Gauḍapāda on Imagination

Sthaneshwar Timalsina

Journal of Indian Philosophy

ISSN 0022-1791

J Indian Philos
DOI 10.1007/s10781-013-9203-6

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 Author's personal copy
J Indian Philos
DOI 10.1007/s10781-013-9203-6

Gauḍapāda on Imagination

Sthaneshwar Timalsina

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract The philosophy of Gaudapāda, although found in a small treatise, has

˙
remained obscure, as both the classical and contemporary approaches to reading this
philosopher have overlooked his highly original contributions. This essay explores
the scope of imagination in Gaudapāda’s philosophy, with a focus on terms such as
˙
kalpanā and ābhāsa. This reading of Gaudapāda’s philosophy tallies with some of
˙
the findings in contemporary consciousness studies.

Keywords Gaudapāda · Kalpanā · Ābhāsa · Imagination · Consciousness ·

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Phenomenology

Both traditional and contemporary studies on Gaudapāda have given short shrift to
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the creative genius of this master. Following the traditional viewpoint, Gauḍapāda
extends the then-existing Upanisadic philosophy that culminates in the writings of
˙
his grand disciple Śaṅkara. Following contemporary analysis, the philosophy of
Gauḍapāda is heavily influenced by the Nāgārjunian Mādhyamaka dialectics.1 What
has been overlooked in both these trends of study is the way Gauḍapāda borrows
from both systems to advance his own arguments. Reading Gauḍapāda in light of
the early Upanisadic or Buddhist philosophies has its own merits. What is missing in
˙
these trends, however, is Gauḍapāda’s original contribution. Since it is not possible
to address the entire philosophy of Gauḍapāda in one paper, I will restrict myself to

1
This trend was championed by Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya and many of his arguments have been
widely accepted. His commentary on GK (Bhattacharya 1992) is also exemplary. A similar trend is
explicit in Jacoby (1913). For some recent studies on Gauḍapāda, see Kaplan (1987), King (1995), Fox
(1993), Wood (1990), and Bouy (2000). For the influence of Gauḍapāda on Moksopāya, see Slaje (1996).
˙
S. Timalsina (&)
San Diego State University, San Diego, CA, USA
e-mail: [email protected]

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analyzing a single term kalpanā that stands for imagination in Gauḍapāda’s

writings, and contextualize his thoughts in broader comparative perspectives.
While earlier studies have stressed Gauḍapāda’s use of the terms such as māyā2
or ajāti and have linked his studies with the Mādhyamaka philosophy, I contend that
Gauḍapāda’s application of kalpanā, or imagination, is original. To say something is
imagined can mean the insubstantiality of the imagined object. It can also mean that
entities are given reality due to imagination. Traditional readings are based on
considering the fictive nature of imagination. This reading falls short, as we know
today, thanks to phenomenologists,3 cognitive scientists, and contemporary
philosophers in the analytical tradition, that imagination is embedded in every
instance of perception, and cannot be excluded from any specific cognitive mode.
Whether or not imagination constitutes the entire reality, there is wide acceptance
that imagination plays a greater role in human cognitive behavior than previously
attributed. Reality, accordingly, is not merely a representation of what is ‘out there,’
but is a creative process where the subject actively engages in its creation.
Consciousness, accordingly, is inherently creative, imagination being its essential
nature. My reading of Gauḍapāda in the following pages advances and relies upon
these parameters. This is not an attempt to evaluate the entire oeuvre of Gauḍapāda
but only to highlight select passages relating to the nature and scope of imagination
in his non-dual philosophy.
It has been generally understood that the Mādhyamikas, while propounding
emptiness (śūnyatā), apply the term kalpanā and others to negate the substantiality
of phenomena. Advaitins such as Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara use the term to negate the
reality of anything that is phenomenal, albeit not in the same sense that
Mādhyamikas understand it. Kalpanā does not negate the Brahman, the foundation
of imagination. A singular core of self-experience giving rise to phenomena comes
to prominence when the Yogavāsiṣṭha and the Advaita doctrine of Ekajīva are
studied. This concept is foundational for even the emergence of dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda, the
Advaita doctrine that creation is a mere seeing, where ‘seeing’ stands for both pure
consciousness and imagination.4 Rather than understanding that since the world as
we experience it is mere imagination, it has no substantiality, or interpreting the text
as negation of the externals, I am making the argument that what we consider as
real, or external, is given to consciousness through imagination, that imagination is
dormant within consciousness, and it is due to imagination that our conventions
arise. It also means that ‘knowing’ things cannot preclude imagination.
As an Advaitin, Gauḍapāda maintains that there exists just the Brahman in the
absolute sense. At the same time, he also endeavors to explain the phenomena by
relying on the epistemology where consciousness, the essential being of awareness-
in-itself, constitutes reality the way we cognize it in our phenomenal modes.
Kalpanā or imagination is crucial at this juncture, and if my reading is correct, this
is at odds with the traditional identification of Gauḍapāda as illusionist. If what

2
For the concept of māyā, see Gonda (1952, pp. 3–62), Fort (1985).
3
For the phenomenological study of Advaita, see Gupta (1998, 2009, 2012). This trend is found as early
as Sinari (1972).
4
For the concept of dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi, see Timalsina (2006). For the concept of Ekajīva, see Timalsina (2009).

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Gauḍapāda meant is the non-duality of consciousness that is inherently imagining,

creation being inherent to the imaginary power of the Brahman,5 this understanding
differs from both the traditional reading of Advaita and also from some suggestions
that he has succumbed to the absolutism of emptiness. Giving imagination a status,
being assigned as a property of consciousness, also brings the various monistic
doctrines closer, with Trika being predominant. This reading also distinguishes
Gauḍapāda’s position from the Yogācāra doctrine, as the application of imagination
in Yogācāra does not substantiate, or does not require that the ground wherein
imagination occurs to be real.
Initial arguments stem from reading the examples of dream in the Māṇḍūkyakā-
rikā (MK). In this text of Gauḍapāda, to dream is not to reject the phenomenality of
entities but only to argue that just as a dream is but consciousness, so is the world.
Consciousness, in this presentation, projects reality, as if outside, just like in a dream.
Although the dream objects and the dreaming subject, including the mode of
consciousness that is dreaming, are not separate, as the very consciousness constitutes
itself in the triadic form of subject, object, and the epistemic mode, so is, following
Gauḍapāda, the world, its perceiver, and the mode of perception, a triadic constitution
of consciousness alone. If kalpanā is similar to dreaming, which Gauḍapāda reiterates
again and again, it could not have been used to reject phenomenality but only to affirm
its non-substantiality in the absence of consciousness. The later Advaitins such as
Prakāśānanda and Madhusūdana Sarasvatı̄ endeavor to prove that Gauḍapāda
founded the Advaita doctrine of Dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi and also the doctrine of Ekajīva. If these
doctrines are read along the lines that pure consciousness lies as the foundation which
creates externality on its own, as if a dream or imagination, this understanding is
identical to the proposed reading outlined above.

Hierarchy of Subjects: Initial Ground for a Discourse on Imagination

Gauḍapāda turns to the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad (MU) to establish the first platform for
a discourse on imagination. Following MU, the self acquires different identities
while undergoing different modes of consciousness: vaiśvānara refers to the
subjective experience of the waking self, taijasa refers to that of dreaming and
prājña to the subject in a deep sleep.6 During these modes, the subjects have a
somewhat different identity. The subject that dreams of flying cannot fly (or even
believe that he can fly) when awake. The dreaming self is in this regard closer to the
ego-self, or the mind, that can still imagine or hallucinate flying, even when awake.
The initial ground for Gauḍapāda’s reflection is, how can the same subject
experience himself differently in different modes? ‘Imagination’ provides a proper
framework for explanation, as the self ‘imagines’ itself differently in these different
states of consciousness. Although this response can resolve the tension of multiple
self-identities in different conscious states, it raises another issue of the transcendent

5
For the concept of śakti in early Advaita, see Timalsina (2013).
6
For a select study of the states of consciousness in the philosophy of Gauḍapāda, see Fort (1980, 1985)
and Sharma (2001).

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self as the organizing entity for different subjective modes. For Gauḍapāda, this
transcendent self is the Brahman, the essential nature of the self (ātman). The
immediate question is, how does this self acquire different identities? And the
response is, through kalpanā, or imagination.
The following verse is crucial to demonstrate the way the ‘constructed self’ is
presented in GK:
kalpayaty ātmanātmānam ātmā devaḥ svamāyayā |
sa eva buddhyate bhedān iti vedāntaniścayaḥ || GK 2.12.
The luminous (deva) self, with its own māyā, imagines/constitutes the self on
its own. He alone realizes the distinctions. This is the conclusion of the
Upaniṣads.
This is the self-constituting self that has been identified with the Brahman, and
following Gauḍapāda, this transcendent self is endowed with the power that gives
finitude (māyā), based on the etymology of māyā as yā māti, from the root √māṅ
mane, she who measures. This transcendent self, albeit unbound and without any
subjectivity, does nonetheless constitute identity, subjecthood, and this construction
is the act of imagination (kalpayati).
The passage cited above comes in a sequence where all the verses in GK 2.9–19
utilize the term kalpanā, or the terms derived of the root √kṛp. Noteworthy also is
the fact that the term vikalpa is read in this sequence as synonymous with kalpanā.
Now the issue is, what is the content that Gauḍapāda describes by using these terms?
The following is the summary:
Both in dream and waking states, there are internal and external entities, and
internal entities are considered as non-existent, while the externals are
‘imagined’ to be real. This is the self that recognizes some entities as real and
others unreal in both these states. The entities considered as internal last as
long as the mind constitutes their reality and those considered as external last
as long as there is a relation between the subject and object. Therefore there is
nothing constituting their difference. The dim entities inside the mind and the
vivid ones outside are both imagined, and the difference is constituted by the
senses. The transcendent self first imagines the subject and the entities as
internal and external and we remember what we experience. Just as a rope not
ascertained as a rope due to darkness is imagined in varied forms, so it is with
the self, and just as imagination vanishes when the rope is determined as such,
this is the same case with realizing the self. What has been construed in varied
forms is the very self, and this power is inherent to the self qua consciousness
that gives finitude. Although self-reflexive, the self becomes finite with its own
power of māyā (GK 2.9–19).
As the above summary clarifies, what Gauḍapāda is concerned with is the way
consciousness constitutes reality. Rather than reading the above discourse as
addressing mind-independent objects (a topic that in itself is problematic), we can
understand Gauḍapāda if we were to read this in the context of the consciousness
that constitutes internality and externality. This is also the time-constituting self, as

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for Gauḍapāda, dvayakāla, or the time that has the dyad of subject and object
embedded within, is what gives rise to the sense of externality. There is also a
distinction between this time and internal time, in Gauḍapāda’s term, ‘cittakāla’
(GK 2.14). The duration of entities is constituted by consciousness contingent upon
temporal awareness, and this awareness varies, as Gauḍapāda maintains. This sense
of temporality, in Gauḍapāda’s understanding, follows after consciousness consti-
tutes the subject, since the two modes of time are subjective constructions, while
time is the innermost fabric in all manifestations.
Gauḍapāda’s project, therefore, is to explain the consciousness that constitutes
subjectivity, and what he maintains is that this very self qua consciousness gives the
sense of externality and temporality, relying on its own power that fragments this
non-dual consciousness into the varied forms of subject and objects. Noteworthy
also is Gauḍapāda’s terminology that the self ‘first imagines the subject’ (jīvaṃ
kalpayate pūrvam … GK 2.16), which is used in the singular. Subjective experience
is always singular, and relying on this singularity of self-experience, a separate
Advaita model of Ekajīva, or a single subject, has been established. However, it is
not the case that Gauḍapāda only uses the singular when addressing the subject
(jīva).7
In order to address the subject-constituting consciousness that is a-temporal, I
will exploit another term that is frequently used in the subsequent Advaita literature,
the term of cidābhāsa.8 The term jīva does not describe the illusory and constructed
nature of subjective consciousness as does cidābhāsa, or an appearance of
consciousness. His concept of non-origination (ajāti) is a response to the
teleological question: why does this transcendent self manifest in terms of subject
and object? Gauḍapāda argues, since it is the power of imagination that is intrinsic
to consciousness or the self, the power that constitutes itself as the subject while
giving externality to the entities of its fancy, there is no external teleology. When
articulating the reasons for creation, the use of ‘intrinsic nature’ (svabhāva) of the
self, as assigned by Gauḍapāda (GK 1.9), explains the same theme. Consciousness,
in this depiction, is inherently endowed with the power of imagination and it is in its
act of imagination that it constitutes subjectivity and externality.

Ontology of Imagination

Rather than considering imagination as non-existent, to engage Gauḍapāda seriously

requires addressing its substantiality. After all, imagination is the power of the self,
and to consider imagination as non-existent is tantamount to accepting the self as
illusory. On this background, the way kalpanā has been understood in the
Mādhyamika philosophy needs to be distinguished from the Advaita use of the term,
beginning with Gauḍapāda’s application.

7
For the use of singular in describing jīva, see also GK 3.11.
8
MUK 3.29–30 uses ābhāsa to describe the manifestation of duality. This ābhāsa concept gives rise to
an independent Advaita model with the philosophy of Sureśvara.

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Vikalpa, for Gauḍapāda, is comparable to the dream state or māyā (GK 1.7). This
application does not deviate from that of the Mādhyamikas. Gauḍapāda, however,
needs to be read without contradicting his meta-thesis that the self constitutes
subjectivity and temporality, and gives rise to the dyad of subject and object.
Dream, in this analysis, is crucial, as the self is autonomous in both imagining and
giving the sense of reality to its imagination. The projection of consciousness as
external, as is vivid in the case of dream or fancy, is what mediates sensation and the
confirmation that what is experienced is real. Dream, in this reading, does not negate
the substantiality of what is being dreamt, it only rejects its phenomenal distinction
from the dreamer: dream entities do not exist outside of the dreaming subject.
Rather than making dream arguments as metaphysical, these then need to be read as
epistemological. In order to negate the substantiality of anything other than the self,
Gauḍapāda makes a leap, maintaining that if there were vikalpas, they would
subside within consciousness, returning to their primordial form (GK 1.18). An
application of the term vikalpa, in this reading, is not to reject the substantiality of
what is being experienced but only to affirm that their essential nature is
consciousness or the very self. The distinction from the Mādhyamika understanding
is in deriving a positive meaning, rather than interpreting it as negation of what is
being experienced. In conclusion, the consciousness of externality is not categor-
ically different, whether this externality is given to a waking self or a dreaming one.
Upon the question, what happens to entirely non-existent entities that are mere
fiction, Gauḍapāda introduces a concept of ‘dream-fiction,’ things considered as
imaginary in dreaming. When we dream, we do not just cognize entities, we also
imagine and also know that what we have imagined is not real. Actually this
capacity of the subject to create a fiction while dreaming is what gives substantiality
to dreaming: since there are entities that are not real and are merely imagined, the
dreaming subject considers the externality given to entities in dreaming as external,
and therefore real. What is missing in this, though, is that this is just the power of the
self to constitute a hierarchy among imaginations, making some more substantial
than the other.9
Vikalpa also has a linguistic domain. All the verbal constructs are considered
vikalpa, and there is no vikalpa in the absence of speech. Gauḍapāda’s use of this
term in GK 2.12 and 2.16 is noteworthy, as in these applications, the scope of
speech involves subjectivity: the very subject is a linguistic construct: language
precedes subjectivity.
When addressing the philosophy of Gauḍapāda, the analysis of sat and asat, or
existent and non-existent, cannot preclude the aforementioned linguistic parameters.
Accordingly, when Gauḍapāda explains something as asat, this should not be
interpreted as utterly non-existent, leading to the Nāgārjunian position. On the
contrary, Gauḍapāda is cleverly developing a non-dual exegesis grounded on
transcendental consciousness, displacing the framework of emptiness, while
exploiting terminology that allows him to reject those resisting the substantiality of
what is external. Gauḍapāda is simply saying that even in the waking state, we
constitute entities as non-existent (GK 2.10). Remarkably, Gauḍapāda acknowledges

9
This reading of dream-fantasy or dream-fiction rests on my reading of GK 2.9–10.

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the creativity of consciousness, comparing the imaginary, as evident in the dream,

with the externals cognized in the waking state. The object, for Gauḍapāda, then, is
not something external to consciousness but the very consciousness given in terms of
the external. What is out there, a bare object, is not something Gauḍapāda is interested
in addressing. Vikalpa can only address what is within the domain of speech, and this
is what is given to consciousness. Externalization, objectification, conceptualization,
and recollection are the powers of the self or consciousness that Gauḍapāda describes
in terms of the ‘autonomous’ (prabhu) or the luminous (deva).10
There is a third application of the term vikalpa in Gauḍapāda’s philosophy. He is
not interested in developing philosophy that is merely grounded on dry logic. He
explores the ways of phenomenological reduction, ultimately going back to what is
immediately given to consciousness. And this effort is supported by the idea of
vikalpa, as this has a yogic relation with the concept of nirvikalpa, the state of
consciousness without mental constructs. Although Gauḍapāda’s yogic reduction
has some resemblance to Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, it is not identical.
What Husserl understands as consciousness is vikalpa for Gauḍapāda. The subject-
constituting consciousness, the foundation that gives rise to vikalpa, temporality,
and intentionality, is just consciousness with the latency to constitute these, albeit
through mere imagination. This transcendent self, foundational for the emergence of
subjectivity, is reached through negation that ultimately leads to the nirvikalpa state.
Gauḍapāda therefore argues that the reality is nirvikalpa (GK 2.35; 3.34). I have
previously demonstrated that vikalpa in Gauḍapāda’s terminology equates to
kalpanā or imagination. With this, it can be concluded that just as the subject
constitutes its bondage by imagining itself as bound, and just for the reason that it
can, so can the self liberate itself by stopping imagination, as it can. Mind, for
Gauḍapāda, is the faculty of consciousness when engaged in imagining, and when
imagination ceases, there exists no mind, the essence of amanaska yoga. It is
explicit in his writing, when he says that this amanastā or ‘not having a mind’ is a
consequence of stopping the act of imagination (with the use of the term na
saṅkalpayate) (GK 3.32). The thing-in-itself or the self that is prior to imagination,
or before the rise of subjectivity, in Gauḍapāda’s terminology, is akalpaka or not the
one that gives rise to imagination (GK 3.33).
Some scholars have suggested that GK may have been written by different
authors. Whether or not this is the case, there is a shift in terminology as the
chapters unfold. Terms derived of the root √kṛp occur primarily in the first two
chapters, while this is relatively less apparent in the last two.11 This absence
coincides with the frequency of the term ābhāsa in subsequent chapters. When
reading GK as a single text, this makes sense, then, that ābhāsa and kalpanā are
treated equally, since the term ābhāsa is used by Gauḍapāda to negate the
externality of what is being manifest. In other words, ābhāsa is as much the product
or state of imagination as is kalpanā.

10
For the use of prabhu, see GK 1.8; 2.13. For deva, see 1.9; 1.10; 2.12; and 2.19.
11
There are two instances in GK 4.73–74 where the term with the root √kṛp occurs in a compound as
kalpitasaṃvṛti.

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For Gauḍapāda, imagination is required for the manifestation of the dyad of

subject and object (dvayābhāsa) (GK 3.29, 30). His dream analogy is consistent in
this application, as it is with the use of kalpanā. He argues that the appearance of the
dyad in the waking state can be compared to a dream. What Gauḍapāda is not
saying, and what most scholars mistakenly attribute to Gauḍapāda, is that subject
and object do not exist: this passage only confirms that the dyad of subject and
object in the waking state is as much a fabrication of consciousness as it is in
dreaming. The issue is, how does consciousness give rise to externality? And
Gauḍapāda is consistent in his response that it is due to its power of imagination.
The appearance of the dyad of subject and object is explained again in GK 4.61–62,
albeit this time with a shift in terminology for mind from manas to citta. Gauḍapāda
describes the yogic state of mind devoid of objects in terms of both nirvikalpa and
anābhāsa (GK 3.46). Both refer to the state of consciousness where there is no
appearance of externals. Consciousness, for Gauḍapāda, pulsates or has motion, and
this motion in consciousness is known through the emergence of externals. He
explains anābhāsa again in this context, where consciousness does not pulsate in
terms of giving rise to externality (GK 4.48). What is externality then? For
Gauḍapāda, just as circles are seen when moving a firebrand, so are the externals
generated by the pulsation of consciousness (GK 4.49–51).
For Gauḍapāda, consciousness in itself is devoid of forms, can be aspanda or
non-pulsating, akalpaka or non-imagining, or anābhāsa, not giving rise to the
externals. Examining this from Husserl’s paradigm, there is nothing intentional in
this consciousness-in-itself. With pulsation, or the power of imagination dormant to
consciousness, it gives rise to externality through which objects are cognized.
Gauḍapāda’s phenomenology does not need to lead to any form of idealism, as his is
not a thesis in which the mind creates external objects; it only explains how
externality is given to consciousness, how the dyad emerges in consciousness, and
Gauḍapāda explains that this occurs with the aid of imagination.
Let me examine a set of examples from Gauḍapāda where the term ābhāsa occurs
in compounds:
arthābhāsa or the appearance of the externals (GK 4.26),
jātyābhāsa or the appearance of the universals (GK 4.45),
calābhāsa or the appearance of entities in motion (GK 4.45),
vastvābhāsa or the appearance of entities as lasting over a period
of time (GK 4.45),
ṛjuvakrādikābhāsa or the appearance of shape as straight or curved
(GK 4.47), and
grahaṇagrāhakābhāsa or the appearance of cognizing and cognizer
(GK 4.47).
The term artha is not just an object; rather it explains entities in motion (√ṛ+tha).
This juxtaposes with vastu, where entities are viewed as lasting over a period of
time (√vas +tu), or entities that are motionless. In this sense, vastu is an opposite of
cala, the entity that is in motion. In essence, it is an appearance, or imagination, that
identifies motion or its lack within entities, and this superimposition gives the sense
that entities are either in motion or not. Universals are similarly created by the mind,

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as they are not just bare objects but are given sense by the mind, based on the images
that it constitutes. Shape, such as being straight or curvy, accordingly, is the
appearance given by mind. Entities are neither straight nor curvy: shapes are mental
products. Consciousness manifesting itself as the process of cognition and the subject
of cognition, accordingly, is a mere appearance. Now, going back to the equation I
have made with kalpanā and ābhāsa, it is the dormant power of consciousness that
constitutes these realities. What is consciousness in itself, then, is something that has
neither motion, origin, or the dyad of cognizing and cognizer (GK 4.45). The term
used here for consciousness is vijñāna. Following this application, there is no
hierarchy in consciousness: what is described with terms such as caitanya or
prajñāna is not distinct from that identified by vijñāna.
Relying on the assumption that the perceived reality is not apart from the self,
Gauḍapāda argues that the very consciousness manifests in the form of the objects of
dream, the act of dreaming, and the dreaming subject that perceives dream-reality.
Accordingly, Gauḍapāda maintains, what is conceived in the waking state as the
entities apart from the subject, and the cognitive mode, are all but consciousness itself
manifest in different modalities (GK 4.64–66).
Gauḍapāda is credited for maintaining that there is no origination (ajāti).
Following the above arguments, consciousness is not in reality constituting the
externals, and therefore there is no real origination in consciousness. In other words,
if the world is considered as the creation of the mind, Gauḍapāda is rejecting this
thesis, as what he maintains is that consciousness is not constituting anything
external to itself, for what appears as its construction is its power of imagination,
and externality is grasped in this act of consciousness, a consequence of it being
endowed with such power. This only problematizes the position that our perception
allows us to touch upon the externals as they are, without the mediation of
imagination. As Gauḍapāda maintains:
The dyad of the entities grasped by consciousness and the grasping subject are
but only the pulsation of the mind (citta). The mind, therefore, is
[characterized] as having no intentionality of its own (nirviṣaya), [being]
a-temporal (nitya), and devoid of contact with externals (asaṅga) (GK 4.72).
The above passage dismantles the hierarchy of the self or ātman and the mind or
citta. Otherwise, Gauḍapāda would not describe the mind with the given qualifiers.
Due to the fact that consciousness is autonomous in giving rise to externality with its
dormant power of imagination, consciousness does not need to be always
intentional, and this model deviates from what Husserl understands as conscious-
ness. Gauḍapāda’s quest for establishing ajātivāda needs to be read in this light, that
consciousness in itself is non-intentional. And this is not to make it a transcendent
consciousness, as he equates manas with this consciousness that in itself is devoid of
objects.
If we read Gauḍapāda along these lines, we come to the conclusion that the
instances of ajāti refer to consciousness devoid of imagination, without any
appearance, and free from pulsation. Therefore, when he says ‘there exists
something that is not created before origination (prāg utpatter ajaṃ… GK 3.1),
nothing originates even when it is so conceived (na jāyate kiñcij jāyamānaṃ…

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GK 3.2). His example of the sky to describe consciousness is compelling: just as

there is no origination of the sky inside a pot when a new pot is made, so also is
consciousness not originated (GK 3.3–4). In his presentation, consciousness is a
priori for any contemplation as much as for language, subject, and perception.
This non-origination of Gauḍapāda, therefore, needs to be read as consciousness
essentially not being modified when manifest as the externals.12 And when the
falsity of dream is given as an example to describe phenomena, this also is not
to say that dreams are not real but only to say that it is not correct to consider
dreams as external to consciousness. The example of dream serves Gauḍapāda
well, as the dyad of subject and object is essential for dreaming, just as for
perceiving. He argues, this is the pulsation of the mind that constitutes this dyad
whether in dream or in the waking state, and if the mind stops its pulsation,
there is no origination of the dyad (GK 3.29–31).

Describing the Commonsense

Our commonsense experience rests on consciousness giving rise to the sense of the
externals as externals, subject as subject, universal as universal, and motion as
motion. Whether or not consciousness in itself is altered in these apparent
modifications, our cognitive activities depend upon consciousness assuming these
modalities. This requires a two-tier phenomenology to address what is given in
reality and what appears to consciousness as given. Gauḍapāda’s terminology to
describe creation in terms of māyā and avidyā suffices to develop this two-pronged
strategy to describe reality. The statements such as ‘no subject is ever originated’
(GK 3.48), and ‘[the self] first imagines or constructs the subject’ (GK 2.16) cannot
be reconciled otherwise.
The second chapter of GK, ‘not-the-way-it-is’ (vaitathya), is primarily dedicated
to explaining this paradox of creation in the absence of creation. Common examples
to describe the commonsense experience involve rope-snake, magic, dream,
firebrand, hallucination, and so on, where, in all examples, externality or form is
given by the mind. Rather than using these examples to negate the externals, I am
reading these as affirmation that they are only instances of consciousness. The
difference in this reading is that it grounds consciousness and there is really no
discourse on bare objects outside of what is given to consciousness. Gauḍapāda’s
application of the terms kalpitasaṃvṛti and paramārtha (GK 4.73–74) is notewor-
thy, as these terms describe the perception of externality and consciousness
experiencing subject and object. In turn, phenomena are the products of
imagination, although the consciousness that is grasping these as its own
imagination cannot itself be imaginary, and thus is the ground consciousness.
Gauḍapāda cannot negate the reality-constituting-consciousness, or his position
would be identical to that of the Mādhyamikas.

12
This is why when he discusses the non-origination of the real nature, this relate to consciousness. See
GK 3.19–22.

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One needs to keep in mind that GK comes against the backdrop of the
Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad, a text that details four states of consciousness, waking,
dreaming, deep sleep, and the transcendent state where consciousness does not
particularize any object while remaining translucent. Gauḍapāda’s project
therefore is not to address anything that is external to consciousness. He
develops his philosophy to describe the varied states in which consciousness
manifests, where consciousness is deluded or being unaware (agrahaṇa),
cognizing itself as the ways it is not (anyathāgrahaṇa), and being aware or
waking (bodha). To be aware is to know the way consciousness is, and to not
confuse consciousness with its projection; not being aware stands for the deep
sleep, and both the dream and waking states of consciousness fall under
cognizing otherwise.13
The preferred terminology in the Advaita of Śaṅkara to describe commonsense
experience is by accepting a category of ‘ignorance’ (avidyā). Gauḍapāda prefers
māyā, which at the same time means the magical power, illusory nature, something
that does not exist, and something that limits (from √māṅ).14 Contemporary
scholarship has read GK primarily through the prism of the influence of
Mādhyamaka, and they are correct in many of their assessments. I differ from their
reading, in particular that Gauḍapāda applied the term māyā in the same sense as has
been used by the Mādhyamaka philosophers such as Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva. For
Gauḍapāda, this māyā maintains the self in slumber (KG 1.16), and the self is divine
in the sense that it is endowed with māyā (GK 2.12 and 19). Gauḍapāda also cites
the Vedic passage where the term māyā occurs (GK 3.24).15 One can see a
fundamental difference in these two ways of using māyā in the passage where
Gauḍapāda contends that only what exists can be differentiated due to māyā, and
something that does not exist cannot come into being due to māyā (GK 3.27–28).
The term for ‘self’ frequently occur in GK. There is, however, a noteworthy
distinction in the preferred terminology. When Gauḍapāda uses the term ātman, the
self is described as ‘endowed with’ māyā (GK 3.10). However, when he uses the
term jīva, the self is ‘constructed by’ māyā (GK 4.69). What constitutes distinction
in the non-dual self, according to Gaudapāda, is māyā (GK 3.19). What has been
˙
overlooked in the contemporary readings is, that Gauḍapāda is using the term māyā
repeatedly in its etymological meaning (with the root √mā, to measure. He even
cites the Ṛgveda along with the repeated use of the term deva to describe the self
endowed with māyā, preserving its earlier meaning as the magical divine power.
Rather than interpreting these applications as referring to a non-existent entity, or
illusion, it is reasonable that these terms are read as equivalent to kalpanā or
imagination, a power inherent to the self that allows the self to manifest externality.

13
For the terminology of agrahaṇa and anyathāgrahaṇa, see GK 1.15.
14
For examples, see: anādimāyayā supto GK 1.16; ātmā devaḥ svamāyayā GK 2.12; māyaiṣā tasya
devasya GK 2.19; svapnamāye yathā dṛṣṭe GK 2.31; ātmamāyāvisarjitāḥ GK 3.10; māyayā bhidyate hy
etan GK 3.19; indro māyābhir ity api GK 3.24; sato hi māyayā janma yujyate GK 3.27; asato māyayā
janma tattvato naiva yujyate | bandhyāputro na tattvena māyayā vāpi jāyate || GK 3.28; māyāhastī GK
4.44; janma māyopamaṃ teṣāṃ sā ca māyā na vidyate | GK 4.58; yathā māyāmayād bījāj jāyate tanmayo
’ṅkuraḥ | GK 4.59; cittaṃ calati māyayā | GK 4.61; māyāmayo jīvo GK 4.69.
15
This refers to the passage: indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa īyate | Ṛgveda 6.47.18.

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This reading of māyā as inherent to the self that gives rise to externality, and also
the argument that māyā and kalpanā are identical, both allow the reading that
consciousness in itself is endowed with the capacity to imagine, and not that what is
imagined as external is in fact external, but that the essential nature of consciousness
is intact even when it gives rise to externals. Imagination, along these lines, is the
central driving force inherent to consciousness in the rise of subjectivity,
temporality, and externality. In this reading, the intentionality of consciousness is
due to its inherent power of imagination. And this power lies in the transcendent
mode of consciousness, as it is essential in constituting both the subject and its field
of experience.

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