The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus

Author(s): John Rawls

Source: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring, 1987), pp. 1-25
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/764257
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 THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUSt
JOHN RAWLS*

The aims of politicalphilosophydepend on the societyit addresses.In a

constitutional democracyone of its mostimportant aims is presenting a political
conceptionof justice that can not only providea sharedpublic basis forthe
justification of politicaland socialinstitutions but also helpsensurestability from
one generationto the next.Now a basis of justification that restson self-or
group-interests alonecannotbe stable;sucha basis mustbe, I think,evenwhen
moderatedby skilfulconstitutional design,a meremodusvivendi,dependent on a
fortuitous of
conjunction contingencies. What is needed is a regulativepolitical
conception ofjusticethatcan articulate and orderin a principledwaythepolitical
ideals and values of a democraticregime,therebyspecifying the aims the
constitution is to achieveand thelimitsit mustrespect.In addition,thispolitical
conceptionneedsto be suchthatthereis somehopeofits gainingthesupportof
an overlappingconsensus,that is, a consensusin whichit is affirmed by the
opposing religious,philosophical and moral doctrines likely to thrive over
generations in a more or lessjust constitutional
democracy, where the criterionof
justice is that politicalconception itself.
In thefirstpartofmydiscussion(Secs I-II) I reviewthreefeatures ofa political
conception ofjusticeand notewhya conceptionwiththesefeatures is appropriate
giventhehistoricaland socialconditionsof a modemdemocratic society,and in
particular, theconditionI shallreferto as thefactofpluralism. The secondpart
(Secs III-VII) takesup fourillustrative-butI thinkmisplaced--objections we
are likelyto haveto theidea ofan overlapping consensus,and to itscorollary that
social unityin a democracycannotreston a sharedconceptionof themeaning,

tThis essay is a considerablerevisionof a lecturegivenat Oxfordin May as the Hart Lecturein

Jurisprudence and Moral Philosophyfor1986 underthetitle'PoliticalPhilosophyin a Democratic
Society'.The titlehas been changedto give a morespecificidea of thelecture'scontents.It was a
privilegeforme to be able to give thislecturein honourof Professor 1H.L. A. Hart fromwhomI
havelearnedso much,bothfromhis workand his example,sincetheFall of 1952whenin OxfordI
was firstso fortunateas to be exposedto them.I shouldlike to thanktheMasterand Fellowsof
University Collegeforinvitingme to give thelectureand forthegeneroushospitality theyshowed
me duringmystayin Oxford.I am gratefulto Derek Parfitfora numberofvaluable
suggestions
priorto the lecture,and fordiscussionafterwards I shouldlike to thankRonald Dworkin,Allan
Gibbard and Paul Seabright,and ProfessorHart himself.Partsof the lecturewere also givenin
Aprilat theUniversity ofSt. Andrewsas theKnox MemorialLecture,afterwhichI receivedhighly
instructivewrittencommentsfromJohnHaldane, and at BedfordCollege,London
University.
Followingmy returnto the United States I benefitedfromnumerousvaluable suggestionsand
criticismsfromJoshuaCohen,Thomas Nagel,David Sachs and T. M. Scanlon.BurtonDrebenhas
beenofverygreathelpfromthebeginning.
*ProfessorofPhilosophy, HarvardUniversity.

I
@ Oxford University Press 1987 OxfordJournal of Legal Studies Vol. 7No. I

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2 THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS

value and purposeof humanlife.This corollarydoes not imply,as one might

think,thattherefore social unitymustrestsolelyon a convergence of self-and
group-interests,or on thefortunate outcomeof politicalbargaining. It allowsfor
the possibilityof stablesocial unitysecuredby an overlapping consensuson a
reasonablepoliticalconceptionofjustice.It is thisconception ofsocialunityfora
democratic societyI wantto explainanddefend.
By way of background,several comments.When Hobbes addressedthe
contentious divisionsof his daybetweenreligioussects,andbetweentheCrown,
and
aristocracy middle-classes, the basis of his appeal was self-interest: men's
fearofdeathand theirdesireforthemeansofa commodious life.On thisbasishe
soughtto justifyobedienceto an existingeffective (even if need be absolute)
sovereign. Hobbes did not think this form of psychological egoismwas true;but
he thoughtit was accurateenoughforhis purposes.The assumptionwas a
politicalone,adoptedto givehis viewspracticaleffect. In a societyfragmented by
sectariandivisionsand warringinterests, he saw no othercommonfootholdfor
politicalargument.
How far Hobbes's perceptionof the situationwas accuratewe need not
consider,forin our case mattersare different. We are thebeneficiaries of three
centuriesof democraticthoughtand developingconstitutional practice;and we
can presumenotonlysomepublicunderstanding of,but also someallegianceto,
democraticideals and values as realizedin existingpoliticalinstitutions. This
opens the way to elaboratethe idea of an overlapping consensuson a political
conception ofjustice:sucha consensus,as we shallsee,is moralbothin itsobject
andgrounds,and so is distinctfroma consensus,inevitably fragile,foundedsolely
on self-or group-interest,evenwhenorderedby a well-framed constitution.' The
idea of an overlapping consensusenablesus to understand how a constitutional
regimecharacterized by the factof pluralismmight,despiteits deep divisions,
achievestability and socialunitybythepublicrecognition ofa reasonablepolitical
of
conception justice.

The thesisof the firstpart of my discussionis thatthe historicaland social

conditionsof a moderndemocraticsocietyrequireus to regarda conceptionof
justiceforits politicalinstitutions in a certainway.Or rather,theyrequireus to
do so, ifsucha conception is to be bothpracticableandconsistentwiththelimits
I OccasionallyI referto theHobbesianstrandin liberalism, by whichI meantheidea thatordered
libertyis best achieved by skilfulconstitutionaldesign framedto guide self-(family-)and
group-interests to workforsocialpurposesbytheuse ofvariousdevicessuchas balanceofpowers
and thelike; it can be foundin Montesquieu'sSpiritofLaws (1748), Hume's essay'That Politics
may be reducedto a Science'(1741), in Madison'sFederalist,Number1o (1788), and in Kant's
'PerpetualPeace' (1796). This strandbecomespurelyHobbesianto the extentthatit sees self-
(family-)and group-interests as the only available, or the only politicallyrelevant,kind of
motivation;ofcourse,Montesquieu,Hume,Madisonand Kantdid notholdthisview.

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 JOHN RAWLS 3
ofdemocratic politics.Whattheseconditionsare,andhowtheyaffect thefeatures
of a practicableconception, I notein connection withthreefeaturesof a political
conceptionofjustice,two of whichI now describe,leavingthethirdforthenext
section.
The firstfeatureof a politicalconceptionof justice is that,while such a
conceptionis, of course,a moralconception, it is a moralconceptionworkedout
for a specifickind of subject, namely,for political,social and economic
institutions.2In particular, it is workedoutto applyto whatwe maycallthe'basic
structure'of a modernconstitutional democracy.(I shall use 'constitutional
democracy',and 'democraticregime',and similarphrasesinterchangeably.) By
thisstructure I meana society'smainpolitical,social and economicinstitutions,
and how theyfittogether intoone unifiedschemeofsocialcooperation. The focus
of a politicalconceptionofjusticeis theframework of basic institutionsand the
principles, standardsand preceptsthatapplyto them,as wellas how thosenorms
areexpressedin thecharacterand attitudesofthemembersofsocietywhorealize
its ideals. One mightsuppose that this firstfeatureis alreadyimpliedby the
meaningof a politicalconceptionofjustice:forifa conceptiondoes notapplyto
thebasic structure of society,it wouldnotbe a politicalconceptionat all. But I
meanmorethanthis,forI thinkofa politicalconception ofjusticeas a conception
framedin thefirstinstance3 solelyforthe special case ofthe basic structure.
The secondfeaturecomplements the first:a politicalconceptionis not to be
understoodas a generaland comprehensive moralconceptionthatappliesto the
politicalorder, as if this order was only another subject,anotherkindof case,
fallingunder that conception.4 Thus, a politicalconceptionofjusticeis different
frommanyfamiliarmoraldoctrines, fortheseare widelyunderstoodas general
and comprehensive views. Perfectionism and utilitarianism are clear examples,
sincethe principlesof perfection and utilityare thoughtto applyto all kindsof
subjectsrangingfromthe conductof individualsand personalrelationsto the
2 In sayingthat a conceptionis moral I mean,amongotherthings,that its contentis givenby
certainideals,principlesand standards;and thatthesenormsarticulatecertainvalues,in thiscase
politicalvalues.
3 The phrase'in thefirstinstance'indicatesthatwe are to focusfirston thebasic structure. Should
we finda reasonablysatisfactoryconceptionofjusticeforthiscase, we can thentryto extendit to
further cases, ofwhichone ofthemostimportant is therelationsbetweenstatesand thesystemof
cooperationbetweenthem.I acceptKant's view in 'PerpetualPeace' thata worldstatewouldbe
eitheran oppressiveautocracy,or continuallydisturbedby open or latentcivil wars between
regionsand peoples.Hence we wouldlookforprinciplesto regulatea confederation ofstatesand
to specifythe powersof its severalmembers.We also need to clarifyhow theprinciples ofjustice
applyto associationswithinthestate.On this,see theremarksin 'The Basic Structureas Subject',
Secs II and IX, in Valuesand Morals,eds A. I. Goldmanand JaegwonKim (Reidel,1978).
4 I thinkofa moralconceptionas generalwhenit appliesto a widerangeofsubjectsofappraisal(in
thelimitof all subjectsuniversally),
and as comprehensive whenit includesconceptionsofwhatis
of value in humanlife,ideals of personalvirtueand character,and the like,thatare to inform
much of our conduct(in the limitof our life as a whole). Many religiousand philosophical
doctrinestendto be generaland fullycomprehensive. See also footnote23 on p 14.

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4 THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS

organization ofsocietyas a whole,andevento thelaw ofnations.Theircontentas

politicaldoctrines is specifiedby theirapplicationto politicalinstitutions and
questionsof social policy.Idealismand Marxismin theirvariousformsare also
generaland comprehensive. By contrast, a politicalconceptionofjusticeinvolves,
so faras possible,no priorcommitment to anywiderdoctrine.It looksinitiallyto
thebasicstructure andtriesto elaboratea reasonableconception forthatstructure
alone.
Now one reasonforfocusingdirectlyon a politicalconceptionforthe basic
structureis that,as a practicalpoliticalmatter,no generaland comprehensive
viewcan providea publiclyacceptablebasis fora politicalconceptionofjustice.5
The social and historicalconditionsof moderndemocraticregimeshave their
originsin the Wars of Religionfollowingthe Reformation and the subsequent
development of the principleof toleration,and in the growthof constitutional
governmentand of large industrialmarket economies. These conditions
profoundly affectthe requirements of a workableconceptionof justice: among
other things,such a conceptionmust allow for a diversityof generaland
comprehensivedoctrines,and for the pluralityof conflicting, and indeed
incommensurable, conceptionsof the meaning,value and purposeof humanlife
(or whatI shallcall forshort'conceptions ofthegood') affirmed bythecitizensof
democratic societies.6
This diversityof doctrines-thefactof pluralism--isnot a merehistorical
conditionthatwill soon pass away; it is, I believe,a permanent featureof the
public culture of modern democracies. Under the politicaland social conditions
securedbythebasic rightsand liberties associated
historically with these regimes,
the diversityof views will persistand may increase.A public and workable
agreement on a singlegeneraland comprehensive conception couldbe maintained
onlyby the oppressive use of statepower.' Since we are concernedwithsecuring

5 By a publiclyacceptablebasis I meana basis thatincludesideals,principlesand standardsthatall

membersof societycan not onlyaffirm but also mutuallyrecognizebeforeone another.A public
basis involves,then, the public recognitionof certain principlesas regulativeof political
institutions,and as expressingpoliticalvaluesthattheconstitution is to be framedto realize.
6 It is a disputedquestionwhetherand in whatsenseconceptions ofthegood areincommensurable.
For our purposeshere,incommensurability is to be understoodas a politicalfact,an aspectofthe
factof pluralism:namely,the factthatthereis no availablepoliticalunderstanding as to how to
commensurate theseconceptionsforsettling questionsofpoliticaljustice.
7 For convenience,I give a fullerlist of these social and historicalconditions,beginningwiththe
threealreadymentionedabove: (i) the fact of pluralism;(2) the fact of the permanenceof
pluralism,givendemocraticinstitutions; (3) the factthatagreementon a singlecomprehensive
doctrinepresupposestheoppressiveuse ofstatepower.Four additionalones are: (4) thefactthat
an enduringand stabledemocraticregime,one not dividedintocontending factionsand hostile
classes,mustbe willinglyand freelysupportedby a substantialmajority of at least its politically
activecitizens;(5) the factthata comprehensive doctrine,wheneverwidely,if not universally,
sharedin society,tendsto becomeoppressiveand stifling; (6) thefactthatreasonablyfavourable
conditions(administrative, economic,technological and thelike),whichmakedemocracypossible,
exist; and finally,
(7) the factthatthe politicalcultureof a societywitha democratictradition

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 JOHN RAWLS 5
the stabilityof a constitutional regime,and wish to achievefreeand willing
agreementon a politicalconceptionof justice that establishesat least the
constitutionalessentials,we mustfindanotherbasis of agreement thanthatof a
generaland comprehensive doctrine.8Andso, as thisalternative
basis,we lookfor
a politicalconceptionof justice that mightbe supportedby an overlapping
consensus.
We do not,of course,assumethatan overlapping consensusis alwayspossible,
given the doctrinescurrently existingin any democraticsociety.It is often
obviousthatit is not,not at leastuntilfirmly
heldbeliefschangein fundamental
ways.' But the point of the idea of an overlappingconsensuson a political
conceptionis to show how, despitea diversityof doctrines,convergence on a
politicalconceptionof justice may be achievedand social unitysustainedin
long-run thatis,overtimefromone generation
equilibrium, to thenext.

II

So farI havenotedtwofeatures ofa politicalconceptionofjustice:first,

thatit is
expressly framedto apply to thebasic structureof society:and second,that it is
notto be seenas derivedfromanygeneralandcomprehensive doctrine.
Perhapsthe consequencesof thesefeaturesare clear.Yet it maybe usefulto
surveythem.For whileno one any longersupposesthata practicablepolitical
conceptionfor a constitutional regimecan rest on a shareddevotionto the
Catholicor the ProtestantFaith,or to any otherreligiousview,it may stillbe
thoughtthatgeneraland comprehensive philosophicaland moraldoctrines might
servein thisrole.The secondfeature deniesthisnotonlyforHegel'sidealismand
Marxism,and forteleological moralviews,as I have said,butalso formanyforms
of liberalismas well. While I believethat in fact any workableconceptionof
politicaljusticefora democraticregimemustindeedbe in an appropriatesense
liberal-I come back to this question later-its liberalismwill not be the
liberalism ofKant orofJ.S. Mill,to taketwoprominent examples.
Considerwhy:thepublicroleof a mutually recognizedpoliticalconceptionof
justiceis to specifya pointofviewfromwhichall citizenscan examinebeforeone

implicitly containscertainfundamental intuitiveideas fromwhich it is possibleto work up a

politicalconceptionofjusticesuitablefora constitutional regime.(This last is importantwhenwe
characterizea politicalconceptionofjusticein thenextsection.)We maythinkof thefirstsix of
thesesevenconditionsas knownby commonsense,thatis, as knownfromour sharedhistoryand
theevidentfeaturesand aspectsofour politicalcultureand presentcircumstances. They belongto
what we mightreferto as the commonsense politicalsociologyof democraticsocieties.When
elaboratinga politicalconceptionofjustice,we mustbear in mindthatit mustbe workableand
practicablein a societyin whichthefirstsix conditionsobtain.
8 Here I assume that free and willing agreementis agreementendorsedby our considered
convictionson due reflection, or in what I have elsewherecalled 'reflective equilibrium'.See A
TheoryofJustice,pp 19ff, 48ff.
9 Ilow thesebeliefsmightchangeis discussedlaterin Secs VI-VII.

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6 THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS

anotherwhetheror nottheirpoliticalinstitutions arejust. It enablesthemto do

thisby citingwhat are recognizedamongthemas valid and sufficient reasons
singled out by that conceptionitself.'oQuestions politicaljustice can be
of
discussedon thesamebasis by all citizens,whatever theirsocialposition,ormore
particular aims and interests,or theirreligious,philosophicalor moralviews.
Justificationin matters of justiceis addressedto otherswhodisagreewith
political
us, and therefore it proceeds from some consensus:frompremisesthatwe and
othersrecognizeas true,or as reasonableforthepurposeof reachinga working
agreement on thefundamentals ofpoliticaljustice.Giventhefactofpluralism, and
given that justificationbegins from some consensus, no general and
comprehensive doctrinecan assume the role of a publiclyacceptablebasis of
political
justice.
Fromthisconclusionit is clearwhatis problematic withtheliberalisms ofKant
and Mill. They are bothgeneraland comprehensive moraldoctrines:generalin
that theyapply to a wide rangeof subjects,and comprehensive in that they
includeconceptions ofwhatis ofvaluein humanlife,idealsofpersonalvirtueand
characterthatare to inform our thoughtand conductas a whole.Here I have in
mind Kant's ideal of autonomyand his connectingit with the values of the
Enlightenment, and Mill's ideal of individuality and his connecting it withthe
valuesof modernity. These two liberalisms both comprehend far more thanthe
political."Their doctrinesof freeinstitutions rest in large part on ideals and
values that are not generally, or perhaps even widely, shared in a democratic
society.They arenota practicable publicbasis ofa politicalconception ofjustice,
and I suspectthesameis trueofmanyliberalisms besides those ofKant and Mill.
Thus we cometo a thirdfeatureofa politicalconception ofjustice,namely, it is
notformulated in termsofa generaland comprehensive religious,philosophical or
moraldoctrine butratherintermsofcertainfundamental intuitive ideasviewedas
latentin thepublicpoliticalcultureof a democratic society.These ideas are used
to articulateand orderin a principledway its basic politicalvalues.We assume
thatin anysuchsocietythereexistsa tradition ofdemocratic thought, thecontent
of which is at least intuitively familiarto citizensgenerally.Society'smain
institutions,together withtheacceptedformsoftheirinterpretation, are seenas a
fundofimplicitly sharedfundamental ideas and principles. We supposethatthese
ideas and principles can be elaboratedintoa politicalconception ofjustice,which
we hopecan gainthesupportofan overlapping consensus. Of course,thatthiscan
be donecan be verified a
onlybyactuallyelaborating politicalconception ofjustice
Io I suppose thesereasonsto be specifiedby the ideals,principlesand standardsof the mutually
acknowledged politicalconception, whichis, as notedearlier,a moralconception.Thus political
institutions are not thoughtof as justifiedto all citizenssimplyin termsof a happyconvergence
of self-or group-interest, and the like. This conceptionofjustification is in contrastwiththe
Hobbesian strandin the traditionof liberalthought;it is foundin Rousseau's Social Contract
(1762) and playsa centralrolein Hegel'sPhilosophyofRight(I82z).
ix For Kant again see 'What is Enlightenment?' and forMill see especially'On Liberty'(1859), Ch
III, pars i-9.

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 JOHN RAWLS 7
and exhibiting the way in whichit could be thussupported.It's also likelythat
morethanone politicalconceptionmaybe workedup fromthefundof shared
politicalideas; indeed,this is desirable,as these rival conceptionswill then
competeforcitizens'allegianceand be graduallymodifiedand deepenedby the
contestbetweenthem.
Here I cannot,ofcourse,evensketchthedevelopment ofa politicalconception.
But in orderto conveywhat is meant,I mightsay thatthe conceptionI have
elsewherecalled'justiceas fairness'is a politicalconceptionofthiskind.12It can
be seenas starting withthefundamental intuitiveidea ofpoliticalsocietyas a fair
system of social cooperationbetween regardedas freeand equal persons,
citizens
and as bornintothe societyin whichtheyare assumedto lead a completelife.
Citizensare further describedas havingcertainmoralpowersthatwouldenable
themto takepartin socialcooperation. The problemofjusticeis thenunderstood
as that of specifying the fairtermsof social cooperationbetweencitizensso
conceived.The conjectureis thatby workingout such ideas, whichI view as
implicitin the public politicalculture,we can in due coursearriveat widely
acceptableprinciples ofpoliticaljustice."
The detailsarenotimportant here.Whatis important is that,so faras possible,
these fundamental intuitiveideas are not takenforreligious,philosophicalor
metaphysical ideas. For example,whenit is said thatcitizensareregardedas free
and equal persons,theirfreedomand equalityare to be understoodin ways
congenialto thepublicpoliticalcultureand explicablein termsofthedesignand
requirements ofitsbasic institutions. The conception ofcitizensas freeandequal
a
is, therefore,politicalconception, the content ofwhich is specified in connection
withsuch thingsas the basic rightsand libertiesof democraticcitizens."'The
12 For thefullestdiscussion,see A TheoryofJustice(197I). I have discussedjusticeas fairnessas a
politicalconceptionin 'Justiceas Fairness: Politicalnot Metaphysical',Philosophyand Putblic
Affairs,Summer 1985. Ronald I)workin's liberalconceptionof equalityis, I think,another
exampleof a politicalconceptionofjustice.See his A MatterofPrinciple(Cambridge,Harvard
University Press,1986),theessaysin PartThreeon liberalismandjustice.
I3
These principleswillexpressand give certainweightsto familiarpoliticalvalues such as liberty
and equality,fairequalityof opportunity, and the efficient
designof institutions to servethe
commongood, and the like. But we can arriveat a politicalconceptionof justice in a very
different way, namely,by balancingthese competingvalues directlyagainstone anotherand
eventuallyadjustingthemto one anotherin the lightof theoverallbalance,or pattern, ofvalues
thatseemns best to us. A procedureof thiskindis suggestedby Sir Isaiah Berlin;see forexample
his essay 'Equality',in Conceptsand Categories(Oxford,i980), p ioo. The advantageof starting
withthefundamental intuitiveidea of societyas a fairsystemof social cooperationmaybe that
we do not simplybalancevaluesdirectlyin thelightofan overallpattern, but see how thevalues
and theirweightsare arrivedat in theway theyare specifiedbythedeliberations ofthepartiesin
the originalposition.Here I referto the detailsof how justice as fairnessis workedout. The
thoughthereis thatthesedetailsprovidea clearerconceptionofhow weightsmaybe determined
thanthe idea of balancingin thelightof an overallpattern.But perhapsthe idea of societyas a
fairsystemof social cooperationmightitselfbe regardedas sucha pattern, in whichcase thetwo
procedurescouldcoincide.
14 On this,see 'PoliticalnotMetaphysical',Sec V.

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8 THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS

hope is thattheconception ofjusticeto whichthisconception of citizensbelongs

willbe acceptableto a widerangeofcomprehensive doctrines andhencesupported
byanoverlapping consensus.
But,as I have indicatedand shouldemphasize,successin achievingconsensus
requiresthatpoliticalphilosophytryto be, so faras possible,independent and
autonomousfrom other parts of philosophy,especiallyfrom philosophy's
long-standing problemsand controversies. For giventhe aim of consensus,to
proceedotherwise wouldbe self-defeating. But as we shallsee (in Sec IV) we may
notbe ableto do thisentirely whenwe attempt to answertheobjectionthatclaims
that aiming for consensus implies scepticismor indifference to religious,
philosophical ormoraltruth.Nevertheless, thereasonforavoidingdeeperquestions
remains.For as I havesaid above,we can presenta politicalvieweitherbystarting
explicitlyfromwithina generaland comprehensive doctrine, or we can startfrom
fundamental intuitive ideasregardedas latentin thepublicpoliticalculture.These
two waysof proceedingare verydifferent, and thisdifference is significanteven
though we may sometimes be forced to assert certain aspects of our own
comprehensive doctrine. So while we may not be able to avoid comprehensive
doctrinesentirely, we do what we can to reducerelyingon theirmorespecific
details,or theirmoredisputedfeatures. The questionis: whatis theleastthatmust
be asserted;andifitmustbe asserted, whatis itsleastcontroversial form?
Finally,connected witha of
politicalconception justice is an essential companion
conceptionof freepublicreason.This conceptioninvolvesvariouselements.A
crucialone is this:just as a politicalconception ofjusticeneedscertainprinciples of
justiceforthebasicstructure tospecify itscontent, italsoneedscertainguidelines of
enquiryand publiclyrecognizedrules of assessing evidence to govern its
application.Otherwise,thereis no agreedway fordetermining whetherthose
principles are satisfied, andforsettling whattheyrequireofparticular institutions,
or in particular situations. Agreement on a conception ofjusticeis worthless-not
an effective agreement at all-without agreement on thesefurther matters.And
giventhefactofpluralism, thereis,I think, no betterpracticable alternativethanto
limitourselvesto the sharedmethodsof,and the publicknowledgeavailableto,
commonsense,and theprocedures and conclusionsofsciencewhenthesearenot
controversial. It is thesesharedmethodsandthiscommonknowledge thatallowsus
to speakofpublicreason.'"As I shallstresslateron,theacceptanceofthislimitis
not motivatedby scepticismor indifference to the claims of comprehensive
doctrines;rather, it springsfromthefactofpluralism, forthisfactmeansthatin a
pluralistsociety free publicreason can be effectively established innootherway.'6

15 For a fullerdiscussion,see A TheoryofJustice,Sec 34, and 'Kantian Constructivism', Lect II,

PP 535-543.
I6 Two otherelementsof theidea offreepublicreasoninjusticeas fairnessare these:thefirstis a
publiclyrecognizedconceptionof everyone's(rational)advantage,or good, to be used as an
agreedbasis ofinterpersonal comparisonsin mattersofpoliticaljustice.This leads to an account

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 JOHN RAWLS 9
III

I nowturnto thesecondpartofmydiscussion (Secs III-VII) andtakeup four

objections likely to be raised againstthe idea of socialunityfounded on an
overlapping consensus on a political of
conceptionjustice. These objectionsI want
torebut, fortheycanprevent ouraccepting whatI believeis themostreasonable
basis of socialunityavailableto us. I beginwithperhapsthemostobvious
objection,namely, thatan overlapping consensus is a meremodusvivendi. But
several
first explanatory comments.
EarlierI notedwhatitmeansto saythata conception ofjusticeis supported by
an overlapping consensus.It meansthatitis supported bya consensus including
theopposingreligious, philosophical and moraldoctrines likelyto thriveover
inthe
generations society effectivelyregulatedbythat of
conceptionjustice. These
opposing doctrines we assumetoinvolve conflictingandindeedincommensurable
comprehensive conceptions ofthemeaning, valueandpurpose ofhumanlife(or
conceptions of thegood), and thereare no resourceswithin the viewto
political
judge those conflictingconceptions. are
They equallypermissible provided they
respectthelimitsimposed bytheprinciples ofpoliticaljustice.Yetdespitethefact
thatthereareopposing comprehensive conceptions affirmedinsociety, thereis no
as tohowan overlapping
difficulty consensus mayexist.Sincedifferent premises
mayleadto thesameconclusions, we simply supposethattheessential elements
ofthepolitical conception, itsprinciples,
standards andideals,aretheorems, as it
were,at whichthe comprehensive doctrines in the consensusintersect or
converge.
To fixideasI shalluse a modelcase ofan overlapping consensus to indicate
whatis meant;andI shallreturn to thisexample from timeto time.It contains
threeviews: one view affirms the politicalconception becauseits religious
doctrineandaccount offaithleadto a principleoftoleration andunderwrite the
fundamental of a constitutional
liberties regime; the second view affirms the
political
conception onthe basisofa comprehensive liberal moral doctrinesuch as
thoseofKantandMill;whilethethirdsupports thepolitical conception not as
foundedon anywiderdoctrine butrather as initself
sufficienttoexpresspolitical
valuesthat,underthereasonably favourable conditions thatmakea moreorless
justconstitutional
democracy possible,normally outweigh whatever othervalues
mayopposethem.Observeaboutthisexample thatonlythefirst twoviews-the
religiousdoctrineand the liberalismof Kant or Mill-are generaland
comprehensive. The political
conception ofjusticeitselfis not;although it does
holdthatunderreasonably favourable it is
conditions, normally adequatefor
of primarygoods. See 'Social Unityand PrimaryGoods', in A. K. Sen and B. Williams,eds,
Utilitarianismand Beyond(CambridgeUniversityPress, 1982),Secs I-V. The secondfurther
elementis the idea of publicity,whichrequiresthatthe principlesof politicaljustice and their
(in theirown terms)be publiclyavailableto all citizens,alongwiththeknowledgeof
justification
whethertheirpoliticalinstitutionsare just or unjust.See 'Kantian Constructivism', Lect II,
PP 535-543.

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IO0 THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS

questionsofpoliticaljustice.Observealso thattheexampleassumesthatthetwo
comprehensive viewsagreewiththejudgmentsofthepoliticalconception in this
respect.
To begin with the objection:some will thinkthat even if an overlapping
consensusshouldbe sufficiently stable,theidea of politicalunityfoundedon an
overlapping consensus must still
be sinceitabandonsthehopeofpolitical
rejected,
community and settlesinstead for a publicunderstanding thatis at bottoma mere
modusvivendi.To thisobjection,we say thatthehope of politicalcommunity
mustindeedbe abandoned,ifby such a community we mean a politicalsociety
unitedin affirming a generaland comprehensive doctrine.This possibilityis
excludedby thefactofpluralismtogether withtherejection oftheoppressiveuse
ofstatepowerto overcomeit. I believethereis no practicable alternativesuperior
to the stablepoliticalunitysecuredby an overlapping consensuson a reasonable
politicalconceptionof justice. Hence the substantivequestionconcernsthe
significant featuresof such a consensusand how these featuresaffectsocial
concordand the moral qualityof public life. I turnto why an overlapping
consensusis nota meremodusvivendi.'7
A typicaluse of thephrase'modusvivendi'is to characterize a treatybetween
two stateswhosenationalaims and interests put themat odds. In negotiating a
treatyeach statewould be wise and prudentto make sure thatthe agreement
proposedrepresents an equilibrium point:thatis,thatthetermsandconditions of
thetreatyare drawnup in such a way thatit is publicknowledgethatit is not
advantageousforeitherstate to violateit. The treatywill thenbe adheredto
because doing so is regardedby each as in its nationalinterest,includingits
interestin itsreputation as a statethathonourstreaties.Butingeneralbothstates
are readyto pursuetheirgoalsat theexpenseoftheother,and shouldconditions

17 Note that what is impracticableis not all values of community (recall that a communityis
understoodas an associationor societywhoseunityrestson a comprehensive conceptionof the
good) but onlypolitical community and its values. Justiceas fairnessassumes,as otherliberal
politicalviewsdo also, thatthevaluesofcommunity are notonlyessentialbut realizable,firstin
thevariousassociationsthatcarryon theirlifewithintheframework of thebasic structure,and
secondin thoseassociationsthatextendacrosstheboundariesofnation-states, suchas churches
and scientificsocieties.Liberalismrejectsthestateas a community because,amongotherthings,
it leads to the systematicdenial of basic libertiesand to the oppressiveuse of the state's
monopolyof (legal) force.I shouldadd that in the well-ordered societyof justice as fairness
citizenssharea commonaim,and one thathas highpriority: namely,theaim ofpoliticaljustice,
thatis, the aim of ensuringthatpoliticaland social institutionsarejust, and of givingjusticeto
personsgenerally, as whatcitizensneed forthemselvesand wantforone another.It is nottrue,
then,thaton a liberalview citizenshave no fundamental commonaims. Nor is it truethatthe
aim of politicaljusticeis not an important partof theiridentity (usingtheterm'identity', as is
now oftendone,to includethebasic aims and projectsbyreference to whichwe characterize the
kindof personwe verymuchwantto be). But thiscommonaim of politicaljusticemustnotbe
mistakenfor(whatI havecalled)a conceptionofthegood. For a discussionofthislastpoint,see
AmyGutmann,'Communitarian Criticsof Liberalism',Philosophyand PublicAffairs, Summer
1985,P 3' I, footnote14.

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 JOHN RAWLS II

changetheymaydo so. This background highlights thewayin whicha treatyis a

meremodusvivendi.A similarbackgroundis presentwhenwe thinkof social
consensusfoundedon self-or group-interests, or on the outcomeof political
bargaining: social is
unity only apparent its stabilityis contingenton
as
circumstancesremainingsuch as not to upset the fortunateconvergenceof
interests.
Now, thatan overlapping consensusis quitedifferent froma modusvivendiis
clearfromour modelcase. In thatexample,notetwo aspects:first,theobjectof
consensus,the politicalconceptionof justice,is itselfa moralconception.And
second,it is affirmed on moralgrounds,thatis, it includesconceptions of society
and of citizensas persons,as well as principles ofjustice,and an accountof the
cooperativevirtuesthroughwhich those principlesare embodiedin human
character and expressedin publiclife.An overlapping consensus,therefore, is not
merelya consensuson acceptingcertainauthorities, or on complying withcertain
institutionalarrangements, foundedon a convergence of self-or group-interests.
Allthreeviewsin theexampleaffirm thepoliticalconception:as I have said,each
recognizesitsconcepts,principles and virtuesas thesharedcontentat whichtheir
severalviews coincide.The factthatthosewho affirm the politicalconception
startfromwithintheirown comprehensive view,and hencebeginfromdifferent
premisesand grounds,does not make their affirmation any less religious,
philosophical or moral,as thecase maybe.
The precedingtwo aspects(moralobjectand moralgrounds)ofan overlapping
consensusconnectwitha thirdaspect,thatof stability:thatis, thosewhoaffirm
the variousviews supportingthe politicalconceptionwill not withdrawtheir
supportof it shouldthe relativestrength of theirview in societyincreaseand
eventually become dominant. So long as the threeviews are affirmed and not
the
revised, politicalconception will stillbe supportedregardless of shiftsin the
distribution of politicalpower.We mightsay: each view supportsthe political
conceptionforits own sake,or on its own merits;and thetestforthisis whether
theconsensusis stablewithrespectto changesin thedistribution ofpoweramong
views.This featureofstability highlights a basic contrastbetween an overlapping
consensus and a modus vivendi, the stabilityof which does depend on
happenstance and a balanceofrelativeforces.
This becomes clear once we changeour exampleand includethe views of
Catholics and Protestantsin the sixteenthcentury.We no longerhave an
overlapping consensuson theprincipleoftoleration. At thattimebothfaithsheld
thatit was the dutyof the rulerto upholdthe truereligionand to repressthe
spreadofheresyand falsedoctrine.In thiscase theacceptanceof theprinciple of
tolerationwouldindeedbe a meremodusvivendi,becauseifeitherfaithbecomes
dominant,the principleof tolerationwill no longerbe followed.Stabilitywith
respectto the distribution of powerno longerholds. So long as views held by
Catholicsand Protestants in thesixteenth centuryare verymuchin theminority,
and are likelyto remainso, theydo not significantly affectthemoralqualityof

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 12 THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS

publiclifeand the basis of social concord.For the vast majorityin societyare

confident thatthedistribution of powerwillrangeoverand be widelysharedby
viewsin theconsensusthataffirm the politicalconceptionofjusticeforits own
sake.But shouldthissituationchange,themoralqualityof politicallifewillalso
changein waysI assumeto be obviousandto requireno comment.
The precedingremarkspromptus to ask whichfamiliarconceptions ofjustice
can belongto a consensusstablewithrespectto the distribution of power.It
seems that while some teleologicalconceptionscan so belong,othersquite
possiblycannot,forexample,utilitarianism."s Or at leastthisseemsto be thecase
unless certainassumptionsare made limitingthe contentof citizens'desires,
preferences, or interests."Otherwisethereappears to be no assurancethat
restrictingor suppressingthebasic libertiesof somemaynotbe thebestwayto
maximizethetotal(or average)socialwelfare.Since utilitarianism in its various
formsis a historicallyprominentand continuingpart of the traditionof
democraticthought,we may hope thereare ways of construingor revising
utilitarian
doctrineso thatit can supporta conception ofjusticeappropriate fora
constitutional regime,even if it can do so onlyindirectly2oas a meansto the
greatestwelfare.Insofaras utilitarianism is likelyto persistin a well-ordered
the
society, overlapping consensus is in thatcase allthemorestableandsecure.

IV
I turnto the second objectionto the idea of an overlappingconsensuson a
political conceptionof justice: namely,that the avoidance of general and
comprehensive doctrinesimplies indifference or scepticismas to whethera
of
politicalconception justice is true.
This avoidance mayappearto suggestthat
sucha conceptionmightbe themostreasonableoneforus evenwhenit is known
notto be true,as iftruthweresimplybesidethepoint.In reply,it wouldbe fatal
to thepointofa politicalconceptionto see it as scepticalabout,or indifferent
to,
truth,muchless as in conflictwithit. Such scepticism or indifferencewouldput
politicalphilosophyin conflict
withnumerouscomprehensive doctrines,and thus
defeatfromtheoutsetits aimofachievingan overlapping consensus.In following
themethodof avoidance,as we maycall it, we try,so faras we can,neitherto
18 Here I meantheviewof Bentham,Edgeworthand Sidgwick,and of suchcontemporary writers
as R. B. Brandtin A Theoryof the Good and theRight(Oxford,1979), R. M. Hare in Moral
Thinking(Oxford,198i), and J. J. C. Smartin Utilitarianism:For and Against(Cambridge,
1973).
19 Desires, preferencesand interestsare not the same but have distinctfeatures;and these
differences playan important
partin different versionsofutilitarianismespousedby thewriters
mentionedin the previousfootnote.I believe,however,thatthegeneralpointin thetextholds
againstall theseversions.
20 The adverb'indirectly' so-called.For a clearaccountof J.S.
hererefersto indirectutilitarianism
thisdoctrine,see JohnGray,Mill on Liberty:A Defence(London,
Mill's view as exemplifying
I983).

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 JOHN RAWLS 13

assertnorto denyanyreligious,philosophical or moralviews,or theirassociated

philosophicalaccountsof truthand the statusof values. Since we assumeeach
citizento affirm some such view or other,we hope to makeit possibleforall to
acceptthe politicalconceptionas true,or as reasonable,fromthe standpoint of
theirowncomprehensive view,whateveritmaybe.2'
Properlyunderstood, then,a politicalconceptionof justiceneed be no more
indifferent, say, to truthin moralsthan the principleof toleration,suitably
understood, needbe indifferent to truthin religion.We simplyapplytheprinciple
of tolerationto philosophyitself.In this way we hope to avoid philosophy's
long-standing controversies, amongthemcontroversies aboutthenatureoftruth
and thestatusof valuesas expressedby realismand subjectivism. Sincewe seek
an agreedbasis of publicjustification in mattersofjustice,and sinceno political
agreementon those disputedquestionscan reasonablybe expected,we turn
insteadto the fundamental intuitiveideas we seem to sharethroughthepublic
politicalculture. We try developfromthese ideas a politicalconceptionof
to
justicecongruent with our consideredconvictions on due reflection.Justas with
religion, citizens situated in thought and belief within their comprehensive
doctrines,regardthe politicalconceptionof justice as true,or as reasonable,
whatever thecase maybe.
Some maynotbe satisfied withthis:theymayreplythat,despitetheseprotests,
a politicalconception ofjusticemustexpressindifference or scepticism.Otherwise
it could not lay aside fundamental religious,philosophical and moral questions
because theyare politicallydifficult to settle,or may proveintractable. Certain
truths,it may be said, concernthingsso important thatdifferences about them
have to be foughtout,even shouldthismeancivilwar.To thiswe sayfirst, that
questionsare not removedfromthepoliticalagenda,so to speak,solelybecause
theyare a sourceof conflict. Rather,we appealto a politicalconceptionofjustice
to distinguish betweenthosequestionsthatcan be reasonablyremovedfromthe
politicalagenda and thosethatcannot,all the whileaimingforan overlapping
consensus.Some questionsstillon the agenda willbe controversial, at least to
somedegree;thisis normalwithpoliticalissues.

21 It is important
to see thattheview thatphilosophyin theclassicalsense as the searchfortruth
about a prior and independentmoral ordercannot providethe shared basis for a political
conceptionofjustice (assertedin 'Politicalnot Metaphysical',p 230) does not presupposethe
controversial
metaphysical claim thatthereis no such order.The above paragraphmakesclear
whyit does not.The reasonsI giveforthatviewarehistoricaland sociological,and havenothing
to do withmetaphysical doctrinesabout the statusofvalues.What I hold is thatwe mustdraw
theobviouslessonsof our politicalhistorysincetheReformation and the Wars ofReligion,and
the developmentof modernconstitutional democracies.As I say in Sec I above,it is no longer
reasonableto expectus to reachpoliticalagreement on a generaland comprehensive doctrineas
a way of reachingpoliticalagreementon constitutional essentials,unless,of course,we are
preparedto use theapparatusofthestateas an instrument ofoppression.If we arenotprepared
to do that,we must,as a practicalmatter,look forwhat I have called a politicalconceptionof
justice.

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14 THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS

To illustrate:fromwithina politicalconception ofjusticelet'ssupposewe can

accountbothforequal libertyofconscience, whichtakesthetruthsofreligionoff
thepoliticalagenda,and theequal politicaland civilliberties, whichbyrulingout
serfdom and slaverytakesthepossibility ofthoseinstitutions offtheagenda.22 But
controversialissuesinevitably remain:forexample,howmoreexactlyto drawthe
boundariesofthebasic liberties whentheyconflict (whereto set'thewallbetween
churchand state');how to interpret therequirements of distributive
justiceeven
whenthereis considerable on
agreement generalprinciples forthe basic structure;
and finally, of
questions policy such as theuse of nuclear weapons. These cannot
be removedfrompolitics.But by avoidingcomprehensive doctrineswe tryto
bypassreligionand philosophy'sprofoundest controversies so as to have some
hopeofuncovering a basis ofa stableoverlapping consensus.
Nevertheless in affirming a politicalconceptionofjustice we mayeventually
have to assertat least certainaspectsof our own comprehensive (by no means
necessarilyfully comprehensive)23 religiousor philosophicaldoctrine.This
happenswheneversomeoneinsists,forexample,thatcertainquestionsare so
fundamental that to ensuretheirbeing rightlysettledjustifiescivil strife.The
religioussalvationofthoseholdinga particular religion,or indeedthesalvationof
a whole people,may be said to dependon it. At this pointwe may have no
alternativebutto denythis,andto assertthekindofthingwe hadhopedto avoid.
Buttheaspectsofourviewthatwe assertshouldnotgo beyondwhatis necessary
forthepoliticalaimofconsensus.Thus,forexample,we mayassertin someform
thedoctrineof freereligiousfaiththatsupportsequal libertyof conscience;and
giventheexistenceof a just constitutional regime,we denythattheconcernfor
salvationrequiresanything incompatible withthatliberty. We do notstatemore
ofourcomprehensive viewthanwe thinkwouldadvancethequestforconsensus.
The reasonforthis restraintis to respect,as best we can, the limitsof free
publicreason (mentionedearlierat the end of Sec II). Let's supposethatby
respectingtheselimitswe succeedin reachingan overlappingconsensuson a
22 To explain:whencertainmattersare takenoffthepoliticalagenda,theyare no longerregarded
as propersubjectsforpoliticaldecisionby majorityor otherplurality voting.In regardto equal
libertyof conscienceand rejectionof slaveryand serfdom,this means that the equal basic
thatcoverthesemattersare takenas fixed,settledonce and forall.
libertiesin the constitution
They are part of the public charterof a constitutional regimeand not a suitabletopic for
on-goingpublicdebate and legislation,as if theycan be changedat any time,one way or the
other.Moreover,the moreestablishedpoliticalpartieslikewiseacknowledgethesemattersas
settled.Of course,thatcertainmattersare takenoffthe politicalagendadoes not meanthata
politicalconceptionofjustice shouldnot explainwhythis is done. Indeed,as I note above,a
politicalconceptionshoulddo preciselythis.For thinking ofbasic rightsand libertiesas taking
certainquestionsoffthepoliticalagendaI am indebtedto StephenHolmes.
23 I thinkof a doctrineas fullycomprehensiveifit coversall recognizedvaluesand virtueswithin
one ratherpreciselyarticulatedsystem;whereasa doctrineis onlypartiallycomprehensive when
it comprisesa numberof non-politicalvalues and virtuesand is ratherlooselyarticulated.This
limitedscope and loosenessturnsout to be importantwithregardto stabilityin Sec VI-VII
below.

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 JOHN RAWLS 15

conceptionof politicaljustice. Some mightsay that reachingthis reflective

agreement is itselfsufficient
groundsforregarding thatconceptionas true,or at
any rate highlyprobable. But we refrain from thisfurther step: it is unnecessary
and may interfere with the practicalaim of findingan agreedpublic basis of
The idea of an overlapping
justification. consensusleavesthisstepto be takenby
citizensindividually in accordancewith theirown generaland comprehensive
views.
In doing this a politicalconceptionof justice completesand extendsthe
movement of thoughtthatbeganthreecenturiesago withthegradualacceptance
oftheprinciple oftolerationandled to thenon-confessional stateand equalliberty
of conscience.This extensionis requiredfor an agreementon a political
conceptionofjusticegiventhehistoricaland socialcircumstances ofa democratic
society.In this way the fullautonomy of democratic citizens connects witha
of
conception politicalphilosophy as itselfautonomous and of
independent general
and comprehensivedoctrines.In applyingthe principlesof tolerationto
philosophyitselfit is leftto citizensindividually to resolveforthemselvesthe
of
questions religion,philosophy and morals in accordance withtheviews they
freelyaffirm.

A thirdobjectionis thefollowing: evenifwe grantthatan overlapping consensus

is nota modusvivendi,it maybe said thata workablepoliticalconception mustbe
generaland comprehensive. Withoutsucha doctrineon hand,thereis no way to
orderthe manyconflicts ofjusticethatarise in publiclife.The idea is thatthe
deepertheconceptualand philosophical bases of thoseconflicts,
themoregeneral
and comprehensive thelevelofphilosophical reflection
mustbe iftheirrootsareto
be laid bare and an appropriateorderingfound.It is useless, the objection
concludes,to tryto workout a politicalconceptionofjusticeexpresslyforthe
basic structure
apartfromanycomprehensive doctrine.
Andas we havejust seen,
we maybe forcedto refer, at leastin someway,to sucha view.24
This objectionis perfectlynatural:we are indeedtemptedto askhowelsecould
theseconflicting
claimsbe adjudicated.Yet partoftheansweris foundin thethird

24 It is essentialto distinguish
betweengeneraland comprehensive
viewsand viewswe thinkofas
abstract.Thus, whenjusticeas fairnessbeginsfromthefundamental intuitiveidea ofsocietyas a
fair systemof cooperationand proceedsto elaboratethat idea, the resultingconceptionof
politicaljusticemaybe said to be abstract.It is abstractin thesameway thattheconceptionofa
perfectly competitivemarket,or of generaleconomicequilibrium, is abstract:thatis, it singles
out, or focuseson, certainaspects of societyas especiallysignificant fromthe standpointof
politicaljustice and leaves othersaside. But whethertheconceptionthatresultsitselfis general
and comprehensive, as I have used those terms,is a separatequestion.I believethe conflicts
implicitin the factof pluralismforcepoliticalphilosophyto presentconceptionsofjustice that
are abstract,if it is to achieveits aims; but the same conflictspreventthoseconceptionsfrom
beinggeneralandcomprehensive.

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x6 THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS

viewin ourmodelcase: namely,a politicalconception ofjusticeregardednotas a

consequenceof a comprehensive doctrinebut as in itselfsufficient to express
valuesthatnormally outweighwhateverothervaluesopposethem,at leastunder
the reasonablyfavourableconditionsthat make a constitutional democracy
possible. Here the criterionof a just regimeis specifiedby that political
conception;and thevaluesin questionare seenfromitsprinciples and standards,
and fromits accountof the cooperativevirtuesof politicaljustice,and thelike.
Those who hold thisconceptionhave,of course,otherviewsas well,viewsthat
specifyvaluesand virtuesbelonging to otherpartsoflife;theydiffer fromcitizens
holdingthetwootherviewsin ourexampleofan overlapping consensusinhaving
no fully(as opposedto partially)25 comprehensive doctrinewithinwhichtheysee
all values and virtuesas being ordered.They don't say such a doctrineis
impossible, but ratherpractically speakingunnecessary. Theirconviction is that,
withinthe scope allowedby thebasic libertiesand theotherprovisionsof a just
constitution, all citizenscan pursuetheirway of lifeon fairtermsand properly
its
respect (non-public)values. So long as thoseconstitutional guaranteesare
secure,theythinkno conflict of valuesis likelyto arisethatwouldjustifytheir
opposingthepoliticalconceptionas a whole,or on suchfundamental mattersas
of or
liberty conscience, equalpoliticalliberties, or basic civilrights, thelike.
and
Those holdingthispartially comprehensive mightexplainit as follows.We
view
shouldnotassumethatthereexistreasonableandgenerally acceptableanswersfor
all or even formanyquestionsof politicaljusticethatmightbe asked.Rather,
we mustbe preparedto acceptthe factthatonlya few suchquestionscan be
satisfactorily resolved.Politicalwisdomconsistsin identifying those few,and
among them the most urgent. That done, we must frame the institutions of the
basic structure so thatintractable conflictsare unlikelyto arise; we must also
acceptthe need forclearand simpleprinciples, thegeneralformand contentof
whichwe hopecan be publiclyunderstood. A politicalconception is at bestbuta
guiding framework of deliberation and reflectionwhich us
helps reachpolitical
agreement on at leasttheconstitutional essentials.If it seems to haveclearedour
view and made our consideredconvictions morecoherent;ifit has narrowedthe
gap betweentheconscientious convictions ofthosewhoacceptthebasicideasofa
constitutional regime,thenit has servedits practicalpoliticalpurpose.Andthis
remainstrueeventhoughwe can'tfullyexplainouragreement: we knowonlythat
citizenswho affirm thepoliticalconception, and who havebeenraisedin and are
familiar with-the fundamental ideas of thepublicpoliticalculture, findthat,when
theyadoptitsframework ofdeliberation, theirjudgments convergesufficiently so
thatpoliticalcooperation on thebasis ofmutualrespectcan be maintained. They
view thepoliticalconceptionas itselfnormally sufficient and maynotexpect,or
thinktheyneed,greaterpoliticalunderstanding thanthat.

betweena doctrine'sbeingfullyvs partially

25 For thedistinction see footnote
comprehensive, 23 in
Sec IV.

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 JOHN RAWLS 17

But herewe are boundto ask: how can a politicalconception of justice

express values that, under the reasonably favourable conditions that make
democracy possible,normally outweigh whatever other values conflictwith
them?One way is this. As I have said, the most reasonablepolitical
conception ofjusticefora democratic regime willbe,broadly speaking, liberal.
But this means,as I will explainin the nextsection,thatit protects the
familiarbasic rightsand assignsthema specialpriority; it also includes
measures to ensurethatall persons in society havesufficientmaterial meansto
makeeffective use of thosebasic rights.Faced withthefactof pluralism, a
liberalview removesfromthe politicalagendathe most divisiveissues,
pervasive uncertainty and seriouscontention aboutwhichmustundermine the
basesofsocialcooperation.
The virtuesof politicalcooperation that make a constitutional regime
possibleare, then,verygreatvirtues.I mean,forexample,the virtuesof
toleranceand being ready to meet othershalfway,and the virtueof
reasonableness andthesenseoffairness. Whenthesevirtues (together withthe
of
modes thought and sentiments are in
theyinvolve) widespread societyand
sustainits politicalconception ofjustice,theyconstitute a verygreatpublic
of
good,part society's political Thus,
capital.26 thevalues that conflictwiththe
of
politicalconception justice and its sustaining virtues may be normally
outweighed becausetheycomeintoconflict withtheveryconditions thatmake
fairsocialcooperation possibleon a footing ofmutualrespect.
Moreover, conflictswithpoliticalvaluesaremuchreduced whenthepolitical
is
conception supported an
by overlapping consensus, the more so themore
inclusivetheconsensus. For in thiscase thepolitical conception notviewed
is
as incompatible withbasicreligious, philosophical andmoralvalues.We avoid
havingto consider theclaimsofthepolitical conception ofjusticeagainstthose
of thisor thatcomprehensive view;norneedwe say thatpolitical valuesare
moreimportant
intrinsically thanothervaluesand that'swhythelatterare
overridden. Indeed,sayingthatis the kindof thingwe hopeto avoid,and
achieving an overlapping consensus enablesus to avoidit.
To conclude:given the fact of pluralism,what does the work of
reconciliationby freepublicreason,and thusenablesus to avoidreliance on
general and comprehensive doctrines, is two things:first,identifying the
fundamental role of politicalvaluesin expressing the termsof fairsocial
cooperation consistent with mutual respect between citizensregarded as free
andequal;and second,uncovering a sufficientlyinclusiveconcordant fitamong
andothervaluesas displayed
political in an overlapping consensus.
26 The term'capital'is appropriate
and familiarin thisconnectionbecausethesevirtuesarebuiltup
slowlyover time and dependnot onlyon existingpoliticaland social institutions(themselves
slowlybuiltup), but also on citizens'experienceas a whole and theirknowledgeof the past.
Again,likecapital,thesevirtuesdepreciate,as it were,and mustbe constantly
renewedbybeing
reaffirmed
and actedfromin thepresent.

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18 THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS

VI

The last difficulty

I shallconsideris thattheidea ofan overlapping consensusis
utopian;thatis, thereare not sufficient political,social,or psychological forces
eitherto bringabout an overlapping consensus(whenone does notexist),or to
renderone stable(should one exist). Here I can onlytouchon this intricate
questionand I merelyoutlineone way in whichsuch a consensusmightcome
about and its stabilitymade secure.For thispurposeI use the idea of a liberal
conception of politicaljustice,thecontentof whichI stipulateto havethreemain
elements(notedpreviously): first,a specification of certainbasic rights,liberties
and opportunities (of the kind familiar from constitutional democraticregimes);
second, an assignment of a special priority to those rights,libertiesand
opportunities, especially with respect to the claims of the generalgood and of
perfectionist values; and third, measures assuring to all citizens adequate
all-purposemeans to make effective use oftheir basic libertiesand opportunities.27
Now let's supposethatat a certaintime,as a resultofvarioushistorical events
and contingencies, theprinciples of a liberalconception havecometo be accepted
as a mere modusvivendi,and that existingpoliticalinstitutions meet their
requirements. This acceptancehas come about,we may assume,in muchthe
samewayas theacceptanceoftheprinciple oftoleration as a modusvivendicame
aboutfollowing theReformation: at firstreluctantly,butnevertheless as providing
theonlyalternative to endlessand destructive civilstrife.Our question,then,is
this: how mightit happenthat over generations the initialacquiescencein a
liberalconceptionof justice as a modusvivendidevelopsinto a stable and
enduring overlapping consensus ? In thisconnection I thinka certainloosenessin
ourcomprehensive views, as well as their not beingfullycomprehensive, maybe
particularlysignificant.To see this, let'sreturn to our model case.
One way in whichthatexampleis atypicalis thattwo of the threedoctrines
were describedas fullygeneraland comprehensive, a religiousdoctrineof free
faithand the comprehensive liberalismof Kant or Mill. In these cases the
acceptanceof thepoliticalconceptionwas said to be derivedfromand to depend
solelyon thecomprehensive doctrine.But howfarin practicedoes theallegiance
to a politicalconceptionactuallydependon its derivation froma comprehensive
27 A fulleridea of thecontentof a liberalconceptionofjusticeis this:(1) politicalauthority must
respectthe rule of law and a conceptionof thecommongood that includesthe good of every
citizen;(2) libertyofconscienceand freedomof thoughtis to be guaranteed, and thisextendsto
thelibertyto followone's conceptionof the good,providedit does not violatethe principlesof
justice; (3) equal politicalrightsare to be assured,and in additionfreedomof the press and
assembly,the rightto formpoliticalparties,includingthe idea of a loyal opposition;(4) fair
equalityofopportunity and freechoiceofoccupationare to be maintainedagainsta background
of diverseopportunities; and (5) all citizensare to be assureda fairshareof materialmeansso
thattheyare suitablyindependent and can take advantageof theirequal basic rights,liberties
and fairopportunities. Plainlyeach of theseelementscan be understood ways,and so
in different
thereare manyliberalisms. However,I thinkof themall as sharingat least thethreementioned
in thetext.

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 JOHN RAWLS 19

view? There are severalpossibilities.For simplicity distinguish threecases: the

politicalconception is derivedfrom the comprehensive doctrine; it is notderived
frombut is compatiblewiththatdoctrine;and last, the politicalconceptionis
incompatible withit. In everyday lifewe havenotusuallydecided,or eventhought
muchabout,whichofthesecases hold.To decideamongthemwouldraisehighly
complicatedissues; and it is notclearthatwe needto decideamongthem.Most
people'sreligious,philosophical and moraldoctrinesarenotseenbythemas fully
generaland comprehensive, and theseaspectsadmitofvariations ofdegree.There
is lots of slippage,so to speak,manywaysforthepoliticalconceptionto cohere
looselywith those(partially)comprehensive views,and manyways withinthe
limitsof a politicalconceptionof justice to allow forthe pursuitof different
(partially)comprehensive doctrines.This suggeststhatmanyifnotmostcitizens
come to affirm theircommonpoliticalconceptionwithoutseeingany particular
connection, one way or theother,betweenit and theirotherviews.Hence it is
possibleforthemfirstto affirm the politicalconceptionand to appreciatethe
publicgood it accomplishesin a democraticsociety.Should an incompatibility
laterbe recognizedbetweenthe politicalconceptionand theirwiderdoctrines,
thentheymightverywell adjustor revisethesedoctrinesratherthanrejectthe
politicalconception.28
At this point we ask: in virtueof what politicalvalues mighta liberal
conceptionofjusticegain an allegianceto itself?An allegianceto institutions and
to the conceptionthat regulatesthemmay, of course,be based in part on
long-term self-and group-interests, customand traditional attitudes, or simplyon
the desire to conformto what is expectedand normallydone. Widespread
allegiancemay also be encouragedby institutions securingforall citizensthe
politicalvalues includedunderwhat Hart calls the minimumcontentof natural
law. Butherewe areconcernedwiththefurther bases ofallegiancegenerated bya
liberalconception ofjustice.29
Now whena liberalconceptioneffectively regulatesbasic politicalinstitutions,
it meetsthreeessentialrequirements ofa stableconstitutional
regime.First,given
the fact of pluralism-the fact that necessitatesa liberalregimeas a modus
vivendi in the firstplace--a liberal conceptionmeets the urgentpolitical
requirement to fix,onceand forall,thecontentofbasicrightsandliberties, andto
assign them Doing thistakes thoseguaranteesoffthe political
special priority.
agendaand putsthembeyondthecalculusof socialinterests, thereby establishing
28 Note thathere we distinguishbetweentheinitialallegianceto, or appreciationof,the political
conceptionand the later adjustmentor revisionof comprehensive doctrinesto which that
allegianceor appreciationleads wheninconsistenciesarise. These adjustmentsor revisionswe
may suppose to take place slowlyover time as the politicalconceptionshapes comprehensive
viewsto coherewithit. For muchofthisapproachI am indebtedto SamuelScheffler.
29 See the The Conceptof Law, (Oxford,i96I), pp 189-I95, forwhat Hart calls the minimum
contentofnaturallaw. I assumethata liberalconception(as do manyotherfamiliar conceptions)
includesthisminimumcontent;and so in the textI focuson the basis of the allegiancesuch a
conceptiongeneratesin virtueofthedistinctive
contentofitsprinciples.

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20 THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS

clearlyand firmly thetermsof socialcooperationon a footingofmutualrespect.

To regardthatcalculusas relevantin thesemattersleavesthestatusand content
of those rightsand libertiesstill unsettled;it subjectsthemto the shifting
circumstances of time and place, and by greatlyraisingthe stakesof political
controversy, dangerously increasestheinsecurity andhostility ofpubliclife.Thus,
the unwillingness to take these mattersoffthe agenda perpetuatesthe deep
divisionslatentin society;it betraysa readinessto revivethoseantagonisms in
the hope of gaininga morefavourable position should later circumstances prove
propitious.So, by contrast,securingthe basic libertiesand recognizing their
priority achieves the work of reconciliationand seals mutual acceptance a
on
of
footing equality.
The secondrequirement is connectedwitha liberalconception'sidea of free
public reason. It is highlydesirablethat the formof reasoninga conception
specifiesshould be, and can publiclybe seento be, correctandreasonably reliable
in its own terms."3 A liberalconceptiontriesto meetthesedesideratain several
ways.As we have seen,in workingout a politicalconceptionofjusticeit starts
fromfundamental intuitiveideas latentin the sharedpublicculture;it detaches
politicalvalues fromany particularcomprehensive and sectarian(non-public)
doctrine;and it triesto limitthatconception's scopeto mattersofpoliticaljustice
(the basic structureand its social policies).Further,(as we saw in Sec II) it
recognizesthat an agreement on a politicalconceptionofjusticeis to no effect
withouta companionagreementon guidelinesof publicenquiryand rules for
assessingevidence.Giventhefactofpluralism, theseguidelinesand rulesmustbe
specifiedby reference to theforms of reasoning available to commonsense,andby
the proceduresand conclusionsof sciencewhennot controversial. The role of
these shared methodsand this commonknowledgein applyingthe political
conceptionmakesreasonpublic; the protection givento freedomof speechand
thought makes it free. The claims of religion and philosophy(as previously
emphasized)are notexcludedout of scepticism or indifference, but as a condition
ofestablishinga sharedbasis forfreepublicreason.
A liberalconception'sidea of publicreasonalso has a certainsimplicity. To
illustrate:even if general and comprehensive teleologicalconceptionswere
acceptableas politicalconceptionsofjustice,the formof publicreasoningthey
specifywould be politicallyunworkable.For if the elaborate theoretical
calculationsinvolvedin applyingtheir principlesare publiclyadmittedin
questionsof politicaljustice(consider,forexample,whatis involvedin applying
the principleof utilityto thebasic structure), thehighlyspeculativenatureand

30 Here thephrase'in its own terms'meansthatwe are notat presentconcernedwithwhetherthe

conceptionin question is true,or reasonable(as the case may be), but with how easily its
understoodand reliablyappliedin publicdiscussion.
principlesand standardscan be correctly

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 JOHN RAWLS 21

enormouscomplexityof these calculationsare bound to make citizenswith

conflictinginterestshighly suspicious of one another's arguments.The
information theypresupposeis veryhard if not impossibleto obtain,and often
thereare insuperableproblemsin reachingan objectiveand agreedassessment.
Moreover,even thoughwe thinkour argumentssincereand not self-serving
when we presentthem,we must considerwhat it is reasonableto expect
othersto thinkwho stand to lose when our reasoningprevails.Arguments
supportingpoliticaljudgmentsshould,if possible,not onlybe soundbut such
that theycan be publiclyseen to be sound.The maximthatjustice mustnot
onlybe done, but be seen to be done,holds good not onlyin law but in free
publicreason.
The thirdrequirement metby a liberalconceptionis relatedto thepreceding
ones. The basic institutionsenjoinedby such a conception,and its conception
of free public reason-when effectively workingover time-encourage the
cooperativevirtuesof politicallife: the virtueof reasonablenessand a sense of
fairness,a spiritof compromiseand a readinessto meetothershalfway,all of
whichare connectedwith the willingnessif not the desire to cooperatewith
otherson political termsthat everyonecan publiclyaccept consistentwith
mutualrespect.Politicalliberalismtestsprinciplesand ordersinstitutions with
an eye to theirinfluenceon themoralqualityof publiclife,on thecivicvirtues
and habits of mind theirpublic recognitiontends to foster,and which are
neededto sustaina stableconstitutional regime.This requirement is relatedto
the precedingtwo in this way. When the termsof social cooperationare
settledon a footingof mutualrespectby fixingonce and for all the basic
libertiesand opportunitieswith theirpriority,and when this fact itselfis
publiclyrecognized,thereis a tendencyforthe essentialcooperativevirtuesto
develop.And this tendencyis furtherstrengthened by successfulconductof
freepublic reason in arrivingat what are regardedas just policies and fair
understandings.
The three requirementsmet by a liberal conceptionare evidentin the
fundamental structuralfeaturesof the publicworldit realizes,and in its effects
on citizens' politicalcharacter,a characterthat takes the basic
rightsand
libertiesfor grantedand disciplinesits deliberationsin accordancewith the
guidelinesof free public reason. A politicalconceptionof justice (liberalor
otherwise)specifiesthe formof a social world-a backgroundframework
withinwhich the lifeof associations,groupsand individualcitizensproceeds.
Inside that frameworka workingconsensus may often be secured
by a
convergence of self-or group-interests;but to securestabilitythatframework
mustbe honouredand seen as fixedby the politicalconception,itselfaffirmed
on moralgrounds.
The conjecture,then,is that as citizenscome to appreciatewhat a liberal
conceptiondoes, theyacquire an allegianceto it, an allegiancethat becomes
strongerover time.They come to thinkit both reasonableand wise forthem

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22 THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS

to confirm
theirallegianceto its principlesofjustice as expressingvalues that,
under the reasonablyfavourableconditionsthat make democracypossible,
normallycounterbalancewhatevervalues may oppose them. With this an
consensusis achieved.
overlapping

VII
I have just outlined how it may happen that an initial acquiescence in a liberal
conceptionof justice as a meremodusvivendichangesovertimeintoa stable
overlapping consensus.Thus theconclusion just reachedis all we needto say in
replyto the objectionthattheidea of such a consensusis utopian.Yet to make
this conclusionmoreplausible,I shallindicate,necessarily onlybriefly, someof
themainassumptions underlying thepreceding accountofhowpoliticalallegiance
is generated.
First,thereare the assumptionscontainedin what I shall call a reasonable
moralpsychology, that is, a psychologyof humanbeingsas capable of being
reasonableand engagingin fairsocialcooperation. Here I includethefollowing:
(i) besides a capacity for a conception of the good, peoplehave a capacityto
of
acquire conceptions justice and fairness (which specifyfair terms of
cooperation) and to act as these conceptionsrequire;(2) whentheybelievethat
institutions or socialpracticesarejust,or fair(as theseconceptions specify),
they
are readyand willingto do theirpartin thosearrangements providedtheyhave
reasonableassurancethatotherswillalso do theirpart;(3) ifotherpersonswith
evidentintention striveto do theirpartinjustorfairarrangements, peopletendto
developtrustand confidencein them; (4) this trustand confidence becomes
stronger and morecompleteas thesuccessof sharedcooperativearrangements is
sustainedovera longertime;and also(5) as thebasicinstitutions framedto secure
our fundamental interests(the basic rightsand liberties)are morefirmly and
willingly recognized.
We mayalso supposethateveryone recognizeswhatI havecalledthehistorical
and socialconditionsofmoderndemocratic societies:(i) thefactofpluralism and
(ii) the factof its permanence, as well as (iii) the factthat thispluralism be
can
overcomeonlyby theoppressiveuse of statepower(whichpresupposesa control
of the state no group possesses). These conditionsconstitutea common
predicament. But also seenas partof thiscommonpredicament is (iv) thefactof
moderatescarcityand (v) thefactof therebeingnumerouspossibilities ofgains
fromwell-organized socialcooperation, ifonlycooperationcan be established on
fairterms.Alltheseconditions and assumptions characterizethecircumstances of
politicaljustice.
Now we are ready to draw on the precedingassumptions to answer once again
the question: how might an overlapping consensus on a liberal conception of
justice develop from its acceptance as a mere modus vivendi? Recall our
assumption that the comprehensive doctrines of most people are not fully

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 JOHN RAWLS 23

comprehensive, andhowthisallowsscopeforthedevelopment ofan independent

allegianceto a liberal conception once how it works is appreciated. This
independent allegiance in turn leads people to act with evident intentionin
accordance withliberalarrangements, sincetheyhave reasonableassurance
(founded on pastexperience) thatotherswillalsocomply withthem.So gradually
overtime,as thesuccessofpolitical cooperation citizens
continues, cometohave
increasingtrust andconfidence inoneanother.
Notealsothatthesuccessofliberalinstitutions maycomeas a discovery ofa
new socialpossibility: the possibilityof a reasonably harmonious and stable
pluralistsociety.Beforethe successful and peacefulpracticeof toleration in
societieswithliberalpolitical institutions
therewas no wayofknowing ofthat
It can easilyseemmorenaturalto believe,as thecenturies'
possibility. long
practiceofintolerance appeared toconfirm, thatsocialunity andconcord requires
agreement on a generaland comprehensive religious,philosophical or moral
doctrine.Intolerance was acceptedas a condition ofsocialorderandstability."3
The weakening ofthatbelief helpstoclearthewayforliberal institutions.Andif
weaskhowthedoctrine offreefaithmight develop, perhaps it is connected with
thefactthatit is difficult, ifnotimpossible, tobelieveinthedamnation ofthose
withwhomwehavelongcooperated onfairterms withtrustandconfidence.
To conclude: thethirdviewofourmodelcase,seenas a liberalconception of
justice,mayencourage a meremodusvivendito developeventually intoan
overlapping consensus precisely becauseitis notgeneral andcomprehensive. The
conception's limitedscopetogether withtheloosenessof our comprehensive
doctrinesallowsleewayforit togainan initialallegiance toitself andthereby to
shapethosedoctrines accordingly as conflicts arise,a processthattakesplace
graduallyovergenerations (assuming a reasonable moralpsychology). Religions
thatoncerejected toleration may come to accept itand toaffirm a doctrineoffree
the
faith; comprehensive liberalismsofKant and Mill,whileviewed as suitable
for
non-publiclife and as possible bases foraffirming a constitutional are
regime, no
longer as
proposed political of
conceptionsjustice. On thisaccount an overlapping
consensus is nota happycoincidence, evenifaidedas it no doubtmustbe by
historical
goodfortune, butis ratherinparttheworkofsociety's publictradition
ofpolitical
thought.

VIII

I conclude
bycommenting on whatI havecalledpolitical
briefly liberalism.
We
have seen thatthisview steersa coursebetweenthe Hobbesianstrandin
as a modusvivendisecured
liberalism-liberalism bya convergence ofself-and
as coordinated
group-interests and balancedby well-designedconstitutional
arrangements-and a liberalismfoundedona comprehensivemoraldoctrinesuch

31 Humeremarkson thisin par 6 of'LibertyofthePress'(i741).

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24 THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS

as thatof Kant or Mill. By itself,the former cannotsecurean enduringsocial

unity, the latter cannot gain sufficientagreement.Political liberalismis
represented in ourmodelcase ofan overlapping consensusbythethirdviewonce
we take the politicalconceptionin questionas liberal.So understoodpolitical
liberalismis theview thatunderthereasonablyfavourable conditionsthatmake
constitutional democracy possible,politicalinstitutionssatisfying theprinciplesof
a liberalconceptionof justice realize politicalvalues and ideals that normally
outweighwhatever othervaluesopposethem.
Politicalliberalismmustdeal withtwo basic objections:one is the chargeof
scepticismand indifference, the otherthat it cannotgain sufficient supportto
assure compliancewith its principlesof justice. Both of these objectionsare
answeredby findinga reasonableliberal conceptionof justice that can be
supported by an overlapping consensus.For sucha consensusachievescompliance
by a concordantfit between the political conception and general and
comprehensive doctrinestogetherwiththe publicrecognition of the verygreat
value of the politicalvirtues.But as we saw, successin findingan overlapping
consensusforcespoliticalphilosophy to be, so faras possible,independent ofand
autonomousfrom other parts of philosophy,especiallyfrom philosophy's
long-standing problemsand controversies. And this in turngives rise to the
objection that liberalism
political is scepticalof religiousand philosophical truth,
or indifferent to theirvalues.Butifwe relatethenatureofa politicalconception to
thefactof pluralismand withwhatis essentialfora sharedbasis offreepublic
reason,thisobjectionis seento be mistaken. We can also note(see theendofSec
IV) how politicalphilosophy's independence and autonomyfromotherpartsof
philosophy connects withthe freedom and autonomy ofdemocratic citizenship.
Some maythinkthatto securestablesocialunityin a constitutional regimeby
looking for an overlappingconsensus detaches political philosophyfrom
philosophy and makesit intopolitics.Yes and no: thepolitician, we say,looksto
the nextelection,the statesmanto the nextgeneration, and philosophyto the
indefinite future.Philosophysees the politicalworldas an on-goingsystemof
cooperationover time,in perpetuity practically speaking.Politicalphilosophy is
relatedto politicsbecauseit mustbe concerned, as moralphilosophy neednotbe,
withpracticalpoliticalpossibilities.32 This has led us to outline,forexample,how
it is possibleforthedeepdivisionspresentin a pluralistic societyto be reconciled
througha politicalconceptionofjusticethatgraduallyovergenerations becomes
the focus of an overlappingconsensus.Moreover,this concernwith practical
possibilitycompels politicalphilosophyto considerfundamental institutional
questions and the assumptions ofa reasonable moral psychology.
Thus politicalphilosophy is notmerepolitics:in addressing thepubliccultureit
takes the longest view, looks to society's permanenthistoricaland social
conditions, and triesto mediatesociety'sdeepestconflicts. It hopes to uncover,
32 On thispoint,see theinstructive on Rousseau: Autonomy
remarksbyJoshuaCohen,'Reflections
and Democracy',Philosophyand PublicAffairs,Summer1986,pp 296f.

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 JOHN RAWLS 25

and to helpto articulate,a sharedbasis of consensuson a politicalconception of

justicedrawinguponcitizens'fundamental intuitiveideas abouttheirsocietyand
theirplace in it. In exhibitingthe possibilityof an overlapping consensusin a
societywith a democratic traditionconfronted by the factof pluralism,political
philosophyassumesthe role Kant gave to philosophy generally:the defenceof
reasonablefaith.In our case thisbecomesthedefenceof reasonablefaithin the
ofa just constitutional
realpossibility regime.

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