G.R. Nos.

154470-71               September 24, 2012

BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner,
vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK and BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. Nos. 154589-90

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent.

FACTS

the PDB filed with the RTC two separate petitions for Mandamus, Prohibition and Injunction
29 

with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, docketed as Civil
Case No. 94-3233 (covering the first set of CB bills) and Civil Case 94-3254 (covering the second
set of CB bills) against Nuqui, the BSP and the RCBC. 30

The PDB essentially claims that in both the April 15 transaction (involving the first set of CB bills)
and the April 19 transaction (involving the second set of CB bills), there was no intent on its part to
transfer title of the CB bills, as shown by its non-issuance of a detached assignment in favor of the
BOC and Bancap, respectively. The PDB particularly alleges that it merely "warehoused" the first
31 

set of CB bills with the BOC, as security collateral.

On December 28, 1994, the RTC temporarily enjoined Nuqui and the BSP from paying the face
value of the CB bills on maturity. On January 10, 1995, the PDB filed an Amended Petition,
32 

additionally impleading the BOC and All Asia. In a January 13, 1995 Order, the cases were
33 

consolidated. On January 17, 1995, the RTC granted the PDB’s application for a writ of
34 

preliminary prohibitory injunction. 35 

After the petitions were filed, the BOC acquired/reacquired all the nine CB bills – the first and second
sets of CB bills (collectively, subject CB bills).

Defenses of the BSP and of the BOC 37

Alternatively, the BSP asked that an interpleader suit be allowed between and among the
claimants to the subject CB bills on the position that while it is able and willing to pay the
subject CB bills’ face value, it is duty bound to ensure that payment is made to the rightful
owner. The BSP prayed that judgment be rendered:

a. Ordering the dismissal of the PDB’s petition for lack of merit;

b. Determining which between/among [PDB] and the other claimants is/are lawfully entitled
to the ownership of the subject CB bills and the proceeds thereof;

c. x x x;

Subsequent events
The PDB agreed with the BSP’s alternative response for an interpleader –

4. PDB agrees that the various claimants should now interplead and substantiate their respective
claims on the subject CB bills. However, the total face value of the subject CB bills should be
deposited in escrow with a private bank to be disposed of only upon order of the RTC. 42

The BOC and the PDB filed a Joint Motion, submitting these Escrow Agreements for court approval.
47 

The RTC gave its approval to the parties’ Joint Motion. Accordingly, the BSP released the maturity
48 

proceeds of the CB bills by crediting the Demand Deposit Account of the PDB and of the BOC with
50% each of the maturity proceeds of the amount in escrow. 49

On September 28, 2000, the RTC granted the BSP’s motion to interplead and, accordingly,
required the BOC to amend its Answer and for the conflicting claimants to comment thereon. In 57 

October 2000, the BOC filed its Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,
reiterating its earlier arguments asserting ownership over the subject CB bills. 58

In a January 10, 2002 Order, the RTC dismissed the PDB’s petition, the BOC’s counterclaim
and the BSP’s counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader, holding that under CB Circular
No. 28, it has no jurisdiction (i) over the BOC’s "counterclaims" and (ii) to resolve the issue of
ownership of the CB bills. With the denial of their separate motions for Reconsideration, the BOC
64  65 

and the BSP separately filed the present petitions for review on certiorari.66

THE BOC’S and THE BSP’S PETITIONS

The BOC argues that the present cases do not fall within the limited provision of Section 10
(d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28, which contemplates only of three situations:

first, where the fraudulent assignment is not coupled with a notice to the BSP, it can grant no relief;
second, where the fraudulent assignment is coupled with a notice of fraud to the BSP, it will make a
notation against the assignment and require the owner and the holder to substantiate their claims;
and third, where the case does not fall on either of the first two situations, the BSP will have to await
action on the assignment pending settlement of the case, whether by agreement or by court order.

The PDB’s case cannot fall under the first two situations. With particular regard to the second
situation, CB Circular No. 28 requires that the conflict must be between an "owner" and a "holder,"
for the BSP to exercise its limited jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims; and the word "owner" here
refers to the registered owner giving notice of the fraud to the BSP. The PDB, however, is not the
registered owner nor is it in possession (holder) of the CB bills. Consequently, the PDB’s case can
67 

only falls under the third situation which leaves the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, with the
authority to resolve the issue of ownership of a registered bond (the CB bills) not falling in either of
the first two situations.

The BOC asserts that the policy consideration supportive of its interpretation of CB Circular No. 28 is
to have a reliable system to protect the registered owner; should he file a notice with the BSP about
a fraudulent assignment of certain CB bills, the BSP simply has to look at its books to determine who
is the owner of the CB bills fraudulently assigned. Since it is only the registered owner who complied
with the BSP’s requirement of recording an assignment in the BSP’s books, then "the protective
mantle of administrative proceedings" should necessarily benefit him only, without extending the
same benefit to those who chose to ignore the Circular’s requirement, like the PDB. 68
Assuming arguendo that the PDB’s case falls under the second situation – i.e., the BSP has
jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership of the CB bills – the more recent CB Circular No. 769-
80 (Rules and Regulations Governing Central Bank Certificates of Indebtedness) already
superseded CB Circular No. 28, and, in particular, effectively amended Section 10 (d) 4 of CB
Circular No. 28. The pertinent provisions of CB Circular No. 769-80 read:

Assignment Affected by Fraud. – Any assignment for transfer of ownership of registered certificate
obtained through fraudulent representation if honored by the Central Bank or any of its authorized
service agencies shall not make the Central Bank or agency liable therefore unless it has previous
formal notice of the fraud. The Central Bank, upon notice under oath that the assignment was
secured through fraudulent means, shall immediately issue and circularize a "stop order" against the
transfer, exchange, redemption of the Certificate including the payment of interest coupons. The
Central Bank or service agency concerned shall continue to withhold action on the certificate until
such time that the conflicting claims have been finally settled either by amicable settlement between
the parties or by order of the Court.

Unlike CB Circular No. 28, CB Circular No. 769-80 limited the BSP’s authority to the mere issuance
and circularization of a "stop order" against the transfer, exchange and redemption upon sworn
notice of a fraudulent assignment. Under this Circular, the BSP shall only continue to withhold action
until the dispute is ended by an amicable settlement or by judicial determination. Given the more
passive stance of the BSP – the very agency tasked to enforce the circulars involved - under CB
Circular No. 769-80, the RTC’s dismissal of the BOC’s counterclaims is palpably erroneous.

Lastly, since Nuqui’s office (Government Securities Department) had already been abolished, it can69 

no longer adjudicate the dispute under the second situation covered by CB Circular No. 28. The
abolition of Nuqui’s office is not only consistent with the BSP’s Charter but, more importantly, with
CB Circular No. 769-80, which removed the BSP’s adjudicative authority over fraudulent
assignments.

THE PDB’S COMMENT

The PDB claims that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint/petition and not by
the defenses set up in the answer. In filing the petition with the RTC, the PDB merely seeks to
70 

compel the BSP to determine, pursuant to CB Circular No. 28, the party legally entitled to the
proceeds of the subject CB bills, which, as the PDB alleged, have been transferred through
fraudulent representations – an allegation which properly recognized the BSP’s jurisdiction to
resolve conflicting claims of ownership over the CB bills.

The PDB adds that under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts should refrain from determining
a controversy involving a question whose resolution demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion. In the present case, the BSP’s special knowledge and experience in resolving disputes
on securities, whose assignment and trading are governed by the BSP’s rules, should be upheld.

The PDB counters that the BOC’s tri-fold interpretation of Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28
sanctions split jurisdiction which is not favored;but even this tri-fold interpretation which, in the
second situation, limits the meaning of the "owner" to the registered owner is flawed. Section 10 (d)
4 aims to protect not just the registered owner but anyone who has been deprived of his bond by
fraudulent representation in order to deter fraud in the secondary trading of government securities.

The PDB asserts that the existence of CB Circular No. 769-80 or the abolition of Nuqui’s office does
not result in depriving the BSP of its jurisdiction: first, CB Circular No. 769-80 expressly provides that
CB Circular No. 28 shall have suppletory application to CB Circular No. 769-80; and second, the
BSP can always designate an office to resolve the PDB’s claim over the CB bills.

Lastly, the PDB argues that even assuming that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of
ownership of the CB bills, the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over the BOC’s so-called
"compulsory" counterclaims (which in truth is merely "permissive") because of the BOC’s failure to
pay the appropriate docket fees. These counterclaims should, therefore, be dismissed and
expunged from the record.

THE COURT’S RULING

We grant the petitions.

At the outset, we note that the parties have not raised the validity of either CB Circular No. 28 or CB
Circular No. 769-80 as an issue. What the parties largely contest is the applicable circular in case of
an allegedly fraudulently assigned CB bill. The applicable circular, in turn, is determinative of the
proper remedy available to the PDB and/or the BOC as claimants to the proceeds of the subject CB
bills.

Indisputably, at the time the PDB supposedly invoked the jurisdiction of the BSP in 1994 (by
requesting for the annotation of its claim over the subject CB bills in the BSP’s books), CB Circular
No. 769-80 has long been in effect. Therefore, the parties’ respective interpretations of the provision
of Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 do not have any significance unless it is first established
that that Circular governs the resolution of their conflicting claims of ownership. This conclusion is
important, given the supposed repeal or modification of Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 by the
following provisions of CB Circular No. 769-80:

ARTICLE XI
SUPPLEMENTAL RULES

Section 1. Central Bank Circular No. 28 – The provisions of Central Bank Circular No. 28 shall have
suppletory application to matters not specially covered by these Rules.

ARTICLE XII
EFFECTIVITY

Effectivity – The rules and regulations herein prescribed shall take effect upon approval by the
Monetary Board, Central Bank of the Philippines, and all circulars, memoranda, or office orders
inconsistent herewith are revoked or modified accordingly. (Emphases added)

We agree with the PDB that in view of CB Circular No. 28’s suppletory application, an attempt to
harmonize the apparently conflicting provisions is a prerequisite before one may possibly conclude
that an amendment or a repeal exists. Interestingly, however, even the PDB itself failed to submit an
71 

interpretation based on its own position of harmonization.

The repealing clause of CB Circular No. 769-80 obviously did not expressly repeal CB Circular No.
28; in fact, it even provided for the suppletory application of CB Circular No. 28 on "matters not
specially covered by" CB Circular No. 769-80. While no express repeal exists, the intent of CB
Circular No. 769-80 to operate as an implied repeal, or at least to amend earlier CB circulars, is
72 

supported by its text "revoking" or "modif[ying" "all circulars" which are inconsistent with its terms.
At the outset, we stress that none of the parties disputes that the subject CB bills fall within the
category of a certificate or evidence of indebtedness and that these were issued by the Central
Bank, now the BSP. Thus, even without resorting to statutory construction aids, matters involving the
subject CB bills should necessarily be governed by CB Circular No. 769-80. Even granting, however,
that reliance on CB Circular No. 769-80 alone is not enough, we find that CB Circular No. 769-80
impliedly repeals CB Circular No. 28.

An implied repeal transpires when a substantial conflict exists between the new and the prior laws.
In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law
unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and the old
laws. Repeal by implication is not favored, unless manifestly intended by the legislature, or unless it
73 

is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated, that the laws or orders are clearly repugnant and
patently inconsistent with one another so that they cannot co-exist; the legislature is presumed to
know the existing law and would express a repeal if one is intended. 74

There are two instances of implied repeal. One takes place when the provisions in the two acts on
the same subject matter are irreconcilably contradictory, in which case, the later act, to the extent of
the conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The other occurs when the later act
covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute; thus, it will operate
to repeal the earlier law.75

A general reading of the two circulars shows that the second instance of implied repeal is present in
this case. CB Circular No. 28, entitled "Regulations Governing Open Market Operations,
Stabilization of Securities Market, Issue, Servicing and Redemption of Public Debt," is a regulation
governing the servicing and redemption of public debt, including the issue, inscription, registration,
transfer, payment and replacement of bonds and securities representing the public debt. On the
76 

other hand, CB Circular No. 769-80, entitled "Rules and Regulations Governing Central Bank
Certificate of Indebtedness," is the governing regulation on matters (i) involving certificate of
77 

indebtedness issued by the Central Bank itself and (ii) which are similarly covered by CB Circular
78 

No. 28.

The CB Monetary Board issued CB Circular No. 28 to regulate the servicing and redemption of
public debt, pursuant to Section 124 (now Section 119 of Republic Act R.A. No. 7653) of the old
Central Bank law which provides that "the servicing and redemption of the public debt shall also be
79 

effected through the Bangko Sentral." However, even as R.A. No. 7653 continued to recognize this
role by the BSP, the law required a phase-out of all fiscal agency functions by the BSP, including
Section 119 of R.A. No. 7653.

In other words, even if CB Circular No. 28 applies broadly to both government-issued bonds and
securities and Central Bank-issued evidence of indebtedness, given the present state of law, CB
Circular No. 28 and CB Circular No. 769-80 now operate on the same subject – Central Bank-issued
evidence of indebtedness. Under Section 1, Article XI of CB Circular No. 769-80, the continued
relevance and application of CB Circular No. 28 would depend on the need to supplement any
deficiency or silence in CB Circular No. 769-80 on a particular matter.

In the present case, both CB Circular No. 28 and CB Circular No. 769-80 provide the BSP with a
course of action in case of an allegedly fraudulently assigned certificate of indebtedness. Under CB
Circular No. 28, in case of fraudulent assignments, the BSP would have to "call upon the owner and
the person presenting the bond to substantiate their respective claims" and, from there, determine
who has a better right over the registered bond. On the other hand, under CB Circular No. 769-80,
the BSP shall merely "issue and circularize a ‘stop order’ against the transfer, exchange, redemption
of the [registered] certificate" without any adjudicative function (which is the precise root of the
present controversy). As the two circulars stand, the patent irreconcilability of these two provisions
does not require elaboration. Section 5, Article V of CB Circular No. 769-80 inescapably repealed
Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28.

The issue of BSP’s jurisdiction, lay hidden

On that note, the Court could have written finis to the present controversy by simply sustaining the
BSP’s hands-off approach to the PDB’s problem under CB Circular No. 769-80. However, the
jurisdictional provision of CB Circular No. 769-80 itself, in relation to CB Circular No. 28, on the
matter of fraudulent assignment, has given rise to a question of jurisdiction - the core question of law
involved in these petitions - which the Court cannot just treat sub-silencio.

Broadly speaking, jurisdiction is the legal power or authority to hear and determine a cause. In the 80 

exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power, it refers to the authority of a court to hear and decide a
case. In the context of these petitions, we hark back to the basic principles governing the question
81 

of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

First, jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined only by the Constitution and by law. As a 82 

matter of substantive law, procedural rules alone can confer no jurisdiction to courts or
administrative agencies. In fact, an administrative agency, acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, is a
83 

tribunal of limited jurisdiction and, as such, could wield only such powers that are specifically granted
to it by the enabling statutes. In contrast, an RTC is a court of general jurisdiction, i.e., it has
jurisdiction over cases whose subject matter does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.84

Second, jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined not by the pleas set up by the defendant in
his answer but by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
85  86 

favorable judgment on the basis of his assertions. The reason is that the complaint is supposed to
87 

contain a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. 88

Third, jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time of the filing of the complaint. 89

Parenthetically, the Court observes that none of the parties ever raised the issue of whether the BSP
can simply disown its jurisdiction, assuming it has, by the simple expedient of promulgating a new
circular (specially applicable to a certificate of indebtedness issued by the BSP itself), inconsistent
with an old circular, assertive of its limited jurisdiction over ownership issues arising from fraudulent
assignments of a certificate of indebtedness. The PDB, in particular, relied solely and heavily on CB
Circular No. 28.

In light of the above principles pointing to jurisdiction as a matter of substantive law, the provisions of
the law itself that gave CB Circular 769-80 its life and jurisdiction must be examined.

The Philippine Central Bank

On January 3, 1949, Congress created the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank) as a
corporate body with the primary objective of (i) maintaining the internal and external monetary
stability in the Philippines; and (ii) preserving the international value and the convertibility of the
peso. In line with these broad objectives, the Central Bank was empowered to issue rules and
90 

regulations "necessary for the effective discharge of the responsibilities and exercise of the powers
assigned to the Monetary Board and to the Central Bank." Specifically, the Central Bank is
91 

authorized to organize (other) departments for the efficient conduct of its business and whose
powers and duties "shall be determined by the Monetary Board, within the authority granted to the
Board and the Central Bank" under its original charter.
92 

With the 1973 Constitution, the then Central Bank was constitutionally made as the country’s central
monetary authority until such time that Congress shall have established a central bank. The 1987
93 

Constitution continued to recognize this function of the then Central Bank until Congress, pursuant to
the Constitution, created a new central monetary authority which later came to be known as the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

Under the New Central Bank Act (R.A. No. 7653), the BSP is given the responsibility of providing
94 

policy directions in the areas of money, banking and credit; it is given, too, the primary objective of
maintaining price stability, conducive to a balanced and sustainable growth of the economy, and of
promoting and maintaining monetary stability and convertibility of the peso. 95

The Constitution expressly grants the BSP, as the country’s central monetary authority, the power of
supervision over the operation of banks, while leaving with Congress the authority to define the
BSP’s regulatory powers over the operations of finance companies and other institutions performing
similar functions. Under R.A. No. 7653, the BSP’s powers and functions include (i) supervision over
the operation of banks; (ii) regulation of operations of finance companies and non-bank financial
institutions performing quasi banking functions; (iii) sole power and authority to issue currency within
the Philippine territory; (iv) engaging in foreign exchange transactions; (v) making rediscounts,
discounts, loans and advances to banking and other financial institutions to influence the volume of
credit consistent with the objective of achieving price stability; (vi) engaging in open market
operations; and (vii) acting as banker and financial advisor of the government. 1âwphi1

On the BSP’s power of supervision over the operation of banks, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8791 (The
General Banking Law of 2000) elaborates as follows:

CHAPTER II
AUTHORITY OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL

SECTION 4. Supervisory Powers. — The operations and activities of banks shall be subject to
supervision of the Bangko Sentral. "Supervision" shall include the following:

4.1. The issuance of rules of conduct or the establishment of standards of operation for
uniform application to all institutions or functions covered, taking into consideration the
distinctive character of the operations of institutions and the substantive similarities of
specific functions to which such rules, modes or standards are to be applied;

4.2. The conduct of examination to determine compliance with laws and regulations if the
circumstances so warrant as determined by the Monetary Board;

4.3. Overseeing to ascertain that laws and regulations are complied with;

4.4. Regular investigation which shall not be oftener than once a year from the last date of
examination to determine whether an institution is conducting its business on a safe or
sound basis: Provided, That the deficiencies/irregularities found by or discovered by an audit
shall be immediately addressed;

4.5. Inquiring into the solvency and liquidity of the institution (2-D); or
 4.6. Enforcing prompt corrective action. (n)

The Bangko Sentral shall also have supervision over the operations of and exercise regulatory
powers over quasi-banks, trust entities and other financial institutions which under special laws are
subject to Bangko Sentral supervision. (2-Ca)

For the purposes of this Act, "quasi-banks" shall refer to entities engaged in the borrowing of funds
through the issuance, endorsement or assignment with recourse or acceptance of deposit
substitutes as defined in Section 95 of Republic Act No. 7653 (hereafter the "New Central Bank Act")
for purposes of relending or purchasing of receivables and other obligations. [emphasis ours]

While this provision empowers the BSP to oversee the operations and activities of banks to
"ascertain that laws and regulations are complied with," the existence of the BSP’s jurisdiction in the
present dispute cannot rely on this provision. The fact remains that the BSP already made known to
the PDB its unfavorable position on the latter’s claim of fraudulent assignment due to the latter’s own
failure to comply with existing regulations:
96 

In this connection, Section 10 (b) 2 also requires that a "Detached assignment will be recognized or
accepted only upon previous notice to the Central Bank x x x." In fact, in a memo dated September
23, 1991 xxx then CB Governor Jose L. Cuisia advised all banks (including PDB) xxx as follows:

In view recurring incidents ostensibly disregarding certain provisions of CB circular No. 28 (as
amended) covering assignments of registered bonds, all banks and all concerned are enjoined to
observe strictly the pertinent provisions of said CB Circular as hereunder quoted:

xxxx

Under Section 10.b. (2)

x x x Detached assignment will be recognized or accepted only upon previous notice to the Central
Bank and its use is authorized only under the following circumstances:

(a) x x x

(b) x x x

(c) assignments of treasury notes and certificates of indebtedness in registered form which
are not provided at the back thereof with assignment form.

(d) Assignment of securities which have changed ownership several times.

(e) x x x

Non-compliance herewith will constitute a basis for non-action or withholding of action on

redemption/payment of interest coupons/transfer transactions or denominational exchange that may
be directly affected thereby. [Boldfacing supplied]

Again, the books of the BSP do not show that the supposed assignment of subject CB Bills was ever
recorded in the BSP’s books. [Boldfacing supplied]
However, the PDB faults the BSP for not recording the assignment of the CB bills in the PDB’s favor
despite the fact that the PDB already requested the BSP to record its assignment in the BSP’s books
as early as June 30, 1994. 97

The PDB’s claim is not accurate. What the PDB requested the BSP on that date was not the
recording of the assignment of the CB bills in its favor but the annotation of its claim over the CB bills
at the time when (i) it was no longer in possession of the CB bills, having been transferred from one
entity to another and (ii) all it has are the detached assignments, which the PDB has not shown to be
compliant with Section 10 (b) 2 above-quoted. Obviously, the PDB cannot insist that the BSP take
cognizance of its plaint when the basis of the BSP’s refusal under existing regulation, which the PDB
is bound to observe, is the PDB’s own failure to comply therewith.

True, the BSP exercises supervisory powers (and regulatory powers) over banks (and quasi banks).
The issue presented before the Court, however, does not concern the BSP’s supervisory power over
banks as this power is understood under the General Banking Law. In fact, there is nothing in the
PDB’s petition (even including the letters it sent to the BSP) that would support the BSP’s jurisdiction
outside of CB Circular No. 28, under its power of supervision, over conflicting claims to the proceeds
of the CB bills.

BSP has quasi-judicial powers over a

class of cases which does not include
the adjudication of ownership of the
CB bills in question

In United Coconut Planters Bank v. E. Ganzon, Inc., the Court considered the BSP as an
98 

administrative agency, exercising quasi-judicial functions through its Monetary Board. It held:
99 

A quasi-judicial agency or body is an organ of government other than a court and other than a
legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. The
very definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The
ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the
need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge
and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts. A "quasi-
judicial function" is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers
or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature.

Undoubtedly, the BSP Monetary Board is a quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial powers or
functions. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, the BSP Monetary Board is an independent
central monetary authority and a body corporate with fiscal and administrative autonomy, mandated
to provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking and credit. It has power to issue
subpoena, to sue for contempt those refusing to obey the subpoena without justifiable reason, to
administer oaths and compel presentation of books, records and others, needed in its examination,
to impose fines and other sanctions and to issue cease and desist order. Section 37 of Republic Act
No. 7653, in particular, explicitly provides that the BSP Monetary Board shall exercise its discretion
in determining whether administrative sanctions should be imposed on banks and quasi-banks,
which necessarily implies that the BSP Monetary Board must conduct some form of investigation or
hearing regarding the same. [citations omitted]

The BSP is not simply a corporate entity but qualifies as an administrative agency created, pursuant
to constitutional mandate, to carry out a particular governmental function. To be able to perform its
100  101 
role as central monetary authority, the Constitution granted it fiscal and administrative autonomy. In
general, administrative agencies exercise powers and/or functions which may be characterized as
administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of these five, as
may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. 102

While the very nature of an administrative agency and the raison d'être for its creation and103 

proliferation dictate a grant of quasi-judicial power to it, the matters over which it may exercise this
power must find sufficient anchorage on its enabling law, either by express provision or by
necessary implication. Once found, the quasi-judicial power partakes of the nature of a limited and
special jurisdiction, that is, to hear and determine a class of cases within its peculiar competence
and expertise. In other words, the provisions of the enabling statute are the yardsticks by which the
Court would measure the quantum of quasi-judicial powers an administrative agency may exercise,
as defined in the enabling act of such agency. 104

Scattered provisions in R.A. No. 7653 and R.A. No. 8791, inter alia, exist, conferring jurisdiction on
the BSP on certain matters. For instance, under the situations contemplated under Section 36, par.
105 

2 (where a bank or quasi bank persists in carrying on its business in an unlawful or unsafe manner)
106 

and Section 37 (where the bank or its officers willfully violate the bank’s charter or by-laws, or the
107 

rules and regulations issued by the Monetary Board) of R.A. No. 7653, the BSP may place an entity
under receivership and/or liquidation or impose administrative sanctions upon the entity or its officers
or directors.

Among its several functions under R.A. No. 7653, the BSP is authorized to engage in open market
operations and thereby "issue, place, buy and sell freely negotiable evidences of indebtedness of the
Bangko Sentral" in the following manner.

SEC. 90. Principles of Open Market Operations. – The open market purchases and sales of
securities by the Bangko Sentral shall be made exclusively in accordance with its primary objective
of achieving price stability.

xxxx

SEC. 92. Issue and Negotiation of Bangko Sentral Obligations. – In order to provide the Bangko
Sentral with effective instruments for open market operations, the Bangko Sentral may, subject to
such rules and regulations as the Monetary Board may prescribe and in accordance with the
principles stated in Section 90 of this Act, issue, place, buy and sell freely negotiable evidences of
indebtedness of the Bangko Sentral: Provided, That issuance of such certificates of indebtedness
shall be made only in cases of extraordinary movement in price levels. Said evidences of
indebtedness may be issued directly against the international reserve of the Bangko Sentral or
against the securities which it has acquired under the provisions of Section 91 of this Act, or may be
issued without relation to specific types of assets of the Bangko Sentral.

The Monetary Board shall determine the interest rates, maturities and other characteristics of said
obligations of the Bangko Sentral, and may, if it deems it advisable, denominate the obligations in
gold or foreign currencies.

Subject to the principles stated in Section 90 of this Act, the evidences of indebtedness of the
Bangko Sentral to which this section refers may be acquired by the Bangko Sentral before their
maturity, either through purchases in the open market or through redemptions at par and by lot if the
Bangko Sentral has reserved the right to make such redemptions. The evidences of indebtedness
acquired or redeemed by the Bangko Sentral shall not be included among its assets, and shall be
immediately retired and cancelled. (italics supplied; emphases ours)
108 
The primary objective of the BSP is to maintain price stability. The BSP has a number of monetary
109 

policy instruments at its disposal to promote price stability. To increase or reduce liquidity in the
financial system, the BSP uses open market operations, among others. Open market operation is a
110 

monetary tool where the BSP publicly buys or sells government securities from (or to) banks and
111 

financial institutions in order to expand or contract the supply of money. By controlling the money
supply, the BSP is able to exert some influence on the prices of goods and services and achieve its
inflation objectives.
112

Once the issue and/or sale of a security is made, the BSP would necessarily make a determination,
in accordance with its own rules, of the entity entitled to receive the proceeds of the security upon its
maturity. This determination by the BSP is an exercise of its administrative powers under the law as
113 

an incident to its power to prescribe rules and regulations governing open market operations to
achieve the "primary objective of achieving price stability." As a matter of necessity, too, the same
114 

rules and regulations facilitate transaction with the BSP by providing for an orderly manner of,
among others, issuing, transferring, exchanging and paying securities representing public debt.

Significantly, when competing claims of ownership over the proceeds of the securities it has issued
are brought before it, the law has not given the BSP the quasi-judicial power to resolve these
competing claims as part of its power to engage in open market operations. Nothing in the BSP’s
charter confers on the BSP the jurisdiction or authority to determine this kind of claims, arising out of
a subsequent transfer or assignment of evidence of indebtedness – a matter that appropriately falls
within the competence of courts of general jurisdiction. That the statute withholds this power from the
BSP is only consistent with the fundamental reasons for the creation of a Philippine central bank,
that is, to lay down stable monetary policy and exercise bank supervisory functions. Thus, the BSP’s
assumption of jurisdiction over competing claims cannot find even a stretched-out justification under
its corporate powers "to do and perform any and all things that may be necessary or proper to carry
out the purposes" of R.A. No. 7653.  115

To reiterate, open market operation is a monetary policy instrument that the BSP employs, among
others, to regulate the supply of money in the economy to influence the timing, cost and availability
of money and credit, as well as other financial factors, for the purpose of stabilizing the price
level. What the law grants the BSP is a continuing role to shape and carry out the country’s
116 

monetary policy – not the authority to adjudicate competing claims of ownership over the securities it
has issued – since this authority would not fall under the BSP’s purposes under its charter.

While R.A. No. 7653 empowers the BSP to conduct administrative hearings and render judgment
117 

for or against an entity under its supervisory and regulatory powers and even authorizes the BSP
Governor to "render decisions, or rulings x x x on matters regarding application or enforcement of
laws pertaining to institutions supervised by the BSP and laws pertaining to quasi-banks, as well as
regulations, policies or instructions issued by the Monetary Board," it is precisely the text of the
BSP’s own regulation (whose validity is not here raised as an issue) that points to the BSP’s limited
role in case of an allegedly fraudulent assignment to simply (i) issuing and circularizing a ‘"stop
order" against the transfer, exchange, redemption of the certificate of indebtedness, including the
payment of interest coupons, and (ii) withholding action on the certificate.

A similar conclusion can be drawn from the BSP’s administrative adjudicatory power in cases of
"willful failure or refusal to comply with, or violation of, any banking law or any order, instruction or
regulation issued by the Monetary Board, or any order, instruction or ruling by the Governor." The118 

non-compliance with the pertinent requirements under CB Circular No. 28, as amended, deprives a
party from any right to demand payment from the BSP.
In other words, the grant of quasi-judicial authority to the BSP cannot possibly extend to situations
which do not call for the exercise by the BSP of its supervisory or regulatory functions over entities
within its jurisdiction.
119

The fact alone that the parties involved are banking institutions does not necessarily call for the
exercise by the BSP of its quasi-judicial powers under the law. 120

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction

argues against BSP’s purported
authority to adjudicate ownership
issues over the disputed CB bills

Given the preceding discussions, even the PDB’s invocation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
misplaced.

In the exercise of its plenary legislative power, Congress may create administrative agencies
endowed with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. Necessarily, Congress likewise defines the
limits of an agency’s jurisdiction in the same manner as it defines the jurisdiction of courts. As a
121 

result, it may happen that either a court or an administrative agency has exclusive jurisdiction over a
specific matter or both have concurrent jurisdiction on the same. It may happen, too, that courts and
agencies may willingly relinquish adjudicatory power that is rightfully theirs in favor of the other. One
of the instances when a court may properly defer to the adjudicatory authority of an agency is the
applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
122

As early as 1954, the Court applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction under the following terms:

6. In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction in administrative
commissions and boards the power to resolve specialized disputes xxx ruled that Congress in
requiring the Industrial Court's intervention in the resolution of labor-management controversies xxx
meant such jurisdiction to be exclusive, although it did not so expressly state in the law. The Court
held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction ... the courts
cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the
purposes of the regulatory statute administered." (emphasis ours)
123 

In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that while an action for rescission
124 

of a contract between coal developers appears to be an action cognizable by regular courts, the trial
court remains to be without jurisdiction to entertain the suit since the contract sought to be rescinded
is "inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether
or not the reversion of the coal operating contract over the subject coal blocks to [the plaintiff] would
be in line with the country’s national program and objective on coal-development and over-all coal-
supply-demand balance." It then applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction –

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in
many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It
may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that
the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because
technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is
within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a
claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the
special competence of an administrative body."

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what
coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating
contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the Bureau of Energy Development
as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The
Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the
exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues
preclude an initial judicial determination. [emphases ours]

The absence of any express or implied statutory power to adjudicate conflicting claims of ownership
or entitlement to the proceeds of its certificates of indebtedness finds complement in the similar
absence of any technical matter that would call for the BSP’s special expertise or competence. In 125 

fact, what the PDB’s petitions bear out is essentially the nature of the transaction it had with the
subsequent transferees of the subject CB bills (BOC and Bancap) and not any matter more
appropriate for special determination by the BSP or any administrative agency.

In a similar vein, it is well-settled that the interpretation given to a rule or regulation by those charged
with its execution is entitled to the greatest weight by the courts construing such rule or
regulation. While there are exceptions to this rule, the PDB has not convinced us that a departure
126  127 

is warranted in this case. Given the non-applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the BSP’s
own position, in light of Circular No. 769-80, deserves respect from the Court.

Ordinarily, cases involving the application of doctrine of primary jurisdiction are initiated by an action
invoking the jurisdiction of a court or administrative agency to resolve the substantive legal conflict
between the parties. In this sense, the present case is quite unique since the court’s jurisdiction was,
originally, invoked to compel an administrative agency (the BSP) to resolve the legal conflict of
ownership over the CB bills - instead of obtaining a judicial determination of the same dispute.

Issue: Whether the dismissal of RTC is proper on the ground of lack of jurisdiction(NO)

THE REMEDY OF INTERPLEADER

Based on the unique factual premise of the present case, the RTC acted correctly in initially
assuming jurisdiction over the PDB’s petition for mandamus, prohibition and injunction. While the
128 

RTC agreed (albeit erroneously) with the PDB’s view (that the BSP has jurisdiction), it, however,
dismissed not only the BOC’s/the BSP’s counterclaims but the PDB’s petition itself as well, on the
ground that it lacks jurisdiction.

This is plain error.

Not only the parties themselves, but more so the courts, are bound by the rule on non-waiver of
jurisdiction. believes that jurisdiction over the BOC’s counterclaims and the BSP’s
129 

counterclaim/crossclaim for interpleader calls for the application of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, the allowance of the PDB’s petition even becomes imperative because courts may raise
the issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte. 130
Of the three possible options available to the RTC, the adoption of either of these two would lead the
trial court into serious legal error: first, if it granted the PDB’s petition, its decision would have to be
set aside on appeal because the BSP has no jurisdiction as previously discussed; and second when
it dismissed the PDB’s petitions and the BOC’s counterclaims on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction,
the trial court seriously erred because precisely, the resolution of the conflicting claims over the CB
bills falls within its general jurisdiction.

Without emasculating its jurisdiction, the RTC could have properly dismissed the PDB’s petition but
on the ground that mandamus does not lie against the BSP; but even this correct alternative is no
longer plausible since the BSP, as a respondent below, already properly brought before the RTC the
remaining conflicting claims over the subject CB bills by way of a counterclaim/crossclaim for
interpleader.

Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides when an interpleader is proper:

SECTION 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter
are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an
interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the
conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among
themselves.

The remedy of an action of interpleader is designed to protect a person against double

131 

vexation in respect of a single liability. It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting

7 

claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the stakeholder (the possessor of
the subject matter) who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in
whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants. 132

Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a single proceeding to
determine conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of having to pay more
than once on a single liability.
133

When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, in reality a new action
arises, where the claims of the interpleaders themselves are brought to the fore, the stakeholder as
134 

plaintiff is relegated merely to the role of initiating the suit. In short, the remedy of interpleader,
when proper, merely provides an avenue for the conflicting claims on the same subject
matter to be threshed out in an action. Section 2 of Rule 62 provides:

SEC. 2. Order. – Upon the filing of the complaint, the court shall issue an order requiring the
conflicting claimants to interplead with one another. If the interests of justice so require, the court
may direct in such order that the subject matter be paid or delivered to the court.

This is precisely what the RTC did by granting the BSP’s motion to interplead. The PDB itself
"agreed that the various claimants should now interplead." Thus, the PDB and the BOC
subsequently entered into two separate escrow agreements, covering the CB bills, and submitted
them to the RTC for approval.

In granting the BSP’s motion, the RTC acted on the correct premise that it has jurisdiction to resolve
the parties’ conflicting claims over the CB bills - consistent with the rules and the parties’ conduct -
and accordingly required the BOC to amend its answer and for the PDB to comment thereon.
Suddenly, however, the PDB made an about-face and questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Swayed by the PDB’s argument, the RTC dismissed even the PDB’s petition - which means that it
did not actually compel the BSP to resolve the BOC’s and the PDB’s claims.
Without the motion to interplead and the order granting it, the RTC could only dismiss the PDB’s
petition since it is the RTC which has jurisdiction to resolve the parties’ conflicting claims – not the
BSP. Given that the motion to interplead has been actually filed, the RTC could not have really
granted the relief originally sought in the PDB’s petition since the RTC’s order granting the BSP’s
motion to interplead - to which the PDB in fact acquiesced into - effectively resulted in the dismissal
of the PDB’s petition. This is not altered by the fact that the PDB additionally prayed in its petition for
damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit "against the public respondents" because the grant of the
order to interplead effectively sustained the propriety of the BSP’s resort to this procedural device.

Interpleader

1. as a special civil action

What is quite unique in this case is that the BSP did not initiate the interpleader suit through an
original complaint but through its Answer. This circumstance becomes understandable if it is
considered that insofar as the BSP is concerned, the PDB does not possess any right to have its
claim recorded in the BSP’s books; consequently, the PDB cannot properly be considered even as a
potential claimant to the proceeds of the CB bills upon maturity. Thus, the interpleader was only an
alternative position, made only in the BSP’s Answer. 135

The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil action, is primarily governed by the specific provisions
in Rule 62 of the Rules of Court and secondarily by the provisions applicable to ordinary civil
actions. Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly authorize the filing of a complaint-in-interpleader as
136 

part of, although separate and independent from, the answer. Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in relation
to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court does not include a complaint-in-interpleader as a
137 

claim, a form of defense, or as an objection that a defendant may be allowed to put up in his
138  139 

answer or in a motion to dismiss. This does not mean, however, that the BSP’s
"counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader" runs counter to general procedures.

Apart from a pleading, the rules allow a party to seek an affirmative relief from the court through
140  141 

the procedural device of a motion. While captioned "Answer with counter complaint/cross-claim for
interpleader," the RTC understood this as in the nature of a motion, seeking relief which essentially
142 

consists in an order for the conflicting claimants to litigate with each other so that "payment is made
to the rightful or legitimate owner" of the subject CB bills.
143 

The rules define a "civil action" as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." Interpleader may be considered as a
stakeholder’s remedy to prevent a wrong, that is, from making payment to one not entitled to it,
thereby rendering itself vulnerable to lawsuit/s from those legally entitled to payment.

Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of particular rules to govern the
uniqueness of its application and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, governing
ordinary civil actions, a party’s claim is asserted "in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third
(fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention." In an interpleader suit, however, a claim
is not required to be contained in any of these pleadings but in the answer-(of the conflicting
claimants)-in-interpleader. This claim is different from the counter-claim (or cross-claim, third party-
complaint) which is separately allowed under Section 5, par. 2 of Rule 62.

2. the payment of docket fees covering BOC’s counterclaim

The PDB argues that, even assuming that the RTC has jurisdiction over the issue of ownership of
the CB bills, the BOC’s failure to pay the appropriate docket fees prevents the RTC from acquiring
jurisdiction over the BOC’s "counterclaims."

We disagree with the PDB.

To reiterate and recall, the order granting the "PDB’s motion to interplead," already resulted in the
dismissal of the PDB’s petition. The same order required the BOC to amend its answer and for the
conflicting claimants to comment, presumably to conform to the nature of an answer-in interpleader.
Perhaps, by reason of the BOC’s denomination of its claim as a "compulsory counterclaim" and the
PDB’s failure to fully appreciate the RTC’s order granting the "BSP’s motion for interpleader" (with
the PDB’s conformity), the PDB mistakenly treated the BOC’s claim as a "permissive counterclaim"
which necessitates the payment of docket fees.

As the preceding discussions would show, however, the BOC’s "claim" - i.e., its assertion of
ownership over the CB bills – is in reality just that, a "claim" against the stakeholder and not as a
"counterclaim," whether compulsory or permissive. It is only the BOC’s alternative prayer (for the
144  145 

PDB to deliver to the BOC, as the buyer in the April 15 transaction and the ultimate successor-in-
interest of the buyer in the April 19 transaction, either the original subjects of the sales or the value
thereof plus whatever income that may have been earned pendente lite) and its prayer for damages
that are obviously compulsory counterclaims against the PDB and, therefore, does not require
payment of docket fees. 146

The PDB takes a contrary position through its insistence that a compulsory counterclaim should be
one where the presence of third parties, of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, is not
required. It reasons out that since the RCBC and All Asia (the intervening holders of the CB bills)
have already been dropped from the case, then the BOC’s counterclaim must only be permissive in
nature and the BOC should have paid the correct docket fees.

We see no reason to belabor this claim. Even if we gloss over the PDB’s own conformity to the
dropping of these entities as parties, the BOC correctly argues that a remedy is provided under the
Rules. Section 12, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 12. Bringing new parties. – When the presence of parties other than those to the original action
is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim,
the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained.

Even then, the strict characterization of the BOC’s counterclaim is no longer material in disposing of
the PDB’s argument based on non-payment of docket fees.

When an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite
docket and filing fees by the party seeking affirmative relief from the court. It is the filing of the
complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, accompanied by the payment of the prescribed docket
fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the claim or the nature of the action. However, the
147 

non-payment of the docket fee at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the
case, so long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, especially
when the claimant demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. 148

In the present case, considering the lack of a clear guideline on the payment of docket fee by the
claimants in an interpleader suit, compounded by the unusual manner in which the interpleader suit
was initiated and the circumstances surrounding it, we surely cannot deduce from the BOC’s mere
failure to specify in its prayer the total amount of the CB bills it lays claim to (or the value of the
subjects of the sales in the April 15 and April 19 transactions, in its alternative prayer) an intention to
defraud the government that would warrant the dismissal of its claim. 149

At any rate, regardless of the nature of the BOC’s "counterclaims," for purposes of payment of filing
fees, both the BOC and the PDB, properly as defendants-in-interpleader, must be assessed the
payment of the correct docket fee arising from their respective claims. The seminal case of Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion provides us guidance in the payment of docket fees, to
150 

wit:

1. x x x Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but
also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. [underscoring
ours]

This must be the rule considering that Section 7, Rule 62 of which reads:

SEC. 7. Docket and other lawful fees, costs and litigation expenses as liens. – The docket and other
lawful fees paid by the party who filed a complaint under this Rule, as well as the costs and litigation
expenses, shall constitute a lien or charge upon the subject matter of the action, unless the court
shall order otherwise.

only pertain to the docket and lawful fees to be paid by the one who initiated the interpleader suit,
and who, under the Rules, actually "claims no interest whatever in the subject matter." By
constituting a lien on the subject matter of the action, Section 7 in effect only aims to actually
compensate the complainant-in-interpleader, who happens to be the stakeholder unfortunate
enough to get caught in a legal crossfire between two or more conflicting claimants, for the faultless
trouble it found itself into. Since the defendants-in-interpleader are actually the ones who make a
claim - only that it was extraordinarily done through the procedural device of interpleader - then to
them devolves the duty to pay the docket fees prescribed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. 151

The importance of paying the correct amount of docket fee cannot be overemphasized:

The matter of payment of docket fees is not a mere triviality. These fees are necessary to defray
court expenses in the handling of cases. Consequently, in order to avoid tremendous losses to the
judiciary, and to the government as well, the payment of docket fees cannot be made dependent on
the outcome of the case, except when the claimant is a pauper-litigant. 152

WHEREFORE, premises considered the consolidated PETITIONS are GRANTED. The Planters
Development Bank is hereby REQUIRED to file with the Regional Trial Court its comment or
answer-in-interpleader to Bank of Commerce’s Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim, as previously ordered by the Regional Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 143, is hereby ORDERED to assess the docket fees due from Planters Development
Bank and Bank of Commerce and order their payment, and to resolve with DELIBERATE
DISPATCH the parties’ conflicting claims of ownership over the proceeds of the Central Bank bills.
The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143, or his duly authorized
representative is hereby ORDERED to assess and collect the appropriate amount of docket fees
separately due the Bank of Commerce and Planters Development Bank as conflicting claimants in
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas’ interpleader suit, in accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.