Republic of the Philippines

SANDIGANBAYAN
Quezon City

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff,

SB-16-CRM-0077 -0084
For: Falsification of Public
Documents and Violation of
Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019

JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY,

JR. ET AL..,
Accused.
X-- --- ---- ---- ---- -------- ----- ---- ----X Present:

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.
MARTIRES, J.,
FERNANDEZ, J.

For resolution are the following:

1. Accused Lorenza P. Amores' Motion for Reconsideration

(Re: Hold Departure Order dated February 26) 2016) dated
March 30, 201~ ~

, p. 4, Vol. IV, ",rom (SB-16-CRM-0077) ~

RESOLUTION
People YS. Binay, et al.
SB-16-CRM-0077-0084

2. Accused Manolito N. Uyaco's Motion for Reconsideration

(Re: Hold Departure Order dated February 26, 2016) dated
March 31,2016;2

3. Accused Cecilio P. Lim's Motion for Reconsideration (Re:

Hold Departure Order dated February 26, 20 16) dated March 30,
2016.3,

4. Accused Nelia A. Barlis' Motion for Reconsideration (Re:

Hold Departure Order dated February 26, 20 16) dated March 31,
2016.4,

5. Accused Rodel R. Nayve's Motion for Reconsideration (Re:

Hold Departure Order dated February 26, 20 16) dated March 30,
2016.5, and

6. Accused Eleno M. Mendoza, Motion for

Jr.'s
Reconsideration (Re: Hold Departure Order dated February 26,
2016) dated March 31, 2016;6

THE ACCUSED-MOVANTS' MOTIONS FOR

RECONSIDERATION

Accused-movants pray for the reconsideration and lifting

of the Court's Hold Departure Order (HDO) dated February 26,
2016. They uniformly allege that the Court should have been
more circumspect in issuing the HDO considering that it
restricts their right to travel guaranteed no less by the 1987
Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They
claim that their right to travel cannot be restricted simply
"because there is a pending criminal case against [them]."
Accused-movants further claim that the allowable restrictions
to their right to travel under Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, i.e., interest of national security, public safety or
public health, as may be provided for by law, are not present in
these cases. They all claim that although they are currently
indicted in these criminal cases, they are still presumed
innocent until proven otherwise. Thus, their freedom to travel
even outside the country should not be unduly restricte~

2p .10,id / ~
J p. 109, Vol. I, RCi'Ord (SB~16-CRlvI-0080)
·p.115,id .
5 p. 122, id
(,p. 135, Vol. I, ful'ord (SB-16-CR!.vl-0084) fP /'

"~I
RESOLUTION
People vs. Binay, et at.
SB-16-CRM-OOn -0084

otherwise, their "right to be presumed innocent UJillbe negated

as early as now."7

Accused-movants likewise claim that the ex-parte

issuance of the HDO violated their right to due process because
they were not given the opportunity to be heard prior to its
issuance and due to the absence of any of the recognized
exceptions under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
They also assert that the doctrinal pronounceUlents of the
Supreme Court in Silverio vs. Court of AppealsB and
Santiago vs. VasqueZ3 are inapplicable herein allegedly
because the factual circumstances of the said cases are not
similar to these cases; and, that there is no compelling reason
to issue the HDO against them since they have all the intention
to attend the hearings when required to do so by the Court.
While they are charged with falsification of public documents
and violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
these are not heinous crimes that carry with them the penalty
of life imprisonment or its equivalent. Accused-movants all
claim that they have already submitted to the jurisdiction of the
Court and had posted the required bail bond for their
provisional liberties; hence, there is no further reason to restrict
•
their movement and curtail their freedom to travel abroad. 10

Finally, the accused-movants assert that they are not

flight risks considering that all the people they hold dear,
including their assets, are here in the country. 11

THE CONSOLIDATED OPPOSITION

OF THE PROSECUTION

The prosecution argues for the outright denial of the

subject motions in its Consolidated Opposition dated April 15,
2016.12 According to the prosecution, it is now settled that a
person's right to travel is subject to the usual constraints
imposed by the very necessity of safeguardingthe system/-?

7 pp. 4-5, pp. 11-12, Vol. IV, Ruord(SB-16-CRl\I-0077); pp. 109-110, pp 115-116, pp. 122-123, Vol. I, Record
(SB-16-CRM-0080), pp. 135-137, Vol. I, Ivxord (SB-16-CRlVI-0084)
8195 SCRA 760 (1991)
9 217 SCRA 633 (1993)

10 pp. 5-7, pp. 12-14, V.01. IV, Record (SB-16-CRM-0077); pp. 111-113, pp. 117-119, pp. 124-127, Vol. I, Recor~.
(SB-16-CRM-0080), pp. 137-139, Vol. I, Record (SB-16-CRl\I-0084)
11 p. 8. p. 14, Vol. I V, Rewrd (SB-16-CRM-0077); p 113, P 119, P 127, Vol. I, Retord (SB-1G-CRM-0080), p 139,
Vol. I, Record (SB-16-CRlvI-0084)
12 p. 102, Vol. IV, Record (SB-16-CRM-0077) /
RESOLUTION
People vs. Binay. et al.
S B-16-CRM -0077 -0084
X ------------ --------- ------ - ------ - --- ---- ----- -X

justice13 and that courts have the inherent power to issue an

HDO. It asserts that the issuance by the Court of the assailed
HDO was within its inherent power to ensure that the accused
in these cases are always within its reach. "Protecting the
interest of the people is far more important than simply trusting
the claims of the accused that they have no intention of leaving
the country and evading the criminal cases against them."14

After considering all the arguments of the parties, the

pertinent laws and relevant jurisprudence, the Court DENIES
the accused-movants' motions for reconsideration for reasons
hereunder discussed.

I. The right to trave Z is not

absolute; there are recognized
limitations thereto.

It is conceded that the right to travel or n~e freedom of

movement is one of the rights guaranteed not only under our
Bill of Rights but also under international law.

Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

(UDHR)emphatically declares that:

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and

residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country.

It is worthy to note, however, that at the time of the

adoption of the UDHR, the general consensus among the
member states of the United Nations (UN)was that the UDHR
was not intended to be considered a law. In fact, right after the
adoption of the UDHR by the UN General Assembly, it was the
explicit position of the government of the United States of
America that the said declaration is "not a treaty,)) or ((a~

13

H
Citing Reyes vs. C~'urtof Appeals, 606 SeRA 580 (2009)
P". 6, p. 3, C""5dD,,d 0Pf''''''·' p. 104, VoL IV, R""d (SB16-CRM0077) ff / (J"J.J
M
RESOLUTION
People vs. Binay, et at.
SB-16-CRM-0077-0084

international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a

statement of law or of a legal obligation. "15

Thus, to be of binding character in international law, the

declarations made under the UDHR needed to be converted into
international covenants or treaties. The conversion of these
avowed declarations into the level of an international covenant
started in 1966 with the conclusion of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and which came
into force on March 23, 1976, pursuant to its Article 49.16 The
Philippines became a state party to the ICCPR in 1986.17

Among the rights guaranteed under the ICCPR is the right

of a person to liberty of movement and freedom to choose
his/her residence. Article 12 thereof provides:

Article 12
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within
that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose his residence.
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his
own.
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any
restrictions except those which are provided by law, are
necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre
public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of
others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in
the present Covenant.
4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his
own country.

As can be readily seen from the above-quoted Article 12 of

the ICCPR, the right to liberty of movement is not absolute. It is
subject to certain permissible limitations spelled out in
paragraph 3 thereof, i.e., if there is a law providing for its
limitation, if such restriction is necessary to protect national
security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and
freedoms of others and are consistent with the rights recognized
intheICCP~

15 19 Dep't. State Bulletin 751 (1948) (raken from the remarks of Eleanor Roosevelt, then a U.S. delegate to the
General Assembly); hltps:/ /lvww2.gwu.edu/ -erpapers/ dotuments/ displaydoc4nl?_I=speedles&_dotid
=spt057137; viewed On J"nu"ry 12, 2017
16 b/tp:/ / www.obt·hr.org/ell/professionalill/erest/pages/ apr.alpx; viewed on J anualY 12, 2017
17 http://indicator.r.obchr.org/;viewed on JanUar)f 12, 2017
RESOLUTION
People vs. Binay, el at.
SB-16-CRM-0077-0084
X ------ - --- -------- - -- - - ---- - -- - ----- -- - ----- -- -- X

Within the domestic sphere, a person's right to travel is

likewise guaranteed under Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:

SgCTION 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the

same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law. 18

However, just like Article 12 of the ICCPR, the right to

travel guaranteed under the afore-quoted Section 6, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution is not absolute. The State may validly
impair it in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health, as may be provided by law.

11.The fact 'that accused-movants

are currently facing criminal
charges in court is a limiting
circumstance to their right to
travel.

Accused-movants invoke the aforesaid prOVISIons of the

Bill of Rights, the UDHR and ICCPR in claiming that the Court
impaired their right to travel with the issuance of the assailed
HDO. They all allege that none of the grounds stated under
Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution is present or
availing in this case; that they are not prominent public figures
whose acts can influence or affect the consciousness of the
general public,. to the detriment of national security or public
safety; and, they are not suffering from any contagious disease
that can affect public health; hence, the Court should not have
issued the assailed HDO against them.

Obviously, accused-movants overlook the fact that aside

from the recognized constitutional limitations, there are
statutory and inherent limitations to the said right to tr~

M
R~SOLUTION
People vs. Binay, et at.
SB-16-CRM-0077-0084

In Leave Division, Office of the A.dministrative

Services-Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) vs.
Heusdens,19 the Supreme Court enunciated:

Nonetheless, granting that it is an issue, the exercise

of one's right to travel or the freedom to move from one
place to another, as assured by the Constitution, is not
absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and
inherent limitations regulating the right to travel. Section
6 itself provides that neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public
safety or public health, as may be provided by law. Some of
these statutory limitations are the following:

1] The Human Security Act of 20 10 or Republic Act (R.A.)

No. 9372. The law restricts the right to travel of an individual
charged with the crime of terrorism even though such person
is out on bail.

2] The Philippine Passport Act of 1996 or R.A. No. 8239.

Pursuant to said law, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or his
authorized consular officer may refuse the issuance of,
restrict the use of, or withdraw, a passport of a Filipino
citizen.

3] The Anti- Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 or R.A.

No. 9208. Pursuant to the provisions thereof, the Bureau of
Immigration, in order to manage migration and curb
trafficking in persons, issued Memorandum Order Radjr No.
2011-011, allowing its Travel Control and Enforcement Unit
to offload passengers with fraudulent travel documents,
doubtful purpose of travel, including possible victims of
human trafficking from our ports.

4] The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of

1995 or R. A. No. 8042, as amended by R.A. No. 10022. In
enforcement of said law, the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) may refuse to issue
deployment permit to a specific country that effectively
prevents our migrant workers to enter such country.

5] The Act on Violence against Women and Children or

R.A. No. 9262. The law restricts movement of an individual
against whom the protection order is intended.

6] Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 or R.A. No. 8043.

Pursuant t~ereto, the Inter-Country Adoption Board m'y?

19662 SCRA 126 (2011); Pleas~ refer also to the Di-fselltil1gOpinioll of Justice J\ntonio T. Carpio in Macapagal-

Arroyo YS. De Lima, G.R. No. 199034, and Arroyo YS. De Lima, G.R. No. 199046, November 15, 2011; ~~
bltp:// www.gov.ph/2011/11/15/ g!oria-macapaga!-arrryo-v-de-!ima-el-a!-g-r-1I0-199034jose-miguel-arroyo-v-de-!ima-et-a!-g-r-
110-199046/; viewed on.J anuary 12, 2017

ff
RESOLUTION
People vs. Binay, el al.
SB-16-CRM -0077 -0084

issue rules restrictive of an adoptees right to travel to protect

the Filipino child from abuse, exploitation, trafficking and/ or
sale or any' other practice in connection with adoption which
is harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial to the child.

Inherent limitations on the right to travel are those

that naturally emanate from the source. These are very
basic and are built-in with the power. An example of such
inherent limitation is the power of the trial courts to
prohibit persons charged with a crime to leave the
country. In such a case, permission of the court is necessary.
Another is the inherent power of the legislative department to
conduct a congressional inquiry in aid of legislation. In the
exercise of legislative inquiry, Congress has the power to
issue a subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to a witness in
any part of the country, signed by the chairperson or acting
chairperson and the Speaker or acting Speaker of the House;
or in the case of the Senate, signed by its Chairman or in his
absence by the Acting Chairman, and approved by the Senate
Presiden t. 20

Indeed, there are other well-recognized permissible

restrictions to an individual's right to travel other those stated
under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. For one,
the right to travel of an individual facing a criminal charge is
always subject to, or circumscribed by, the exercise of the court
of its inherent power pursuant to the teachings of the Supreme
Court in Silverio vs. Court of Appeals:21

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be

interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be
impaired ~ven without Court Order, the appropriate executive
officers or administrative authorities are not armed with
arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose
limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or
public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive
phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The
Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition,
1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987
Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel
imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel
Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to
travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs.
Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April
1980,97 SeRA 1~

20 Emphasis supplied; citations omitted

21 Jttpra
RESOLUTION
People vs. Binay, et at.
SB-16-CRM-0077-0084

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution

should by no means be construed as delimiting the
inherent power S!.f the Courts to use all means necessary
to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending
before them, When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court
or judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such
Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).

Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail

but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear
before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have
been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered
nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to
remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confin~s of the
country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the
reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the
Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on
his right ~o travel so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal
proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their
best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their
course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with
an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court
Orders and processes.22

The aforesaid rule was reiterated and expounded by the

Supreme Court in Santiago vs. Vasquez,23 thus:

First, it is averred that the hold departure order was

issued without notice and hearing. Much is made by
petitioner of the fact that there was no showing that a motion
to issue a hold departure order was filed by the prosecution
and, instead, the same was issued ex mere motu by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is in error.

Courts possess certain inherent powers which may

be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction,
in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These
inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the
ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or essential to
the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as
to the due administration of justice; or are directly
appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their
granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's
jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the iitiga~

22

2.J
Emphasis
supra
and w1derscoring supplied ~A'
rf
RESOLUTION
People vs. Binay, el at.
SB-16-CRM-0077-0084

Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the

incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a
grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation,
implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential
to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and
constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court
has the pOpv"erto do all things that are reasonably necessary
for the administration of justice within the scope of its
jurisdiction'. Hence, demands, matters, or questions ancillary
or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and
coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance
of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in
aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the
court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters
which, as original causes of action, would not be within its
cognizance.

Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make

interlocutory orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction. Such
being the case, with more reason may a party litigant be
subjected to proper coercive measures where he disobeys a
proper order, or commits a fraud on the court or the opposing
party, the result of which is that the jurisdiction of the court
would be' ineffectual. What ought to be done depends upon
the particular circumstances.24

Thus, while the limitations provided for under Section 6,

Article III of the 1987 Constitution are not present in these
criminal cases, such fact does not render the Court powerless
to issue the assailed HDOs. The Court possesses the inherent
power to issue an HDO against a person who is facing a criminal
case before it to maintain its jurisdiction and render it effective.

Also, the fact that the Court issued the assailed HDOs ex
parte does not infringe on the accused-movants' right to due
process of law. As seen from the above-quoted portion of
Santiago, the"petitioner therein likewise assailed the issuance
of an ex parte HDO against her by the Court. The challenge,
however, was brushed aside by the Supreme Court because the
issuance thereof undeniably emanated from the
Sandiganbayan's inherent power to use all means necessary
to carry its orders into effect and to preserve and to maintain
the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the cases filed before it
and the pers~n of the accused brought befor~
RESOLUTlON
People vs. Binay, et al.
SB-16-CRM-0077 -0084
x--- --- --- ----- ----- ------ ----- ---- ------- --- ---- x

111. The issuance of the HDOs

against accused-movants
does not negate the
presumption of innocence in
their favor.

Contrary to the accused-movants' claim, the issuance of

the assailed HDOs against them does not amount to a negation
of the presumption of innocence in their favor. To be sure, the
only office of the HDO is to ensure and protect the exercise by
this Court of its jurisdiction to hear and try these cases. It has
absolutely no bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused
which can only be determined after trial. -

IV. The Court has the inherent

power tp effectuate and
preserve its jurisdiction
which can be validly
exercised by the issuance of
the assailed HDOs.

Accused-movants, knowing the doctrinal value of Silverio

and Santiago in resolving their subject motions, assert that
said cases do not apply here allegedly because the factual
backdrop of the petitioners therein is not similar t9 these cases.

Conceding for the nonce that the factual circumstances of

the herein accused-movants are far removed from those of the
petitioners in Silverio and Santiago, this circumstance does
not foreclose the Court from issuing such processes as may be
necessary to effectuate and preserve its jurisdiction.

Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court provides that

when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial
officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary
to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.
One (1)of these processes is the HDOwhich is issued to ensure
that the accused "may be dealt with in accordance with law."

The argument of accused-movants that there is no

compelling reason to issue the HDO against them because they
are charged with falsification of public documents and/ or

~.J ~!IJJI
RESOLUTION
People vs. Binay. et at.
SB-16-CRM-0077-0084

violations of Section 3 (e)of R.A. No. 3019 which are not heinous
crimes penalized with life imprisonment or its equivalent; and,
that they are not flight risks since the people they hold dear,
and their assets, are all here and they do not intend to flee the
country just to evade the pending criminal cases against them,
fails to persuade.

The issuance by the Court of an HOO against persons

criminally charged before it is not contingent on any a priori
determination of whether the said accused is a flight risk or not;
or whether he / she is charged of a heinous crime; or that
his/her family member / s is/ are in the country; or whether the
accused has assets herein; or that he / she had evaded or defied
any issued writs and processes of the Court. Likewise, the
issuance by the Court of HOOs does not depend qn whether an
accused has shown or displayed a tendency or propensity to
evade or disobey any of its lawful orders and/ or writs.

Verily, the only condition to the issuance by the Court of

an HOO is the filing of the criminal Information before it which
thereby vests the Court with jurisdiction over the case. Once a
complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests on the sound discretion of the court.25 It is the
best and sale judge on what to do with the case before it. 26

Finally, all the herein accused-movants have been allowed

to post bail. It is thus with more reason that' the Court may
restrict their right to travel pursuant to the teachings of the
Supreme Court in Santiago, where the Supreme Court
reiterated its ruling in Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals,27 that
courts have the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from
leaving the Philippines:

It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which

we have declared legally valid and complete despite the
absence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by reason of
the peculiar circumstances and grounds hereinbefore
enunciated and which warrant a relaxation of the aforecited
doctrine in Feliciano. Perforce, since under the obligations
assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the
court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving /7
25 Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SeRA 462 (1987) / I'J. /I J/
26 id
27142 seRA 149 (1986)
RESOLUTION
People vs. Binay, et al.
SB-16-CRM-0077-0084

country during the pendency of the case. This was the

ruling we handed down in Manotoc, Jr. us. Court of Appeals, et
al., to the effect that:

A court has the power to prohibit a

person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of
the nature and function of a bail bond.

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court

defines bail as the security required and given for
the release of a person who is in custody of the
law, that he will appear before any court in which
his appearance may be required as stipulated in
the bail bond or recognizance.

Its object is to relieve the accused of

imprisonment and the state of the burden of
keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same
time, to put the accused as much under the
power of the court as if he were in custody of the
proper officer, and to secure the appearance of
the accused so as to answer the call of the court
and do what the law may require of him.

The condition imposed upon petitioner

to make himself available at all times
whenever the court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on his right to
travel. As we have held in People vs. Uy Tuising,
61 Phil. 404 (1935):

... the result of the obligation

assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the
accused amenable at all times to the
orders and processes of the lower court,
was to prohibit said accused from
leaving the jurisdiction of the
Philippines, because, otherwise, said
orders and processes will be nugatory,.
and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the
courts from which they issued does not
extend beyond that of the Philippines
they would have no binding force
outside of said jurisdiction.

Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave

the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may
be placed beyond the reach of the eour~
RESOLUTION
People vs. Binay, el al.
SB-16-CRM-0077-0084
X ------ ------- ------------- --------- - -- ----- - ----x

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES for lack of merit the

following:

1. accused Lorenza P. Amores' Motion for Reconsideration

[Re: Hold Departure Order dated February 26, 2016J dated
March 30,2016;

2. accused Manolito N. Dyaco's Motion for Reconsideration

[Re: Hold Departure Order dated February 26, 2016J dated
March 31, 201Q;

3. accused Cecilio P. Lim's Motion for Reconsideration [Re:

Hold Departure Order dated February 26, 20 16J dated March 30,
2016;

4. accused Nelia A. Barlis' Motion for Reconsideration [Re:

Hold Departure Order dated February 26, 2016] dated March 31,
2016;

5. accused Rodel R. Nayve's Motion for Reconsideration [Re:

Hold Departure Order dated February 26, 2016] dated March 30,
2016; and

6. accused Eleno M. Motion for

Mendoza, Jr.'s
Reconsideration IRe: Hold Departure Order dated February 26,
2016] dated March 31,2016.

ARO M. C
Presidi S Ice
Chairperson

UE ~~RTIRES E T. ANDEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice