This document contains instructions for problem set 3 of the Industrial Organization 142A class taught by Professor Amjad Toukan in Winter 2023. It lists two multi-part questions regarding price discrimination by monopolists. Question 6.8 asks the student to set rental and usage fees as a monopolist for two types of customers. Question 6.9 asks the student to analyze the costs and benefits of price discrimination for a monopolist graphically and discuss the monopolist and social planner's decisions around price discrimination given different costs. The student is instructed to show their work and explanations for full credit.
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Problem Set 3
This document contains instructions for problem set 3 of the Industrial Organization 142A class taught by Professor Amjad Toukan in Winter 2023. It lists two multi-part questions regarding price discrimination by monopolists. Question 6.8 asks the student to set rental and usage fees as a monopolist for two types of customers. Question 6.9 asks the student to analyze the costs and benefits of price discrimination for a monopolist graphically and discuss the monopolist and social planner's decisions around price discrimination given different costs. The student is instructed to show their work and explanations for full credit.
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Industrial Organization 142A
Amjad Toukan Winter 2023 PROBLEM SET 3 Due on March 18th, 2023 by midnight
Please complete the following exercises
6.8. You are an executive for Super Computer, Inc. (SC), which rents out super computers. SC receives a fixed rental payment per time period in exchange for the right to unlimited computing at a rate of P cents per second. SC has two types of potential customers of equal number – 10 businesses and 10 academic institutions. Each business customer has the demand function Q = 10 – P, where Q is in millions of seconds per month; each academic institution has the demand Q = 8 – P. The marginal cost to SC of additional computing is 2 cents per second, regardless of volume. Suppose you set up one two-part tariff – that is, you set one rental and one usage fee that both business and academic customers pay. What usage and rental fees would you set? What would be your profits? Explain why price would not be equal to marginal cost. 6.9. Many schemes for price discriminating involve some cost. For example, discount coupons take up the time and resources of both the buyer and seller. This question considers the implications of costly price discrimination. To keep things simple, let's assume that our monopolist's production costs are simply proportional to output so that average total cost and marginal cost are constant and equal to each other. (a) Draw the cost, demand, and marginal-revenue curves for the monopolist. Show the price the monopolist would charge without price discrimination. (b) In your diagram, mark the area equal to the monopolist's profit and call it X. Mark the are equal to consumer surplus and call it Y. Mark the area equal to the deadweight loss and call it Z. (c) Now suppose that the monopolist can perfectly price discriminate. What is the monopolist's profit? (Give your answer in terms of X, Y , and Z.) (d) What is the change in the monopolist's profit from price discrimination? What is the change in total surplus from price discrimination? Which change is larger? Explain. (Give your answer in terms of X, Y , and Z.) (e) Now suppose that there is some cost of price discrimination. To model this cost, let's assume that the monopolist has to pay a fixed cost C to price discriminate. How would a monopolist make the decision whether to pay this fixed cost? (Give your answer in terms of X, Y , Z, and C.) (f) How would a benevolent social planner, who cares about total surplus, decide whether the monopolist should price discriminate? (Give your answer in terms of X, Y , and Z.) (g) Compare your answers to parts (e) and (f).