Geh 6865 PDF
Geh 6865 PDF
Control Server
Dell® Windows® 10 Thin Client HMI System
Secure Deployment Guide
June 2019
Public Information
These instructions do not purport to cover all details or variations in equipment, nor to provide for every possible
contingency to be met during installation, operation, and maintenance. The information is supplied for informational
purposes only, and GE makes no warranty as to the accuracy of the information included herein. Changes, modifications,
and/or improvements to equipment and specifications are made periodically and these changes may or may not be reflected
herein. It is understood that GE may make changes, modifications, or improvements to the equipment referenced herein or to
the document itself at any time. This document is intended for trained personnel familiar with the GE products referenced
herein.
GE may have patents or pending patent applications covering subject matter in this document. The furnishing of this
document does not provide any license whatsoever to any of these patents.
Public Information – This document contains non-sensitive information approved for public disclosure.
GE provides the following document and the information included therein as is and without warranty of any kind,
expressed or implied, including but not limited to any implied statutory warranty of merchantability or fitness for
particular purpose.
For further assistance or technical information, contact the nearest GE Sales or Service Office, or an authorized GE Sales
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Public Information
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Confidentiality Ensure only the people you want to see information can see it.
• Example: The Microsoft® Windows® operating system typically defines a username to establish an identity for a user and
a password to verify that the user is who they claim to be.
• Example: Many communications schemes use a certificate to verify the identity of the endpoint(s) of that
communication. As part of the initiation of the communication link, one or both sides provide their certificate to verify
their identity.
Authorization is determining what identities are allowed (authorized) to access a resource or perform an action. Most
authorization schemes support multiple levels of authorization, such as a distinction between the ability to view an item
versus the ability to modify an item.
• Example: The Microsoft Windows operating system supports multiple levels of access on items (such as ReadOnly
versus ReadWrite access to a file) and a set of operating system privileges to control actions that users may take.
Access Control Lists (ACLs) are often used as a method of binding together the requester's identity with the level of
access allowed. These are defined on a per-item basis, so different items may have different ACLs.
• Example: The Microsoft Windows operating system supports ACLs on files and devices to define which users have what
access rights to those items.
• Example: The network switches support ACLs on their administrative interfaces to define which elements of the system
have the right to access the administrative functions.
Note When done at the operating system level, ACLs protect an item no matter what tool (program) is used to attempt
access - this is called authoritative security. This is a stronger level of protection than the tool determining to allow access or
not - this is called cooperative or client-based security. Cooperative security can be bypassed by using a different client to
access the resource, authoritative security cannot be bypassed as easily.
Least Privileges is the concept that each user should only be granted the access rights and privileges that they need to
perform their work function. This protects items and configurations against inadvertent changes by users, possibly because of
malware that the user has inadvertently triggered.
• Example: The Microsoft Windows operating system supports the concept of Administrator level access for making
changes to the operating system and software running on the computer. If a user is operating with Administrative access,
any malware that they trigger could alter the operating system or any program in any way that it desired. If the user is
operating with a non-administrative account they are limited in the changes they can make.
• Example: The ToolboxST* system supports a Users and Roles concept to define which operations a user is allowed to
perform, such as forcing variables, issuing alarm acknowledge, and reset commands, or downloading configurations to
controllers.
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is the concept of a consolidation of using the user's identity (authentication) and
their allowed rights (authorization) in a manor slightly easier to maintain. An intermediate concept of a user's Role is
introduced, which defines a collection of users with shared access rights and privileges. This simplifying scheme has a
number of benefits, such as:
• Authorization (done on a per-item basis) is given not to a set of user identities, but instead to a Role - it's ACL is not a list
of usernames but a (much smaller) list of Roles. As users are added and removed from the system, the ACLs on each
item do not have to change since they were tied to the Roles and not the users, making updates faster and more efficient.
• Reporting on the members of a single Role is quick and easy compared to having to visit all items and examine their
individual ACLs.
• If a user's Role changes (their job requirements change), it is a simpler task to assign them to a new role, or to revert it
back if the change was only temporary.
• Provide physical security for all devices - many, if not most devices can be compromised by an attacker that has physical
access to the device at startup/boot time or direct access to the non-volatile media that the device boots from (such as
hard drive or flash memory). Access to network equipment (switches, routers) can allow for introduction of new devices
onto the networks, including network monitoring equipment.
• Disable unused services on devices to reduce the mechanisms available for attacks.
• Wherever possible, configure the site's password requirements (length, complexity) into the devices or operating systems
to have each device enforce them automatically. If it cannot be automatically enforced it must be performed by
procedure.
• Implement RBAC wherever possible and keep the list of users and roles current. Some system components allow for
logging (auditing) failures. Use these if available, preferably logging to a centralized site Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM) (if available) for both convenience and pattern analysis across devices.
• Implement a site-wide scheme for applying software patches, especially those defined as security patches.
Limiting visibility to the control system is a strong defense-in-depth approach to help prevent attacks. This is accomplished
by using separate communications networks (Virtual Local Area Networks [VLANs]) to isolate different equipment types,
then tightly controlling the network traffic that can cross from one VLAN to another. There are various schemes and
recommendations (ISA-99, IEC-62443) that include network segmentation and should be followed when making any
networking changes or while introducing new equipment to the control system.
• Consider using a dedicated point-to-point link instead of a shared network for dedicated functions within the same
network zone. Never bridge network zones using a dedicated link, always go through a router that provides controlled
access (and optional logging).
• Consider using an additional firewall even within a network zone to add additional constraints on traffic, especially if the
traffic includes a protocol that does not support authentication.
Note Windows Thin Clients must undergo a hardening procedure that includes joining them to the network domain,
application of Thin Client group policy, and removal of unused software. Refer to the section Configuration Hardening for
more information.
• Maintain local account passwords according to site policy. Complexity and reuse of rules is not enforced by the
equipment and must be addressed by procedure.
• Users should be provided with local account passwords according to their roles and responsibilities. Administrative level
accounts to the Thin Client terminal should only be provided to those who require them to perform their job function.
• Make sure to change all local account factory default passwords as soon as possible during the site commissioning
process.
• Local User accounts provide normal user level access to the Thin Client terminal. This account is used unless the
automatic login sequence is overridden by the user.
• Local Administrator accounts provide administrative access to the Thin Client terminal. This account is used to modify
the Thin Client terminal configuration. Use of this account password should be limited to those with the requirement to
re-configure or troubleshoot the Thin Client terminal.
• Do not configure the Thin Client terminals with a default gateway address or router address that would allow
communications outside of the local network.
• If external routing is a site requirement, the use of routers and/or firewalls with appropriate rules to limit the addresses
and protocols allowed to pass should be implemented.
Thin Client terminals are typically configured to use the DHCP to reserve an IP address. Since loss of DHCP servers can
prevent the Thin Client terminal from obtaining an IP address, or renewing it when the lease has expired, the lease times
configured into the DHCP servers is purposefully longer than typical industry standards. The long lease should not cause
problems because the number of Thin Client terminals is typically an order of magnitude less than the pool of IP addresses,
and Thin Client terminals do not tend to come and go from the site to drain the address pool.
• If the site has many Thin Client terminals joining and leaving the network (an unlikely event), a reduction in the DHCP
lease period may be necessary. An option may be to script or manually clean out unused but not-yet-expired device leases
if the IP address pool starts to grow low. This would be an unusual condition.
• If changes are made to the DHCP lease time, it may be worthwhile to consider its relationship to the Windows Cached
Credential expiration period (currently 31 days in Microsoft Windows operating systems).
• Static addresses that do not conflict with other site equipment should be available in case manual assignment of Thin
Client terminal IP addresses is required during a long-term failure of the DHCP servers. These addresses should be
outside of the DHCP address pool space to prevent conflicts when the DHCP servers are put back into service.
• Verify the source and integrity of media before placing it into site equipment.
− Software distributions should be verified by whichever method the manufacturer supports, such as signed installation
files or a separate website that lists the hashes for the files on the distribution media.
− Use of password protected media does not ensure that the media is free from malicious software, but it does help
prevent the media from being infected while left unattended.
• Consider using hardware USB port locks to prevent access to USB ports, and/or pull the front or rear USB port
connectors from the motherboard.
• Consider blocking the use of USB ports on all but one or two Thin Client terminals (often the ones associated with
Engineering Workstations) to limit USB exposure, then use the internal network to transfer the information to computers
that need it.
• Make sure the AutoRun option in the host operating system is disabled to help prevent software from being automatically
run when the media is inserted or the session connection is established.
• Set secure passwords for each local User account in each Thin Client terminal and limit exposure to only those who
require them as described in the section User Authentication and Authorization.
Domain Controller A server that provides identity management functions. It holds a database of the users defined and
the groups that those users are members of that are used to control user access to various resources.
Firewall A device that connects between multiple networks to limit the types of traffic that are allowed to flow between the
networks.
Management Data Highway (MDH) A network containing devices that need to be monitored but not controlled. Traffic
from the Monitoring Zone (MDH) to the Control Zone (PDH and UDH) must go through a router with access lists that limits
the traffic allowed.
PDH A network used to transport non-critical information within the Control Zone. Traffic to the Control Zone (PDH and
UDH) from outside the Control Zone must go through a router with access lists that limits the traffic allowed.
SIEM A server that collects event messages from various other subsystems to provide a central location for analyzing and
viewing these events.
Router (Network) A networking device that is typically connected to multiple different networks with rules that define
what message traffic is allowed to cross from one network to a different network.
Switch (Network) A networking device that connects multiple devices together to form an Ethernet Network.
UDH A network that is used to transport critical control information within the Control Zone. Traffic to the Control Zone
(PDH and UDH) from outside the Control Zone must go through a router with access lists that limit the allowed traffic.
VLAN A mechanism for logically connecting multiple devices into one network within a switch or router. Networking
equipment typically support multiple different VLANs within a single switch to provide isolation of network segments within
a single switch. VLANs include the UDH, PDH, MDH, MGH, and DMZ.