Indian Economic & Social History

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Agrarian Relations in North Bihar: Peasant Protest and the Darbhanga

Raj, 1919-20
Stephen Henningham
Indian Economic Social History Review 1979 16: 53
DOI: 10.1177/001946467901600103

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 Agrarian Relations in North Bihar: Peasant
Protest and the Darbhanga Raj, 1919-20

STEPHEN HENNINGHAM
University of New South Wales

In 1919 and 1920 the peasant activist Swami Vidyanand led a protest move-
ment which attracted extensive support among the people of that part of
Bihar which lies north of the Ganges. Protest focussed on the Darbhanga Raj,
Bihar’s largest zamindari and one of the largest landed estates in British
India. Drawing partly on the previously little used records of the Darbhanga
Raj, the following paper explores the context within which the protest move-
ment arose; traces its course during 1919 and 1920; and details how the
Darbhanga Raj defused the movement through a combination of concession,
propaganda and coercion. The paper concludes by discussing the relationship
between this hitherto little examined movement and the mainstream of
nationalist politics in Bihar.’ .

-
.

The protest movement led by Swami Vidyanand developed in a context of

economic and demographic pressure. Post-World War One economic dis-
location increased the prices of consumer goods while a succession of
bad seasons meant that in 1915, 1919 and 1920 foodgrains were scarce
&dquo;

and highly priced.’ Withfew reserves with which to tide themselves over
even one bad year most people suffered greatly. The wages for labour remain-
ed relatively steady, but from them labourers had to pay higher prices for
food. Fortunately they customarily got part of their wages in kind. Tenants
with marginal holdings found themselves in a precarious position: to pay their
rent they had to sell much of their produce at harvest time, when prices were

The research for this paper was financed by the Australian National University and
1
could not have been completed without the assistance of Jeanette Hoorn. For details about
the records of the Darbhanga Raj, see my "The Historical Relevance of the Darbhanga Raj
General Department Records," presented herewith as an appendix.
Judith M. Brown, Gandhi’s Rise to Power: Indian Politics, 1915-1922 (London, 1972),
2
pp. 61-62; Government of Great Britain, Indian Statutory Commission (12volumes, London,
1930), XII, p. 9.

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54

at a seasonal low, and later in the year, had to buy their food at a time when
prices had risen. Sharecroppers, lacking storage facilities, had to sell much of
their crop cheap at harvest time, and then had only limited cash with which
to contend with high commodity prices. The more strongly established mem-
bers of society, however, found higher food prices of great benefit. People
with sufficiently large holdings generally hoped to produce both enough for
their own subsistence and a surplus to be sold in the market. IHigher food-
grain prices meant that rent could be paid more easily, and that more money
remained for the purchase of consumer items. Zamindars also benefited: they
found that they could collect their rents reasonably easily and earned more
from the produce of the land over which they exercised direct cultivating con-
trol. Not infrequently, zamindars and rich tenants profited as grain dealers,
buying cheap at harvest time and selling dear later in the year. The overall
was that while the poor were under serious pressure, those
result, in short,
who were better established found themselves in a favourable position. Even
better established people, however, suffered from the ecological effects of
population pressure.
North Bihar had reached the verge of demographic crisis in the late nine-
teenth century.3 From then onwards population pressure and land shortage
pressed heavily and unremittingly on north Bihar society. By the 1890s a short-
age of land, timber, and of grazing areas for cattle had developed. By the first
decades of the twentieth century shortage had become acute scarcity and
rights to resources had become increasingly contentious. Population pressure
helped sharpen criticism of the long-established, and highly inequitable,
zamindari system of land-holding. In 1793 the &dquo;Permanent Settlement&dquo; had
clarified and guaranteed the zamindars’ rights, but it had d one little to pro-
tect the rights and interests of their tenants.4 The first legislative initiative to
protect the tenantry did not come until the passing of Act X of 1859, the
provisions of which were subsequently enlarged upon by the Bengal Tenancy
Act of 1885. These Acts abolished the landlords’ power to compel ryots to
attend when summoned to their offices, protected the ryot from summary
eviction, guaranteed the continued rights of ryots who could establish that
they had rented land from a zamindar for a period of twelve successive years,
and required zamindars who wished to raise rents to prove, through legal pro-
cesses, that their claim was reasonable.5 But legislation could not of itself
effectively secure the position of the tenantry. The key problem concerned the
successful implementation of the laws: the tenants often knew little about
their rights and even when they knew of them they often found that in legal

Walter Hauser, "The Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha, 1929-42. A Study of an Indian
3
Peasant Movement," University of Chicago, Ph. D. thesis, 1961, p. 7.
B.H. Baden-Powell, The Land Systems of British India, (2 volumes, London, 1892), II,
4
pp. 630-31.
Ibid., pp. 641-56,
5

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 55

contests the zamindars benefited from being at the centre of a wide circle of
influence. Zamindars, moreover, usually commanded more resources, a cru-
cial advantage when, because of the slowness, corruption and complexity of
the judicial process, legal struggles frequently became tests of financial endu-
rance.6
The tenant who did not wish to take legal recourse could engage in direct
action against his landlord. He might, perhaps, be able to put up a good
fight,’ but in the long run the struggle was likely to go against him, not least
because the police, if they intervened, tended to take the side of the zamindar.
Until the early twentieth century flight provided another option for the ryot.
North of the border Nepal, with its lower population, had vacant land for
cultivation.’ And, because north Bihari marriage networks extended into
Nepal there were often relatives to greet the newcomer and help him to settle
down.9 In the 1880s, large areas of the district of Darbhanga became all but
depopulated when ryots and their families responded to oppression by the
rent collectors of the Darbhanga Raj by fleeing northward into Nepal.1°
Brutal, extortionate rent farmers, backed up by a corrupt, arbitrary adminis-
tration collected the rent in Nepal, so taking refuge there could be likened to
leaping from the frying pan into the fire.&dquo; But if conditions became too
unbearable ryots could always, once they heard that conditions in north Bihar
had improved, return either to the area from which they had come or to
some other place. Most ryots, even when relatively well off, had a minimum
of material possessions, most of them readily portable, so changes of residence
could be made fairly easily.l2
By the turn of the century the relationship between ryots and zamindars had
begun to change. From the last decades of the nineteenth century the ad-
ministration had begun to show less inclination to always automatically react
in support of the zamindars. The survey and settlement operations conducted
throughout north Bihar during the 1890s and the 1900s revealed numerous
instances in which abwabs had been imposed and in which the rights and
privileges of the tenantry had been ignored.]3 The administration strongly
J6. Byrne, Bengal District Gazetteers: Bhagalpur (Calcutta, 1911), pp. 115-19.
Minden Wilson, History of Behar Indigo Factories, etc. (Calcutta, 1908, first published
7
1885), pp. 332-34.
Ibid., p. 191, "Maori" [James Inglis], Sport and Work on the Nepaul Frontier (London,
8
1878), pp. 216, 220-21.
Buddhikar Jha, interview, Darbhanga town, 20 September 1976.
9
C.J. O’Donnell, Ruin of an Indian Province. An Indian Famine Explained (London, 1880).
10
Maori, Nepaul Frontier, pp. 216-17; Wilson, Behar Indigo Factories, pp. 190-91.
11
L.S.S. O’Malley, Bengal District Gazeteers: Purnea (Calcutta, 1911), p. 113; C. Vowell,
12
"Report on the Census of the District of Purnea, 1891,’’ para 145, Mise. Papers, BSA.
See for example, J.A. Sweeney, "Statement on Ramnagar," in Government of Bihar
13
and Orissa, Report of the Committee on the Agrarian Conditions in Champaran (2 volumes,
Patna 1917), II.

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56

criticized the zamindars for this misconduct and scolded them for their abuse
of the legal system. The survey and settlement operations, moreover, involved
the detailed recording of patterns of landholding, of rental rates, and of oc-
cupancy rights, and thus established an authoritative documentary basis to
which tenants could refer in legal disputes with their landlords. Nor was the
alternative of fleeing from an extortionate zamindar as attractive as it had
been. 14 There was still land to be tilled, though less than previously, across
the border in Nepal, but because of demographic pressures in north Bihar,
and a resultant shortage of land, anyone who emigrated would have to do so
permanently, since if he returned there would almost certainly be no land
available for him to occupy, except under very disadvantageous terms as a
sharecropper or as a temporary tenant.
With greater protection from the law, and with emigration a much less
attractive proposition than hitherto, tenants were increasingly encouraged to
engage in protest to secure and adva,nce their interests. Indeed, this response
was increasingly forced upon the ryots since, because of demographic pres-
sure, the zamindari system impinged upon them with ever greater force. The
small zamindars, threatened with impoverishment, competed keenly with
their tenants for control over land, collected their rents rigorously, and inten-
sified their exaction of abwabs.I5 The large zamindars, though not always
under the same financial pressure as small zamindars,I6 nevertheless held re-
sponsibility for much oppression. The large zamindars employed as their
amlas men from small zamindar or big tenant families.&dquo; Some of these amlas
lost no opportunity to profit at the expense of those over whom they had
been given authority.&dquo; It was to be in the largest zamindari in the region-
the Darbhanga Raj-that peasant protest developed on an extensive scale.

However, migration to Nepal only gradually ceased to be an attractive proposition. See

14
petition from Mahanand Raut, f 8b, C Darkasht, G 1921-22, RDA.
J.H. Kerr, Final Report on the Survey and Settlement Operations in the Darbhanga
15
District 1896 to 1903 (Patna 1926), p. 101; Lila Rai to Editor, Searchlight, 24 September 1922.
However though they had large incomes, the large zamindars of Bihar often lived
16
beyond them and became embroiled in financial difficulty. See "Review of 1896," Behar
Times, 1 January 1897, and "Triennial Review," Behar Times, 5 January 1900.
Umarpathi Tewari, who became a clerk in the Darbhanga Raj in 1936, was the son of
17
Ram Sakhi Tewari, who held about 50 acres of land, some as a tenant and some as a zamin-
dar. Palat Mishra, who was a Darbhanga Raj jeth ryot in the Madhubani subdivision of
Darbhanga in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, held about 12 to 15 acres of
high quality land. Interview, Jageshwar Mishra, Darbhanga town, 23 September 1976; Inter-
view, Umarpathi Tewari, Dumari village, Darbhanga, 17 October 1976.
Confidential Police Report on Purnea, f 14H, C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA; Champaran
18
Committee Report, II, p. 9; "Benaili Raj—Amlas’ Oppressions," Searchlight, 29 September
1920.

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 57
’

.
III ,

The Darbhanga Raj consisted of holdings scattered across five of the seven
.
districts of north Bihar and covered 2,400 square miles, which was around 12
per cent of the total area (20,400 square miles) of the region. These holdings
yielded 2,000,000 rupees in rental income to their owner, Maharaja Ramesh-
war Singh, the 18th in a line of landed magnates which had come to power
in 1556 and the head of the Maithil Brahman community, the elite religious
community of Bihar.19 Maharaja Rameshwar Singh employed 3,000 people to
administer his estates. The diagram illustrates the structure of the Darbhanga
Raj administration.

ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF THE DARBHANGA RAJ

At the top stood the chief manager who ran the head office located in
Darbhanga town and reported directly to the Maharaja. The chief manager
directed the circle managers, each of whom was responsible for one of the 14
circles which formed the basic administrative unit of the Darbhanga Raj.

For the history of the Darbhanga Raj and its rulers see "Origin and growth of the Dar-
19
bhanga Raj (1574-1666), based on some contemporary and unpublished documents," Indian
Historical Records Commission Proceedings, XXXVI, Part II, 1961, pp. 89-98; Clive Dewey,
"The History of Mithila and the Records of the Darbhanga Raj," Modern Asian Studies 10,
Jata Shankar Jha, History of Darbhanga Raj, (Patna, 1968) and Bio-
1976, pp. 453-60; A
graphy of an Indian Patriot, Maharaja Lakmishwar Singh of Darbhangha (Patna, 1972; Ishvari
Prasad Singh, The Youngest Legislator of India: The Biography of the Hon’ble Maharaja-
dhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh, Bahadur, K.C.I.E. of Darbhangha (Patna, 1936); and Shyam
Narayan Singh, History of Tirhut from the earliest times to the end of the nineteenth century
(Calcutta, 1922). See also the Maharajadhiraja Dr Kameshwara Singh Memorial Volume,
Journal of the Bihar Research Society, XLVIII, 1962. For information about the Maithil
Brahman Community, see Paul R. Brass, Language Religion and Politics in North India
(London, 1974) and Hetukar Jha, "Nation Building in a north Indian religion. The Case of
Mithila," unpublished manuscript. (I am grateful to Dr Hetukar Jha of the Sociology
Department, Patna University for allowing me to use this manuscript.)

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 58

Each circle manager controlled four or five tehsildars (assistant managers),

each of whom held responsibility for Raj activities within a subdivision of a
circle. Beneath the tehsildars were the &dquo;village servants&dquo;-a category which
consisted of jeth ryots, patwaris, peons and barahils.20
The jeth ryots had charge of the collection of rents from the tenants within
one or two villages, and received a commission of a few per cent, varying

upwards in proportion to the percentage of the total rental demand which

they managed to collect. The patwaris kept the rent and land records of the
villages owned by the Darbhanga Raj.21 They and the jeth ryots got assistance
from the peons and barahils, who acted as messengers, retainers, guards and
stand-over men .12 In theory a jeth ryot and patwari counter-balanced one
another, checking each other’s actions and ensuring that each did his job
In fact, they frequently acted in collusion to oppress the tenantry
proper] y.23
and to defraud the Darbhanga Raj.24 The Raj had only a limited capacity to
deal with this situation. In order to collect rent from holdings dispersed over
a wide area, the Raj had to employ locally influential peasants in the posi-
tions of jeth ryot and patwari, and such men generally put their own interests
first.25
The demands of the Darbhanga Raj and the oppression of its amlas free
quently inspired opposition from the villagers. Prior to 1919 this opposition
expressed itself in a sporadic, small-scale and localized manner. However in
1919 and 1920 a protest movement developed which involved large numbers
of people and covered a wide area. The rise of the movement owed much to
the leadership and organizational skills of Bishu Bharan Prasad, a member of
the Pachhima Kayasth jati who came from the village of Sughar in Saran.

L.S.S. O’Malley, Bengal District Gazetteers: Darbhanga (Calcutta, 1907); "Extracts from
20
the Annual Report of the Officiating Manager," Government of Bengal Land Revenue Pro-
ceedings, 48-49, May 1878, BSA; "Report on the Administration of the Darbhanga Raj,
1914/15," C XXXIV, 1915-16, RDA; Raj Darbhanga Directory, 1941 (Darb anga, 1941),
RDA.
G.P. Danby, Chief Manager, Memorandum, 9 March 1933, f 16D27, C Management,
21
Regarding Patwaries and Jethrayats," f 16D39, C Management G 1941-
G 1941-42; "Rules
42, RDA.
22 Jageshwar Mishra, Darbhanga town, 20 September 1976; Maori, Nepaul
Interview
Frontier, p. 147.
"Rules regarding Patwaries and Jethrayats," f 16D39, C Management, G 1941-42,
23
RDA.
In March 1920 the Parihar circle manager commented "The Patwaris and Jeth Ryots
24
generally go hand in hand in injuring Raj interests." Parihar Manager to Chief Manager, 9
March 1920, letter 9, f 2, XXXIV, G 1919-20; see also Alapur AAR, 1326 F (1918-19), f 2,
CXXIV, G 1919-20, RDA.
Chief Manager, Memorandums dated 6 August 1937, 25 August 1939, f 16D27, C
25
Management, G 1941-42, RDA. See also P.J. Musgrave, "Landlords and Lords of the Land:
Estate Management and Social Control in Uttar Pradesh, 1860-1920," Modern Asian
Studies, 6, 3, 1972, pp. 257-75.

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 59

Bishu Bharan Prasad had been born into a reasonably well-established

family: his father held 30 bighas of land as an occupancy tenant and sat on
the local chaukidari panchayat.26 Little is definitely known about Prasad’s
early years, other than that he had been educated to a reasonable standard
and had adopted the life style of a religious mendicant under the name of
Swami Vidyanand (also spelt Bidyanand). Swami Vidyanand wished to emu-
late M.K. Gandhi’s saintly dedication to social work and political activism.
His critics alleged that, when speaking to villagers, he claimed to be Gandhi’s
disciple; but when explaining his activities to officials he denied this charge.2’
Vidyanand may not have presented himself as Gandhi’s chela, but he seems
to have been impressed by Gandhi’s impact on the people and politics of
Champaran in 1917-18.28 And like Gandhi, Vidyanand combined traditional
religious appeal with an ability to publicize his cause and a capacity to orga-
nize political protest.
Vidyanand’s career of political activism among the villagers of north Bihar
began in June 1919, when he participated in a meeting held at the village of
Narar in Madhubani, the northernmost of the three subdivisions of the dis-
trict of Darbhanga, and talked about the rights of cultivators and the need
for the establishment of schools to spread education among the people?9 The
meeting, which extended over four days from 26 June, provided an oppor-
tunity for the airing of a number of grievances.3° A few weeks later, on 311
July, a petition was addressed to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bihar and
Orissa from the &dquo;inhabitants of Narar&dquo; complaining that their landlord was
denying them their customary rights to the fruits and timber of the trees on
their holdings; that they were being required to pay a mutation fee when
their holdings changed hands; that the landlord had unjustly resumed some
of their lands; that they were being forced to supply, without remuneration,
labourers, ploughs and carts for the cultivation of this land; that the &dquo;...well-

Badrinath Upadhya, Reply

26 to "The Open Letter" Printed in the Searchlight Steam Press
with a foreword from alleged Sanyasi calling himself Swami Vidyanand (Bankipore, n.d.),
an

p. 1. This 52-page pamphlet, which was written by the manager of the Rajnager circle of the
Darbhanga Raj, supplies much information about Vidyanand’s activities. The author of the
pamphlet quotes Vidyanand’s letters and petitions in detail before presenting arguments
against them.
. See also the Searchlight, 15 December 1920 which contains a denial by Vidyanand’s
Ibid
27
associate, Shiva Shankar Jha, that he and Vidyanand had misused Gandhi’s name.
In November 1919 Vidyanand commented "... The zamindari of the Maharaja
28
Bahadur of Darbhanga is not only in the District of Darbhanga but mostly in all the neigh-
bouring districts and the tyrannical oppressions have been prevailing everywhere which are
not a bit less than those of Champaran." Vidyanand to the Lieutenant-Governor Bihar and
Orissa, 17 November 1919, para 14, quoted in Upadhya, Reply to Vidyanand, pp. 33-36.
GBO Police Abstract 1356, Darbhanga, 5 July 1919, BSA; GBO FR (1) Oct. 1919, GBO
29
PS f 8, 1920, BSA.
GBO Police Abstract 1356, 5 July 1919, BSA.
30

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 60

to-do people of the village&dquo; who had refused to supply labour and utensils
were being harassed by the institution of false criminal and civil cases; that
customary grazing rights were being denied them because former grazing
lands were being settled for cultivation; and that &dquo;even in these days of fear-
ful scarcity&dquo; the amlas obliged the vendors of oil and ghee to give them a
free supply of these commodities.3’
This petition began a long series.32 The petitions varied from one another
in matters of detail, but usually featured complaints relating to the tenants’
rights in trees, the disappearance of grazing lands, the levying of mutation
fees, the interference by the landlord with occupancy rights, and the exac-
tions and oppressions of amlas. As the year progressed Vidyanand extended
his field of operation. In mid-August he took part in the framing of a peti-
tion on behalf of the inhabitants of Narar and 17 other villages in the Madhu-
bani subdivision.33 Some six weeks later, on 2 October 1919, his associate,
Anirudh Singh, presided over a meeting attended by about 5,000 &dquo;lower and
suppressed class tenants,&dquo; on whose behalf he sent a telegram to the Lieute-
nant Governor, urging the establishment of a commission of enquiry.34
The grievances of the tenants, one official of the Darbhanga Raj later com-
mented, &dquo;... took shape when Bidyanand came on the scenes ... [sic]&dquo; and
it was merely chance that led him to start his movement in the north of the
Darbhanga district. If Vidyanand had &dquo;... gone elsewhere to commence
with,&dquo; the official contended, &dquo;... the results would have been the same.&dquo;&dquo;
Throughout the final months of 1919 Vidyanand continued his activities in
Darbhanga but also found time to make forays out of the district. In Novem-
ber he went to Supaul subdivision in north Bhagalpur intending to address a
meeting.36 The oflicials of the Darbhanga Raj, however, in collusion with the
local representatives of the British administration, deterred him from doing
SO. 31 Next, in early December, he travelled to Patna in an attempt to gain the
support of the nationalist intelligentsia.38 Later in December he visited the
Sonbarsa area, on the banks of the Ganges in north Bhagalpur, to enquire
into the grievances of the local peasants.39 Encouraged by the favourable

Memorial
31 to the Lieutenant Governor of Bihar and Orissa, quoted in Upadhya, Reply
to Vidyanand, pp. 2-3.
Ibid. Five of these petitions
32 a re quoted on pp. 2, 7, 12, 16, 19.
33 pp. 12-14.
Ibid.,
Ibid., p. 47.
34
Note by Onraet, Manager Rohika circle, 11August 1920, on the contents of a letter
35
from Lakshmi Kant Jha, f 14H, C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA.
GBO Police Abstract 1842, Bhagalpur 14 November 1919, BSA; Upadhya, Reply to
36
Vidyanand, pp. 34-36.
Upadhya, Reply to Vidyanand, pp. 35-36; GBO Police Abstract 1944, Bhagalpur, 22
37
November 1919, BSA.
38 Police Abstract 1981, Bihar Special Special Branch, 13 December 1919, BSA.
GBO
GBO FR (2), December 1919, GBO PS f 8, 1920, BSA.
39

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 61

reaction to his tours and meetings Vidyanand outlined a scheme designed to

institutionalize peasant activism through the creation of an extensive organi-
zation with branches in every village.40 This scheme did not come to fruition,
but he at least managed to establish a rudimentary agitational machine which
employed, at the rate of eight annas a day, political workers to tour from
village to village.41
In effort to gain the support of the Indian National Congress Vidyanand
an

journeyed, with a batch of 200 peasant delegates, to the annual conference of

the Congress at Amritsar in December 1919. His effort failed: those present
at the conference showed little interest in his tenants’ rights campaign.42 In
January 1920 Vidyanand returned to north Bihar to continue his work. The
centre of his activities continued to be the Madhubani subdivision of Dar-
bhanga, but he continued to attempt to broaden the geographical range of
his movement. Late in January 1920 he went to the Bihar Provincial Peasants’
Conference, held in Muzaffarpur town.43 The following month he toured in
the Supaul subdivision of the Bhagalpur district. On 5 February a meeting of
between 15,000 and 20,000 people from the Supaul area demanded that in
Permanent Settlement areas rents should be immune from increase; that
common grazing lands be provided in all villages; that ryots should have an
unrestricted right to all the trees standing in their holdings; and that ryots,
without having to gain the permission of the zamindar, should be allowed to
build houses and dig wells in their occupancy holdings.44 During the following
month Vidyanand initiated agitation in Purnea and in the Madhepura sub-
division, the more southerly of the two subdivisions of north Bhagalpur.45
In early April he visited Patna to attend a meeting of the Provincial Congress,
at which, to no avail, he called for the establishment of a committee
of enquiry to look into the grievances of the tenants of the Darbhanga
Raj.46 Throughout the following months he continued his campaign in
the districts of Darbhanga and Bhagalpur,47 and also visited the Gogri
thana of the district of Monghyr where he spoke to tenants about their
grievances over the embankments that the government had built to protect

Swami Bidyanand, "Timely notice to cultivators," leaflet quoted in GBO Police Abstract
40
1680, Bihar Special Branch 11October 1919, BSA; GBO Police Abstract 1786, Bihar Special
Branch, 1 November 1919, BSA.
Manager, Naredigar Circle, Raj Darbhanga
41 to Supaul Subdivisional Officer, 20 Novem-
ber 1920, f 10E, CV, L 1920-21, RDA.
GBO FR(1) January 1920, PS f 8, 1920, BSA; Onraet, Manager Rohika Circle to
42
General Manager, 7 January 1920, f 14 H, C XXV, G 1919-20, RDA.
GBO FR(1), February 1920, PS f 8, 1920, BSA.
43
Ibid.
44
GBO FR(1), March 1920, PS f 8, 1920, BSA.
45
GBO FR(2), April 1920, PS f 8, 1920, BSA.
46
GBO FRS for May-September PS f 8, 1920, BSA.
47

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 62

the Bengal and North-Western railway and which obstructed drainage during
the flood season. 48
In his speeches Vidyanand struck a militant note. For example when
addressing a meeting in Samastipur town, he argued that villagers had a right
to use violence in self defence against the oppression of zamindars and their
retainers.49 Some peasants needed little encouragement to engage in direct
action in defence of their interests. On many occasions during the course of
the campaign peasants cut down trees and used their wood in defiance of the
claim of the landlord to exclusive or substantial rights in trees standing on
land which he owned. 50 The authorities became concerned over the excitement
that Vidyanand generated.51 Some members of the administration, as will be
shown below, cooperated covertly with the Darbhanga Raj in suppressing the
agitations he inspired. Publicly, however, the authorities avoided taking sides
in landlord/tenant disputes. They stayed aloof from Vidyanand’s movement,
and merely attempted to ensure that both parties stayed within the bounds of
the law.
I
During the second half of 1920 Vidyanand became increasingly involved in
running for election to the Bihar and Orissa Legislative Assembly, the electo-
rate of which had been expanded, as a result of the MontaguJChelmsford
reforms of 1918, to include a substantial representation of the more esta-
blished occupancy tenants. His campaign succeeded; in electorates in northern
Darbhanga and northern Bhagalpur he and four other tenants’ represen-
tatives won victories. 52
In the course of his movement Vidyanand attracted extensive support. The
_
petitions framed under his auspices and the meetings over which he presided
concentrated on two categories of grievances both of which were of central
importance to most members of the rural population. One category of grie-
vances concerned the behaviour of the amlas whose characteristic dishonesty
and oppressiveness is amply documented, not merely by the complaints of
their opponents,53 but also in the administrative records recording the policy
discussions and decisions of the senior management of the Darbhanga Raj.,&dquo;
The other category of grievances concerned the interference, on the part of
the management of the Darbhanga Raj, with what the tenants regarded as

48 FR(1) July 1920, PS f 9, 1920, BSA.

GBO
GBO FR(1) May 1920,PS f 8, 1920, BSA.
49
Naredigar Manager to Head Office 20 March 1920, f 14H, C XXVI G 1919-20; Pandoul
50
Manager to Babu Nath Bannurjee 12 March 1920; f 14H, C XXVI G 1919-20.
GBO Police Abstract 1756, Bihar Special Branch 25 October 1919, BSA.
51
GBO, Instructions for the preparation of the electoral roll (Patna 1920), BSA; Brown,
52
Gandhi’s Rise, p. 289; GBO FR(1) December 1920, PS f 8, 1920, BSA.
For tenants’ allegations against amlas, see the Darkasht (i.e., petition) files in the General
53
Department holdings of the Darbhanga Raj.
See for example the conference papers, f 14S C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA.
51

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 63

their rights both in the light of long established custom and under the provi-
sions of the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885. Only recently, in the period 1896 to
1907, survey and settlement operations had helped create a new awareness
among the tenants of their rights. Moreover, population pressure and the
demand for land had multiplied and magnified disputes over the possession of
holdings and tempted zamindars to rent out &dquo;waste lands&dquo; that had formerly
been used for grazing.55 The demand for land created a market in land tenan-
cies. Rich villagers acquired occupancy rights as an investment and then pro-
fited by sub-letting the holdings to sharecroppers and short-term tenants.56
Landlords benefited from the transfer of tenancies by levying mutation fees.5?
These fees were imposed both on transfers by sale and transfers by inheritance.
The fees were widely resented both because they obstructed the taking over
of land by the poor and because they interfered with the investment strategies
of the better-off. 58 With the disappearance of large tracts of standing timber,
destroyed for building and fuel, wood assumed an unprecedented scarcity
value, and disputes over rights in trees multiplied.&dquo;’ Cow dung &dquo;cakes&dquo; pro-
vided an alternative fuel for domestic use, but wood was essential for building
and for the correct fulfilment of Hindu funeral rites
Peasants displayed support for Vidyanand by coming in large numbers to
his meetings. According to a Police Special Branch report Vidyanand attract-
ed 10,000 villagers to a meeting held in Darbhanga on 11 October 1919. Five
months later, according to the same source, some 15,000 to 20,000 people
attended a meeting he presided over in the Supaul subdivision of Bhagalpur.61
In a region in which communications of all kinds were very poor, the ability
to attract such numbers was impressive. Of course, an individual’s ability to
attract large numbers is in itself not decisive evidence that he has extensive
support. Such is the tedium of life in rural India that large numbers of peo-
ple will flock to any kind of public event. More convincing proof that Vidya-

55 AAR 1318
Naredigar F (1910-11), f 16D3, C Naredigar, G 1941-42, RDA; Dharampur
Manager to Chief Manager, 13 March 1920, f 2, C XXXIV, G 1919-20, RDA; Upadhya,
Reply to Vidyanand, p. 13, para 5.
Jacques Pouchepadass, "Local leaders and intelligentsia in the Champaran satyagraha
56
(1917): a study in peasant mobilization," Contributions to Indian Sociology, New Series, 8,
1974, pp. 67-87, pp. 74-75.
; Alapur AAR 1326 F (1918-19) f 2, C XXXIV, G 1919-20, RDA; Interview,
Ibid.
57
Jageshwar Mishra, Darbhanga town, 15 September 1976.
Naredigar AAR 1318 F (1610-11),f 16D3, C Naredigar, G 1941-42, RDA; Upadhya,
58
Reply to Vidyanand, p. 12, para 2; Interview, Jageshwar Mishra, Darbhanga town, 15 Sep-
tember 1976.
Demands concerning rights in trees
59 recur again and again in the petitions quoted in
Upadhya, Reply to Vidyanand.
Ibid., p. 12.
60
61 Police Abstract 1756, Special Branch, 25 October 1919, BSA; GBO FR(1) Febru-
GBO
ary 1920, PS f 8, 1920, BSA.

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 64

nand commanded considerable support is supplied by the Darbhanga Police

Superintendent’s report that at the 11I October meeting peasants donated
8,000 rupees to help finance the campaign in defence of their rights. &dquo;There
is no doubt,&dquo; commented the Superintendent,

that this man is

following the footsteps of Gandhi and inflaming the minds
of the Ryots against the Darbhanga Raj as Gandhi did in Champaran
against the planters.&dquo;
A few days later he reported that the movement was developing rapidly and
that Vidyanand’s influence over both Hindus and Muslims was &dquo;increasing
steadily.&dquo;61
Further evidence of the extent of the support which Vidyanand commanded
may be found in the reports from the managers of the fourteen circles which
formed the basic administrative units of the Darbhanga Raj.64 One such ac-
count came, in March 1920, from the manager of Rohika, a circle situated in
the Madhubani Subdivision near the border with Nepal. In this area well-
established Brahman tenants predominated. &dquo;At the end of the year,&dquo; the
manager reported,
... a peasant agitation was started in the circle by a charlatan calling him-
self Swami Bidyanand, he had meetings instigating ryots to rebel against
landlords and defy their authority, he very soon got a large following as he
promised them all their desires, though of course he could not fulfil any of
his promises [sic].65

In the Madhubani Subdivision Vidyanand attracted support from locally

prominent Brahman occupancy tenants, but elsewhere, in the Padri circle in
south-east Darbhanga for example, he drew support from people lower down
in the social scale who held less secure rights over land. According to the
circle manager, the population of the Padri area consisted of &dquo;low caste men
such as Gowalas, Koeris, Mussalmans etc., and they are most obstinate [sic].&dquo;ss
Some of these people had been cultivating holdings belonging to the Dar-
bhanga Raj on a sharecropping basis. But &dquo;... this year,&dquo; the Padri manager
reported in August 1920, under &dquo;the instigation of a Swami... who came out
in this elaka twice, they have changed their minds not to share the produce

62 Police Abstract 1756, Bihar Special Branch, 25 October 1919, BSA.

GBO
GBO Police Abstract 1786, Bihar Special Branch, 1 November 1919, BSA.
63
The number of circles varied from time to time as a result of administrative adjustments
61
but usually numbered about fourteen. For information on the circles, see the Raj Darbhanga
Directory, 1941, RDA and the annual administrative reports on each circle.
Rohika AAR, 1326 F (1918-19), f 2, C XXXIV, G 1919-20, RDA.
65
Manager, Padri to Chief Manager, 10 August 1920, f 2A, C XXXIV, G 1919-20, RDA.
66

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 65

but to pay rents.&dquo;67 The sharecroppers’ demand that they be allowed to pay
a cash rental rather than give the landlord a half share of the crop was partly,
no doubt, designed to take advantage of the unusually high prices prevailing
for foodgrains. Yet it also indicated an awareness on their part that, if they
continued tilling the land as cash rent payers, they, by collecting receipts,
could establish occupancy rights to the land. Indeed they already claimed such
rights, and contended that they had some documentary evidence to support
their claims. In concluding his remarks the manager stressed the &dquo;need for
orders as to how to handle this urgent business.&dquo;68
Vidyanand’s campaign drew support from a broad spectrum of the social
hierarchy. In the petition from Narar village in Madhubani which initiated the
movement the petitioners complained that they had &dquo;... to supply labourers&dquo;
to their landlord, a complaint indicating that the petitioners were influential
tenants with tied labour at their command.69 The petitioners also complained
that the &dquo;... well-to-do people of the village&dquo; who had refused to comply
with the wishes of the Darbhanga Raj were being harassed by the institution
of legal proceedings.10 The Narar petitioners also, however, complained that
the Darbhanga Raj amlas insisted on a free supply of oil and ghee &dquo;... from
those dealing in these commodities.&dquo;’1 In the village context the producers
and suppliers of these commodities were from lower caste groups, namely
Yadavs in the case of ghee and Telis in the case of oil. And as has just been
shown, Vidyanand also drew support from the lower caste sharecroppers of
the Padri area.

IV

Swami Vidyanand’s campaign strongly challenged the lower level staff of the
Darbhanga Raj. The allegations made against them often rang true, and hence
they initially had no sympathy for Vidyanand’s activities. Eventually, how-
ever, many of them became covert supporters of Vidyanand. &dquo;The people
we should be able to rely on to keep up Raj prestige and influence in the

villages&dquo; one manager reported, &dquo;have many inducements to sell Raj inte-
rests.&dquo;72 The village level staff were paid at rates that had been fixed around
Ibid.
67
68 manager
Padri to Chief Manager, 10 August 1920, f 2A, C XXXIV, G 1919-20, RDA.
See also, Alapur AAR 1326 F (1918-19), f 2, C XXXIV, G 1919-20, RDA. Unfortunately I
was not able to ascertain the outcome of the Padri sharecroppers’ protest movement. It seems
that the Darbhanga Raj was able to contain it effectively through the granting of some con-
cessions.
Upadhya, Reply
69 to Vidyanand, pp. 2-3.
Ibid.
70
Ibid.
71
R.S. King, "Strictly Confidential Note," 14-17 January 1920, letter 1, f 14S, C XXVI,
72
G 1919-20, RDA.

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 66

1880, when the price of food was about a third of the price prevailing in
1920. Previously they had been able to increase their income by extracting
abwabs from the villagers but this could much less easily be done now that
the tenant movement had encouraged the villagers to defy them. Because of
the shaky morale of the lower level staff the Darbhanga Raj was faced, by
the beginning of 1920, &dquo;... with a crisis and a danger never known before. 1171
The upper level staff of the Darbhanga Raj knew of this problem of staff
morale and acknowledged that many of the complaints made against their
subordinates had much justification. The Saraya circle manager expressed a
characteristic opinion when he contended, on the basis of his 30 years’ ex.
perience in the service of the Raj, that &dquo;Ryots never rebel unless treated un-
fairly by amlas.1’7’1 Dissidence among the tenantry and discontent among the
lower level staff interfered with the collection of rent and thus handicapped
the running of extensive estates. The higher management of the Darbhanga
Raj needed to keep both its staff and its tenants reasonably contented.15 In
some instances, moreover, concessions had to be made to the tenants because

they had a legal right to that which they claimed. For this reason P.T. Onraet,
the manager of the Rohika circle, urged the Raj to meet the tenants &dquo;half
way,&dquo; because legally &dquo;... the Raj will not be able to back its demands on
the grounds of ancient customs The imminence of an election to the Le-
gislative Assembly, due in November 1920, also helped shape the attitude of
the Raj administration. This election would be held on the basis of an enlarg-
ed franchise. All those who paid 2 rupees or more in chaukidari tax, or 1
rupee or more in road or public work cesses would be entitled to vote.’, In
order for &dquo;acceptable&dquo; candidates to win ofhce, the senior Raj managers de-
cided at a conference held in January 1920, it would be necessary &dquo;... to

Ibid.
73
Saraya Manager
74 to Chief Manager, 16 June 1928, f la-le, C XVIII, G 1927-28, RDA.
75
In 1915, when there had been agitation under way among tenants of the Darbhanga
Raj the higher management of the Raj had shown some interest in improving Raj/tenant
relations. On 30 June 1915 the manager of the Darbhanga circle canvassed the other circle
managers suggesting the establishment in each circle of a committee of locally influential
men, presided over by the circle manager, to "... look after village improvement, settle dis-
putes, foster good Zamindar/Tenant relations and preach loyalty to Government." Dar-
bhanga circle manager, note dated 30 June 1915, f 26, C XXV, G 1915-16, RDA. The plan
did not come to fruition, but initially it elicited a reasonably favourable response. Six of the
ten managers who replied agreed with the proposal, two thought it was a good idea but
impractical, and two were opposed to it. The managers’ replies are held with the Darbhanga
manager’s note.
76 by Onraet, Manager Rohika circle, 11August 1920, on the contents of a letter
Note
from Lakshmi Kant Jha, f 14H, C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA.
Government of Bihar and Orissa, Instructions for the preparation of the ;
77 electoral roll
note by Sunder, 22 January 1920, f 14Z24, C XXV. G 1919-20, RDA.

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 67

have the tenants in our hands.&dquo; 18

To protect the interests of the Darbhanga Raj and rally the support of the
tenantry the circle managers and the head Office officials decided, at the Janu-
ary conference, to take five initiatives.19 They agreed that the village level
staff should be paid more, so that they would have less need to exact abwabs.
Currently, patwaris and peons earned a lower wage than coolies. In view of
this, one official posed the question, &dquo;How can we not expect them to receive
bribes?&dquo;a° They also decided that the mutation fee, currently being realized
at the rate of 25 per cent of the purchase price, should be reduced to around
about 10 per cent; that the Raj should waive some of its claims concerning
the use of timber; that tenants should be allowed to build houses on their
holdings without having their rent increased; and that the rates being paid for
the hiring of labour and of ploughs should be increased.&dquo; The managers also
considered some of the special problems that had arisen in those of the Raj
properties that lay within the Purnea district. The most notable of the grie-
vances of the Purnea tenants concerned the exaction of fees for the use of
ferries. The Darbhanga Raj owned the right of establishing a ferry service to
carry passengers across a stream or a river that traversed an area which it
owned and usually sub-contracted this right on a long-term basis to a locally
influential peasant. These sub-contractors could not ferry customers during
the dry season, because the streams and rivers almost completely dried up.
Despite this, they had begun the practice of levying, during the dry season, a
ferry fare from every traveller who crossed the dry water course at or near the
point where their ferry plied during the wet season. Since the ferry stations
were situated along the course of the district’s roads and tracks, travellers hal
to pass near them both during the dry and wet seasons. The members of the
conference ordered that henceforth no tolls would be levied during the dry
season and decided, so as to make it easier to enforce this order, that in
future the right to run a ferry would only be let out for short periods.8?
The administrators of the Darbhanga Raj supplemented conciliation with
counter-propaganda. Badrinath Upadhya, the manager of the Rajnager
circle, compiled a 52-page pamphlet in which he replied to the charges laid
and the grievances raised both in Rajnager circle and elsewhere.83 The circle
managers sent retainers to keep a close watch on Vidyanand and his associ-
ates and to dissuade people from supporting them.81 At the January
conference one circle manager argued that

"Conference Papers," letter 1, f 14S, C XXVI,

78 G 1919-20. RDA.
Ibid.
79
Ibid.
80
Ibid.
81
"Special
82 Grievances of Purnea tenants," ibid.
Upadhya, Reply
83 to Vidyanand.
Letters 21 and 22, f 14H, C XXVI,
84 G 1919-20, RDA.

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 68

We should keep the few influential men in our hands. The tenants are

completely in their hands and simply by keeping these few men in our
hands we shall practically have the whole tenantry in our hands.85

A tehsildar of the Alapur circle in northeast Madhubani carried out this

suggestion. Early in 1920 Vidyanand contacted some of the locally influential
men in the circle and arranged to give a lecture on 26 February. Before the

meeting the tehsildar engaged in counter-propaganda in his area among the

locally influential Yadav tenants. Thanks to these efforts:

a partition was created. The better class of the leading Goalas [i.e.,
Yadavs] carefully avoided visiting him; and Vidyanand had for his audience
only the insignificant low class people.&dquo;

The Swami, the tehsildar reported, left Alapur disappointed, having &dquo;failed to
achieve any success.&dquo;8?
The administrators of the Darbhanga Raj also used a variety of coercive
means to dissuade people from supporting Vidyanand. At one stage, it is
clear from a document preserved in the Raj archives, a full-scale programme
of repression was planned for the Rohika and Rajnager circles.88 This prog-
ramme did not come into operation. apparently because it conflicted with the

conciliatory policy adopted at the January conference.e9 But individual Raj

official were not inhibited by the conference from employing coercive
methods. In the Supaul division of north Bhagalpur the Raj amlas,&dquo; ...

being enraged at the stopping of perquisites,&dquo; harassed the tenants by refus-

ing to accept their rent payments when they were protl’ered.9° By this means
Comment by Gadadhar Pandit Jha, "Notes of 15th January Conference," f 14S, C
85
XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA.
Letter 22, f 14H, C XXVI,
86 G 1919-20, RDA.
87
Ibid.
See the Head Office circular to managers Rohika and Rajnager, n.d., held with letter 1,
88
f 14H, C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA. The programme outlined in the circular called on the
Rohika and Rajnager circle managers to bring rent enhancement suits against those local
leaders who had assisted Vidyanand, to initiate damages suits against ryots who had cut trees
without permission, to offer jeth ryots a commission of 10 per cent of the money realized if
they brought people forward to have transfers of holdings recorded on payment of the
"usual" fee of one quarter of the purchase price, to establish and keep up-to-date a register
of "loyal" and "disloyal" ryots, and to investigate and take action upon any Raj legal
claims against "disloyal" tenants.
In the margin of ibid., are written the words "Not Issued." I was unable to confirm that
89
the circular had not been sent out because the volume of despatched Head Office circulars
for the year had been misplaced and could not be located during the period in which I was
working in the Raj Darbhanga Archives. I would be grateful for information on this point
from any scholar who may in future work on the Darbhanga Raj records.
Letter 18, f 14H, C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA; Moti Lal, Tehsildar, Nawahakhar Group
90

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 69

the amlas exposed the tenants to the danger of

being sued for not having
paid their rent, and subjected them to the inconvenience of having to keep
their rent money on hand. In the district of Purnea a local Raj officials
decided that two Raj amlas who had given evidence unfavourable to the Raj
in a criminal case arising from the movement should be dismissed.91 In the
Naredigar circle of the Raj, in the northwest of Bhagalpur district the manager
kept a close eye on Vidyanand’s supporters. Late in 1920 he described one of
them, a Bengali tenant by the name of Suresh Chunder Laha, as &dquo;... a very
dangerous person and... the instigator of much evil;&dquo; and followed this
comment with the cryptic statement &dquo;I am looking after him.&dquo;9’ The same
officials had urged in January 1920 that good tenants be rewarded with con-
cessions, but insisted that

absolutely no concessions should be made unless and until all other means
of gaining over disaffected tenants, if there be such tenants, are exhausted.
A good Manager will use his tact and judgement in winning over unruly,
turbulent and disloyal men, and he should be allowed the fullest possible
latitude in dealing with them in any manner which seems most expedient
to himself. He will always be acting in the Raj interests, and he must be
permitted to exercise his fullest discretion. , ..93

Raj managers also directed coercion

against the Swami himself. On 13 July
1919, according to his
account, Vidyanand was menaced by a group of
own
ruffians while he was journeying from one village to another.9’ In another
incident that occurred a short time later he discovered that men were awai-
ting him along the roads and had to take to the fields to avoid them.95 While
travelling to a meeting scheduled to be held at Madhubani town on October
1919, he was menaced by a large armed mob, and was only saved by the
intervention of the local chaukidars.96 Next, on the 12 November, Vidyanand
attempted to hold a meeting at the village of Parsa Madho, near Nirmali
town in northwest Bhagalpur. By noon on the day of the meeting some 15,000
tenants had gathered. About 40 minutes later a Raj amla arrived accom-

to Manager, Naredigar, 28 March 1920, held with letter 29A,f 14H, C XXVI, G 1919-20,
RDA.
"Report on Samiah case," f 14H, C XXV, G 1919-20, RDA.
91
92
D. Sunder, Manager Naredigar to His Highness the Maharaja, 1 September 1920, f 14H,
C XXVI, G 1910-20, RDA.
93 Sunder, "Confidential Note," 22 January 1920, F 14 Z 24, C XXV, G 1919-20.
D.
RDA.
Swami Vidyanand to the Lieutenant-Governor, Bihar and Orissa,
94 17 November 1919,
quoted in Upadhya, Reply to Vidyanand, pp. 31-36, p, 31.
Ibid., p. 32.
95
Ibid.
96

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70

panied by 50 lathials. Vidyanand asked the local Sub-Inspector of Police to

request them to leave. The Sub-Inspector made this request but the lathials
replied
that if the meeting would be held at that spot they would be dismissed from
their services and that it was the order of the Sub-Manager Bhaptiahi circle.
Hence they would try their best to prevent the holding of the meeting.97

In view of the determination of the Raj servants to disrupt proceedings

-

Vidyanand decided, on the advice of the Police Sub-Inspector and for the
sake of the safety of the people who had gathered, to suspend the meeting,
which he did after talking briefly to the crowd.9B
After the January conference had decided to adopt a more conciliatory
approach to the tenant problem and because direct interference with him had
created bad publicity for the Darbhanga Raj, the supporters of the Raj seem
to have subjected the Swami to less harassment. There continued to be times,
nonetheless, when he courted physical danger. On 20 June 1920, Vidyanand
arrived to hold a meeting at the village of Kothia Dumri, in the north of
Darbhanga district near the Tajpur police thana.99 During the previous weeks
the Swami had vigorously criticized the management of the Bhawara indigo
factory, a concern owned by the Darbhanga Raj.100 According to a police
report, the local tenants became excited about the meeting because they had
heard that supporters of the Bhawara factory were planning to attend. ]01 At
about half past one in the afternoon Vidyanand arrived and announced that
the local police had decided the meeting would have to be postponed in order
to avert a breach of the peace. At this point a group of supporters of the
factory began pressing the Swami with a number of questions. Protagonists
of both sides surrounded him. &dquo;At this juncture 50 or 60 Bhawara men&dquo;lo2
rushed out of an adjacent hiding place, brandishing lathis. By arriving armed
these men broke a promise that had earlier been made to the police by one
of the factory amlas that the supporters of the factory would be unarmed.
The Sub-Inspector of the Tajpur thana ordered the tatlzials to leave, but they
refused to go. The Swami, according to the Sub-Inspector’s account, &dquo;...was
very frightened,&dquo; and asked for a police escort out of the village, &dquo;...as the
Head Clerk of the Bhawara factory had asked him to leave the village at

97 p. 35.
Ibid.,
Ibid., p. 36.
98
W.B. Brett
99 to McPherson, Home Secretary, 7 August 1920, GOI HPf 50, September
1920, NAI.
Ibid.
100
Confidential Diary, Darbhanga Police Superintendent, 23 June 1920, GOI HPf 50,
101
September 1920, NAI,
Ibid.
102

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 71
once.&dquo;101 Once he had managed to get away Vidyanand despatched a tele-
gram to the Searchlight complaining about the way he had been treated.104
In theory the administration and police were committed to assume a neut-
ral attitude to Vidyanand’s movement and to administer the law impartially.
In reality police and local officials tended to side with the Darbhanga Raj
against the dissident tenantry. The police did not effectively protect Vidya-
nand against harassment by Darbhanga Raj lathials and police and local
ofhcials, rather than protect Vidyanand’s right to speak, were quite prepared
to close down his meetings on the grounds that a breach of the peace appeared
likely as a result of the actions of his opponents. The administration had
sympathy for the grievances of the tenantry, but because of its support for
the Zamindari system, and particularly for the Maharaja of Darbhanga, the
premier zamindar of north Bihar, it was unwilling to do anything substantial
to express this sympathy.
With the covert assistance of policemen and oiTicials the Darbhanga Raj
was able to combine coercion with conciliation and keep Vidyanand’s move-
ment under control. In the second half of 1920, with the economic situation
somewhat improved, with the Raj concessions coming into operation, and
with Vidyanand directing his energies towards success in the forthcoming
elections the movement declined. The movement had not succeeded in bring-
ing about the complete redress of all the tenants’ grievances, but it had at
least brought them concessions. Less tangibly, but perhaps of greater long-
term significance, the movement had raised the level of consciousness among
the peasantry of the Darbhanga Raj. This longer term repercussion of the
movement was illustrated by the campaign initiated in Pandoul circle in
December 1921.
On 20 March 1922, a petition arrived at the head oflice of the Darbhanga
Raj from the Telis or oil pressers of the hamlet of Mohamedpur in the
Maksuda mauza. The petitioners complained about the dishonesty of the .

local amlas, who, &dquo;...quite contrary to custom,&dquo; had been exacting free
supplies of oil from them, and said that though unwilling to supply free oil,
they would be willing to pay a cash rate, like the Teli ryots in neighbouring
localities, for the right to extract oil from the seeds of the linseed and teli
plants.&dquo;5 They said they had approached the circle manager with their comp-
laint but had received an unsympathetic response. They claimed that the ,

Ibid.
103
104
Ibid.
Petition from Raghunandan Sahu and others, f 5C, C X, G 1921-22, RDA. The Telis’
105
offer to pay a cash fee the right to produce oil perhaps indicates that they were vexed more
by the arbitrary behaviour of the amlas than by the exaction of the perquisite itself. However
the offer to pay cash may also have been a ploy. Once money changed hands, then receipts
could be demanded; and the Telis could use these receipts as evidence in court to show that
the practice continued, in the hope of being awarded a court decision declaring it illegal.

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72

circle manager had reprimanded them for having, on an earlier occasion,

approached the head office of the Raj, had demanded &dquo;in insulting terms&dquo;
that they supply the free oil, and had refused to accept their rents, even
though they came every day to the circle office ready to pay them, saying
that he intended to realize the rents by litigation. ]06 According to the account
of the circle manager the Telis, every day &dquo;since the time immemorial,&dquo; had
given small quantities of oil to the Patwari and to the other village amlas, but
had decided to stop doing so in November 1921. The circle manager justified
the exaction of the oil by pointing out that the village amlas received &dquo;very
low pay.&dquo;10&dquo; He also commented that this issue had originally been raised in
the area &dquo;...by the so called Swami Vidyanand and since then .from time to
time the agitation breaks out as in this instant.&dquo; He argued that the Telis be
made to supply the oil lest a &dquo;precedent ... be established and if so what is
to prevent such attacks from being made on other such established customs.&dquo;
Though the issue of the oil was in itself only of minor importance, he conclu-
ded, the effect of the custom being successfully defied &dquo;... will be vast and
far reaching for further mischief,&dquo; and therefore contended that the oil should
be collected &dquo;at any COSt.&dquo;108 The senior management of the Raj responded
to this suggestion by commenting that since the exaction of the oil was an
abwab the Raj had no legal redress against the Telis.’os &dquo;Our remedy,&dquo; the
head office decided,

lies in finding out and stopping the privileges we might have been hitherto
allowing them to enjoy matter of favour and in putting other tactful
as a

pressure forcing them to come to their senses and realize that they should
not be recalcitrant and ungrateful to the landlord [sic].l1O
The Chief Manager of the Darbhanga Raj therefore wrote to the Pandoul
manager requesting him to find ways of putting &dquo;tactful pressure&dquo; on the
Teli roots.111
By means of &dquo;tactful pressure,&dquo; the exact nature of which remains obscure,
the administration of the Darbhanga Raj defused the protest movement of
the Pandoul oil pressers The history of the oil pressers’ agitation illustrates
that Swami Vidyanand’s movement had continuing repercussions. However
it also demonstrates that the Darbhanga Raj had managed to weather Vidya-
nand’s movement successfully, and still had substantial resources and effec-
tive means at hand with which to bring dissident villagers into line.

Ibid.
106
107 Manager to Chief Manager, 15 December 1921, f 5C, C X, G 1921-22, RDA.
Pandoul
Pandoul Manager to Chief Manager, 7 April 1922, held with ibid.
108
Head Office notes, 3 May 1922, f 5C, C X, G 1921-22, RDA.
109
110 Ibid.

Chief Manager to Manager Pandoul, 5 May 1922, f 5C, C X, G 1921-22, RDA.

111

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 73

in north Bihar during 1919 and 1920 the combination of harsh economic condi-
tions with demographic pressure and with the implementation of the Montagu/
Chelmsford reforms provided suitable circumstances for Swami Vidyanand’s
protest movement to attract considerable support. By late 1920 Vidyanand
had excited widespread interest and had achieved election to the legislature.
By this time, however, his movement was on the wane. Vidyanand’s shift of
emphasis away from direct action and towards electioneering partly explains
the decline of the movement. Vidyanand himself seems to have been satisfied,
at least temporarily,112 when his advocacy of peasant interests won him the
electoral support of that small minority of occupancy tenants which had
gained the franchise. In addition, in 1920 prices were lower and scarcity was
less than in 1919, with the result that economic pressure on the poorer
peasants decreased.113 Moreover, after a time the novelty value of Vidyanand’s
tours and meetings were off, and people, finding that change did not come as

completely or as quickly as at first they had hoped, lost their enthusiasm for
the movement.’ 14
Nonetheless, the most important reason for the ebbing away of Vidyanand’s
movement was the skilful strategy adopted by the senior management of the
Darbhanga Raj The senior Raj managers endeavoured particularly to ensure
the allegiance of &dquo;... the few influential men&dquo; who held a leading position
among the peasantry.&dquo;’ These men and the rest of the peasantry were at odds
with the Raj because of the misconduct of the Raj anilas and because demo-
graphic pressure had sharpened the conflict between the Raj and its tenants
over the control and use of the means of agrarian production. The senior

Raj managers enacted concessions which mollified both the &dquo;... the few
influential men&dquo; and their social inferiors. Because the better established
peasants were profiting from the conditions of scarcity and high prices, it
seems probable that they were quite easily satisfied with the concessions
instituted. The less well established peasants, who were suffering from the
high price and scarcity situation, may have been less impressed by the conces-
sions, but they depended on ‘’... the few influential men&dquo; for leadership.
Moreover, the Darbhanga Raj supplemented the concessions with propaganda
and coercion in an effective programme of containment.

Subsequently Vidyanand assumed a more radical stance, and in 1922 began calling for
112
the abolition of the zamindari system. By this time, however, conditions were much less
favourable for the mounting of mass protest. Searchlight, 29 December 1922.
The lessening of economic pressure was reflected in a fall in the crime rate. See GBO
113
FR (2), August 1920 PS f 8, 1920, BSA.
GBO FR(2), March 1920, PS f 8, 1920, BSA.
114
Comment by Gadadhar Jha, "Notes of 15th January Conference," f 14S, C XXVI, G
115
11 1919-20, RDA.

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 74

In containing Vidyanand’s campaign the Darbhanga Raj received the covert

assistance of the British administration and benefited from the stance adopted
by the Bihar Congress. At first, aware that the grievances that Vidyanand
publicized were genuine and impressed by his ability to mobilize extensive
support, Congressmen displayed sympathy for the movement. Congressmen
also sympathized with Vidyanand because the reigning Maharaja of Darbhanga,
Rameshwar Singh, was a leading opponent of the nationalist intelligentsia and
a staunch supporter of the British.&dquo;6 However as support for Vidyanand
grew
Congressmen became less willing to be associated with him.
The turning point in the attitude of the Bihar Congress to Vidyanand came
in April 1920 when Vidyanand attended a Bihar Provincial Conference and
moved a resolution calling on the British administration to form a committee
of enquiry into the grievances of the Darbhanga Raj tenants. The leading
Congressmen Rajendra Prasad opposed the motion and succeeded in having
it shelved. In opposing the motion Prasad alleged that Vidyanand was untrust-
worthy, had falsely claimed to be Gandhi’s chela, and was a charlatan out to
make a career for himself by exploiting the discontents of the peasant .117 After
this denunciation, the Congress disassociated itself from Vidyanand.
The opposition of Congress to Vidyanand resulted from the conservatism of
the nationalist movement in Bihar. Vidyanand’s activities in 1919 and 1920
sought to protect the rights and interests of the peasantry but involved no
attack on the legitimacy of the zamindari system itself. The aims of the
campaign were reformist rather than radical. However despite Vidyanand’s
reformism the Bihar Congress became greatly concerned. Vidyanand focussed
his campaign against the Darbhanga Raj but claimed to speak generally on
behalf of the tenants. The Bihar Congress feared that moderate agitation
might develop into radical protest and that the campaign against the chief
zamindari in north Bihar might develop into an attack on the entire zamindari
system.
Many Congressmen came from landlord backgrounds and had only limited
sympathy for criticism of the conduct of landlords and their amlas. The
Congress, moreover, looked particularly for support to the large numbers of
small landlords in Bihar, and sought to unite landlords and tenants against the
British.&dquo;&dquo; Congress therefore adopted a &dquo;neutral&dquo; stance on landlord/ tenant
disputes. (Given existing circumstances, of course, this neutrality amounted
to covert support of the landlords.) Consequently it was only in exceptional
circumstances that Congress favoured tenants against their landlords. Admit-

GBO FR(1), December 1919, PS f 8, 1919, BSA.

116
GBO
117 FR(2), April, PS f 8, 1920, BSA.
G. McDonald, ’’Unity on Trial: Congress in Bihar, 1919-39," in D.A. Low (Ed.),
118
Congress and the Raj: Facets of the Indian Struggle, 1919-1947 (London, New Delhi, 1977),
pp. 292-95.

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 75

tedly, Congressmen did give some support to the tenants in the anti-indigo
campaign which developed in north Bihar from 1917 to 1922.119 However this
campaign was directed against a small group of European planter-landlords
who were identified with the British administration and who, as an &dquo;alien elite,’
’lacked close ties with the local population.120 Otherwise, during Vidyanand’s
movement, and subsequently during the struggle for independence, Bihar
Congressmen discouraged anti-landlord protest. By doing so they helped
protect their own privileged position in north Bihar society and helped main-
tain the alliance between tenants and small landlords against the British
Raj.

ABBREVIATIONS

See my "Protest and Control in North Bihar, India, 1917-1942. A Study of Conflict
119
and Continuity in a Colonial Agrarian Society,’’ Australian National University, Ph. D.
thesis 1978, Chapter 2.
See my "The Social Setting of the Champaran Satyagraha: The Challenge to an Alien
120
Elite," The Indian Economic and Social History Review, XIII, 1, 1976.

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