ifa, An Exposition of Ifa Literary Corpus and
Sixteen Great Poems of Ifa. He has written many articles on traditional
African religion. He has special concern for the Yoruba culture in
the diaspora.
Muhammad AI-Ghazali: Dr. Al-Ghazali is Assistant Professor and

heads the Department of Social Sciences at the Islamic Research
Institute, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan.
Recent publications include: “Islamic Philosophy of Dawah,” Journal
of the International Islamic University (1995); “Reason and Revelation -
Conflict or Convergence,” Muslim Education Quarterly (1944); a book
Socio-Political Thought of Shah Wali Ullah is in production. He is pres-
ently working on a critique of methodology in the social sciences.
Paul Badham: The Reverend Professor Paul Badham is Dean of

Theology and Religious Studies and Director of the Program in
Death and Immortality at the University of Wales, Lampeter. He
edited or authored the following books: Christian Beliefs about Life and
Death; Death and Immortality in the Religions of the World; Immortality or
Extinction?; Ethics on the Frontiers of Human Existence; and A John Hick
Reader.
M. Darrol Bryant: Dr. Bryant is the Secretary General of the Inter-

Religious Federation for World Peace. He is Professor of Religion
and Culture, Renison College, University of Waterloo, Canada. He
is author or editor of more than a dozen books, the most recent is
Jonathan Edward’s Grammar of Time, Self, and Society; other books
- 252-
CONTRIBUTORS 253
include: Religion in a New Key; Huston Smith: Essays on World Religions;

Interreligious Dialogue: Voices from a New Frontier; The Many Faces of
Religion and Society; and God: The Contemporary Discussion. He is cur-
rently researching the notion of dialogue and a history of Christian
thought.
William Cenkner: Dr. Cenkner is Professor of the History of

Religions and former Dean of the School of Religious Studies, The
Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. His books include:
The Hindu Personality in Education: Tagore, Gandhi, Aurobindo; A
Tradition of Teachers: Sankara and the Jagadgurus Today; he is co-author
and editor of The Religious Quest and editor of Multicultural Experience
in U.S. Church and Theology. His current project is a book on
Rabindranath Tagore.
Francis Xavier D’Sa: Professor D’Sa, S.J., is presently Director of

the Institute for the Study of Religion, De Nobili College, Pune,
India; he was also Director of the Department of Sanskrit and
Symbolism at this institute. For many years Professor of Indian
Religion and Theology at the Jesuit Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, he is
author of Gott, der Dreieine und der Allganze. Vorwort zur Begegnung
zwischen Christentum und Hinduismus; recent articles include “The
Remembering of Text and Tradition: Some Reflections of Gerhard
Oberhammer’s Hermeneutics of Encounter,” and “The Happening
of Tradition: The Mimamsa’s Vedapramanan,” both in Hermeneutics
of Encounter: Essays in Honour of Gerhard Oberhammer, ed. F. X. D’Sa
and R. Mesquita. His research continues in the encounter of
Mimamsa and contemporary hermeneutics.
David J. Goldberg: Rabbi Goldberg is Senior Rabbi at The Liberal

Jewish Synagogue, Leo Baeck College, London. He is author of The
Jewish People and his most recent book appearing in 1995 is To the
Promised Land.
David Ray Griffin: Dr. Griffin is Professor of Philosophy of Religion

and Theology, School of Theology at Claremont & Claremont
Graduate School, California. He is also the Executive Director of the
Center for Process Studies. Among his many books are: God, Power,
and Evil: A Process Theodicy; God and Religion in the Postmodern World;
254 CONTRIBUTORS
Evil Revisited; Parapsychology, Philosophy and Spirituality. He is co-
author of: Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition; Primordial Truth
and Postmodern Theology; Varieties of Postmodern Theology; Founders of
Constructive Postmodern Philosophy. He has also edited a number of
books, among which is The Reenchantment of Science, Spirituality and
Society. He is now working on a project arguing the need for global
governance to deal with security, and ecological and economic crises.
Anthony J. Guerra: Dr. Guerra is Vice Provost for Academic Devel-

opment, University of Bridgeport, Connecticut. He is author of
Romans and the Apologetic Tradition: The Purpose, Genre, and Audience
of Paul's Letter. He is also editor of Unification Theology in Comparative
Perspectives. He is presently working on a comparative study of the
origins of various religions from ancient times to the modern period.
Riffat Hassan: Dr. Hassan is Professor of Islamic Studies, University

of Louisville, Kentucky. She has done extensive development work
in Pakistan among Muslim women.
Sheldon R. Isenberg: Dr. Isenberg is Associate Professor of Jewish

studies in the Department of Religion and the Center for Jewish
Studies, University of Florida, Gainsville. His recent writing in-
cludes: “Aging in Judaism,” The Handbook ofAging and the Humanities,
ed. by Thomas R. Cole; “The Post-Modern Return of the Meta-
physically Repressed,” Aries (1991-1992); “More Than We Can Say:
Modern and Post-Modern in Perennialist Perspective,” Aries (1990).
He is now working on psychospiritual development from a compara-
tive perspective.
Gene G. James: Dr. James is Professor of Philosophy, Department

of Philosophy, The University of Memphis, Tennessee. He is author
of numerous articles in philosophy of religion, social and political
philosophy, ethics and related areas. He is also co-author of a
textbook in logic and editor of several anthologies. He is currently
working in environmental ethics and a book on evil in the world’s
religions.
CONTRIBUTORS 255
Stephen Kaplan: Dr. Kaplan is a Professor in the Department of

Religious Studies, Manhattan College, New York. He is author of
Hermeneutics, Holography and Indian Idealism: A Study of Protection and
Gaudapada’s Mandukhya Karka. His recent articles include:
“Yogacara Roots of Advaita Idealism?,” Journal of Indian Philosophy
(1992); “A Holographic Analysis of Religious Diversity: A Case Study
of Hinduism and Christianity,” Journal of Religious Pluralism (1993).
His current project is the impact of orality and genre on
interpretation of Indian philosophical texts.
E. O. Oyelade: Reverend Dr. Emmanuel Oguntoye Oyelade is

Senior Lecturer, Department of Religious Studies, Obafemi
Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. His recent articles include:
“Religion, Politics, and Peace in Africa: A Study of Religious Plural-
ism and Islamic Fundamentalism,” in Religion and Peace in Multi-
Faith Nigeria, ed. J. K. Olupona; “The Creative Poems of Mu’azu
Hadeja: An Aspect of Islam and Social Change in Northern
Nigeria,” in Diversity of Creativity in Nigeria, ed. Bolaji Campbell;
“The Doctrine of Predestination: A Study of Religio-Cultural
Interactions in Nigeria,” in IFE, Annuals of the Institute of Cultural
Studies, ed. Bade Ajuwon. His research project is Islam and Christian
missions in contemporary Nigeria.
Peter C. Phan: Dr. Phan is Professor and former Chairperson in the

Department of Theology, School of Religious Studies, The Catholic
University of America, Washington, D.C. He is also former editor of
the journal Dialogue & Alliance. Author of several books and many
articles in theology, culture, and society, his book Eternity in Time is
mentioned here with recent articles: “Contemporary Context and
Issues in Eschatology,” Theological Studies (1994); “Experience and
Theology: An Asian Liberation Perspective,” Zevscrift fiir Mission-
swissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft (1993). He is currently re-
searching inculturation of theology in the Vietnamese society of the
17th century.
Mary Ann Stenger: Dr. Stenger is Visiting Associate Professor in
Religious Studies, University of Louisville, Kentucky. Her recent
articles include: “Tillich’s Approach to Theology and Natural
Sciences: Issues of Truth and Verification,” Natural Theology versus
256 CONTRIBUTORS
Theology of Nature ?/Naturliche Theologie versus Theologies der Natur?, ed.

by Gert Hummel; “Paul Tillich and the Feminist Critique of Roman
Catholic Theology,” Paul Tillich: A New Catholic Assessment, ed. by
Raymond F. Bulman & Frederick J. Parella. Several articles on
religious pluralism also appear in Religious Pluralism and Truth: Essays
on Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Religion, ed. by Thomas Dean. She is
currently working on a project to bring together pluralist and
feminist critiques of Christian theology.
Medagama Vajiragnana: The Venerable Dr. Vajiragnana is Abbot

of the London Buddhist Vihara, Bedford Park, London. He is
author of three books: Buddhist Meditation; Life of a Lay Buddhist;
Parent and Child in Buddhism; also two monographs, “Peace Through
Buddhism,” and “Health Through Buddhism.” All were published
in the 1980’s in Malaysia and Singapore.
Chandra Wikramagamage: Dr. Wikramagamage is Professor of Pali

and Buddhist Studies and Dean of the Faculty of Arts, University of
Jayewardenepura, Nugegoda, Sri Lanka. His research publications
include: Galvihara, Polonnaruva; The Avukana Buddha; The Stupa; By.
G. Smither’s Architectural Remains, Anuradhapura (Rev. Ed.); First and
Second Excavation Reports of Abhayagirivihara; and Buddhist Iconology.
He continues to research in Buddhist art and architecture.
Jane Mary Zwerner: Dr. Zwerner is author of The Co-Existence of God

and Evil. Recent articles include: “Modalism Revisited,” Negation and
Theology, ed. by Robert Scharlemann; “Futility, Autonomy, and
Informed Consent,” Health Progress (March, 1994); “In the Patient’s
Best Interest,” Health Progress (April, 1993); “Exclusively Male
Imagery in Religious Language,” Worship (July 1992). She was
recently Vice President, Values Integration and Leadership Devel-
opment, Allegany Health System, Florida. She is currently working
on a textbook in ethics.
i OdLO) $16.95
Religion has to do primarily with the desire to overcome evil through

proper relation to the supreme power of the universe.... To be religious
is to believe both in the reality of evil and in a divine reality that, be-
cause of its power and goodness, can and will provide salvation from
this evil. .
oe —David Ray Griffin, Claremont School of Theology
While for Maimonides and others evil designated radical unreality, lack
of being, for the Kabbalah the realm of evil, the other side, was too
real, too much a matter of Jewish corporate and personal experience,
to be denied its reality by attributing the human experience of evil merely
to an intellectual deficiency.
—Sheldon Isenberg, University of Florida
There is no word in Pali which is the exact equivalent of the English
word evil. The word which is frequently used in Pali is papa, which
means that which defiles the mind. It is associated with the three im-
moral roots: greed, hatred, and delusion. All evil actions are rooted in
one or more of these three qualities.
—Medegama Vajiragnana, Abbot, London Buddhist Vihara
The main.emphasis of the teachings of Islam is, therefore, a constant
concern and endless effort to purify the intentions of the inner self.
This, according to the Qur’an, constitutes one of the cardinal func-
tions of the Prophet. Such inner purification ofthe self is a fundamen-
tal objective, because in Islam the root of all evil is the inner human
intention.
—Muhammad Al-Ghazali, International Islamic University, Pakistan
William Cenkner is Professor of History of Religions and former Dean

of the School of Religious Studies, The Catholic University of America.
ISBN 1-55778-753-0
90505080
181557 £E7 538 IK}
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All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, in

Cover Art: Art Resource, NY, Cain and Abel, Titian.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Evil and the response of world religion / edited by William

Manufactured in the United States of America

PART ONE: RESPONSES FROM THE RELIGIONS

PART TWO: RESPONSES FROM ASIAN TRADITIONS

10. Three Levels of Evil in Advaita Vedanta

PART THREE: RESPONSES FROM AFRICAN

PART FOUR: CONTEMPORARY RESPONSES

One could attribute this to the enormity of world tragedy in this

essential nature, its characteristics, and its means of proliferation—

The conference included over sixty participants from many

conference, I found in the experience of interreligious dialogue

Two essays speak directly from the Christian biblical tradition,

evil from Asian traditions, Buddhism and Hinduism in particular.

Bhagavad Gita. At the very least this is an attempt at comparative

begun in Korea but now spread throughout the world. For

ahigw, 2i sat “ger as

Ai a Sieiciie ae Siac Sais Bie erie of i 4a

ot Nee. phe: riety'sth

bod lia pebe We — aby ee stil

M odern biblical scholars identify four writers whose work

Disobedience, Destruction, and a New Beginning

threatened with destruction by allowing it to return to chaos.

Like JE, P also describes a covenant with Abraham in which he is

they are cases of inappropriate mixing. If any instances of un-

The rules regarding sacrifices, prevention of inappropriate mix-

M ystics and philosophers from many traditions have recog-

The evolution of this millennia-old tradition requires that we move

widows and orphans, and were unfaithful to God in their rituals.

repudiates Job’s comforters, the representatives of the simplistic

complaints find a direct response. In addition, great suffering on the

Evil and the Rabbis

respond. For the rabbis nothing that happens to a person or the

The Evil Inclination

The underlying myth informing Jewish views of evil manifests a

Evil in the Zohar

life is God manifesting in our universe; everything receives its being

divine sefirotic macrocosmic consciousness. Healing comes when we

Healing the Break

powers, not isolating them and not homogenizing them. If this is

has become something else, something more complex, with the

here is no more agonizing problem of belief than the exis-

attempt to grapple with the questions posed by the apparent reality

have this property in order to be matter.’ To expect God to create

need to differentiate between natural and moral evils. Natural evils

memory of the victims any solution which depends on the tidy

Hick’s own approach, in a Christian context, is to side with

perplexing. The existence of the whole process, with its contingen-

By Jane Mary Zwerner

T heodicists from Augustine to Hick have placed the fall at the

The cross on which Jesus of Nazareth was crucified is both the

bonum of creation, and the cross is the paradigmatic historical event

requires both joy and sorrow. The happiness of transfiguration is

Paul acknowledges that what he is preaching is an absurdity and a

Salvation demands belief in the crucifixion, not in the creation or

Transfiguration: New But Old

however, which affect us profoundly and irrevocably. These are the

in the midst of evil are often isolated from other persons or

the cross. My account of a transfiguration theodicy does not explain

By Mary Ann Stenger

al he central Christian symbol of the cross has been given a

The Structure of the Symbol of the Cross

sayings of Jesus invokes images of self-sacrifice. In the Gospels,

The cup of blessing that we bless, is it not a sharing in the blood of

In both baptism and communion, the Christian is sharing in the

separated from faith in the resurrection of Jesus. But for the

of the cross as Jesus sacrificing himself as Jesus to be the Christ, to

Jesus dies to himself, sacrificing his finite human characteristics

Freedom from death:

. One man’s act of righteousness leads to justification and life for

a guard against idolatry and injustice. Tillich recognizes that when

Use of the Cross to Legitimate Violence