Castaño, Stephen Neil S.

Luz v. People, 669 SCRA 421, 429-430

FACTS:

PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned as a traffic enforcer saw the accused
driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused
for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet
while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-
station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said
sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for
violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on
getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to
take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside
it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket
which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size,
including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon
seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused
opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that
upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table
which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while
the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.

ISSUE:

Whether the search conducted is incidental to a lawful arrest

RULING:

No. The court held in the negative. The following are the instances when a warrantless
search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of
evidence in “plain view”; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless
search; (v) customs search; (vi) a “stop and frisk” search; and (vii) exigent and
emergency circumstances. None of the abovementioned instances, especially a search
incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense.

Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure
for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of
the driver’s license of the latter. At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write
his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been "under arrest." There was no
intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him
into custody.

It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by
petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a
fine only. Under the Rules of Court (Rule 112 Section 5 (c)), a warrant of arrest need
not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine
only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for
such an offense.

This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly,
when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty,
or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the
motorist. In this case, however, the officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation
ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.

The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the
very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their
inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.

 
 Pestillos v. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014

FACTS:

At 3:15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty.
Generoso. The latter called the police station to report the incident. Acting on the report,
SPO1 Monsalve dispatched SPO2 Javier, with the augmentation personnel from the
Airforce, A2C Sayson and Galvez, to go to the scene and render assistance. They
arrived at the scene and saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten. The latter pointed to the
petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite" the
petitioners to go to the police station for investigation. At the inquest proceeding, the
prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon, but
the latter fortunately survived. Petitioners were indicted for attempted murder.

The petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the
ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless
arrest took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the
perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police
station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for
preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court. The RTC denied the motion and also the motion for reconsideration. The
petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, on the RTC for the denial of their motion for preliminary investigation. The
appellate court dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant.

RULING:

YES. To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the
complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the
scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime
transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty.
Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and,
notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood;
more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they
did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they
narrated a different version of what transpired.

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they
have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the
scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable
to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the
police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These
circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their
personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.

This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog did not
flee but voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the
present case even admitted to have been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso,
although they had another version of what transpired.

In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the

courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the
requirement of immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable cause that the
person sought to be arrested committed the crime.

To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the
above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was
being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is
patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has
recently committed the crime.
 Borlongan v. Pena

FACTS:

Atty. Peña instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses,
damages, and attorney’s fees against Urban Bank and herein petitioners, before the
RTC of Negros Occidental, BagoCity. Atty. Peña anchored his claim for compensation
on the Contract of Agency allegedly entered into with the petitioners, wherein the former
undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from
unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay
City.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that they never appointed the respondent
as agent or counsel. Attached to the motion were several documents in an attempt to
show that the respondent was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by
the petitioners.

In view of the introduction of the documents, Atty. Peña filed his Complaint-Affidavit with
the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City. He claimed that said documents were
falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the
signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI. Worse,
petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they
were falsified.

In a Resolution, City Prosecutor found probable cause for the indictment of petitioners
for four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents, penalized by the
second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
Reinvestigation. Petitioners insisted that they were denied due process because of the
nonobservance of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the
Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they were not afforded the right to submit
their counter-affidavit. Then they argued that since no such counter-affidavit and
supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on
the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of
arrest, also in contravention with the Rules of Court. Petitioners further prayed that the
information be quashed for lack of probable cause.

MTCC denied the omnibus motion primarily on the ground that preliminary investigation
was not available in the instant case – which fell within the jurisdiction of the first-level
court. The court, likewise, upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was
issued in accordance with the Rules of Court.

Petitioners immediately instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before
the CA which dismissed the petition. Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issuance of the warrant of arrest was valid? (NO)

RULING:

In the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the mandate of the Constitution is for the judge to
personally determine the existence of probable cause. Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, d no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Corollary thereto, Section 9(b) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts nor
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

(b) Where filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court. — If the complaint or information
is filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court, the procedure provided for in Section 3(a)
of this Rule shall likewise be observed. If the judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the
respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest after personally examining in writing and under oath the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers.

Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that "[n]o x x x warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing x x x the persons x x x to be seized." Interpreting the words
"personal determination," we said in Soliven v. Makasiar that it does not thereby mean
that judges are obliged to conduct the personal examination of the complainant and his
witnesses themselves. To require thus would be to unduly laden them with preliminary
examinations and investigations of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before them. Rather, what is emphasized merely is the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the
existence of probable cause. To this end, he may: (a) personally evaluate the report and
the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutor's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence.
What he is never allowed to do is to follow blindly the prosecutor's bare certification as
to the existence of probable cause. Much more is required by the constitutional
provision. Judges have to go over the report, the affidavits, the transcript of
stenographic notes if any, and other documents supporting the prosecutor's certification.
Although the extent of the judge's personal examination depends on the circumstances
of each case, to be sure, he cannot just rely on the bare certification alone but must go
beyond it. This is because the warrant of arrest issues not on the strength of the
certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it. He should even
call for the complainant and the witnesses to answer the court's probing questions when
the circumstances warrant.

An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates

the privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded by the State.

Measured against the constitutional mandate and established rulings, there was here a
clear abdication of the judicial function and a clear indication that the judge blindly
followed the certification of a city prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest with respect to all of the petitioners. The careless
inclusion of Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., in the warrant of arrest gives flesh to the bone of
contention of petitioners that the instant case is a matter of persecution rather than
prosecution. On this ground, this Court may enjoin the criminal cases against
petitioners.
 Ocampo v. Abando, G.R. No. 176830 February 11, 2014

FACTS:
A mass graveyard was found at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan,
Leyte by the43rd Infantry Brigade containing 67 skeletal remains of those believed to be
victims of “Operation Venereal Disease (VD)” by the Communist Party of the
Philippines/ New People’s Army/National Democratic Front (CPP/NPA/NPDF) of the
Philippines. This was done to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.
Members of the Scene of the Crime Operation team conducted forensic crime analysis
to identify the bodies by way of DNA sample. The initial report of the PNP Crime
Laboratory on their identities remained inconclusive, but, in a Special Report, the Case
Secretariat of the Regional and National Inter-Agency Legal Action Group came up with
ten names of possible victims after comparing the testimonies of relatives and
witnesses.
P C/Insp. Almaden of the (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Captain
Allan Tiu (Army Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army sent 12
undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte through Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor Vivero).The letters requested appropriate legal
action on 12 complaint-affidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front of
the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including petitioners herein along with
several other unnamed members.
Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias Piedad,Leonardo C. Tanaid,
Floro M. Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and Veronica P. Tabara. They
narrated that they were former members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.According to them,
Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central
Committee.Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo),Randall B. Echanis
(Echanis),Rafael G. Baylosis (Baylosis),and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)were then
members of the Central Committee.
From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied, tortured and
executed by members of the CPP/NPA/NDF pursuant to Operation VD.
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued a
subpoena requiring, among others, petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and
those of their witnesses.Petitioner Ocampo submitted his counter-affidavit.Petitioners
Echanisand Baylosis did not file counter-affidavits because they were allegedly not
served the copy of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence. Counsel of
petitioner Ladlad made a formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006 during the
preliminary investigation. However, petitioner Ladlad did not file a counter-affidavit
because he was allegedly not served a subpoena.
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the
commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged." He ordered the issuance
of warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail for their temporary liberty.
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others (including
petitioners Echanis and Baylosisand Ladlad) was then pending before the RTC Makati,
Branch 150 (RTC Makati).Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner
Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder in this case, are already
absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in
connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested by virtue of the
warrant of arrest issued by Judge Abando. On 1 February 2008, petitioners Echanis and
Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause
with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend
Service of Warrant.
Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but before being able to rule thereon, Judge Abando
issued an Order transmitting the records of Criminal Case to the Office of the Clerk of
Court, RTC Manila.
Petitioner Ladlad and Baylosis filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail and a Motion to Allow
Petitioner to Post Bail respectively.The OSG interposed no objection to the grant of
aP100,000 cash bail to them. The Court granted the motions of petitioners Ladlad and
Baylosis and fixed their bail in the amount ofP100,000, subject to the condition that their
temporary release shall be limited to the period of their actual participation in the peace
negotiations.

ISSUE:
Were petitioners denied due process during preliminary investigation and in the
issuance of the warrant of arrest?

HELD: 
"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
evidence in support of one's defense." What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be
heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present ones own side of the story
cannot claim denial of due process.
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no
longer be found in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other
hand, Saturnino Ocampo at Satur, Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad
submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem
failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of appearance by their
respective counsels.
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the
complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed.
As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity
to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid.
 People v. Tan 608 SCRA 85, 95

Facts:
Two separate information were filed against respondent Tan for violation of the Revised
Securities Act, when he failed to file with SEC the amount of all BWRC (Best World
Resources Corporation) shares of which he is the beneficial owner within 10 days after
he became such beneficial owner.
During the trial, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence. RTC admitted the pieces of
evidence, but denied admission of all other exhibits. Tan filed Motion for Leave to File
Demurrer to Evidence. Petitioner filed its Opposition to which Tan filed a Reply. In the
end, RTC issued an order granting Tan’s Demurrer to Evidence.
Petitioner filed a petition before the CA assailing the order of RTC which granted Tan’s
motion. CA denied, ruling that the dismissal of a criminal action by the grant of a
Demurrer to Evidence is one on the merits and operates as an acquittal, for which
reason, the prosecution cannot appeal therefrom as it would place the accused in
double jeopardy.
Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in granting Tan’s Demurrer to Evidence.

Held: 
No. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is “filed after
the prosecution had rested its case,” and when the same is granted, it calls “for an
appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits,
tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.” Such dismissal of a criminal case by the
grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the
accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is not
present in this case. RTC did not violate petitioner’s right to due process as the
petitioner was given more than ample opportunity to present its case which led to grant
of Tan’s demurrer. RTC never prevented petitioner from presenting its case. In fact, one
of the main reasons for the RTCs decision to grant the demurrer was the absence of
evidence to prove the classes of shares that the Best World Resources Corporation
stocks were divided into, whether there are preferred shares as well as common shares,
or even which type of shares respondent had acquired. As such RTC did not abuse its
discretion in the manner it conducted the proceedings of the trial, as well as its grant of
respondent’s demurrer to evidence.
 AAA v. Carbonell June 8, 2007

FACTS:

Feb. 28, 2001 to Aug.16, 2001:  AAA worked as a secretary at the Arzadon Automotive
and Car Service Center. He Boss Arzadon is the accused. 
May 27, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m.: Arzadon asked her to deliver a book to an office
located at another building but when she returned to their office, the lights had been
turned off and the gate was closed. But she still went in to get her handbag. 
On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a pipe.  He told
her to go near him and upon reaching his side, he threatened her with the pipe and
forced her to lie on the pavement.  He removed her pants and underwear, and inserted
his penis into her vagina.  She wept and cried out for help but those were useless since
nobody was there. She didn’t report the incident at first because of Arzadon’s threats
but then she found out she’s preggy so she eventually filed the complaint for rape.
AAA failed to appear for the 4 consecutive orders to take the witness stand in order to
satisfy the judge for the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. Because of this, dismissed the Case for lack of probable cause. He claims that
under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause “to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.
Petitioner contends that the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and her witnesses in satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest as the documentary evidence and transcript of
stenographic notes may sufficiently establish this.   
Respondent Judge Carbonell argues in his Comment  that the finding of probable cause
by the investigating prosecutor is not binding or obligatory, and that he was justified in
requiring petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand in order to determine
probable cause.

ISSUE:
WON Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case
No. 6983 for lack of probable cause

HELD:
YES.
Soliven v. Makasiar: The constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the judge
to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses.  Instead, he may opt to:
1)personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor
or 2) he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses.  ->
What the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he
should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor.  
In this case, Judge Carbonell dismissed the case without taking into consideration the
June 11, 2003 Resolution of 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo, the
October 13, 2003 Resolution of the panel of prosecutors, and the July 1, 2005
Resolution of the Department of Justice, all of which sustain a finding of probable cause
against Arzadon.  Moreover, he failed to evaluate the evidence in support thereof.
Respondent judge’s finding of lack of probable cause was premised only on the
complainant’s and her witnesses’ absence during the hearing scheduled by the
respondent judge for the judicial determination of probable cause. 
Petitioner narrated in detail the alleged rape incident both in her Sinumpaang Salaysay.
and Complaint-Affidavit.  She attended several clarificatory hearings that were
conducted in the instant case.  The transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing held
on October 11, 2002 shows that she positively identified Arzadon as her assailant, and
the specific time and place of the incident.  She also claimed that she bore a child as a
result of the rape and, in support of her contentions, presented the child and her birth
certificate as evidence.  In contrast, Arzadon merely relied on the defense of alibi which
is the weakest of all defenses.
After a careful examination of the records, the SC found that there is sufficient evidence
to establish probable cause. 
Thus, respondent Judge committed GAD in the dismissal. for lack of probable cause on
the ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to take the witness stand.
Considering there is ample evidence and sufficient basis on record to support a finding
of probable cause, it was unnecessary for him to take the further step of examining the
petitioner and her witnesses.  Moreover, he erred in holding that petitioner’s absences
in the scheduled hearings were indicative of a lack of interest in prosecuting the case.
In fact, the records show that she has relentlessly pursued the same.   
Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret out the truth.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  
 Soliven vs. Makasiar G.R. No. 82585 167 SCRA 393

FACTS:

Secretary of Justice denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and upheld the
resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal’s finding of a prima
facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by Beltran was
denied by the Secretary of Justice. On appeal, the President, through the Executive
Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC
judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and
the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause? (NO)

RULING:

This calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants
of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personallyby the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the
grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible
officers as may be authorized by law", has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that
the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is
not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting
down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided
is reiterated and clarified in this resolution. It has not been shown that respondent judge
has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the
warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
 Malacat v. CA

FACTS:
Four (4) police officers were conducting a patrol in Quiapo due to bomb threats that had
been occurring in the area for the last seven (7) days. They found two groups of
Muslim-looking men standing on opposite sides of the Quezon Boulevard corner who
were acting suspiciously and their eyes were moving very fast. After thirty minutes of
observing the two groups, they decided to approach one of the groups. Upon seeing the
policemen, the groups fled in all directions. Fortunately, one of the men later identified
as Malacat, was apprehended. Without a warrant, the police officer searched him and
found a grenade tucked inside his front waist line. Malacat was arrested and charged
with illegal possession of explosives.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid.

RULING:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed
in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant,
subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has
been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been
described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are
limited to the following:
(1) customs searches;
(2) search of moving vehicles;
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consent searches;
(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
(6) a "stop and frisk.

The trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to
a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite
quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity
of the incidental search.
 MA. GRACIA HAO AND DANNY HAO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 183345 Septembe 17, 2014

Facts:

Manuel Dy Awiten (Dy), claimed that as a longtime client of Asiatrust Bank (where Ngo
was the manager) and because of their good business relationship, he took Ngo's
advice to deposit his money in an investment that will give a higher rate of return. Ngo
introduced Dy to Gracia Hao (Hao) (petitioner), who presented herself as an officer of
various reputable companies and an incorporator of State Resources Development
Corporation where subsequently DY invested. Dy's initial investment was P10M. He
received the promised interest from is investment. Thus, convincing him to invest more.
He invested almost P10OM. The additional investments were given through checks.
Gracio Hao also issued several checks representing Dy's earnings. These checks were
subsequently dishonored. Dy seek Ngo's help to recover the amount. Ngo promised,
however, Dy subsequently discovered that the former already resigned from the bank.
This time, Dy confronted Gracia. Dy learned that his money was invested in the realty
business of Gracia Hao's realty business. Dy filed a complaint with the public
prosecutor. The public prosecutor filed an information for syndicated estafa. Warrant of
arrest were subsequently issued against the Hao's and other accused Hao filed a
motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warant of arrest. They invoked lack of
probable cause and the pendency of their petition for review with the DOJ. RTC denied
the petitioner's twin motion. CA affirmed the RTC's decision with regard to the twin
motion. However, the CA opined that the information shows only probable cause for
simple estafa only. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the arraignment shall be deferred because of the pendency of the
petition for review with the DOJ

Held:

NO. Under Section 11(c), Rule 116of the Rules of Court, an arraignment may be
suspended if there is a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor pending at
either the DOJ, or the Office of the President However, such period of suspension
should not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office. As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for review with the DOJ
on November 21, 2003. Since this petition had not been resolved yet, they claimed that
their arraignment should be suspended indefinitely.
 People v. Adriano

FACTS:

Adriano was charged with the crime of illegal sale of shabu punishable under Section 5,
Article ll of RA 9165. Acting on a report received from a barangay oficial and an
informant that Adriano was selling drugs, the police formed a team to conduct a buy-
bust operation to entrap Adriano, designating PO1 Morales as the poseur-buyer, and
marking the buy-bust money consisting of ten P100.00 bills with the initials "PC". PO1
Morales bought P200.00 worth of shabu from Adriano. Upon giving Adriano the marked
money and after receiving a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, PO1
Morales signaled his team to arrest Adriano. PO2 Ronnie Fabroa immediately arrested
Adriano. Adriano avers that the shabu allegedly seized from his possession is
inadmissible because the warrantless arrest of his person is invalid and that the
arresting officers violated Section 21 of RA 9165. The RTC found the him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The CA affirmed.
Thus this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the warrantless arrest is invalid

HELD:

No. The warrantless arrest is valid. Warrantless arrests are allowed under three
instances provided in Sec 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules on CrimPro. Adriano was arrested
pursuant to Section 5(a), which provides that a person may be arrested without a
warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense." In the case at bar, Adriano was caught in the act of committing an offense, in
flagrante delicto, when Adriano was caught selling illegal shabu through a buy- bust
operation, within the plain view of the arresting officers. With regard to the warrantless
arrest, the defense's contention that the buy-bust team should have procured a search
warrant for the validity of the buy-bust operation is misplaced. Warrantless arrests are
allowed in three (3) instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, to wit: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
Based on the above provision, Adriano was arrested pursuant to Section 5(a), which
provides that a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." In the case at bar, Adriano
was caught in the act of committing an offense, in flagrante delicto, when Adriano was
caught selling illegal shabu through a buy- bust operation, within the plain view of the
arresting officers. A buy-bust operation is "a form of entrapment, in which the violator is
caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only
authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything
that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime.
Finally, the arresting officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the perfomance of
their official duties. The presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence. However, in the case at bar, the defense failed to present any proof to
substantiate its imputation of ill motive on the part of the arresting officers. Contrarily,
the prosecution duly proved the existence of the two elements of the crime of illegal sale
of shabu and established the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. The
presumption of regularity in favor of the arresting officers prevails.
 Ongcoma Hadji Homar vs. People of the Philippines 
G.R. No. 182534. September 2, 2015
FACTS: 
The petitioner was charged for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. The Information
states that on or about August 20, 2002, the petitioner was found to possess one heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 grams of as shabu. The petitioner pleaded
not guilty during arraignment. PO1 Eric Tan (Tan) was the lone witness for the prosecution.
he testified that on August 20, 2002, at around 8:50 in the evening, while proceeding to the
area onboard a mobile hunter, they saw the petitioner crossing a “No Jaywalking”portion of
Roxas Boulevard. They immediately accosted him and told him to cross at the pedestrian
crossing area. The petitioner picked up something from the ground, prompting Tangcoy to
frisk him resulting in the recovery of a knife. Thereafter, Tangcoy conducted a thorough
search on the petitioner’s body and found and confiscated a plastic sachet containing what
he suspected as shabu. Tangcoy and Tan executed a sinumpaang salaysay on the
incident. The petitioner was the sole witness for the defense. He testified that he was going
home at around 6:30 p.m. after selling imitation sunglasses and other accessories at the
BERMA Shopping Center. After crossing the overpass, a policeman and a civilian stopped
and frisked him despite his refusal. They poked a gun at him, accused him of being a
holddupper, and forced him to go with them. They also confiscated the kitchen knife, which
he carried to cut cords. He was likewise investigated for alleged possession of shabu and
detained for one day. He was criminally charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Parañaque City, Branch 77 for the possession of the kitchen knife but he was eventually
acquitted. CA affirmed the decision. Petitioner’s Contention: The shabu, which was
allegedly recovered from the petitioner, is inadmissible as evidence because it was obtained
as a result of his unlawful arrest and in violation of his right against unreasonable search
and seizure. The petitioner has not committed, was not committing and was not attempting
to commit any crime at the time of his arrest. In fact, no report or criminal charge was filed
against him for the alleged jaywalking. 

ISSUE:
WON there was a valid warrantless arrest. 

RULING:
No.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer
for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the
arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical
restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an
intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on
the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1)
The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence of or within the view of the arresting officer. The prosecution has the burden to
prove the legality of the warrantless arrest from which the corpus delicti of the crime -shabu-
was obtained. For, without a valid warrantless arrest, the alleged confiscation of the shabu
resulting from a warrantless search on the petitioner’s body is surely a violation of his
constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. As a consequence, the alleged
shabu shall be inadmissible as evidence against him. The indispensability of the intent to
arrest an accused in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.The Court held that the
shabu confiscated from the accused in that case was inadmissibleas evidence when the
police officer who flagged him for traffic violation had no intent to arrest him. Due to the lack
of intent to arrest, the subsequent search was unlawful.
 People vs. Collado
698 SCRA 628, 642-643, June 17, 2013

FACTS:
PO2 Noble received information from a civilian asset that spouses Marcelino and Myra
were engaged in selling shabu and that drug users, including out-of-school youth, were
using their residence in 32 R. Hernandez St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, for their drug
sessions. A buy-bust operation team was thereafter formed. The asset introduced PO2
Noble to Marcelino as a regular buyer of shabu. Myra accepted the money. Marcelino
then took from his pocket a small metal container from which he brought out a small
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and gave it to PO2 Noble.
Meanwhile, SPO2 Cruz and another police officer went inside the house of Marcelino
and Myra, where they found Apelo, Cipriano, Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang
and Latario gathered around a table littered with various drug paraphernalia such as an
improvised water pipe, strips of aluminum foil with traces of white substance, disposable
lighters, and plastic sachets. A strip of aluminum foil used for smoking marijuana was
recovered from Ranada.
RTC found Marcelino and Myra guilty of Secs. 5, 6, and 11 of RA 9165. Apelo, Cipriano,
Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang and Latario are guilty of Sec. 14 of RA 9165.
CA affirmed the decision with modification that Apelo, Abache, Sumulong, and
Madarang are accessories, not principals.
ISSUE:
WON irregularities attended the arrest, detention, and the procedure in handling the
specimen seized from them.
RULING:
The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in flagrante delicto made in pursuance of
Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was effected after Marcelino and
Myra performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble the sachet of shabu and Ranada
of having in his control and custody illegal drug paraphernalia.
As for the specimen, the failure of the police officers to inventory and photograph the
confiscated items are not fatal to the prosecution's cause, provided that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized substance were preserved, as in this case.
In Rañada’s case, he was actually caught having custody and control of the confiscated
drug paraphenalia intended for smoking, injecting, etc. into one's body. It was also
indubitably shown that he failed to present authority to possess the prohibited articles,
much less, an explanation of his possession thereof. However, as regards the other
accused who were seen in the company of Rañada, the evidence of conspiracy against
them was insufficient. They were in close proximity to Rañada at the time and place of
the incident. But mere presence at the scene of the crime does not imply conspiracy.
The prosecution failed to show specific overt acts that would link these accused to
Ranada's possession of the said contrabands. The CA erred in ruling that they were
accessories to the crime.
 People v. Edaño, G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014

Facts: On November 19, 2002, the petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal sale of shabu under Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The charge
stemmed from the buy-bust operation conducted by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) wherein a
poseur-buyer purchased shabu from the petitioner.
 
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the petitioner guilty as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.
 
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that the prosecution failed to
prove the elements of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs beyond reasonable doubt.
 
Issue: 

Whether the prosecution was able to prove the elements of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs beyond
reasonable doubt.
 
Held: 
The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was able to prove the elements of the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs beyond reasonable doubt. To establish the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In this case, the prosecution was
able to prove that the petitioner sold shabu to the poseur-buyer and received payment for it.
The defense argued that the petitioner's right to counsel was violated during his custodial investigation, rendering
his extrajudicial confession inadmissible in evidence. However, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner failed
to prove that his right to counsel was violated, and that he was adequately informed of his constitutional rights
before he made his confession. The Supreme Court also rejected the defense's argument that the chain of
custody of the seized drugs was not properly established. The Court found that the prosecution was able to
establish the chain of custody through the testimonies of the PDEA agents who conducted the buy-bust operation
and the forensic chemist who examined the seized drugs. Based on these findings, the Supreme Court affirmed
the petitioner's conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
 People v. Endaya, G.R. No. 205741, July 23, 2014

FACTS: 
On 11 November 2002, police operatives of Mataas na kahoy Police Station, acting on a report
from a barangay official that appellant is involved in illegal drug activities, conducted
surveillance operations on appellant. A week of surveillance confirmed the veracity of the report.
The police operatives and the civilian asset proceeded to the place of operation: the Golden
Luck Beer Garden located at Barangay2-A, Mataasnakahoy, Batangas. At a distance of about
ten (10) to fifteen (15) meters from the beer house, the civilian asset alighted from the vehicle
and proceeded on foot to the establishment where appellant was a regular customer. In the
meantime, the buy-bust team positioned themselves at a place outside the restaurant not far
from where the civilian asset was. Appellant subsequently arrived and approached the civilian
asset, who was standing in front of the beer house. The two talked for a while, after which, the
police operatives saw the civilian asset hand the marked money to appellant who, in turn,
handed something to the former which later turned out to be a plastic sachet containing shabu.
After receiving the plastic sachet from appellant, the civilian asset made the pre-arranged signal
of touching his head to signify that the transaction had been completed. The police officers then
immediately approached appellant Appellant was forthwith brought to the Mataasnakahoy
Police Station where police officers again searched his body to look for an identification card.
This body search yielded another eight plastic sachets of shabu, found in his wallet by PO2
Chavez aside from the other sachets confiscated during the buy-bust operation.
The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt which was affirmed by the CA.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON there was a lawful arrest and the sachets of shabu confiscated were admissible as
evidence.
Ruling:  
YES. The sachets of shabu are not fruits of poisonous tree; hence, admissible in evidence
against appellant.
Appellant continued to crave for acquittal claiming that, assuming without conceding that he had
in fact sold and possessed the plastic sachets of shabu, they cannot be admitted in evidence for
being fruits of a poisonous tree, having been obtained after an unlawful arrest and search.
Appellant's insistence on the illegality of his warrantless. arrest lacks merit. Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Court allows a warrantless arrest under any of the following circumstances:
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In this case, the arrest of appellant was effected under paragraph (a) or what is termed "in
flagrante delicto." For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicate under
paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted Rule, two requisites
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Here, SPO4 Benedicto, SPO2 Babadilla, and PO2 Chavez personally witnessed the exchange
between appellant and the poseur-buyer of the marked money and the plastic sachet containing
a white crystalline substance which subsequently tested positive for shabu.At the time he was
arrested, therefore, appellant was clearly committing a crime in full view of the buy-bust team.
As held by the CA:
Because (appellant] had been caught in flagrante delicto by the apprehending police officers,
they, as the arresting officers were duty bound to apprehend the culprit immediately and to
search him for anything that may be used as proof of the commission of the crime. The search,
being an incident of a lawful arrest, needed no warrant for its validity.
 People vs. Chi Chan Liu

FACTS:
Police Officers Lazaro Paglicawan and Isagani Yuzon received a radio message from the
BarangayCaptain of Ambil Island that a suspicious looking boat was seen somewhere within the
vicinity of saidisland. Immediately the police officers headed towards the specified location
wherein they spotted 2boats anchored side by side transferring transparent plastic bags
containing a white, crystallinesubstance later positively identified as 46.6 kilograms of shabu.
The appellants were apprehended andtried to bribe the arresting officers. After investigation,
appellants and the drugs were later turned overto the proper authorities. Due to the language
barrier, an interpreter was given them to inform andexplain their rights under Philippine laws
inclusive of the right to remain silent, the right to counsel, aswell as the right to be informed of
the charges against them, and the consequences thereof .Appellantspleaded not guilty. The trial
court found appellants guilty. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto theDecision of the RTC.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the appellants are guilty of the crime of importation or possession of
regulated drugs.
2. Whether or not there was a violation of their constitutional rights to unreasonable search
and seizure.
3. Whether or not the corpus delicti of the crime charged has been established beyond
reasonable doubt.
4. Whether or not the appellants’ detention was legal.
5. Whether or not the arraignment of appellants’ is valid despite the language barrier.
6. Whether or not appellants’ guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:
1. The appellants are guilty of the crime of possession of regulated drugs. The mere fact
that the appellants were Chinese nationals as well as their penchant for making
reference to China where they could obtain money to bribe the apprehending officers
does not necessarily mean that the confiscated drugs necessarily came from China. The
intelligence report does not sufficiently prove the allegation that appellants were, in fact,
importing illegal drugs in the country from an external source. Appellants’ exoneration
from illegal importation of regulated drugs does not, however, free them from all criminal
liability for their possession of the same is clearly evident. The evidence on record
clearly established that appellants were in possession of the bags containing the
regulated drugs without the requisite authority.
2. NO. There was no violation of their constitutional rights against unreasonable searches
and seizures. In this case, appellants were actually committing a crime and were caught
by the apprehending officers in flagrante delicto. Records reveal that on the date of their
arrest, the apprehending officers, while acting upon a report from the Barangay Captain,
spotted appellants transferring cargo from one boat to another. The police officers found
them with the illegal drugs plainly exposed to the view of the officers. These
circumstances are judicially recognized exceptions to the requirement of obtaining a
search warrant.
3. YES. From the time of appellants’ arrest, the seized bags of regulated drugs were
properly marked and photographed. Proper inventory was also conducted in the
presence of the appellants and Mayor Telebrico, who signed a receipt evidencing that
the confiscated drugs were turned over to the PNP Regional Headquarters. There, the
evidence was sent to theRegional Crime Laboratory Service Office for an examination
which yielded positive results.Evidently, an unbroken chain of custody of the confiscated
drugs was established by the prosecution.
4. YES. This Court is mindful of the difficult circumstances faced by the police officers in
this case,such as the language barrier, the unresponsiveness of the appellants, the fact
that one of the days fell on a Sunday, as well as the disparity in the distances between
the different offices. Buteven assuming that the police officers intentionally delayed the
filing of the Information,appellants should have taken steps to report or file charges
against the officers. Unfortunately,they cannot now rely on administrative short comings
of police officers to get a judgment of acquittal for these do not diminish the fact that
illegal drugs were found in appellants’ Possession.
5. YES. The trial court gave appellants time to secure the services of counsel of their
choice. Theappellants had ample opportunity to secure the services of a counsel of their
own choice. Theycannot now assign error in the proceedings conducted by the trial court
for the fact remains that they were appointed with counsel in full compliance with the
law. In much the same way,appellants had every opportunity to secure the services of a
Chinese interpreter with such competence at par with their standards. The trial court
gave appellants the authorization to seek, through their counsel, the Chinese Embassy’s
assistance for purposes of procuring a Chinese interpreter. Appellants were even given
time, through several postponements, to properly secure the services of one.
6. YES. This Court accords the highest degree of respect to the findings of the lower court
as to appellants’ guilt of the offense charged against them, especially when such
findings are adequately supported by documentary as well as testimonial evidence. It is
clear, therefore, that based on the findings of the courts below, appellants were, in fact,
in possession of regulated drugs without the requisite authority