GLOSSARY OF GREEK TURKISH RELATIONS - INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES - ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ - Σ99 - 2020 12 14 1 PDF

1.
GLOSSARY OF GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS
Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

Ημ. Έκδοσης: . . .12/12/2020 Ημ. Αποδελτίωσης: . . .14/12/2020
Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 99
GLOSSARY
OF GREEK-TURKISH
RELATIONS
Thanos Dokos
Phd in International Relations
Cambridge University
The Glossary of Greek-Turkish Relations was

originally written in Greek in 2018 and revised in
2019 when the author was the director general
of the Hellenic Foundation for European and
Foreign Policy ELIAMEP Some limited
revisions were made to the glossary for the
purposes of this publication by Kathimerini
1. GLOSSARY OF GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 100
Introduction Over the last 60 years or so Greece and Turkey have rather frequently found themselves in
periods of serious crisis or even on the brink of war during the Istanbul Pogrom 1955 the
various crises involving Cyprus 1963-64 1967 1974 and the S-300 missile crisis of 1997-98 a
number of serious incidents in the Aegean 1976 1987 the Imia crisis in 1996 and the evolving
crisis of 2020 and the Öcalan Affair of 1999
At the same time and especially during the period from 1974 to 1999 there was an
escalating arms race between the two countries resulting in an ongoing low-intensity conflict
with occasional lulls Despite the rapprochement between the two countries after 1999 which
resulted in a noticeable improvement in economic and people-to-people relations and the political
climate in general there was no real progress in normalizing bilateral relations
Although there are few fundamental differences between the policies of the AKP and the
Kemalist opposition parties on the issue of Greek-Turkish relations one should acknowledge
that much of the period of rule in Turkey by the Justice and Development Party AKP has overall
been characterized by low tension even in periods of intense Greek economic weakness The
situation gradually began to change after the failed coup of July 2016 partly due to the incident
of the eight Turkish officers who sought asylum in Greece but mainly because of Turkey's
growing regional ambitions
During this period 2016 there have been an increasing number of references to and
escalating reminders of the Turkish theory of the gray zones for example low-altitude
flyovers over a large number of Greek islands which calls into question Greece's sovereignty
over a number of rocks islets and inhabited islands in the Aegean More recently there has been
a significant increase in tension caused by Turkish statements and actions and more specifically
the Turkish-Libyan memorandum for the delimitation of maritime zones in the context of the
Mavi Vatan Blue Homeland narrative the hybrid operations in Evros February-March of
2020 and the multiple times Turkey has sent its ships to conduct research in maritime areas
which Greece considers as its own
This glossary together with the maps section is an attempt to explain and clarify a
number of specialized terms as well as more complex issues for the benefit of a wider audience
Greek and international who may have an insufficient or inaccurate understanding of Greek
Turkish relations

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KATHIMERINI 99
GLOSSARY OF GREEK TURKISH RELATIONS
with a loose federal structure the vagueness regarding the

timeline for the return of occupied territories to the Greek
The Annan Plan Cypriots the continued presence of Turkish troops albeit
Cyprus submitted its application for membership to the EU in significantly lower numbers in Cyprus even after the
under the Vasiliou government during the summer of 1990 implementation of the agreed solution the preservation of
The Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Cyprus was signed the obsolete institution of guarantor powers the legalization
in Athens in the spring of 2003 and entered into force on 1 May of the permanent presence of a large number of settlers
2004 when Cyprus became one of the ten new members of the the conversion of the agreements reached by the so-called
EU The prospect of Cypriot accession was the catalyst for a Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus with Turkey into
new mediation effort on the part of the UN under Secretary federal law the provision for the existence of foreign judges
General Kofi Annan which culminated in the presentation of in the Constitutional Court who would make decisions in
five versions of a comprehensive plan to resolve the Cyprus cases of inter-community disagreements the imposition of
problem and the ultimate rejection of the final plan by the limitations in the installation of members of each community
Greek-Cypriots in a referendum in April 2004 on territories belonging to the other constituent state the
As the Republic of Cyprus headed towards becoming imposition of extensive deviations from the European acquis
a member of the EU and with its citizens already launching which created a feeling among Greek Cypriots that they
appeals against Turkey at the European Court of Human Rights would also become a second-class member of the EU and
for the infringement of their property rights in the occupied finally the weakness or unwillingness of the UN to make
territories Ankara seemed to be in a difficult position besides an indicative assessment of the cost of reunification and the
Turkey was also facing great difficulties in its effort to begin resolution of the property issue even though the cost was
its own accession negotiations The UN Secretary-General's to be borne by the Greek Cypriot community and Turkey
initial idea of leveraging Cyprus need for a resolution and was to be absolved from any financial responsibilities for the
the simultaneous Turkish need to improve its image was in deprivation of rights and the destruction it had caused on the
the right direction but was rather poorly implemented island all these factors plus the inability to convincingly
The Annan Plans caused a great sense of distrust in a present the potential benefits of the Annan Plan to the citizens
large part of the Greek Cypriot public as a result of several of of Cyprus led to strong objections from the majority of the
its basic provisions the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus Greek population and eventually to the failure of the UN
as a prerequisite for the creation of a new state probably effort to resolve the Cyprus problem
UNCLOS MARITIME ZONES
NATIONAL AIRSPACE INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE
12 n.m 24 n.m
Territorial Contiguous
Sea Zone
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

200 n.m
CONTINENTAL
LAND MASS
CONTINENTAL SHELF
DEEP
SEABED
Sources Batongbacal and Baviera 2013
It Λ Till U I I lVI

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 102
Ultimately the Annan Plan 5 was accepted by 65 of program for the co-production and acquisition of the 5th
Turkish Cypriots but was rejected by 76 of Greek Cypriots generation F-35 fighter planes and systems of intelligence
in the April 2004 referendum The accession of the Republic gathering and battle management ranging from a broad
of Cyprus to the EU followed shortly after spectrum of sensors to space-based systems
Even though there does not seem to be at present any
serious cause for concern regarding a radical upset of the balance
Β of military power between Greece and Turkey maintaining a
Balance of military power balance of power with an adversary with almost three times the
The chart on the following page depicts the balance of military budget for defense spending and with strong regional ambitions
power between Greece and Turkey It must be noted that as although certainly also many open fronts will not be a simple
far as military forces are concerned the purges of Air Force matter for Greece The utilization of new technologies in the context
pilots and other experienced military officials in Turkey as a of an out-of-the-box way of thinking could play a major role in this
result of the failed coup of July 2016 and the increasing use
of ideological rather than merit-based criteria for promotions Blue Homeland Mavi Vatan in Turkish
or postings have undoubtedly had a negative effect on the This is both a narrative and a strategic plan to overcome
war fighting capability of the Turkish Armed Forces At the the obstacles posed by geography and international law to
same time however in the context of Greek-Turkish relations an expansion of Turkish-controlled maritime zones in the
the risk of an accident spiraling out of control due to lack of Eastern Mediterranean as de jure changes to land borders is
experience has increased Turkey has invested considerable a much more difficult task In addition to the rather expected
resources in order to develop its defense industry while at maximalist positions this narrative is characterized by a
the same time has been procuring sophisticated air-defense highly creative and innovative interpretation of international
systems S-400 from Russia as a result sanctions have been law and a surreal approach to geographical reality see also
imposed by the US and Turkey has been excluded from the Turkey-Saraj Memorandum

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 103
ç Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe CFE and a

number of CBMs have been signed since the limited bilateral
Casus Belli rapprochement started in 1999 A series of measures were
In June 1995 a few days after the ratification of the Convention agreed upon although not necessarily implemented including
on the Law of the Sea by Greece the Turkish Grand National a two-month later to be extended to four months summer
Assembly issued a resolution stating among other things moratorium on military exercises in the Aegean exchange of
that It is not possible for Turkey to accept that it must visits at the level military academies and of chiefs of general
establish its naval connection with the high seas and oceans staff a hotline for use in the event of an emergency cooperation
via Greek territorial waters Turkey has vital interests in the on peace-building missions and natural disasters etc Aviation
Aegean The Turkish National Assembly while hoping that CBMs have also been discussed but without result
the Greek government will not decide to extend its territorial
waters in the Aegean beyond six miles thereby upsetting the Constitutional Amendment Turkey
balance established in Lausanne has decided to delegate to The victory of the yes vote in the Turkish referendum of 2017
the Turkish government all the responsibilities including was rather expected even though the result was very close
those deemed necessary from a military point of view for the The small margin of victory and the allegations brought forth
preservation and defense of the vital interests of our country by the opposition and international watchdogs heightened
This threat of war did not concern a potential violation of suspicions of some limited tampering of the verdict but the
international law but a state exercising its legal rights Greece result remained the same Turkey began a new chapter in
made a series of formal protests to international organizations its history and as a result there are now multiple questions
primarily pointing out how this violated Article 2.4 of the UN concerning the country's future
Charter on abstaining from the threat or use of force against Tayyip Erdogan vigorously promoted a constitutional
another state The withdrawal of casus belli is included in amendment that significantly strengthened the powers of
all the annual progress reports of the European Commission the president abolished the office of the prime minister
and in the relevant resolutions of the European Parliament and weakened the powers of parliament and the judiciary
regarding the accession of Turkey to the EU essentially leading to a new model of governance from the
Presidential Palace Ak Saray/White Palace What is particularly
Confidence-Building Measures CBMs worrying is the apparent absence of a system of checks and
Confidence-Building Measures CBMs as a concept in balances in combination with strong autocratic tendencies
international relations theory first appeared almost sixty As far as Greek-Turkish relations are concerned a
years ago during the Cold War initially at a bilateral level in functioning Western-style democracy is not a necessary
US-USSR relations and then also at a multilateral level Such prerequisite for maintaining good neighborly relations or at
measures usually appear after a crisis or war A prime example least for effectively managing problems However it is more
of a CBM was the famous hotline which connected the likely that an autocratic Turkey might drift further away from
offices of the heads of state of the US and USSR immediately the EU and the Western code of conduct in interstate relations
following the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 The term CBM
includes a wide range of measures political and/or military Continental Shelf
that states having difficult relations with each other can use Under international law a continental shelf is defined as
in an effort to the underwater sea bed and the subsoil beyond the national
• Reduce tension in their territorial waters A state does not possess full sovereignty
relationships and/or
• prevent the
possibil ity of accidental hostilities or a surprise within its continental shelf yet it exercises nonetheless
attack and/or sovereign rights These concern exclusively a the exploration of
• confirm the non-hostile nature of their intentions the continental shelf and b the exploitation of the continental
The starting point for CBMs is the political will of the parties to shelf s natural resources The continental shelf extends up to
promote mutual security The implementation of such measures 200 nautical miles from the point from which the breadth of
is aimed at increasing trust in the intentions of the parties the territorial waters is measured unless the geographical
if these intentions are consistent or not with the pursuit of conditions allow for an extension beyond these limits In
mutual security In other words there is a close relationship such a case the continental shelf may be extended to up to
between security and trust It's important to note that when 350 nautical miles from the shore In the Mediterranean no
implementing CBMs the following basic condition must be such distances exist
met first the measure cannot affect the existing balance of The principal motivation in international efforts to
power between the parties That is the relative benefits must delimit continental shelves has been the exploitation of offshore
be mutual and the balance of power that existed prior to the resources mainly hydrocarbons and the same seems to
agreed CBMs must not be upset apply in the case of Greece and Turkey even though the
Measures can vary ranging from a simple open channel of existence of significant and economically exploitable deposits
communication to steps to curb military activity and verification of hydrocarbons in the Aegean has yet to be established with
measures up to a non-aggression pact In the context of Greek any certainty The joint exploitation of hydrocarbons in both
Turkish relations the Papoulias-Yilmaz Protocol has been signed the Aegean and in the Eastern Mediterranean constitutes a
see related entry verification measures are in force under the longstanding objective of Ankara

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 104
Balance of military forces GREECE WM TURKEY
857 355,000 8.8

143,000 4.0
11 195
Populations million GDP(bn USD Personnel Defence expenditures bn USD
Weapons
systems GREECE I TURKEY
MAIN BATTLE
TANKS 1,341
28 attack
136 transport
NAVY
11 13 33 19 18 13 18 53
fast
34 29
maritime
submarines frigates fast landing maritime submarines frigates landing
boats craft helicopters boats craft helicopters
34 F-4 43 Mirage-2000 154 F-16 61 F-4 260 F-16 7 tanker aircraft

AIR FORCE
231 4 early warning aircraft
321
combat 4 early warning aircraft 35 medium-size
combat
aircraft 26 medium-size transport aircraft aircraft transport aircraft significant number of UAVs
small number of UAVs
PATRIOT 5-300
6 batteries
ι
1
batteries
MAIN F-16 modernization maritime patrol aircraft S-400 air defence system T-214 submarines MILGEM
PROCUREMENT modernization new frigates acquisition of Rafale national combat ship T-129 attack helicopters
PROGRAMS fighter aircraft A-400 large transport aircraft light helicopter carrier
KATIIIMF.RINI
The official Greek position has been that the delimitation must be carried out on the basis of the median line/line of
of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone equidistance which has as its basis of measurement the coastal
constitute the sole dispute between Greece and Turkey all shores of the Greek islands on the one side and the coastal
other issues are treated as being unilateral Turkish claims shores of the Turkish mainland on the other Greece stipulates
The difference between Greece and Turkey regarding the furthermore two preconditions for the resolution of the dispute
continental shelf dates back to November 1973 when the a that no Greek island will find itself enclosed within the
Turkish Government Gazette published a decision to award Turkish continental shelf and b that the political continuity
licenses to the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation of Greece's national territory must be ensured An account
TPAO to conduct explorations in underwater regions in close of the official Greek positions concerning its relations with
proximity to Greek islands Turkey can be found at www.mfa.gr Foreign Policy Issues
Turkey maintains that a the fundamental criterion for Issues of Greek-Turkish Relations The problem with the Greek
the delimitation of the continental shelf is the natural-geological position regarding the continental shelf and the EEZ as being
relationship of the dry land mass with the seabed b islands the sole dispute between Greece and Turkey is that if the two
constitute special cases c the Aegean is a semi-enclosed countries agree to seek recourse to the International Court of
sea which requires the application of special exceptional Justice for the delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ
regulations and d the principle which must be applied is this delimitation will take place on the basis of the current
that of equity An account of the Turkish positions concerning breadth of the territorial waters
the Aegean can be found at www.mfa.gov.tr Turkish-Greek
Relations/Aegean Problems/The Aegean Problems Convention on the Law of the Sea UNCLOS
The Greek response is that a islands are entitled to The UNCLOS was signed in 1982 after many years of
a continental shelf in exactly the same way as mainland negotiations and entered into force in 1994 It regulates all
territories and b the delimitation of the continental shelf uses of the oceans including the delimitation of maritime zones

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 105
and the exploitation of natural resources More specifically of March 1987 was the lack of effective communication
• The criteria of the 200-meter isobath and the between the two sides and the perception formed by the
exploitation
of the seabed in the 1958 convention were replaced by the Turkish leadership at that time that Athens was seeking to
criterion of a distance of up to 200 miles from the coast start drilling in an area of the continental shelf that had not
• Islands have full rights to maritime zones been delimited The Turkish side in responding sought to
including an
EEZ and continental shelf Rocks that do not have their emphasize that its strongly-held territorial claims remained
own economic life were excluded They were given only unchanged A possible interpretation is that the crisis was
territorial waters caused by misinterpretations on both sides and that Turkish
• No specific delimitation rules were defined for the delimitation Prime Minister Turgut Özal's absence from office due to illness
of the EEZ and the continental shelf The only question is gave the hawks in the Turkish military and diplomatic corps
the general achievement of an equitable result an opportunity to try to reverse Özal's policies aimed at a
• The convention has been
signed to date by 160 countries Greek-Turkish rapprochement
with key exceptions being the United States Israel Turkey In contrast to the 1996 Imia crisis see the entry for
Venezuela and Syria Imia crisis which most analysts believe led to a negative
outcome the handling by Greece of the March 1987 crisis is
Crisis management seen as having been successful as Turkey did not subsequently
Crisis management includes the totality of measures aimed move ahead with offshore seismographic surveys in disputed
at the avoidance of the military escalation of a political crisis areas Paradoxically and given Turkey's initial incorrect
or if the original goal cannot be accomplished the limitation impression that Greece intended to conduct seismographic
of the extent and intensity of a conflict Crisis management is surveys in disputed areas the outcome of the crisis was not
more of an art than a science and is based on a combination of seen as negative for Turkish interests either
inspiration wisdom judgment and abilities of decision makers It is however clear that Turkey did not fully mobilize its
rather than a predetermined formula or a rigid set of rules It is armed forces during the crisis whereas Greece proceeded with
an idiosyncratic mix of decisiveness and caution intransigence a general mobilization marked by the departure of the entire
and flexibility and recklessness and careful moves and actions fleet from the Salamis Naval Base and the withdrawal of two
Crisis management a familiar phenomenon during the era of submarines from a NATO exercise the selective mobilization
the European balance of powers gained a new importance in of army reserves and the deployment of fighter jets to front
the age of nuclear weapons Following the terrifying Cuban line air bases Greece also made the decision to temporarily
missile crisis the then US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara suspend the operation of US bases as a symbolic gesture
declared possibly with a hint of hyperbole that there is The trip of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Karolos
no such thing as strategy only crisis management Papoulias to Sofia and his meeting with the Bulgarian leader
Crisis management strategies in the context of crisis Todor Zhivkov should also be considered as essentially a
management the difference between strategy and tactics is symbolic move The assessment of the Greek side was however
smaller than usual and the two terms often describe similar that this move could create a sense of uncertainty to Turkey
actions fall into two broad categories aggressive strategies while adding pressure on Western powers to intervene in a
which aim to change the status quo to the detriment of the firefighting role It is not certain however that Greece would
opponent and defensive strategies whose goal is to obstruct or have secured significant diplomatic support from its EEC
reverse developments that would lead to a detrimental outcome partners or NATO allies due to the rather idiosyncratic foreign
for one's own side It should be stressed that instructions on policy of the Papandreou government with its waning but still
crisis management consist of general advice rather than a clear leanings toward anti-Americanism and Third-Worldism
specific formula A single instruction or a series of instructions During this period there was a relative balance between
doesn't cover all eventualities or possible crises The process of land forces with a clear however numerical superiority for
crisis management assuming there is enough time available Turkey a balance between naval forces but with a clear Greek
includes the following stages superiority in terms of personnel quality and a relative balance
• The assessment of a situation as a crisis in the air a small numerical superiority for Turkey in fighter
• The correct identification of
targets and goals jets and a Greek superiority in the quality of personnel On
• The
shaping of alternative courses of action including the this point there is a significant difference with the Imia crisis
examination of possible benefits and costs for each alternative in 1987 Turkey did not enjoy air superiority as it did in 1996
solution and the continuous search for new information A comparison of the forces leads to the conclusion that in
around the various alternative solutions a military conflict if Turkey had decided to mobilize its forces
• The selection and implementation of a course of action and react in a dynamic manner Greece would likely not have
been defeated Of course there is no guarantee that it would
Crisis of March 1987 have prevailed either The most likely result would have been
A main cause of this crisis as well as of Greek-Turkish a draw with losses for both sides depending on the duration
antagonism in general was the suspected existence of of the conflict which would have been largely determined
significant hydrocarbon deposits in the Aegean combined by the reaction and intervention of the US and NATO One of
with the geographical peculiarities of the region According the most important lessons of the March 1987 crisis was the
to historian Sotiris Rizas however the cause of the crisis need for multiple open channels of communication between

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 106
Athens and Ankara The lack of such channels played a key transformed into a particularly multifaceted and complex
role in the 1987 crisis and made it difficult to manage the problem Its potential solution however is based on a simple
Imia crisis in 1996 as well cost-benefit assessment between two alternatives the
reunification or non-reunification of the island
Cyprus Dispute In the first case any solution that may be adopted will
Even though it does not formally constitute a bilateral Greek be characterized by specific constraints since the current state
Turkish issue the Cyprus dispute has played a significant of affairs which is unfavorable to Hellenism is the result of a
role in the relations between the two countries The late defeat in a military confrontation and as is well known any
ambassador Byron Theodoropoulos the Dean of Greek losses sustained on the battlefield cannot be fully restored at
diplomacy argued that all of the Aegean disputes were the table of diplomatic negotiations No matter the form of
either invented or exaggerated by Ankara which wrongly such a reunification of the island it is possible that it may not
calculated that these could be used to counterbalance the allow for the elimination of Turkish influence yet it could
Cyprus problem Greece constitutes together with Turkey potentially achieve its significant reduction It will certainly
and Great Britain a guarantor power of Cyprus where it has bring some territorial gains Even though the complete removal
maintained a military presence the Hellenic Force in Cyprus of all security guarantees and the immediate withdrawal of all
ELDYK It is hard to imagine that a full normalization of foreign military forces is highly desirable there is disagreement
relations between Greece and Turkey could ever be achieved among experts as to whether it is realistic This is due to
without the prior resolution of the Cyprus dispute the Turkish strategic view regarding Cyprus according to
In theory there are three possible alternatives for the the former Turkish prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu and
future of Cyprus echoed by high-ranking officials of the erstwhile Kemalist
a A de jure division of the island involving the return of establishment this is that Even if there was not a single
some of the occupied territories and the two communities Muslim Turk living in Cyprus there would be a Cyprus question
agreeing to follow separate paths to the extent of course for Turkey because of the island's geostrategic location at the
that this is practically feasible on an island with Cyprus heart of its very own vital space
particular characteristics Potentially other solutions could be sought regarding
b Maintaining the current state of affairs in the event that the easing of the system of guarantees and provisions for its
negotiations fail This would likely not be the final chance gradual phasing out as well as for the immediate withdrawal
for a solution since diplomacy almost always ensures that of the greater part of the occupying military forces and for the
there will be a subsequent negotiation The problem is integration of those that remain in a multinational force with
that in the history of the Cyprus issue every subsequent provisions for a complete withdrawal on the basis of a set timeline
proposed solution has been worse for the Greek Cypriot What needs to be clear however is that the solution
side than the previous one of a bizonal bi-communal federation as it is being discussed
c A solution which would be based on the logic of a bizonal today may on the one hand have potential benefits territorial
and bi-communal federation based on mutually acceptable benefits a phasing out of the Turkish presence and influence
terms regarding the central issues/questions security economic growth yet on the other it also entails significant
territory property claims settlers governance and with risks in the event that the emerging state of affairs proves to be
relatively limited jurisdictional powers for the federal dysfunctional and non-viable and results in increasing tensions
government The key phrase here is that of a viable and between the two communities and potentially between the
functional solution an element which appears to have two mother countries The conversion of a unified Cyprus into
been missing from the exceptionally complex Annan Plan a dysfunctional state like Bosnia Herzegovina and possibly
which in its final form was negative for Greek Cypriot towards the more volatile end of the spectrum either due to
interests see relevant entry objective difficulties or due to Turkey's efforts to undermine
In 2004 the Annan Plan for the resolution of the Cyprus dispute the situation after a potential solution cannot be ruled out
was submitted by the United Nations following negotiations Alternatively there is the option of maintaining the
between the parties involved In the referendum which was current status quo in the hope of a more favorable set of
subsequently carried out 65 of the Turkish Cypriot side circumstances and balance of powers arising However so
voted in favor of the plan whereas 76 of Greek Cypriots voted far the passage of time has not worked to the benefit of the
against it There have been many and intense discussions Greek-Cypriot side and each new plan for a solution has been
regarding the weaknesses of the Annan Plan and most worse than that which came before The most likely outcome
analysts continue to question its functionality and viability is that the non-resolution of the issue will cement the division
New inter-community discussions were held in 2017 which of the island with all that entails
did not however lead to a positive outcome The main point
of disagreement was the question of security i.e whether or Criteria for a solution of the Cyprus issue
not to maintain foreign military forces on the island and the The solution to the Cyprus issue must be evaluated on the basis
system of guarantees of the degree to which the following objectives and interests
As a result of flawed assessments atrocities distorted have been achieved
perceptions and stereotypes external interventions and As regards the Greek Cypriots the desired objectives
entrenched interests the Cyprus issue has gradually been include a clear improvement of the present situation on issues

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 107
such as a the territorial question b the reinforcement of a political control and may act counter to the decisions of the
sense of security through the withdrawal of all armed forces elected government It became widely known in 1996 with
the demilitarization of the island and the elimination of the the Susurluk case and a few years later it was identified
Zurich-London system of guarantees c compensation for seized with the Ergenekon case
properties d the reduction in the level of political and economic In 2014 Erdogan referred to a parallel state led by the
dependence of Turkish Cypriots on Turkey e the smooth Gulen organization known as Hizmet meaning Service
functioning of the new state f the unhindered exploitation of According to government officials in January 2014 the
energy resources by the two communities g the maintenance parallel state conspired against the armed forces through
of current demographic and political balances and h the the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases As a result court decisions
economic development of a united Cyprus The above issues against the deep state should be reconsidered in light of the
are not presented here necessarily in any order of significance injustices this parallel state has caused As Angelos Syrigos
and they obviously do not all carry the same weight states it is Utopian to believe that the Turkish deep state
As far as Greece is concerned its interests include 1 will disappear The efforts of its ideological opponents in
the protection of Hellenism in Cyprus 2 minimizing the Turkey are focused on transforming it so that it might come
possibility of a political or military conflict with Turkey and under their own control
the creation of conditions that will allow for a more general
improvement in Greek-Turkish relations 3 the avoidance of Dialogue
problems that could disrupt the smooth functioning of the EU At various times and for different reasons the subject of a
in the event that Turkey should wish to use a Turkish-Cypriot Greek-Turkish dialogue returns to the fore together with
veto or any other arrangements that may be provided for by the possibility of reaching an agreement on bilateral issues
the solution under negotiation in order to promote its own through negotiation Every negotiation presupposes bilateral
interests vis-à-vis the EU 4 the ability for Greece to have contacts discussions and unavoidably some form of dialogue
a presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and to continue its Unfortunately the very idea of a dialogue with Turkey has been
cooperation with other countries in the region and 5 the demonized in Greece as it has become synonymous either
ability for Greece to participate in energy-related activities with political naïveté or surrender or appeasement of Turkey's
in the Eastern Mediterranean Again not all of the above expansionist intentions The majority of these reactions are
interests carry the same weight emotional not based on a substantive understanding of the
The mix of proposed arrangements regarding the above issues rational argument or strategic analysis Sadly any
issues will determine to a great extent the final net positive discussion of the major questions in Greece's external relations
or negative value of any proposed solution for Hellenic Greek be they about relations with Turkey or the former Macedonian
Cypriot and Greek interests The use of objective criteria to issue are dominated by aggressive populism and over-simplistic
the extent possible in the evaluation process can potentially claims to patriotism or more often claims of a lack thereof
help us come out of a dead-end discussion where the only on the part of specific individuals while a dispassionate
solutions appear to be either a default acceptance of just about approach analysis and debate are sorely lacking
any solution with all the downsides and the risks this might But at the other end of the spectrum politicians and
entail or the outnght rejection of any and every solution academics are sometimes guilty of a rather naïve understanding
irrespective of their benefits and positive aspects and the of the tools available for managing bilateral relations with
pursuit of an ideal solution which unfortunately will never Turkey assuming that international law or membership to
materialize the EU are sufficient by themselves This school of thought
In any case the role of Greece must be to a large degree significantly underestimates the deterrent effect of military
secondary supporting the choices made by Nicosia It should power especially in the context of Greek-Turkish relations
however have a more active role in negotiations regarding Abstaining from dialogue can be a useful diplomatic
security arrangements because of its role as the guarantor tactic during particular periods but would be harmful as a
of the security of Cypriot Hellenism The final decision rests permanent foreign policy strategy Foreign policy demands
with the Greek Cypriots who will have to weigh the potential creative thought imagination new ideas and initiatives good
benefits and risks o f alternative choices preparation and trust in one's abilities The easy solution to
an extent the result of intellectual laziness is the offhand
D rejection of any new idea proposal or initiative
Dialogue is not synonymous with formal negotiation
Deep State though it can lead there The international community sees
The term Deep State derin devlet refers to a system dialogue as an extremely important means for the peaceful
running parallel to the official government apparatus that resolution of disputes Even when dialogue does not yield
regularly intervenes in state affairs especially those with a results its continuation is preferable to its absence Some
national security dimension Targets of the deep state have analysts even argue that two countries which are talking to
included over the years minorities and especially the Kurds each other could hardly go to war Even though history and
communists Islamists journalists and in general anyone international experience do not entirely support this view it is
who could be considered a threat to the secular state founded a fact that dialogue can do no harm when certain preconditions
by Mustafa Kemal This parallel system is not subject to any are present and specifically when

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 108
• The dialogue is conducted on the basis of a well-designed Energy Greece

strategy what are the vital national interests what are the To date the only discovery of hydrocarbons in Greece took place
red lines what is the desired goal and sound negotiating off the west coast of the island of Thasos Prinos Extracting
tactics the petroleum from the Prinos Oil Field is currently the
• It enjoys the political support of the governing party and a responsibility of the Greek company Energean and production
significant portion of the opposition Critical statements by could reach up to 3,800 barrels per day although in the past
the opposition may be useful in the course of the negotiation it had been as high as 26,000 barrels per day covering about
as the government may use them to claim its inability to 10 of national needs
make further concessions so long as they are based on a prior In 2011 Greece after a 15-year period of general inactivity
understanding and there is agreement on the substance rightly adopted a new policy regarding the exploration and
If the above conditions are met there is no reason to object exploitation of hydrocarbons in its maritime zones in the
to dialogue provided of course the necessary safeguards Ionian and south of Crete Legislation was adopted explicitly
are in place to allow withdrawal if the national interests are stipulating that the median line line of equidistance would
no longer served be the basis for delimitation in the absence of agreements
and this new legislation was officially submitted to the UN
As part of the implementation of this new policy
Ε international tenders were announced for the exploitation of
Ecumenical Patriarchate specific offshore plots in the aforementioned areas following
After1923 the Turkish state refused to recognize either the appropriate explorations and the collection of seismic and
ecumenical nature of the institution of the Patriarchate or other data There are reasonable hopes for the discovery and
its nature as a legal entity Consequently it did not recognize exploitation of deposits probably relatively limited in size
the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate over the institutions that in the Ionian Sea and in the Epirus region In the event of
belong to it Furthermore for many decades the Turkish state potential discoveries in the areas south of Crete the deposits
limited the right to be elected as the Patriarch to clergymen may be quite substantial at this point in time however the
with Turkish citizenship who had been practicing their religious uncertainty in those regions is higher
duties in Turkey There were also similar problems with the Of course exaggerated expectations and projections that
election of members of the Holy Synod After 2009 the AKP are not based on hard data should be avoided Experts including
governments made some goodwill gestures that may facilitate scientists and government officials are of course aware of the
the future resolution of the above problems Additionally in lack of sufficient scientific data the diplomatic difficulties
1971 the Turkish Ministry of Education banned the operation of and the time required to start commercial exploitation of
the Theological School of Halki invoking a law which banned any deposits Greece's goal should be to increase the energy
the operation of private higher education institutions The footprint and turn the country into an energy player rather than
issue has not yet been resolved however despite promises a mere spectator and ideally into an energy hub through
during the Erdogan period of government the TAP pipeline the Greece-Bulgaria Gas Interconnector a
potential future interconnector to North Macedonia and the
The Eight the eight Turkish officers asylum seekers EastMed pipeline
It is not uncommon for a country's government to face an
undesirable development a hot potato where options are Energy Greece-Turkey
extremely limited and quite problematic In this case the Greek As well as being a cause of friction between Greece and Turkey
government was called upon to handle the arrival and asylum the field of energy is also an area of albeit limited cooperation
requests of eight Turkish officers that were subsequently between the two countries Regarding the areas of dispute
accused by the Turkish authorities of taking part in the failed and the general ambitions of Turkey in the Aegean and the
July 2016 coup For President Erdogan the issue was extremely Eastern Mediterranean information can be found under other
sensitive and the exercise of strong pressure needed to be entries As far as cooperation is concerned the TGI pipeline
taken as a given Turkey-Greece Interconnector transports natural gas of
However the relevant reflexes of the Greek side proved Azeri origin from Turkey to Greece The TAP Trans Adriatic
slow and the issue was not resolved immediately and with Pipeline will transport natural gas from Azerbaijan to Italy
concise procedures Since then the issue has been used by the via Turkey Greece and Albania
Turkish side for negotiation purposes but also as a tool to put
pressure on the Greek side and as a reminder that the cost of The EU and Greek national security
ignoring Turkish requests and interests can be high The arrest The EU's Global Security Strategy 2016 emphasized the need
of the two Greek soldiers who appear to have lost their bearings to strengthen the internal security of the EU member states
and entered a few meters into Turkish territory in the Evros while also stabilizing the external environment on the EU's
area and their detention for 167 days initially without charge southern and eastern borders by taking on a more active role
appeared to be linked to the case of the Eight by Ankara It and launching various initiatives This text well-written and
is worth noting that similar incidents of unintentional border certainly useful is currently not much more than a wish list at a
crossings in the past have been almost immediately resolved point when uncertainty over Brexit is widespread and European
through communication between local commanders weakness in the defense sector and in the formulation of a

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 109
common foreign policy is evident However common foreign expulsion All migrants will be protected in accordance
defense and security policy may be areas in which the EU with the relevant international standards and in respect of
following a German-French initiative could take a step forward the principle of non-refoulement It will be a temporary and
to counterbalance the negative dynamics caused by Brexit extraordinary measure which is necessary to end the human
Given its longstanding goal of staying at the core of an suffering and restore public order Migrants arriving in the
EU that is increasingly characterized by a variable geometry Greek islands will be duly registered and any application
and in light of the multidimensional threats to Greek national for asylum will be processed individually by the Greek
security Greece cannot afford to be absent from relevant authorities in accordance with the Asylum Procedures
consultations and Initiatives Active Greek participation in Directive in cooperation with UNHCR Migrants not applying
the initiatives already undertaken in the fields of defense and for asylum or whose application has been found unfounded
security would strengthen national efforts to claim a distinct or inadmissible in accordance with the said directive will
role both within the EU and at a regional level and would help be returned to Turkey Turkey and Greece assisted by EU
strengthen Greece's deterrent capability institutions and agencies will take the necessary steps and
agree any necessary bilateral arrangements including the
The EU and Turkey presence of Turkish officials on Greek islands and Greek
Turkey expressed its interest in joining the European Economic officials in Turkey as from 20 March 2016 to ensure liaison
Community in 1959 and formally applied in 1963 when the Ankara and thereby facilitate the smooth functioning of these
Agreement was signed The Customs Union was signed by both arrangements The costs of the return operations of irregular
parties in 1995 and entered into force in 1996 After many years migrants will be covered by the EU
of efforts Turkey started accession negotiations with the EU 2 For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek
in 2005 Of the 35 chapters that constitute the EU acquis on islands another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to
issues such as energy human rights employment transport the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria
the judiciary and the environment 16 have been opened but A mechanism will be established with the assistance of
only one research and technology has been closed temporarily the Commission EU agencies and other Member States
The opening of another eight chapters has been blocked as well as the UNHCR to ensure that this principle will be
by the European Council due to Turkey's non-compliance with implemented from the same day the returns start Priority
the relevant obligations regarding the opening of Turkish will be given to migrants who have not previously entered or
ports and airports to Cypriot ships and planes while Cyprus tried to enter the EU irregularly On the EU side resettlement
itself has stated that it will block the opening of another under this mechanism will take place in the first instance
six chapters for as long as Turkey does not implement the by honoring the commitments taken by Member States in
Additional Protocols to the Ankara Agreement the conclusions of Representatives of the Governments of
Several European countries have reservations about Member States meeting within the Council on 20 July 2015
Turkey's potential EU membership Greece supports Turkish of which 18,000 places for resettlement remain Any further
membership because in that case the normalization of Ankara's need for resettlement will be carried out through a similar
relations with Greece and Cyprus would be a prerequisite and voluntary arrangement up to a limit of an additional 54,000
because it believes that a European Turkey will be a better persons The Members of the European Council welcome the
neighbor At present the scenario of full membership is an Commission's intention to propose an amendment to the
extremely low probability one as the obstacles to membership relocation decision of 22 September 2015 to allow for any
which include the country's size and its specificities as well resettlement commitment undertaken in the framework
as Erdogan's authorit arian tendencies and aggressive foreign of this arrangement to be offset from non-allocated places
policy are considered to be clearly greater than the potential under the decision Should these arrangements not meet
benefits A special relationship between Turkey and the the objective of ending the irregular migration and the
EU on terms that have not yet been discussed in detail is number of returns come close to the numbers provided
certainly more likely for above this mechanism will be reviewed Should the
As far as Greece is concerned the limited weight given number of returns exceed the numbers provided for above
by the EU to issues of security and defense together with the this mechanism will be discontinued
importance attributed to Turkey due to the size of its market 3 Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new
and its contribution in managing refugee/migration flows limit sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey
any effective European interventions in Greece's favor to simple to the EU and will cooperate with neighbouring states as
expressions of support and to sanctions that are by and large well as the EU to this effect
symbolic e.g against individuals involved in illegal drilling 4 Once irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU are
ending or at least have been substantially and sustainably
The EU-Turkey Statement to tackle irregular migration reduced a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme
March 2016 will be activated EU Member States will contribute on a
1 All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into voluntary basis to this scheme
Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to 5 The fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap will be
Turkey This will take place in full accordance with EU and accelerated vis-à-vis all participating Member States with
international law thus excluding any kind of collective a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 110
at the latest by the end of June 2016, provided that all of negotiations over the delimitation of maritime zones. The
F
benchmarks have been met. To this end Turkey will take the agreement would provide for any matters not resolvable
necessary steps to fulfil the remaining requirements to allow through negotiations to be referred to an international court.
the Commission to make, following the required assessment There is speculation that significant convergence had been
of compliance with the benchmarks, an appropriate proposal achieved on certain matters, and that the idea of variable
by the end of April on the basis of which the European geometry regarding the breadth of territorial waters had
Parliament and the Council can make a final decision. been discussed as the basis for a possible agreement (see the
6) The EU, in close cooperation with Turkey, will further speed relevant reference in the text by Angelos Syrigos). The process
up the disbursement of the initially allocated 3 billion euros has been frozen since January 2016.
under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and ensure funding
of further projects for persons under temporary protection
identified with swift input from Turkey before the end of
March. A first list of concrete projects for refugees, notably FIR
in the field of health, education, infrastructure, food and FIR stands for Flight Information Region, established by the
other living costs, that can be swiftly financed from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for the purpose
Facility, will be jointly identified within a week. Once these of providing a flight information service. The Athens FIR
resources are about to be used to the full, and provided the covers the entire Greek national airspace, as well as sections of
above commitments are met, the EU will mobilise additional international airspace across the region. Jurisdiction over the
funding for the Facility of an additional 3 billion euro up FIR is exclusively of an administrative nature, and concerns
to the end of 2018. only the safety and facilitation of international air navigation.
It must be noted that both sides have voiced complaints (each The Greek position is that, in accordance with the
side of a different nature) about the implementation of the regulations of the ICAO and international practice and in
statement, while a broader discussion on the future of EU- order to ensure the safety of civil aviation flights, all aircraft,
Turkish cooperation on migration and on EU-Turkish relations whether civil or military, are required to submit flight plans
more broadly needs to take place rather urgently. prior to their entry into the Athens FIR.
Turkey maintains that state aircraft (which include
Exploratory talks military aircraft) are not required to submit flight plans, and
Since 2002, Greece and Turkey have held 60 meetings between accuses Greece of attempting to convert an administrative
high-ranking officials of their respective foreign ministries, jurisdiction into sovereign rights over the airspace of the
with the aim of reaching an agreement on the commencement Aegean.

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 111
Syrian refugees naboring countries 5,573,384

ι
CountryI Source Data date Population

Turkey Government of Turkey 4 November 2020 65.1
Lebanon UNHCR 30 September 2020 15.8
Jordan UNHCR 4 September 2020 11.8
Iraq UNHCR 31 October 2020 4.3
Egypt UNHCR 30 September 2020 2.3
Other North Africa UNHCR 31 January 2020 0.6
G as Oinousses Agathonisi and Farmakonisi The ownership

status of these islands is according to Ankara in question
Government Council for National Security KYSEA and must be determined through negotiations
The Government Council for National Security as it was It should be noted that under Article 12 of the Treaty of
renamed in 2019 or KYSEA is responsible for the cabinet Lausanne Turkish sovereignty is explicitly limited to the coast
level formation of government policy and decision-making on of Asia Minor and to islands up to three nautical miles off the
matters concerning the country's national security Among Turkish coast Also according to article 15 of the same treaty
other things the Council a formulates national security Turkey relinquishes in favor of Italy all rights and titles over
strategy taking into consideration the country's foreign and the following islands Astypalaia Rhodes Halki Karpathos
defense policy policy for public order and civil protection and Kassos Tilos Nisyros Kalymnos Lews Patmos Lipsi Symi and
policy for cybersecurity energy security and the security of Kos which are now occupied by Italy and the islets dependent
critical infrastructure coordinating in parallel all the competent thereon and also over the island of Kastellorizo
bodies involved and necessary resources for its implementation With the Treaty of Paris of 1947 these islands were ceded
and b decides on issues that concern the structure of the from Italy to Greece Recently the issue of the gray zones has
armed forces and the security forces and approves the long been the subject of public political discord between the Turkish
and medium-term programs for the development of the government and the Kemalist opposition which has raised the
country's defense capabilities as well as major programs for issue in a wholly irresponsible manner accusing Erdogan of
the modernization research acquisition and production of a lack of patriotism for having allowed the occupation of 18
defense equipment Turkish islands by Greece in recent years According to reports
The composition of the Government Council for National these islands are Farmakonisi Agathonisi Kalolimnos Plati
Security has changed several times since it was first created Giali Levitha Kinaros Syrna Arkoi Fourni Thymaina Kalogeri
yet there have been no major modifications The regular Oinousses Panagia the Dionysades Koufonisi and Gavdos
members of KYSEA are the prime minister as its president The general belief is that Turkey is using the gray zones
the ministers of Foreign Affairs National Defense Citizen's in an effort to advance its long-term strategy of expanding its
Protection Mercantile Marine and Island Policy and the chief area of direct or indirect control in the Aegean and secure the
of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff who does not maximum possible benefits from any future demarcation of
possess the right to vote The Council's secretary is the prime maritime zones More specifically Turkey is seeking to question
minister's national security advisor the baselines which will be used to determine the maritime
zones in any future settlement It is also thought that Turkey
Gray Zones wishes to use the gray zones as an additional tool for changing
Since 1996 Turkey started talking officially about its gray the Lausanne Treaty Negotiations about sovereignty over
zones theory of undetermined sovereignty for a number of Greek islands which is being disputed by Turkey a century
islands and islets in the Aegean including inhabited islands after relevant treaties had been signed is clearly an issue no
and the need to discuss the issue on the basis of the property Greek government could ever accept
titles held by both sides Following the Imia crisis 1996 in
which Turkey challenged Greek sovereignty over the two islets Greek Armed Forces
that lie east of Kalymnos a spokesman for the Turkish Foreign For countries such as Greece that are located in a difficult
Ministry said that the Imia problem had become broader neighborhood the armed forces constitute a fundamental
to include a number of other islands of similar size whose tool for deterrence and crisis management Because the
ownership was apparently unclear Since then the Turkish reasons for maintaining a strong military have unfortunately
side has insisted thai there are gray areas of sovereignty in not yet disappeared a credible deterrent capability will remain
the Aegean that include at least 100 other sources refer to 180 essential for the national security of Greece for the foreseeable
small islands and islets several of which are inhabited such future There is an urgent need for a new defense policy that

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 112
KATHIMERINI
takes into account the emerging global and regional security training staffing armament and defense industry issues
environment new technologies organizational structures and it should present concrete and realistic proposals for the
and training models as well as the economic and social more efficient operation of the Greek Armed Forces and the
circumstances inside the country preservation of its deterrent capabilities in a difficult political
The need for a more efficient use of human and and economic situation All the above proposals are presented
economic resources and at the same time more rational in detail in the White Paper on Foreign Policy Defense and
and effective organization of the armed forces preceded the Security of ELIAMEP in Greek Sideris Publications 2016
current crisis Unfortunately local interests and corporatist pp 82-87 and 264-282
perceptions combined with political inertia have prevented In the medium-to-long-term Greek-Turkish relations can
the implementation of changes that should have taken place only be fully normalized through diplomacy An armed conflict
many years ago This present period therefore needs to be would entangle both sides in a vicious cycle of tensions for
a period of extensive evolution and adaptation regarding many years to come Since however accidents do happen poor
organizational structures economies of scale and adaptation judgment is not uncommon and domestic political crises can
to the new economic conditions and restrictions The central lead to external adventures for the sake of distraction the goal
goal should be to make the most of the available resources and should be to keep any neighboring country from entertaining
maintain the country's deterrent capacity which it is hoped dangerous thoughts or undertaking hostile actions
will help in the diplomatic resolution of disputes Greece's aim should be to maintain a negative cost
The geopolitical and economic situation raises a number benefit ratio for any scenario of escalation or conflict it is
of questions regarding military service and the manning of important that so far the current Turkish leadership has
units the need for additional changes in the structure of the shown no evidence of irrationality in the context of our bilateral
armed forces the next generation of armament procurement relations The necessary know-how and ideas do exist in the
programs the utilization of new technologies the restructuring ranks of the armed forces although out-of-the-box thinking will
of the domestic defense industry participation in peacekeeping also be needed but this will also require political consensus
missions Greece's role in NATO possible contribution in efforts and decisions by successive governments which will have
to create a European defense capability and other forms of to demonstrate the necessary degree of responsibility and
military cooperation with allied countries This new defense a willingness to ignore political costs and to go up against
policy can only emerge from a deep strategic review process established interests wherever necessary
and we must look to countries with significant military
capability and organization that implement strategic review Greek-Turkish rapprochement Earthquake Diplomacy
processes at regular intervals as examples to follow The Greek-Turkish rapprochement began in the summer of
The proposed review process should address a number of 1999 when Greek-Turkish relations had reached their lowest
key questions such as the evolving international environment point after successive crises Imia S-300 and the Öcalan case It
threat assessments efficient utilization of other elements was greatly facilitated by a change in Greek and Turkish public
that can contribute to national security and defense the role opinion after the earthquakes in Istanbul August and Athens
and the missions of the armed forces as well as structural September This new period of low tension and friendship

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 113
led to the Helsinki Agreement December 1999 the signing Polarcus Samur which was renamed Barbaros Hayreddin
of several bilateral agreements on issues of economic cultural Pasa This vessel has conducted explorations in the EEZ of
customs scientific and technological cooperation protection Cyprus from 2014 onwards and together with the seismic
of the environmental fighting organized crime tourism and research vessel OruçReis and the drillships Yavuz Fatih and
irregular migration the latter were only rarely implemented Kanuni which together cost Turkey a total of more than 800
by the Turkish side as well as measures to build trust between million it will be used to promote the Turkish objectives in
the two countries and thus improve the political climate and the Eastern Mediterranean
reduce tensions However no substantial progress was made
on the high-level policy issues Aegean dispute Hotlines
That notwithstanding economic relations between the During the crises of 1987 and 1996 Imia the absence of
two sides improved significantly with bilateral trade reaching channels of direct communication between Greece and Turkey
3.3 billion 2008 and 2.3 billion due to the economic crisis in became particularly evident This was especially true in the
2009 compared to just 638 million in 1999 with a persistent case of the Imia crisis when any consultations were conducted
and pronounced Greek export deficit Greek investment in primarily via Washington and secondarily via Brussels NATO
Turkey increased dramatically rising possibly as high as 8 One of the benefits of the Greek and Turkish rapprochement
billion with the most notable example being the acquisition which began in 1999 was the creation of direct channels of
of a significant share of the Turkish bank Finansbank by the communication hotlines or red telephones at multiple levels
National Bank of Greece the largest Greek investment outside between prime ministers ministers for foreign affairs and
Greece amounting to 5.7 billion Today Greek investments defense and chiefs of staff of the armed forces In the past
in Turkey have decreased while bilateral trade reached 3.4 these channels of communication functioned rather successfully
billion in 2017 Greek exports 1.95 billion imports 1,434 in the management of several incidents It remains to be
billion seen whether this will still be the case today
H I
Helsinki Agreement 1999 Imia
At the EU summit in Helsinki December 1999 it was agreed In the context of the Turkish theory regarding the so-called
that Greece would withdraw its objections and veto and gray areas the most famous disputed islets are of course the
support Turkey's efforts to join the EU in exchange for two pair of islets of Imia the crisis of 1996 is further discussed in the
concessions a Cyprus's entry into the EU in the next wave relevant entry of the present Glossary as well as more extensively
of European Union enlargement regardless of whether the in the main body of the text by Angelos Syrigos For many years
Cyprus problem had been resolved and b if bilateral efforts the Turkish position at least as it was articulated by officials
to resolve the Greek-Turkish dispute were not successful by was that these were regions of undetermined sovereignty For
December 2004 then the two countries would discuss the some years now the Turkish position as regards the two islets of
submission of their differences to the International Court of Imia has shifted from sea rocks of undetermined sovereignty
Justice in The Hague to a region under Turkish sovereignty
Greece decided to support Turkey's accession to the The complete list of contested islets had not been officially
EU provided it met the preconditions believing that this made public see entry for gray areas The governments of the
would lead to the resolution of the Greek-Turkish disputes and Justice and Development Party AKP were quite cautious as to
Turkey becoming a better neighbor for Greece As a result of the way that they would publicly refer to the issue However as
developments regarding European-Turkish relations and the mentioned in the entry on gray areas the Turkish opposition
opposition of several European states to the prospect of the for reasons of internal politics made the issue of the gray
full accession of Turkey the Helsinki strategy has ceased to areas a subject of public political discourse in Turkey
have any practical benefit for Greece and a Plan Β is urgently Ankara generally believes that by loading the bilateral
needed agenda with additional items it will be able to leave a future
Greece has no reason to support the suspension of the negotiating table with more gains The question is whether
EU-Turkey negotiations However given the strong opposition Turkey has calculated accurately the cost-benefit ratio in its
of several EU member-states to full-membership for Turkey choice of a matter where the international conditions and the
Greece needs to become fully engaged in the discussion about relevant maps including older official Turkish maps render its
a special relationship between the EU and Turkey legal position particularly weak But of course it is coercion
and not international law that continues to be the main tool
Hora/Sismik Barbaras Hayreddin Pasa of Turkish foreign policy towards Greece and the Eastern
The Hora was an old German vessel that was bought by Turkey Mediterranean
in 1976 converted into a survey vessel and renamed Sismikl
it went on to play a leading role in the crises of 1976 and 1987 Imia Crisis 1996
between Greece and Turkey The vessel was last used in 2011 in Turkey tried to take advantage of the political vacuum
the EEZ of Cyprus and it was subsequently decommissioned in Greece caused by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou's
In 2013 Turkey bought the Norwegian research/survey vessel long illness and resignation and to challenge Greek national

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 114
sovereignty in the Aegean and consequently to weaken its legal body there are ways of lowering tensions which do not
sovereign right to extend its territorial waters It was hoping require either country retreat from its longstanding legal
to force direct negotiations with or without US mediation positions for example through the submission of flight
on all Greek-Turkish disputes as defined by Turkey Other plans to the NATO headquarters in Naples for Turkish aircraft
objectives may have included distracting the Turkish public entering the Athens FIR as had been discussed in the mid
from internal problems 1990s regarding the submission of partial flight plans three
At the time of this particular crisis Greece's new prime instead of five points of information
minister Costas Simitis was not only inexperienced in matters
of national security but was also preoccupied with the formation International Court of Justice at The Hague ICJ
and functioning of a new government so he failed to function This is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations UN
effectively as a unifying figure There was limited coordination The International Court of Justice consists of 15 judges appointed
between the main actors involved Prime Minister and Ministers every 9 years by the UN Security Council and the UN General
of Foreign Affairs and National Defense and no comprehensive Assembly The judges are drawn from different geographical
plan to deal with the Turkish actions Instead a number of regions and are selected on the basis of their credentials The
disconnected measures were adopted court cannot include two judges of the same nationality For a
Consequently there was no unified center managing the case to be tried at the ICJ all interested states must agree to
crisis Due to this lack of coordination statements by government have the case referred to it The court's decisions are arrived
ministers offered differing or even contradictory messages at in secrecy by a majority vote and are binding while its
despite the government's decision to de-escalate the situation opinions are of an advisory nature and are non-binding Any
Another factor that may have had a negative effect on country which is a signatory to the court's statute can refer a
the efforts to manage the crisis was that while the political case to it as can under certain conditions countries which
leadership was determined to avoid a military conflict in are not parties to the statute Greece recognizes the binding
the armed forces a culture of escalation and preparedness for jurisdiction of the court except in matters related to national
operations had developed It became clear too that the lack security while Turkey does not recognize its jurisdiction
of knowledge and/or experience of the political leadership In 2015 Greece filed a supplementary statement to both
ministers MPs regarding both the basic principles of crisis courts of The Hague and Hamburg regarding its recognition
management and the National Rules of Engagement see of their jurisdiction The declaration exempts from binding
separate entry was a significant problem This insight is valid jurisdiction matters of national sovereignty and measures
not only for the Greek government of 1996 but for the Greek of a defensive nature while with regard to another country
political establishment in general bringing a case against Greece it sets the following conditions
a that the country in question must accept in advance the
Infringements of international regulations Violations binding jurisdiction of the court and b 12 months must
of national air space elapse between the original recognition of jurisdiction and
Infringements involve the entry of Turkish military planes the case being lodged Within that period Greece may depart
into the Athens Flight Information Region Athens FIR from the court's binding jurisdiction Greece has exempted
without prior notification and without following the relevant from the Hamburg court see below matters pertaining to
regulations Efforts have been made under NATO mediation the delimitation of boundaries which it considers fall under
for the resolution of the issue of these infringements through the jurisdiction of The Hague
Turkish authorities providing limited flight information to
the Greek authorities An agreement was almost reached International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
without a final result Violations involve the entry of Turkish The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea based
fighter planes into Greek national air space usually in the area in Hamburg is an independent judicial organ established
between 6 and 10 nautical miles from the coast under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Hundreds of infringements and violations take place UNCLOS to try cases and resolve differences stemming from
each year In the case of either infringements or violations the the interpretation and implementation of the Convention
Turkish fighter aircraft are visually identified and intercepted Greece selected the Tribunal for the resolution of differences
by Greek fighter planes In many cases these interceptions in the context of the Convention According to Angelos Syrigos
evolve into aerial engagements and mock dogfights which the choice of venue expressed an implicit condemnation
have resulted in the loss of aircraft and pilots The situation is by the Greek side of the International Court of Justice at the
expected to be further complicated by Turkey's use of unmanned Hague for a series of judgments in which it gave limited
aerial vehicles UAVs drones Since their interception by continental shelf rights to islands In essence however the
fighter planes is hardly a cost effective option the Greek side Greek declaration in favor of the Hamburg tribunal has no
must now find a way of countering this new Turkish tactic practical significance Turkey is not a signatory to UNCLOS
It is clear that the two sides have adopted radically and is rather unlikely to become one
different legal interpretations both about the obligations of
state aircraft entering a foreign FIR and about the breadth of International waters
the Greek airspace Until these differences are resolved through The waters between the territorial waters of individual states
bilateral negotiations or through resort to an international are known as international waters No state can exert national

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 115
sovereignty in international waters and all states have the he has again unleashed nationalist forces on both sides which
rights to fishing navigation overflight laying cables and neither he nor Kurdish moderates like Selahattin Demirta of
pipelines and scientific research Today 49 of the Aegean the HDP party will be able to control
Sea are international waters Although there is a growing polarization in Turkish
society it is not clear that the majority of Kurds want
Islands independence Moreover their geographical dispersion between
There are about 9,000 islands in the Aegean including islets and large urban centers and areas in southeastern Turkey does not
rocks 450 of which belong to Turkey while the rest belong to facilitate such a solution Substantial concessions in granting
Greece About 100 Greek and 7 Turkish islands are inhabited cultural rights and local autonomy would probably go a long
way towards resolving the Kurdish problem However time
Israel and Turkey is not in Turkey's favor on this issue
The strategic relationship of the 1990s was succeeded by The problem becomes even more complicated as there is
the difficult relationship of the Erdogan era culminating also an important regional dimension The gradual formation
in the episodes of Davos and the Mavi Marmara vessel The of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq despite the temporary
prevailing mentality of the Israeli state and especially of setback caused by the referendum of September 2017 combined
its foreign policy and national security apparatus which is with the inability to manage the internal Kurdish issue
characterized by a deep suspicion of other actors quite possibly politically and the developments in Syria which led Turkey
may not permit a full normalization of relations with an Islamist to a military incursion and temporary occupation of Syrian
Turkey despite the strong urging of the US during the Obama territories has seen a resurgence for the Turkish political
Administration and despite the significant economic interests military establishment of the Sevres Syndrome i.e the fear
that exist between the two countries Moreover any process of territorial fragmentation of Turkey as a result of the plans
of rapprochement between Israel and Turkey will be tested and actions of external forces The picture becomes even
by the next Palestinian crisis In the energy sector which is more complex if one takes into account the roles and interests
of particular interest to Cyprus and Greece one has difficulty of the United States Russia the central Iraqi government
imagining how Israel might trust a country like today's Turkey and on another level of Iran and Syria countries with large
with its dynamic regional agenda with a growing Islamist Kurdish populations within their territories
influence enough to make the main transport route of its
natural gas to Europe dependent on its good relations with The Kurtulu
Ankara Even though an improvement in bilateral relations The Kurtulu was a Turkish cargo ship that together with
mainly for economic reasons cannot be ruled out a return to the Dumlupinar another Turkish vessel transported food
the pre-2000 levels of strategic cooperation must be considered and humanitarian aid to Nazi-occupied Greece Athens and
highly unlikely Piraeus in particular during the famine period of 1941-1942
The aid was sent at the initiative of the Turkish Red Crescent
Κ and international humanitarian organizations
The Kurdish issue

In its modern phase the Kurdish issue has beleaguered Turkey
M
for approximately 35 years Tayyip Erdogan and the AKP Median line line of equidistance
promoted the so-called Kurdish Opening initiative with In cases where the distances between two states do not allow
religion rather than ethnicity being the link connecting Turkish the full development of their maritime zones the median line
citizens He even reached the point of promising the Kurds or line of equidistance is usually chosen as the delimitation line
a degree of local autonomy This policy which for a number The median line is used in the case of states whose coasts face
of years had significant electoral benefits for the AKP also one another it's a line parallel to the two opposing coastlines
included negotiations with the imprisoned Kurdish leader each point of which is an equal distance from the baselines
Abdullah Öcalan who remains an influential figure among of each state In the case of states whose coasts are adjacent
Kurds and brought the two sides closer to a political solution to each other we refer to a lateral line where each point of
to the Kurdish problem in the period 2014-2015 However equidistance is calculated based on the nearest points of the
Erdogan who deserves credit for his political courage up to respective baselines
that point is also responsible for abandoning this policy and
using the Kurdish threat to win the November 2015 snap Military coup failed 16th July 2016 consequences
election Today's situation has some similarities to the 1980s The desperate poorly designed and rather amateurishly
when heavy clashes between security forces and Kurdish executed attempt by a group of active Turkish officers to
separatists were taking place in the southeastern part of the overthrow President Tayyip Erdogan and the government
country of the Justice and Development Party AKP had dramatic
At this point it looks quite difficult to return to a consequences for Turkey Erdogan believes the coup was
meaningful dialogue between the two sides The demonization masterminded by his former mentor and close collaborator
by Erdogan of not only the PKK but of moderate Kurds as well Fethullah Gülen a cleric who has been living for many years in
may have helped him win the election but it is possible that self-exile in the state of Pennsylvania in the US The considerable

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 116
Kurdish populations in Tur

Kurdish majority areas
and the Middle East
Mixed population areas
Mediterranean Sea
influence and deep infiltration that Gülen and the moderate organization according to the Turkish government but also
Islamist movement Hizmet had over the Turkish police and of those who were in positions of high authority e.g in the
civil service allowed Erdogan to dismantle the Kemalist judiciary or in the education sector and did not fully agree
establishment and to obtain overall control of the country It with Erdogan's own positions and objectives
must be noted also that Gülen had founded a large number of
educational institutions inside and outside Turkey which had Minorities
been used by Turkish diplomacy as tools for exercising soft With the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 the Greek
power The rift between Erdogan and Gülen over the division population of then Constantinople now Istanbul and the
of power a few years earlier had led to what were at times Muslim population of Western Thrace were excluded from
very fierce confrontations and to the frequent expulsions of the population exchange and remained in the territories in
so-called Gülenists from the state apparatus which they resided Articles 38 to 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne
In response to the failed coup and as though well contained explicit provisions for the protection of the minorities
prepared in advance in the words of the European Commissioner excluded from the population exchange The drafters of
Johannes Hahn the Turkish government unleashed a massive the treaty apparently had as their model an Ottoman-style
wave of purges not only among the armed forces and law minority community a millet with its own places of worship
enforcement agencies but across the entire public sector schools charitable institutions and cemeteries and with its
including many thousands of higher education professors and own separate jurisdiction over family and inheritance law in
judges The total number of public servants who faced judicial accordance with the minority's customs
persecution or were simply fired is potentially as high as In the years that followed the signing of the treaty the
200,000 and it continues to increase albeit at a much slower Greek minority communities of Istanbul Imbros Gökceada
pace It is generally believed that Erdogan took advantage and Tenedos Bozcaada suffered severe persecution by the
of the coup in order to completely purge the state apparatus Turkish state The result is that its members today number
not only of those who may have been implicated in the coup 2,000-3,000 mostly elderly people The Muslim minority in
and of Gülen's supporters more generally FETO a terrorist Greece on the other hand numbers about 120,000 people or

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 117
1% of the total Greek population. Its greatest numbers are in and discrimination in issues of infrastructure in the areas
the region of Thrace, while several thousand members of the where the Muslim minority lived was discontinued. At the
minority live in Athens and Thessaloniki. same time, a large-scale effort was undertaken to improve
Turkey has systematically violated its obligations on the overall economic situation for Thrace, which, until then,
minority issues under the Treaty of Lausanne. The tragic fate of had been the poorest region within the EEC. The aim of this
the Greek minority in Turkey's largest city is discussed below policy was the integration of the minority into society.
in the entry about the Istanbul pogrom. The creation of an open This policy of equality under the law and equal
rural prison on Imbros in 1964 and the expropriations of the participation was followed consistently by all the governments
most fertile land on the island contributed significantly to the that followed. After the critical period of 1990-91, two more
shrinkage of the Greek minority there, just as the Varlik tax important measures were taken. The first was the decision
had been a blow against the Greeks of Turkey during WWII. In of the then minister of education, George Papandreou, to
addition, significant pressure was exerted on the Patriarchate, establish a quota of 0.5% for admission to universities and
culminating in the closure in 1971 of the Theological School technical colleges for people from the Muslim minority.
of Halki in Turkey, an institution which had supplied the It was a measure of positive discrimination that resulted
Patriarchate with properly trained priests. What's more, there in the ending of the sizeable student migration to Turkey
are still issues regarding the fate of Greek properties in Istanbul, that had been taking place upon completion of elementary
with the beneficiaries having in some cases appealed to the school. The second measure was the repeal of Article 19 of
Council of Europe. the Citizenship Code, under which Greek citizenship had
As for the Muslim minority in Western Thrace, in 1923 been stripped from Muslims who stayed out of the country
it numbered 86,000 people. Today it stands at 120,000 (about for a long period of time.
50% Turks, 30-35% Pomaks and 15-20% Roma). During the Despite significant progress, problems remain, including
1960s, the treatment of the Muslim minority was directly the problematic behaviour of the Turkish consulate in Western
linked to the treatment of the Greek minority by the Turkish Thrace, Turkish economic influence in the wider region
state, and in particular the expulsion in 1964 of all Greek of Thrace, the position of Muslim women, the question of
citizens of Turkey who resided in Istanbul. classifying the minority as national or religious, attempts
The Greek state, searching for ways to put pressure on to create networks with links to extremist Islamists, and, of
Turkey to stop the persecution of its Greek minority, adopted course, the completion of efforts to effectively consolidate
a series of discriminatory administrative measures against equality under the law and equal participation for this
the Greek Muslims of Thrace. This policy began a few months minority.
before the 1967 coup in Greece and was fully developed during
the military dictatorship. With regard to the Greek Muslims Montreux Convention (1936)
of Thrace, Turkey criticizes Greece for: a) the implementation The Montreux Convention regulated the terms of freedom
of Article 19 (of 1955) of the Greek Citizenship Code (repealed of navigation in the Turkish Straits by foreign ships. The
in 1998 but without retroactive effect), which provided for international character of the regime of the Straits ceased to
the removal of Greek citizenship from nationals of non-Greek exist. Also, any possibility of intervention in the Straits by
descent who left the country without the intention of returning; states other than Turkey was terminated, with the country
b) the fact that muftis and the administrators of waqfs are essentially becoming the guarantor for the implementation
appointed by the Greek state, instead of being chosen by the of the convention. Turkish sovereignty was fully restored
minority itself; and (c) the administrative discrimination on land and in the maritime zones from the Bosporus to the
carried out against the minority in order to drive its members Dardanelles.
out of Greece. The protocol of the convention allowed for the rearmament
After the end of the dictatorship, the political status quo of the broader area of the Straits. Even though Greece
for the Muslim minority was restored with the election of two failed to include an explicit reference to ending the regime of
Muslim deputies to the Greek parliament. The administrative demilitarization for Lemnos and Samothrace, the official Greek
measures, however, continued to be applied to the detriment position is that the abolition of the entire Convention on the
of Muslims, though in a much less intense and systematic Straits of 1923 led to the abolition of the provisions regarding
fashion. Over time, the discriminatory administrative measures the demilitarization of those two islands.
against Muslims turned into an excellent vote-winning tool for
parliamentary and mayoral candidates in the prefectures of Motives and causes for Turkey's behavior vis-à-vis Greece
Xanthi and Rodopi. After 1991, the Greek state began to pursue Approximately 2,500 years ago, the Chinese general and
a policy of equality under the law and equal participation, strategist Sun Tzu stressed the need to really know one's
and important measures have been taken for the integration adversary as a prerequisite for success in any conflict. Greece's
of the Muslim minority into Greek society. performance in this matter has, unfortunately, been rather poor.
While the new policy retained the definition of the Its relatively limited understanding of the domestic political
Lausanne Treaty of the "Muslim minority", for the first situation and Turkish strategic thinking has not, to date, allowed
time it was recognized that this minority consists of three Greece to successfully engage in such intellectual exercises. A
sub-groups: the Turks, the Slavic-speaking Pomaks and the systematic and in-depth effort to analyze and understand the
Roma. Unacceptable administrative quotas were abolished current political, social and economic developments of Turkey

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 118
remains of vital importance as an in-depth understanding of

internal processes and foreign policy planning is a absolute
Ν
prerequisite for Greek efforts to design an effective foreign National Airspace
policy vis-a-vis Turkey with the central goal of managing Through a presidential decree of 1931 Greece set its airspace
challenges and if possible normalizing relations at 10 nautical miles After its 1974 invasion of Cyprus Turkey
To understand Turkey's foreign policy one must consider began to question through statements and the flights of fighter
at least five elements The first is Turkey's deep military aircraft the breadth of the airspace claiming that the extension
involvement in Syria seen in the context of its overall Kurdish of Greek airspace in the zone from 6 to 10 miles was illegal
policy To Turkey's nervousness one must add Erdogan's because according to international law the Chicago Convention
grandiose ambitions regarding the regional and broader role national airspace must align with a country's land territory
of his country This mixture of insecurity and arrogance is a and territorial waters Greece claims that what has come to be
cause for concern for a number of other countries known internationally as the Greek Paradox has customary
The second element is the shift in Turkey's alliances a force in international law since Turkey did not dispute it for 40
change that has brought it closer to Russia and consequently years This argument is not however Greece's strongest legal
created difficulties for its relations with the US NATO Germany card and the final resolution of the airspace issue is directly
the EU and Israel linked to the issue of the breadth of its territorial waters
The third factor to consider is the criticism within Turkey
of Erdogan from more nationalist circles accusing him of The National Pact Misak-I Milli and the Borders of our Heart
failing to defend Turkish national interests and his struggle This was a standard point of reference for the Turkish delegation
for political and personal survival in light of the 2023 elections to the Lausanne Conference According to Angelos Syrigos
this will force him to adopt increasingly hardline positions The National Pact Misak-I Milli which was adopted in 1920
on domestic and foreign policy issues by the last Ottoman parliament included all the demands of
The fourth point to keep in mind concerns the Eastern the emerging nationalist movement during the last stages of
Mediterranean where Turkey considers that if it does not the Ottoman period
react to existing and planned exploratory activities it risks a The National Pact was a text that adopted modern
weakening of its claims At the same time Erdogan seems to ideas for its time such as a referenda to determine the fate
have adopted an aggressive strategy put forward by factions of of territories b the protection of minority rights
the armed forces and based on the Blue Homeland narrative The National Pact was a realistic text Neither the
see separate entry for Blue Homeland Arab nor the Balkan regions were claimed The immediate
The final element is that since 1996 Turkey has been Turkish claims were confined exclusively to the territories
pursuing a gray area policy in the Aegean that is a strategy controlled by the Ottoman army at the time of the signing
of calling Greek sovereignty over certain islets in the Aegean of the Armistice of Mudros immediately after the end of the
into question in an effort to improve its negotiating position First World War These included the region of Eastern Thrace
in the event of any future negotiations on the delimitation of along with Adrianople/Edirne
the continental shelf Areas outside the borders of the armistice could be
included in the Turkish state only if the local population
Muftis expressed that desire in a referendum Such areas were the Arab
Turkey protests against the muftis the religious clerics of regions Kars Ardahan and Artvin on the present-day border of
the Muslim minority in Thrace being appointed by the Greek Turkey with Armenia and Georgia as well as Western Thrace
state instead of being elected by the local populace The Greek Although he has repeatedly maintained that Turkey
argument is that there is no tradition of electing muftis has no ambitions on the territory of anyone Turkish President
because such a thing would contradict their function as judges Tayyip Erdogan has also stated according to the Athens
of Islamic law in matters of family and inheritance law At the News Agency Macedonian Press Agency his positions on
moment there are three official muftis in Thrace appointed the borders of the heart of Turkey saying Turkey is larger
by the Greek state and two pseudo-muftis allegedly elected than Turkey It is not possible for us to be imprisoned in 780,000
by the Muslim minority but in fact appointed by the Turkish square kilometers Natural borders are one thing and the
consulate borders of our heart are another Our brothers in Mosul in
At the end of 2017 the Greek government announced its Kirkuk in Skopje may be outside our physical borders but
intention to change the way muftis are elected and to impose they are within the borders of our heart at the heart of our
preconditions so that an electorate would be formed that would heart The Turkish Republic did not come out of nowhere
be free from the influence of non-minority elements or other Just as the Ottoman Empire took over from the Seljuks so did
external actors Law 4511/2018 altered the jurisdiction of muftis the Turkish Republic take over from the Ottoman Empire We
in matters of the administration of justice Their jurisdiction embrace our history as a whole
became optional for members of the Muslim minority and
only when the parties concerned both agree to be subject to National Rules of Engagement
it Otherwise the civil courts have mandatory jurisdiction The purpose of the National Rules of Engagement NRE is
This was a necessary change as Greece was the only European to establish procedures and provide specific instructions
country in which Islamic law sharia was implemented regarding the reaction of the Greek armed forces in crisis

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 119
Ottoman empire 19141920

Conseptual map based
on the daims of the Misak-i Milli Kars, Ardanah & Batumi
with known territorial borders Western Thrace
from 1914, 1918, 1920 and 1878.
Borders of other countries

were highly fluid between
1914-1926, these are not shown.
Unoccupied core territories of the

Ottoman Empire in the bountaries
of 1914 as on the eve of the
Armistrice of Mudros (191810-30).
Dodecanese
Ottoman Empire territory with
Turkish (Muslim) minorities -
leased to third powers (as of 1920).
Former territory of Ottoman Empire
(before 1914) with Turkish (Muslim) Cyprus
majorities.
Arab Majorities.
vilayet
Sanjak
Aleppo Zor Mosul
vilayet
KATHIMERINI
or conflict situations. Such actions can be isolated, incidents other public servants, as well as a small number of experts,
or major crises. The NRE also aim to both preserve national and will function to support KYSEA, which will continue to
prestige and to ensure the minimum loss of life of armed forces' have the central role in decision making. The proposed body,
personnel, while avoiding pointless and provocative actions. which is currently in the final stages of creation, should avoid
The NRE are divided into two categories: (1) those that getting involved in issues of a tactical nature, which should
may not lead to the escalation of a crisis because they are be the focus of ministries and services.
restrictive in nature and are implemented under the authority
of the general staffs of the armed forces, without the need NATO
for special authorization; and (2) those that may cause an An objective and dispassionate historical assessment would
escalation of a crisis and whose implementation requires likely lead to the conclusion that it was an erroneous and
special authorization from the Government Council for National counterproductive view to consider that NATO, as an alliance,
Security (KYSEA). bore significant responsibility for its lack of response to the
It should be noted that, beyond any order or guideline, Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the adoption of a neutral stance
it remains the obligation and the inalienable right of the on the points of friction between Turkey and Greece (that
commander of a unit: or captain of a ship or aircraft to take conclusion regarding non-responsibility of the organization
all necessary measures, in any event, to protect the lives of does not necessarily apply to specific member states). This is
his personnel and the safety of the unit. because, by its nature and charter, NATO did not and does not
have the power of any institutional intervention in disputes
National Security Council (Greece) between its member countries. This sense of injustice has
In order to deal with both external and internal threats and led Greece to not make the most of what NATO can offer: the
challenges to its security, the institutional and organizational training of members of the armed forces, and the transfer of
reinforcement of the national security apparatus and emergency know-how regarding operational doctrines and the structure
response is essential. To this end, it is of critical importance and organization of the armed forces. For a number of reasons,
to establish a high-level body (National Security Council/NSC), NATO membership can be a useful foreign and defense policy
which will be able to design the long-term Greek national tool for Greece. But we should not expect the Alliance to take
strategy, as well as to make policy recommendations to a position regarding the Greek-Turkish conflict (unless Turkey
the country's political leadership: the prime minister and decides or is forced to leave NATO, a scenario whose probability,
the cabinet, or KYSEA - the institutions that, according to while non-zero, remains quite low).
the constitution, are involved in decision making and the
implementation of national security policy. This body - NAVTEX
streamlined, kept to the minimum possible size for its efficient This is an international service which has the aim of
operation - will be staffed by diplomats, military officers and disseminating to ships at sea navigational, meteorological

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 120
and emergency information concerning coastal areas The The Greek participation in this failed operation aside
information is automatically received and directly printed from causing a significant deterioration in the already
Turkey often announces the reservation of large areas in the problematic Greek-Turkish relationship also provoked negative
Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean for naval exercises reactions from the Kurds who felt that at the end Greece
and hydrocarbon exploration betrayed Ocalan It also resulted in tarnishing the country's
image A direct result of the Ocalan case was an effort to
The nineteen thirties 1930s reorganize the Greek National Intelligence Service which
Following the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922 and the Treaty began with the appointment of an active ambassador to the
of Lausanne in 1923 one of the main goals of Eleftherios position of director
Venizelos but also of Kemal Atatürk who wished to transform
Turkey into a modern European-style state was to secure an Operational Control of the Aegean
atmosphere of detente with neighboring states which would Following Greece's withdrawal from the NATO military
allow the country to devote itself without distractions to a command in 1974 Turkey challenged Greece's responsibility
long-term national growth project a necessary step after the for operational control of the Aegean through a series of actions
disastrous Greek-Turkish war of Of 1919-1922 and the resulting The issue was partially resolved with the readmission of Greece
influx of a large number of refugees from Asia Minor in 1980 Turkey continued to raise the issue of operational
The first step in Venizelos plan of diplomatic boundaries and twice tried to set new standards in 1992
engagements was Italy Next came the Greek-Turkish Treaty with NATO's new command structure and in 2000 with
of Friendship Neutrality Conciliation and Arbitration and the the delimitation plan for regions of aerial policing Today
Protocol for Naval Armaments signed in Ankara on October disagreements and periodic friction remain although their
30 1930 On September 14 1933 the two countries signed the importance has diminished significantly due to changes in
Ankara Pact Pact of Cordial Friendship under which they NATO's command structure
undertook to guarantee their common borders as well as to
communicate on international matters of mutual concern Operation Balyoz Sledgehammer
The treaty in question was perhaps not surprisingly under In 2008 a significant number of military officials and other
the circumstances not implemented by Turkey in 1940-41 public servants were brought to trial in Turkey and many were
when Greece was attacked by the Axis powers In any case given long prison sentences as part of the Ergenekon case an
the 1930s have been described as the golden decade of Greek alleged clandestine paramilitary organization with close ties
Turkish relations to the Turkish military and security forces and the deep state
The Erdogan government accused high-ranking members of
NOTAM the Turkish armed forces of drafting plans in 2003 to create a
A NOTAM is a notice to airmen regarding issues of flight hot incident with Greece even involving the shooting down
safety the reservation of areas for aviation exercises etc Turkey of a Turkish airplane through friendly fire with the aim of
routinely reserves large areas of the Aegean for exercises thus destabilizing Turkey and eventually leading to the removal
abusing the relevant right of the AKP government The alleged existence of such plans
created understandable concern in Greece
Ο
Ocalancase
Ρ
The Ocalan case has gone down as an example of unsuccessful Papoulias-Yilmaz Protocol
crisis prevention and management with particularly negative Within the framework of the short-lived easing of tensions
consequences regarding Greece's international image and between Greece and Turkey following the signing of the
Greek-Turkish relations The crisis began with the arrival of the Davos Declaration 1988 the then Greek Foreign Minister
leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party PKK Abdullah Ocalan Karolos Papoulias and his Turkish counterpart Mesut Yilmaz
on Greek soil and ended with his arrest in Kenya following agreed on a protocol of measures for the building of mutual
a twelve-day stay of himself and his entourage in the Greek trust It stipulated among other things a moratorium on
ambassador's residence He was subsequently sentenced to military exercises in the Aegean for a two-month period later
death later commuted to life imprisonment by a Turkish court extended to four months during the tourist season and on
The role of private citizens in the effort to transfer and days of religious or national celebration Greece complains
shelter Ocalan in Greece raised very serious questions The that Turkey frequently violates the protocol
obvious one that arises was who was shaping the foreign
policy of the country the elected government or private The Paris Peace Treaty 1947
citizens whether well-intentioned or not with different goals As a result of consultations between the United States Britain
perceptions or even interests The cost of pursuing a private and the USSR it was agreed that the Dodecanese would be
foreign policy was also particularly high in the Imia crisis The ceded to Greece According to Article 14 of the Paris Peace
result of private actions in the Ocalan case was to burden Treaty 1 Italy hereby cedes to Greece in full sovereignty
Greece with an extremely difficult problem which would the Dodecanese Islands indicated hereafter namely Stampalia
certainly have a high cost but no visible benefit Astropalia Rhodes Rhodos Calki Kharki Scarpanto

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 121
Casos Casso Piscopis Tilos Misiros Nisyros Calimnos that a significant gap exists between the terms of a proposed
Kalymnos Lews Patmos Lipsos Lipso Simi Symi Cos agreement and the stereotypical demands of public opinion
Kos and Castellorizo as well as the adjacent islets 2 These which should neither dictate the moves of the political
islands shall be and shall remain demilitarised leadership nor be ignored the lack of democratic legitimacy
Turkey was not a combatant in the Second World War and and consequent high political costs will create significant
as a result it did not participate in the Paris Peace Conference difficulties in the approval ratification and implementation
and thus it could not put forward any claims regarding the of the agreement
Dodecanese On the basis of multiple official and unofficial
Turkish statements over the years there is little doubt that the
ceding of the entire Dodecanese to Greece was a significant
R
disappointment for Turkey Rocky islets
According to the United Nations Convention for the Law of
Procès-Verbal of Berne the Sea UNCLOS islands have full rights to maritime zones
Following the sailing of the Turkish research vessel Sismik I This excludes rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or
into the Aegean discussions were undertaken in November economic life and therefore do not have the right to maritime
1976 which led to the signing of the Procès-Verbal of Berne zones Economic Exclusion Zone Continental Shelf other
The procès-verbal was not intended to resolve the problems than territorial waters There is no other definition of islet
between the two countries and it did not address the substance in the Convention
of the dispute It sought to establish a code of behavior and
the general framework within which the discussions between Russia Greece Turkey
the two countries might proceed In recent years Russia has sought to strengthen its economic
The problem that arose in relation to the procès-verbal energy in the sectors of natural gas and nuclear power and
was located in paragraph 6 which stipulated that the two military S-400 air defense system ties with Turkey It is
countries would abstain from any initiatives or actions that possible that Russo-Turkish cooperation on the basis of common
were related to the continental shelf of the Aegean There were political and economic interests is of a rather opportunistic
two points of contention The first concerned the time limitation nature not a true strategic partnership Also disagreements
set on this abstention from explorations of the continental shelf appear to exist between the two countries regarding the
The second point concerned the geographical area covered situation in Syria Libya and lately in Nagorno-Karabakh
by the procès-verbal Both issues were raised with pressing However these differences have so far been manageable
urgency during the crisis of March 1987 and they continue to and it appears that so far at least a modus vivendi has been
preoccupy to a certain extent the two countries until today found The deepening of Russo-Turkish relations is a source
since Turkey deems that the moratorium on exploration which of serious concern for both the US and NATO
was agreed covers the entire Aegean This thaw in Russian-Turkish relations came as a rather
unpleasant surprise for some in Greece It shouldn't have
Public opinion and Greek-Turkish relations because Russia a traditional great power formulates its foreign
The responsibility for the incomplete reporting and distorted policy on the basis of its national interests rather than any
views regarding certain foreign policy issues is shared by a sentimental considerations regarding history or religious
significant portion of the Greek political intellectual and faith As a result any high expectations of substantive Russian
journalistic elites For many years they have opted to publicly support of Greece in the context of its problems with Turkey
support stereotypical views and opinions that have little or on the issue of Cyprus should be avoided Having said this
to do with reality rather than informing the Greek public there are still significant mutual interests between Greece
objectively as they have the responsibility to do about the and Russia and an effort to improve bilateral relations and
real dimensions of t he problem to seek realistic areas of cooperation is imperative for Greece
In the case of Greek-Turkish relations in particular
it is extremely important to have a sober public debate and
to provide responsible and well-substantiated answers to S
questions such as which disputes concern sovereign rights Scramble
and which are about operational responsibilities Where does Scramble is a command for take-off in the shortest possible time
international law favor Greece and where does it not Which a few minutes maximum of fighter aircraft that the Hellenic
actions being taken by Turkey in the Aegean are illegal and Air Force is routinely keeping in a state of readiness This tactic
which are not What would be a realistic way for resolving is used to quickly identify and intercept Turkish aircraft that
the bilateral problems and what would be the positive and commit violations and infringements in the Aegean
negative consequences of implementing that option
Any solution to serious foreign policy problems which Search Rescue SAR
inevitably will involve some elements of compromise while Search and rescue for maritime accidents is conducted under
of course taking into account vital national interests must the framework of the 1979 Hamburg International Convention
enjoy at least a basic level of support among the citizens of on Maritime Search and Rescue For air accidents search and
a country who must be sufficiently informed In the event rescue is governed by the relevant agreements established

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 122
Military bases in the Eastern Mediterranean

Ankara
Ο
TURKEY
CYPRUS
Γ r1 Q Hmeymin air base
Q Ο Dhekelia Q Tartus naval base
Akrotiri
through the International Civil Aviation Organization ICAO Greeks in the city were expelled or forced to leave their homes
According to the Regional Air Navigation Agreement of 1952 and properties and find refuge in Greece From 100,000 Greek
the areas of responsibility of states for aviation accidents inhabitants of the city in 1923 today only 2,000-3,000 remain
correspond to the Flight Information Regions FIRs In the including mixed marriages while out of the 8,200 inhabitants
event of a plane crash in which the aircraft goes into the sea of the islands of Gökceada Imbros and Bozcaada Tenedos
the relevant search and rescue provisions of the ICAO apply very few elderly people remain
In the case of maritime accidents on the other hand the
Hamburg Convention stipulates that in areas of the high seas Sevres Syndrome
an agreement must first be reached between any adjacent The so-called Sevres Syndrome or ghost of Sevres i.e the
coastal states possibility of the fragmentation of Turkey as a result of the
Since 1944 Greece has coordinated the search and rescue plans and actions of various external forces is directly related
operations in all high-sea areas of the Aegean The search and to the Kurdish problem It is a concern of a psychological
rescue zone is aligned with that of the FIR There has been no nature that is not supported by events However it seems that
agreement between Greece and Turkey with regard to maritime it has long influenced the way of thinking and behavior of the
accidents however as Turkey is seeking to equate aviation Turkish military-political establishment
and maritime accidents and consequently to challenge the
limits of the Athens FIR It should be noted that search and Souda Bay naval air base
rescue like the issue of air traffic control in the Athens FIR Souda Bay is a deep-sea port and advanced naval base for the
see related entry are not questions of sovereign rights but support of US and NATO armed forces operating in the Eastern
of administrative responsibilities Mediterranean and the Middle East It is considered by the US
to be a military installation of high importance in a particularly
September events or Istanbul pogrom volatile region It also houses the Greek-administered NATO
On September 6 1955 in connection to international Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center NMIOTC
developments regarding the Cyprus problem and in response where Special Forces from all the allied forces are trained Use
to a bomb placed by a Turkish agent in the house where Kemal of Souda Bay by the US is expected to increase as a result of
Ataturk was born in Thessaloniki a Turkish mob with the the renewal of the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement
tolerance of the Turkish authorities as was proven in 1960 during MDCA between Greece and the US
the trial of Adnan Menderes who was prime minister at the
time committed acts of violence against the Greek population Straits used for international navigation
of Istanbul with a number of murders rapes and beatings and As mentioned in the relevant entry the right of innocent
looted Greek homes shops schools and cemeteries passage was not considered enough to meet the needs of
These events constituted the first major blow against the travelling ships For this reason a new regime was created in
Greek population of Istanbul In 1964 most of the remaining the Convention on the Law of the Sea which applies in parallel

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 123
with that of innocent passage It is the regime of transit does this on the premise that the US and the Europeans will not
passage and it applies only to straits used for international allow a prolonged clash between Turkey and Greece Therefore
navigation air and naval operations will be of decisive importance during
Straits used for international navigation belong to the the early stages of hostilities
territorial sea of a state and connect one part of the high seas or Peace with Greece depends exclusively on maintaining
an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or unquestionable military superiority on the Turkish side The
an exclusive economic zone In the straits used for international key for stability in the Aegean is Turkey's power of deterrence
navigation the transit of vessels is exercised without being In a second phase after the extension of national
impeded by the coastal state which generally cannot prohibit territorial waters to 12 nautical miles Greece intends to declare
the transit of ships The only restrictions concern the obligation that the triangle demarcated by Rhodes Crete and Cyprus
of traveling vessels to not navigate in a manner that could constitutes its own exclusive economic zone In this manner
endanger the security of the coastal state to not pollute the it will enclose Turkey inside a strategic zone extending from
sea to comply with the rules of navigation and finally to not Lemnos opposite the Dardanelles to the Gulf of Iskenderun
engage in fishing and research activities or smuggling It is and it will place under its control all supply routes to Anatolia
accepted that submarines can transit international straits Turkey deems that the creation of a political crisis with
submerged In addition the UNCLOS gives aircraft the right Syria that will culminate in a conflict will provide Greece with
to fly over and transit international straits freely a right the opportunity to realize its designs in the Aegean and force
which is not provided by the regime of innocent passage Turkey to fight on two fronts
through territorial waters Finally no prior permit from or From now onwards Turkey must not rely on the
even notification of the coastal state is required collective defense of NATO Turkey must rely exclusively on
In the case of the Aegean straits used for international its own powers
navigation are those that are located within territorial waters In the event of a military conflict between Turkey and
and connect one part of the high seas with another i.e virtually a neighboring state foreign support for the PKK will increase
all the areas connecting the northern with the southern Aegean and this internal threat will require the engagement of a far
and the passages around Crete The geography of the Aegean greater military force
with its large number of islands in combination with the The potential attackers against Turkey i.e Greece and
6-mile territorial sea create a large number of straits many Syria will coordinate their moves
of which could po tentially be considered as straits used for For the above reasons Turkey must adopt a strategic
international navigation For this reason Greece submitted policy of two-and-a-half wars that is to say of two simultaneous
a statement in 1982 claiming the right to limit the number large-scale operations in the Aegean and on its southeastern
of straits used for international navigation in the Aegean borders and to be prepared for a half war in the country's
and to specify which of the many alternative straits could be interior against the PKK
used for transit passage Despite the statement the issue of
establishing the routes where the right of transit passage Treaty of Lausanne 1923
can be exercised remained dormant This is the basic treaty governing Greek-Turkish relations With
the Treaty of Lausanne Turkey reclaimed Eastern Thrace which
Τ the Treaty of Sevres had ceded to Greece Turkey also took
back the area of Smyrna Izmir Greece retained the Aegean
The Theory of Two-and-a-Half Wars islands except for two at the entrance of the Dardanelles
In 1996 an article by a senior Turkish diplomat Sukru Elekdag Gôkçeada Imbros and Bozcaada Tenedos Finally Ankara
was published on the subject of the Two-and-a-Half-War recognized the annexation of Cyprus by Great Britain and
Strategy in the March-May issue of the Turkish journal of the Dodecanese by Italy Also the mandatory exchange of
Perceptions This quarterly journal was published by the populations between Greece and Turkey was agreed while the
Strategic Studies Center which was funded by the Ministry Muslims of Western Thrace and the Greeks who were settled
for Foreign Affairs Mr Elekdag was one of the two experts before 1918 in Constantinople Istanbul were excluded
appointed by Turkey for the wise men dialogue with Greece No wonder that Tayyip Erdogan's statements about the
and someone with significant influence in the Ministry of revision or modernization of the Lausanne Treaty have caused
Foreign Affairs Below are excerpts featuring the key points concern and apprehension in Greece Even if one accepts the
made in the article explanation that it was addressed to an internal audience and
In order to cause social and political chaos in Turkey's challenging the existing regime in the Aegean and Thrace may
internal affairs and so as to be able to impose a state of fait have not been his primary motive how should one interpret
accompli in the Aegean Greece is providing significant financial the frequent declarations concerning Turkey's interest droit
support to the Kurdistan Workers Party PKK Moreover de regard in the language of diplomacy or perhaps right to
it sends PKK terrorists who have settled in its territory to openly intervene in a vast region starting from the Balkans
Turkey so that they may carry out attacks against the Turkish and reaching as far as Central Asia and beyond
tourism industry The mixture of pan-Turanism and neo-Ottomanism with
Athens seeks to change the balance of power in the Islam as a cohesive force is the spiritual child of Turgut Özal
Aegean to its own benefit as regards naval and air forces It a prime minister and later president of Turkey 1983-1993

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 124
IRAQ
LEBANON
ISRAEL
GAZA —
LIBYA
EGYPT
Erdogan's statements also show touches of Russian influence The importance of Israel for the US and Egypt's key
as President Putin for whom Erdogan has openly expressed role in the Arab world and the Middle East in general make
his admiration has adopted a doctrine bearing his name that these efforts for strategic cooperation even more attractive
refers among other to the protection of Russian minorities and potentially beneficial for Greece and Cyprus The EU
in the former Soviet Union also benefits indirectly from closer cooperation between two
member states and two important regional players
Tripartite cooperation between Greece and Cyprus The strategic relationship with Israel will remain one
with Israel and Egypt of the key elements of Greek foreign policy Of course Greece
In turbulent times and/or periods of limited financial resources will have to walk a fine line between strategic interests on
for the exercise of an active foreign policy cooperation with the one hand and historical ties and a sense of justice but
neighboring states and the establishment of alliances at a also the potential impact on regional stability on the other
tactical and strategic level may constitute an extremely useful when it comes to the Palestinian problem
tool for the promotion of national interests This is precisely the Now that the tripartite cooperative relationships have been
logic behind the evolving triangular cooperation between established the priority must be on the deepening of relations
Greece and Cyprus with Israel and Egypt respectively A with Israel and Egypt Exchanges of visits at the level of heads
common factor in both cases is the difficult to poor relations of of state and senior ministers are certainly important but the
Cairo Tel Aviv Nicosia and Athens with Ankara Of course the creation of institutional and personal links between mid-level
existence of a common adversary does not by itself constitute a officials who will remain in positions of responsibility for quite
solid basis for building a relationship of strategic cooperation some time and will therefore ensure the necessary continuity
Cooperation should be based on common interests and this is also of high significance In this framework in addition to
is what the states mentioned above are trying to accomplish the extremely useful military exercises one should explore
Examining the stance of all Greek governments since various ideas including student exchanges in English-language
2010 it is positive that there has been remarkable continuity on programs at Military Academies the creation of joint working
this matter Continuity and consistency are key prerequisites groups for information analysis crisis management exercises
for a successful foreign policy In the case at hand there exist and simulation-based wargaming joint seminars at diplomatic
important common interests between the countries involved academies and military schools parliamentary working groups
including the exploitation of potential energy resources the cooperation on combatting Islamic terrorism etc
exchange of information on security matters the need for It is expected that the tripartite cooperative relationships
broader political military and economic cooperation as well will contribute to the creation of an axis of stability in the
as the containment of state and non-state actors that act in a troubled Eastern Mediterranean Such cooperation could be
destabilizing manner expanded to include Jordan Lebanon the UAE as well as

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 125
the US which has expressed its interest for a 3+1 format its previous solely Western-oriented approach This does of
and France The effort for the creation of a regional security course entail a risk of strategic overextension particularly if
architecture in a region where there are no such institutions diplomatic and military activity is not backed by the necessary
should be open-ended in terms of joint activities and also economic strength
open to the membership of other countries from the region According to Davutoglu Turkey should endeavor to
provided they behave in a non-aggressive manner and respect implement a multi-level multi-dimensional foreign policy
a basic code of conduct making overtures in all directions If these efforts are
successful the benefits will certainly be considerable However
Turkey-Saraj Memorandum as analysts have pointed out it is by no means easy to succeed
On November 27 2019 Turkey and the UN-recognized Saraj in simultaneously satisfying different partners that on certain
government of Libya also known as the Government of National issues have conflicting interests And in today's circumstances
Accord/GNA signed two memoranda The first concerns the a number of questions arise Can Turkey successfully integrate
delimitation of maritime zones between the two countries these multiple dimensions independent nationalist Islamic
and the second deals with the provision of Turkish military pan-Turkist/neo-Ottomanist global and Western Do Turkey's
assistance to Libya The content of the first highly favorable ambitions continue to be compatible with the strategic
to Turkey memorandum was largely determined by the objectives of the West Indeed analysts and officials in the
dependence of the Saraj government on Ankara As one analyst US have for some time been asking the question Who lost
summed it up Saraj breathes with Turkish lungs Turkey concerned that the country has clearly been moving
The memorandum on the delimitation of maritime zones away from the West
not only ignores the relevant provisions of the international law One should note the role of the powerful lobby of the
of the sea convention as it recognizes only territorial waters of Eurasianists who promote the idea of Turkey making a strategic
six nautical miles and not the right to a continental shelf and shift towards Asia as they believe the West has entered a period
EEZ for Greek islands such as Crete Rhodes and Karpathos of decline However it appears that the influence of this school
but also defies logic and common sense something that is of thought has waned recently as the Turkish president has
immediately apparent from a simple glance at the map engaged in to an effort to square the circle by maintaining
The memorandum on maritime delimitation is a direct close ties with Russia but also avoiding sanctions from the US
challenge and threat to Greek sovereign rights and national returning to the F-35 jet fighter program and securing some
interests as if acted upon as Turkey threatens to do in the form form of support for the ailing Turkish economy
of hydrocarbon exploration and drilling it will completely cut Generally speaking Erdogan has managed to strengthen
off Greece from the Eastern Mediterranean Greece's aim is his country's international role and influence partly by
to delegitimize this memorandum mainly through a partial exploiting international circumstances Of course the policy
delimitation agreement it signed in July 2020 with Egypt At of zero problems with neighbors the brainchild of then
the political level once the Turkey-Libya memorandum was foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu has not been successfully
signed the Greek government had no choice but to support implemented Despite Turkey's perceived importance for the US
through diplomatic means the rival faction that of the Libyan there are clearly visible dark clouds over US-Turkish relations
National Army LNA led by General Haftar Greece has also Relations between Turkey and the EU have been at an impasse for
developed good relations with Angila Saleh the Speaker of the a number of years with no progress in accession negotiations in
internationally recognized Libyan Parliament based in Tobruk part due to the Cyprus problem but also and more importantly
which opposes the Saraj government Europe's inability to play due to Turkey's failure to meet accession criteria
a decisive role in its immediate neighborhood and the limited In the Balkans Turkey continues its policy of neo
interest of the United States have opened the door for other Ottomanism centered on Muslim/Turkish minorities and with
actors Turkey Russia UAE turning the Libyan civil war into a a particular focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina Kosovo North
complex international conflict Egypt is deeply concerned not Macedonia although the normalization of relations with Greece
wanting to see a neighboring country dominated by the Muslim appears to be hampering Turkish plans and Albania while its
Brotherhood and becoming a pawn of Turkey An attempt by interest in Western Thrace remains undiminished However
the GNA to seize additional territory especially oil-rich areas it can be argued that Ankara has clearly overestimated the
is likely to provoke an Egyptian military intervention attractiveness of the Ottoman past for the peoples of the Balkans
Ankara has made a major political and military and the same can be said of the Middle East while Turkey's
investment in Libya as part of its bid to become a dominant continuing path of divergence from the EU which despite
power in the Eastern Mediterranean It has even sought to its problems and weaknesses remains the clear priority for
acquire permanent military bases in Libya It is however too the countries of the Western Balkans only serves to constrain
early to judge the success or failure of Turkey's Libya policy the expansion of Turkish influence in the Balkan Peninsula
At the same time Turkey's emergence as an energy
Turkish foreign policy and Strategic Depth hub remains a top priority for Ankara and in this context it
the Davutoglu doctrine continues to actively press ahead on different energy fronts
According to the architect of the AKP's foreign policy Ahmet such as the Southern Gas Corridor and TurkStream while also
Davutoglu Turkey is striving to build its foreign policy along seeking to participate in the exploitation of hydrocarbons in
alternative strategic axes strategic depth as opposed to the Eastern Mediterranean

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 126
Turkish NAVTEX in the Eastern Mediterranean

NAVTEX 1024/20
between August and October 2020
10-23 August 2020
TURKEY
NAVTEX 1062/20
23-27 August 2020 Marmaris
NAVTEX 1085/20
27 August 1 September 2020
NAVTEX 1093/20
2 12 September 2020
NAVTEX 1262/20 CYPRUS

12 22 October 2020
Mediterranean Sea
HE It is also important to point out that present-day Turkey Turkish strategy in the Aegean
appears to have fallen victim to what has been termed the Turkey has a long-term strategy of increasing the part of the
arrogance of power having lost any sense of moderation Aegean it controls directly or indirectly Possible motives
and proportion on many foreign policy issues Historically include the need for free navigation as that is perceived by
strategic overextension the gap between goals and means Ankara the desire to participate in the exploitation of the
is not an uncommon phenomenon in international politics wealth-producing resources in the Aegean to the extent
Today one can see a systematic tendency towards that they exist in substantial quantities and in the Eastern
the overestimation of Turkey's undeniably considerable Mediterranean as well as the mindset of a major regional
capabilities coupled with a systematic underestimation of power that seeks to impose its will on neighboring states
its serious problems To achieve its goal it uses a variety of tools
Finally from a Greek point of view the management airspace infringements/violations legal arguments about
of Greek-Turkish relations is made even more difficult by the the demilitarization of islands disputing search and rescue
decision-making system in Ankara all important decisions are jurisdiction casus belli threats regarding territorial waters
being taken by a tight circle of advisors in a closed environment and the particularly dangerous theory of gray zones and
where dissent is not encouraged while formerly important the questioning of the sovereignty of a number of islands
actors such as the Foreign Ministry have been marginalized including inhabited ones
The whole situation has become even more complicated because
of the insecurity of the Turkish president both personal
following the failed coup in July 2016 and political his concern
U
about losing domestic political dominance due to economic USA Greece Turkey
and other problems as well as his very ambitious plans for the history of the triangular
One could write a great deal about
2023 and his legacy relationship between Washington Athens and Ankara Today

Σελίδα: . . . . . . . . 127
relations between the US and Turkey are particularly difficult

in contrast to relations between the US and Greece which
are going through their best period in recent history The
Naval Base at Souda Bay in Crete is of great significance to
American military activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and
beyond and there have occasionally been rumors of plans to
transfer some military activities from the air base of Incirlik
to military installations in Greece
In October 2019 the Mutual Defense Cooperation
Agreement MDCA was signed which foresees an increased
American military presence in Greece and a deepening of the
strategic relationship between the two countries The US has
shown a particular interest in the port of Alexandroupolis
both from an energy and a military perspective The US is
also interested in the triangular cooperation between Greece
Cyprus-Israel and its own participation in the scheme in a
3+1 format and it has moreover taken the step during the
past few months of issuing strong and clear statements of
support in favor of the Greek positions on issues such as the
memorandum between Turkey and Fayez al-Sarraj and the
right of islands to a continental shelf and an EEZ This positive
stance of the State Department and the broader national
security apparatus has been somewhat offset however by
the close personal relationship between Presidents Trump and
Erdogan It remains to be seen whether US foreign policy visa-vis
Turkey will be markedly different under President Biden
In any case this very good relationship with Washington
is particularly welcome in Athens yet it would be wise not
to set expectations too high given the ever-present objective
of the US to not lose a country of high geostrategic value
such as Turkey
Vision for 2023

This is a particularly ambitious plan for the centenary of the
Republic of Turkey Among other goals it foresees that Turkey
will rank among the ten biggest economies worldwide today
Turkey ranks 17th with a GDP of 2 trillion it is about 850
billion today exports of 500 billion income per capita of
25,000 and unemployment reduced to just 5 The plan
also includes the construction and operation of three nuclear
energy power plants with a total capacity of 4,700 MWe the
development of ports to be among the top ten largest worldwide
the domestic production of aircraft unmanned aircraft and
satellites and Turkey becoming the fifth most important
tourist destination in the world with over 50 million visitors
each year and 50 billion of revenue from tourism In addition
Turkey will be a member of the EU This legacy is very
important for Erdogan in his quest to be remembered in his
people's minds and in history books as the most important
leader in the history of the modern Turkish state

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1.

GLOSSARY OF GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

The Glossary of Greek-Turkish Relations was

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

with a loose federal structure the vagueness regarding the

UNCLOS MARITIME ZONES

NATIONAL AIRSPACE INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE

EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

ç Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe CFE and a

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

Balance of military forces GREECE WM TURKEY

857 355,000 8.8

Populations million GDP(bn USD Personnel Defence expenditures bn USD

34 F-4 43 Mirage-2000 154 F-16 61 F-4 260 F-16 7 tanker aircraft

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

• The dialogue is conducted on the basis of a well-designed Energy Greece

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

Syrian refugees naboring countries 5,573,384

CountryI Source Data date Population

Lebanon UNHCR 30 September 2020 15.8

Jordan UNHCR 4 September 2020 11.8

Iraq UNHCR 31 October 2020 4.3

Egypt UNHCR 30 September 2020 2.3

Other North Africa UNHCR 31 January 2020 0.6

G as Oinousses Agathonisi and Farmakonisi The ownership

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

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Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

The Kurdish issue

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

Kurdish populations in Tur

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

remains of vital importance as an in-depth understanding of

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

Ottoman empire 19141920

Borders of other countries

Unoccupied core territories of the

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

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Military bases in the Eastern Mediterranean

Μέσο: . . . . . . . . . INTERNATIONAL NEW YORK TIMES_ΕΙΔΙΚΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ

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Turkish NAVTEX in the Eastern Mediterranean

NAVTEX 1262/20 CYPRUS