The Methodology of Technical Due Diligence Report Preparation For An Office, Residential and Industrial Buildings

Review
Authors(s): Anthony James Joes

Review by: Anthony James Joes
Source: The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 113, No. 1 (Jan., 1989),
pp. 145-147
Published by: The Historical Society of Pennsylvania
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20092315
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1989 BOOK REVIEWS 145
bear the responsibility for re-establishing the Continent's international struc

ture and of ordering its affairs" and that democracy not only made em
barrassing demands on diplomacy but frequently overrode its requirements.
The hatred toward the defeated enemy which prevailed among the public
in all the Western democracies made a rational peace unlikely at best. And
at almost every crucial juncture considerations of domestic politics tended
to prevail. All of the principals, Wilson included, opted all too often for
the role of politician over that of statesman. The pressure, the temptation
to pander, frequently proved too great to withstand. While that is perhaps
understandable in human terms, "history does not," as George Kennan
once so trenchantly wrote, "forgive us our national mistakes because they
are explicable in terms of our domestic politics."
The book has further virtues. For the first time the other members of
the American delegation are fleshed out and brought to life (particularly
interesting are the views of and the role played by Tasker Bliss), with the
result that we see even more clearly that there was precious little agreement
among the American delegation with respect to either objects or to requisite
strategies. In addition, Walworth does a better job than most historians have
done in analyzing the problems inherent in constructing a viable security
organization and in pointing out the likely practical consequences of the
League's constitutional peculiarities.
If the book has any major fault it is only that Walworth in straining to
understand and to be fair to Wilson occasionally falls under his spell and
seems to accept, if only momentarily, two of the major tenets of Wilsonian
mythology?namely, that aggression can be stopped by words and that the
United States really played an objective, disinterested role at the peace
conference. But those are small things when we remember what a long
shadow Wilson has cast over the whole American approach to the conduct
of foreign policy.
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign WILLIAM C. WlDENOR
Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961. By Robin W.

Winks. (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1987. 607p.
Bibliography, index. $22.95.)
Robin W. Winks, Townsend Professor of History at Yale University and

former member of the diplomatic service, has produced a rich and wide
ranging book that tells of the role?and what an intimate and vital role it
was?of the Ivy League universities in the origins of the U.S. intelligence
services. The primary focus is on the Office of Strategic Services (OSS),
146 BOOK REVIEWS January
the World War II parent of what grew into the Central Intelligence Agency,
but the narrative develops certain major strands of the story down to the
present day.
The contributions of Yale to the foundation and growth of the American
intelligence community fascinate Winks, and understandably so. Yale men
abound in these pages, from Nathan Hale (whose statue adorns the precincts
of CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia), to Lt. Col. Peter Downey, first
American officer to be killed in Vietnam; a list of their names would include
many of the most distinguished scholars in the world. Winks believes that,
until recently, more graduates entered American intelligence services from
Yale than from any other school of comparable size.
The urgencies of World War II and the emerging menace of the Cold
War enabled the OSS and its successors to call on the services of the country's
most distinguished historians, political scientists, economists, anthropologists,
and so on. In the Pacific, for one example, U.S. Naval strategists found
themselves confronted with the task of preparing defenses for islands whose
names would soon achieve world fame, but about which they had at the
time practically no information. They turned to the professors, mostly from
the Ivy League and many from Yale, and were not disappointed. In many
ways, the wartime OSS was like a university, a haven for "the idiosyncratic
individual with odd curiosity, distinctive knowledge, the freewheeling
thinker"; even today, the precincts of CIA headquarters are called "the
campus."
Several lengthy, illuminating, and not unsympathetic portraits of out
standing American intelligence figures (most notably, perhaps, the brilliant,
tragic James J. Angleton) provide insight into the foreign policies of the
Truman and Eisenhower eras. But Winks also effectively studs his narrative
with memorable nuggets, such as the story of how five Yale scholars, in
the summer of 1951, using only open sources, prepared a description of
American defense capabilities whose accuracy shocked CIA Director Walter
Bedell Smith and scandalized President Truman.
Winks seeks to explain, without complete success, why the intimate bonds
between the Ivy League and the intelligence community became unravelled.
Perhaps the tensions generated by a democracy trying to engage in global
intelligence activities in a world of apparently increasing moral ambiguities
made such a denouement inevitable, but Winks suggests as well that in the
post-Vietnam world, intelligence work is less attractive to talented young
men who do not have to face the alternative of active military service, as
many did in the exciting days of the OSS. At any rate, Winks believes that
the Ivy League has lost its predominance in the intelligence services to
West Point, the University of Southern California, and several Catholic
institutions. And he offers the piquant observation that Ivy schools, having
1989 BOOK REVIEWS 147
"democratised" their recruitment, were no longer so clearly the strongholds

of the "well-connected."
The increasing estrangement between large segments of the academic
world and American intelligence has been expensive for both sides. Southeast
Asian studies are "dead" in American universities, according to Winks,
because federal funding for these programs was cut off in the face of bitter
antagonism toward American foreign policy generated by scholars who had
for years been receiving generous support from the federal government.
In summary, this engagingly written volume about a neglected but fas
cinating subject, full of remarkable characters, wise asides, and provocative
judgments, should be intriguing reading for a wide academic audience.
St. Joseph's University Anthony James Joes
Tippecanoe and Trinkets Too: The Material Culture of American Presidential

Campaigns, 1828-1984. By Roger A. Fischer. (Urbana and Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1988. x, 322p. Illustrations, sources, index.
$34.95.)
Roger Fischer's Tippecanoe and Trinkets Too is both welcome and disap
pointing: welcome because it provides illustrations of a large corpus of
presidential campaign material held by American museums and collectors,
and disappointing because it does not get much beyond a descriptive re
cording of the pieces discussed, nor much beyond a conventional academic
interpretation of the campaigns considered. Fischer's preface notes that his
volume was "motivated by a desire to assist two disparate groups: the
curators, antiquarians, and collectors who gather and preserve the physical
relics of past American presidential campaigns and the academic historians
who create the scholarly interpretations of those quadrennial contests" (p.
vii). The first group, he notes, "often appear to be at best only dimly aware
of the historical context ... of the objects they treasure." "Political his
torians, on the other hand, have traditionally limited their scholarly inquiries
to the recorded verbiage of this or that election." Fischer's aim is to aid
both groups in broadening their vision in relation to this important and
neglected class of materials.
Unfortunately, Fischer does not entirely succeed in his object. His account
of presidential campaign memorabilia is organized by eras: 1824-40, 1840
54, 1856-72, 1876-92, 1896-1916, 1920-48, 1952-72, and 1974-84. Each
chapter is profusely illustrated, usually with materials from the Division of
Political History of the Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of
American History (a division of which I was curator in the late 1950s and

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Review

Authors(s): Anthony James Joes

bear the responsibility for re-establishing the Continent's international struc

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign WILLIAM C. WlDENOR

Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961. By Robin W.

Robin W. Winks, Townsend Professor of History at Yale University and

"democratised" their recruitment, were no longer so clearly the strongholds

St. Joseph's University Anthony James Joes

Tippecanoe and Trinkets Too: The Material Culture of American Presidential

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