Matin. Lefort en Bagdag
Matin. Lefort en Bagdag
Matin. Lefort en Bagdag
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Ignaas Devisch
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Abstract
Given the ongoing political turbulence worldwide, it is more than necessary for us to reconsider the question of
democracy. This question has been posed by French philosopher Claude Lefort for many years, but it has assumed
a renewed urgency. Although in Iraq the first danger of democracy, totalitarian dictatorship, was tackled, the liberators
clearly had not thought about the other risk when dealing with democracy: the complete implosion of society into a
pure formless collection of atomic individuals. Since democracy is a particular political regime, Lefort says, it comes
down to understand the formal differences between totalitarianism and democracy. In democracy the place of power is
symbolically empty; this place of power can be refigured into a totalitarian power, but can also be actually empty, when
a regime falls apart into factions and fractions, all fighting for their own interests and idea(l)s. It is therefore not sufficient
to bring democracy by dethroning the king. Although the source of legitimacy in a democratic regime is the people, the
people remains indeterminate. This indeterminacy and thus also vulnerability is a core principle of democracy in Leforts
theory. Ultimately, the craziness of democracy lies in its vulnerability.
Keywords: Democracy; Political regime; Vulnerability; French democratic institutions in Iraq after 2003 (the locus classicus of this
philosopher vast literature can be found in works including [1-4]. The transitology
literature emphasizes formal procedures, civic virtues (e.g., leadership,
Introduction public reason, etc) and the normative/strategic effects of institutions
One would be hard-pressed to find a contemporary political project (i.e., their role in orienting and structuring political choices). The
that does not claim the mantle of democracy. From the operations focus is on positive structures, and the theoretical exercise is reduced
room of George W. Bush’s pentagon a decade ago, to the streets of to descriptive classification and institutional modeling. Transitology
Cairo, Athens and Kiev today, democracy provides the banner for a represents democracy as something that might feasibly be engineered.
motley variety of efforts to change the world. For some, democracy is By contrast, Lefort takes democracy’s indeterminacy-the “empty place
an end in itself, a set of technical procedures and rituals for the stable of power” at its core-as the starting point for a hermeneutic inquiry
reproduction of order. For others, it provides means to an end (social into the phenomenon of democracy. In doing so, he shows how
justice, for example). And, for others still, democracy provides a veil of democracy’s contradictions are sources of its strengths as well as its
legitimacy facilitating the advance of projects, practices and rationalities vulnerabilities and-indeed-of the dangers that lurk within it. Lefort’s
of government have little or nothing to do with democracy as such (the analysis suggests the craziness of the project to engineer democracy, if
rule of markets, for example; or the justification of military/colonial
only because-in the final analysis-democracy is not a thing at all.
occupation).
We begin by sketching the contours of Lefort’s thinking
This remarkable quality-the sense in which democracy provides a
on democracy. We then move to a discussion of the Iraqi case
seemingly “empty place” into which otherwise contradictory political
projects might be projected and spun into the constitutive agencies itself, suggesting that the failure of the USA-UK project of forced
and meanings of government-provides a crucial source of its resilience democratization in Iraq had at least as much to do with failures of
and (almost) universal appeal. Democracy refers to a power or regime theoretical imagination as with failures of decision-making and
that resists objectification or determinacy. At the same time, however, implementation in the field. In conclusion, we suggest what the
this indeterminacy also points to a constitutive paradox: how does one exercise of applying Lefort to the Iraq case tells us about the limitations
go about constituting a meaningful order which, by its own definition of mainstream (liberal) theories of democratic change, and also how
and logic, is premised on the constant displacement of order and attention to what happened in Iraq might help us think with Lefort to
meaning? This points not only to the vulnerability of democracy, but move beyond the limitations of Lefort’s approach to democracy.
also-to borrow the term applied by French political philosopher Claude
Lefort—its “craziness.” Can such a crazy, indeterminate phenomena be
engineered? Is a techno-politics of democratization possible?
*Corresponding authors: Ignaas Devisch, Ghent University, University College
Artevelde, Lange Boomgaardstraat 89000 Ghent, Belgium, Tel: 00-32-498574801;
In the following remarks, we reflect on this paradox, developing
E mail: [email protected]
a tentative critique of the techno-politics of contemporary democracy
Christopher Parker, Ghent University, Belgium, Tel: +32 9 264.55.69; Fax: +32 9
promotion. We do so by positioning a critical reading of Lefort against
264.69.97; E mail: [email protected]
the backdrop of efforts at forced democratization in Iraq. Insofar as
Received October 30, 2013; Accepted January 23, 2013; Published February
democratization was indeed a primary objective of the 2003 invasion
03, 2014
and subsequent occupation, Iraq provided a testing ground for the
theories and technologies of late-20th century liberal democracy. Citation: Devisch I, Parker C (2014) Democraziness: Reading Claude Lefort in
Baghdad. J Pol Sci Pub Aff 2: 111. doi:10.4172/2332-0761.1000111
These theories, articulated in the “transitology” literature that came
to dominate the field of Comparative Politics after the fall of the Iron Copyright: © 2014 Devisch I, et al. This is an open-access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted
Curtain, closely informed the assumptions and practice of the policy use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and
makers, consultants and academic experts who sought to engineer source are credited.
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of power, to the order of law and to the order of knowledge which is be suicidal, but democracy without identification also turns out to be
negated. The economic, legal and cultural dimensions are, as it were, without any demos or kratein of its own’ [16]. According to Nancy, a
interwoven into the political. This phenomenon is characteristic of society consisting of atomic entities, a formless society, is as hopeless
totalitarianism’ [11]. as the suffocating grip of the communal collective on the individual.
This is a complex and sometimes misinterpreted point in Lefort’s Iraq
analysis, as Bernard Flynn alos stated [6]. Lefort is not defending
democracy as such, nor is he naïve about democracy as if it would While weapons of mass destruction provided a pretext for the
protect us from all evil. Rather, he makes a plea for understanding what March 2003 Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, policymakers in
democracy is all about, and for an awareness of the contradictions Washington and London quickly signaled that democratic transition,
that might provoke a slide towards totalitarianism. We should be culminating in freely contested national elections, would provide the
aware of this intrinsic potentiality and not make the mistake—to eventual endgame of Iraq’s forced revolution. This was in keeping
paraphrase Alain Badiou—of moralizing about democracy instead of with the spirit of the Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy
thinking about it. This is what he calls ‘le consensus anti-totalitaire (NSS) document of 2002, which advocated “coercive democratization
et démocratique’ [15]. With this, he articulates a profound concern as a solution to Middle East terrorism” [17]. Leading neo-conservatives
regarding the lack of genuine thinking about democracy today. Badiou in the Bush Administration envisioned a more substantial, assertive
suggests that it is almost forbidden to question democracy today: those and permanent US presence in the Gulf region. More specifically, they
who dare to do so run the risk of being called totalitarian. Instead of advocated a role for the US military in securing and expanding “zones
agreeing with this moral common sense, Badiou wants to think about of democratic peace” [18]. Democratization-together with the advance
democracy. of free markets and other perceived cornerstones of liberty and social
modernity-would not only provide additional means for achieving
This, of course, is also Lefort’s concern. Today for instance, we may these objectives, but also serve as an ideological justification for the
be satisfied with the idea of resisting the possible desire to ‘refigurate’ project of consolidating US hegemony into the 21st century. The NSS
politics, to guarantee the brightening prevalence of democracy. If the even went so far as to assert that in the present world, “there is only one
dictators are sent home, then democracy is waiting in all its glory. This model for success: freedom, democracy and free enterprise. … These
was clearly a characteristic of the assumptions that informed the project values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society
of forced democratization in Iraq: not only the neo-conservatives close [19].
to the White house, but also many liberals—together with scholars
influenced by more than a decade of research that seemed to confirm the Yet, while the invasion of Iraq was clearly a neo-conservative policy
post-Cold War spirit of democratic and free-market triumphalism— coup—and while the project was contested on grounds related to
bought into the idea of Iraq as a “democracy in waiting.” All that had international law (e.g., the admissibility of regime change, the legality of
to be done, it seemed, was to destroy the barriers that held back the a pre-emptive strike, the consequences for Iraqi civilians, etc.), as well
global flow of transition and newness, and root out the totalitarian core as by some conservative isolationists—it is remarkable few observers
of the regime, and democracy would flourish. Larry Diamond made questioned the assumptions that underpinned the actual project of
the point poetically: via the application of principles divined from the democratization itself. Indeed, insofar as the proposed project of
systematic study of democratic transitions elsewhere, he argued, it democratizing Iraq faced questioning, doubt tended to center on the
would be possible to demonstrate that “the social soil of [Iraq]...had not presumed traits of Arab-Islamic society rather than on assumptions and
been turned irretrievably into desert. It could be irrigated and brought practices identified by, and derived from, the comparative literature on
back” [2]. Diamond is an influential scholar of democratic transition democratic transitions. These assumptions had so dominated the field
who served as the Coalition Provisional Authority’s ‘Senior Advisor on over the previous fifteen years that otherwise critical scholars had few
Governance’ from 12/03 to 08/04. tools with which to counter the image of the Iraqi regime as an object
that might be transformed by war and techno-political intervention.
Lefort explicitly warns us against such lazy thinking. On the other
hand, and this is also a crucial point in Lefort’s thinking, if democracy This problem raises questions about representation, and—more
has become nothing more than mere disagreement or dissent, then it specifically—about relationships between the representation of power
tends to collapse from within: and the exercise of that power to shape and make the world. It also
suggests the role of social scientists in the making of the objects that the
‘If the place of power appears, no longer as symbolically, but as
claim only to study. How did Iraq come to be imagined and presented
really empty, then those who exercise it are perceived as mere ordinary
individuals, as forming a faction at the service of private interests as an object of techno-political intervention? And how did war come
and, by the same token, legitimacy collapses throughout society. The to be accepted as a legitimate means through which to pursue such
privatization of groups, of individuals and of each sector of activity a project? What led so many people to believe that war might be an
increases: each strives to make its individual or corporatist interest effective and legitimate vehicle for democratization? Part of the answer
prevail. Carried to an extreme, there is no longer a civil society’ [11]. to these questions might be found by investigating the ways in which
scholars produced images of the Iraqi regime (and, indeed, the figure of
Jean-Luc Nancy, who, in the early 1980s, invited Lefort to his
the regime more generally), and in the ways in which knowledge about
‘Centre de recherches philosophiques sur le politique’ (Centre for
democracy was produced and represented by scholars, think-tanks
philosophical research on politics), also seems to be aware of this. In
The Sense of the World, Nancy writes that ‘This question forms the and policy makers. A full ethnographic account with corresponding
contour, if not of the aporia, at least of the paradox of political sense genealogy of knowledge production in these areas is beyond the scope
today: without figuration or configuration, is there still any sense? But of this brief paper. But Lefort’s insights provide us with a possible
as soon as it takes on a figure, is it not ‘totalitarian’ truth?’ [16] Nancy shortcut. In the following paragraphs, we look briefly at the issue of
not only summarizes the aporia of contemporary politics, he also puts representation. We focus on a particularly crucial episode between
his finger on it when he writes: ‘The totalitarian subject turns out to 2004 and 2006. This was a time when occupation authorities were
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pushing ahead with elections, and when Iraq was sliding precipitously amorphous than its theoretical representation allowed for. Accordingly,
toward all-out civil war. in order for the project to be made legible, they were themselves forced
to identify and place the power that provided the focus for efforts at
In order for the project of forced democratization to present itself
democratization. They accomplished this with reference to the ethno-
as plausible and effective, power and politics in Iraq first had to be
sectarian framework that they took as an organic given of Iraqi society.
represented as an object—a thing or substance that could be studied,
And in doing so they unwittingly consolidated the stakes, and stoked
opened up (by war if necessary) and made amenable to technical
the fires, of ethno-sectarian conflict.
intervention. In short, power and politics in Iraq had to be represented
through the figure of the regime. Even as Bush Administration officials and Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) chief Bremer increasingly (and ironically) stressed
The objectivity of political regimes is by and large taken for granted
the importance of a strong central state (with central control over,
in contemporary political thought and practice. We tend to forget that
inter alia, oil resources), the CPA in practice continued to manage
its appearance reflects a particular style, or tradition, of making claims
public sentiment, and channel political demands, through sectarian
upon, and producing knowledge about the political world. The regime
intermediaries. This was enshrined in the composition of the Iraqi
first emerged as a claim about the (legitimate) place of power during
Governing Council, the federalization provisions of the Transitional
the course of the French Revolution, and was passed along through
Administrative Law, the Shiite- Kurd-Sunni troika of the Presidential
a various political traditions before becoming reified in comparative
Council, and the Iraqi Interim Authority that was handed power in
politics literature over the last thirty-plus years of the twentieth century.
the formal transfer of sovereignty to Iraqis on 28 June 2004, and not
During the course of more than two centuries, it has provided a potent
least in the elections that were held on 30 January 2005 to choose the
“practical illusion” of political life, orienting the political imaginations
membership of the Transitional National Authority, members of which
of leftists and liberals alike, and serving as a framework around
would also be selected to write Iraq’s constitution.
which knowledge of the political world might be constructed and
deployed. Underlying this figure, however, is a certain conflation of the The degree to which outsiders insisted on seeing Iraqi political
conventions for representing power with actual sources, articulations society in sectarian terms is not only striking, it became and self-
and distributions of power [20,21]. We return to this point below. fulfilling1. According to the International Crisis Group [25], Iraqis
themselves consistently rejected the sectarian vision even as they found
In Iraq, power was represented in the form of the totalitarian
themselves increasingly forced to express themselves politically in such
regime. If the literature presented the persistence of authoritarianism
a framework. Polling conducted by Mansoor Moaddel [26] suggests
in the Arab world as a phenomenon that was “out of step with history,”
that Iraqis stand out in the region in terms of asserting their national
by 2000, Iraq was considered a special case even by Middle Eastern
(i.e., Iraqi) identity above alternatives (e.g., religious, sectarian, or
Standards. Scholars, largely drawing on accounts from Iraqi exiles,
ethnic). His survey suggests that 60 percent of all Baghdadis “consider
produced an image of a political order built upon fear and organization
themselves Iraqis above all.”
[22], for example, argue that Saddam molded the Iraqi Ba’ath party
along Stalinist lines. “By the end of the 1970s,” they suggest, “the Both prior to and following the invasion, US officials saw
state apparatus controlled Iraq, the Ba’ath party controlled the state sectarianism as a framework for managing Iraqi political society in the
apparatus, and Saddam Hussein controlled the Ba’ath party” [22]. This absence of strong state institutions, and they actively advanced ethnic/
totalitarian image was reinforced by works like Kanan Makiya’s hugely sectarian communities as the constituent building blocks of the new
influential book Republic of Fear [23]. Makiya detailed the totalitarian political order. Elections were advanced to address ritual functions of
asthetic that pervaded Iraq’s public life, linking it to the personality cult legitimacy, and to reveal the actual balance of power between agents
around Saddam and the willingness of the state to deploy violence in representing communal interests and visions of political life, thereby
service of political order. These tropes ran through both the popular and making it possible for communal agents to rationally negotiate the
academic work published on Iraq through the 1990s. Not surprisingly, framework of a new order on that basis. Even as planners were forced to
in 2003 Pentagon officials presented the first task of democratization pull back from the more radical elements of neo-liberal restructuring,
in Iraq as destroying the regime’s “centers of gravity” (i.e., its places this communalist vision was built into the constitutional and electoral
of power). Officials frequently presented the policy in a single word: exercises that unfolded over the course of 2005. While no doubt
“decapitation.” reflecting genuine (however misguided) views within the administration
regarding the nature of Iraqi politics and society, the communitarian
To be sure, Iraqi political life during the period before 2003 was framework was also convenient from the perspective of blocking
characterized by violence (although nothing in comparison to what articulation of any mass political movement that might undermine
came after). And few would deny the megalomania of Saddam. implementation of the underlying neo-liberal/neo-conservative
However, the actual articulation of political and economic power in project. In other words, officials sought to segregate residual political
Iraq was very different from that contained in the trope (or image) interests and passions from the wider project of restructuring Iraq’s
of the totalitarian regime. Indeed, the organization of political and political economy along neo-liberal lines. Against this backdrop, the
economic power within Iraq had been transformed dramatically electoral arena might be seen as consolidating and legitimating a
during the course of the Iran-Iraq war and the international sanctions calculative framework through which to manage the residual passions
regime of the 1990s-early 2000s. Furthermore, the sources of power did of a political world otherwise being remade in the image of the self-
not emanate from Saddam himself, nor from within the institutions regulating market. In invoking the sectarian framework, occupation
and departments of the state apparatus as such. Power was articulated authorities were reviving a framework for managing political society
within a variety of complexes of economic and political relationships reminiscent of that advanced by the Ottomans and British Mandate
involving oil companies, international smuggling networks, UN officials of earlier eras.
institutions and relations with foreign governments [24]. To make a
long story short, the power that presented itself as the focus of effort
1
The argument that Saddam governed by cultivating ethnic and tribal divisions
is overstated; he did not so much cultivate communal divisions as undermine all
techno-political transformation was in fact much more diffuse and secular, non-communal bases of opposition to his authority.
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or Division: Palgrave-Macmillan, New York, USA.
Annual Review of Political Science 2: 115-144.
23. Makiya K (1998) Republic of fear: the politics of modern Iraq. Berkeley
4. Huntington S (1993) The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth
University of California Press.
Century. Norman: Oklahoma University Press, Norman.Alahmad N (2007)
The Politics of Oil and State Survival in Iraq: Beyond the Rentier Thesis. 24. Parker C, Moore p (2007) The War Economy of Iraq. Middle East Report
Constellations 14: 586-612. 243:. 6-15.
5. Flynn B (2002) Totalitarianism after the fall. Constellations 9: 436-444. 25. ICG (2005) Unmaking Iraq: a constitutional process gone awry Middle East
Briefing.
6. Flynn B (2005) The philosophy of Claude Lefort. Interpreting the political.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois. 26. Moaddel M (2006) Values and Perception of the Islamic Publics: Findings of
Values Surveys. New York, USA.