US ARMY SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY

FORT BLISS, TEXAS

CORRESPONDING STUDIES PROGRAM

RB 22-600-20

THE DUTIES RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY OF NCO's

FEBRUARY 1989

c
•
TAgLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
PREFACE • . • • . . • . • • • . . ..;
CHAPTER 1 - \~HY THIS MANUAL? •. 1-1 - 1-18
CHAPTER 2 - THE ORGANIZATION . . . • 2-1 - 2-9
CHAPTER 3 - CHANNELS OF COt1MUNICATION. . 3-1 - 3-14
CHAPTER 4 - AUTHORITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND DUTY. • 4-1 - 4-21
CHAPTER 5 - CONCEPTS OF TASKS AND TASK APPLICATION • • • • 5-1 - 5-19
CHAPTER 6 - ST,a.TEr~E~lTS OF GENERAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITIES OF
OFFICERS AND NCO'S 6-1 - 6-8
CHAPTER 7 - SUMPARY • . . . • . . 7-1 - 7-4

The wordina in this manual should not be construed to discriminate between the sexes.

In order to avoid a repetitious use of the terminology, "he/she," the tems "he," "him,"

and "his," as well as "men," are intended to include both the masculine and feminine

gender. Any exceptions to this usage will be so noted •

 PREFACE

This manual was prepared to further develop and refine the doctrine of the
functional relationship which must exist between officers and NCOs at all
1eve1s wi thi n the Army. Inc 1uded is the essent i a 1 doc tri ne necessa ry for
commissioned officers and noncommissioned officers to begin the process of
clarifying their duties, responsibilities, and authority. The manual should
be used in conjunction with other interpersonal skills and existing leader­
ship doctrine.
Chapter 1 presents a brief historical view of the traditional relationship
among officers and NCOs. It presents facts and establishes a basis for
discussing some of the major problems which exist in the Army today.
Chapter 2 identifies the basic components that exist within an organization
in which the officer and NCO must effectively function. This is done
using a systems approach which utilizes the Army organizational effective­
ness mode 1.
Chapter 3 explains the methods and channels of communication in the chain
of command and supporting channels. Emphasis is placed on the NCO support
channel and the need and use of feedback within the communication process.
Chapter 4 is an explanation of the concepts of authority, responsibility,
and duty. Authority is discussed followed by an overview of power as the
means for establishing effective authority. In the discussion of respon­
sibility, the responsibility of individuals and the responsibility of
commanders are defined and clarified. Finally, the concept of duty is
developed with a distinction made between a duty and a task.
Chapter 5 presents a model incorporating the traditional Army philosophy
of supervision. Although perhaps confusing because the model is new, field
testing has shown that it is useful and useable as a technique for training
NCO's and officers. Examples are presented which transfer the principles
of the model to common, easily understood situations. Lastly, the chapter
focuses on developing teamwork and teambuilding processes.
Chapter 6 outlines the primary functional duty areas of the officer corps
and NCO corps.
Chapter 7 traces the emergence of the noncommissioned officers corps as
a profession. It stresses the importance of ethics within the NCO corps
and the need for continual policing of itself. Lastly, the text is
sunmarized.

48-2003
ST/2

 Chapter 1
WHY THIS MANUAL?

INTRODUCTION
Confusion exists among commissioned and noncommissioned officers about their
duties, responsibility, and authority. The purpose of this manual is to
assist both commissioned and noncommissioned officers in clarifying their
duty to reduce this confusion. This manual presents both principles and
techniques. Following the principles and applying the techniques in this
manual produces a total method which will clarify the duties, responsibility,
and authority of commissioned and noncommissioned officers.
One lesson prevails: progress requires flexibility. If something works,
it is retained; if it fails, it 1s rejected. One tradition that has with­
stood the test of time is the complementary relationship and mutual respect
between the commissioned and the noncommissioned officer in the US Army.
Since the US Army's inception in 1775, their duties have been separate but
necessarily related. There are traditional, functional, and legal reasons
for the particular duties of commissioned and noncommissioned officer.
In order to better understand the direction we (officers and NCO's) should be
going, it is helpful to understand why the ArmY is structured with commissioned
officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers.
Commissioned Officers.
The historical forebearer of the American commissioned officer begins with the
formation of the Army in 1775. Commanders of companies and regiments came from
the segment of the population that had money or property because the commander
had to raise and equip his unit out of his own pocket. The transmission of
orders and information was primarily by written message since verbal messages
sent by messenger were subject to being forgotten or misinterpreted by the
messenger. Thus the primary qualification for appointment to officer ranks
was education (literacy) and property. Those men who possessed these qualifi­
cations normally identified with existing 18th Century European class systems.
When the United States was established by the Constitution, several of the
"class" ideas were retained in terms of "commission" or appointment by the
President. One reason was to maintain a degree of influence in the Army by
the "prop~rtied class." Another more practical reason was to establish a
legal basis for the President to appoint and have direct control over qualified
people to act as his legal agents and assist him in carrying out his duties as
Commander-i n-Chief. Over the course of time, the "class" idea of possession
of property has become irrelevant as a qualification for officership, although
the requirement for a high degree of education and literacy continues.

48-2003-N12,M
SMA 1-1 ST/2
 $ .

The "direct agent relationship" \'Iith the President has been retained. It is A
this direct tie with the Conmander-fn-Chief \thich serves as the basis for com­ pe
m1ss10ned off1cers' legal authority, their basis to exercise command, and their wa
placement in the ArfTlY's organizational structure in a position of authority pe
over warrant and noncommissioned officers. The commissioned officer's appoint­ u\'IiI
ment and each promotion stems from the President's recommendation and approval fo
by Congress. is
te
Our ranks of today evolved from our past history. There are legal reasons and th
traditions for the particular duties outlined in the military justice bi
system because law evolves from tradition, precedent, and deliberate reason­
ing. In addition there are customs and courtesies that exist and remain Th
because armies require links with their past in order to bind soldiers together au
in the profession of arms. rna
ac
Warrant Officers. th
The warrant officer, a position established in 1918, was a soldier raised from !!£
the ranks, by virtue of demonstrated competence in a particular technical field.
lb,
li
tt
l(
J
•• '~~f
;:;; ~.'

Fi gu re 1-1

1-2 ST/2
 A "wa rrant" is a wri tten document issued by an authori ty di recti n a com~etent
person to perform a specific activity. For example, in civilian Tife a search
warrant" is signed by a judge (authority), ordering Patrolman Smith (competent
person) to search (an act) Apt 5, 1818 Grant Avenue (specific place). This
"warrant" is specific and limited in that Patrolman Jones cannot be substituted
for Smith and Apt 7 cannot be searched instead of Apt. 5. The Secretary of Army
is the official who appoints warrant officers. While warrant officers are
technically not in the same category as commissioned officers, Congress includes
the warrant officer in the total officer corps strength since their responsi­
bilities and authority parallels that of the commissioned officer in many areas.
The US Army warrant officer is, therefore, a qualified soldier who is given
authority and directed to perform specific duties such as banamaster, aviator,
maintenance technician and so forth. By virtue of having a warrant, he/she is
accorded a higher rank with commensurate rewards. Thus a warrant officer ranks
the noncommissioned officer.
NCQ·s
The origin of the noncommissioned officer can be traced back to the Roman
legions. The Roman success in war was due to march formation, camp prepara­
tion, and response to orders in battle. The training of the Roman soldier was
long, detailed, and intense. The Roman commanders had found that the tactical
and administrative requirements of drilling and fielding a successful army
absorbed all their time. Necessity caused them to turn to the ranks for assist­
ance. They picked exceptional soldiers to be commanders of ten and assistants

Figure 1-2
1-3 ST/2
•
to commanders of 100 and 600, to supervise the individual training, to carry
out their plans, and perform administrative and logistical tasks. The command­
ers of ten and assistants to the comnanders of 100 and 600 were the first "non ­
commissioned" officers (called principalis). An indication of their importance
can be derived from the English translation of that Latin/Roman word which
roughly means principal, main, key, or first in rank.
"Noncommissioned" in the mi 1i tary sense, then and now, means tha t entry to or
occupation of a position of res onsibi1ity and authority is based upon demon­
a
strated competency and continue performance rather than "cormnissioned li , and
that personnel in that position are key or essential for effective operation
of uni ts.
The origin of the noncommissioned officer in the American Amy goes back to
the formation of the Continental Army in 1775. Early organization was pattern­
ed after the British model which had officers appointed (or elected) to command
or to serve on staffs. Sergeants, in turn, were appointed (or elected) from
the ranks to serve as subordinates to comnanders or to assist staff officers.
But until the arrival and appointment of Baron Von Steuben as Washington's
Inspector General, there was little uniformity in terms of qualifications,
duties, responsibilities, authority, and standards. Von Steuben began working
at Valley Forge, where Washington's disheartened troops were then encamped.
On 29 March 1779, Steuben's "Regu1 ati ons for the Order and Oi sci p1 i ne of the
Troops of the United States" appeared. For the next thirty-three years, it
was our offi cia 1 manua 1. Commonly known as liThe B1 ue Book," it conta i ned
about 100 small pages setting forth clearly and simply the fundamentals of
guard duty, organization, field operations, and drill.
There were instructions for the commandant of a regiment and for leaders down
to corporal. They clearly established guidelines for selection and outlined
duties of noncommissioned officers that have proven valid over the years and
are still used today. Von Steuben's instructions for the commandant of a regi­
ment s ta ted:

The choice of noncomnissioned officers is also an object of the

greatest importance: The order and discipline of a regiment

depend so much upon their behavior that too much care cannot be

taken in preferring none to that trust but those who by their

merit and conduct are entitled to it. Honesty, sobriety, and a

remarkable attention to every point of duty, with neatness to

their dress, are indispensable requisites; a spirit to command

respect and obedience from the men, an expertness in performing

every part of the exercise, and an ability to teach it are also

absolutely necessary ••••

1-4 ST/2
Instructions for the sergeant major were:
The Sergeant t1ajor, bei ng a t the head of the noncol11l1i ss i oned

officers must pay greatest attention to their conduct and be­

havior, never conniving at the least irregularity cOlT1Tlitted by

them or the soldiers, from both of whom he must exact the most

implicit obedience. He should be well acquainted with the in­

terior management and discipline of the regiment ••••

Instructions for the first sergeant of a company included:

The soldier, having acquired that degree of confidence of his

officers as to be appointed First Sergeant of the company,

should consider the importance of his office; that the disci­

pline of the cOMpany, the conduct of the men, their exactness

in obeying orders, and the regularity of their manners, will,

in a g~at measure, depend on his vigilance. He should be

intimately acquainted with the character of every soldier of

the company, .and should take great pains to impress upon their

minds the indispensable necessity of the strictest obedience,

as the founda ti on of order and regul a ri ty • • • •

These regulations also gave instructions for sergeants and corporals, impress­
ing on them the importance of their duty and responsibility tov/ard discipline
and order of a company. They cautioned against "too great familiarity with
the men" but insisted that each soldier "be treated with proper respect. 1I A
further word of caution \'Ias libya contrary conduct they forfeit all regard,
and thei r authori ty becomes despi sed. II
These statements are essentially as valid today as they were then. In com­
paring AR 600-20 outlining rIco responsibilities with the above instructions,
it is interesting to note how closely they parallel each other.

Figure 1-3
1-5 ST/2
General Washington sought diligently to establish the authority and prestige ~.•
of the nonco","issioned officers. In 1780 he wrote, "it need not be urged ,
that the regularity of the service depends on having sufficient number of
good nonco","issioned officers." In order to keep a certain distance between
the nonco","issioned officers and the privates, the former were to be quartered
together, separately from the other enlisted men. Company co","anders were
cautioned to use every possible means to keep up a "proper subordination" of
privates to nonco","issioned officers and in no case to reprimand them in the
presence of privates.

Fi gure 1-4
It is from this lineage and for the same basic reasons that the noncomis­
sioned officer of the US ArmY exists today. The nonco","issioned officer was
and is romoted from the ranks and char ed with duties which assist and
comp ement teo lcer ln t e isc arge 0 lS own. n e ect, to use
legal terminology, NCO's serve as an agent of the officer, and other organizers
of the Army, and derive a large measure of their legal authority from those
sources.

1-6 ST/2

 Figure 1-5

Today's Army is obviously more complex than the Army of the American Revolution.
The modern lethal battlefield requires greater degrees of control, discipline,
and training. Today's commissioned officers are required to become more involved
with the strategy, tactics, resource management, planning, policymaking, and
unit training which contribute to the overall effectiveness of their units;
they permit and require the NCO to prepare the soldier to meet his individual
challenge on the battlefield. Only through a coordinated and complementary
effort among the leaders can that unit preparedness and success in battle be
achieved.
Unfortunately, recent history has seen some alterations in the relationship
between the commissioned and the noncommissioned officer as the Army has moved
through various wars to its present state.

1-7 ST/2
Changing Influences
During the 20th Century, the Army fought in two world wars, a police action in
Korea, and an undeclared war in Vietnam. In each instance, the Army expanded
from a small standing force to a combat force numbering in the millions.

8.3

2.4
1.6 1.6

Wor1 d War World War II Korea Vietnam Today

c::l Peace CZZJWar

Figure 1-6. Effect of War and Peace on Army Size (In millions)
As a result of this necessarily rapid growth, both the Army's commissioned
officers and noncommissioned officers were rapidly promoted to positions of
grea ter respons i bil i ty wi thout the season; ng" and growth found ina peaceti me
environment. Commissioned officers and NCO's were produced and funneled
into the replacement pipeline without a great deal of time to learn their
new jobs, let alone their old ones. Training was limited to the barest
essentials. Despite the lack of training, they did an admirable job. As
a result of these factors, plus rapid rotation of personnel among units and
losses through casualties, the level of experience found in the junior com­
missioned officer and noncommissioned officer ranks was low. Naturally,
where the experience factor was low and personnel turbulence high, mistakes
were made. Learning was often the by-product of mistakes which can be attri­
buted to a lack of experience. In the environment of IIget the job done - do it .~ ,
"

'\;

yourself," high stress, and IImistakes could cost lives,1I the higher ranking,
more experienced commissioned officers and NCO's intruded more and more into

the areas of the junior officer; and, more specifically, into the jobs of the

junior NCO. The seniors often either took over functions belonging to sub­

ordinates or oversupervised them. Many leaders no longer had faith, mutual

trust, and confidence in their subordinates; and as a consequence, the exper­

ienced leader attempted to do his own job and portions of his subordinates' also.

1-8 ST/2
 An example would be that of a battalion/squadron commander directing the
tactical maneuver of a company/battery/troop, or the f1'rst sergeant supervis­
ing weapons cleaning. As a result of this intrusion, control became more and
more restrictive and centralized, leading to a gradual erosion of effective­
ness by subordinates. This was particularly frustrating to the NCO's, espe­
cially the more junior NCO's at squad/section level. But there were and are
strong pressures on both senior commissioned officers and noncommissioned
officers to become more involved in the direct runni'ng of every detail of the
lower organizations such as company/battery/troop and platoon. Too often the
supervisor chose to accomplish the task himself because he was convinced
that it was easier, perhap$ faster, or 6etter than trusting the subordinate to
do the job correctly.
Following each of the major conflicts of the 20th Century, the Army has gone
through periods of readjustment. Leaders picked up the broad job knowledge
and experience they were unable to receive earlier because they were "fighting
the war, II and adj us tments were made to reverse the above trends. The more
experienced person was relied upon to train the less experienced in their
job. The end result was buildup of experience and a return to an essentially
pre-war level of job knowledge and expertise.
Today the situation in the post-Vietnam era is unique because of the war's
length and because the fighting job was left to the regular force without full
moblization of reserves. A large number of experienced personnel, who would
have been relied upon to train less experienced subordinates, have also retired
from the Army.

1917-1918

WI I I

1941-1945

WW II I

1950-1953

Korea I

1965-1974

Vietnam I

,0. Figure 1-7. Duration of 20th Century Conflicts

1-9 ST/2
 The environment the Army now operates in has also drastically changed as a

result of advances in technology. In order to better grasp this phenomena,

a look at the past is needed to place it in perspective.

Thl
The Past de
th
Compared to today, war was less complicated and less immediate. A~ peace­ ap
time activity was divided between garrison and the field. Collective training ie
(unit) took place in the field. Maintenance and support were the common th
activities in garrison. Units assumed (incorrectly) that the school system du
provided thoroughly trained soldiers. There was garrison training to accomp­ wo
lish centralized requirements. The normal method for this instruction was Ar
patterned after the service schools. fc
mE
Nonconmissioned officers were prorroted to higher ranks only when vacancies n
existed. Promotion was often subject more to circumstances than to skills,
and reduction was often arbitrary. Their leadership skills and technical Pl
skills were acquired from experience, self-development, and handed down to Uc
them from more experienced noncommissioned officers. On the other hand. the lE
NCO's more often than not stayed in the same units, provided stability, and Me
passed on tradition and experience directly to junior NCO's and enlisted mt
persons. hi
11
Commissioned officers were trained in a formal school system but gained tl
experience and organizational skills in units. Promotion and job assignment d
were centrally controlled for commissioned officers. d
1
Sufficient time to gear up for war was assumed. For the wars in the recent c
past, time was available, but rapid expansion at war's onset scattered NCO's c
throughout the Army. Rapid promotion due to an expandinq Army retirement and t
subsequent battle losses further eroded the NCO corps and lowered their over­ v
all level of leadership and technical expertise. Newer NCO's appointed because t
of immediate need learned quickly and performed adequately during the war. e
Many NCO's, however, did not have the prerequisite experience/training to cope u
with all the new tasks associated with the peacetime qarrison environment.
This problem of inexperience and lack of training was compounded by the changes S
resulting from wartime lessons learned, and by the acquisition of newer, more \'.
complicated equipment which demanded even more traininq to insure adequate
maintenance and operator supervision. c
Unit stability has been lost. r.-.ore enlightened leadership and more difficult

technical skills were required. Reassessment and modification or relearning

of prior doctrine was undertaken. This cycle was repeated after each previous

war in the 20th Century but with varying degrees of success. However, with
each cycle, a loss of a degree of job knowledge and greater supervision of

subordinates (whether it was needed or not) resulted.

Today
Technology has compressed time and space. Weapons of war move faster, farther,

and destroy with greater accuracy and lethality than ever before. Maintenance

and service support requirements have also increased. Doctrinal and weapons

ST/2
1.. 10

I
development, resource constraints, and the requirement for constant readiness
dictate ~anaged change.
The old methods for managing the Army in peacetin:e have gone. The method of
development, assignment, and schooling of NCO's now closely parallels that of
the commissioned officer system. The service school training limitations are
apparent. Unit training can better deal \'lith individual differences in exper­
ience, the forgetting curves, and personnel turbulence. These things require
the presence and application of knowledge by experienced personnel. However,
due to the Vietnam conflict's length, many of those experienced personnel who
would otherwise have been able to assist in this training have been lost to the
Army. ~1any officers and NCO's nO\'/ entering the senior grades have operated
for a long time under the wartime "get the job done - do it yourse1 fll environ­
ment; so much so that they have little experience in any other way of operating.
They had been "conditioned ll to respond in a particular manner.
Projections of what the modern battlefield will be like indicates that individ­
ual action and initiative at squad/section, platoon, and company/battery/troop
levels will be vital in winning the critical first battle of the next war.
r10re nUr.Jerous and complex equi pment wi 11 be needed to fi ght in thi s envi ron­
mente The maintenance and training on this complicated equipment must be
handled at that level also for the sake of greater efficiency. In peacetime,
leaders rrust be trained at those levels to maintain equipment and operate
this, the Anny must have leaders at all levels V/ho are trained and knmJ their
duties, are prepared to perfonn their duties, are given the trcl.ining to do their
duti es, are gi ven the opportuni ty to do thei r duti es and are capab 1e and knOW:-­
1edgeab 1e in the tra i ni ng of subordi na tes to do thei r duti cs - nO\'1. Resource
constraints (personnel, time, money, and materiel) are such today that the Anny
cannot afford to have two 1eaders ina uni t a ttempti n9 to perfonn the same task at
the same ti me and getti ng in each other's way. The Amy cannot afford oversuper­
vision on the part of corrrnissioned officers and NCO's; and it can least afford
to stand idly by and allow any degree of misunderstanding and misutilization to
exi s t betv/een corrrni ss i oned offi cers and NCO' s whi ch adversely ir1pac ts on a
unit's combat readiness.
Since the end of the Vietnam conflict, numerous changes have taken place
vii thi n the ArlT'~. Reversa 1 of the trend to oversupervi se or to do another's
job, a reduction in rigid and highly centralized controls, and establishment
of requirements that subordinates be able to operate to their maxir.Jur.l capabil­
ity within the scope of their established duties and responsibilities are
underway. The time is available to develop an individual leader's ability to
his fullest potential. The risk and consequences associated with honest
mistakes have been reduced. The personnel populating the Army system have
been screened and rescreened as a result of various force reduction programs
and only the highest caliber personnel have been retained. Formal school
systems for both officers and NCO's now exist. And lastly, the opportunity
to take advantage of the good features of the "old Aroy" has presented
itself. The opportunity to make our Amy a more effective fighting force is
now at hand.

1-11 ST/2
The Army has recognized the requirements of the modern battlefield and developed
programs to meet those requirements. Leadership training is more relevant
and integrated into all aspects of training. Soldier's manuals and individual
skill qualification tests are being fielded to guide improvement in individual
training skills. ARTEP's provide collective training standards. The personnel
managers of the Army have developed programs which provide guidance in manage­
ment skills. This manual provides a model for leaders to candidly address
the problem of liMited job knowledge and experience; a methodology
\'Ihich allo\,/s them to identify and correct the problem, and offers doctrinal
changes which will assist them in doing so. What is being offered is a thought
process and not a laundry list of what each person's job comprises. Use of
this methodology allows leaders to better determine the duties, responsibili­
ties, and authority of NCO's, and their relationship with the officer and to
correctly assign tasks to the appropriate individual.
tJithin the Army no\'1, for many of the reasons discussed earlier, understanding
of each individual's job and the tasks that make up that job is lacking.
This is indicated by four specific symptoms:
a. Tasks are being shared.
Too often leaders at various levels believe that they share and perform the
same tasks; e.g., both directly supervise the soldier. This leads to tv/o
dangers: (1) the subordinate is oversupervised, or (2) he is receiving
no supervision or training since each superior thinks the other is doing the
task. The results are a reduction in effectiveness of the soldier, conflict
in the implementation of the task to be performed, and supervisors neglecting
other important tasks.

SHARED TASkS

Fi gurc 1-3

1-12 ST/2
 Sharing of tasks will lead to over supervision of th.e doe.r or no superv"(siQrl
at all:

DIG THlT FOIHOLE

DI' THlT FOIHOLE , MOlE TOTHI LEn····.lIE
SOLDIEI-WlTCH WHEIE 11 WIDEI.
YOU'IE THIOWIH'
THlT SOil••••

Figure 1-9

I SUII WISI I
DIW WHlT TO
10 IOn

Figure 1-10

ST/2
1-13

r/2
 b. Lack of communication.
Supervisors and immediate subordinates are doing their own tasks but are not
cOlT1T1unicat1ng witH 'each other. IH1S results in reduced effectiveness, conflict,
mismanagement of assets, and generally impacts adversely on the unit because
information has not been exchanged. In this situation (despite the proficiency
in individual skills that may have been attained) the lack of interaction
between supervisor and subordinate, and failure to exhange information does
not provide the meaningful contribution to the unit that could be expected.
Although individual tasks may be accomplished, their effectiveness is greatly
diminished because the lack of communication results in the tasks not being
related to the common goal. In the worst case, conflict results, or at best,
a lack of concerted effort and waste of resources occurs.

NO-COMMUNICATION

Figure 1-11
c. Jobs are not understood.
Supervisors and immediate subordinates may be dOin, a great deal of talkinfi to
each other, but one or the other, or both may not now what tasks make up is
jo~. The supervisor who does not know either his own job or that of his
su ordinat~sis particularly harmful to unit effectiveness. By not being
familiar with the soldier's job, the supervisor can be easily misled and
will be unable to effectively supervise. Soldiers who do not know their job
have a right to expect someone to train and supervise them in acquiring job
knowledge. The soldier must make an effort to get his supervisors to help
in acquiring this job knowledge. Not knowing the job can result in tasks not
being accomplished, inadequate supervision of tasks, and improper or incomplete
task accomplishment. 1-14 ST/2
 DOES NOT kNOW 108

Figure 1-12
d. Usurping or relinguishing tasks.
On the one hand, usurping is illustrated by a supervisor performing his
subordinates' tasks without giving them an opportunity to perform the tasks.
The supervisor lacks confidence in the subordinate's ability, and feels he
can do whatever is needed better and faster. He would rather do it per­
sonally than spend the time \1hich may be necessary to explain what must
be done and train the subordinate. Oversupervising falls into this category.
Conversely, relinguishing is typified b~ an individual not willing to make an
effort to learn hO\,I to ~erfonn all the acets of his ~Ob, or dragging his
feet in accomplishing \,1 atever he is responsible foroing. The super­
visor is then compelled to do it himself. It can also be illustrated by a
competent indivicual at the first overture of his superior wanting to do
it himself, failing to say, "That's ~w job!" The net result in thjs
situation is that one person is spena,ng time on tasks that are not properly
his (\'Jhile neglecting some that are), and the other person is not being
properly utilized, and is in effect "undertasked."

1-15 ST/2
 Le.,
thA:
uni
tra
shi
ab:1
sut
Pre
. 1~~
::·.4n~

Figure 1-13
Assistance
While these four problem areas exist between commissioned officers and between
noncommissioned officers, it is critical that these problems be recognized
and eliminated when officers and NCOs work together. Officers and NCOs who
use this manual and apply the doctrine should have little difficulty in
clarifying their duties, responsibility, and authority. However, in the
event that they encounter unique problems, assistance in applying the in
method is available. imp
Eve
Techniques presented in this manual draw upon current Army doctrine in the
area of Organizational Effectiveness (EO) as outlined in AR 600-76,
rra
1lTS
Organizational Effectiveness (OE) Activities and Training. Organization whi
Effectiveness Staff Officers (OESO) are available ArmY-wide to provide uni
assistance in the use of the techniques addressed in this manual. OESO's
are located within the Sl/Gl/DPCA/DCSPER or Human Resources Development Thi
staff element, or within the highest staff element in the organization which or
is responsible for the personnel management function. A minimum of two OESO's au1
are authorized per installation/division, and one per separate brigade. jot
Additional OESO's are located within the organizational structure of
mi~
intervening headquarters; e.g., corps and major commands (MACOM).
The OESO is trained to assist leaders in the development of an environment

conducive to effective use of individual and unit skills and abilities. A

training course at the USA Organizational Effectiveness Training Center

1-16 5T/2
- - - - . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- -----_..... _ ........

(U5AOETC) provides selected personnel with instruction across broad areas

of technical, management, and behavioral science concepts. All of these
concepts can be applied to military orqanizations, and OE50's are available
to assist in such areas as: (1) more fully understanding organizations,
(2) improving interpersonal and unit communications, (3) problem solvinq and
planning, (4) management of time and meetings, (5) developing teams,
(6) clarifying duty assignments, (7) performance and personal counseling,
(8) transitioninq between personnel changes, (9) resolution of conflict, and
(10) improving intergroup cooperation.

Leaders may also identify a need to further develop leadership abilities in

themselves and their subordinates. A particular course useful in developing
units is the Leadership and Management Develonment Course (L&MDC) and the
training of personnel to present L&MDC. L&MDC is designed to develop leader­
ship and management skills and to provide an opportunity to build upon existing
abilities in increasing duty effectiveness and influencing the effectiveness of
subordinates. L&MDC provides an effective approach in which to learn new skills,
provides feedback to participants on their own learning, supports current Army
leadership doctrine, and relates directly to a leader's duty, responsibility,
and authority. Participants can expect to increase their awareness of how
various management, leadership, and communication skills appropriately gear
management styles to specific situations, increase performance and personal
counseling skills, and improve decisionmaking. All these skills are critical
elements that NCOs use in the execution of their duties, responsibility, and
authori ty.
Summary
Although the same problems exist in the officer-to-officer relationship and
the NCO-to-NCO relationship, a critical one today is the work relationship
existing between the officer and the NCO. Much progress has been made in
recent years throughout the Army in bringing to light and correcting conflicts
in officer-NCO work relationships. But, there is still considerable room for.
improvement. It is toward this end that a total Ar~ effort must be directed.
Ever~ leader must accelerate this ong01ngprocess. ~o'diersmustbetterunder­
~~ what each individual's Job enta,ls and his working relations with
his suberiors and subordinates. We must define the duties, responsibilities
which elong to his subordinates. If this is done, the effectiveness of
units and the Army will improve.
This publication was developed for the purpose of providing each soldier, NCO
or officer, with a greater knowledge of his duties, responsibilities and
authority, and a higher degree of skill in applying them to whatever the
job at hand may be. By this means, more rapid progress toward the goal of
mission accomplishment and more effective units can be achieved.

1-17 5T/2

From the historical perspective, the relationship of the officer and the NCO
has always exhibited a great deal of interdependence. In earlier times, the
prime requi rement of the officer \'/aS tha t he coul d recrui t and support
his unit and receive and transmit written orders and information. The officer
was to serve as an example of courage and bravery, but not necessarily
military proficiency. If he ~/as militarily a.ble, this was a bonus. The
prime requirerrent of the noncomnissioned officer \'/as military proficiency.
Thus, from our beginnings we see a complementing relationship bet~~een officers
and NeOs.
It is obvious that armies are tremendously more complex today than during
the American Revolution. The modern lethal battlefield requires even
greater degrees of control, discipline, and training. Commissioned officers
are required to become more involved today than at any time in the past with
the strategy, tactics, resource management planning, policy making and
collective training which contribute to the overall effectiveness of their
units. They must require and permit the noncor.missioned officer to insure
individual soldiers are prepared to meet their challenge on the battlefield.
It is only through a coordinated and complementary effort that unit preparedness
and success in battle can be achieved.
HOU THEN DOES THE Ar-1ERICAf! rlO:lcortlISS IONED OFFICER COr-lPLEr1ENT THE
CorfHSSIO~lED OFFICER?

~COSI primary function is to lead and supervise. They perform their duties
\'Iithin the framework of units. The follo~/ing chapter presents a brief
overview of organizations. The overview is intended to provide a useful
perspective of organizations so that vie will be.tter understand the
important part each plays in improving unit functioning.

1-18 ST/2

 Chapter 2
THE ORGANIZATION

INTRODUCTION
Out; es, res pons ; bil ; ties, and the authori ty of the fICO are exerc i sed wi thi n
the framework of ArmY organizations. Without organization, the ArmY would be
a shapeless, ineffective force unable to carry out its assigned mission of
prompt and sustained combat. Any discussion of the duties of the NCO in the
ArmY must first examine the manner in which Army units are formed and organized.
Units differ from one another because they are organized to fulfill different
missions, just as a missile battalion is formed along different lines than an
airborne infantry platoon. Nevertheless, military units can be viewed as
containing common elements which must be understood before we discuss NCO
duties, responsibilities, and authority within that organization. In this
chapter we are going to discuss systems, or what components or parts exist in
an organization; 'and processes, or how things happen in an organization.
The Systems View.
Any open, dynamic organization can be thought of in terms of a general systems
model as shown below.

FEEDBACK - - - - - - - - - _ .

'li

INPUTS OUTPUTS

FLOW OF MATERIAL/ENERGY/INFORMATION ~
~-----v

Figure 2-1. G~n~ral Systems Model

This open system interacts \'Ii th the environnent in \'!hich it exists and keeps
its ability to accomplish the mission by changes to its \</orking processes,
inputs, and outputs. Adequa te i npu ts of the proper type mus t be provi ded for
the uni t to produce outputs of a des i red type if the uni tis to con ti nue success­
fully. There is little need for a basic training company that cannot be filled
wi th recruits and given adequate time to train those recruits to be soldiers.
In the same "Jay, a basic training company that cannot produce trained
soldiers because of unskilled trainers or poor leadership will not continue
to exist. The Ar"1Y cannot tolerate a wasteful unit that cannot accomplish its
mission. The Army is not isolated, and once a unit is formed it does not remain
the same. All organizations must remain open to change from both outside and
inside influences. Those units that close theMselves off from reality of a
changing world will eventually prove unable to accomplish their assigned
mission and will fail.
The Systems View of an Army Organization
Figure 2-2 expands the basic systems model as shown above and identifies the
basic components of an Arr;jy organization. Inputs of equipment, personnel,
funds, time, etc., are fed into the organization and the ultimate output is in
the form of combat readiness and mission accomplisnnent. The internal struc­
ture, which represents any organization, is illustrated as a series of common
components or subsystems: people, structure, objectives, technology, chain
of corrrnand, and 1eader, all at work "Ii th in an envi ronmenta 1 suprasystern. ({fi 9 .2- 3)
There is a practi ca 1 put"pose for the sys ter.1S vi e\/; it is somethi ng tha t can
be used on the job. It reflects an organization as a whole with COMponents
that "/ork together for the good of the entire organization.
EfWIRom1ENTAL SUPRASYSTEt,1

Figure 2-2. Components of Army Units

2-2 ST/2c
 PoLITICS
\, I I

,
ETHICS

EcONQ\1Y ---+ f-- CIVILIAN

Cor+uNlrv

I '\
HIGHER HEADQUARTERS INFLATION

Figure 2-3. Environmental Suprasystem

-3) Environment.
Any Army organization, large or small, exists in an environmental suprasystem
composed of elements outside of the organization that act upon it. Such elements
as politics, economy, ethics, government. location, and in combat the enemY.
all impact upon every Army organization. In addition, other organizations and
particularly higher headquarters make up part of that environment. Naturally
the functioninfj of people within the organization is affected by these external
influences. For an NCO to perform duties, fulfill responsibility, and exercise
authority': it is necessary to have an understanding of the environmental
influences acting on the organization.

STRUCTURE

PEOPLE

Fi gure 2-4. People and Structure Componen ts

ST/2c
2-3 ST/2c
People
The environment acts on all parts of an organization but especially its
people. The people part of an organization considers individuals and teans.
Within the people component of the organization are included individual value
systems, attitudes, ootivation, morale, personal behaviors - all those things
\'/hich make a person "tick." Also included are relationships \·lith others, inter­
personal trust, openness, group dynamics, and conflict which help or hinder the
organization from pulling together tO~Jard mission accomplishment and combat
readiness. This most important component is also affected by the mission,
technology, and structure of the internal organization. These forces help
set the organizational cli~ate within which NCO's carry out their duties,
responsibilities, and authority. 11ithout a complete and thorough knm/ledge
of the people assigned to an organization, it is not possible to efficiently
accc~plish mission objectives.

Structure
This organizational conponent involves the division and coordination of
assigned missions within the organization. This occurs in both forMal and
informal activi ties. The fornal structure is set by organization charts, duty,
and job descriptions, standard operating procedures, and Army regulations.
Patterns of cOlT.lunication, authority, and work flm" are fornally laid out. The
fa rna 1 structure of an organization generally establishes the official relations
that o~cur between the technical, leader, and people components. There is,
hO\,/ever, another inforrnl structure that establishes unofficial patterns that
frequently bypass the formal structure.

- - ­ FORMAL
", , ,- - - - - INI=O~4AL

,
\

Figure 2-5. Formal and Informal Structure

These informal structures frequently contribute as r,lUch or more to attainMent
of mission objectives than do fonnal ones. The str'uctu~~e of a family may
theoretically have the husband as the head, wife in the mother role, and
children more subservient. HO\,/ever, the real authority and pm'fer may, in
many situations, be the two-year-old. For example, although the father and
mother may desire to go out for dinner at a rather formal restaurant, the t\vO­
year-old's needs for special foods, behavior pattern (crying a lot and de~anding
attention) may dictate the selection of a "family" restaurant or no restaurant
at all. In the informal organization of a co~pany or battalion, the most
influential person may not be the commander. The battalion connander's driver,
because he hears and sees more than most other enlisted people, becomes very
i rnportant in the uni t "grapevi ne. II In order for NCO I S to ca rry ou t thei r
functions, it is necessary to understand both the fornal and infor~al organiza­
tion structure and use both to obtain maximum mission performance.
2-4 ST/2c
 MISSION

Figure 2-6. The Mission and Technology Components

t1i ss ion
Soldiers are organized to do specific things in an organization. These missions
1S or goals are established by the organization and serve to accomplish its
overall mission in the military. Each AmlY organization has its own mission
which is a broad statement of its goals. Hhen that mission is broken into
attainable short-range targets, those targets are called objectives. Clearly
established and prioritized objectives help to motivate organization members
and reduce the number of meaningless activities. A clear understanding of a
unit's mission a~d objectives assists an NCO to accurately assess situations
that arise and a:'\lr/.. \~rii2tely apply sufficient resources to accomplish the
mi ss i on. For i ns ~~? :·~ ce gi ven the opportun i ty to fi re on two enemy tanks, a
5

tank cDrTlar.der \I!OU; I.~ seiect the tank that appeared most threatening to an
infantry colLwm if protection of the infantry column was the key aspect of the
assigned mission. In the same manner, a thorough understanding of the unit's
current and future workload forms part of the basis for recommending approval/
disapproval of leave requests of subordinates by the NCO in charge of that
section of the unit.
Technology
Objectives are not attained ~/ithout the application of methodologies, tools,
techni que s, and knmvl edge. The spec i fi c tec hnology demanded is determi ned
by the requirements of the organization and the desired outputs. The technology
for calling an artillery fire mission on the battlefield differs significantly
from technology utilized in a hospital or logistics office. The technology
component of the organization is shaped by the specialization of knowledge
ing and skills required, the types of equipr.lent involved, and the location of the
t organization. Because organizations do not remain static, the technology
component is a dynamic, ever-changing system that continually affects the
r, organization's structure and people components. Hhen an NCO becomes and remains
technically and tactically proficient he is operating to full productivity in
the technical component of the organization.
a­
2-5 ST/2c
ST/2c
 -U~

PEl
01
,z:dJJ
/ g,
pr

.Q!
' A!i
.­ .. t~
Figure 2-7. The Chain of Conmand and Leader Components. 01
of
Chain of Command wi
iJ1
The chain of command component consists of the officers, noncommissioned officers ci
and civilians, who hold leadership or management positions below the position of mi
leader within the organization. They are the people who assist the leader in t~
setting goals and objectives, establishing plans, supervising, directing, training, SE
and developing unit personnel. They form a crucial link in the communication nc
between the leader and the other subsystems. They frequently are the leaders of t~
their own organizations. They may acquire a great deal of informal power and w~
influence. The Army has established this as a separate subsystem because of the ma
variety of ways it is used by leaders. It is important to remember that the rE
chain of command can contribute to the accomplishment or failure of the organi­ ~
zational m1ssion. flo
ae
Leader pr

Every organization has a component that organizes and controls the other com­

ponents, bringing them to work together for the good of the whole. In the body,

the brain serves this function, on a football team the coach, and in the Anmy it

is the leader/commander/manager. The leader component addressed here is that

part of the organization that is responsible for all the organization does or T~
fails to do. The capability to integrate organizational activities requires at
power, authority, decisionmaking and coordinating ability, a thorough knowledge ca
of all organizational components, etc. Notice in Figure 2-7 how the leader th
component is entirely contained within the other components and appears overlaid
on the entire organization. This illustrates how the function of leading an 1.
organization must take into account all aspects of the existing and the desired pe
organization. The function of leading also spreads itself through many layers or
of the organization. Whenever you see the exercise of responsibility, authority, fl
and power or someo~e directing people in their efforts towards a common goal, you in
are seeing the leader component in action.
2.
c~
iJ1
T~
p<l
as

Figure 2-8. Unit Climate

2-6
- - - . . r - - - - - - - ­ - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------------ - -- -

Unit Climate
People in organizations perceive those things that exist within the boundaries
of the organization as the unit climate. The ability of the leader and the
chain of command to integrate and coordinate organizational components can have
great impact on individual perceptions of unit climate and subsequently on the
productivity and satisfaction of unit members.
Organizational Processes
As leaders, NCO's need to focus the application of available time and energy ­
these resources are too limited to squander. Now that you have a systems view
of the components of the organization, it is important to acquire an understanding
of the processes at work in an organization. With one eye, see the system, and
with the other eye focus on the processes within the system. Processes are these
interrelationships that exist within and between components Day-to-day emergen­
o

cies promote a near-sighted view of problems which produces ways of accomplishing

missions that provides only short-term, temporary, or limited fixes. For example,
the most recent phone call reports a truck breakdown to the battalion motor
ng, sergeant. To deal repeatedly with these calls would be dealing with symptoms and
not causes. Until the causes of these problems are known and action taken to solve
them, the battalion motor sergeant will continually face more breakdowns. But
what type of leadership action is required to get to the root of the problem:
maintenance management, motor pool stand-down, personnel changes, training, or
retraining in the motor pool? Many leaders cannot or will not pay attention to
these more permanent and all-encompassing dynamic processes of the leader's
function. Processes are those activities that take place in an organization to
accomplish the mission. There are three distinguishing aspects of organizational
processes:
1. They affect many people, and/or
2. They cross several components of the organization, and
3. They crucially affect key functional areas.
There are, at least seven processes that are so basic that they are functioning
at all times at some level within the organization. The breakdown of any process
can reduce organizational effectiveness. NCO's are vitally involved in each of
these processes.
1. Planning. Not only must plans be made to accomplish predictable actions and
perform required duties, but provisions must be made to cope with contingencies
or unplanned events which cause organizational adjustments. Planning requires
y, flexibility to accomplish duties, adequate resources must be sought and provided
ou in time to meet objectives.
2. Decision Making. An effective decision making process makes organizational
choices in a timely manner at those levels where most appropriate. At every level
in the organization, duties are performed based upon an analysis of the situation.
The most effective level for the decision making process to occur is as low as
possible in the organization where the leader has precise knowledge of all the
aspects of duty performance and consequences of a particular decision. It is

2-7

improper for a colonel to make decisions about placement of a particular machine

gun in a particular defensive position, for the colonel does not have the precise
knowledge of all aspects of that particular machine gun team. It is just as
improper for a squad leader to decide to vacate a designated road block site
for the squad leader does not have knowledge of the consequences of that particular
decision.
3. Motivation. When functioning effectively, this organizational process has
soldiers inclined to give their best effort to accomplish the mission. Full
application of this process aims at attracting and retaining qualified personnel,
obtaining dependable performance from them, and obtaining behavior above and beyond
what is prescribed in rules, regulations, and job standards towards the achieve­
ment of organizational objectives. It is perhaps the most complex and difficult
organizational process for any leader to achieve.
4. Goal Integration. This process deals with harmonizing individual goals
with organizational goals and is related to the process of motivation. The
motivation process is easier to accomplish if an individual's own goals and
objectives are in line with those of the organization. An example is in the
assignment of a soldier to a clerical position. A soldier assigned to this
position, who hopes to follow an administrative career, will likely derive
great pleasure in the job and enjoy the opportunity as the goals of that soldier
would be in line with those of the organization. A soldier with aspirations to
become a carpenter may not be as effective in the clerk's position since personal
goals would conflict with organizational goals.
5. Cooperation. In this process, teamwork maximizes the quality and quantity
of work produced. The ideas, perceptions, experience, and efforts of all team
members are contributed to the accomplishment of the unit mission. Without
the teamwork involved in advancing under fire, the objective would not be taken.
Without the teamwork that occurs in a tank crew, the vehicle will not perform
its mission. A benefit of the cooperation process is that it provides all
members of an organization the opportunity to contribute to the team effort.
It also provides an opportunity for subordinates at each level to observe the
functioning of their superiors so subordinates are trained to take on higher
positions. By observing squad leaders, fire team leaders learn; and by being
next in succession, these fire team leaders are more likely to perform adequately
in the next higher position. The succession might be on an instantaneous basis
(battle loss), temporary basis (leave or other absence), or the long-tenm
development of future leaders for the years ahead. Developing teamwork and
teambu;lding are covered in chapter 5.
6. Sueervision. Supervision is the process that leaders use to insure that
subordlnates are properly performing their duties. Proper supervision as an
organization process means that leaders support subordinate needs in the
performance of their duties The techniques leaders use in supervising sub­
o

ordinates varies with organization level and the needs of subordinates. In

the process of supervision, leaders are matching individual duty performance
to the production of mission accomplishment. Proper supervision produces
quality duty performance and allows the duty performers to grow and develop
in the job. The organization process of supervision for NCO's and commissioned
officers is covered in detail in chapter 5.
2-8
 7. Communication Flow
There is an adequacy of upward as well as downward communication. Superiors,
peers and subordinates are receptive to ideas, concepts, suggestions, and
lr opinions. Downward communication is timely, relevant, credible, and adequate.
Communication channels are always open and organizational members are free to
discuss and describe personal positions about issues and concerns without fear.
There is ample communication between organizational components. Rules, roles,
relationships and responsibilities are clearly understood by all concerned. A
key element in an NCO's duty performance is the passing of information from
soldiers to leaders and back down the chain. Communication flov! will be
discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.
8. Summary
Noncommissioned officers are a key part of the various components of ~he organi­
zation. They are vitally involved with all organizational processes as are
commissioned officers. As parts of the leader and chain of command components,
noncommissioned and commissioned officers must function together as a team to
provide unity to the leader component. Vlhen thinking of organizational compo­
nents, or subsystems, it is important to remember that a change in one component
will impact in all the other components that make up an organization. By being
aware of the concepts presented in this chapter, you can aid in reducing the
impact of the changes that must occur in a dynamic and responsive Army. The
remainder of this manual concentrates on how the officer-NCO relationship can
be developed to produce a team that will attain maximum organizational effec­
ti veness.

2-9

, - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _._---- _ _. _-_._._ ... ... _........

Chapter 3

CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION

The center of activity in Army units is directed toward mission accomplishment

and combat readiness. This activity is totally dependent upon a means of
communication flow between people. Communication flow is an organizational
process that plays an all important role in Army organizations. To insure
efficient and effective mission accomplishment, it is imperative that commu­
nication flow in the Army be a two-way process. A leader may make a decision
and communicate it to other members of the organization with the expectation
that a particular action will be carried out. However, the likelihood that
what the subordinate heard coincides with what the speaker said is quite
small. Accomplishment of effective communication flow is often difficult,
and the technical problems involved in communication flow can be quite
severe. Unders tandi ng the commun i ca ti on flow proces sins ures tha t i nforma­
tion is exchanged up, down, and laterally. A key element, therefore, in an
NCO's duty performance is the passing of information accurately from soldiers
to leaders and back down. Communication and direction within the Army may
take place within "channels" that supplement the chain of command. In
addition to the chain of command, the primary channels are the NCO support
channel, technical/administrative channels, and staff channels. The channels
of communication are part of the structure component of Army units.
Chain of Command.
THERE IS ONLY ONE CHAIN OF COMMAND IN THE ARMY. Through the chain of command,
instructions and orders relating to the performance of the unit mission are
issued and policies for conducting business are conveyed down to the unit. It
is a two-way system. The chain of command carries information from within the
unit back up to its leader, feeding back how things are going, what the problems
are, requests for clarification, and help. The chain of command in a rifle
company extends from the company commander through the platoon leaders and
squad leaders, to the individual soldier.
Communication is the way people deal with each other and is the means used to
tie individual effort together. In line with the principle of unity of
command, one person is in charge of giving direction. In football the offen­
sive plays are called by the quarterback; there is only one signal caller. It
is the same in the Army. For each level in the unit there is only one boss,
one signal caller. To have it otherwise would be confusing, frustrating, and
ineffective. In other words, the unit is most effective if the soldier is
responding to one leader. At the same time, in terms of correction or
adjustment, there can be only one person who is accountable or responsible.
If the quarterback calls a bad-pTay or ignores instructions from the coach,
he is answerable, not a lineman or receiver. It is to the quarterback that
new instructions come. In the Army, we do the same. We call this system the

3-1 ST/2a
chain of command. Working with and supporting the chain of command are parallel
supplementing channels, generally falling into three categories:
(1) STAFF CHANNELS
(2) TECHNICAL/ADMINISTRATIVE CHANNELS
(3) NCO SUPPORT CHANNEL
Support Channels
At the same time, it is obvious that there is a need for supplemental commu­
nications. A line coach may spot a weakness in the defensive lineup or a
receiver coach may notice a breakdown in coverage. The trainer may detect an
injury or an equipment problem. The communication to adjust or correct the
problem will normally not pass through the coach or the quarterback but will
go direct to the responsible players on the field. A guard may shift a few
inches, a receiver may change his fake, and the trainer may retape an ankle
or replace a shoestring. All these activities contribute to team success.
Activity of this type in the Army takes place within "channels" supplementing
the chain of command. The primary ones are the NCO support channel, technica1/
administrative channels, and staff channels. Activity not only takes place
within each of these channels, but also between them, and between the channels
and the chain of command. The staff and technical/administrative channels are
means for communicating direction and were formally recognized within the Army
for a long time. The NCO support channel is a much newer addition, which
acknowledges and formalizes the existence of a natural channel which has
always informally existed. The main difference in its operation from the
staff and technical/administrative channels is that it involves only NCO's,
and is not restricted to a specialty or specific functional area.
As technical/administrative and staff channels are extensions of the chain of
command, they are similar in their functions; however, they have different
characteristics. These technical/administrative and staff channels are
unique because normally communication is between people in the respective
channel who have the same type job functions. Staff channels function
strictly within their staff area (i.e., G1 or Sl, S2, S3, S4) and operate
from staff member to like staff member. Technical/administrative channels
may cut across staff boundaries.

3-2 ST/2a
 For example:
SUPPORT CHANNELS
A TECHNICAL/ADMINISTRATIVE A STAFF CHANNEL MAY
CHANNEL MAY INCLUDE: INCLUDE:
AG G4 (Div)
Personnel Officer S4 (Bde, Bn)
Executive Officer XO (Co)
Bn PSNCO Supply Sergeant
First Sergeant Supply Clerk
Training NCO
Platoon Sergeant
Figure 3-1 Staff and Technical/Administration Support Channels
NCO Support Channel
The NCO support channel vertically parallels and supplements the chain of
command. It operates within and comprises a portion of both technical/adminis­
trative and staff channels. It operates by passing information and instruction
on an NCO to NCO basis. Although it usually involves matters relating to
enlisted personnel, this channel deals with both technical/administrative
and staff subjects that enhance unit effectiveness and harmony.
The NCO support channel originates from the installation/major command CSM
through intermediate levels, through the battalion CSM and in turn through
the company/battery lSG, PSG, to the squad leader/section chief/team leader.
This channel is used for exchanging information, providing reports, issuing
instructions which are directive in nature, and accomplishing routine (but
important) activities in accordance with command policies and directives.
Most often, it is used to execute established policies, procedures, and
standards involving the performance, training, appearance, and conduct of
enlisted personnel. The authority of the NCO support channel rests with the
chain of command. It does not circumvent or replace the chain of command.
It frees the chain of command from transmitting routine, detailed, policy­
based instructions and information. The NCO support channel makes the chain
of command available to responsively originate and transmit command policy
and directives from the highest to the lowest levels in the minimum time
and with the least chance of misinterpretation.
THE NCO SUPPORT CHANNEL IS SUBORDINATE TO AND SUPPORTIVE OF THE CHAIN OF
COMMAND. As the NCO support channel parallels the chain of command, it is
the duty of the NCO to insure that the chain of command is keet informed of
actions implemented through the NCO support channel and to ellminate the
possibilit~ of the NCO support channel operating outside of command policy
and directlves. Problems must be brought to the attention of the chain of
command and resolved through a coordinated effort. Since the NCO support
channel should be operating in accordance with established command policy
and directives, conflicts will normally be minimal and easily resolved.
3-3 ST/2a
Previously the NCO support channel was considered an informal communications
channel. Recent attitudinal chanqes to AR 600-20 not only formalized the NCO
support channel bur-further expanded its functions, making it directive in
nature as long as its directives remain within established command policies
and procedures. Because of this formalization of the NCO support channel and
its expanded functions, company/battery/troop commanders can expect to see the
battalion/squadron command sergeant major (C5M) in their company/battery troop
areas frequently. The C5M 1 s visits should be viewed in the same manner as the
visitation by the battalion/squadron 51, S2, S3, S4, providing_that correct
staff procedures are utilized. Visits of the C5M snould be welcomed for the
assistance provided to the unit and should not be a source of concern for sub­
ordinate commanders.
These supporting channels and their relationship with the chain of command
can be graphically illustrated. At brigade level, the chain of command is
depicted as follows:

W
t
t
1
U
s

Figure 3-2. Brigade Chain of Command

3-4 ST/2a
 Adding to the above diagram, the immediate subordinate senior NCO of ~ach
individual in a command position produces the following:

Figure 3-3. Brigade i~CO Support Channel

What has been illustrated is the NCO support channel; the channel parallel
to the chain of command. The NCO support channel is similar in operation to
the staff channels. They both deal strictly within the guidelines of estab­
lished policy and approved procedure to free commanders of routine actions.
Usage is dependent to a great extent on the freedom of operation and
support given to NCO's by the commander.

a
3-5 ST/2a
We can also portray staff relationships the same way. For example, in the
logistics area we have:

Figure 3-4. Brigade Staff Channel

Similarly, an example of a technical/administrative channel for the mainte­
nance area looks like this:
Al
ct
fr
ar
me
al
an
e)j
pr
cc
SL

Su
op
co
di
th
so
qu
NC
Figure 3-5. Brigade Technical/Administrative Channel re
3-6 ST/2a
 r'1atching these examples of support channels with the chain of cor.mand shows
how the va ri OLIS pos i ti ons in these channel s re 1ate to a commander a t any
particular organizational level (Figure 3-6). Note that the chain of cOlilnand
and support c~lannels operate in tv/O directions, not only dOVIn, but also up.

Support Chi!!!! 1S
Chlln 0' C_nc1
U!!!
'rl_
IM.,
lataHon
&.tv.'
CoIIpanl
LIYtl

Fi gure 3-6. ChC'. i;l of CorTland and Supporting Channel s

A1tho ugh in the above fi C'LTe th2 SL:pport channels are s epa ra ted from the
chain of command, this does not il!Jply that these channel s operate independently
from the chain of cor,Tland. Their authority comes from the chain of command
and their purpose is to support the objectives of the chain of command. The
members of these channels work for their appropriate commanders. For example,
although the first sergeant is in the NCO support channel, he still works for
and is responsible to the company/battery/troop commander. If conflicts
exist between direction provided by the chain of comnand and direction
provided by supporting channels, the conflict is resolved by the chain of
comnand.
SUPPORT CHANNELS ARE DIRECTIVE IN NATURE.
Support channels are directive when they assist the chain of cotmland and
operate i'fithin the policies and procedures established by the chain o t
comnand. These channel s are advi sory and informa ti ona 1 \aJhen they hel p subor­
dinates and leaders perform better. They also save time. In football, as in
the Art-:l,Y, the Ilea d coach (or a corrrnander) cannot talk to every player (or
soldier). For this reason the head coach (commander) nonnally deals with the
quarterback (subordinate corrrnander) and assistant coaches (staff or senior
NCOls). Infomation that affects the team may originate with a lineman or
receiver but the head coach should hear of it from an assistant coach.

'2a
3-7 ST/2a
PROBLEMS IN COMMUNICATION FLOW
E
Whil e the Anny can des i gn, set up, support, and exerci se "channe1s and the
II

"chain of conmand,1I it is important to point out what can happen to the best I
of systems. The sender and receiver are people. There is always the poten­ t
tial for distortion or misunderstanding due to personality clashes, fatigue, s,
emotion, experience, and cultural differences. Clarity may suffer because of i
brevity. Time pressures and other distractions may interfere or garble what P
;s sent or received. Sometimes the media form such as radio, teletype, or gl
letter, causes a problem. s'
al
Effective conmunication is how teamwork is gained and how the effectiveness
of organizations is improved. Unfortunately, poor communications and break­
downs in organizations cause problems. However, it is a rare occurrence when I····

only problems are indicated and no level of success was achieved. 80th success ":•.
and problems require a process of evaluation and feedback to identify and '.
correct the problem or capitalize on the success.

EVALUATION OF
Mission
Accomplishment
and
Combat
Readiness
ASS
So,
eor
to
eon
suel
\'las '
as i
reir
shol
meni
reel
Figure 3-7. Evaluation and Feedback prot
or 1
3-8 ST/2a
 EVALUATION AND FEEDBACK
If an organi za ti on is to sus ta in i tsel f, it mus t reduce its errors and make
the roost of its successes. In order to do this, the organization must have
some mechanism to detect and measure problems and successes and transmit that
in forma ti on. Thi s mechan i Sl!l i nvo1ves eva 1ua ti on and feedback. r~i s s i on accom­
plishment and combat readiness serve as realistic indicators of our ultimate
goal - success in battle. By comparing training output against desired
standards, feedback can be obtained \'/hich indicates the degree of success
achieved or the scope and magnitude of proble~s.

Figure 3-8.
ASSESSt,jENT
So, there must be adjustment from \'Iithin or outs'ide the organization to
correct problems. Success should not be neglected. Conditions contributing
to success must be deterQined and action taken to insure that success is
continued. Assessment consists of determining the factors which lead to
success or failure. Success or failure in mission accomplishment or a
v/aste of resources is soon apparent to both working and supervisory levels
as a result of feedback. Assessment results in either adjustment or
reinforcement of success. To insure that success is continued, the success
should be assessed to reinforce those elements which contributed to its achieve­
ment; and, to identify those elements to be adjusted. To avoid continuance or
recurrence of fa il LIre or \Alas te of resources, an assessment of the cause of the
problem is performed. Adjustments are made by leaders within the organization
or leaders at higher levels outside the organization will intervene.
2a
3-9 ST/2a
Adjustments to solve problem areas and to reinforce elements contributing to
success are combined to form a new input to the entire system, and the process
begins anew. It is through this self-correcting process that training and
preparation for success in battle can and must be carried out.

Fi gure 3-9.
BASIC COMMUNICATIONS FLOW BETWEEN PEOPLE
No channel is effective without clear and concise communications between
people. Directives must be understood before they can be followed. "I
know you believe you understand what you think I said, but, I am not sure
you realize what you heard is not what I meant./I This quotation illustrates
the problem people often face when trying to explain their ideas to each other.
We must realize that there are many deterrents to good communication, and
we must be prepared to recognize and eliminate them when they occur. When
discussing communication, it must be kept first and foremost in our minds
that we are talking about people, people interacting to exchange information.
There are many kinds of communications. The artist, the musician, the actor,
the soldier - all are communicators. Each conveys to others some attitudes,
thoughts, or emotions. There are four basic elements to communications.
They are:
1. The Sender. A person who originates an idea.
2. The Message. The idea as it is expressed.
3. The Media. A way to convey the message.
4. The Receiver. Someone who receives, interprets, and provides feedback
on the message.

3-10 ST/2a

~.
;
,
l ··.
 R decodes
S E
E interprets
..D MESSAGE. MEDIA
C
E analyzes
I
E V
R E
R

provides
accuracy
understanding

:k

Figure 3-10. Basic Connunications r'1ode1

Both sender and receiver must listen effectively. Effective listening
skills are both infinitely COMplex and profoundly simple. Like the game
of golf, these skills can be enjoyed at many levels of proficiency. These
skills involve two basic ingredients: sensitive perception and selective
ref1 ecti ng.
2a

3-11 ST/2a
Sensitive perception requires that we listen with intensity both to what is being to
said and what is not being said. It involves being able to tell the difference stc
between the medium and the message, between what is being said and the way in ela
which it is being said. The communications process is total •. Thus, messages are mes
sent both verbally and non-verbally. The sensitive listener is one who tunes into as
many different levels and decides what the message is the sender is trying to com­ thi
municate at that moment. tic
al~
Selective reflecting involves deciding the appropriate level of communications to and
use when responding. It is not essential to respond to everything heard. Everyone
can improve their listening effect1veness by applying the following three guidelines Yes
tim
1. Anticipate the speaker's point before he makes it. Try to figure out what ica
the person is Soin g to say next before he says it. If we guess correctly, then we is
have thought a out it twice. If we guess incorrectly, we then compare what the and
speaker actually said to what we thought he was building to. pro
und
2. Identify what the speaker has for evidence. Do not ·ust acce t a s eaker's "Wh.
assertions but be sure his evidence supports his conclus1ons. s we ana yze s alw
evidence later on,_ we can look for logical inconsistancies or flaws in his argu­
ments. Thi s enab'1 es the 1i s tener to reach a more i nfonned conc1 us i on. Res
com
3. Summarize periodically as you listen. After you have listened hard for the
several minutes, go back over what has been said and summarize it in your mind. Thi
summarizing reinforces what we heard, increases our chances of being able to recall 1.
the material, and doubles the benefit we have gained from listening to the speaker. leal
e;tl
There are many causes for ineffective communication between people. Some
the
of these are barriers such as distortion, lack of trust, lack of understanding
us ­
of each other, 1anguage or wor-d difference that is not unders tood or is offens i ve,
It .
personality clashes, difference in experience levels, general background,
you
or lack of confidence and respect. All of these are detrimental to the
catE
development of rapport and communication between people.
get~

Communication must be accomplished in a manner which allows no room for

2.
misinterpretation. For example, a helicopter pilot may decide to capture
Hill
an enemy soldier running alone in a field. As the pilot lands near the
sec1
fleeing soldier, he may say to the door gunner, "Get him!" What do the

instructions mean? Is the gunner to open fire on the soldier; or, is he to

3.
jump out and physically capture the soldier? When interpretation is needed,
Feec
the result may be something the pilot did not intend. To avoid problems such
and
as the one just-mentioned, say what you mean so others don't have to wonder

wha t you sa i d.
4.
the
FUNDAMENTAL TECHNIQUES TO PROVIDE FEEDBACK BETWEEN PEOPLE
clar
to t
Feedback through mutual two-way communication insures clear understanding. By
;nsu
sitting down to discuss an issue or plan, there can be enough interaction to
rest
insure a reasonable amount of understanding. The platoon sergeant (PSG) can
reply rece
ques
3-12 ST/2a by s
go;n
n9 to directions from the first sergeant (lSG) by restating, "This is what I under­
stand you to mean ••• Right?" The lSG can then nod agreement or make further
elaboration of what is desired if it is felt the PSG has not received the
re message accurately. This sort of mutual give and take should proceed as long
nto as necessary to achieve mutual understanding. Obviously, not all issues require
om- this form of feedback. Simple directives might be issued in one-way communica­
tion and easily understood. However, you need to have complete knowledge and
always give complex issues more time and effort to forestall misunderstandings
to and their unfortunate consequences.
'yone
!11 nes: Yes, two-way communications, with restatement as a form of feedback, are more
time consuming than simple one-way communication. But the accuracy of commun­
-,what
we
ication and the confi dence of the receiver increases when the two-way process
is used. Therefore, there is a choice to be made that must take the situation
and circumstances into consideration. Emphasis on a one-way communication
process in order to save time may be shortsighted because the possible incomplete
understanding may lead to very time consuming errors in accomplishment. Consider:
~ker' 5 . "Why is there never enough time to do it right in the first place, but there is
is always enough time to do the whole thing over again?"
u-
Restatement then is a way of helping another person understand. It is
communication to a person or group that serves to clarify meaning for both
or the sender and receiver. Some techniques for useful feedback or restatement are:
:-Thi
"eca11 1. Be descriptive, not evaluative. By describing your understanding of the order it
~aker. leaves the other individual free to use your current level of understanding to
either clarify or agree. By avoiding evaluative language which attacks the person,
the poss i bi 1i ty of defens i veness and confl i ct is reduced. II I t does nit make sen se for
us to move thi s tent today and then re 1oca te the enti re CP tomorrow" is eva 1ua ti ve.
i; ve, It is likely to cause a defensive reaction from the person giving the order. Instead,
you could say, "I understand we are to move this tent today. But the entire CP relo­
cates tomorrow, is it okay to delay moving the tent until then?" This question
gets the same point across but avoids a defensive reaction.
2. Be specific, not general. To state, "I understand I am to move my section to
Hill 347 in grid AD4581 at 1300 hours" rather than III understand I am to move the
section is more useful to the purpose of establishing clarity and understanding.
ll

3. Take into account the purposes of both the receiver and sender of feedback.
Feedback can be destructive or disruptive when it serves only the sender's purpose
and fails to consider the purpose of understanding on the part of the receiver.
4. Make it useful; solicit rather than impose it. Restatement is most useful when
the sender has formulated the kind of questions which will serve best the purposes of
clarification and understa:nding. "After I give these directions I want each of you
to tell me what I mean," may serve to insure everyone is listening but certainly not
~y insure everything was clearly understood. Don1t force it. Use the technique of
restatement in a more natural manner, allow it to develop from questions of the
reply receiver. For example, after issuing a squad movement order and one of the riflemen
questions what time the movement takes place, your answer can start the feedback process
12a by saying something like 1I0kay, we move at 0545 hours. Who can tell me how we are
go; ng to cross the ri ver?"

3-13 ST/2a
5. Make it well-timed. In general, feedback is most useful at the earliest oppor­
tunity after the initial direction is received (depending, of course, on the appro­
priateness of the situation and basic understanding of the direction concerned). The
best time to clarify understanding of an operation order is at the time it is issued.
Half way to the objective is too late to start clarifying information about the special '
equlpmeht required for the mission.
6. It is applied to all concerned. Feedback with only one member of a team does not
insure understanding and purpose with the other members of the team even if the other
members are present at the time feedback is being applied with the one team member.
Check to insure the desired directions are received by all. To have only three of
four platoon sergeants fully understand the directions of the lSG is not a totally
satisfactory situation.
Summar~.
Communlcations flow is of vital concern to the noncommissioned officer. NCO's
in the NCO support channel receive their instructions from the chain of command
and communicate the plans and policies of the chain of command to their soldiers.
In addition, it is the noncommissioned officer in the NCO support channel who
primarily supervises the soldier in order to attain combat readiness and
achieve unit goals.
NCO's supervise the actual effort of the work teams in the organization. They are in
the organizational positions where problems with policies and plans will likely become
known first. Therefore, it is essential that NCO's recognize their key function of
providing feedback to the chain of command. In terms of duties, NCO's have a duty to
insure effective communications flow w·ithin their units. NCO's have authority to
supervise and lead. They are also held accountable for the performance of their duty.
The following chapter clarifies the authority, responsibility, and type of duties
of NCO's.

3-14 ST/2a
 Chapter 4

,por­ AUTHORITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND DUTY

'pro­
• The
ssued.
special In this chapter we will define the terms authority, responsibility, and duty
in detail and establish a common frame of reference for use of these terms
in the remainder of the manual.
es not
other
ber.
of
J ly

I.

re ; n
become
of
ty to
a
duty.
s

4-1

 MILITARY AUTHORITY
(Power and Actions)

INTRODUCTION.
Military authority is the element of the leader component which guides the
organizational processes by utilizing the chain of command and supporting
channels. Military authority starts with the constitution which divides
authority for the military between Congress and the President. Congress
has the authority to make laws for the govern~ent of the Army, and the
President has authority to command the Army as Commander-in-Chief.
WHAT IS AUTHORITY?
fAfIt#orft 1s the 1e i timate ower of a 1eader to di rect those subordinate
tofhim ,Qrtotakeacti'Onw thin the scop~ '< 9f*is>.:~pGslti:O#} Let us first
address the two types of authority we have identified: COMMAND and GENERAL
MILITARY AUTHORITY.
COMMAND AUTHORITY.
Command authority is exercised when a member of the Army is assigned to or
assumes a position requiring the direction and control of other members of
the Army. Command authority is not limited to commissioned officers. A
commander is any leader who directs and controls soldiers and has the
inherent authority to issue orders necessary for the accomplishment of the
unit mission or for the welfare of soldiers, unless contrary to law or regu­
lation. Command may be given to or assumed by enlisted members of the Army.
So a tank commander, squad leader, section or platoon sergeant uses command
authority to direct and control. A dining facility manager is using command
authority to operate the dining facility. Generally, the senior ranking
Army member commands or assumes command as necessary. Command authority has
several sources, but it primarily originates with Presidential authority of
the Commander-in-Chief. Most command authority comes from regulation and
not from law. Command authority is restricted to the soldiers and facilities
which make up the unit.
GENERAL MILITARY AUTHORITY.
The second type of authori ty is genera 1 mi 1ita ry authori ty. l..L2.?_..the author­
ity extended to all members of the Army to take action. It originates in
oaths of office, law, the rank structure, tradition, and regulation. For
example, the UCMJ (law) qives authority to "commissioned officers, warrant
officers, petty officers, and noncommissioned officers to quell quarrels,
frays, and disorders . . . and to apprehend persons . . . who take part. II

Unlike command authority, general military authority may be exercised over

other service members who are not in the same unit. For example, a finance
sergeant sees a group of soldiers in a brawl. The finance sergeant has the

4-2

l.. _
_ _ _______
general military authority and moral obligation to break up the brawl even
though none of the soldiers are in the sergeant's finance section. The
same type of authority is used when the NCO of one battalion stops a soldier
from another battalion and gives instruction on military courtesy.
Guidelines for Delegation and Use of Authority.
Now that we have outlined the two general types of authority, let us next
look at the delegation of authority and some guidelines for delegating or
assuming authority.
Just as it is impossible for Congress and the President to participate in
every facet of the Armed Forces, it is impractical for the commissioned
officers appointed by the President to participate directly in every event
within the Army. These commissioned officers must also delegate to noncom­
missioned officers in the organization the authority necessary to accomplish
the goals of the organization.
Guideline #1. When required to perform a specified, directed, or implied
duty or task, the authority necessary to accomplish the task comes with
the duty or task whether or not you are so instructed. If you are told
by your supervisor to "have the soldiers clean their weapons today,ll you
have a task to perform. It is not necessary for your senior to add, "You
may issue orders to your soldiers to have them report to the arms room.1I
For every task assigned, you have automatically been delegated the author­
ity necessary to accomplish the task. If you must keep the soldiers for
three hours after the end of the workday to get the weapons clean, you
have that authority because the weapons must be cleaned today.
Guideline #2. As a superior, when you delegate a duty or a task, you cannot
give authority to a subordinate which requires him to use authority you do
not possess. This means you cannot give a task to a subordinate which requires
him to use authority you do not have. If the authority to sign certain types
of requisitions rests with the company/battery/troop commander, the platoon
leader cannot give the task IIsign these requisitions" to the platoon sergeant
because this task requires authority that the platoon leader does not have.
Guideline #3. Unless restricted by law, regulation, or a superior, you may
delegate any or all of your authority__to your subordinates. Since only the
company/battery/troop commander, who is a commissioned officer, can admin­
ister an Article 15, the commander cannot delegate the task to "administer
Article 15 1 s 11 to the executive officer or first sergeant, since the UCMJ
(law) restricts this authority. On the other hand, the company/battery/
troop cOJl111ander has the authority to perform the task "rnaintain unit
vehicles,1I and in turn may delegate this authority in whole 01' in part to
a motor officer or motor sergeant.
Guideline #4. As a subordinate, you cannot assume authority that xou~
superior does not possess, has restricted, or cannot delegate. When we

4-3
say "assume" authority, we mean that you take over a task on your own initia­

tive because of circumstance or necessity. If you were the executive officer

or first sergeant, you could not assume the task "administer Article 15's"

because your company/battery/troop commander cannot delegate the authority

necessary to do so. On the other hand, the executive officer could (in the

absence of instructions or guidance) assume the task to "maintain unit vehi­

cles" and the authority necessary to accomplish the task.

Guideline #5. Authority is limited to the duty or task to be performed.

If the first sergeant had delegated the task "get five men from each platoon

and police around battalion headquart~rs" to one of the platoon sergeants,

the platoon sergeant's authority is limited to five men, not six or seven,

from each platoon. It is also limited to policing the headquarters. He

does not have the authority to direct the detail to perform other tasks.

"" ...

~
~
c(
>
u
0
~
c(
...

~
c(
~
C) ~

"" ~ ""
Q. ~
""
~ 0
u ""
)( ~
c(
~
"" x

PUNITIVE
CORRECTIVE

REINFORCEMENT
Figure 4-1.

Power is the capacity to influence and control the behavior of subordinates

in order to accomplish the mission. While authority is the organizational
right to take action or use power, the mere possession of power does not
give a person the organizational right to act or exercise power. For exam­
ple, a personnel assignments clerk has the power (by changing orders) to
divert incoming soldiers to certain organizations, but the clerk has no

4-4

authority or organizational right to make the decision. In other words,

Guideline #5 applies, for the clerk's task is lito type orders assigning
soldiers to the units determined by his superiors." The possession of
power does not automatically give effective authority to an individual.
The following discussion addresses only the power relationship of the
leader over the subordinate, but you should be aware that power operates
in all directions.
(1) Legal Power. In part, this power is derived from law and regula­
tion. It is effective only to the extent that soldiers believe that their
superior has a legitimate organizational right to influence them, and that
they are obligated to accept the influence. But in addition to regulation,
there are several other sources which affect legitimacy of the superior.
First, subordinates enter the Army with many cultural values which affect
the legitimacy of a superior's power. For instance, during the last decade
in our culture, we have seen many more women enter the work force and become
supervisors of men in some organizations. Even today, women supervisors may
have difficulty in influencing some men because these men believe that women
do not have a legitimate basis to exercise power over men.
Second, when subordinates accept the organizational structure, they also tend
to accept the legitimacy of the hierarchy of authority and power related to
organizational positions. The acceptance of the position in the organization
confers a right to the person occupying the position to take action, for exam­
ple, a squad leader having the right to exercise command authority over the
squad. This legal power of the "squad leader" relates primarily to the posi­
tion and is somewhat independent of the person occupying the position. Simi­
larly, a master sergeant has greater power when occupying a command sergeant
major position than does a master sergeant in the same unit occupying a staff
position.
Legal power begins with the constitution and flows downward from the President
as Commander-in-Chief, through intermediate commanders, to all commissioned
officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers. Each has author­
ity which includes, but is not limited to, maintaining discipline and job
performance standards. Congress specifically recognized that NCO's must
issue orders and provided penalties for failure to obey NCO orders in Arti­
cle 91, UCMJ. This is an example of yet a third source of legal power. A
soldier may accept an NCO's orders because the soldier recognizes that Con­
gress (an agency the soldier accepts as having the right to control) ha~
reinforced that right of the NCO to issue orders. The symbol representlng
this delegation of power is primarily the insignia of rank.
(2) Coercive Powers: Coercive power, in its broadest sense, can be
defined as power which influences a person to perform or behave in a
manner contrary to how that person desires to behave at the time. It can
be actual or implied force, a threat, or fear of the consequences of an

4-5
action or of an omission. There are only two legal ways in which coercive
power can be exercised. Both are only effective as a means for influencing
subordinates by the extent to which soldiers believe that noncompliance with
orders will result in action taken on the soldier. The first coercive power
is punitive action, which is derived from statutory provisions of the UCMJ.
Congress has restricted punitive action to commissioned and warrant officers
who also are assigned to command company/battery/troop or larger units.
Commissioned officers who are not designated commanders, as well as NCO's,
exercise punitive action only through their recommendations to a designated
commander, who alone has the power to take punitive action. The NCO must
know that he may not take punitive action but can definitely influence the
imposition of punitive action by recommending to the commander that it be
taken.
The second coercive power, which is nonpunitive in nature, is corrective
action. It is the tool used most often by noncommissioned officers to r
maintain order and discipline, and to train their soldiers. Corrective c
actions are administrative admonitions, reprimands, exhortations, dis­ r
approvals, criticisms, censures, reproofs and rebukes, and extra training, 1
and may be either written or oral. Corrective actions may also include,
c
subject to applicable regulations, administrative withholding of privi­ n
leges. o
t
The various corrective actions emphasize the element of correction, the rr
idea that the misconduct is not the product of an intentional, deliberate, e
or gross failure to comply with the prescribed standards of military con­ a
duct. The misconduct is probably the product of simple neglect, forgetful­ t
ness, ignorance or laziness. Implicit in the use of corrective action is c
the belief that the soldier concerned can, with proper guidance, become an T
efficient and competent soldier. In dealing with the lesser range of mis­ o
conduct, the noncommissioned officer is primarily engaged in teaching and T
training in discipline and the proper standards of conduct, and should not t
be interested in punitive actions, or the infliction of a penalty. This m
is a fine, but crucial, line for the noncommissioned officer. A wise use a
of the various corrective actions will frequently result in an individual
adjusting and improving his conduct to preclude becoming a candidate for v
punitive action. This corrective, nonpunitive action is the normal method 1
noncommissioned officers use to maintain discipline in their units when
coercive measures are required. Extra training and instruction, if timely
and appropriate, may achieve a corrective effect and avoid more formal
disciplinary measures later becoming necessary. But extra training and
instruction are not to be used as punitive measures. The following exam­
ples illustrate the proper use of corrective training and instruction
oriented toward improving performance in the problem area:
a. An individual appearing in improper uniform may be required to
attend special instruction in correct wearing of the uniform.
b. An individual in poor physical condition may be required to take
additional conditioning drills and participate in extra field training and
road marches.
4-6
These examples are not inclusive listings of what is or is not permissible.
These measures are in the nature of training and instruction -- not punitive
actions. Authority to employ them is inherent in command authority. Care
should be exercised, at all levels, to ensure that training and instruction
are not used in an oppressive manner to evade the procedural provisions
applicable to the imposition of punitive actions. Deficiencies that have
been satisfactorily corrected by means of training and instruction will not
be noted in the records of the soldiers concerned and will be considered
closed incidents.
To use coercive power as a primary method of influencing subordinates can be
very costly in many ways. First, coercive power usually produces some nega-·
tive feelings in the subordinate. These negative feelings tend to attach
themselves to the person or organization using the coercive power, that is,
soldiers do not IIlike their superior. Coercive power also tends to produce
ll

resistance to authority in the subordinate. Consequently, subordinates will

do only the minimum work possible to avoid the application of coercive power
rather than doing the most they could do had they wanted to do the work.
Third, superiors tend to see their subordinates' conformity as an indication
of commitment to the goals of the organization when in fact subordinates do
not hold favorable attitudes toward the organizational goals. Fourth, sub­
ordinates working under coercive conditions will often strive to escape from
the aversive or unpleasant environment. In the Army, escape from the environ­
ment is perhaps most seriously expressed by some types of AWOL; however,
equally serious avoidance acts can be seen when soldiers go to sick call to
avoid work or continually request to be transferred from the unit. However,
the overriding, immediate consideration for supervisors is that the use of
~oercive power is often an inefficient management practice for the supervisor.
The supervisor must be constantly present to observe the subordinate's behavior,
otherwise the superior will not be able to apply punitive or corrective actions.
The instant the supervisor leaves, soldiers tend to reduce their productivity
to the minimum effort necessary to avoid the unpleasant consequences. This
means that if supervisors rely on coercive power, subordinates can hardly be
allowed to work unsupervised if the supervisor wants guality work output. It
is impractical and ineffective for leaders to constantly and personally super­
vise subordinates. Therefore, emphasis on the use of coercive power in the
long run is often detrimental to organizational goals.
(3) Reward Power: This power derives from the c~acity of the leader
to provide desired rewards to a soldier for good performance. It is effec­
tive as a means of influencing soldiers to the extent which they believe
they will be rewarded for complying with orders.
Reward power is obviously the opposite of coercive power in many ways. Using
rewards tends to produce positive feelings which attach not only to the person
giving the reward but also to the organization. Rewards also tend to create
positive attitudes as well as public conformity to the standards of the organ­
ization because soldiers want to produce quality work to obtain rewards.
Rewards cause soldiers to stay in the pleasant environment rather than attempt

4-7

to escape from the environment. For the supervisor, reward power is a more
effective method of obtaining quality work since subordinates will continue
to work for the potential reward even in the absence of the supervisor. The
supervisor is then freed to perfonm other activities such as planning.
An obvious duty of commissioned and senior noncommissioned officers is to
devise systems in their unit which provide meaningful reward power to the
squad or section leaders. The military system does not allow the section
leader or tank commander to raise payor give bonuses, but there is an
awards and decorations system. Official recognition in the fonm of a letter
of achievement is often meaningful and a very powerful reward. Reward power
is also exemplified in the authority to give time off for a job well done,
and by simply telling the soldier that he is doing a good job.
(4) Expert Pow r. This power derives from the leader's accumulation
f kno ledge, skills, nd cap biliti s. It is made effective as an influ­
enc'ng de ice to the extent which soldiers believe their leader possesses
knowledge, information, and skills the soldiers need. Expert power is a
power that must be earned. No leader can delegate, nor do ribbons or
patches confer expert power. Expert power is only attained when the
leader displays and the soldier recognizes competence.
The importance of expert power, particularly for the noncommissioned offi­
cer and junior officer, is obvious. Although all commissioned and noncom­
missioned officers have legal, coercive, and reward power, there are real
limitations to these powers. If the commissioned or noncommissioned officer
isn't at least as good at his job as any other soldier under his control
and supervision, he will be less than totally effective. All leaders must
be IItechnically and tactically proficient. II Expert power is how the non­
commissioned officer during daily and constant contact with soldiers pri­
marily establishes credibility, influence and power, and maintains effective
authority needed to accomplish the mission.
For the newly appointed junior leader, expert power must be developed by
gaining the knowledge and skills required by his position. As skills are
developed, the leader must demonstrate to his subordinates through compe­
tent job perfonmance that the leader has the capability to lead in all
phases of the unit mission. Today, there are many opportunities for
leaders to demonstrate expert power. This is particularly important
for junior officers and NCO's in preparing their soldiers for the SQT ..
In the training processes, leaders demonstrate their competence to the1r
subordinates.
(5) Charismatic Power. This derives from the leader's ersonalit
and is effective as a means for in luencing sold1ers to the extent they i
respect and admire the leader. ~
c
For many years, leadership effectiveness was attributed mostly to a leader's s
inspirational abilities which were based on personality. While cha~ism~tic
~
power can be a strong influence, it is viewed today as the power Wh1Ch 1S b

4-8
least likely to continuously influence subordinates. It is a rare leader
who possesses the ability to inspire soldiers based solely on personality.
This power requires the support of the other types of power.
As mentioned earlier, reward power supports charismatic power because the
soldier tends to "like" his superior while coercive power detracts from
charismatic power.
In summary, authority is only as effective as subordinates perceive the
"organizational right" to exercise power. Power is the capacity to influ­
ence or direct others. Legal power is derived from laws, regulations and
other sources of legitimacy, and overlaps somewhat with the other types
of power.
Coercive power causes a person to perform regardless of the person's
desire. Coercive power is the "stick." Reward power is the opposite
of coercive power; it is the "carrot." Reward power is the power which
causes soldiers to "want to perform." However, while both coercive and
reward power form essential ingredients of command, leaders should strive
to increase the use of reward power and decrease the use of coercive power.
Exaert power is the power most effective on a daily basis, least restricted,
an most under the control of a leader. To maintain this power, the leader
must constantly work to be the best in all aspects of soldiering. No senior
can delegate job knowledge and proficiency. It must be learned and earned.
Charismatic power is the power most likely to be effective if a leader has
it. Unfortunately, very few military leaders possess it; and thus, it can­
not be depended upon by most of us. We have to rely more on the other types
of power.
ACTIONS.
We have already mentioned, during the discussion on power, several actions
that may be taken to enhance power. Since power is dependent on the per­
ception of soldiers, actions of supervisors lay the foundation and develop
the proper perceptions in soldiers. These actions are categorized as punitive,
corrective or reinforcing. Punitive and corrective actions build perceptions
that substandard job performance or noncompliance with orders will consist­
ently result in unpleasant consequences for the soldier. On the other hand,
the recognition of a job well done by giving an 'award or decoration is an
action which reinforces perceptions that quality performance will be rewarded.
Taking a sincere interest in the soldier and providing frequent, meaningful
counseling are actions which build charismatic (or referent) power. Whenever
an officer or NCO is publicly promoted, subordinates' perceptions of the legal
power of the supervisor are enhanced. Of course, first-line supervisors are
involved in actions every day which can enhance their expert power, for exam­
ple, the individual training of their subordinates. Not done properly, they
can have an opposite effect. These actions, of course, are specific to the
supervisor's job position.
Many of the above actions are dependent on the support provided the NCO
by the commissioned officer. Commissioned officers must acknowledge that

4-9
noncoll'lni ss i oned off; cers not only needauthori ty, but a source of power to
be effective as leaders and enlisted commanders. The ultimate source of
most power for the noncommissioned officer is the convnissioned officer.
Commissioned officers must sURPort those methods and systems within the
organization which allow and •push down" authority to noncormtissioned
officer leaders.
Some actions which commissioned officers can take to reinforce and push
down power to NCO's are as follows:
a. When a soldier has been recommended for Article 15, the soldier's
immediate NCO supervisor is consulted in the presence of the soldier for
the NCO's recommendation.
b. Specify to the NCO supervi sor in the presence of the so 'ld'icY' that
if the soldier has improved his performance during the period of punishment
(such as 30 days extra duty) that the NCO may request remission of part of
the punishment.
c. Promote or recommend promotion only when the NCO supervisor recom­
mends or concurs with the action.
d. When presenting an award to a soldier, have the immediate NCO
supervisor actively involved in the presentation, particularly when the
NCO recormtended the award.
By thus increasing the noncommissioned officer's capability to carry out
daily organizational requirements, commissioned officers can turn their
emphasis to the planning and management needed for readiness in peace and
success in war. The noncommissioned officer must grasp every opportunity
to demonstrate the capability to conduct the routine daily business that
"runs the Army," and in turn allow the cormtissioned officer to better per­
fonn his duty of "collTllanding the Army" and to give the NCO the duties that
he is ideally suited to accomplish. The following section on responsibility
provides an overview of responsibility as it impacts on both commissioned
and noncommissioned officers.

!~
t

!
!
I,
f
[,

4-10

 RESPONSIBILITY

When you are responsible for something, you are liable for, or accountable
for the outcome. You are answerable to someone who is in authority and
sometimes to another person or group of persons. You must answer either
for an action or an omission. RESPONSIBILITIES ARE BROKEN INTO TWO CATE­
GORIES: INDIVIDUAL and COMMAND.
Individual Responsibility.
As an individual commissioned, warrant or noncommissioned officer, or
private soldier, you are held accountable for your personal, individual
conduct. Every member of the Army has individual responsibility. For
example, every Army member is required to have funds in his account when
writing a check. If the check is returned, the member is held accountable,
not the superior. In a military sense, individual responsibility is most
clearly defi~ed i~ the actions that Congress has included in the UCMJ as
punitive acts. But individual responsibility is not limited to only puni­
tive acts. Individual responsibility includes the entire range of an
individual's conduct and job performance.
For example, in a combat engagement, the loader in a tank puts a HEP round
instead of HEAT in the gun. The target, an enemy tank, will not be hit and
not be killed. Within the few seconds available for a battle-sight fire mis ­
sion, there is no chance for the tank commander to check that the loader put
the right type round in the gun tube. The mista ke or failure is individual
yet the entire crew and tank can be lost. Responsibility to do things right
is inherent--it goes with the job.
Individual responsibility is not given or delegated. It is there. It was
assumed when you gave your oath of enlistment or accepted your commission.
A soldier's individual reseonsibi1it~ is .accountabi1ity for one's own
actions; it is accountabillty to one s fellow soldiers, to appointed
leaders and to one's unit, the Army and the American people.
Command Responsibility.
Command responsibility refers to the collective or organizational account­
ability of a commander of a unit. A COMMANDER IS ANY LEADER WHO DIRECTS
AND CONTROLS OTHER SOLDIERS If you are a commander, your command respon­
sibility encompasses being held accountable for how well your unit detail,
fire team, section, squad, platoon, etc., accomplished (or failed to accom­
plish) its organizational goals or missions.
For example, the brigade commander and all the soldiers in an infantry
battalion hold the Battalion Commander responsible and accountable for
mission accomplishment. No one expects the Battalion Commander to act
as a TOW gunner - no matter how proficient he is. Because while he
does so, who commands the battalion, makes future plans, and provides

4-11

the resources and direction to the battle captains? If the Battalion Com­
mander in this case did so, he is taking responsibility from one of his
soldiers and not meeting his own.
Factors Affecting Command Responsibility
Co~anders at all levels carry a special burden. Goal achievement and mis­
sibn accomplishment are dependent on the successful performance of individ­
uals within the unit as well as on the performance of the commander. Like
individual responsibility, command responsibility is inherent when assigned
to or accepting a command or leadership position.
There are several factors to consider before commanders and leaders should
be held accountable. First, the leader must be able to exercise a reason­
able degree of control over those things which affect his unit's capability
to perform its mission. The degree of control includes the amount of author­
ity necessary to direct the internal operation of the unit. Authority is
necessary to direct the internal operation of the unit. Authority is neces­
sary but in itself is not sufficient for holding leaders accountable. Many
events may occur in thelenvironment (see Chapter 2) over which the leader
has no control. Second, leaders need the right amount and mix of resources
(time, people, money, etc.). There are two elements involved: commanders
must provide the resources to subordinates, and subordinates must ask for
the resources when needed. It is a two-way street. Third, leaders should
be accountable only to the extent that reasonable foresight and subsequent
action would have prevented the problem. Last, the seriousness of the event
influences accountability. It should be tolerable for mistakes to be made
on a field training exercise, where errors result only in highlighting the
need for further training; but, it would be intolerable to allow the same
error on the battlefield where soldiers' lives and the future of the country
are at stake. At the same time, single severe events should not necessarily
lead to absolute action against leaders. The quarterback who throws a pass
interception which leads to losing the game and the championship, still
returns the next season. The coach recognizes the experience and potential
of the quarterback.
Assigning responsibility is not easy nor are there clear-cut solutions. Each
leader or commander assesses the command responsibility of his subordinates.
In turn, each subordinate works partly within the confines of his commander's
expectations. As members of work groups, it is essential that leaders and
subordinates interact to clarify their duties. The process of team building
which includes duty clarification is discussed in Chapter 5. The different
types of duties are explained in the next section of this chapter.
In general, a duty is the moral obligation to perform a requirement arising
from appointment as a commissioned officer or NCO and from assignment to an
organizational position. For example, both commissioned officers and NCOs
have a duty to take care of their soldier. Many duties of commissioned
officers and NCOs are shared because both are members of the profession of
arms. Similarly, a company commander and first sergeant may share a duty

4-12
1I
;

because of their related organizational positions. Sharing duties means

that both commissioned officer and NCO work toward the same goal, objec­
tive, or mission. For example, every commissioned officer and NCO in a
maintenance company share the duty to work together to accomplish the
company's maintenance mission. Commissioned officers share with NCOs
the duty to enforce standards of military appearance of subordinates.
However, the performance of some duties are primarily, but not exclu­
sively, the concern of either the commissioned officer or NCO. There
are three types of duties: specified, directed, and implied.

4-13

Specified Duties.
Specified duties are those with which an individual is charged in Army
Regulations, DA General Orders, the UCMJ and other publications. Specified
duties are position related and are spelled out in such publications as the
Soldier's Manual S T, ARTEP, and MOS ·ob descri tions. It is here that
soldiers are specl lca ly charged to per orm their uties, and are told what
they must do and the standards required. In this area there is no question
who should be performing what duties.
AR 600-20 charges the noncommissioned officer with the duty of insuring
the military courtesy of all soldiers. In this case, not only does the regu­
lation serve as a basis for the noncommissioned officer's authority, but com­
manders are also specifically charged in the regulation to support the noncom­
missioned officer in this duty. Similarly, Article 7 of the UCMJ charges the
noncommissioned officer with quelling quarrels, frays, and disorders among
military personnel, and, as the source, specifically provides the authority
for the NCO to perform this duty.
Specified duties are being clearly defined in Soldier's Manuals and Com­
mander's Guides and are job-specific. Drivers who change tires, check lug
nuts, etc., are performing their specified duties. Squad leaders \'Jho perform
individual training and account for their squad members by name are also
executing specified duties.
The major portion of the individual soldier's job consists of specified
duties. Similarly, the first-line supervisors will spend the most of their
working day performing their specified duties, but typically they will also
be performing some directed and implied tasks. Specified duties will gener­
ally decrease among officers and NCO's as rank increases. The following
figure illustrates how the number of specified duties decrease as a soldier
is promoted to higher positions in the unit.

Soldier's Job Sphere Squad Leader's Job Sphere CSMfs Job S;:;,ere

Figure 4-2. Specified Duties Decrease as Position in Unit Increase.

4-14

Directed Duties.
Directed duties are those duties given verball or in writin via LOI's,
DF's, SOP s, memorandums, policy statements, etc. by a superior which are not
normal 1 art of the job osition or MOS. Examples of directed duties include
charge of quarters CQ, sergeant of the guard, staff duty officer, company
motor officer, and NBC noncommissioned officer where these duties are not
found in the unit's organizational charts. Most of the "additional duties"
found at company level are directed duties, such as voting officer. These
duties are given to subordinates by leaders. They are not necessarily
spelled out or found in manuals or regulations but often are to meet specific
requirements. Many of the duties and tasks transmitted fall within this
category, and the authority for performance of these duties stems from the
leader by virtue of his assignment of the duty.
Directed duties can be derived from special requirements that occur
occasionally and exist as a one-time function only. Additionally, they
can be derived from relationships that typically exist in units and will
remain in force on a regular, recurring basis.
The individual soldier usually has few directed duties. A soldier may
be directed to perform a specified duty. The duty is still a specified
duty even though he was directed to do it. It is a specified duty if it
is part of the MOS of the soldier even though a soldier may be directed to
perform it. The noncommissioned officer, on the other hand, receives more
directed duties as he moves up the organization in rank and position. It
is natural to understand, for instance, that the CSr1 would receive many
more directed duties than the soldier because of the special relationship
that ex is ts retween the CSr·1 and the commander.

Platoon Sergeant First Sergeant Command Sergeant Major

Specified

Figure 4-3. Directed and Implied Duties Increase

as Position in Unit Increases.

4-15
Examples of directed duties follow:
(a) The platoon sergeant tells the squad leader to organize the platoon's
athletic program, (b) the platoon sergeant tells the squad leader to form the
platoon tomorrow morning because he will be absent, (c) the aircraft commander
says to the co-pilot, "you take over and I'll operate the radios," (d) the com­
pany commander delegates the additional duty of NBC trainer to a subordinate.

4-16

Impl i ed Duti es.

Implied duties in many cases support the accomplishment of the specified
duties, but in other situations they may not be related to the MOS job
position. These duties may not be written, but are 1mplied in instruc­
tions. They are neither specified nor directed but are all those other
duties which must be performed in order to get the job done better, and
assist in keeping the unit functioning on an optimum level. In most
cases, the accomplishment of these duties is dependent upon individual
initiative. A soldier mayor may not be told to do these implied duties.
He normally just routinely does them or fails to do them. These duties
and their subsequent tasks, are generally undefined and nontask analyzed.
Implied duties usually are people oriented, and concern every aspect of
mission accomplishment~

Duties under this category involve communication and team building activ­
ities between superiors and subordinates. They include many tasks involved
in leadershie, example setting and pretarin g subordinates to eventually
assume positlons of greater responsib; it~. They are the unwritten but
fundamental tasks that help you accomplis your specified and directed
duties more professionally or with greater efficiency. They improve the
work environment and create a climate that motivates soldiers to perform
because they want to, not because they have to. They include the many
common soldiering duties that, even though they have not been identified
as critical in soldiers manuals, are essential for the Arm to run effec­
tively on a ay-to- ay asis.

Implied duties thus are inherent in what we have called specified and
directed duties. The authority for these implied duties comes from
the same sources as the specified and directed duties. They logically
"fallout," and can be conceptualized as seen on the following page:

4-17

 Specified 01 rected
Duties Duties

Inherent Inherent

Implied

Duties

Figure 4-4.

It has been said that "noncommissioned officers run the company.II While
this is not entirely true, many of the duties and tasks that are inherent,
and necessary in order to conduct the on-going business of the company/
batter /troo can be classified and understood as im lied duties of NCO's.
Some more specific examp es are: 1 an NCO who observes that the bul­
letin board is out of date and inconsistent with unit policy, tells the
lSG so that it will be corrected, (2) the NCO who spot-corrects deficien­
cies noted in the barracks, (3) the squad leader who adjusts the training
schedule to make the squad member's training day less of a hassle, and
(4) the NBC noncommissioned officer using initiative obtains nails and
sees that the protective masks are properly stored, (5) personnel with
a vested interest in unit readiness usually call key personnel along the
supply system (i.e., Logistics Assistance, Supply and Services, Industrial
Operations or National Inventory Control Point) to massage the supply sys­
tem and check on requisition status, parts availability, and expeditious
transportation of parts.
The private E-2 also has some implied duties, but his specified duties
are predominant. Additionally, this is also true for junior officers
and noncommissioned officers. Due to such intangibles as individual
initiative it is difficult to accurately state what proportion of
implied to specified and directed duties exists.

4-18

Duty Clarification.
Members of the Army must take responsibility for clarifying their duties,
understanding their duties in accomplishing assigned missions, and accom­
plishing them. Although duties are relatively easily assigned, their
clarification is a much more difficult and involved process and is too
often left undone. It is a dynamic process involving the application
of interpersonal skills to insure full understanding of the duty by
both the individual assigning it and the person undertaking what has
been assigned.
Leaders and subordinates (squad, section, platoon, company, etc.) within
work groups sometimes have misconceptions of others' duties and their
own duties in the organization. Duties are often thought to be clearly
understood and never changing by members of the group. Unfortunately,
duties often are not well understood and do frequently change. This is
a particular problem when work groups at squad and section level are
integrated into the larger work group of platoon and company teams. To
obtain a clear understanding, it is helpful to have the work group set
aside some time to meet to discuss four aspects of duty: duty expecta­
tion (what others think someone is responsible to do and how it should
be done), duty understanding (what the person thinks he is to do), duty
acceptance (what the person is directed to do), and duty behavior (what
the person actually does). The work group then makes notes about their
own duties in terms of these four aspects. Group members make notes on
their understanding of duties of others on the team. This process sets
the stage for a discussion of individual expectations which follows and
either confirms or changes duties related to the mission.
This activity serves to develop a stronger, more effective work group
around issues directly related to mission performance, provides imme­
diate, tangible results that confront misconceptions and dissatisfaction
head-on, and establishes clear expectations of duty performance. Specif­
ically, duties are clarified and redefined, expectations of others are
clarified, and duty evaluation becomes an on-going process.
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DUTY AND TASK.
Duties give leaders and soldiers only general guidelines about what is
expected of them. Duties do not necessarily tell leaders and soldiers
how they are to perform in their position. For example, the ~eco~ds
section NCO in an administrative branch may have a duty to malntaln
records. Telling the NCO to perform that duty does not tell him how
he does it. Within the duty are many tasks that the NCO must do. He
might be required to order forms and general office supplies, to allo­
cate workload among the clerks, to submit certain weekly or monthly
reports, to train clerks in preparing forms, to arrange the work area,
and to review records. Another example comes from all NCO's duty to
enforce standards of military appearance. In this case, a particular
NCO might have tasks which include: (1) briefing his subordinates on

4-19
appearance standards, (2) inspecting soldiers' clothing and equipment for
serviceability, (3) inspecting the fit of subordinates' uniforms, and (4)
informing subordinates about the clothing sales store.
Tasks are the elements that make up duties. Tasks are the things soldiers
and leaders do to fulfill their duties. Duties are shared among officers
and NCO, but the tasks should not be shared.

DUTY

Figure 4-5. Each Duty Requires the Performance of Many Tasks.

4-20

Summary
The following example identifies how one's duty, responsibility, and author­
ity relate one to the other.
The effectiveness of exercising authority is dependent on the perceptions
of the person over whom power is exercised. An NCO, in civilian clothes,
is in an airport heavily traveled by soldiers. The NCO observes a soldier,
in uniform, who is strolling around the airport shops with his hat on the
back of his head, his hands in his pockets, and his coat unbuttoned. The
NCO approaches the soldier, identifies himself by showing the soldier his
10 card, and directs (commands) the soldier to button his coat, etc. The
soldier refuses to comply with the NCO's directive showing he does not per­
ceive that the NCO has the authority to exercise corrective action in these
circumstances. In fact, the NCO has the duty, and therefore the authority,
to enforce standards of dress. This is a specified duty charged to all NCO's
by AR 600-20, and the NCO is using his general military authority. If the
NCO neglects his duty, thus failing to fulfill his responsibility, he can be
held accountable. There are several corrective actions that the NCO might
take at this point to enforce his authority (organizational right and moral
obligation) to take corrective action. First, he should calmly explain that
he has the authority to make the correction, that he has issued a lawful order,
and that the soldier could have punitive action taken against him if he refuses
to comply. Usually, this approach will be effective. However, if the soldier
does not comply, the NCO may take his second corrective action. He can take
the soldier's name, service number, and unit and refer the disobedience to the
soldier's company commander for punitive action. This second action is usually
the end of the incident so far as the NCO and soldier are concerned; but there
is a final, ultimate action which the NCO could take in unusual and extreme
cases of disobedience which occur off post. The NCO may cause the soldier to
be placed in custody of military police, or in the event that military police
are unavailable, he may request that civil police officers apprehend the sol­
dier until he can be returned to military control. Of course, this ultimate
physical action should be reserved for those serious instances of continued
disobedience and used only as a last resort.
The following chapter discusses how commissioned officers and NCOs should
supervise and support their subordinates in the performance of their tasks;
and consequently, in the performance of their duty.

4-21

 Chapter 5
CONCEPTS OF TASKS AND TASK APPLICATION
In thi s chapter we wi 11 defi ne three types of tasks and descri be the concepts,
and associated terms, which serve as the basis for proper assignment of tasks
to officers and noncommissioned officers.
In order to explain the process by which the ArmY insures that every task is
done and done right, and that every person is accountable for tasks to a
single, immediate supervisor, we have chosen to discuss three different types
of tasks: DOING TASKS (DT), DIRECT SUPERVISING AND SUPPORTING TASKS (DSST), AND
FOLLOW-ON SUPERVISING AND SUPPORTING TASKS (FSST). These tasks illustrate ho';, /
the chain of command and supporting channels should operate.
The essence of this Chapter is as old as the Army. A person with a task to
be done (a "doing task") has only one boss or immediate supervisor. The
immediate supervisor is charged with performing related supervising and
supporting tasks to see that the doing tasks are done and done right. In
like fashion, the next higher level supervisor is charged with follow-on
supervising and supporting tasks which insure that those direct supervising
and supporting tasks are done.

lcn •• 111£111TE
SIIO.llllTE, .IT
lin, £lCEPT
TI SPIT CHECI

ICTS D.
'0£1

Figure 5-1.
5-1 ST/2a
Although Soldiers Manuals have listed the crftical tasks, Soldiers Manuals,
job descriptions, and other publications cannot list all the tasks that must
be done to make the ArJllY function effectively. Direct superv'ising and sup­
porting tasks (DSST's) and follow-on supervising and supporting tasks (FSST's)
fill this void. Here is one way of looking at how these concepts meet this
need.
TASKS:

.THE "DOING" TASK:

A doing task (DT) is a specific or direct action which must be done by the
individual to accomplish an end or Qbjective. The DT is different from the two
other types of tasks (discussed below). Direct and follow-up supervising and
supporting tasks involve teaching, advising, supervising, helping, evaluating,
leading, motivating, and providing assets to individuals charged with "doing"
task and are expressions of supervision and leadership. Doing tasks involve
the "doing" of physical and mental acts; for example, checking a rifle maga­
zine to see that it dosen't bind and will feed properly, zeroing an M-16 rifle
sight, or cleaning the rifle. These examples of DT's accomplish the duty of
care and maintenance of individual equipment. This is duty, and part of the
job, of each individual soldier in the Army who has individual equipment

FORCE DOING TASKS TO LOWEST LEVEL:

In determining which organizational level will perform a doing task, common
sense and sound management practices dictate that OTis must be forced downward
to the lowest level which should perform the DT.
It is an implied duty of every leader to force OTis to the lowest level.
This forcing of doing tasks to the ,lowest level is part of training and
developing subordinates. We see this principle violated today in many
instances. At some installations, a commissioned officer is required to
personally inspect, count, and sign for ammunition from the ammo dump. Is
there any reason why a commissioned officer must perform this task? Certainly
noncommissioned officers can inspect, count, and sign for ammunition.
In this example, the installation commander, who created this task for the
commissioned officer, must reflect on Itwho should do this task," and revise
the regulations or operating procedures to force the task to the lowest organ­
izational level. This is only one example. The impact from management prac­
tices which result in improper task assignment is not usually recognized at

5-2 ST/2a
first reflection. Why must a battalion/squadron commander (or the executive
officer) sign high-priority requisitions? Does the commander personally check
the equipment to see that the requisition is valid? Probably not; he/she
simply takes the word (trusts) the battalion/squadron motor officer and signs
the requisitions. Does this task of signing high-priority requisitions prevent
abuse of the priority designators? Wouldn't it be better to place that task
on the individual with an intimate knowledge of and direct individual respon­
sibility for that particular functional area? The battalion/squadron commander
could then be freed to check on the validity of the requisitions. If all these
tasks are taken all together, it is quickly concluded that many current operating
and management systems are at odds with the principle that a dOin~ task
must be forced to its lowest level. Failure to force a doing tas to its
lowest level is failure to operate effectively and is disasterous to the crea­
tion of job satisfaction. It is also critical to remember that the doer of a
Doin Task DT remains the same no matter from what or anizational level the"
DOln Task DT 1S viewed. or examp e, a DOlng Tas for a squad ea er 1S
to conduct lndividual training for the soldiers of his squad. Everyone in the
chain of command from platoon leader to the division commander must recognize
that individual training of the soldier is the squad leader's Doing Task - not
the platoon leader's nor the company commander's.
DIRECT SUPERVISING AND SUPPORTING TASKS.
For every doing task that an individual performs or should perform, the first­
line supervisor of that individual must assume associated tasks with respect
to the doer that insures that the doin task is done and done ri ht. These
tasks are defined as direct supervising and supportlng tas s DSST and belong
to the immediate supervisor of the doer. TRADOC service schools have done
an excellent job in Soldie~ Manuals and publications in outlining the critical
tasks required of the doers. These are often called hard-skill tasks. How­
ever, to insure that the soldier is not working alone, with improper motivation
and leadership, the immediate supervisor must often perform unwritten tasks to
provide the "how to" and "want toll aspects of the job. Allied with this is
reinforcement of the principle that every soldier must have one IIboss" to look
to for supervisory support, advice, teaching, help, and leadership.
This says that for each task a soldier must do, there is one person charged
with insuring that the doer not only knows how to do it but that the same
erson is also directl char ed with he1 in , advisin , teachin leadin ,
communlcatlng, motivating, provl lng resources, and lrect y supervlslng the
doer's efforts. The person holding the DSST for any doing task is an immediate
supervisor of the doer and not a senior person removed from the direct line of
respons i bi 1i ty. The i mmedi ate supervi sor of the IIdoerll shoul d perfonn the
DSS task which is: to insure that the doer can do the task, and to spot
check to see that he does in fact, do it, i.e., train the doer.

ST/2a

5-3
 Takes direct action
on Doer to insure
that Doer-aois it right
- the "how to" and "want to"

Figure 5-2.
FOllOH-ON SUPERVISING AND SUPPORTIrlG TASKS.
The question now arises, "Is that the extent of this complementing chain of
tasks?" No, i t extends up through the next supervisory level and beyond .
Follow-on u ervisi~ and su ortin task FSST is a follow-on task to a
dlrect supervlslng an support n9 task; and except or spot-checkln~, it relates
indirectly to the dOin, task and directly to the DSST. It is a tas' inherent
with supervisors at al levels to insure not only that the DT is accomplished
at the lowest level, but that those charged with the DSST know and do their
job of teaching, helpi ng, advising, leading, communicating, motivating, super­
vising, and providing assets. This is a task involved in the statement,
"train the trainers. " Thi s simply says that the platoon serTeant has a FSST
task to insure that the squad leader is insuring that the so dier is doing what
he is required to do. Although the platoon sergeant has a duty involving
training, he is not directly charged with training each individual. The
platoon sergeant is instead charged with insuring that immediate subordinates
are trained, and knO\'J how to train, their soldiers. The platoon sergeant spot
checks a soldier's doing task, not with the purpose in mind of checking the
soldier, but checking to see if the squad leader is performing his DSST
\'/ith respect to the soldier's doing task. In other words, the platoon sergeant
is checking certain indicators to insure the system is functioning properly.

ST/2a

5-4
 Takes direct action
on first-line supervisor
to see that he does DSST
(not on Doer!)

Direct action on Doer

Does it

Figure 5-3.
The concept of the three categories of tasks is quite simple. In essence it
says that every soldier must know what his job is, and do it. The doing
task associated with a specific action relates to the person and an action
that must be accomplished. Each doing task has a direct supervising and
supporting task (DSST) that is related to the doing task and is the responsi­
bility of the first-line supervisor of the soldier who is accomplishing the
doing task. It insures that the task is accomplished properly and that the
soldier is provided the training to enable him to accomplish the doing
task. Associated with both the "doing task" and the DSST is the follow-on
supervising and supporting task (FSST). The FSST is normally two or more
levels removed from the doer. The FSST of hither level su~ervisors is to
insure that tasks several levels below are be n9 accomplis ed. The concept
embraces the philosophy that leaders at all levels make periodic and random
assessments of the tasks that have been assigned. It is also implicit that
the frequency and intensity of the FSST diminishes proportionately the more
removed the supervisor is from the "doer" in the organizational structure.
For example, in Figure 5-3 intermediate supervisors FSST's are expected to be
required and performed less frequently, and not in as much detail as the
DSST's of the immediate supervisor of the doer.
Doing tasks and supervising tasks often tie directly together. The relationship
of soldiers' doing tasks and their superiors' supervising tasks is best shown
within the context of normal work environments.

5-5 ST/2a
SITUATION #1 - The soldier and NCO Relationship. 51
For illustrative purposes, we take a typical maintenance section. In the section Th
is a motor sergeant and several mechanics. There is also a commissioned officer Th
who has been given a directed duty of motor officer. All the mechanics work for pa
the motor sergeant. The mechanics perform many activities on the vehicles they me
maintain. All of these activities are doing tasks since they involve tasks on In
equipment. The motor sergeant also has many doing tasks. These may include pa
such doing tasks as ordering parts, inventorying parts on hand, or producing a~
a work flow distribution chart for the shop. The motor sergeant is the final
or direct supervisor of the mechanics. Tt
mf
One of the vehicles needs a new carburetor. Although the motor sergeant is tc
skilled in replacing carburetors, the motor sergeant assigns the doing task of Sl
replacing the carburetor to Specialist Smith. The motor sergeant has applied t
the principle of forcing doing tasks down to the level where it is most easily and ~
efficiently performed. The motor sergeant did not take over the doing task of a l

the mechanic. Specialist Jones, another mechanic in the section and close friend o
of Smith, offers to help Smith replace the carburetor. The motor sergeant o
knows that Smith is capable and trained to replace carburetors. The motor r
sergeant assigns a different doing task to Jones and directs Jones not to help p
Smith. The motor sergeant has performed a direct supervising task based on the t
principle that doing tasks should not be shared. Had the motor sergeant allowed IT
Jones to share the task, Jones would have not been available to perform other ~
doing tasks. S
Let us suppose for a moment that Specialist Smith had not replaced carburetors (
for sometime and that Smith is the only mechanic available. The motor sergeant
is concerned that Smith might have some difficulty. The motor sergeant might
then perform several different but direct supervising tasks depending on Smith's
ability. One supervising task might be to remind Smith that the steps to follow
when replacing the carburetor can be found in a technical manual. Perhaps this
direct supervising task will be sufficient to give Smith the support needed to
perform the doing task. If not, the motor sergeant might stop by the vehicle
and watch while Smith is replacing the carburetor. But in performing all these
direct supervising tasks, the motor sergeant should not reach the point where he
performs the doing task himself, even in the extreme case where Smith was totally
untrained. In this case, the motor sergeant would perform still different super­
vising tasks to train Smith. These direct supervising tasks might include a
fundamental teaching technique such as demonstrating how to perform the task,
but ultimately the motor sergeant will still require Smith to perform the doing
tasks. Direct supervising tasks occur between the individual with the doing
task and the immediate or direct superior in the chain of command or supporting
channel.

ST/2a

5-6
- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------_.. __._­ .-

SITUATION 2 - The NCO and Officer Relationshi~.

The immediate and direct supervisor of the motor sergeant is the motor officer.
The rootor sergeant also has some doing tasks. One of these tasks is ordering
parts. So the motor officer performs certain direct supervising tasks over the
motor sergeant which are directly related to the motor sergeant's doing tasks.
In this case, the motor officer will periodically check the status of repair
parts. In turn, the rootor offi cer wi 11 consul t \'d th andadvi se the motor sergeant
as necessary to insure that sufficient repair parts are on hand.
The motor officer is also concerned with the motor sergeant's supervision of the
mechanics. However, the motor officer should not share these direct supervising
tasks with the motor sergeant. Instead, the motor officer will perform some
supervising tasks over the motor sergeant which indirectly relate to the doing
tasks of the mechanics. Let us go back to where Specialist Smith is replacing
the carburetor. In the normal course of the day, the motor officer happens to come
across the mechanic as he replaces the carburetor. In this case, the motor
offi cer sees that Smi th is ha vi ng di ffi cu1ty wi th the do i ng tas ks. The motor
officer also sees that Smith is not using a technical manual. The motor officer
returns to the maintenance shop and informs the motor sergeant about Smith's
problem. The motor sergeant then performs the appropriate direct supervising
task. The motor officer exercised control over the mechanic by supervising the
motor sergeant, not the mechanic. This task was a follow-on supervising task
when related to the mechanic's doing task, but it was perfot~ed with the motor
sergeant.
SITUATION 3 - Higher Level Leaders.
Let us now expand the basic situation of the maintenance section to illustrate
how these principles are applied in the more complex situation. The maintenance
section is part of an engineer company. The company commander has a prime interest
in the readiness of unit vehicles. The company commander has certain direct
supervising tasks over the motor officer's doing tasks since the company commander
is the motor officer's direct supervisor. If the company commander had
seen Specialist Smith's difficulty with the carburetor, the company commander
would have performed follow-on supervising tasks appropriate to the motor officer.
In other words, the company commander would exercise control over the readiness of
unit vehicles by working with and through the motor officer.
And so it goes at each higher level, the engineer battalion commander exercises
direct and follow-on supervising tasks with each of the company commanders and
the battalion staff.
Benefits of Using Follow-on Supervising Tasks.
The traditional reaction of most leaders is to make corrections "on-the-spot."
Certainly leaders must make on-the-spot corrections. When to make an
on-the-spot correction depends on many factors. No manual can establish
clear-cut rules about when to make on-the-spot corrections. Each leader should
consider the following factors before making on-the-spot corrections •

• 5-7 ST/2a
First, is the soldier's direct supervisor or leader available? If so, the direct
supervisor should be contacted and make the appropriate correction. Second, is
time critical? Some corrections must be made immediately because they involve
safety of soldiers. On the rifle range, it is critical that soldiers pointing
their weapons anywhere but downrange be corrected on-the-spot. In summary, when
to make an on-the-spot correction is dependent on the experience and judgement of
the leader seeing the problem. When such corrections are made, leaders must
still perform a follow-on supervising task by informing the appropriate leader
in the chain of command or supporting channel.
On the other hand, using follow-on supervising tasks reinforces the relationship
between leaders and immediate subordinates. The motor sergeant understands that
between the motor officer and himself that the motor sergeant alone is accountable
for the quality of work in the maintenance section. It also reinforces the
relationship ~etween the motor sergeant and the mechanic. The mechanic comes to
understand that he is accountable to the motor sergeant for his doing tasks, and
that when he needs advice or assist&nce, he turns to the motor sergeant and not
to the motor officer.
The Nature of Supervising Tasks.
Both direct and follow-on supervising tasks support subordinates in the performance
of their tasks. Supervision involves many behaviors. These include but are not
limited to: (1) training subordinates to gain skills necessary to properly exe­
cute their tasks, (2) providing advice and guidance to subordinates as appropriate
to their level of experience ~nd competence, (3) providing resources to subordin­
ates so that they have the people, material, time or other assets necessary to
accomplish the mission, (4) evaluating subordinates' performance and consequently
providing feedback to subordinates through performance counseling or other appro­
priate methods, (5) aligning subordinate goals with organizational goals to the
~xtent possible, and (6) performing other organizational processes (discussed in
Chapter 2) as appropriate to organizational position. In short, direct and follow­
supervising tasks involve teaching, advising, supervising, helping, evaluating,
leading, motivating, and providing assets to subordinates.
SITUATION 4 - How the NCO Support Channel Is Used At Company/Troop/Battery Level.
Any leader in an organization with the appropriate legal or position authority may
delegate a task to be accomplished. It is imperative, however, that the task
be delegated to the appropriate individuals in the organization and in a manner so
as not to usurp the delegating authority of the next individual down the chain of
command or supporting channel. The following example is used to illustrate this
concept:

The unit commander has generated the mission of constructing a new storage shed.
The shed is for a new piece of equipment which will be delivered to the unit on a
specific date. Prior to assigning or delegating this mission, the commander must
first, as a minimum, consider the following items:
5-8 ST/2a

l
 t 1. Is it a mission primarily calling for duties of officers or duties of NCO's?
2. What external or additional assistance will be needed to accomplish the
mission?
f
3. What is the time limit for the completion of the mission?
4. Hhat assets will be provided and \'/here they Ire to be acquired?
5. What specific guidance to issue (OOIS and Oonltls)?

Ie In considering the mission, the unit corrrnander must first decide whether the
mission is a function of a commissioned officer or an ~JCO. If it is a mission
primarily involving officer duties, then mission assignment will be to the executive
officer or platoon leader(s), and the chain of comand \f.Jill effect the mission.
If on the other hand, it is an t-lCO duty area, then the mission is delegated to the
company first sergeant. Regardless of who the mission is to be delegated to, the
project should be discussed with the first sergeant and executive officer. Equally,
at platoon or section levels the platoon sergeant and platoon leader, or section
NCO and section officer, must discuss the details and ramifications of the mission
on their particular units.
Ice
In the specific situation, the unit comoander has decided that constructing the shed
.te is an ~JCO functional duty, (see Chapter G); therefore, the mission is delegated to
1­
the first sergeant and will be carried out within the NCO Support Channel. The
follovling figure illustrates how this miss'jon will be delegated.
----Issues ~'1i ssion to NCO Support Channel through 1SG

8
y
CO ----Provides Guidance to lSG
I
----Inspects Final Product
Iw-on

8 lSG
----Accepts Mission
----Provides Personnel and Other Assets
----Spot Checks Progress of Nission Accomplishment

8
.y
----Accepts fli ssion From 1SG
·0
PSG ----Orqanizes Construction Team
----Sp~t Checks Process of Mission Accomplishment

®
m
QD
LORS
----Accepts Objectives
----Delegates Tasks to Individual Team ~·1embers
----Oi rectly Supervi ses Tas k Acconpl i shment

----Fol1o~;s
V Instructions of SQD LDR
----Perfo""s the Doing Tasks

•
Figure 5-4 •
5-9 ST/2b
The unit conmander should not directly assign the mission to either the PSG or Squad
Leaders. Similarly, the first sergeant will not approach the "most available"
soldiers and direct them to perform the tasks to accomplish the mission. Under
certain situations it ~ay be necessary and prudent for the lSG to issue instructions
and delegate the mission at the same time; ho\'lever, the key supervisors must be
present during the discussion, or be adequately informed, and their specific
responsibilities as outlined still remain the same. Each individual described has
doing tasks as it pertains to the accomplishment of this project. For example,
the unit corrmander inspects the final product; the first sergeant monitors the
overall progress of the construction; the platoon sergeant checks the process of
construction or Iho\'J" the mission is getting done, provides quality control,
perfc~~s direct supervising tasks with advice and directives to the squad
leaders; the squad leaders directly supervise the enlisted ~ember's doing tasks
and the squad members performing the doing tasks on the actual construction of
the shed.
It is the con~and responsibility of the unit. comander to insure that the links in
the nco support channel, as organized for the accomplishment of this mission, remain
intact and that the 1 inks in the channel are not by-passed. In addition, the unit
comanc!er r:lakes spot checks throughout the life of the mission to insure: (1)
that the methods for delegating tasks are systematic, and (2) that each subordinate
supervisor has properly forced tasks to the lm'Jest level. However, each individual
i:1 the i~CO support channel mus t be aVJare of the del ega ti on and supervi s i on process
and provide feedback to the next higher supervisor in the channel when problems become
c:isruptive to the work process. ~'loreover, it is the unit conmander's duty to
insure that the NCO support channel has been provided the best supporting assets
available. He makes provision to prevent any environmental or external obstacles
disrupti~g the progress of the mission. In providing assets to the platoon
ss:'cr:a;~t, the first sergeant should strive to maintain uni t integrity \'/henever
;;ossiblc. TI~~ direct supervisor \'Iould then re~ain the squad/section leader or
Ot~12,(, riCO of the en 1is ted members to the mi ss i on.

The previous situations \-Jere examples limited to situations where supervision

clearly follm'led the norr.lal unit structure. For example, the cOP.1pany cor:rnander
supervised the motor officer who in turn supervised the motor sergeant, and the
~otor sergeant supervi sed all the mechani cs. t10s t Army organi za ti ons opera te
\·lith a parallel and unified chain of comnand and NCO support channel. Recall
the discussion of these structures in Chapter 3. Amy units are organized
wi th these t\'lO formal channels because experi ence has shown tha t above
squad/section level the demands placed on the leader component generally
exceed the ability of anyone individual. At platoon and company level, leadership
functions at platoon headquarters are divided bebJeen platoon leader and platoon
sergeant; or company cor.mander, executive officer, and first sergeant at company
headquarters. As unit size increases from company level to battalion level,
the functions of leadership are divided among many staff, technical, and NCO
support channe 1s as \'Ie 11 as the chain 0 f corrrnand.
The basic leader team is found at each organizational level above squad/section.
It consists of the commissioned officer and ~lCO, one in the chain of command and
the other in the NCO support channel. Each individual is ideally suited to
perfom certain duties because of training, experience, and position. How \'Iell
these bas ic teams work together depends partly on the interpersonal ski 11 s of the
comissioned officer and rJCO and partly on their understanding of their duties
and tasks.
5-10 ST/2b
 DEVELOPING TEAMWORK
True teanwork among any group of individuals engaged in the accomplishment of a
goal/objective/mission is perhaps the most valuable technique for assuring the
efficient and successful outcome of that task. A simple but practical definition
of teanwork is that process of cooperation and integration of efforts by each
member of the team where any personal interests or desires are subordinated for
the efficient accomplishment of the team's mission. The major emphasis in this
definition is that team members, although performing and responsible for a specific
task, must insure that their efforts are in step with the other members of the
team and that this integrated effort will efficiently accomplish the team's mission.
The remaining section of this chapter deals with developing teamwork among officers
and NCO's.
Elements of Teamwork.
It is imperative that members of an Army organization know to which team or com­
bination of team(s) they belong. The common features of any team or the interaction
between teams must include the following:
MISSION: It must be worthwhile and compatible with the size and make-up of the team.
The mission establishes the team's reason for existence.
INTERDEPENDENCE: Each team member requires and is dependent on the other members
for information, coordination, and the available applicable skills in order to get
the mission accomplished.
SYNERGY: The solution to a problem is more likely to be an improved or better
solution if more than one individual participates in arriving at the solution.
Synergy involves more than adding together the skills of the individual in a work
group. True synergy occurs when individuals working together produce something
greater than simple addition of the skills would indicate possible.
ACCOUNTABILITY: Team members are accountable to the team for what they do or fail
to do in performing their tasks in meeting the team's objectives or mission.
Based on rank and position, a particular soldier may be a member of many different
teams within an Army organization. For example, the chief of firing battery (SFC E7)
of a l05mm howitzer battery is a member of at least the four following functional
teams:
1 - The firing battery headquarters team.
2 - The team of senior section sergeants of all sections in the battery.
3 - The team of chiefs of firing batterys in the battalion.
4 - The team comprising all members of his own firing battery.

5-11 ST/2b
 o
Another factor that is important to the idea of team\'1ork is that team members must be o·
competent and proficient in their individual tasks in order that their contributions at
to the team be worth\·/hile and significant. Because of differences in levels of pt
expertise, hO\'Jever, it is imperative that a more cOr.1petent or expert member of the CI
team provide the assistance and training necessary to improve the proficiency level fl
of the less qualified team member. Normally, in the case of junior enlisted Nl
people, the team sergeant or senior NCO is responsible for providing this assistance. o'
Therefore, team members work closely together and not in a vacuum or behind a wall a'
a'vlay from the other team members. An effective team is one in which the members h'
recognize existing strengths and weaknesses of each other and work together to w'
correct and overcolre shortcomings. The team must therefore provide its members an bE
atmosphere in whi ch i ndi vi dua 1 weaknesses can be freely admi tted and i rrrnedia te ar
corrective actions taken.
Ar
OPERATIrJG AT POINT OF TANGENCY IN TEAM~JORK.
ne
SL
As specific tasks or duties are divided among team members, there is a point at which th
the tasks or duties of one team member ir.1pacts or makes contact with the tasks or
duties of another team member. This point is called The Point of Tangency. Tangency TE
is a geometric term simply meaning meeting in a single point, or at a point of
contact. The following example is offered to illustrate this concept. The four Te
members of a tank crew opera tes as a team, and as such compri se a cri ti ca 1 porti on a
of the tank platoon unit. is
of
Tank Crew is
ei

(This figure may It

by dra\'In in the th
form of a tank.) wo
tal
In
rna
ad
mel
go '

Figure 5-5.

5-12 ST/2b
1

i
;
- --- - - - --- ---------- - - - - --

I
.i

Each member of this tank cre\<1 team perfonns and is individually responsible for
unique tasks related to the efficient functioning of the tank. In training or
combat, this tank cre\'/'s mission is quite simply stated but explicit: the
destruction of targets \'Iithin that tank's capability. Hhile performing their
individual tasks, it becomes readily apparent that each crew member's accomplishment
of his task is dependent on the performance of the others in the tank. A weakness
or failure on the part of anyone cre\', member could adversely impact on the crew's
accomplishment of its mission. Each crew member in this example op_e rates at a
point of tangency with the other. ~10reover, because the tank commander has
command responsibility for the operation of that tank crew, the tank commander
functions at a point of tangency with the others in a dual capacity as senior
NCO to subordinates as well as team leader. The following are exa~ples of some
of the possible combinations of tank crew positions \'/hich may normally operate
at a point of tangency. In the above figure, each crew member is operating within
his own sphere; hOViever, he must be aware of the point of tangency of his sphere
with that of other cre\,1 members. As depicted, the spheres include points of tangency
bet\'/een tea~ leader (TC E6) and team member (GNR E5); or between a superi or (GflR - E5)
and a subordi na te (loader - E4); or bet\lJeen team members (loader E4 and dri ver E3).
An i~portant aspect of operating at a point of tangency is that team members must
neither relinquish nor usurp each other's tasks. This aspect applies both ways to
superiors and subordinates alike. Only the udoer u or team member is responsible to
the team for satisfactory accomplishment of tasks required by his position.
TEAM INTERACTION: INTERPLAY.
Teanwork not only lends itself to fit those periods of the actual test of performing
a unit mission or the fighting of the actual battle in combat. For indeed, teamwork
is of paramount importance during the preparation of the unit for the accomplishment
of these critical assignments or the conduct of combat engage~ents. Therefore, it
is not ah/ays feasible for teams within units to operate at a point of tangency \'/hen
either of the following two factors predominate:
- A team identity has not been established a~ong members of the unit; and
2 - When a significant portion of the unit is unqualified, weak, or lacks
proficiency in its tasks \'/hich may be critical to the unit's status.
It is therefore essential that members of the chain-of-command team as \'/ell as
those teams of each supporti ng channel kno\-I uhow to U make the team\'JOrk concept
work in order that the other tea~s in the unit may in fact operate at a point of
tangency. One of the principal means for achieving effective team\'JOrk is Team
Interac ti on. Team interacti on is a process whereby team me~bers exchange i nfor­
mation by means of verbal and "witten communications, coordination, training,
advice, help, and supervision. This is a dynamic process involving the team
members and must occur on a continuing basis at all levels. Essential rules
governing the interaction process are:

5-13 ST/2b

 1 - DISCIPLIrIE, r1UTUAL RESPECT, A~ID TRUST. Tean members, regardless of rank

and status, r.1ust s!1O\·! respect for thenselves and each ether member of the
team. Respect given is respect received. In addition, superiors must
trust subordinates. On the other hand, subordinates must realize they
have the trust and confidence of their superiors and do their best
not to violate that trust. Section leaders will quickly lose
their subordinates' respect if they speak dovm to them, belittle them, or
violate their dignity. Similarly, subordinates will quickly lose the
trust and confidence of their superior if they fail to apply their best
efforts to accomplish a task \'/ithin the allotted or agreed-upon time frame.
2 - TIJO HAy-cormUrIICATION. Cor.rnunications channels should aluays be open to
allovi for the tir:lely exchange of information both between superiors and
subordinates and beb/een peers. ~leeded infonnation is critical to the
decision making process and must therefore be free in cOr.1ing from \'/herever
available in the team. The cor.munications flm'l must be both vertical
and 1a te r a 1 •
3 - A SAFE Arm HEALTHY 'IORK ENVIRONf'lHIT. Leaders/supervi sors/superiors are
responsible for provicing such an environment, and subordinates are
responsible for maintaining it that VJay.
4 - Er1PATHY MID COOPERATION. r·lembers of the team requi re some reassurance that
their best interests \·dll be safeguarded by the other team members; and in
return, they offer thei r O\-m coopera ti on and unders tandi ng to other
individuals on the team whether solicited or unsolicited.
As mentioned earlier, the team interaction process is a dynar.1ic one in \'/hich team
members are continually seeking or offering assistance fror.1 peers, subordinates, and
superiors \·,hen and \'/here needed. normally, subordinate team members, because of a
lack of experience and/or expertise, seek assistance or training from superiors to
gain greater proficiency iil their specialty or task assignment. Once this training
has been completed and the proficiency acquired, then the subordinate \'Jould return
to operate at the point of tangency \'/ith other team members. It is certainly not the
case that only subordinates require assistance or training but in many instances
such is the case for superiors. Regardless of the individual's position or rank,
he may need assistance. The key to the interaction process is that \'/herever the
need arises, it be recognized, acknowledged, and a course for corrective action be
undertaken.
An exar.1ple of this ~'namic team interplay is the case of a new officer entering a
work team, section, or platoon. Because his background was limited to an academic
environment, the ne\'J officer may be unfamil iar \'lith the functional structure or organ­
ization of his unit. Without relinquishing his duties as leader or supervisor,
the new officer will take the initiative to seek the assistance needed in acquiring
the proficiency needed to operate interdependently or at the point of tangency \'/ith
the rest of his unit. This assistance may also be sought from his senior NCO or unit
comnander. At the same ti me, both the cOr.To1ander and s eni or NCO shoul d be qui ck to
ackno\'/ledge the nevI offi cer' s defi c i ency and vol unta ri ly offer ass is tance. Another
examp1e is tha t of a nev/ly ass i gned bri dge sergeant (SFC) who may 1ack profi ci ency in
the construction of bridges organic to the bridge company of which he is a member.

5-14 ST/2b
 This bridge sergeant seeks advice and assistance from the first sergeant to acquire
the level of required skill. Without interfering with the bridge sergeant's
duties that come with his position, the first sergeant will render the needed
assistance, training, or advice to bring him up to proficiency, after which they
will both begin operating at a point of tangency.
The following illustration depicts the fact that the team interaction/interrlay
process can take whatever form needed within the unit regardless of the ind~vidua1's
position, status, or rank.

Five Examples of Interplay for Teaching, Advising, Helping, ~uperyt'tng~

Figure 5-6.
Because it is a dynamic interaction process, it is important that the structure
of the team be occasionally evaluated to insure that team members are clear
about their tasks and duties. It may be necessary for leaders or supervisors
to reclarify tasks of each team member. t·10reover, team members may seek a
reclarification of their tasks or duty based on changes or adjustments to the
unit's mission, SOP's, chain of command, or introduction of new equipment.
Additionally, changes in the team's or unit's environment may dictate a reclar­
ification or redesignation of tasks. Leaders and supervisors must keep subordinates
informed, and together they must all provide the needed input for planning for
the future. Drastic or spontaneous changes should impact only minimally on the
efficiency of the team and thus not detract from the high status of unit readiness
already achieved.

5-15 ST/2b
In conclusion, teamwork is the means by which Army units accomplish their mission
while doing so successfully in an efficient and effective manner. Teamwork is
a reality from the lowest echelon two-man team and progresses up through section,
platoon, company, and battalion. Belonging to a team and being committed to its
success while reaping the benefits of esprit, unity, and an effective and ready
organization are among the positive motiviating factors which influence a soldier
in their desire to be part of the Army Team. Leaders, both NCO's and officers, are
charged with knowing their duties, tasks, and responsibilities and helping their Sor
subordinates know theirs. It is the two key elements of operating at the po~nf inc
of tanfency and the team interaction process which assures effective teamwor n
the un t, and ultimately, an effective organization.
TEAM BU ILDING
Team building is a process used among members of a work group or work team to
coordinate a goal, objective, or mission. An important by-product of team
building is that it strengthens the interpersonal relationship between the members
of the work team. Members of the work team may comprise the individuals in the
already established echelons of a unit. For example, the positions found in a rifle
squad, a security squad of an MP company, a pathfinder team, a photo section in
a signal company, or an AVLB section of a bridge company. On the other hand, Id
individuals from different squads, sections, and platoons, of a unit may also be pr
brought together for the purpose of forming a work team for accomplishing a mission. ar
Regardless of the composition of the team, the team-building process is an effective se
technique for enabling the team members to know something about how each other of
operates and what can be expected from that member during the actual performance of a
the mission. The size of the team is also immaterial; team building may be effected be
between teams of two members or among members of teams as large as a battalion~ ar
tE
The intention in team building is to enhance the authority of the senior member(s) mi
of the group, such as to delegate tasks and issue orders in the traditional sense. mE
In team building, the leaders are clearly identified and their duties defined wi
for the benefit of the entire team. However, an important factor in team tl
building is that each member is allowed to freely participate in the discussion f(
and decision making process of how the mission is to be done. It has been
found that a team member will support and be more committed to the team's
mission if he had some input into how the mission was to be accomplished.
Team building also allows the members to "clear the air ll and resolve any inter­
personal conflicts that might later enter into and adversely impact on the team's
objective. Therefore, team building improves the problem solving ability of the
team by working through the following issues:
1. Better understanding of each other's duties, responsibility, and authority.
2. Clearer understanding of the group processes within and between teams.
3. The ability to use conflict in a positive rather than destructive way.

5-16 ST/2b
 Some of the other activities that may occur during a team building session
inc 1ude:
1. Clarification of duties.
2. Problem solving activities.
3. Goal setting.
4. Time management.
5. Improving communications.
Ideally in order for team building to occur, all members of the team should be
present. The location of the team building sessions should preferably be in an
area that is neutral to the members present. A neutral area is one which is
separated from the work or living area of any of the team members. The advantage
of this procedure is that it precludes one or a segment of team members from having
a psychological edge over the other members because the team building session is
being conducted on his "turf." The unit commander and'senior NCO's in the unit
are the primary source in the unit as observers of the team building process. Ideally,
team building should occur with a process or group observer present in order that he
might facilitate the process as it is ongoing. During the team building, team
members must be open to give and receive feedback from each other and must also be
willing to change when necessary to insure the progress of the group. OESO's are
trained in the process and techniques of team building and they are available
for ass is tance.

5-17 ST/2b

•
 THE CORRECTION PROCESS

a. Except for spot checks by intermediate and mid-level supervisors,

the first line supervisor takes the direct action on the doer to help, advise.
teach, etc.
b. As a result of spot checks. intermediate and mid-level supervisors
take corrective action on their immediate subordinate supervisor. Each
supervisor takes corrective action through his subordinate to exercise the
chain of command or appropriate supporting channel.

(HELP. ADVISE. SUPERVISE. TEACH. EVALUATE. LEAD. IGTIVATE All) PROVIDE ASSETS)

I
Direct Action On
I
Direct Action on
I~d1.te Subordinate Immeditte Subordinate
I
Direct Action
on Doer
(Resul ts frOt'1l FSST (Results frOllDSST

Detailed Check Detailed Check Detailed Chectt

of FSST of DSST of DT

Spot Check of DT

Peri odi c Spot Check of DT·

Figure 5-7.
THE EVALUATION PROCESS
a. A doer performs a doing task.
b. The first line supervisor has a direct supervising and supporting task
to perform a detailed check of the doer.
c. In turn, each supervisor performs a detailed check of his immediate
subordinate •
d. In relation to the doer, the more removed the supervisor is from the
doer in the chain of command or supporting channel the less detailed are the
checks made.
5-18

 Summa rye

Critical concepts to remember are:

- TASKS SHOULD ilOT BE SHARED.

- SUPERVISING ArID SUPPORTInG TASKS RELATE TO A DOING TASK.

- DIRECT SUPERVISIflG ArID SUPPORTrr~G TASKS RELATE DIRECTLY TO A DOING TASK.

- FOllOH-ON SUPERVIS IrIG Arm SUPPORTHJG TASKS RELATE DIRECTL Y TO DIRECT SUPERV ISHIG

AND SUPPORTING TASI(S AilD INDIRECTLY TO DOHIG TASKS.

At this time we should see our method and thought process developing. We must

understand the concepts of tasks and supervising and supporting tasks, the

necessity of operating at the point of tangency, and the interplay that must

exi s t for teaITl'/ork. Thus, if we kno\'J the s i tua ti on and the team ava 11 ab1e to

do the job, identify tasks to be done and apply the methodology of assigning tasks,

we have increased our effectiveness and improved the probability of achieving

mission accomplishment. This is a prerequisite if effective teambui1ding is

to foll 0\<1.

Team building activities can lead to a thorough understanding of the team's

duties and functions, how each team supports the other teams in the unit, and
hO\'J they all relate to the cOlllilon organizational mission. Competently perfonned,
team building emphasizes the common mission concept, is task and mission centered,
and focuses on unit strengths to resolve weaknesses. Just as importantly, team
building can help focus on the real day-to-day issues and concerns in the
organization, and thus serves to open up lines of communication. In the
follo\'ling chapter, the functional duty areas of commissioned officers and NCO's
are presented. To buil d teaJTIl!Jork, these duty areas provide the basic elements
upon \'/!1ich to c1ari fy duties within teams •

5-19 ST/2b

•
•

Chapter 6
STATEMENTS OF GENERAL DUTY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF OFFICERS AND NCOS
The previ ous chapter er1llhas i zed the importance of offi cers and noncormli ssi oned
officers performing the correct task. To insure that this occurs, tasks must
be assigned to or assumed by the appropriate individual.
The correct assignment/assumption of tasks is dependent upon determining if
the task falls within the officer or noncommissioned officer area of responsi­
bility. The purpose of Chapter 6 is to provide the information that you will
need to formulate a thought process that allows you to determine if the task
belongs to an officer or NCO.
To understand the areas of responsibility of the officer and noncommissioned
officer today, it is helpful to trace their evolution from the beginning of
the American Army. As you recall, Chapter 1 gave an historical perspective
to the NCO. Chapter 1 also indicated that NCO duties in the Revolutionary
War were basically in concert with our present day AR 600-20, ArmY Command
Policies and Procedures.
The Continental Army was initially organized utilizing the British model
where sergeants were appointed to serve as subordinates to commanders or to
assist staff officers. But the real evolution of duties, responsibilities,
and authority of NCO's did not start until 1779 \'/hen Baron Von Steuben's

famous Blue Book, Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of
the United States, was approved by Congress. This Blue Book remained the
Army's official manual until 1813. Selected quotes from the Blue Book,
demonstrate the original areas of responsibilities for NCO's: In the Blue
Book, "Reqimental comnanders were admonished that the "discipl ine and order of
their regiments depended on a wise choice of nonconrniss1oned officers." The
Blue Book further states that NCO's should be "completely expert in the
exercise of arms and maneuvers, and possess an ability to teach." In spelling
out the duties of the sergeant major, Von Steuben indicated that the sergeant
major was responsible for the conduct and behavior of the NCO's within each
company. Each sergeant was "responsible for the squad committed to his care,
that is, for seeing that officers' orders were carried ' out, forteach1nghis
men the rudiments of so, di ery, see; n9 tha t they were properlY dressed and
responsive to discipline •.• and for reforming his squad in the confusion
of battle Ii.
One of Von Steuben's most enduring legacies to the United States ArlT\Y was the
charter rules for noncommissioned officers. The similarity of this 198-year­
old document to the information contained in chapter 4, AR 600-20, ArmY Com­
mand Policy and Procedure, is striking. To illustrate this similarity, and
to familiarize you with the current basic responsibilities and tasks of non­
commissioned officers, the following quotes are offered from AR 600-20.
"Establishing and maintaining the professional standards of the non­
commissioned officers and their job performance, care of individual
soldiers and their families, training in basic skills and attributes

•
of a soldier, proper wear of the uniform: appearance, military courtesy
of enlisted personnel, care of individual arms and equipment of enlisted
personnel, care of living quarters of enlisted personnel, (and) area
mai ntenance tas ks . . . II
6-1 ST/2b
Conriland Sergeant r·1ajor Duties and Responsibilities:
"This is the position title that designates the senior noncolTr.'lissioned
officer of the command at battalion or higher level. He executes estab­
lished_policies and standards pertaining to the perfonnance, training,
appearance, and conduct of enlisted personnel. He provides advice and
initiates recommendations to the commander and staff in matters pertaining
to enlisted personnel.
"The first sergeant is the senior noncor.missioned officer in companies,
batteries, and troops. It is nonna1 for company commanders to use the
noncommissioned officer support channel (covered in Chapter 4) for con­
ducting many routine activities • • • The first sergeant conducts
routine company administration and company operations as directed by
the company corrmander."
The duties in AR 600-20 are necessarily broad. To ease the specific assignment
of duties, they have been refined into the particular functional duty areas of
officers and noncommissioned officers. These consist of functional duty areas
to be used as a ~ in the assignment of tasks. Hhile there are exceptions,
the most notable~ich are covered later in this chapter, they do provide
an excellent guide in assigning tasks.
FUtlCTIOtJAL DUTY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF Cor!HSSIONED OFFICERS
1. Exercise of COmMand (in the strict sense as defined in AR 27-10).
2. Accountable for mission accomplishment.
3. Accountable for unit mission readiness.
4. t'1id-and long-range plans.
5. Establishing and interpreting policy.
6. Setting of standards.
7. Establishing unit procedures and guidelines.
8. flanagerren·t and allocation of unit personnel and resources.
9. Collective training, including planning, providing resources, conducting
and evaluating.
10. Accountability for unit performance.
11. Delegation of authority.
12. Accurate and timely t\l/o-\'Jay corrmunication through the chain of command.
13. Developr.1ent and training of officer and NCO subordinates.
14. Establishing and maintaining professional standards for the officer corps.
15. Adr.1inistration of UCf1J.
16. Supporting the noncommissioned officer.
Of the above, exercise of command (other than that of a temporary, crlS1S­
originated nature) and adninistration of UCf1J, are by definition the only
functional areas which are the sole legal jurisdiction of the officer. The
remainder of the above areas are those \"lhich the officer has by tradition,
organization, and accepted management practice been directed.
\'Jhile duty areas of responsibility for cor.rnissioned officers appear to overlap
with rJCO duty areas of responsibility, we must remember that \,/hile duties can
be shared, tasks should not be shared. The duties as outlined be1o\'J for NCO's

6-2 ST/2b
•
provide excellent guidance to assist NCO's and commissioned officers in
determining their specific duties. Under each of the 12 duty areas for NCO's
are only a few examples of tasks that NCO's perform in fulfilling their duty.
1. Personal and professionaldevelo~ment of the soldier.
-recommend promotions, awards an punitive actions
-counsel soldiers in their strengths and weaknesses and how they affect
their duty performance
-insure soldiers are utilized in their MOS
-insure that required technical publications are available and utilized
-insure that deserving soldiers attend service schools as appropriate
2. Individual trainin of the soldier in his her MOS and in basic
sold1er1ng Sl s
-educate soldiers in history and traditions of the service, military
courtesy, personal hygiene, appearance standards, and drill and ceremonies
-train enlisted person as effective team member
-train individual soldier in his skill level and for SQT
-train soldier for survival on the battlefield.
3. Accountabi 1i ty for squad/secti on/team.
-know what soldier is doing during duty hours
-know where each individual soldier lives and how to locate him
-know why soldier is going to sick call or other appointments, how they are
treated, and what are the findings
-use squad/section/team as a unit to accomplish goals/objectives/mission

• 4. Soldier's military appearance and physical condition.

-make on-the-spot corrections for deficiencies in military appearance
-conduct physical training
-assist personnel with physical training problems
-enforce PT and appearance standards
-train soldier how to properly maintain and wear uniform and equipment.
5. Physical and mental well-being of the soldier and his family.
-know where and how sol di ers 1i ve
-know soldier's family situation and provide assistance if needed
-inform soldiers of services available to them and their families through
the mili ta ry
-visit soldier support activities and insure that they are acting in best
interests of the soldier.
-visit soldier and family members who are sick and provide needed assistance
-refer soldier to medical assistance when necessary
6. Su ervision, control, and disci line of subordinate NCO's and enlisted ersons.
-counse 1ng an ma1nta1n counse ngs recor s
-support actions of subordinate NCO leaders
-educate personnel on UCMJ
-recommend punitive action through appropriate channels

•
-conduct additional remedial training when required

ST/2b
7. Communication between the ind1vidual soldier and the organ1zat10n.
-use the chain of command or appropr1ate supporting channels
-listen and respond to soldier's suggestions and complaints
-support and explain to the soldier reason for current policies
-instill the feeling of unit pr1de, integrity, and loyalty
8. Planning and conduct of the routine day-to-day operation of the unit within
the policies established by the officer.
-provide input to training schedule for individual skill training
-conduct team training
-supervise the execution of established policy
-supervise movement of troops
-handle unique situations not covered by instructions
-insure NCO support channel supports policies established by chain of command
9. Maintainin established standards of professionalism and job performance for
a
the soldier an the NCO corps.
-conduct special training to resolve areas of training weakness
-train subordinates to meet standards
-provide up-to-date information for all levels of SQT
-set the example so that subordinates can see the professional NCO in action
10. Maintenance, serviceability, accou~tability, and readiness of assigned arms
and egui~ment.
-con uct periodic inspections of arms and equipment
-maintain and develop a thorough knowledge of technical/maintenance aspects of
equipment among soldiers and subordinate NCO's
-enforce maintenance and supply systems procedures for the chain of command
-provide valid equipment status reports to the chain of cOlTTnand
-insure arms and equipment are properly secured and stored
11. Appearance and condition of unit billets, facilities and work areas.
-conduct periodic inspections
-conducts fire and safety inspections and drills
-set and enforce cleanliness standards
-eat frequently in mess hall and observes mess operation
-observe operation of recreational facilities and service clubs and recommend
actions to improve services
-supervise maintenance of billets, facilities, and work areas
12. Advising, supporting, following, and implementing policy established
by the off; ce r.
-maintain established standards
-keep officers informed
-seek and provide guidance to chain of command when necessary
-support priorities established by the commander
-keep NCO support channel tracking and parallel to chain of command

ST/2b
6-4
• IN ESTABLISHING GENERAL RULES FOR USE WHEN DETER~lINING A TASK SHOULD BELONG
TO A NCO OR OFFICER, IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THE Cm1MANDER SETS THE OVERALL
POLICIES AND STANDARDS OF HIS UNIT AND IS CONCERNED t~ITH THE ENTIRE RANGE OF
DUTIES OF HIS OFFICERS, ~CO'S AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL. THE DIVISION OF THESE
FUNCTIONAL DUTY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITIES, BETWEEN OFFICERS AND NONCOMMISSIONED
OFFICERS, DOES NOT IMPLY THAT THEY OPERATE IN A SEPARATE COMPARTMENTALIZED
MANNER. THE FUNCTIONAL DUTY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY, OFFICER AND NCO, ARE
INTERLOCKING AND INTERDEPENDENT - AN EXAMPLE OF THIS WOULD BE THE DEPENDENCY
OF COLLECTIVE TRAINING UPON INDIVIDUAL TRAINING. THEREFORE, MISSION
ACCOMPLISHMENT DEMANDS THAT OFFICERS AND NCO'S ADVISE, ASSIST, AND LEARN
FROM EACH OTHER TO INSURE COORDINATED ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE,
COMPLEMENTING RESPONSIBILITIES. AT THE SAME TIME, IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED
THAT THE COMMISSIONED OFFICER AS THE COMMANDER H.I\S THE BASIC RESPONSIBILITY
IN ALL FUNCTIONAL AREAS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE FOR COMMA~lDERS WHEN
ESTABLISHING THE STANDARDS, CARE, AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOP~ENT OF ALL UNIT
PERSONNEL.
To insure an in depth understandinq of these rules, the followinq amplifica­
tion is offered for each rule~

• 1. THE OFFICER Cor~~1ANDS, PLANS, ESTABLISHES POLICY, AND

~1ANAGES THE ARMY; THE NCO CONDUCTS THE DAI LY BUS INESS
OF THE ARMY WITHIN ESTABLISHED POLICY.
Discussion:
Although the ultimate decision on policy rests with the officer, the officer
seeks the advice and assistance of supporting NCO's to insure the policies and plans
are sound. The NCO advises and assists officers, as appropriate, in the estab­
lishment of policies and development of plans. Concurrent with the officers
planning and policy making, the NCO is conducting the daily business of the Army
within established policy.
Task Example:
A commandinq officer of a company, battery, or troop will administer an Article
15 to an habitual brawlinq soldier, plan for a company tactical exercise and
decide which vehicles and personnel will qo on the exercise. Hhile the officer
is planning, the NCO's will be conducting daily routine company business,
such as company formation, movement to the motor pool, maintenance supervision,
quartermaster laundry processinq, \<Ieapons cleaning, etc. All the daily routine
operations are conducted usinq the company SOP(s), approved by the comoany
commander.

• 6-5 ST/2b
2. THE OFFICER FOCUSES ON COLLECTIVE TRAINING WHICH LEADS
TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT; THE NCO FOCUSES ON INDIVIDUAL
TRAINING WHICH LEADS TO MISSION CAPABILITY.
Discussion:
The officer uses the ARTEP and other training management standards to effec­
tively manage collective training. The NCO primarily uses the soldier's
manuals, SQT's and job books to insure individual proficiency. (NCO's in
command positions, such as squad and section leaders, will also utilize the
ARTEP for tra i ni ng purposes. These NCO's will focus on i ndi vi dua 1 and
collective training.) --­
Task Example:
A field artillery battalion S-3 will closely monitor the overall training of
the battalion Fire Direction Center (FDC). The S-3 operations sergeant
focuses on individual training proficiency such as the training of the Chief
Computer in the FDC.
3. THE OFFICER IS PRIr~RILY INVOLVED IN UNITS AND UNIT
OPERATIONS; THE NCO PLACES MAJOR FOCUS ON INDIVI­
DUAL SOLDIERS AND TEAM LEADING.
Discussion:
Squad leaders insure that each squad member is a well-trained soldier and
molds them into a squad team. The squad leader/section leader is concerned
both with individual members and his team. At the platoon level the platoon
sergeant (PSG) insures that each squad/section leader knows and does his job
correctly, and as an assistant to the platoon leader, becomes involved in
squad and platoon training and operations. Similarly, other teams in other
units and branches operate accordingly.
Task Example:
An infantry platoon leader preparing for an ARTEP is concerned about his
platoon's ability to carry out all facets of an advance guard mission. In
contrast, the squad leader is concerned about individual skills of each squad
member that makes an effective soldier and cohesive squad.
4. THE OFFICER CONCENTRATES ON UNIT EFFECTVENESS AND UNIT
READINESS; THE NCO INSURES THAT EACH SUBORDINATE NCO
AND SOLDIER, INCLUDING PERSONAL EQUIPMENT, IS INDIVID.
UALLY READY AND FUNCTIONING AS AN EFFECTIVE TEAM
MEMBER.
Discussion:
The officer establishes priorities, states objectives, issues orders, allo­
cates resources and provides support for unit exercises and operations. The
NCO must insure individual readiness is achieved since an essential part of
unit effectiveness and unit readiness is individual performance, proficiency
and preparedness. Individual readiness includes the maintenance, service­
ability, cleanliness and correct amounts of assigned equipment.
6-6 ST/2b
•

lask Example:
The transportation platoon leader is concerned about having the proper number
of trucks available on time for a convoy. The concern of the transportation
platoon sergeant is that each truck is topped off, has a licensed driver,
that the basic issue list items for each vehicle is complete, and other
similar individual items.
5. THE OFFICER PAYS PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE STANDARDS,
CARE, AND PROFESSIONALISM OF OFFICERS; THE NCO FOCUSES
ON THE STANDARDS, CARE, AND PROFESSIONALISM OF NCO'S
AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL.
Discussion
The commander establishes the overall policy for standards, care and profession­
alism of all unit personnel. Under this policy, the officers monitor all
ranks, and the NCO's are responsible for monitoring enlisted ranks.
Task Example:
A combat engineer battalion commander is concerned about the maintenance
management proficiency of the bridge company's officers. The commander
coordinates with the battalion S-3, and the bridge company commander to
correct the problem. The same combat enqineer battalion command sergeant major

detects a significant NCO knowledge shortfall in laying out a minefield. The

sergeant major coordinates an NCO class, through the S-3 operations sergeant,
to rectify this situation.
By applying the five rules of general areas of responsibility, most tasks and
responsibilities can be readily labeled officer or noncommissioned officer.
Conscientious ap~lication of these five rules is an i~ortant ste in formu­
latingthe thoug~tprotess'necessaryto correctly ass~n'tasksan a responsi­
bilities.
Exceptions to General Rules.
Application of these five statements of general areas of responsibilities of
officers and NCO's will normally insure proper assignment of responsibilities.
However, there are two noncommissioned officer positions which you perhaps
have identified that represent exceptions to some of the five rules.
The first exception is the squad leader/section leader. These positions are
unique in that, under normal circumstances, they are the only noncommissioned
officers directly in the chain of command. Therefore, the squad/section
leader has to focus both on the proficiency of individual members of the
squad/section and also on the squad/section's overall proficiency - individual
and collective. This exception primarily applies to statements 2, 3, and 4.
The position of platoon sergeant (PS~) is the other exception. This position
is unique because the PS~ must be prepared to assume the responsibilities of

•
an officer, the platoon leader. The platoon sergeant is. in fact, the assis­
tant platoon leader of the platoon. He must take command in the absence of
6-7
ST/2b
the platoon leader and must be able to accomplish battle or administrative
missions. 'The platoon sergeant's skills should be essentially equal to those
of the platoon leader. As platoon leader. the PSG assumes the same responsi­
sibilities as the commissioned officer - except for responsibilities directly
related (i.e., ucMG, Reports of Survey, etc.) to the officer's commission.
This exception applies mainly to statement 1. 2. 3 and 4. The degree of
impact of this position (PSG) upon assignment of responsibilities will vary
and is somewhat dependent upon the experience and personalities of the platoon
leader and platoon serqeant. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant must
recognize the importance of mutually educatinq each other. This means that
the platoon sergeant must move in and out of the officer's area of responsi­
bility to prepare himself for the position of platoon leader and to teach and
advise the platoon leader.
Summary. The items which you should understand completely and which you
should apply when assigning tasks follow:
1. THE OFFICER COMMANDS, PLANS, ESTABLISHES POLICY. AND MNJAGES THE ARMY;
THE NCO CONDUCTS THE DAILY BUSINESS OF THE ARMY WITHIN ESTABLISHED POLICY.
2. THE OFFICER FOCUSES ON COLLECTIVE TRAINING WHICH LEADS TO MISSION ACCOM­
PLISHMENT; THE NCO FOCUSES ON INDIVIDUAL TRAINING WHICH LEADS TO MISSION
CAPABILITY.
3. THE OFFICER IS PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN UNITS AND UNIT OPERATIONS; THE NCO
PLACES HIS MAJOR FOCUS ON INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS AND TEAM LEADING.
4. THE OFFICER CONCENTRATES ON UNIT EFFECTIVENESS AND UNIT READINESS; THE
NCO INSURES THAT EACH SUBORDINATE NCO AND SOLDIER, INCLUDING PERSONAL EQUIP­
MENT, IS INDIVIDUALLY READY AND FUNCTIONING AS AN EFFECTIVE TEAM MEMBER.
5. THE OFFICER PAYS PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE STANDARDS, CARE, AND
PROFESSIONALISM OF OFFICERS; THE riCO FOCUSES ON THE STANDARDS, CARE, AND
PROFESSIOt~ALISM OF NCO'S AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL.

The following chapter provides an overview of the manual. It reviews the

requirement for the development of a professional NCO corps.

6-8 ST/2b
 1
Chapter 7

•
SUTU1ARY

It is generally agreed that there are three conditions for the existence of a

profession. They are: (1) A body of learned knowledge, which when used,
provides a service to society; (2) A standard of success measured by accom­
plishment in servicing society rather than personal gain; and (3) SOr.1e form
of ethical code and a system for the education of its practitioners. The
nonco~issioned officers corps of the Army exists today as a pr9fession. Let
us revi e\tl bri efly how the NCO corps meets the cri teri a of a profess i on.
The primary function of any military organization is to protect the security of
a society of nation by \'I'llatever means determined necessary by that society, to
include the use of violence. Some poeple \'lOuld argue that the use of violence
or even the potential threat of the use of violence, does not provide a service
to mankind. To those people, it should be emphasized that unless a society is
capable of protecting its ideals and values by internal means or through
alliances, the nation will not long exist when threatened by an outside force.
If a society is not able to exist because of another society's domination,
\'!ha t benefi t or servi ce can tha t soc i ety be to gl oba 1 mank i nd? Thus, the con­
trolled use of violence as a defensive measure does provide a service to the
society it is S\'lorn to protect. In addition to its prir.1ary function, the
United States military forces have established a reputation of providing
global humanitarian services for the benefit of all mankind. Such services
include aid to any nation during times of natural disasters; technical
assistance and in many cases equipment for the building of roads, bridges,

• dams, etc; medical aid and assistance whenever and wherever needed; and
technology in almost every field of endeavor. The NCO corps is a viable
element of the military forces and is repeatec!ly involved in providing
assistance to other nations around the world. Not a day passes that some of
its members are not actively engaged in activities that benefit mankind.
Advancement in military science, increased emphasis on delegation of authority
and responsibility to the lmIJest level consistent \'1ith mission accomplishment,
and the realization of the expanding leadership role of the NCO, all these
factors caused changes in organization, management, training, and education of
the Polen and women of the NCO corps. In 1957, the Depa rtment of Defense
announced a reorganization of the grade structure of the noncommissioned
officer corps. Two new senior NCO ranks were added: E8 and E9. Simul­
taneously, new positions of greater responsibility were identified for these
senior NCO's to occupy. The cor.nand sergeants major program was created in
1968 so that corrrnanders at and above battalion level could have an experienced,
kno\,/ledgeable senior NCO to advise, assist, and implement the cor.mander's
programs. The Arr]}' recogni zed that in order for the NCO corps to accompl i sh
its increased leadership role, a fotal educational program had to be devised.
Thus, the noncommissioned officers educational system was developed and imple­
mented. The emphasis \'/as placed not only on military technology but also on
a broadening of civilian education to encompass the subjects of management,
behavioral sciences, administration, and organizational structuring to mention
bl!t a fC\,I. tlo longer \IJere NCO's expected to be only "doers", they were nO\,1
leaders, thinkers, initiators, and managers. The establishment of the

• Sergeants flajor Academy in 1972 exemplified this neVI concept of the NCO Corps •

7-1 ST/2 C

The official written ~thical codes for the enlisted personnel are the Oath
of Enlistment and the Code of Conduct. Both of these codes closely parallel
the core value of the Officers Corps code of ethics: Duty, Honor, Country.
An unofficial ethical code is the Moral and Ethical Responsibilities of
Leaders; Creed of the Noncommissioned 'Offiter. Because the noncommissioned
officer has such frequent exposure to the majority of the junior enlisted
personnel as well as officers, a violation of the ethical code by an NCO is
immediately known and receives wide dissemination. The damage is immeasureable.
While the NCO corps in itself can take no, punitive action, i~.~~~ and does police
ethical violations by reporting them through the NCO support channel and chain of
command for appropriate corrective action. It is absolutely essential for a
professional NCO corps that the honesty and integrity of every NCO be above
reproach. The NCO corps must police itself.
The noncommissioned officers corps has' come a long way in establishing itself
as a profession. The basic framework for building a profession exists.
There is still much to be done. One of the most important tasks now at hand
is to educate all service members in the duties, responsibility, and authority
of the noncommissioned officer.
The continued professional development of individual NCO's can be fulfilled
only if the doctrine presented in this manual is understood and conscientiously
applied. Remember that officers and NCO's may share duties, but no task should
be shared. For example, both the officer and NCO are charqed with duties
related to unit material readiness; but while the officer is responsible
for management of the maintenance proqram, the NCO is charged with the daily
routine supervision of normal maintenance tasks. such as lubrication, requiSition
of parts, and inspections. While both have duties related to maintenance,
neither the officer nor the NCO perform the tasks charged to the other.
Duties will fall into three general categories: Specified. Directed and Implied.
Specified duties are those duties which are clearly outlined in DA publications
such as Fr~s, TMs, and ARs. Directed duties are usually unique to an organization
and are found in SOPs or commander's directives. Implied duties are duties that
the conscientious individual usually performs voluntarily to insure the smooth,
efficient functioning of his unit. Usually, as NCO's climb in rank, their
specified duties will absorb less of their time and more of their duties become
directed and implied. The following are the two critical concepts of duties:
a. THERE ARE SHARED DUTIES. BUT TASKS SHOULD NOT BE SHARED.
b. DUTIES MAY BE SPECIFIED, DIRECTED, OR IMPLIED. DIRECTED AND
IMPLIED DUTIES TEND TO INCREASE AS RANK AND POSITION INCREASE.
Authority necessary to accomplish a duty comes with the assigned duty. whether
the duty is directed, specified, or implied. Sufficient authority to accomplish
that duty is automatically delegated. When a platoon sergeant received instruc­
tions that his platoon's weapons will be cleaned today, he has the automatic and
necessary authority to hold the platoon past normal duty hours in order to
accomplish the mission that his orders/instructions,specify. Remember that
there exi sts blo categori es of authori ty, COMMAND and GENERAL MILITARY AUTHORITY.
Command authority is the organizational right to carry out your unit's mission.
You are exercising command authority over your subordinates by virtue of your
7-2 ST/2b
 ,
position in the unit. On the other hand, general mil itary authority charges

•
each leader, by virtue of his rank, to enforce all regulations at all
times, regardless of duty assignment. It is fully incur.1bent upon all soldiers
to correct violations of regulations, and in some circumstances the soldier
may find that he has to correct a superior.
Keep in mind that all military members have individual responsibility for
their conduct, sucn-is personal appearance and maintenance of their private
bus i ness and fami ly affa irs. The i ndi vi dua1 is cha rged \'/i th accountabi 1 i ty
in these areas both as a soldier and as a member of society. COJTr.land respon­
sibility, on the other hand, is the collective responsibility for unit achieve­
ment of set standards for maintenance, discipline, training performance, and
other military goals. Hhile subordinates are ans\'/erable to the cOtmlander as
the unit progresses toward these goals, commanders are fully responsible
for the achievement of the goals in the eyes of their commander. There are
certain factors, such as degree of control, which il71pact on corrmand respon­
sibility. Bear in mind that when leaders issue orders, it is incumbent upon
leaders to provide the resources necessary to perform the task. It is useless
to have a soldier clean a rifle \'Jithout providing a rod, bore cleaner, oil,
and pa tches.
Hhether you are operating in an environment that demands either the use of legal,
coercive, re\'Iard, expert, or charismatic pO\'ler, the power you chose to utilize
is only effective to the extent that the soldiers believe you truly have this
power to exert over them. If a platoon sergeant is placed in a predicament
where he is forced to threaten punishment to an uncooperative soldier, the

•
soldier can choose to believe that the platoon sergeant is bluffing. The
platoon sergeant knows that any punishment to the soldier that might result
is based mainly on the platoon' ~ergeant'sinfluence (expert and charismatic
power) in the unit and the degree of seriousness of the offense (legitimate
power). If the soldier believes that punishment will follo\,1 as a consequence
of misdealing with legitimate power, the platoon sergeant exercises as much
authority over the soldier as is necessary to complete the task at hand.
Tasks are categorized as Doing Tasks, Direct Supervising and Supporting Tasks,
and FollO\'/-on Supervising and Supporting Task. Hhen the mission has been
received, leaders analyze the orders, decide how the mission can be accom­
plished in the most timely and efficient manner, and appropriately assign
tasks to the chain of connand, staff/technical channel, or NCO support
channel. The follo\'ting are the critical concepts of task:
a. A TASK IS A SIiIGlE, SPECIFIC ACTIOfI TO BE PERFORf·1ED.
b. DOInG TASKS r\lUST BE PUSi-:ED DOHiJ TO THE lOL-IEST ORGANlZATIOf·!Al
LEVEL THAT SHOULD DO IT.
c. FOR EVERY DOIllG TASK, THERE IS A DIRECT SUPERVISlilG AND SUPPORTING
TASK (DSST).
d. FOR EVERY DSST, THERE IS A FOllOH-Of'! SUPERVISH~G AND SUPPORTING
TASK (FSST).
leaders at levels must strive to develop teamwork \'Ihile applying the
doctrine of authority, responsibility, and duty when assigning tasks.
leaders can establish teams and properly assign tasks by using the concepts
discussed in this text. The procedure to follow is:
~ 7-3 ST/2b

J
 1. ANALYZE THE SITUATION TO DETERMINE THE IMPLIED MISSIONS, GOALS, AND
OBJECTIVES.
2. DETERMINE TASKS REQUIRED TO DO MISSION.
3. DETERMINE TEAM ASSETS AVAILABLE.
4. ESTABLISH TEAM ORGANIZATION AND DETERMINE WHICH TASKS FALL TO OFFICERS
OR NCO's.
5. ASSIGN DOING TASKS TO LOWEST LEVEL AND IDENTIFY WHO HAS THE DSST.
Officers and noncommissioned officers, and superiors and subordinates within
those categories, must enter each other's sphere for advice. help. informa­
tion and learning, i.e., INTERPLAY. However, once this has been received,
officers and noncommissioned officers must pull back into their own spheres
and operate at A POINT OF TANGENCY if meaningful performance, effective
teamwork, and a clear division of labor are to be achieved.
The final and most significant doctrinal principles which must be retained
and correctly applied if the desired clear division of labor is to be achieved
are:
1. THE OFFICER COMMANDS, PLANS, ESTABLISHES POLICY, AND MANAGES THE
ARMY; THE NCO CONDUCTS THE DAILY BUSINESS OF THE ARMY WITHIN ESTABLISHED POLICY.
2. THE OFFICER FOCUSES ON COLLECTIVE TRAINING WHICH LEADS TO MISSION
ACCOMPLISHMENT; THE NCO FOCUSES ON INDIVIDUAL TRAINING WHICH LEADS TO MISSION
CAPABILITY.
3. THE OFFICER IS PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN UNITS AND UNIT OPERATIONS; THE
NCO PLACES HIS ~~JOR FOCUS ON INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS AND TEAM LEADING.
4. THE OFFICER CONCENTRATES ON UNIT EFFECTIVENESS AND UNIT READINESS;
THE NCO INSURES THAT EACH SUBORDINATE NCO AND SOLDIER, INCLUDING PERSONAL
EQUIPMENT, IS INDIVIDUALLY READY AND FUNCTIONING AS AN EFFECTIVE TEAM MEMBER.
5. THE OFFICER PAYS PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE STANDARDS. CARE. AND
PROFESSIONALISM OF OFFICERS; THE NCO FOCUSES ON THE STANDARDS, CARE. AND
PROFESSIONALISM OF NCO's AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL.

7-4 AFPP-FBT