SpaceX Response To D
SpaceX Response To D
SpaceX Response To D
____________________________________
)
Application of )
)
SPACE EXPLORATION HOLDINGS, LLC ) Call Signs: S2983 and S3018
)
For Modification of Authorization for the ) IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20230215-00036
SpaceX Gen1 NGSO Satellite System )
____________________________________)
Space Exploration Holdings, LLC (“SpaceX”) has proposed to upgrade the satellites used
the Fixed-Satellite Service (“FSS”) to enhance the system’s ability to provide high-capacity, low-
latency broadband services throughout the United States, including in underserved and unserved
areas.1 The only party that responded to this application was DISH Network Corporation
(“DISH”),2 which has repeatedly and unsuccessfully challenged SpaceX’s NGSO deployment.
Here, DISH recycles old arguments claiming that SpaceX’s application should either be denied or
that an existing condition on SpaceX’s license—one that DISH itself proposed—should be made
more burdensome unless SpaceX provides DISH with proprietary information not called for under
1
See Application for Modification of Authorization for the SpaceX Gen1 NGSO Satellite System, IBFS File No.
SAT-MOD-20230215-00036 (Feb. 15, 2023) (“Modification Application”).
2
See Petition for Additional Information, Additional Conditions, or Denial, IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20230215-
00036 (Apr. 3, 2023) (“DISH Petition”).
1
As discussed further below, DISH fails to present any reason to deny, defer, question, or
condition this modification, and the Commission should grant it expeditiously. While SpaceX
continues to meet or exceed all of the Commission’s requirements to deploy upgraded satellites
for use in its Gen1 system and offer improved service to American consumers, DISH continues to
oppose every effort by SpaceX to close the digital divide. Specifically, DISH is requesting access
to SpaceX’s confidential data and reusing erroneous arguments the Commission has rejected time
and time again. Worse, DISH hit a new low by attempting to rewrite a specific Gen1 license
condition that DISH itself proposed and SpaceX accepted, knowing that this rewrite would
In challenging an upgrade to SpaceX’s Gen1 system that would increase spectral efficiency
and provide improved service to American consumers, DISH makes unsupported accusations that
SpaceX’s proposed upgrades would lead to violation of the equivalent power flux-density
incorporated into the Commission’s rules.3 This continues a pattern in which DISH comes up with
ever more contorted arguments about potential EPFD violations to slow competition and service
enhancements from SpaceX—this time adding highly speculative assumptions to the mix in an
attempt to manufacture an issue where none exists. As it has done each time that DISH has
employed this strategy in the past, the Commission should reject DISH’s obstructionist tactics and
proceed to grant SpaceX’s application. SpaceX is eager to proceed with the deployment of its
upgraded Gen1 system to ensure all Americans have access to even more capable high-capacity,
3
See 47 C.F.R. § 25.146(a)(2).
2
DISCUSSION
SpaceX has provided all required and necessary information to demonstrate to the
Commission that it will not cause harmful interference to Direct Broadcast Satellite (“DBS”)
operators like DISH using the 12 GHz spectrum band (12.2-12.7 GHz), both in its ongoing
operations and under the proposed modification. In fact, SpaceX is complying with the condition
that DISH requested under SpaceX’s Current Authorization. In the proceeding leading up to that
authorization, DISH and its hired gun, Marc Dupuis—who has built a cottage industry of attacking
SpaceX—proposed that the Commission impose the following condition on SpaceX (DISH’s
SpaceX agreed to accept this condition and limit its ability to serve American consumers, at the
behest and insistence of DISH, and the Commission granted SpaceX’s application based on this
condition.5
SpaceX has not requested relief from this condition. To the contrary, SpaceX stated that it
will continue to comply with the technical parameters of its license, which include the condition
4
See Letter from Jeffrey H. Blum to Marlene H. Dortch, IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20200417-00037 et al., at 3
(Apr. 6, 2021) (“DISH Apr. 6 Ex Parte”).
5
See Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, 36 FCC Rcd. 7995, ¶¶ 39, 97e (2021) (“Current Authorization”).
3
proposed by DISH to protect its operations in the 12 GHz band.6 But once again, DISH cannot
take yes for an answer. This time, DISH attempts to rewrite its own condition to slow down its
competitor and harm American consumers who rely on SpaceX’s critical broadband satellite
services—and is once again postulating its own corner cases to manufacture a potential
At the risk of covering ground the Commission has gone over repeatedly with DISH, the
Commission’s rules require NGSO FSS applicants to certify that they will comply with applicable
EPFD limits.7 SpaceX has done so in this application.8 While no more is required, SpaceX has
done more. The proposed modification with the smaller beam footprints is consistent with
SpaceX’s existing ITU filings. Accordingly, as stated in its application, this modification does not
require any changes to SpaceX’s ITU network filings.9 Those are the same filings that include
EPFD data files that the ITU Radiocommunication Bureau has already analyzed and for which it
issued a “favorable” compliance finding for SpaceX’s Ku-band operations—which include the 12
GHz band.10 The Commission has found that compliance with these EPFD limits is sufficient to
SpaceX has certified its compliance with applicable EPFD limits and has not sought relief
from its Gen1 license condition requiring—pursuant to the language demanded by DISH—that it
6
See Modification Application, Technical Attachment at A-2 (stating that “SpaceX requests no other technical
changes to its authorization at this time”).
7
See 47 C.F.R. § 25.146(a)(2).
8
See Modification Application, Technical Attachment at A-5.
9
See id., Technical Attachment at A-7.
10
See Description of EPFD validation and results of examination, ITU, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
R/space/epfdData/321520025_STEAM-1_Results_Summary.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2023).
11
See Update to Parts 2 and 25 Concerning Non‐Geostationary, Fixed‐Satellite Service Systems and Related
Matters, 32 FCC Rcd. 7809, ¶ 39 (2017) (“NGSO Update Order”); 47 C.F.R. § 25.289.
4
“not use more than one satellite beam from any of its satellites in the same frequency in the same
or overlapping areas at a time.”12 SpaceX has also provided the EPFD data files to the Commission
as part of its Current Authorization and made available to DISH and other interested parties the
required information in its PFD masks which account for the contribution of all co-frequency
beams per satellite in accordance with ITU Recommendation S.1503. Given that the PFD masks
of this modification are covered by the Current Authorization and the ITU has already granted
SpaceX a favorable finding for its Ku-band operations, any accusation that SpaceX will cause
interference in 12 GHz band is completely unfounded and not consistent with the Commission’s
II. THE COMMISSION SHOULD REJECT DISH’S “STUDY,” DUE TO ITS DEPENDENCE ON FALSE
TECHNICAL AND REGULATORY ASSUMPTIONS
In a desperate bid to take shots at SpaceX and its customers, DISH resorts to its old
playbook—even if its play is inconsistent with the rules. DISH once again calls its hired gun to
concoct a corner case to distract from the rules. And as always, DISH uses the corner case to build
a convoluted argument, this time arguing that SpaceX’s use of narrower beam footprints could
somehow cause more interference to DBS service in the 12 GHz band. In the proceeding leading
to SpaceX’s Current Authorization, this same consultant conceded that SpaceX’s operations would
comply with relevant EPFD limits using the ITU-approved analysis before applying his own
bespoke approach to find an EPFD exceedance. The Commission rightly rejected that bespoke
approach,14 as did the D.C. Circuit on review.15 Here again, the consultant concedes that SpaceX’s
12
Current Authorization ¶¶ 39, 97e.
13
See 47 C.F.R. § 25.289.
14
See Current Authorization ¶¶ 38-40.
15
See Viasat, Inc. v. FCC, 47 F.4th 769, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“[T]he governing rules require interference between
GSO and NGSO systems to be assessed through the method used in the ITU-approved validation software.”
(citing 47 C.F.R. § 25.146(a), (c)(2))).
5
proposed use of narrower beams “in itself does not necessarily mean that the newer beams will
increase the risk of interference into GSO BSS networks.”16 He then proceeds to search for a
scenario in which smaller beams—which generally enable more efficient spectrum sharing—
For this purpose, the consultant contrives an analysis of service to Hawaii involving wider
beams using a four-frequency reuse pattern and narrower beams using a two-frequency reuse
pattern.17 The consultant does not provide any explanation for why the reuse pattern assumptions
are different, nor does he provide any operational basis for making those assumptions. Later in
the analysis, he introduces a scenario that assumes three beams from three different satellites
The consultant then proceeds to assume, without any evidence, that because SpaceX will
have narrower beams, it will seek to pack these beams in a way that results in greater overlap that
will cause increased interference to GSO systems. DISH’s consultant offers no explanation as to
why this conclusion can be inferred. He then argues that since the ITU’s validation software
assumes that only “Nco” satellites outside the GSO exclusion zone contribute to interference, this
could lead to inaccurate results if in fact the beams from satellites serving nominally different areas
significantly overlap.19
software systems—has addressed this very concern to validate EPFD compliance and thereby
16
DISH Petition, Exhibit 1 at 3.
17
See id., Exhibit 1 at 6, 9.
18
Id., Exhibit 1 at 9.
19
Id. The condition imposed on SpaceX at DISH’s request requires operation in the 12 GHz band with Nco=1.
6
ensure protection of GSO systems. As stated in the Transfinite Software User Guide, the modeling
software does not include contributions of nearby co-frequency beams from additional satellites
outside of the GSO exclusion zone because each NGSO system “will have constraints that limit
its ability to provide service from more than a specified number of satellites simultaneously due to
intra-system interference constraints.”20 For that reason, the Transfinite Software intentionally
only accounts for a set number of active NGSO satellites “so that the aggregate EPFD is not the
sum of all visible satellites.”21 SpaceX performed the EPFD analysis as required and intended by
the Transfinite Software. DISH provides no explanation for its assumption that Starlink user
terminals can “easily discriminate between two adjacent satellites” or its argument that therefore
SpaceX provided all of its PFD masks in accordance with ITU Recommendation S.1503
and used the Transfinite Software which the ITU requires operators to use to confirm EPFD
complies with applicable limits. But complying with the rules of the ITU and the Commission is
clearly not sufficient for DISH. Yet, even with a consultant paid specifically to find flaws in
SpaceX’s analysis, DISH can reach its conclusions only by making unsupported assumptions and
deviating from the ITU’s validation approach. The Commission should once again reject DISH’s
20
Visualyse EPFD User Guide, Transfinite Systems Ltd 44 (Nov. 2022), https://download.transfinite.com/
websitedownloads/VisualyseEPFD_UserGuide.pdf.
21
Id.
22
DISH Petition, Exhibit 1 at 9.
7
III. THE COMMISSION HAS PREVIOUSLY REJECTED DISH’S ATTEMPTS TO INVOKE ITS
BESPOKE ALTERNATIVES TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS APPROACH TO EPFD
VALIDATION
The Commission has repeatedly dismissed DISH’s baseless claims that SpaceX will violate
applicable EPFD limits. In the meantime, DISH has had many opportunities to try to change the
rules in its favor within the appropriate ITU working groups. Indeed, that process is currently
ongoing in ITU Working Party 4A, which is developing proposals to be considered at the next
World Radio Conference. To the extent DISH feels that the EPFD regime should be revised, that
is the path for achieving a new international consensus that can then be applied consistently across
all NGSO systems. But rather than follow the appropriate paths to address any concerns, DISH
when applied to SpaceX—and demands that SpaceX share proprietary information that is not
Like any consensus, the EPFD limits represent a compromise, meaning that neither GSOs
nor NGSOs got everything they wanted when the limits were adopted at the ITU. In fact, the rules
are objectively overly protective of GSOs, to the detriment of consumers of NGSO services. But
the ITU adopted the EPFD limits and validation software for international use, and the
Commission has decided to defer to them domestically, precisely because they represent a
consensus (albeit biased) approach. In the absence of such an agreed-upon metric, all NGSO
applicants, opponents, and other interested parties would file their own bespoke analyses
structured to favor their own particular viewpoint, leaving the Commission (and ITU) to devote
the personnel and time necessary to sort them out in each case, and likely inconsistently. Relying
rehashing of competing one-off analyses. As the Commission has recognized, this regime gives
8
NGSO operators “every incentive” to perform their EPFD analyses properly.23 And as the
Commission has made clear, third-party validation of EPFD compliance is not required.24 As
much as DISH would like to install itself as the arbiter of EPFD compliance, that role has been
filled.
CONCLUSION
DISH has offered no basis for deferring, denying, or conditioning approval of SpaceX’s
Gen1 modification. Accordingly, the Commission should move expeditiously to grant it so that
SpaceX can proceed with its plans for deployment of its upgraded hardware and bring its benefits
Respectfully submitted,
Counsel to SpaceX
23
Current Authorization ¶ 34.
24
See Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, 34 FCC Rcd. 12307, ¶ 11 (IB 2019) (“[T]here is no legal requirement that
third parties evaluate the sufficiency of EPFD data inputs prior to deployment of an NGSO system, and, more
importantly, this delay would unfairly prejudice SpaceX’s timely implementation of its new system.”).
9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on this 18th day of April, 2023 a copy of the foregoing pleading was
Pantelis Michalopoulos
Andrew M. Golodny
Steptoe & Johnson LLP
1330 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
Jeff Blum
Alison Minea
Hadass Kogan
DISH Network Corporation
1110 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Suite 450
Washington, DC 20005