Considine - Policy Interventions
Considine - Policy Interventions
Considine - Policy Interventions
even a virtuous goal such as increased participation has its prob- Policy Interventions and Citizen Engagement
lematic dimension. The chief threats to participation come from
three criticisms: that it creates an overload in the work that public or if it takes a middle path it will simply apportion available
programmes must do, that it leads to capture of public organiza- resources across a larger number of programmes, each getting a
tions by vested interests, and that it is subject to the 'free rider' smaller amount than they need to be effective. We can see that the
problem, leaving most of the work to be done by an unrepresen- overload scenario is a serious threat to good government and that it
tative minority. may be a greater threat in those systems where participation is
based on a crude set of bidding wars amongst entrepreneurs. That
in turn will be a consequence of the kind of institutional context
Overload structuring interventions.
Capture
A major objection to developmental participation is its cost. Any
form of participation will increase the demands which individuals A related problem is the one raised by Stigler (1949, 1982) who
and groups make, it is argued. This excess of demands is then claims that the involvement of interest groups in policy-making
identified as the prime cause of 'overload', a condition in which results in the 'capture' of government regulatory institutions by the
governments are thought to become exhausted by the many pro- major interests they are established to control. Producer interests
grammes they are required to run (Birch, 1984; Murray, 1984). such as manufacturers and professions are Stigler's primary targets.
The proponents of this view point out that new programmes are Although they pretend to oppose government regulatory policy, he
often added without consideration of which ones should be says, they actually become its main beneficiaries through
closed. We can certainly see how the dynamic might work in restrictive rules which prevent competition and consumer choice.
practice. In any community there will be a range of public Regulation can mean any sustained effort to control behaviour.
services. Different population groups have their favourites which Taxation is a form of regulation. So is requiring children to attend
serve their special needs. They are willing to protest if these are school. Putting warning labels on cigarette packs is a regulatory
disturbed, but they pay less attention to other services which they strategy and so is limiting exhaust emissions from city buses.
do not themselves use. New groups form around demands for Capture occurs for several reasons. The first of these is that
new services and these attract the interest of leaders wishing to those being regulated have a greater interest than everyone else in
get elected. It is generally easier to get elected by promising paying close attention to the specific actions of the regulator. It
something new. makes sense for them to spend a lot of time and money watching
Other political entrepreneurs also have a natural incentive to and anticipating the moves being made by politicians, bureaucrats
want to add things to the menu. However they get no immediate and other interests. This concentration of attention is a sizeable
value from making promises to cut programmes out, since all that advantage in a policy system where most leaders and communities
does is create immediate dissent and lose them votes. So instead are struggling with expanding agendas.
they try to add without deleting. By this method the services Generally speaking, those being regulated soon become better
menu keeps expanding to the limits of prudent budgeting, and informed than everyone else. In part this is because they begin
even beyond if a way can be found to borrow funds to accom - with more information. Cigarette manufacturers must know quite a
modate these short-term pressures. Now once in office and faced lot about their product in order to produce it. The knowledge is
with responsibility for balancing the books the leadership must intrinsic to the act of production. For the regulator this is not the
either turn nasty and start offending part of its own support base, case. The regulator must go out and seek information about
how things are produced and must often rely on what the Policy Interventions and Citizen Engagement
manufacturer says.
A second information imbalance occurs because the group likely benefits. Furthermore, an entrepreneurial class will generally
being regulated suffers some cost as a result of being regulated bring forward ideas that express the general interests of citizens
and they are always prepared to find ways to reduce or avoid this such that by staying home the average person can enjoy the
cost. So spending money gathering new information always offers benefits and suffer few of the costs of getting involved.
a potential payoff But for the regulator the best that can be Mancur Olson (1971), in The Logic of Collective Action, explains
achieved by spending funds on information gathering is that the why not everyone needs to join the union in order to get the
status quo regulations will remain in force. benefits of a pay rise. If the benefit to be achieved cannot be
Closely related to the information problem is the fact that the localized to those responsible for achieving it, then it will be in the
regulatory system may become captured because the expertise rational self-interest of the majority not to participate, and simply
needed to be an effective regulator can only be found in the indus - to let others put themselves out to press the case for change. The
try being regulated. If government needs doctors to regulate other same case can be made for joining an environmental group such as
doctors then perhaps the system of regulation will always favour a Greenpeace. Throwing oneself in front of whaling boats in a
medical outlook. boiling sea can be costly, certainly more costly than sitting at
The reason capture is seen as a problem for theories of partici- home. And since everyone can go to the seaside and view the
pation is that these are generally opportunities for these interests to whales after they are saved from extermination, it seems to make
close an agenda that others might want opened. A public process to sense to let a few Greenpeace agitators do the hard work.
discuss renewable energy options will likely be dominated by This is very much an instrumental view of political participation.
power companies and the research organizations they help fund. It It assumes that participation is itself a cost with no intrinsic
will also be difficult to keep these interests off any board or benefits. One does not have fun while participating. Rather one is
commission devised to express public opinion. giving up something in order to participate. Almost all forms of
participation by citizens collapse under the weight of this logic if
What the Stigler case points to is a form of organizational
this first principle is accepted. Even the small cost associated with
pathology in which regulation may begin well but then become
exercising one's vote on election day appears as a bad trade given
corrupted. The solution therefore lies in refreshing the mandate of
the chances of getting what you really want from your local
the regulator from time to time. Once again, this cannot happen if
member.
the form of participation employed allows interest groups to
Why then are there so many people investing time and effort in
dominate.
different forms of group membership? Olson's answer is that they
must be getting something else. There must be some other payoff,
other than the primary issue. He makes a distinction between
Free riding
different kinds of benefits available to people in groups. The main
economic benefits, or collective goods, are supplemented in the
The third threat to effective participation comes from the rational
case of large groups with non-economic benefits. Olson uses the
choice claim that we examined in chapter 8 that most people will
case of large trade unions to illustrate the point. If they relied on
'free ride' on the efforts of others rather than participate their ability to secure wage improvements alone, large unions
themselves. The kernel of this criticism is the idea that citizens might find it difficult to attract members. So they provide
will find it more rational to let others agitate for change or voice insurance, welfare services and superannuation benefits as a
opinions because the costs of participating are higher than the supplement.
One need not accept Olson's exclusive focus on economic pay Policy Interventions and Citizen Engagement
offs in order to see that he is allowing different sources of benefit
to result from participation of this kind. If we stretch his logic to stall, coopt and deflect worthwhile proposals for action. We might
include the developmental values discussed above we might argue summarize these as four key threats - lack of resources, insufficient
that for some people the act of involvement might have an intrin- time, tokenism and manipulation.
sic utility. It might for example help them feel more attached to Under the heading of resource constraints we observe that many
their fellow human beings, neighbours or co-workers. exercises in participation limit popular engagement to a brief
Similarly one might view government as facing equally exchange of established positions and perhaps a round of
complex problems of gaining the support and participation of their submission-writing by the already informed. The hallmark of such
citizens. Simple rules of cost-benefit might suggest that no citizen cases is the advertisement in the press asking members of the public
ought to participate in anything. Indeed the most rational course of to submit written papers to a parliamentary inquiry or bureaucratic
action, following Olson, might be for individual citizens to sell review. For decision makers the yield from such a process might
their right to vote to entrepreneurs capable of collecting sufficient include early warning of major problems but if so this is the only
support to enact policies. However if voting is taken as a devel- likely source of significant learning. As a pressure valve such
opmental activity as well as an instrumental one, the benefits to be strategies have some modest value but beyond this they are almost
derived will include a sense of belonging, fostering of civic worthless. Such submissions as are received are bound to be
responsibility and increased knowledge on the part of ordinary unrepresentative. They may also be partial, or biased towards
citizens (Putnam, 1993). existing interests.
Ultimately, whether or not these forms of participation lead to A more subtle but equally problematic influence is the limitation
often placed upon the time available for people to become involved.
increased demand, overload or capture will depend upon the insti-
Once-off inquiries are perhaps the most limiting. To begin from a
tutions used to facilitate such participation. Rules and rituals
standing start, become informed, consult others and then reach the
establish the expectations which participants have, the range of
point of being ready to offer a view may take weeks or even
issues that can legitimately be discussed, and the kinds of bids that
months. If becoming informed also involves gaining access to
will be viewed as possible. Since all systems require some form of
expertise, or conducting a study of one's own, several months may
participation (at a minimum by elites and interest groups) the
well be a minimum. In countries like the Netherlands where high
question is not so much whether to foster participation, but what
levels of social consensus are sought for any major policy change, it
kind is appropriate to different public policy issues and to differ-
may take more than a year for everyone to have their say and for an
ent visions of contemporary democracy. agreed piece of legislation to be drafted. Good consultation
strategies therefore have time budgets which deal directly with the
conditions faced by those from whom feedback is sought.
Threats to effective participation Perhaps the most persistent complaint about governmental
consultation is that decisions are being taken elsewhere and the
Very few policy processes are resourced to the level needed to process for public participation therefore has no authority.
allow everyone to participate; less than a few employ sufficient Arnstein's (1969) ladder of participation describes this lower level
time for people to become informed; and only a minority grant form as 'therapy' or 'manipulation'. What is implied here is that the
real authority to the views expressed in consultation processes. A organization conducting the consultation has a motive and an
further threat comes from the potential which these public interest that is likely to be very different to that of the general
processes generate for elites, including political elites, to block, public, or the local interest groups.
We could perhaps see this as the negative value of participation. prejudice. Rarely did the ordinary citizen meet liberal intellectual
A minister might announce a consultation in order to keep an standards of civility or rational deliberation. As survey techniques
aggrieved interest group or community from taking direct action caught on as a prime method in the 1950s disillusionment grew.
while he or she works on their own plan to solve the problem. Berelson et al. (1954) summed up the post-war consensus:
Another strategy which gives the consultees no real power is one
Our data reveal that certain requirements commonly assumed
in which the minister or department expects the various interests
for the successful operation of democracy are not met by the
to attack one another and to fail to agree on anything. This is often behaviour of the 'average' citizen ... Many vote without real
a method for lowering expectations by showing the public that no involvement in the election ... The citizen is not highly
agreed solution can be found. Sometimes political leaders will use informed on the details of the campaign ... In any rigorous or
consultations or public inquiries as a means to get their own narrow sense the voters are not highly rational.
officials to take an issue more seriously. By pushing the
bureaucrats out into the public gaze they hope to soften internal The highly acclaimed study of public involvement in politics pro-
opposition to their own agenda. Here again the authority given to duced by Almond and Verba (1963) generalized these findings
public participants is minimal. through a five-nation comparison of Britain, Italy, West Germany,
Mexico and the US. Most citizens were not involved in parties and
nor were they active in political associations. Only a minority said
Citizenship and responsive rule they discussed politics frequently, and most agreed that they did
not pay attention to media reports of government actions on a
In all policy systems based on democratic norms the citizen regular basis. Clearly this expression of disappointment displays as
remains the primary source of sovereignty. In practice citizens much about the social scientist's preconceptions as it does about
adopt different roles in each system. Each has its own dynamic citizen politics. What is defined as a political act or political
and is capable of influencing the policy development process in involvement? Many of those who are not members of the major
characteristic ways. For example, individuals act as: parties may have been active in other ways. Membership of local
dubs and cultural groups might have been considered as a means
voters for the creation of important social values. Family, clan and
political party members neighbourhood politics might have served as a base from which
community activists other politically relevant values and action strategies could
protesters develop. And participation could have been understood as a
campaign workers changing historical process, rather than a single census based on
petition signers one-off measures.
workplace opinion leaders Dalton (1988:65), for example, shows that protest activities
respondents to opinion surveys have been increasing in most Western countries. Involvement in
union or association members demonstrations grew to 10 per cent or more in these countries and
audience members for the mass media.
reached 26 per cent in France during this same time period. In
1974 some 58 per cent of US citizens signed petitions and by 1981
Until recently, the prevailing assessment of the citizen so far as
this had grown to 61 per cent. In Britain the growth was from 22
social science was concerned was that he or she was a case of
per cent to 63 per cent and in West Germany from 30 per cent up
ignorance and apathy punctuated by occasional outbursts of active
to 46 per cent.
Policy Interventions and Citizen Engagement Policy Interventions and Citizen Engagement
The Dalton study (1988:71) showed that the form of Table 11.1 Sherry Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation
participation had been changing in most Western societies. 'Par-
ticipation in citizen-initiated and policy-oriented forms of political Citizen control Degree of citizen power
activity is increasing ... Political input is not limited to the issues Delegated power
Partnership
and institutionalised channels determined by elites.' The increased
use being made of direct forms of democracy, protest and Placation Degree of tokennism
community-based action by citizens provides new forms of policy Consultation
influence, different in scope and method from more traditional Informing
channels provided through parties, elections and interest groups.
Therapy Non-participation
This categorization was heavily influenced by both the opti-
Manipulation
mism and the frustrations of the 1960 programmes of urban
renewal and poverty relief in the US. It provides a clear definition
of citizen involvement which puts its emphasis on the redistribu- Source: Sherry Arnstein, 1969. 'A ladder of citizen participation', AlP
tion of political power: Journal, July.