Dressen Complaint Filed 5.22.23

Case 3:23-cv-00155 Document 1 Filed on 05/22/23 in TXSD Page 1 of 124
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
BRIANNE DRESSEN, ERNEST

RAMIREZ, SHAUN BARCAVAGE,
SUZANNA NEWELL, NIKKI HOLLAND,
and KRISTI DOBBS,
Plaintiffs,
COMPLAINT FOR
v. DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF
ROB FLAHERTY, White House Director of
Digital Strategy, in his official capacity; JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., President of the
United States, in his official capacity;
KARINE JEAN-PIERRE, White House Case No. 3:23-cv-155
Press Secretary, in her official capacity;
COURTNEY ROWE, White House Covid-
19 Director of Strategic Communications and
Engagement, in her official capacity;
CLARKE HUMPHREY, White House
Digital Director for the Covid-19 Response
Team, in her official capacity;
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES; XAVIER
BECERRA, Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services, in his official
capacity; VIVEK MURTHY, United States
Surgeon General, in his official capacity;
ERIC WALDO, Chief Engagement Officer
for the Surgeon General, in his official
capacity; CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION; CAROL
Y. CRAWFORD, Chief of the Digital Media
Branch of the Division of Public Affairs at the
CDC, in her official capacity;
DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; ALEJANDRO
MAYORKAS, Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security, in his official capacity;
CYBERSECURITY AND
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY
AGENCY; JEN EASTERLY, Director of
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the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security

Agency, in her official capacity;
THE STANFORD INTERNET
OBSERVATORY; ALEX STAMOS,
Director of the Stanford Internet Observatory;
RENEE DIRESTA, Research Manager of the
Stanford Internet Observatory;
Defendants.
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
It is axiomatic that the government may not “induce, encourage, or promote private persons
to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.” Norwood v. Harrison, 413
U.S. 455, 465 (1973). Nor may it coerce or induce a private entity to take action that the
Constitution prohibits the government from doing directly. Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at
Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1226 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Indeed, it is essential to free government that the First Amendment be safeguarded “to the
ends that men may speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be exposed
through the processes of education and discussion.” Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
As George Orwell put it, “[i]f liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what
they do not want to hear.” It is not the government’s role to curate, filter, or suppress disfavored
speech before it reaches the eyes and ears of American citizens. Yet, that is precisely what
transpired—and continues to occur—here.
This case challenges the government’s mass-censorship program and the shocking role that
it has played (and still plays) in ensuring that disfavored viewpoints deemed a threat to its agenda
are suppressed. This sprawling censorship enterprise has involved the efforts of myriad federal
agencies and government actors (including within the White House itself) to direct, coerce, and,
ultimately, work in concert with social media platforms to censor, muffle, and flag as
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“misinformation” speech that conflicts with the government’s preferred narrative—including
speech that the government explicitly acknowledges to be true.
Plaintiffs in this case—Brianne Dressen, Shaun Barcavage, Kristi Dobbs, Nikki Holland,
Suzanna Newell, and Ernest Ramirez—all use social media and have or had accounts on several
platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Twitter, TikTok, and GoFundMe. All
Plaintiffs except for Mr. Ramirez suffered—and continue to experience—serious and debilitating
medical injuries within days (and, in many cases, hours) after taking one of the Covid vaccines.
Mr. Ramirez’s 16-year-old son Ernest Ramirez, Jr. died five days after taking his first dose of the
Pfizer Covid vaccine. All six Plaintiffs have relied on social media as a means of: sharing their
personal experiences after they, or a loved one, were medically harmed after taking the vaccine;
exchanging advice, medical research, and support with others who were injured after taking the
vaccine; and engaging with other users in private support groups for vaccine-injured individuals
and their loved ones. Plaintiffs’ use of social media in these ways has been met with heavy and
ongoing censorship.
Plaintiffs’ speech has repeatedly been flagged as misinformation or removed entirely,
while their social media accounts are at constant risk of being frozen or disabled. For example, in
July of 2021, Facebook shut down a private support group for vaccine-injured individuals called
“A Wee Sprinkle of Hope,” of which Ms. Dressen was a member, after she posted an infographic
that listed certain symptoms that people had experienced post-Covid vaccine, as well as a link to
a press conference where she had recently spoken about her vaccine injuries. Facebook informed
her that the group was disabled for violating Facebook’s “Community Standards on
misinformation that could cause physical harm.”
3
In August of 2021, after Mr. Ramirez’s son died, he launched a GoFundMe page to help
fundraise enough money for a trip to Washington, D.C. to speak about his son’s story. A week
later, GoFundMe informed Mr. Ramirez that his account had been removed for violating the
platform’s terms of service for “Prohibited Conduct.” As a result, all the funds that Mr. Ramirez
had raised were forfeited. On November 11, 2021, which would have been his son’s seventeenth
birthday, Mr. Ramirez posted a photo on Facebook and Twitter of himself beside his son’s casket
at his funeral. The caption of the photo read: “My good byes to my Baby Boy.” Facebook flagged
the post with a warning box viewable to other users labeling it as “partly false information.”
Twitter deleted the photo altogether and warned Mr. Ramirez: “Make sure you’re sharing reliable
information. Visit the COVID-19 Information Center for reliable vaccine info and resources.”
On multiple occasions, TikTok removed Ms. Holland’s video posts in which she shared
her personal experiences after taking the Covid vaccine, including her medical injuries and
recovery process. TikTok notified her that the videos violated “Community Guidelines” for
posting “violent and graphic content” and for “integrity and authenticity” concerns.
In the summer of 2021, Mr. Barcavage created a private support group on Facebook for
those who were suffering tinnitus post-vaccination. Facebook frequently labeled posts within the
group as “misinformation” or with a message redirecting viewers to “more accurate information”
on the CDC website. As the group administrator, Mr. Barcavage had to develop code words with
the other members, such as “vee” for vaccines, to prevent posts, including links to news articles
and medical journals, from being flagged as misinformation or removed entirely.
On June 28, 2021, Ms. Dobbs participated in a press conference held by U.S. Senator Ron
Johnson, along with other vaccine-injured individuals, where they shared their post-vaccine
experiences. Within twenty-four hours of the press conference, one of Ms. Dobbs’s private support
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groups on Facebook was shut down, and member lists were eliminated entirely under the claim
that the group had been spreading “misinformation.” A few days after the press conference,
another Facebook support group to which Ms. Dobbs belonged was shut down for posting a link
to the press conference and an infographic displaying symptoms that people had experienced post-
vaccination. As a result of Facebook’s shutdown of the group, Ms. Dobbs lost contact with nearly
two thousand other vaccine-injured individuals who had been members of the group.
On September 30, 2022, Ms. Newell posted a video entitled “Kindness” on YouTube in
which she and a vaccine-injured friend discussed their difficult experiences and how “Team
Humanity” and the kindness of others had allowed them to maintain hope. They did not make any
claims about the Covid vaccine. YouTube removed the video for “misinformation” and for
violating its Community Guidelines.
The vast majority of Plaintiffs’ censored speech was deeply personal and frequently
private. For attempting simply to engage with others and to discuss their own pain, experiences,
advice, and sources of hope, however, they have been met with censorship and accusations of
spreading lies and “inciting violence.” Through this irrational and brutal censorship regime,
Defendants have treated what is, in truth, personal and intimate speech as impermissible political
dissent to the government’s preferred policies. Thus, what began as personal and intimate has
been forcibly converted into political speech by government suppression. Plaintiffs are innocent
victims in the federal government’s exhaustive crusade against any message that might threaten—
or even question—its vaccination agenda.
Under the First Amendment, the federal government must play no role in policing private
speech or picking winners and losers in the marketplace of ideas. Indeed, the Constitution’s text
is explicit: “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. Amend
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I. Hence, any law or policy that merely “abridges” or reduces the constitutionally protected sphere
of speech violates the First Amendment. Yet federal officials have been doing that and more here
as they chip away at the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech and supplant it with what
amounts to government-induced censorship. Through threats, pressure, inducement, and coercion,
Defendants now work in concert with social media companies to censor content the government
deems “disinformation,” “misinformation,” and “malinformation”—a feat that the government
could never lawfully accomplish alone. Secretary Mayorkas of DHS commented that the
government’s efforts to police private speech on social media are occurring “across the federal
enterprise.” It turns out that this statement is quite literally true.
Defendants’ own words, documents from Twitter and the government itself, along with
discovery produced in the lawsuit Missouri v. Biden, chronicle Defendants’ extensive efforts in
staggering detail. Defendants are engaged in egregious violations of the First Amendment across
numerous federal agencies—including the White House, the Office of the Surgeon General, the
CDC, DHS, and CISA—as well as massive government/private joint censorship enterprises,
including the Stanford Internet Observatory’s “Virality Project,” to target and suppress speech on
the basis of content (i.e., Covid vaccine-related speech) and viewpoint (i.e., speech raising doubt
or concern about Covid vaccines’ safety and efficacy and the extent and severity of side effects).
As alleged further herein, numerous emails, as well as evidence of regular meetings, phone
calls, and exchanges of information between Defendants and major social media platforms,
unveiled in Missouri v. Biden, the Twitter Files, and Defendants’ own public documents, reveal
that Defendants have been directing social media censorship of constitutionally protected speech
when it runs counter to the message that the government wishes to propagate. One of the primary
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objectives of Defendants’ mass censorship program has been to chill and suppress speech related
to the Covid vaccine and its—sometimes devastating—side effects.
As just one example, in an email exchange in March, 2021 between a Facebook executive
and the White House Director of Digital Media, Rob Flaherty informed the Facebook executive:
“We are gravely concerned that your service is one of the top drivers of vaccine hesitancy—period.
… We want to know that you’re trying, we want to know how we can help, and we want to know
that you’re not playing a shell game … this would all be a lot easier if you would just be straight
with us.” In a clear attempt to appease the White House official, the Facebook executive replied
about a week later, informing Flaherty that Facebook had made a number of policy changes,
including the removal of “Groups, Pages and Accounts” containing, in the executive’s words,
“often-true content” that “can be framed as sensation, alarmist, or shocking.”1
Among the Defendants is one private entity, the Stanford Internet Observatory (SIO),
which describes itself as “a cross-disciplinary program of research, teaching and policy
engagement for the study of abuse in current information technologies, with a focus on social
media.” During the Covid-19 pandemic, SIO launched the Virality Project (or VP) as a means of
tracking and censoring Covid-related speech on social media platforms. According to the Virality
Project’s report, dated April 26, 2022, the VP targeted speech by “domestic actors” (i.e., American
citizens) that “questioned the safety, distribution, and effectiveness of the vaccines.”2 According
to VP, true medical injuries and adverse health effects from the Covid vaccine qualify as
“misinformation” when “shared absent context.”3 Similarly, VP categorized as misinformation
1
See Jenin Younes & Aaron Kheriaty, The White House Covid Censorship Machine, The Wall Street Journal (Jan.
8, 2023), https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-covid-censorship-machine-social-media-facebook-meta-
executive-rob-flaherty-free-speech-google-11673203704.
2
Stanford Internet Observatory, et al., The Virality Project, “Memes, Magnets, and Microchips: Narrative Dynamics
Around COVID-19 Vaccines” (Apr. 26, 2022), https://purl.stanford.edu/mx395xj8490.
3
Id.
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“[p]ersonal anecdotes,” and it deemed “adverse event stories” objectionable because they are
“employed to push back against vaccine mandates.”4 According to VP’s report, six major social
media platforms censored content at VP’s instigation: Facebook (including Instagram), Twitter,
Google (including YouTube), TikTok, Medium, and Pinterest. The report explains that such
censorship was effective in “deplatforming” recurring actors, which “led to an apparent reduction
in false or misleading content.”5
In July, 2021, Ms. Dressen’s activities were detailed in a report created by the Virality
Project. The purpose of VP’s report was to cultivate “real-time detection, analysis, and response
to COVID-19 anti-vaccine and mis- and disinformation” and to support “information exchange
between public health officials, government, and social media platforms.”6 Under the heading
“Ongoing Themes and Tactics,” the report singles out Ms. Dressen and expresses skepticism of
her “claims [of] life-altering injuries,” concluding that: “An injury story that does not have a
proven causal link to the vaccine nevertheless garnered high spread because it was picked up by a
major anti-vaccine activist and by conservative politicians engaged in prior anti-vaccine
activities.”7 Notably, in June, 2021, Ms. Dressen visited the United States National Institutes of
Health (NIH) as part of its “Investigation of persistent neurological symptoms following SARS-
CoV2 vaccine.” NIH confirmed that she had suffered Covid vaccine-induced medical conditions.
This fact is not featured in VP’s report.
Crucially, the Virality Project expressly admits that it works closely with federal
government agencies and officials to carry out this joint censorship enterprise—and that it seeks
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Virality Project Weekly Briefing #31, July 20, 2021 – July 27, 2021,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/60025974f9f7920e6b40885b/t/6100842926d6617b4ab85e36/1627423792279/
Virality+Project+-+0727+Weekly+Briefing.pdf.
7
Id.
8
to develop even closer ties. According to its report, among VP’s key “stakeholders” are federal
health agencies, including CDC and the Office of the Surgeon General, which are engaged in
continuous, ongoing communication and close collaboration with VP to effect a “whole-of-
society” effort to include an active role for the government in censoring disfavored, vaccine-related
speech.8 As alleged in further detail herein, SIO has plainly worked in concert with the government
Defendants to censor speech on social media regarding the Covid vaccine and its side effects. SIO
is thus sued as a de facto government agent.
The federal government has launched a war against purported mis-, dis-, and
malinformation, which it claims must be suppressed despite the First Amendment, to protect
American citizens from supposedly harmful or dangerous ideas. Indeed, Defendants admit to
suppressing truthful speech, including stories of vaccine side effects that it has expressly
acknowledged to be true, but which the government nevertheless targets for censorship because
such speech “could fuel vaccine hesitancy.”9 Experience, however, “should teach us to be most
on our guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent.” Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928). The United States government was formed on the
principle that it exists to protect the sovereign rights of each individual American citizen. These
unconstitutional actions not only censor, but they also seek to control what ideas Americans might
have in the first place by, among other things, preventing them from reading about the harms
caused by Covid vaccines.
Defendants’ massive and ongoing censorship enterprise has silenced, suppressed, and
chilled constitutionally protected speech on social media platforms—modern society’s public
8
Stanford Internet Observatory, et al., The Virality Project, “Memes, Magnets, and Microchips: Narrative Dynamics
Around COVID-19 Vaccines” (Apr. 26, 2022), https://purl.stanford.edu/mx395xj8490.
9
Twitter Files #19: The Great Covid-19 Lie Machine: Stanford, the Virality Project, and the Censorship of “True
Stories,” at https://twitter.com/mtaibbi/status/1636729166631432195.
9
square. These actions have directly impacted the Plaintiffs in this case, all of whom have been
censored, flagged as “misinformants,” shadow-banned, maligned, cast in a false light, and denied
their rights to receive information and advice about Covid vaccine injuries and to freely associate
with other members of the vaccine-injured community—even in private support groups closed to
the public—as a result of Defendants’ actions, which lack any conceivable statutory or
constitutional authority. Defendants’ censorship operation continues unrepentant and unabated to
this day, and it gravely threatens the rights of free speech and free association of not only the
Plaintiffs, but of all Americans.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28
U.S.C. § 1367 because the federal law claims arise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States.
2. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because Plaintiff
Ernest Ramirez resides in this District.
3. This Court may issue a declaratory judgment and grant permanent injunctive relief
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202.
PARTIES
4. Plaintiff Brianne Dressen was formerly a preschool teacher in Saratoga Springs,
Utah. Due to the debilitating medical injuries that she experienced after taking the AstraZeneca
Covid vaccine as a part of a clinical trial, she has been unable to continue teaching. She resides in
Salt Lake City, Utah.
5. Plaintiff Shaun R. Barcavage was formerly a research nurse practitioner at Weill
Cornell Medicine. Due to the debilitating medical injuries that he experienced after taking his first
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dose of the Pfizer Covid vaccine, he is currently on disability leave. He resides in Riegelsville,
Pennsylvania.
6. Plaintiff Kristi Dobbs is a dental hygienist. Due to the debilitating medical injuries
that she experienced after taking her first dose of the Pfizer Covid vaccine, she was unable to return
to work until April, 2023, and she currently works one day a week. She resides in Joplin, Missouri.
7. Plaintiff Nikki Holland was formerly a full-time physical therapist. Due to the
debilitating medical injuries that she experienced after taking her second dose of the Moderna
Covid vaccine, she has been unable to return to work and is currently on disability leave. She
resides in Henry, Tennessee.
8. Plaintiff Suzanna Newell worked in financial services for over 25 years and served
most recently as the Vice President of Corporate Social Responsibility at a large bank in
Minneapolis. Due to the debilitating medical injuries that she experienced after taking her second
dose of the Pfizer Covid vaccine, she is currently on disability leave. She resides in Saint Paul,
Minnesota.
9. Plaintiff Ernest Ramirez is a service technician for a carwash company. His 16-
year-old son Ernest Ramirez, Jr. died five days after taking his first dose of the Pfizer Covid
vaccine. Mr. Ramirez resides in Edinburg, Texas.
10. Defendant Rob Flaherty is Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Digital
Strategy at the White House. He is sued in his official capacity.
11. Defendant Joseph R. Biden, Jr., is the President of the United States. He is sued in
his official capacity.
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12. Defendant Karine Jean-Pierre is the White House Press Secretary. She is sued in
her official capacity. She is substituted for her predecessor, former White House Press Secretary
Jennifer Psaki.
13. Defendant Courtney Rowe is or was the White House Covid-19 Director of
Strategic Communications and Engagement. She is sued in her official capacity.
14. Defendant Clarke Humphrey is the White House Digital Director for the Covid-19
Response Team. She is sued in her official capacity.
15. Defendant Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is a cabinet-level
executive agency within the government of the United States.
16. Defendant Dr. Vivek Murthy is Surgeon General of the United States. He is sued
in his official capacity.
17. Defendant Eric Waldo is Chief Engagement Officer for the Surgeon General. He
is sued in his official capacity.
18. Defendant Xavier Becerra is Secretary of HHS. He is sued in his official capacity.
19. Defendant Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is a federal agency
under HHS.
20. Defendant Carol Crawford is Chief of the Digital Media Branch of the Division of
Public Affairs within the CDC. She is sued in her official capacity.
21. Defendant Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a cabinet-level executive
agency within the Government of the United States.
22. Defendant Alejandro Mayorkas is Secretary of DHS. He is sued in his official
capacity.
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23. Defendant Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is an agency
within DHS that is charged with protecting the United States’ cybersecurity and physical
infrastructure.
24. Defendant Jen Easterly is the Director of CISA within DHS. She is sued in her
official capacity.
25. Hereinafter, Defendants Rob Flaherty, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Karine Jean-Pierre,
Courtney Rowe, Clarke Humphrey, HHS, Dr. Vivek Murthy, Eric Waldo, Xavier Becerra, CDC,
Carol Crawford, DHS, Alejandro Mayorkas, CISA, and Jen Easterly will be referred to jointly as
the “Government Defendants.”
26. Defendant Stanford Internet Observatory (SIO) is “[a] program of [Stanford
University’s] Cyber Policy Center, a joint initiative of the Freeman Spogli Institute for
International Studies and Stanford Law School.” See Stanford Internet Observatory, Cyber Policy
Center, at https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io. SIO describes itself as “a cross-disciplinary program
of research, teaching and policy engagement for the study of abuse in current information
technologies, with a focus on social media.”
27. In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, SIO launched the Virality Project, which is
a “coalition of research entities focused on supporting real-time information exchange between the
disinformation research community, public health officials, civil society organizations,
government agencies, and social media platforms.” See About, Virality Project, at
https://www.viralityproject.org/news/about. Through the Virality Project SIO contracts with
federal government agencies to censor Americans for expressing disfavored opinions about Covid-
19. SIO is sued as a de facto government agency.
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28. Defendant Alex Stamos is the Director of SIO. He is sued in his official capacity
as a de facto government actor.
29. Defendant Renee DiResta is the Research Manager at SIO. She is sued in her
official capacity as a de facto government actor.
30. On information and belief, the social media censorship activities of SIO alleged in
this Complaint were conducted under the direction of Stamos and DiResta.
31. Hereinafter, Defendants SIO, Alex Stamos, and Renee DiResta will be referred to
jointly as the “De Facto Government Defendants.”
BASIC PRINCIPLES
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS AMERICANS’ RIGHTS TO EXPRESS, HEAR AND READ
PERSPECTIVES THAT ARE CONTROVERSIAL, OUTSIDE THE MAINSTREAM, AND DIFFER
FROM THE GOVERNMENT’S MESSAGING
32. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits Congress from
making laws “abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const., amend. I.
33. “And the rights of free speech and free press are not confined to any field of human
interest.” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945); see also Knight First Amend. Inst. v.
Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 2019), vacated on other grounds, 141 S. Ct. 1220 (2021) (“As
a general matter, social media is entitled to the same First Amendment protections as other forms
of media.”).
34. The prohibition against restrictions on speech applies to all branches of
government. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017) (“The First Amendment prohibits
Congress and other government entities and actors from ‘abridging the freedom of speech[.]’”);
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding that Nixon
Administration’s attempt to prevent publication of classified information violated the First
Amendment).
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35. The bedrock of the First Amendment is that government officials lack power to
censor disfavored speakers and viewpoints.
36. “Debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” New York
Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270; see Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (“The
Free Speech Clause exists principally to protect discourse on public matters[.]”).
37. “We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we
owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes. When
they are so harmless to others or to the State … the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is
not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test
of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order. If there
is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
38. “[A]s a general matter, … government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002).
39. Labeling disfavored speech “disinformation,” “misinformation,” or
“malinformation” does not strip it of First Amendment protection.
40. Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that “false statements, as a
general rule, are beyond constitutional protection.” United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718
(2012).
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41. “Absent from those few categories where the law allows content-based regulation
of speech is any general exception to the First Amendment for false statements. This comports
with the common understanding that some false statements are inevitable if there is to be an open
and vigorous expression of views in public and private conversation, expression the First
Amendment seeks to guarantee.” Id. (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)).
42. “Our constitutional tradition stands against the idea that we need Oceania’s
Ministry of Truth.” Id. at 723 (citing G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949) (Centennial ed.
2003)).
43. “Were the Court to hold that the interest in truthful discourse alone is sufficient to
sustain a ban on speech … it would give government a broad censorial power unprecedented in
this Court’s cases or in our constitutional tradition. The mere potential for the exercise of that
power casts a chill, a chill the First Amendment cannot permit if free speech, thought, and
discourse are to remain a foundation of our freedom.” Id. at 723.
44. “The theory of our Constitution is ‘that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.’” Id. at 728 (quoting Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
45. “The First Amendment itself ensures the right to respond to speech we do not like,
and for good reason. Freedom of speech and thought flows not from the beneficence of the state
but from the inalienable rights of the person. And suppression of speech by the government can
make exposure of falsity more difficult, not less so. Society has the right and civic duty to engage
in open, dynamic, rational discourse. These ends are not well served when the government seeks
to orchestrate public discussion through content-based mandates.” Id. at 728.
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46. The First Amendment also protects the right to receive information. See Martin v.
U.S. E.P.A., 271 F.Supp.2d 38 (2002) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (“where a speaker exists …, the protection afforded
is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”).
47. The right to receive information is “an inherent corollary of the rights to free speech
and press that are explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution” because “the right to receive ideas
follows ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment right to send them.” Bd. of Educ., Island
Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. Number 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (emphasis in original).
See also id. (quoting Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees
are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only
sellers and no buyers.”).
48. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[a] fundamental principle of the First
Amendment is that all persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then,
after reflection, speak and listen once more.” Packingham v. North Carolina, 127 S. Ct. 1730,
1735 (2017).
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT SECURES AMERICANS’ FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIVE

ASSOCIATION, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO FORM AND FREELY COMMUNICATE WITHIN
PRIVATE GROUPS WITHOUT ABRIDGMENT BY GOVERNMENT
49. “[T]he First Amendment’s protection extends beyond the right to speak.”
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst’l Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 68 (2006). It also protects the
“right to associate for the purpose of speaking.” Id.
50. The freedom of expressive association secures the right to associate for the
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment, including the exercise
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of free speech. The Constitution guarantees freedom of association “as an indispensable means
of preserving other individual liberties.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
51. As the Supreme Court has long recognized, “‘implicit in the right to engage in
activities protected by the First Amendment’ is ‘a corresponding right to associate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, religious, and cultural ends.’” Boy Scouts
of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622).
52. The freedom of expressive association is “crucial in preventing the majority from
imposing its views on groups that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas.” Id. at
647-48. Moreover, the freedom of speech “could not be vigorously protected from interference
by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not
also guaranteed.” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
53. “An association must merely engage in expressive activity that could be impaired
in order to be entitled to [First Amendment] protection.” Id. at 655. Further, the First
Amendment “does not require that every member of a group agree on every issue,” nor does it
require that a group “trumpet its views from the housetops” in order for the group to receive First
Amendment protection for its expressive association. Id. at 655-56.
54. “The right to speak is often exercised most effectively by combining one’s voice
with the voices of others.” Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 68. “If the government were free to restrict
individuals’ ability to join together and speak, it could essentially silence views that the First
Amendment is intended to protect.” Id.
18
III. THE GOVERNMENT MAY NOT USE PRIVATE COMPANIES TO ACCOMPLISH WHAT IT
CANNOT DO DIRECTLY
55. It is “axiomatic” that the government may not “induce, encourage, or promote
private persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.” Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973).
56. Private action may be rendered state action by the government in many ways.
57. The government can be held responsible for private action “when it has exercised
coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the
choice must in law be deemed that of the State.” Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982);
see also Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1226 (2021) (“The
government cannot accomplish through threats of adverse government action what the
Constitution prohibits it from doing directly.”)
58. Coercion includes “the threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of
coercion, persuasion, and intimidation.” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963)
(even where private party is “free” to ignore government’s “advice” because its refusal would
violate no law, it is still state action when government induces private party to suppress speech
under thinly veiled threats of legal action).
59. “[A] public official who tries to shut down an avenue of expression of ideas and
opinions through ‘actual or threatened imposition of government power or sanction’ is violating
the First Amendment.” Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 230 (7th Cir. 2015) (Posner,
J.) (quoting Am. Fam. Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir.
2002)). “Threatening penalties for future speech goes by the name of ‘prior restraint,’ and a prior
restraint is the quintessential first amendment violation.” Id. at 235 (quoting Fairley v. Andrews,
578 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 2009)).
19
60. The censorship and suppression of speech that Defendants have coerced social
media platforms to impose on disfavored speakers, content, and viewpoints constitute prior
restraints on speech, which are the most severe restrictions and the most difficult to justify under
the First Amendment. “One obvious implication of” the First Amendment’s text “is that the
government usually may not impose prior restraints on speech.” Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys. v.
Wilson, 142 S. Ct. 1253, 1259 (2022).
61. In fact, “such compulsion so plainly violates the Constitution” that it is rarely
necessary for courts to have to step in. Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2018).
62. “Further, the government actor need not have direct power to take adverse action
over a targeted entity for comments to constitute a threat, provided the government actor has the
power to direct or encourage others to take such action.” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Cuomo, 350
F.Supp.3d 94, 115 (N.D.N.Y. 2018).
63. Where the government encouraged and pressured private actors “into adopting” the
government’s preferred policy, there is “significant encouragement, overt or covert[,]” constituting
government action. Mathis v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 891 F.2d 1429, 1431 (9th Cir. 1989).
64. The Government Defendants’ actions readily satisfy the above tests. As alleged
herein, the Government Defendants have coerced, encouraged, conspired and worked in concert
with private entities to carry out constitutionally forbidden actions, which have directly impacted
the Plaintiffs in this case. Further, the Government Defendants have used threats of adverse
government action, including threats of increased regulation, antitrust enforcement or legislation,
and repeal or amendment of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) immunity
to pressure private parties to increase censorship of free speech on their platforms.
20
65. Ultimately, however, the text of the Constitution eliminates the need for a showing
of government coercion or a showing that private entities were somehow transformed into
government actors. The First Amendment bars government from “abridging the freedom of
speech.” U.S. Const. Amend I. Thus, at least in a claim against the government, the constitutional
question is simply whether government has caused a reduction in the freedom of speech—for
example, by pursuing policies of content or viewpoint discrimination—not whether the private
partner has been sufficiently coerced into becoming a government actor.
66. To be sure, Blum v. Yaretsky (described above) recites that “a State normally can
be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has
provided such significant encouragement, either over or covert, that the choice must in law be
deemed to be that of the State.” But Blum and its progeny in the Supreme Court were lawsuits
against private entities, seeking to hold them liable as governmental actors—not lawsuits against
government actors. (The sole exception was City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v. Buckeye Community
Hope, 538 U.S. 188, 197 (2003), in which the Court cast aside the Blum analysis because “[n]ot
only did the courts below not directly address this theory of liability, but respondents also appear
to have disavowed this claim at oral argument” and “never articulated a cognizable legal claim on
these grounds.”) Thus, neither under the Constitution nor under Supreme Court precedent can the
standard in Blum be considered the measure of when a government defendant may be held
accountable for its conduct through private entities to violate constitutional rights.
67. Regardless of the legal analysis applied to the facts of this case, Defendants’
conduct in carrying out its mass censorship program through the actions of private entities has
abridged free speech and is therefore unlawful.
21
IV. PRIVATE PARTIES MAY QUALIFY AS STATE ACTORS SUBJECT TO THE CONSTITUTION’S
CONSTRAINTS
68. There is no single test to identify state action on the part of a private entity. See,
e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 294 (2001).
However, Blum and other Supreme Court precedents allow a private party to qualify as a state
actor under certain circumstances.
69. First, private parties may be held to constitutional standards as state actors if “there
is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action.” Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
70. Such a nexus exists when the government “has exercised coercive power or has
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert,” that the action can be deemed
that of the State. Id. This includes when the government “affirmatively commands” a private
party to take action or “is responsible for” the challenged action. Id. at 1005, 1011.
71. Second, “a private party’s joint participation with state officials” in unconstitutional
conduct “is sufficient to characterize that party as a ‘state actor.’” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982); see also Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921,
1928 (2019) (“[A] private entity can qualify as a state actor … when the government acts jointly
with the private entity.”). “It is enough that [the private actor] is a willful participant in joint
activity with the State or its agents.” Id. at 941 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794
(1966)); see also Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 294 (state action on the part of private party occurs
when there is “a symbiotic relationship between the [government] and the [private party].”)
72. State action through joint engagement occurs when the government “knowingly
accepts the benefits derived from unconstitutional behavior.” Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088,
1093 (9th Cir. 2003). Joint action may also be proven by showing that government officials and
22
private parties have acted in concert in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights.
See, e.g., Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1453 (10th Cir. 1995).
73. Further, private acts may constitute joint state action if the private parties “have
conspired with a state official.” Sims v. Jefferson Downs Racing Ass’n, Inc., 778 F.2d 1068, 1076
(5th Cir. 1985). To establish a conspiracy, “[i]t is enough that [a private party] is a willful
participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.” Id. (citing United States v. Price, 383 U.S.
787, 794 (1966)).
74. Third, private action may constitute state action when the private entity is
“entwined with governmental policies” or when the government is entwined in the management
or control of the private action. Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296 (“Entwinement will support a
conclusion that an ostensibly private organization ought to be charged with a public character and
judged by constitutional standards”).
75. As alleged herein, the De Facto Government Defendants engaged with the federal
government in its massive government/private joint censorship enterprise through SIO’s “Virality
Project,” to target and suppress speech on the basis of content and viewpoint.
76. Through the Virality Project, the De Facto Government Defendants built strong ties
with several federal government agencies, most notably the Office of the Surgeon General and the
CDC, and engaged in continuous, ongoing communication with government officials (which, on
information and belief, continues to this day) to execute the government’s censorship scheme.
77. Through their willful and joint participation with the government in its
unconstitutional censorship enterprise and the powerful nexus between the De Facto Government
Defendants and the federal government—including many, if not all, of the Government
23
Defendants—the De Facto Government Defendants plainly qualify as state actors under Supreme
Court precedent. Therefore, they must be held accountable as de facto government actors.
V. AGENCIES ARE ONLY PERMITTED TO EXERCISE CONGRESSIONALLY DELEGATED

AUTHORITY
78. “[A]gency actions beyond delegated authority are ultra vires and should be
invalidated.” Detroit Int’l Bridge Co, v. Gov. of Canada, 192 F.Supp.3d 54 (D.D.C. 2016); see
NFIB v. OSHA, 142 S. Ct. 661, 666 (2022) (OSHA vaccine mandate “extends beyond the agency’s
legitimate reach” as evidenced by the “lack of historical precedent, coupled with the breadth of
authority that the Secretary now claims”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
79. Courts look to an agency’s enabling statute and subsequent legislation to determine
whether the agency has exceeded its authority. See Tiger Lily LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing and
Urban Development, 525 F.Supp.3d 850, 861 (W.D. Tennessee), aff’d, 5 F.4th 666 (6th Cir. 2021)
(determining that CDC eviction moratorium was unlawful, as “to hold otherwise would be to
construe the statute so broadly as to grant this administrative agency unfettered power to prohibit
or mandate anything, which would ignore the separation of powers and violate the non-delegation
doctrine.”).
80. “A reviewing court owes no deference to the agency’s pronouncement on a
constitutional question and must make an independent assessment of a citizen’s claim of
constitutional right when reviewing agency decision-making.” Poett v. United States, 657 F. Supp.
2d 230, 241 (D.D.C. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
81. Under the APA, this Court is authorized to hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions that it determines to be contrary to constitutional rights or in
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right. See 5 U.S.C.
§§ 706(2)(B), (C).
24
82. Also under the APA, agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. See 5
U.S.C. § 704.
83. Agency action is final if, first, it “marks the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s
decisionmaking process.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quoting Chicago &
Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)).
84. Second, the action must be one by which “‘rights or obligations have been
determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences will flow.’” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178 (quoting
Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71
(1970)).
85. The actions of Defendants, alleged herein, on information and belief, reflect and
result from specific, discrete, and identifiable decisions of Defendants to adopt an unlawful social
media censorship scheme.
VI. CONGRESS MAY NOT DELEGATE AUTHORITY COUNTER TO THE CONSTITUTION
86. “The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may
not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176
(1803). Indeed, “even under our modern, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause,
Congress’s regulatory authority is not without effective bounds.” United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 608 (2000).
87. Congressional enactments that exceed Congress’s constitutional bounds are
invalid. Id. at 607; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
88. Congress is prohibited from conferring upon a federal agency power or authority
that is contrary to the Constitution. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (“the
fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of
25
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution”) (citing I.N.S. v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)).
89. Further, “[a]n agency’s power is no greater than that delegated to it by Congress.”
Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986).
90. Congress’s authority is “limited to those powers enumerated in the Constitution,”
as the Constitution withholds from Congress “a plenary police power that would authorize
enactment of every type of legislation.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566; see also Const.
Art. I, § 8. Although Congress enjoys authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the
channels and instrumentalities of commerce among the states, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 91
(1824), including electronic channels and instrumentalities, it may not regulate noneconomic
matters, such as speech, that were never within the scope of the Commerce Clause and that only
indirectly have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See James Wilson, State House Yard
Speech (Oct. 6, 1787), at https://csac.history.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/281/2017/07/
James_Wilson.pdf (“a power similar to that which has been granted for the regulation of
commerce” was not “granted to regulate literary publications,” and thus “the proposed system
possesses no influence whatever upon the press); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557; United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.
91. Moreover, the text of the Constitution is explicit that: “Congress shall make no law
… abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. Amend I. Any law or policy that “abridges” or
reduces the sphere of constitutionally protected speech thus violates the First Amendment.
92. Therefore, even if (contrary to what is alleged herein) Defendants’ censorship
enterprise were within the bounds of the statutory authority delegated by Congress (it is not),
Defendants’ conduct would still, and does, remain ultra vires in violation of any conceivable
26
constitutional authority. Congress is not constitutionally authorized to confer upon federal
agencies any power, purpose, or authority beyond the Constitution’s enumerated powers or that
violates the First Amendment.
FACTS OF THE CASE
I. SOCIAL MEDIA COMPANIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
93. Social media is widely understood to be “the modern public square.” Packingham,
137 S. Ct. at 1737 (2017). Social media platforms provide “perhaps the most powerful
mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard.” Id.
94. “Today’s digital platforms provide avenues for historically unprecedented amounts
of speech, including speech by government actors. Also unprecedented, however, is the
concentrated control of so much speech in the hands of a few private parties.” Knight First Amend.
Inst., 141 S. Ct. at 1221. This concentrated control enables government control.
95. On information and belief, Facebook has close to 3 billion registered users
worldwide, and over 180 million users throughout the United States.
96. According to a Pew Research study, 66 percent of adults report using Facebook,
and 31 percent of U.S. adults say they regularly obtain information about current events from the
site.10
97. On information and belief, Twitter has more than 340 million users worldwide,
including approximately 70 million users in the United States.11 Around 500 million tweets are
posted on Twitter every day, and they are accessible to non-Twitter users on the internet.
10
See Mason Walker & Katerina Eva Matsa. News Consumption Across Social Media in 2021, Pew Res. Ctr. (Sept.
20, 2021), available at https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2021/09/20/news-consumption-across-social-
media-in-2021/.
11
Adam Hughes & Stefan Wojcick, 10 Facts about Americans and Twitter, Pew Res. Ctr. (Aug. 2, 2019), available
at https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/02/10-facts-about-americans-and-twitter/.
27
98. Twenty-seven percent of U.S. adults say that they use Twitter, and 14 percent of
U.S. adults say they regularly get news on Twitter.12
99. Forty-one percent of U.S. adults say they use Instagram,13 and 13 percent of U.S.
adults say that they regularly get news from the site.14
100. On information and belief, TikTok has more than one billion users worldwide,
including over 150 million users in the United States.
101. According to a Pew Research study, 21 percent of U.S. adults say that they use
TikTok,15 and 10 percent of U.S. adults say that they regularly get news from the site.16
102. On information and belief, YouTube has more than 4 billion hours of video views
every month. Videos on YouTube channels are visible to both YouTube users and to the general
public on the internet. An estimated 500 hours of video content are uploaded to YouTube every
minute.
103. Eighty-two percent of U.S. adults say that they use YouTube, and 25 percent of
U.S. adults say that they regularly get news on YouTube.17
104. Many social media platforms, including both Facebook and Twitter, permit
formation of private groups where users can join and communicate with each other. Posts in
private groups are visible only to other group members.
105. Social media platforms can suppress or censor speech by means other than removal
or suspension of accounts. Some of these methods are immediately known to an account’s owner
12
Jacob Liedke & Katerina Eva Matsa, Social Media and News Fact Sheet, Pew Res. Ctr. (Sept. 20, 2022), at
https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/fact-sheet/social-media-and-news-fact-sheet/.
13
Adam Hughes & Stefan Wojcick, supra note 11.
14
Liedke & Matsa, supra note 12.
15
Brooke Auxier & Monica Anderson, Social Media Use in 2021, Pew Res. Ctr. (Apr. 7, 2021), at
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/04/07/social-media-use-in-20 21/.
16
Liedke & Matsa, supra note 12.
17
Id.
28
and his or her audience, and some are not. These methods include, but are not limited to, imposing
warnings or strikes against accounts to chill disfavored speech, “shadow banning” disfavored posts
and accounts by making them less visible to other users or not at all, demonetizing content,
adjusting algorithms to suppress or de-emphasize speakers or messages, placing warning labels on
content, promoting negative comments on disfavored content, and requiring additional clicks to
access content.
106. All these methods ultimately serve to chill and suppress speech. Fearing the loss
of their valuable accounts, limits on the visibility and reach of their speech on the platforms, the
loss of connections with other users or members of social media groups, and/or the damage to their
credibility or standing to express their views, users self-censor to avoid making statements that
might be deemed to violate the social media companies’ rules for censoring and flagging speech
as “misinformation.”
II. THE WHITE HOUSE AND SURGEON GENERAL’S OFFICE COERCE, PRESSURE, AND
ENCOURAGE SOCIAL MEDIA COMPANIES TO CENSOR DISFAVORED SPEECH ABOUT
COVID-19
107. On January 17, 2020, then-candidate and now-President Biden stated in an
interview with the New York Times editorial board that Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act should be “revoked” because companies like Facebook did not adequately censor
false information in the form of political ads criticizing him.18 In the same interview, Biden
described Mark Zuckerberg, owner of Meta (Facebook and Instagram,) as “a real problem” and
advocated that he be held civilly liable for content that indirectly leads to harm, and possibly even
held criminally responsible.
18
The Editorial Board, Joe Biden Says Age Is Just a Number, The New York Times (Jan. 17, 2020), at
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimes-interview.html.
29
108. During the presidential transition, on December 2, 2020, President Biden’s former
chief of staff and top technical advisor, Bruce Reed, publicly stated that it was “long past time to
hold the social media companies accountable for what’s published on their platforms,” referring
to amendment or repeal of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.19
109. On Saturday night, February 6, 2021 at 9:45 p.m., Rob Flaherty emailed Twitter to
demand the immediate removal of a parody or imposter account linked to Finnegan Biden, the
President’s adult daughter (“Please remove this account immediately”).20 He followed up by
saying “I have tried using your form three times and it won’t work—it is also ridiculous that I need
to upload my id to a form [to] prove that I am an authorized representative of Finnegan Biden.”21
110. Two minutes later, at 9:47 p.m., Twitter responded, “Thanks for sending this over.
We’ll escalate for further review from here.”22 Flaherty responded the same minute, “Cannot
stress the degree to which this needs to be resolved immediately.” Within 45 minutes, Twitter
informed Flaherty that it had suspended the account.23
111. The following day, Twitter emailed Flaherty and described steps he could take to
“streamline the process” for the White House’s censorship demands. Twitter offered to enroll
White House officials in Twitter’s Partner Support Portal for expedited review of flagging content
for censorship, recommending that Flaherty “designate a list of authorized White House staff for
Twitter’s Partner Support Portal.”24
19
Biden Tech Advisor: Hold Social Media Companies Accountable for What Their Users Post, CNBC.com (Dec. 3,
2020), at https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/02/biden-advisor-bruce-reed-hints-that-section-230-needs-reform.html.
20
Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact at 13, Missouri v. Biden, 576 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Mo. 2023) (ECF No. 212-
3).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
30
112. Twitter noted that it had been recently bombarded with such requests for censorship
from the White House: “we would prefer to have a streamlined process strictly with your team as
the internal liaison. That is the most efficient and effective way to ensure we are prioritizing
requests. In a given day last week for example, we had more than four different people within the
White House reaching out for issues.”
The Largest Worldwide Campaign—of Censorship
113. The next day, February 8, 2021, Facebook emailed Rob Flaherty, Courtney Rowe,
and Clarke Humphrey of the White House to explain how it had recently expanded its Covid-19
censorship policies. Facebook stated: “We wanted to make sure you saw our announcements
today about running the largest worldwide campaign to promote authoritative Covid-19 vaccine
information and expanding our efforts to remove false claims on Facebook and Instagram about
Covid-19, Covid-19 vaccines and vaccines in general during the pandemic.”
114. Under the heading, “Combating Vaccine Misinformation,” Facebook provided a
detailed list of expanded censorship policies: “We are expanding our efforts to remove false claims
on Facebook and Instagram about Covid-19, Covid-19 vaccines and vaccines in general during the
pandemic. Since December [i.e., during the Biden transition], we’ve removed false claims about
COVID-19 vaccines that have been debunked by public health experts. … [W]e are expanding the
list of false claims we will remove to include additional debunked claims about the coronavirus
and vaccines. … Groups, Pages and accounts on Facebook and Instagram that repeatedly share
these debunked claims may be removed altogether. We are also requiring some admins for groups
with admins or members who have violated our COVID-19 policies to temporarily approve all
posts within their group. … On Instagram, in addition to surfacing authoritative results in Search,
31
in the coming weeks we’re making it harder to find accounts in search that discourage people from
getting vaccinated … .”25
115. Within 19 minutes of receiving this email, Flaherty responded in a displeased tone,
urging Facebook for more information about how strict the new policies would be. Quoting
Facebook’s email in italics, he wrote: “This line, of course, stands out: that repeatedly share these
debunked claims may be removed altogether. Can you share more about your framework here?
May, of course, is very different than ‘will.’ Is there a strike policy, ala Youtube? Does the
severity of the claims matter?” He also asked for specific data on the application of the censorship
policies: “And as far as your removal of claims, do you have data on the actual number of claims-
related posts you’ve removed? Do you have a sense of how many are being flagged versus how
many are being removed? Are there actions (downranking, etc.) that sit before removal? How are
you handling things that are dubious, but not provably false?”26
Posts Cause “Political Violence”—Target Civic and Health-Related Groups
116. The next day, February 9, 2021, Flaherty followed up with Facebook with a demand
for more information and an accusation that Facebook’s failure to censor speech on its platforms
causes “political violence”: “All, especially given the Journal’s reporting on your internal work on
political violence spurred by Facebook groups, I am also curious about the new rules as part of the
‘overhaul.’ I am seeing that you will no longer promote civic and health related groups, but I am
wondering if the reforms here extend further? Are there other growth vectors you are controlling
for?” Flaherty suggested an oral meeting to discuss: “Happy to put time on the calendar to discuss
further.”27
25
Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
26
Id.
27
Id. at 16.
32
117. Facebook responded on February 9, 2021 with a detailed answer to each of
Flaherty’s questions about the enforcement of its new policies and an offer to discuss further.
Flag and Suppress “Wrongthink”
118. Among other things, Facebook reported that it would “suspend the entire Page,
Group, or account” in case of repeat violations; that it “will begin enforcing this policy
immediately,” that for vaccine-skeptical content that does not violate Facebook’s policies,
Facebook will “reduce its distribution and add strong warning labels with more context, so fewer
people see the post,” and that Facebook was working to censor content that does not violate its
policies in other ways by “prevent[ing] posts discouraging vaccines from going viral on our
platforms; address[ing] content that experts believe dissuades people from getting the vaccine, but
does not violate our misinformation policies, through the use of information labels; and
prevent[ing] recommendations for Groups, Pages, and Instagram accounts that repeatedly push
content discouraging vaccines.”28
119. Facebook also promised Flaherty that it would aggressively enforce the new
censorship policies: “We will begin enforcing this policy immediately, with a particular focus on
Pages, Groups and accounts that violate these rules, and we’ll continue to expand our enforcement
over the coming weeks.”29
120. On February 24, 2021, Facebook emailed Rob Flaherty with the subject “Misinfo
Themes,” stating: “Following up on your request for COVID-19 misinfo themes we are seeing.
All the below claims violate our updated Covid and vaccine misinformation policies that we
announced earlier this month, and we are removing these claims from our platforms,” and
28
Id.
29
Id. at 17.
33
identifying the following: “Vaccine Toxicity,” “False Claims About Side Effects of Vaccines,”
“Comparing the Covid Vaccine to the Flu Vaccine,” and “Downplaying Severity of COVID-19.”30
Tell Us What Information You Are Not Censoring
121. Flaherty responded by requesting details about Facebook’s actual enforcement
practices and a report on misinformation that was not censored: “Can you give us a sense of volume
on these, and some metrics around the scale of removal for each? Can you also give us a sense of
misinformation that might be falling outside your removal policies? Goes without saying, just
because it’s on your list for removal hasn’t historically meant that it was removed, so I want to get
a sense of the state of play here!”31
122. Facebook promised to discuss this at an upcoming oral meeting: “Hope to cover a
lot of that on Monday … Can definitely go into detail on content that doesn’t violate like below
but could contribute to vaccine hesitancy.”32
123. On March 1, 2021, White House officials Rob Flaherty and Clarke Humphrey,
along with Joshua Peck of HHS, participated in a meeting with Twitter about misinformation.
After the meeting, Twitter emailed these officials and assured the White House that it would
increase censorship of “misleading information” on Twitter: “Thanks again for meeting with us
today. As we discussed, we are building on our continued efforts to remove the most harmful
COVID-19 misleading information from the service.”33
30
Id.
31
Id. at 17-18.
32
Id. at 18.
33
Id.
34
124. On March 12, 2021, referring to previous oral communications with the White
House and HHS, Facebook emailed Flaherty “[f]ollowing up on our commitment to share our
survey data on vaccine uptake.”34
125. Facebook provided the White House with a detailed report and summary on the
topic and noted that the information had evidently been requested by or on behalf of “White House
/ HHS” officials: “Hopefully, this format works for the various teams and audiences within the
White House / HHS that may find this data valuable.”35
126. On March 15, 2021, at 3:20 a.m., Flaherty sent an email to Facebook
acknowledging, “[g]ood insights here,” but then immediately pivoted to demand more and
different data, linking a recent Washington Post article accusing Facebook of allowing the spread
of information about vaccine hesitancy, stating: “I’m more interested in the data that was outlined
in the Washington Post (https//www.washingtonpost.com/technology/202l/03/l4/facebook-
vaccine-hesistancy-qanon) [a]nd what interventions you are testing/their effectiveness.”36
127. This would become a standard tactic of the White House: linking to articles critical
of Facebook in the press, and then demanding more information or actions based on those articles.
128. The day before, Sunday, March 14, 2021, at 11:13 p.m., Flaherty had emailed a link
to the same article to Facebook, copying White House COVID-19 official Andrew Slavitt, with no
more text in the email and the subject line: “You are hiding the ball.”37
34
Id. at 19.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
35
129. The next morning, Facebook responded by stating, “there is a misunderstanding on
what this story is covering with respect to research that’s happening—I will call to clear up.
Certainly not hiding the ball.”38
Censorship Expands to True but Disfavored Information
130. Flaherty responded accusatorily, referring to a series of at least three previous
conversations in which the White House had demanded more information from Facebook about
its censorship policies. He made clear that the White House was seeking more aggressive action
on “borderline” content—i.e., content that does not clearly violate Facebook’s own censorship
policies but which the White House demands action against anyway. Flaherty wrote: “I don’t
think this is a misunderstanding … I’ve been asking you guys pretty directly, over a series of
conversations, for a clear accounting of the biggest issues you are seeing on your platform when
it comes to vaccine hesitancy, and the degree to which borderline content—as you define it—is
playing a role.”
Accusations of Non-Compliance and Dishonesty
131. Flaherty followed with a series of accusations that Facebook was prevaricating with
the White House about its “borderline” (i.e., not violative) content: “You said you would commit
to us that you’d level with us. I am seeing in the press that you have data on the impact of
borderline content, and its overlap with various communities. I have asked for this point blank,
and got, instead, an overview of how the algorithm works, with a pivot to a conversation about
profile frames, and a 45-minute meeting that seemed to provide you with more insights than it
provided us.”39
38
Id.
39
Id. at 20.
36
132. He accused Facebook of being the “top driver[] of vaccine hesitancy,” demanded
action against “borderline” content, and stated that the White House wanted to be directly involved
in those efforts: “I am not trying to play ‘gotcha’ with you. We are gravely concerned that your
service is one of the top drivers of vaccine hesitancy—period. I will also be the first to
acknowledge that borderline content offers no easy solutions. But we want to know that you’re
trying, we want to know how we can help, and we want to know that you’re not playing a shell
game with us when we ask you what is going on. This would all be a lot easier if you would just
be straight with us.”40
Facebook Bows in Submission and Contrition
133. Facebook responded to Flaherty on March 15, 2021: “We obviously have work to
do to gain your trust. You mention that you are not trying to play ‘gotcha’ with us—I appreciate
the approach you are taking to continued discussions. We are also working to get you useful
information that’s on the level. That’s my job and I take it seriously—I’ll continue to do it to the
best of my ability, and I’ll expect you to hold me accountable.”41
134. The same day, Andrew Slavitt (who had been copied on these exchanges between
Facebook and Flaherty) weighed in, accusing Facebook of dishonesty in a series of oral meetings:
“It would [be] nice to establish trust. I do feel like relative to others, interactions with Facebook
are not straightforward and the problems are worse—like you are trying to meet a minimum hurdle
instead of trying to solve the problem and we have to ask you precise questions and even then we
get highly scrubbed party line answers. We have urgency and don’t sense it from you all. 100%
of the questions I asked have never been answered and weeks have gone by.”42
40
Id. at 20-21.
41
Id.
42
Id.
37
135. Slavitt then threatened unspecified Executive action against Facebook in retaliation
for Facebook’s perceived lack of cooperation with the White House’s demands on censorship of
“borderline” content: “Internally we have been considering our options on what to do about it.”
136. On March 16, 2021, Facebook responded to Slavitt, respectfully explaining its
position but also promising to share information about vaccine hesitancy in “real time”: “We are
absolutely invested in getting you the specific information needed to successfully manage the
vaccine roll out.” Facebook promised to increase information-sharing and proposed a detailed oral
meeting on the topic: “But I understand your point regarding how we communicate, and that we
need to share information with you in a way that prioritizes what we are seeing in as close to real
time as possible.” Facebook also offered to speak to Slavitt by phone at any time.
The White House Makes Its Demands
137. On Friday, March 19, 2021, Facebook had a meeting with White House officials,
including Flaherty and Slavitt.
138. Two days later, on Sunday, Facebook sent a follow-up summary of the meeting
which noted that the White House (1) demanded a “Consistent Product Team [Point of Contact]”
at Facebook, (2) demanded “Sharing Additional Data” from Facebook, (3) had asked about
“Levers for Tackling Vaccine Hesitancy Content,” and (4) asked about censorship policies for the
Meta platform WhatsApp.
139. In a follow-up email, Facebook noted that, in direct response to White House
demands, it was censoring, removing, and reducing the spread of content that did not violate its
policies: “You also asked us about our levers for reducing virality of vaccine hesitancy content.
In addition to policies previously discussed, these include the additional changes that were
approved late last week and that we’ll be implementing over the coming weeks. As you know, in
38
addition to removing vaccine misinformation, we have been focused on reducing the virality of
content discouraging vaccines that does not contain actionable misinformation. This is often-
true content … but it can be framed as sensation, alarmist, or shocking. We’ll remove these
Groups, Pages, and Accounts when they are disproportionately promoting this sensationalized
content.”43 (emphasis added).
140. On March 22, 2021, Flaherty responded to Facebook, demanding much more
detailed information and action on “sensationalized” content on its platforms. Flaherty noted that
White House officials were demanding a plan from Facebook to censor non-violative content, i.e.,
“looking out for your game plan on tackling vaccine hesitancy spread on your platform.”
141. In this email, Flaherty demanded more information and greater censorship of such
non-violative “sensational” and “skeptical” content: “If you’re down ranking sensational stuff—
great—but I want to know how effective you’ve seen that be from a market research perspective.
And then, what interventions are being taken on ‘skepticism?’ … [W]hat are you trying here, and
again, how effective have you seen it be. And critically, what amount of content is falling into all
of these buckets? Is there wider scale of skepticism than sensationalism? … As I’ve said: this is
not to play gotcha. It is to get a sense of what you are doing to manage this.” (italics in original).
142. Facebook then agreed to schedule a meeting that Wednesday at 4:00 pm to discuss
these issues with Flaherty and Slavitt.
The Accusations Intensify
143. In an email on April 9, 2021, Flaherty accused Facebook of being responsible for
the riot at the Capitol on January 6, 2021, by not censoring enough speech online, suggesting that
Facebook would be similarly responsible for COVID-related deaths if it did not engage in more
43
Id. at 22-23.
39
online censorship here: “In the electoral context, you tested and deployed an algorithmic shift that
promoted quality news and information about the election. This was reported in the New York
Times and also readily apparent to anyone with cursory social listening tools. You only did this,
however, after an election that you helped increase skepticism in, and an insurrection which was
plotted, in large part, on your platform. And then you turned it back off. I want some assurances,
based in data, that you are not doing the same thing again here.”44
144. Facebook responded: “Understood. I thought we were doing a better job [of]
responding to this—and we are working to get the data that will more clearly show the universe of
the Covid content that’s highest in distribution with a clear picture of what percentage of that
content is vax hesitancy content, and how we are addressing it.”45
White House Demands Censorship of Prominent Media Figures
145. In an email to Facebook on April 14, 2021, Flaherty noted that the White House
was tracking COVID-related content in real time, and he demanded the censorship of currently-
trending posts of content from two prominent Fox News hosts, Tucker Carlson and Tomi Lahren:
“Since we’ve been on the phone—the top post about vaccines today is [T]ucker Carlson saying
they don’t work. Yesterday was Tomi Lehren [sic] saying she won’t take one. This is exactly
why I want to know what ‘Reduction’ actually looks like—if ‘reduction’ means ‘pumping our
most vaccine hesitant audience with [T]ucker Carlson saying it doesn’t work’ then … I’m not sure
it’s reduction!”46
44
Id. at 27-28.
45
Id. at 28.
46
Id.
40
146. In an email chain to Flaherty and Courtney Rowe that same day, Facebook assured
the White House that it was “running down the question on Tucker and working on getting you
report by end of week.”47
Amplify the White House’s Speech
147. In an email on April 13, 2021, to Flaherty and Rowe, Facebook offered to cooperate
closely with the White House to “amplify” its preferred messages. Flaherty responded the same
day with a series of detailed requests about how Facebook could do so, including: “Some kind of
thing that puts the news in context if folks have seen it (like your current ‘COVID news’ panel)
that has 3-4 pieces of info (e.g.: Adverse events are very rare—6 cases out of nearly 7 million, the
FDA and CDC are reviewing it so health care providers know how to treat any of the rare events,
this does not affect pfzier [sic] or moderna, which vaccinate via a different mechanism)”; “CDC
is working through an FAQ that we’d love to have amplified in whatever way possible—maybe
through the COVID info panel”; and “[a] commitment from you guys to make sure that a favorable
review reaches as many people as the pause, either through hard product interventions or
algorithmic amplification.”48
Censorship of True, Political, Non-Violative Speech Through a “Spectrum of Levers”
148. The same day, April 13, 2021, Facebook responded with a detailed report on
misinformation on its platforms about this issue. Facebook noted that there was an oral meeting
about misinformation with the White House scheduled the next day.49
149. Facebook also noted that it had recently had a telephone call with Courtney Rowe
about how it was censoring misinformation, and had agreed to provide a detailed report on its
47
Id.
48
Id. at 29.
49
Id. at 30.
41
relevant censorship enforcement policies: “Courtney—as we discussed, we also wanted to send
over some examples of content we see on our platform that we remove (misinformation & harm)
as well as content we take other actions on, but do not remove (vaccine hesitancy). I have included
some examples at the bottom of this email and happy to setup time to talk through this more with
you as well, if helpful.”50
150. Facebook then provided a six-page report on censorship with explanations and
screen shots of sample posts of content that it censors and does not censor.51
151. Facebook then provided a detailed report to Courtney Rowe’s request for specific
examples of posts that are censored on its platforms. First, as to “VACCINE HESITANCY”
content, Facebook explained that this content does not violate Facebook’s content-moderation
policies, but Facebook assured the White House that Facebook still censors such non-violative
content by suppressing it in news feeds and algorithms. Facebook admitted that such content is
often “true” and sometimes involves core political speech or advocacy (e.g., “discussing choice to
vaccinate in terms of personal and civil liberties”): “The following examples of content are those
that do not violate our Misinformation and Harm policy, but may contribute to vaccine hesitancy
or present a barrier to vaccination. This includes, for example, content that contains sensational
or alarmist vaccine misrepresentation, disparaging others based on the choice to or to not vaccinate,
true but shocking claims or personal anecdotes, or discussing the choice to vaccinate in terms of
personal and civil liberties or concerns related to mistrust in institutions or individuals.”52
152. Facebook assured the White House that it censors such true, political, non-violative
content through “a spectrum of levers”: “We utilize a spectrum of levers for this kind of content
50
Id. at 30.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 31.
42
… Actions may include reducing the posts’ distribution, not suggesting the posts to users, limiting
their discoverability in Search, and applying Inform Labels and/or reshare friction to the posts.”53
153. On April 14, 2021, Andy Slavitt also emailed Facebook’s President of Global
Affairs, former Deputy Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Nick Clegg, with a sarcastic
message expressing the White House’s displeasure both with Facebook’s failure to censor Tucker
Carlson who remained trending: “Number one of Facebook. Sigh. Big reveal call with FB and
WH today. No progress since we spoke. Sigh.”54
154. Clegg promptly responded to Slavitt with an apology and promised to immediately
address the censorship of Tucker Carlson.55
155. At 10:51 p.m. the same day, Clegg provided Slavitt with a detailed report about the
Tucker Carlson post, explaining that Tucker Carlson’s content did not violate Facebook policies,
but assuring the White House that Facebook would censor it anyway.56
156. Clegg denied that Carlson’s content was the top post on Facebook, but then stated,
“Regardless of popularity, the Tucker Carlson video does not qualify for removal under our
policies … That said, the video is being labeled with a pointer to authoritative COVID information,
it's not being recommended to people, and it is being demoted.”57
157. Clegg also stated that Facebook was “v[ery] keen” to provide a more detailed report
on its censorship practices in response to White House demands: “I’m v[ery] keen that we follow
up as we’d agreed, and I can assure you the teams here are on it.”
53
Id. at 32.
54
Id. at 32-33.
55
Id. at 33.
56
Id.
57
Id.
43
158. Brian Rice of Facebook then forwarded the same report on the Tucker Carlson post
to Rob Flaherty.
159. Less than twenty minutes later, at 11:29 p.m. on April 14, 2021, Flaherty responded
to Rice, demanding greater censorship and accusing Facebook of causing an “insurrection” by not
censoring enough speech on its platforms: “I guess this is a good example of your rules in practice
then—and a chance to dive in on questions as they’re applied. How was this [i.e., Tucker Carlson’s
post] not violative? The second half of the segment is raising conspiracy theories about the
government hiding that all vaccines aren’t effective. It’s not about just J&J. What exactly is the
rule for removal vs demoting? Moreover: you say reduced and demoted. What does that mean?
There’s 40,000 shares on the video. Who is seeing it now? How many? How effective is that?
And we’ve gone a million rounds on this in other contexts so pardon what may seem like deja
vu—but on what basis is ‘visit the covid-19 information center for vaccine resources’ the best
thing to tag to a video that says the vaccine doesn’t work?”58
160. On Tuesday, April 21, 2021, Facebook responded to the same email chain,
indicating that there had been a phone call with Flaherty (“thanks for catching up earlier”) and
providing another, more detailed report on its censorship of Tucker Carlson in response to each of
Flaherty’s queries, question-by-question. Facebook again reported that Tucker Carlson’s content
had not violated its policies, stating that “we reviewed this content in detail and it does not violate
those policies,” but reported that Facebook had been censoring it anyway and would continue to
censor it even though no fact-check had reported it false: “The video received 50% demotion for
seven days while in the queue to be fact checked, and will continue to be demoted even though it
was not ultimately fact checked.”59
58
Id. at 33-34.
59
Id. at 34.
44
161. In the same time frame, the White House was exerting similar pressure on other
major social-media platforms, including Twitter and YouTube. On April 21, Rob Flaherty, Andy
Slavitt, and Kelsey Fitzpatrick of the White House, along with an official at HHS, participated in
a meeting with several Twitter officials.60
162. The meeting’s subject was “Twitter Vaccine Misinfo Briefing.” The meeting invite
noted: “White House Staff will be briefed by Twitter on vaccine misinfo. Twitter to cover trends
seen generally around vaccine misinformation, the tangible effects seen from recent policy
changes, what interventions are currently being implemented in addition to previous policy
changes, and ways the White House (and our COVID experts) can partner in product work.”61
Twitter Earns Mercy by Silencing Berenson Before Reaching a “Persuadable Public”
163. The next day, Twitter employees noted in internal communications that, during this
meeting, the White House officials had posed “one really tough question about why Alex Berenson
hasn’t been kicked off the platform.”62
164. The Twitter employee noted that the White House’s questions were “pointed” but
“mercifully we had answers.” Another internal Twitter communication noted that the White
House “really wanted to know about Alex Berenson. Andy Slavitt suggested they had seen data
viz that had showed he was the epicenter of disinfo that radiated outwards to the persuadable
public.”63
165. Twitter permanently deplatformed Berenson.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 35-36.
62
Id. at 212.
63
Id. at 212-213.
45
YouTube Meetings to Suppress “Borderline” Information
166. On April 21, 2021, Flaherty and Andy Slavitt of the White House, and Jessica
Scruggs of HHS had a similar meeting with YouTube, to which at least six YouTube officials were
invited.64
167. The calendar invite stated that the purpose of the meeting was: “White House staff
to get briefed by YouTube on general trends seen around vaccine misinformation. As well as, the
empirical effects of YouTube’s efforts to combat misinfo, what interventions YouTube is currently
trying, and ways the White House (and or COVID experts) can partner in product work.”65
168. Just after midnight on April 22, 2021, Rob Flaherty emailed a list of Google
officials about YouTube, copying Andy Slavitt and Clarke Humphrey. He began by referring to
the meeting with Google/YouTube officials on April 21: “Thanks again for the conversation
today.” Flaherty also referred to an earlier, “first conversation,” indicating that there had been
more than one meeting with YouTube.66
169. Flaherty then noted that the White House had asked YouTube to monitor and report
on the speech on its platforms, stating that the White House expected a report from them.67
170. Flaherty then provided a “recap” of their oral conversation, stating that concern
about misinformation on YouTube was “shared at the highest (and I mean highest) levels of the
[White House]”: “To recap: … we remain concerned that Youtube is ‘funneling’ people into
hesitance and intensifying people’s hesitancy … we want to be sure that you have a handle on
vaccine hesitancy generally and are working toward making the problem better. This is a concern
64
Id. at 36.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 37.
46
that is shared at the highest (and I mean highest) levels of the WH, so we’d like to continue a good-
faith dialogue about what is going on under the hood here.”68
171. Flaherty indicated that the White House was coordinating with the Stanford Internet
Observatory, which was then operating the Virality Project, discussed in detail below, noting in
the first bullet point: “Stanford has mentioned that it’s recently Vaccine Passports and J&J pause-
related stuff, but I’m not sure if that reflects what you’re seeing.”
172. Flaherty also praised YouTube for reducing distribution of “borderline” content
(i.e., often-truthful content that does not violate platform policies but that the White House
disfavors): “I believe you said you reduced watch time by 70% on ‘borderline’ content, which is
impressive.” He then followed up with a long series of demands for more information.69
173. Flaherty emphasized that the White House wanted to make sure YouTube’s “work
extends to the broader problem” of people viewing vaccine-hesitant content. And he proposed
regular meetings to push YouTube to disclose its “internal data” to the White House: “We’ve
worked with a number of platform partners to track down similar information based on internal
data, including partners of similar scale. I am feeling a bit like I don’t have a full sense of the
picture here. We speak with other platforms on a semi-regular basis. We’d love to get in this habit
with you. Perhaps bi-weekly? Looking forward to more conversation.”70
The Vaccine Misinformation Brief
174. On April 23, 2021, Flaherty sent Facebook an email that included a document
entitled “Facebook COVID-19 Vaccine Misinformation Brief” prepared by an unidentified third
party.71
68
Id.
69
Id. at 38.
70
Id. at 39.
71
Id.
47
175. The “Brief” had two major headings with several bullet points under each:
“Facebook plays a major role in the spread of COVID vaccine misinformation,” and “Facebook’s
policy and enforcement gaps enable misinformation’s spread.” The “Brief” recommended much
more aggressive censorship of Facebook’s platforms, calling for “progressively severe penalties
… and comprehensive enforcement for pages, accounts, and groups that repeatedly post COVID
vaccine misinformation,” and stating that “[b]ans for COVID19 misinformation should be cross-
platform and enforced at the entity-level, not the account level.” It called for Facebook to stop
distributing even non-violative anti-vaccine content “in News Feed or in group recommendations,”
and it stated that “[v]accine misinformation monitoring and enforcement must adjust as
disinformers evade enforcement … .” And it called for specific censorship of disfavored speakers:
“Warning screens before linking to domains known to promote vaccine misinformation would
dissuade users from following links to off-platform misinformation and hurt the vaccine
misinformation business model Facebook enables.”72
The Greater the Degree of Public Interest, the More Cause to Suppress
176. On May 1, 2021, Nick Clegg of Facebook sent an email to Andy Slavitt indicating
that the White House had recently met with Facebook to “share research work” and make more
demands, stating: “Thanks to your team for sharing the research work with us … .” Clegg
apologized to the White House for not catching and censoring three pieces of vaccine content that
went viral, even though the content did not violate Facebook’s policies: “I wanted to send you a
quick note on the three pieces of vaccine content that were seen by a high number of people before
we demoted them. Although they don’t violate our community standards, we should have demoted
them before they went viral and this has exposed gaps in our operational and technical process.”73
72
Id.
73
Id. at 40.
48
Better Yet: Suppress the Speech in Real Time Before It Goes Viral
177. Clegg promised to be more vigilant in censoring such non-violative content to
prevent it from going viral in the future: “The teams have spent the last 24 hrs analysing these
gaps and are making a number of changes starting next week, including setting up more dedicated
monitoring for Covid vaccine content on the cusp of going viral, applying stronger demotions to a
broader set of content, and setting up daily review and analysis so that we have a better real-time
view of what is being seen by lots of people. I will be checking on this closely to make sure that
these additional steps show results—the stronger demotions in particular should deliver real
impact.”74
178. Clegg then listed in bold the demands that the White House had made in its recent
meeting, with a detailed response to each.75
179. First, the White House had demanded that Facebook address “Non-English
mis/disinformation circulating without moderation.” Facebook promised to take steps to do so.76
180. Second, the White House demanded of Facebook: “Do not distribute or amplify
vaccine hesitancy, and Facebook should end group recommendations for groups with a history of
COVID-19 or vaccine misinformation.” Facebook assured the White House that it was taking
strong steps to censor such content and promised to increase its efforts to do so in the future:
“Much of the research you shared called on us to ensure that our systems don't amplify vaccine
hesitancy content and this is top of mind for us. In addition to the changes I mentioned above, we
have already removed all health groups from our recommendation feature on Facebook, and on
Instagram we filter vaccine-related accounts from our ‘accounts you may follow feature.’ We also
74
Id.
75
Id. at 41.
76
Id.
49
remove accounts that may discourage vaccination from search features. We currently enforce on
hash tags we know are shared to promote vaccine hesitancy content and are working to improve
our automated systems here.”77
181. Third, the White House had demanded that Facebook “Monitor[] events that host
anti-vaccine and COVID disinformation.” Facebook promised to monitor social media “events”
on its platforms more closely and take more aggressive action to censor them.78
182. Fourth, the White House had demanded censorship of the so-called
“Disinformation Dozen” in the private meeting with Facebook, raising the concern that “12
accounts are responsible for 73% of vaccine misinformation.”79
183. Facebook responded that it was scrutinizing those speakers and censoring them
whenever it could, but that most if their content did not violate Facebook’s policies: “we continue
to review accounts associated with the 12 individuals identified in the CCDH ‘Disinformation
Dozen’ report, but many of those either do not violate our policies or have ceased posting violating
content. Our ‘Dedicated Vaccine Discouraging Entity’ policy is designed to remove groups and
pages that are dedicated to sharing vaccine discouraging content and we continue to review and
enforce on these where we become aware of them.”80
Facebook Expresses Doubt: Could Too Much Censorship Be Counterproductive?
184. Clegg noted that he realized the White House would not be satisfied with these
answers: “I realise that our position on this continues to be a particular concern for you.” Clegg
then suggested that too much censorship might be counterproductive and might drive vaccine
hesitancy: “Among experts we have consulted, there is a general sense that deleting more
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 42.
80
Id.
50
expressions of vaccine hesitancy might be more counterproductive to the goal of vaccine uptake
because it could prevent hesitant people from talking through their concerns and potentially
reinforce the notion that there’s a cover-up.”81 Brian Rice also forwarded Nick Clegg’s email to
Rob Flaherty.82
“Not to Sound Like a Broken Record, But Why Aren’t You Censoring More?”
185. On May 5, 2021, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki gave a press conference
where she stated that:
The President’s view is that the major platforms have a

responsibility related to the health and safety of all Americans to
stop amplifying untrustworthy content, disinformation, and
misinformation, especially related to Covid19 vaccinations … . He
also supports better privacy protections and a robust anti-trust
program. So, his view is that there’s more that needs to be done to
ensure that this type of misinformation, disinformation, damaging,
sometimes life-threatening information, is not going out to the
American public (emphasis added).83
186. The next day, May 6, 2021, Flaherty emailed Facebook, demanding more
explanations about why it was not censoring more aggressively. Regarding Nick Clegg’s apology
for not catching and censoring three viral posts earlier, Flaherty linked to one and noted: “For one,
it’s still up and seems to have gotten pretty far. And it’s got 365k shares with four comments.
We’ve talked about this in a different context, but how does something like that happen?”84
187. Flaherty also demanded more information about Facebook’s efforts to demote
“borderline” content: “Won’t come as a shock to you that we’re particularly interested in your
demotion efforts, which I don’t think we have a good handle on (and, based on the below, it doesn’t
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, THE WHITE HOUSE (May 5, 2021, 1:32 PM EDT), at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/05/05/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-
and-secretary-of-agriculture-tom-vilsack-may-5-2021/.
84
Id. at 43.
51
seem like you do either). Not to sound like a broken record, but how much content is being
demoted, and how effective are you at mitigating reach, and how quickly?”85
Suppress Vaccine-Related Speech at All Costs
188. Flaherty then criticized Facebook’s censorship efforts for vaccine-related posts in
Facebook groups related to other topics: “Also, health groups: sure. But it seems more likely that
anti-vax stuff is moving in groups that are not about health but are … mom centric, or other spaces.
Strikes me as the issue here is less from single-use anti-vaccine accounts and more about people
who … do other things and are also vaccine hesitant.”
189. On May 10, 2021, Facebook sent an email to Flaherty and Courtney Rowe of the
White House digital team, touting its efforts to promote vaccination on its platforms.
190. The next day, May 11, 2021, Flaherty responded with a one-line, snarky email
stating: “Hard to take any of this seriously when you’re actively promoting anti-vaccine pages in
search.” He included a link to a news report about this topic on Twitter.86
191. The next day, Facebook responded, assuring Flaherty that it had censored the
accounts mentioned in the news reports: “Thanks Rob—both of the accounts featured in the tweet
have been removed from Instagram entirely … . We’re looking into what happened.”87
192. Facebook assured Flaherty that it was working on processes to suppress disfavored
speech from search results on its platforms and remove anti-vaccine accounts: “We are continuing
to develop technology to improve the quality of search results at scale across Instagram—this is a
continual process built on new technology to address adversarial accounts … . We also remove
accounts that may discourage vaccination from search by developing and using this new
85
Id.
86
Id. at 44.
87
Id.
52
technology to find accounts on Instagram that discourage vaccines, and remove these accounts
from search altogether. We’ve also removed accounts that primarily discourage vaccination from
appearing where we recommend new accounts to follow, such as accounts you may like, and
suggested accounts.”88
193. Facebook acknowledged that its censorship efforts were not enough and promised
the White House they would increase them: “We clearly still have work to do to [sic], but wanted
to ensure you were aware of the authoritative resources we’re pointing people to first as we
continue investing in removing accounts from search that may discourage vaccination.”89
194. The same day, Flaherty responded by accusing Facebook of not doing enough to
censor anti-vaccine content in search results and dissembling to deceive the White House:
“‘[R]emoving bad information from search’ is one of the easy, low-bar things you guys do to make
people like me think you’re taking action. If you’re not getting that right, it raises even more
questions about the higher bar stuff.” Flaherty continued, accusing Facebook of dishonesty: “You
say in your note that you remove accounts that discourage vaccination from appearing in
recommendations (even though you’re using ‘primarily’ to give yourself wiggle room). You also
said you don’t promote those accounts in search. Not sure what else there is to say.”90
195. On May 28, 2021, a senior executive of Meta sent an email to Slavitt and Surgeon
General Murthy reporting that Facebook had expanded its censorship policies. The email stated
that a “key point” was that “We’re expanding penalties for individual Facebook accounts that share
misinformation.”
88
Id. at 45.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 45-46.
53
A Taste of the White House’s Own Medicine
196. At some time prior to July 15, 2021, the White House’s Facebook account
experienced an issue that slowed its growth in followers.
197. On July 15, 2021, Facebook emailed a White House staffer and reported that “the
technical issues that had been affecting follower growth on @potus have been resolved … . you
should start to see your numbers trend back upwards … . Thanks for your patience as we
investigated this.” The White House staffer asked Facebook, “Could you tell me more about the
technical issues affecting audience growth?”91
198. Facebook responded, “from what we understand it was an internal technical issue
that we can’t get into, but it’s now resolved and should not happen again.” The White House
staffer then simply added Rob Flaherty to the email chain without further comment.
199. The same minute he was added to the email chain, 3:29 p.m. on July 15, 2021,
Flaherty exploded at Facebook: “Are you guys fucking serious? I want an answer on what
happened here and I want it today.”92
200. Facebook explained that the White House’s account had been inadvertently swept
into the net of censorship that it had insisted that Facebook impose on private speakers’ accounts.
The Surgeon General’s Misinformation Advisory
201. That day, July 15, 2021, the Surgeon General released an advisory (the July
Advisory) aimed at censoring purported “misinformation” about COVID-19.93
91
Id. at 46.
92
Id. at 47.
93
See U.S. Surgeon General’s Advisory, Confronting Health Misinformation (July 15, 2021),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-general-misinformation-advisory.pdf (COVID-19 Advisory).
54
202. According to the Surgeon General’s advisory, “[m]isinformation” has “caused
confusion and led people to decline COVID-19 vaccines, reject public health measures such as
masking and physical distancing. And use unproven treatments.”94
203. The advisory identifies social media platforms as major sources of
“misinformation.”
204. That day, Press Secretary Jen Psaki gave a joint briefing along with the Surgeon
General and DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas to discuss the advisory.95
205. Murthy acknowledged that:
health misinformation didn’t start with COVID-19. What’s different

now though is the speed and scale at which health misinformation is
spreading. Modern technology companies have enabled
misinformation to poison our information environment with little
accountability to their users. They’ve allowed people who
intentionally spread misinformation—what we call
“disinformation”—to have extraordinary reach.96
206. In response to a reporter’s question about whether the federal government had taken
action to ensure cooperation of tech companies, Ms. Psaki stated:
In terms of actions, Alex, that we have taken—or we’re working to

take, I should say—from the federal government: We’ve increased
disinformation research and tracking within the Surgeon General’s
office. We’re flagging problematic posts for Facebook that spread
disinformation (emphasis added).
94
Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 20, at 85.
95
Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Surgeon General Dr. Vivek H. Murthy, THE WHITE HOUSE (July
15, 2021, 1:05 PM EDT), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/07/15/press-briefing-by-
press-secretary-jen-psaki-and-surgeon-general-dr-vivek-h-murthy-july-15-2021/.
96
Id. (emphasis added)
55
The President Accuses Social Media Platforms of Killing People
207. The next day, July 16, 2021, President Biden stated that Facebook and other social
media platforms were “killing people” by failing to censor enough misinformation.97
208. Subsequently, Facebook’s senior executive Nick Clegg reached out to request
“deescalat[ion]” and “work[ing] together.”98
209. Nick Clegg emailed Surgeon General Murthy and stated, “Dear Vivek, Reaching
out after what has transpired over the past few days following the publication of the misinformation
advisory and culminating today in the President’s remarks about us.” He then stated, “I know our
teams met today to better understand the scope of what the White House expects of us on
misinformation going forward.”99
210. On a follow-up call to the email, Murthy asked Clegg specific questions on
requiring Facebook to share data with outside researchers about the scope and reach of
misinformation on its platforms: “[T]he most specific questions were about understanding the
data around the spread of misinformation and how we were measuring that, and … how we could
have external researchers validate the spread of misinformation and—and helping us as a field
understand the depth of the problem.”100
211. One such “external researcher” that the OSG had in mind was Renee DiResta, of
the Stanford Internet Observatory, which hosted a “rollout event” for the advisory featuring Dr.
Murthy on the day that the advisory was announced.101
97
Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Cecilia Kang, ‘They’re Killing People’: Biden Denounces Social Media for Virus
Disinformation, The New York Times (July 16, 2021), at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/16/us/politics/biden-
facebook-social-media-covid.html.
98
99
Id.
100
Id. at 67-68.
101
Id. at 68.
56
212. On July 16, 2021, a reporter asked Ms. Psaki to elaborate on the Government’s role
in flagging Facebook “disinformation.”102
213. Ms. Psaki responded:
it shouldn’t come as any surprise that we’re in regular touch with

social media platforms—just like we’re in regular touch with all of
you and your media outlets—about areas where we have concern,
information that might be useful … so we are regularly making sure
social media platforms are aware of the latest narratives dangerous
to public health that we and many other Americans … are seeing
across all of social and traditional media. And we work to engage
with them to better understand the enforcement of social media
platforms.103
Slake the White House’s Censorship Thirst—or Face the Consequences
214. A reporter stated that “yesterday after the press briefing” Facebook said that it had
removed 18 million pieces of COVID misinformation and asked whether the White House found
that sufficient.104
215. Ms. Psaki responded, “[c]learly not, because we’re talking about additional steps
that should be taken.” (emphasis added). She also reiterated that “we are in regular touch with
social media platforms.”105
216. On July 17, 2021, another Facebook official emailed Anita Dunn, the political
strategist and Senior Advisor to the President in the White House, begging for assistance in getting
back into the White House’s good graces.106
217. The Facebook official wrote: “Would love to connect with you on the President’s
comments on Covid misinfo and our work there. Really could use your advice and counsel on
102
Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, THE WHITE HOUSE (July 16, 2021, 1:20 PM EDT),
july-16-2021/.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
57
how we get back to a good place here. … As I hope you know, we’ve been doing a significant
amount of work to … fight the misinfo … Obviously, yesterday things were pretty heated, and I’d
love to find a way to get back to pushing together on this—we are 100% on the same team here in
fighting this and I could really use your advice.”
218. Facebook then wrote: “We had a conversation with the Surgeon General’s office
yesterday to discuss the advisory in more detail and hope to continue to work to address concerns.”
219. On July 18, 2021, having received no response to his email requesting a meeting,
the Facebook official texted Dr. Murthy stating, “I imagine you and your team are feeling a little
aggrieved—as is the FB team, it’s not great to be accused of killing people—but as I said by email
I’m keen to find a way to deescalate and work together collaboratively. I am available to
meet/speak whenever suits.”107
220. Four days after President Biden’s comments, USA Today reported that “[t]he White
House is assessing whether social media platforms are legally liable for misinformation spread on
their platforms.”108
221. The report noted: “[r]elations are tense between the Biden administration and social
media platforms,” and that the government was “examining how misinformation fits into the
liability protections granted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which shields
online platforms from being responsible for what is posted by third parties on their sites.”
107
Id. at 92.
108
Matthew Brown, “They should be held accountable”: White House reviews platforms’ misinformation liability,
USA Today (July 20, 2021, updated 8:06 PM ET),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/07/20/whitehouse-reviews-section-230-protections-covid-
misinformation/8024210002/.
58
Social Media Platforms Strive to Show that They Are Obeying Orders
222. On July 20, 2021, Rob Flaherty emailed YouTube, linking to a Tweet of
“borderline” content and stating, “I’m curious: Saw this tweet. [Linking the Tweet]. I think we
had a pretty extensive back and forth about the degree to which you all are recommending anti-
vaccination content. You were pretty emphatic that you are not. This seems to indicate that you
are. What is going on here?”109
223. YouTube responded by assuring Flaherty that it “reduce[s]” the recommendation
of anti-vaccine speech even when it does not violate YouTube’s policies and that its goal was “to
have views of nonsubscribed, recommended borderline content below 0.5%.”
224. On July 23, 2021, after meeting with Surgeon General Murthy, Nick Clegg of
Facebook sent a follow-up email stating: “Dear Vivek, if I may, thanks again for taking the time
to meet earlier today … . I wanted to make sure you saw the steps we took just this past week to
adjust policies on what we are removing with respect to misinformation as well as steps taken to
further address the ‘disinfo dozen’….”110
225. After the July 23 meeting, that same day, Clegg reported back to Murthy with a
series of new censorship actions and policies, including that Facebook had amended its censorship
policies to make them more restrictive: “We also expanded the group of false claims that we
remove, to keep up with recent trends of misinformation that we are seeing.”111
226. Clegg also committed to “do more” to censor misinformation in response to federal
officials’ demands: “We hear your call for us to do more and, as I said on the call, we’re committed
to working toward our shared goal of helping America get on top of this pandemic.”112
109
Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 20, at 54-55.
110
Id. at 93.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 94.
59
227. Clegg further agreed to accede to federal officials’ demands that Facebook make
its internal data on misinformation available to federal officials and researchers like Renee DiResta
of the Virality Project.
228. Clegg also pledged to report back to Murthy repeatedly so that federal officials
could monitor Facebook’s “progress” on censoring misinformation: “We’d also like to begin a
regular cadence of meetings with your team so that we can continue to update you on our progress.
You have identified 4 specific recommendations for improvement and we want to make sure to
keep you informed of our work on each.”113
229. Clegg concluded by promising that Facebook would “strive” to meet federal
officials’ expectations on censorship: “we will strive to do all we can to meet our shared goals.”
230. On a podcast, former White House Covid-19 Advisor Andy Slavitt reminisced
about how, in the summer of 2021, while still working for the Biden Administration, he had warned
Facebook Vice President of Global Affairs Nick Clegg that, “in eight weeks’ time, Facebook will
be the number 1 story of the pandemic.”114 Slavitt also commented on how he had been in contact
with Clegg about which pieces of misinformation to take down.
Facebook and YouTube Expand Censorship of Vaccine “Misinformation”
231. On August 18, 2021, Facebook emailed Rob Flaherty a post entitled, “How We’re
Taking Action Against Vaccine Misinformation Superspreaders.” The post detailed a long list of
censorship actions taken against the “Disinfo Dozen,” including removing over three dozen pages,
groups and accounts linked with them; imposing additional penalties on another two dozen pages,
groups, and accounts linked with them; applying penalties to some of their website domains so
113
Id.
114
https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/is-covid-misinformation-killing-people-facebooks-
nick/id1504128553?i=1000529558554.
60
that third parties posting their content will be deamplified; and removing the remaining violating
content.
232. On August 20, 2021, Nick Clegg emailed Surgeon General Murthy and Eric Waldo
of OSG, detailing Facebook’s additional censorship actions that it had taken as a result of the
Surgeon General’s Health Advisory. Clegg noted that Dr. Murthy had “asked for an update on
existing and new steps that Facebook is taking.”115
233. Clegg explained that Facebook was taking new steps in response to the pressure
from the White House and Surgeon General: “In this update, we describe … further policy work
to enable stronger action against persistent distributors of vaccine misinformation.”116
234. In a section headed “Limiting Potentially Harmful Misinformation,” Clegg
provided five bullet points and four sub-bullet points detailing expanded efforts of censorship by
Facebook taken in response to the Advisory. These included, among others, “expanding our
COVID policies to further reduce the spread of potentially harmful content”; “increasing the
strength of our demotions for COVID and vaccine-related content that third-party fact-checkers
rate as ‘Partly False’ or ‘Missing Context’”; “making it easier to have Pages/Groups/Accounts
demoted for sharing COVID and vaccine-related misinformation”; and “strengthening our existing
demotion penalties for websites that are repeatedly fact-checked for COVID or vaccine
misinformation content shared on our platform.”117
235. On September 29, 2021, Google emailed Eric Waldo to “share an update we
recently made to YouTube’s policies pertaining to vaccine-related misinformation.” Google
reported: “We just announced that we will be introducing a new policy that prohibits content that
115
Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 20, at 97
116
Id.
117
Id.
61
includes harmful misinformation about the safety, efficacy, or ingredients for currently
administered vaccines …” 118
236. On October 19, 2021, Rob Flaherty emailed Facebook, copying several White
House officials and Eric Waldo of OSG, and asked Facebook to “connect on what the admin’s
plans are for the 5-11 vaccine rollout” (approval of the vaccine for children in that age group).119
237. On October 28, 2021, the same day as a Washington Post article about Facebook
employee Frances Haugen’s allegations about misinformation on Facebook, Rob Flaherty emailed
Brian Rice of Facebook a hyperlink to the article. The only text in the email was the subject line,
which stated: “not even sure what to say at this point.”120
Take Responsibility and Censor More—Think of the Children
238. On October 29, 2021, in response to this article, the Surgeon General tweeted from
his official account (as opposed to his personal account), in a thread:
We must demand Facebook and the rest of the social media

ecosystem take responsibility for stopping health misinformation on
their platforms. The time for excuses and half measures is long past.
We need transparency and accountability now. The health of our
country is at stake.121
239. On November 4, 2021, Facebook followed up again with OSG and the White House
with additional reports regarding its censorship of misinformation: “Last Friday, we updated our
misinformation policies for COVID-19 vaccines to make clear they apply to claim about children,”
identifying a list of specific claims.122
118
Id. at 99.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 101.
121
Dr. Vivek Murthy, U.S. Surgeon General (@Surgeon_General), Twitter (October 29, 2021, 4:19PM),
https://twitter.com/Surgeon_General/status/1454181191494606854.
122
62
240. Facebook made clear that the CDC was serving as the “health expert” who was
dictating what could be said on Facebook’s platforms “in real time”: “We’re grateful to our
partners at the CDC for helping get these debunked in advance of the announcement, and we look
forward to staying connected on emerging COVID misinformation trends.”123
241. On November 4, 2021, Meta reported to Rowe, Flaherty, and other White House
officials that “we updated our misinformation policies for COVID-19 vaccines to make clear that
they apply to claims about children….”124
Parody Has No Place in a Decent, Censored Society
242. On November 30, 2021, a White House official emailed Twitter stating, “Would
you mind looking at this video and helping us with next steps to put a label or remove it?”
243. He included a link to a Tweet of an unflattering, comedic video of First Lady Jill
Biden reading to children, which had been clearly edited to make it sound as if she was profanely
heckled while reading to them.125
244. Twitter responded within six minutes: “Happy to escalate with the team for further
review from here.”126
245. That evening, Twitter emailed back, stating, “Update for you—The team was able
to create this event page for more context and details.” The “event page” explained the context of
the parody video but did not censor it; it alerted users that the video had been edited for “comedic”
effect.127
123
Id.
124
Id. at 56.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
See “A video of first lady Jill Biden reading to children was manipulated to include profanity, according to fact-
checkers,” TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2021), https://twitter.com/i/events/1465769009073123330.
63
246. The White House official promptly emailed back, asking that Twitter actually
censor the comedic video, not just provide an event page explaining that it was comedic: “Will
you apply the ‘Manipulated Media’ disclaimer to the video asset itself?”128
247. The next morning, the White House official emailed Twitter again, arguing that
Twitter should apply a label to the video under its content-moderation policies.129
248. Twitter responded that same morning, explaining that the parody video of Jill Biden
was not subject to labeling under its policy: “After escalating this to our team, the Tweet and video
referenced will not be labeled under our synthetic and manipulated media policy. Although it has
been significantly altered, the team has not found it to cause harm or impact public safety.”130
249. Later that day, the White House official responded, disputing Twitter’s
interpretation of its own content-moderation policy and looping in Michael DeRosa, the First
Lady’s press secretary. DeRosa then emailed Twitter, disputing Twitter’s application of its policy.
250. The White House continued to press Twitter for further explanation and action on
December 9, 13, and 17.131
251. On December 17, 2021, Twitter provided a more detailed explanation of its
decision. The White House official emailed back the same day, again disputing Twitter’s
application of its own policy and pressing Twitter on the issue.
252. He then added Rob Flaherty to the email chain.132
253. Nine minutes later, on December 17, Flaherty emailed Twitter, angrily accusing it
of dishonestly misapplying its own policies.133
128
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 58.
133
Id.
64
254. A senior-level Twitter executive then emailed Flaherty proposing to resolve the
matter by phone. After that phone conversation, it appears that the Tweet that prompted the
exchange is no longer available.134
255. On December 21, 2021, Surgeon General Murthy gave a podcast on the Omicron
variant in which he publicly threatened to hold social media platforms “accountable” for not
censoring misinformation: “number one, we have to track down where this misinformation is
coming from and understand how to hold platforms accountable, new technology platforms that
are driving so much of the misinformation spread … . [B]y allowing this misinformation to
proliferate on their sites, they’re subjecting people in the United States and around the world to
extraordinary harm, and they’re doing so with little accountability at this moment and really with
very little transparency. That can’t be allowed to continue because it’s putting everyone’s health
at risk.”135
256. In a January, 2022 interview on MSNBC, Murthy stated that social media
“platforms still have not stepped up to do the right thing[,]” that the focus in stopping the spread
of “misinformation” should be on these companies, and that “this is actually about what
government can do. This is about companies and individuals recognizing that the only way we
get past misinformation is if we are careful about what we say and we use the power that we have
to limit the spread of that misinformation.”136
257. In January, 2022, Facebook reported to White House officials Rowe, Flaherty, and
Slavitt that it had “labeled and demoted” “vaccine humor posts whose content could discourage
134
The link to the tweet, https://twitter.com/ArtValley818_/status/1465442266810486787?s=20, is no longer
available.
135
Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 20, at 103-104.
136
Tom Elliott (@tomselliott), Twitter (Jan. 25, 2022, 10:03 AM), bit.ly/3CGcncD.
65
vaccination.” It also reported to the White House that it “labeled and demoted” posts “suggesting
natural immunity to COVID-19 infection is superior to immunity by the COVID-19 vaccine.”137
258. On February 14, 2022, Surgeon General Murthy participated in a panel discussion
hosted by the Rockefeller Foundation in which he stated that there is a role for government to set
“safety standards” when it comes to misinformation, “particularly from platforms.”138
The OSG’s Request for Information
259. Less than a month later, on March 3, 2022, the OSG issued a formal Request for
Information (RFI) seeking information from social media platforms and others about
misinformation on social media.139
260. According to the New York Times, Murthy “demanded” information about the
major sources of COVID-19 misinformation by May 2, 2022.140
261. The RFI webpage created to facilitate this reporting asks for information from
technology platforms about “sources of COVID-19 misinformation” including “specific, public
actors that are providing misinformation, as well as components of specific platforms that are
driving exposure to information.”141
262. On information and belief, agencies typically issue RFIs as a first step in the process
of implementing regulations on an industry.
137
138
Id. at 105.
139
See Davey Alba, The surgeon general calls on Big Tech to turn over Covid-19 misinformation data, The New York
Times (Mar. 3, 2022), at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/technology/surgeon-general-covid-
misinformation.html.
140
Id.
141
HHS Request for Information on March 7, 2022, at
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/03/07/2022-04777/impact-of-health-misinformation-in-the-digital-
information-environment-in-the-united-states.
66
The CISA Mis-, Dis-, and Malinformation Police
263. On April 12, 2022, CISA announced that it was coordinating directly with social
media platforms to police “Mis, Dis, Malinformation” (MDM). The bulletin reported that CISA’s
“mission evolved” during the Biden Administration to address the new “information
environment.”142
264. The bulletin also stated that the “MDM team supports the interagency and private
sector partners’ COVID-19 response efforts via regular reporting and analysis of key pandemic-
related MDM trends.”143
The White House’s Threats: Censorship or Else
265. On April 25, 2022, White House Press Secretary Psaki was asked at a press briefing
to respond to the news that Elon Musk would acquire Twitter.
266. Psaki responded with the threat of adverse legal consequences for Twitter and other
social media platforms, specifically referencing antitrust enforcement and Section 230 repeal: “the
President has long been concerned about the power of large social media platforms … [and] has
long argued that tech platforms must be held accountable for the harms they cause. He has been a
strong supporter of fundamental reforms to achieve that goal, including reforms to Section 230,
enacting antitrust reforms, requiring more transparency, and more.”144
267. In response to a question about whether Psaki was “concerned about the kind of
purveyors of” “misinformation, disinformation, health falsehoods … having more of an
opportunity to speak there on Twitter,” she stated that the President had “long talked about his
142
CISA, Mis, Dis, Malinformation, available at https://www/cisa.gov/mdm (last visited May 18, 2022).
143
Id.
144
White House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki (April 25, 2022) available at
april-25-2022/.
67
concerns about the power of social media platforms, including Twitter and others, to spread
misinformation, disinformation; the need for these platforms to be held accountable.”145
268. She also affirmed that senior officials within the Biden Administration “engage
regularly with all social media platforms about steps that can be taken that has continued, and I’m
sure it will continue. But there are also reforms that we think Congress could take and we would
support taking, including reforming Section 230, enacting antitrust reforms, requiring more
transparency. And the President is encouraged by the bipartisan support for—or engagement in
those efforts.”146
269. On June 22, 2022, Facebook emailed Waldo of OSG, Rob Flaherty, and other White
House officials with an update on Facebook’s increased censorship.147
270. In the email, Facebook stated that it “[w]anted to ensure that you were aware of our
policy updates following the early childhood vaccine approvals. As of today, all COVID-19
vaccine related misinformation and harm policies on Facebook and Instagram apply to people 6
months or older … .”148
271. Facebook indicated that it had again relied on the CDC to dictate what claims
people can post on Facebook: “We expanded these policies in coordination with the CDC and
ensured that we also included false claims that might be connected to children … .”
272. At the federal officials’ request, Facebook continued to send to the White House
and OSG bi-weekly “Covid Insights Reports” on COVID-19 related misinformation on its
platforms.149
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
148
Id.
149
Id.
68
273. Throughout the spring of 2022, Facebook repeatedly asked the federal officials if
it could discontinue or reduce the frequency of these reports, which it had been sending for over a
year.150
274. On June 13, 2022, Facebook notified the White House and OSG that “we will plan
to discontinue these unless we hear from you that this information continues to be valuable.”
275. Rob Flaherty responded the same day, asking that Facebook continue to send the
reports and further asking Facebook to report on how it would handle misinformation for early-
childhood (under age 5) vaccines.151
276. Facebook continued to send the reports as requested, including two reports on July
17, 2022, and promised to continue sending them.
277. In September of 2022, the White House convened the “United We Stand” summit,
at which the President again demanded that Congress reform Section 230 to punish tech companies
for failing to adequately censor.152
III. THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION’S “DISINFORMATION GOVERNANCE BOARD” WITHIN

DHS
278. On April 27, 2022, Secretary Mayorkas announced that DHS was creating a
“Disinformation Governance Board” to combat “misinformation” and “disinformation.”
279. Documents declassified on June 7, 2022, establish that a whistleblower revealed
that DHS, as of September 13, 2021 (if not earlier), had deemed “disinformation relating to the
origins and effects of Covid-19 vaccines or the efficacy of masks” a “serious homeland security
risk.”153
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 11.
153
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/grassley_hawley_to_deptofhomelandsecuritydisinformationgover
nanceboard.pdf
69
280. Among the declassified documents was a September 13, 2021, DHS memorandum,
which detailed the significant and diverse efforts that DHS intended to take to combat such alleged
misinformation, describing it as the Department’s “mission.”154
281. The DHS memorandum expressly and repeatedly acknowledged that, in pursuit of
its efforts to combat Covid-related “misinformation,” the Department ran the risk of violating the
First Amendment.155
282. The memorandum emphasized the importance of “work[ing] closely” with “private
sector partners” in order to successfully combat and otherwise prevent dissemination of so-called
Covid-related misinformation.156
283. The DHS memorandum also outlined the importance of sharing information, as the
Department had done in the past, with “social media platform operators.”157
284. The documents outlining the creation of the DGB expressly acknowledged that the
“component” governmental agencies tasked with combating misinformation, such as DHS, could
“engage private sector services” and otherwise foster partnerships with “private sector entities
[and] tech platforms” to help achieve the DHS mission of combating and suppressing so-called
Covid-related misinformation.158
285. The week of May 16, 2022, the Biden Administration announced that Jankowicz
had resigned and that it was suspending operations of the Board, following unexpected public
outcry. However, the Board was not permanently dismantled, but instead “paused” while, in the
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
70
meantime, DHS would continue its work “to address disinformation,” according to the Biden
Administration.159
286. On August 24, 2022, following the recommendation from the Homeland Security
Advisory Committee (HSAC), Mayorkas rescinded the DGB’s charter.160
287. In its press release announcing the DGB’s dissolution following HSAC’s
recommendation, DHS also noted that HSAC had “concluded that countering disinformation that
threatens the homeland, and providing the public with accurate information in response, is critical
to fulfilling the Department’s missions” and that DHS would “continue to address threat streams
that undermine the security of our country.”161
288. On May 9, 2023, FOIA-obtained documents were released, revealing the agency’s
formation of a “governance board” to oversee DHS’s “Campaign” against domestic terrorism.162
289. Among the released documents is an internal DHS memo dated January 29, 2021
(just nine days after Biden was sworn in as President), which, under the heading “Characterizing
the Threat” and subheading “Pandemic Impacts,” describes how “the most acute terrorist threat
inside the United States” stems from “DVEs” (domestic violent extremists).163 DHS describes
these “violent extremists” as individuals or small groups who “exploit public fears associated with
COVID-19 to incite violence, intimidate targets, and promote their violent extremist
ideologies.”164
159
Theo Wayt, Mark Lungariello, & Samuel Chamberlain, Biden puts disinfo ‘Mary Poppins’ on ice, scraps Orwellian
DHS Board, THE NEW YORK POST (May 18, 2022), available at https://nypost.com/2022/05/18/biden-admin-pauses-
disinformation-governance-board-report/.
160
See Following HSAC Recommendation, DHS terminates Disinformation Governance Board, Department of
Homeland Security (Aug. 24, 2022), at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/08/24/following-hsac-recommendation-dhs-
terminates-disinformation-governance-board.
161
Id.
162
https://aflegal.nyc3.digitaloceanspaces.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/09040902/2022-HQFO-00179-
AFL.pdf.
163
Id.
164
Id.
71
290. According to DHS, protests against “government restrictions imposed by the
pandemic” qualifies as “domestic violent extremism.”165 The internal DHS memo also describes
how accusations of government overreach and protests against pandemic-era government
restrictions constitute “attempts to foment violence.”166
291. Under the heading “Accurately characterizing domestic terrorism can be
challenging,” the DHS memo explains that the distinction between domestic terrorism and other
criminal behavior “comes down to an individual’s ideology,”167 lamenting that it can be
“exceptionally difficult” to legally make the distinction due to “first amendment protections.”168
292. The DHS memo explains, however, that the intelligence community is only “mostly
prohibited” from “reporting on First Amendment protected activities.”169
IV. THE SIO’S “VIRALITY PROJECT” AND ITS COLLUSION WITH FEDERAL AGENCIES TO
CENSOR SPEECH
293. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the Stanford Internet Observatory launched the
Virality Project as a means of tracking and censoring Covid-related speech on social media
platforms. According to the Virality Project’s report dated April 26, 2022, the VP targeted speech
by “domestic actors” (i.e., American citizens) who “questioned the safety, distribution, and
effectiveness of the vaccines.”170
294. According to VP’s report, SIO’s Research Manager Renee DiResta is the VP’s
Executive Editor and contributor.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Stanford Internet Observatory, et al., The Virality Project, Memes, Magnets, and Microchips: Narrative
Dynamics Around COVID-19 Vaccines (Apr. 26, 2022), https://purl.stanford.edu/mx395xj8490.
72
295. From the start, VP was overtly biased against “anti-vaccine” viewpoints: “The
Project’s original framing document articulated the threat: A surge of anti-vaccine
disinformation will pose significant challenges to the rollout and public adoption of COVID-
19 vaccines in the United States.” (bold in original).171
296. On information and belief, the VP targets truthful speech for censorship and
successfully induced social-media platforms to censor and suppress COVID-related speech that
was not false and, in many cases, not even violative of platform policies.
297. The VP report admits that “it was not always clear what was misinformation; in the
case of the novel coronavirus, it was often simply not yet clear what was true or where scientific
consensus lay,”172 and that “[g]round truth about COVID-19 was rapidly evolving, and even
institutional experts were not always aligned on the facts.”173 Yet this did not stop the VP from
targeting supposed “misinformation” that was admittedly true at the time, or that later turned out
to be true.
298. Most speech targeted by the VP was not false: “The most commonly employed
tactics were Hard-to-Verify Content and Alleged Authoritative Source.”174 According to the VP
report, “Hard-to-Verify Content” is content that is “difficult to fact-check or verify, such as
personal anecdotes,” and “Alleged Authoritative Sources” is content that points to “information
from an alleged public health official, doctor, or other authoritative source.”175
171
Id. at 9.
172
Id. at 7.
173
Id. at 8.
174
Id. at 34.
175
Id. at 12.
73
299. According to the VP, truthful “content” that “leveraged decontextualized statistics
from the US Department of Health and Human Services’ Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting
System (VAERS) database” is misinformation.176
300. According to VP, it is also misinformation when true adverse health events from
vaccines are “shared absent context,” including “[r]are incidents documenting verified adverse
health events.”177
301. The VP report explains that “personal anecdotes” about “vaccine injuries and
severe side effects—ranging from rashes, to blood clots, to death” are also misinformation.178 It
notes that “adverse event stories” are objectionable because they are “employed to push back
against vaccine mandates.”179
302. According to VP, connections made possible through social media platforms
“enabled pathways for the spread of vaccine misinformation.”180 Connections such as “connecting
via Facebook Groups, have enabled users to share, view, and discuss first-person experiences of
supposed vaccine side effects.”181 VP explains that “the more organization occurs on social media,
the more strongly people believe vaccines are unsafe.”182
303. On information and belief, VP successfully pushes platforms to adopt more
aggressive censorship policies: “While online platforms have made progress in creating and
enforcing vaccine related policies, gaps still exist.”183
176
Id. at 44.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 45.
179
Id. at 45-46.
180
Id. at 11.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 3.
74
304. Emails between Twitter and the Virality Project revealed through public reports
show that VP successfully pushed Twitter to adopt more aggressive censorship practices and
repeatedly flagged content for censorship under Twitter’s policies.
305. On March 3, 2021, former CISA intern Jack Cable of VP sent an email to senior
Twitter officials, copying Renée DiResta, advising Twitter that VP was “beginning to ramp up our
notification process to platforms,” and providing “a list of actionable themes of vaccine
misinformation we have recently observed.”
306. In this email, Cable indicated that VP would send “weekly briefing[s]” on
misinformation that would be “targeted to the COVID-related policies we’ve identified on each
platform.”
307. In an email to Twitter, on information and belief, VP flagged supposed
“misinformation” concerning such topics as “the myocarditis situation, Senator Paul Rand’s [sic]
claims about natural immunity, and serious side effects (including a re-emerging concern about
Guillain-Barre Syndrome).”
308. On information and belief, VP flagged to Twitter “True content which might
promote vaccine hesitancy,” including “Viral posts of individuals expressing vaccine hesitancy,
or stories of true vaccine side effects,” and “often true posts which could fuel hesitancy, such as
individual countries banning certain vaccines.”184
184
See Matt Taibbi, Twitter Files #19: The Great Covid-19 Lie Machine: Stanford, the Virality Project, and the
Censorship of “True Stories”, at https://twitter.com/mtaibbi/status/1636729166631432195.
75
309. VP admits that six social media platforms “acknowledge[ed] content flagged for
review” by VP “and act[ed] on it in accordance with their policies”—in other words, censored
it.185
310. VP extensively monitored social media speech to detect disfavored content and
viewpoints: “To surface in-scope content, VP’s team of analysts were divided into topical
detection teams, referred to as pods …. These pods … enabled analysts to develop and ensure
sustained familiarity with how the COVID-19 vaccine conversation was evolving within particular
communities on public platforms.”186
311. VP’s monitoring system tracked content with about 6.7 million engagements on
social media per week, or over 200 million engagements over the seven months: “Average weekly
engagement with content tracked across all Virality Project tickets was 6.7 million.”187
312. This monitoring involved VP analysts reading and searching Americans’ social
media accounts in real time: “Analysts in each pod assessed emerging narratives that were within
scope …, surfacing content both via qualitative observation of the pages and accounts, and by
using lists of common terms associated with vaccine hesitancy and long-standing anti-vaccine
rhetoric.”188
313. This covert, mass surveillance of Americans’ online speech was extensive,
sophisticated, and adaptive: “At the beginning of the project, analysts used broad search terms
(‘vaccine,’ ‘jab’) to surface relevant content and incidents (specific events or stories), but gradually
began to incorporate a combination of machine learning and hand coding to identify additional
185
Written Testimony of Renee DiResta Before the U.S. House of Representatives Regarding “A Growing Threat:
Foreign and Domestic Sources of Disinformation,” Stanford Internet Observatory (July 27, 2022), at
https://ecf.lawd.uscourts.gov/doc1/08917303945.
186
The Virality Project Report, supra note 123 at 15.
187
Id. at 32.
188
Id. at 15.
76
recurring narratives relevant to the four in-scope categories. This included terms related to medical
freedom under ‘Vaccine Distribution,’ or severe adverse effects and death under ‘Vaccine Safety,’
among others. As narratives and new keywords emerged throughout the analysis period, analysts
continually refined their searches.”189
314. VP states that social-media platforms censored content at VP’s instigation:
“Platforms were the final stakeholders in the VP effort. Six social media platforms engaged with
VP tickets—Facebook (including Instagram), Twitter, Google (including YouTube), TikTok,
Medium, and Pinterest—acknowledging content flagged for review and acting on it in accordance
with their policies. On occasion, platforms also provided information on the reach of narratives
previously flagged by VP, which provided a feedback loop leveraged to inform the Project’s
understanding of policies and ongoing research.”190
315. The VP report offers a timeline of policy changes becoming more restrictive of
vaccine-related misinformation that shows repeated tightening of policies by Facebook, Twitter,
and YouTube during 2021.191
316. The VP report emphasizes the importance of both government officials and social-
media platforms in its collaboration on censorship: “As the effort progressed, input from these
partners,” including government officials and platforms, “was crucial in defining the VP’s output
formats and in surfacing where the impacts of vaccine mis- and disinformation were being felt
offline.”192
317. On information and belief, government officials provided “tips” to VP about
misinformation on social media, and VP flagged such content to platforms for censorship.
189
Id. at 16.
190
Id. at 8.
191
Id. at 126, fig. 5.1.
192
Id.
77
318. The VP report states that “federal health agencies” were among VP’s stakeholders,
which “provided tips, feedback and requests to assess specific incidents and narratives.”193
319. According to VP, “[a]n area that required ingenuity was creating a framework for
facilitating the intake of tips from … government partners …. [T]heir tips are often highly valuable
… .”194 (emphasis in original).
320. The VP report states that: “Federal government agencies served as coordinators for
national efforts. The Virality Project built strong ties with several federal government agencies,
most notably the Office of the Surgeon General (OSG) and the CDC, to facilitate bidirectional
situational awareness around emerging narratives.”195
321. VP boasts that the “Office of the Surgeon General incorporated VP’s research and
perspectives into its own vaccine misinformation strategy,” and specifically cites the Surgeon
General’s Health Advisory on this point.196
322. VP engaged in continuous, ongoing communication with government officials,
platforms, and other stakeholders: “The Virality Project delivered 31 weekly briefings focused on
increasing situational awareness and enabling the stakeholders working on countering vaccine mis-
and disinformation to develop the most effective possible response.”197
323. The VP report states that it “provided strategic insights to government entities such
as the OSG, CDC, and the Department of Health and Human Services.”198
193
Id.
194
Id. at 141.
195
Id. at 17.
196
DiResta Testimony, supra note 138 (citing Off. U.S. Surgeon Gen., Confronting Health Misinformation: The
U.S. Surgeon General’s Advisory on Building a Healthy Information Environment (July 15, 2021),
https://hhs.gov.sites.default.files.surgeon.general-misinformation-advisory.pdf.
197
The Virality Project Report, supra note 123 at 18.
198
Id.
78
324. Further, the “Stanford Internet Observatory and the Virality Project also hosted
Surgeon General Vivek Murthy for a seminar on vaccine mis- and disinformation, including the
rollout of the Surgeon General’s advisory on health misinformation.”199
325. VP recommends that the federal government “[i]mplement a Misinformation and
Disinformation Center of Excellence (CoE) housed within the federal government” at CISA “with
its existing mis- and disinformation team.”200 (emphasis added).
326. On information and belief, VP’s censorship activities are ongoing and continue
beyond the period described in the VP report.
V. THE CDC’S PARALLEL CENSORSHIP CAMPAIGN
327. On information and belief, social media companies have frequently and directly
coordinated with CDC to monitor and suppress Covid-related speech.
328. Working closely with the social media platforms, CDC flags supposed
“misinformation” for censorship on the platforms (sometimes using the acronym “BOLO” for “Be
on the Lookout”) and dictates what health statements will be censored on social media.
329. During 2021, Carol Crawford, CDC’s Division Director of Digital Media,
organized and ran “BOLO” meetings on Covid “misinformation” with representatives of social
media platforms—including Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and Google/YouTube—in which she
and other federal officials colluded with those platforms about speech to monitor and target for
suppression.201
199
Id. at 20.
200
Id. at 143.
201
Id. at 139.
79
330. These meetings included Crawford and other CDC officials who would flag
specific social media posts for censorship or topics and provide examples of the types of posts to
censor.
Facebook Censors “Misinformation” upon CDC’s Command
331. Facebook’s “COVID and Vaccine Policy” states that Facebook “does not allow
false claims about the vaccines or vaccination programs which public health experts have advised
us could lead to COVID-19 vaccine rejection.”202
332. CDC officials are included among those “public health experts” who “advise[]”
Facebook on what to censor.
333. For example, on November 4, 2021, in an email from Facebook to the OSG and the
White House concerning the censorship of Covid-related “misinformation,” Facebook made clear
that CDC was serving as the “health expert” who was dictating what could be said on Facebook’s
platforms “in real time”: “We’re grateful to our partners at the CDC for helping get these debunked
in advance of the announcement, and we look forward to staying connected on emerging COVID
misinformation trends.”203
334. On June 22, 2022, in an email from Facebook to the OSG, Rob Flaherty, and other
White House officials, Facebook reported that it had updated the platform’s censorship policy on
“all COVID-19 vaccine related misinformation.”204 According to Facebook, it had again relied on
CDC to dictate what claims users could post on the platform: “We expanded these policies in
202
Facebook, COVID-19 and Vaccine Policy Updates & Protections, https://www.facebook.com/help/23076
4881494641 (emphasis added).
203
204
Id. at 110.
80
coordination with the CDC and ensured that we also included false claims that might be connected
to children….”205
335. Facebook censors Covid-related information as “false,” not based on actual truth or
falsity, but based on whether the statement questions or challenges CDC pronouncements.
336. On March 25, 2021, Crawford and other CDC officials met with Facebook to
discuss Facebook’s policies and approaches to Covid-related “misinformation.”206
337. CDC chose the “Misinformation Topics” to be discussed, which included:
“misinformation about side effects,” and “claims about vaccines leading to deaths.”207
338. For each topic, the slides provided sample posts from Facebook users as examples
of the type of claim, along with a statement from CDC debunking the supposedly erroneous
claim.208 This included debunking any claims that the Covid vaccines had side effects.209
339. On March 30, 2021, Crawford inquired of Facebook what its “approach” was to
censoring local news stories about vaccine-related deaths: “One of the main themes we’re seeing
and from the CrowdTangle report is local news coverage of deaths after receiving the vaccine.
What’s the approach for adding labels to those stories?”210
340. On April 13, 2021, Facebook emailed Crawford and proposed to enroll CDC
officials in a special misinformation reporting channel that would allow CDC to log onto Facebook
as an administrator and flag problematic speech in a more expedited manner.211
341. On November 2, 2021, Facebook’s content-moderation official emailed Crawford
and other CDC officials stating that, “as a result of our work together” with the CDC, Facebook
205
Id.
206
Id. at 117.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 121.
211
Id. at 121-22.
81
had updated its content-moderation policies to increase censorship of vaccine-related claims in
significant ways.212
342. According to the Facebook official, the platform had “launched a new feature on
Instagram, where accounts that repeatedly post content that violates our policies on COVID-19 or
vaccine misinformation may now lose the ability to be tagged or mentioned or may see pop-ups
asking if they’d like to delete certain posts that may violate our policies.”213
343. On February 3, 2022, Facebook’s content-moderation official emailed Crawford to
share the following additional updates that Facebook had made to its misinformation policies “as
a result of our work together”: (1) the removal of claims that Covid vaccines cause heart attacks;
and (2) the reduction of the distribution of content that “likely violates our COVID-19 and vaccine
misinformation policies, but has not yet been reviewed by a human.” 214
Google/YouTube
344. On March 23, 2021, Crawford sent a calendar invite for a meeting with six
Google/YouTube officials, along with other CDC and Census employees. The invite stated:
“CDC/Census to meet with Google regarding our misinformation efforts.”215
345. At this time, CDC had recently executed an Interagency Agreement with the Census
Bureau to assist CDC in addressing misinformation, pursuant to which, Census provided CDC
with reports on “key themes” of misinformation seen on social media.216
346. At the meeting, CDC and Census presented a slide deck similar to the one for the
meeting with Facebook on March 25, 2021, discussed above. The slide deck was entitled,
212
Id.
213
Id. at 131.
214
Id.
215
Id. at 136.
216
Id. at 119.
82
“COVID Vaccine Misinformation: Issue Overview.” The deck’s “Misinformation Topics”
included “infertility, misinformation about side effects, and claims of vaccines leading to
deaths.”217
347. For each topic, the slide deck included a description of a common claim, specific
examples of videos on YouTube and social-media postings making the disfavored claim, and a
putative refutation by the CDC.218
348. Regarding supposed misinformation about vaccine side effects, the deck stated:
“speculation and misinformation about side effects after taking the COVID vaccine have been
prevalent on social media since the first vaccines were approved,” and it provided screen shots of
an example video on YouTube and social-media posts making such claims, along with a putative
refutation by the CDC.219
349. Regarding the topic “Death from Vaccines,” the slide deck stated that “[v]accine-
hesitant groups spreading misinformation and conspiracy theories about alleged vaccine-related
deaths erode trust in the COVID-19 vaccine and the public health system,” and it provided a
sample video on YouTube and social-media posts linking the vaccines to deaths, along with a
putative refutation by the CDC: “According to CDC, VAERS has not detected patterns in cause
of death that would indicate a safety problem with COVID-19 vaccines.”220
350. According to Crawford, she still attends a regular biweekly meeting with Google,
which continues to the present day.221
351. Crawford also has “similar regular meetings with … Meta and Twitter.”222
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Id. at 137.
221
Id. at 138.
222
Id.
83
Twitter
352. On April 8, 2021, Twitter emailed Crawford to request examples of misinformation
from CDC: “All examples of misinformation are helpful … .” The subject line of this email was
“Request for problem accounts.”223
353. Twitter’s email was in response to Crawford’s prior inquiry, “Is there a good way
that we should start engaging on misinformation?”224
354. On May 10, 2021, Twitter offered to enroll CDC officials in the platform’s “Partner
Support Portal”—a privileged channel that would allow for expedited review of content CDC
flagged for censorship.225
CrowdTangle and Other Social Media “Listening” Reports
355. According to Crawford’s sworn deposition testimony in the case Missouri v. Biden,
CDC collaborated with Facebook to flag Covid-related speech for censorship using
“CrowdTangle,” which she describes as “a social media listening tool for Meta properties,”
meaning Instagram and Facebook.226
356. Crawford confirmed that the CDC had privileged access to CrowdTangle starting
in early 2020, and CDC officials used the non-public “social media listening tool” to monitor and
track private speech about COVID-19 on social media.227
357. According to Facebook, “state health departments” were granted access to
CrowdTangle to address “vaccine misinformation.”228 Using CrowdTangle, when government
223
Id. at 143.
224
Id.
225
Id. at 145.
226
Id. at 114.
227
Id. at 114.
228
Facebook, Connecting People in the US With State COVID-19 Vaccine Information (April 12, 2021), at
https://about.fb.com/news/2021/04/state-covid-19-vaccine-information/.
84
health officials “flag potential vaccine misinformation on Facebook and Instagram, [Facebook]
review[s] and remove[s] the content if it violates our policies.”229
358. The CrowdTangle reports survey content that is not publicly available, such as
“personal Group posts.”230
359. CDC has also used other social media “listening tools” to monitor Americans’
speech on social media, including “Meltwater reports,” which are similar to CrowdTangle but can
monitor all platforms.231
360. On January 25, 2021, Facebook emailed Crawford the first of an ongoing, biweekly
series of CrowdTangle reports, which report on “top engaged COVID and vaccine-related content
overall across Pages and Groups.” The email emphasized in bold certain content in the report,
including “Posts about alleged vaccine-related deaths” and “News and reports of severe vaccine
side effects.”232
361. Facebook indicated that it was sending this report in response to a prior
conversation with Crawford: “I am following up on our conversation several weeks ago about
providing more detailed reporting from our CrowdTangle team.”
362. Crawford responded that “the wide group of those looking at misinfo will want
this.”233
VI. “THE PLAINTIFFS AND THE CENSORSHIP OF THEIR SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS
363. All six Plaintiffs are social media users and have maintained accounts on several
platforms, including, but not limited to, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, and TikTok.
229
Id.
230
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id.
85
364. Except for Mr. Ramirez, each of the Plaintiffs experienced serious and debilitating
medical injuries within weeks (if not, in some cases, days) after taking a dose of the Covid-19
vaccine.
365. Except for Mr. Ramirez, each of the Plaintiffs continues to experience serious and
debilitating medical injuries.
366. Mr. Ramirez’s 16-year-old son Ernest Ramirez, Jr. died five days after taking his
first dose of the Pfizer Covid vaccine.
367. While the content that each creates is unique, all six Plaintiffs have regularly used
their social media accounts to: (1) share their personal experiences during the pandemic, including
their experiences after they, or a loved one, took the vaccine; (2) read about other users’
experiences after taking the vaccine; (3) engage with other users in private support groups for
individuals (and their loved ones) who experienced medical harm after taking the vaccine; and (4)
exchange advice, support, and medical research with other users with respect to their vaccine
injuries.
a. Brianne Dressen
368. On November 4, 2020, Ms. Dressen received her first dose of the AstraZeneca
Covid vaccine as part of a voluntary clinical trial.
369. Within an hour of receiving that dose, she experienced tingling down her arm and
later that night had blurry and double vision, as well as distorted hearing.
370. The following morning, Ms. Dressen’s left leg was slumped and weak, causing her
to walk with a modified gate. In addition, she experienced extreme sensitivities to light and sound.
371. Within two weeks of receiving the vaccine, Ms. Dressen suffered from autonomic
dysfunction, gastrointestinal problems, irregular heart rate, painful paresthesia, heart and blood
86
pressure fluctuations, brain fog, and severe limb weakness and loss of bladder control. Her
symptoms became so severe that she was forced to isolate in her bedroom in darkness and silence
for months, only to come out for rehabilitation to address her sensory deficits and her struggle to
walk.
372. On June 16, 2021, Ms. Dressen visited the United States National Institutes of
Health (NIH) as part of its “Investigation of persistent neurological symptoms following SARS-
CoV2 vaccine.” NIH confirmed that she had suffered Covid vaccine-induced medical conditions
and diagnosed her with “postural orthostatic tachycardia syndrome (POTS)” and “post-vaccine
neuropathy,” as well as short-term memory loss.
373. Today, over two years later, Ms. Dressen has been diagnosed with chronic
inflammatory demyelinating neuropathy (CIDP), a permanent and debilitating condition. She
remains unable to work and, at times, relies on a wheelchair due to her chronic neuropathic
condition. Her severe reaction devastated both her own life and that of her young family. At
times, she believed that she could no longer go on living.
374. In April 2021, however, Ms. Dressen discovered through social media that others
around the world were experiencing similar medical reactions after taking the Covid vaccine.
After making these connections, she helped launch support groups on social media platforms,
primarily on Facebook, consisting of individuals across the globe sharing similar vaccine-related
experiences. Through the social media groups, Ms. Dressen’s mental state began to improve,
along with some of her physical ailments, as she was able to connect and share with others during
a time at which she was too ill to venture outside of her home.
375. The focus of the support groups was to share physical symptoms and conditions,
offer emotional support, and discuss potential treatments. Only individuals who had been injured
87
by the Covid vaccine were permitted to join, and a rigorous vetting process was conducted before
any member was admitted.
376. In May 2021, Ms. Dressen became the administrator of one of the Facebook groups
that had been providing her with critical support.
377. On June 28, 2021, Ms. Dressen spoke publicly for the first time about her
experience. She participated in a mainstream media press conference in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
facilitated by Senator Ron Johnson, along with other vaccine-injured individuals, during which
they shared their experiences.
378. Within twenty-four hours of the press conference, the Facebook group of which
Ms. Dressen served as administrator was shut down, and member lists were eliminated entirely
under the accusation that the group was spreading “misinformation,” though the group was private
and limited to discussions of members’ personal experiences. Facebook notified Ms. Dressen that
the group had been disabled for having “content that goes against [Facebook’s] Community
Standards.”
379. A few days later, another of Ms. Dressen’s Facebook groups, “A Wee Sprinkle of
Hope,” was shut down for posting an infographic that listed certain symptoms that people had
experienced post-Covid vaccine, including brain fog, memory loss, fatigue, tinnitus, and
paresthesia. The infographic also included a link to the press conference at which she had recently
spoken about her vaccine injuries. As a result of Facebook’s shutdown of the group, Ms. Dressen
lost contact with nearly two thousand other vaccine-injured individuals who had been members of
the group.
380. It was around this time that Ms. Dressen became aware that she and other advocates
for the vaccine-injured were being shadow banned on Facebook and other social media platforms,
88
meaning that her posts were no longer visible to other users. After several of Ms. Dressen’s posts
in her private vaccine-injured support groups were removed, Facebook notified her that: “Multiple
violations for false information will cause your group’s posts to be moved lower in the News
Feed.”
381. Around this time, Facebook also began to flag many of the posts in the support
groups as “Partly false” or as “Missing Context,” and sometimes Facebook would remove the posts
entirely for going against Facebook’s rules or “Community Standards.”
382. In July 2021, Ms. Dressen’s activities were detailed in a report created by the
Virality Project, a non-profit entity launched by SIO that was tasked primarily with combatting
Covid-19 “misinformation.” Under the heading “Ongoing Themes and Tactics,” the report
expresses skepticism of Ms. Dressen’s “claims [of] life-altering injuries” and concludes that: “An
injury story that does not have a proven causal link to the vaccine nevertheless garnered high
spread because it was picked up by a major anti-vaccine activist and by conservative politicians
engaged in prior anti-vaccine activities.” (emphasis included)
383. In July 2021, Ms. Dressen and several other group administrators launched a new
support group on Facebook, “Covid Vaccine—Long Haul Support Group,” in the hope of
reconnecting with members who had been lost after Facebook shut down the support group called
“A Wee Sprinkle of Hope.”
384. Fearful of being disabled again, Ms. Dressen and her fellow group administrators
had to develop a code for members to describe their experiences. Words such as “vaccine,” “side
effect,” “symptoms,” “Pfizer,” and “Moderna” could not be used, as they often triggered (and
continue to trigger) Facebook to remove the post or shut down the group entirely. Facebook
deemed such posts “misinformation that could cause physical harm.”
89
385. Facebook also claimed that certain of her posts containing words or topics relating
to the Covid vaccine or its side effects violated Facebook’s “standards on violence and incitement”
and notified Ms. Dressen that the platform doesn’t “allow content that leads to a genuine risk of
physical harm or a direct threat to public safety.” Facebook provided the following examples of
such content: “Language that leads to serious violence,” “Threats that could lead to death, violence
or serious injury,” and “Instructions on how to make or use weapons, if the goal is to seriously
injure or kill people.”
386. On November 29, 2021, a group member posted that she had recently developed a
mitral heart valve leak and mitral valve prolapse. The post asked the group: “Anyone else get this
from the v? Will it kill me? They said I don’t need treatment? Why not?” Facebook removed
the post for violating “Community Standards on misinformation about vaccines.”
387. Currently, Ms. Dressen and other group administrators must continuously create
new code words to avoid censorship of their posts as Facebook’s search algorithms regularly adapt.
388. Despite Ms. Dressen’s efforts, numerous posts in the support groups have been, and
continue to be, removed by Facebook, including posts with links to medical articles describing
vaccine side effects and possible treatments. Even posts that Facebook does not remove are often
flagged as potential misinformation or labeled with a warning box directing viewers to visit CDC’s
website for “reliable, up-to-date information.” This includes Ms. Dressen’s attempts to post links
to news articles or podcasts, including features in Science and Newsweek, in which she shared her
personal experience after taking the vaccine.
389. As a result, Ms. Dressen’s ability to assemble medical information, read about
others’ vaccine experiences and symptoms, share personal experiences, and both share and receive
support within the vaccine-injured community has been drastically curtailed.
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390. Ms. Dressen has also experienced censorship and content removal on other social
media platforms, including YouTube, TikTok, Vimeo, and Instagram.
391. In September 2021, Ms. Dressen participated in and distributed an awareness video,
titled “We Want to Be Heard,” with other individuals who had suffered side effects from the Covid
vaccine. TikTok took down the video, notifying Ms. Dressen that it had been removed for
“dangerous acts.”
392. Similarly, YouTube removed a video that Ms. Dressen had posted called “See Us.
Hear Us. Believe Us.” for “violating YouTube’s Community Guidelines.”
393. In October 2021, Ms. Dressen’s husband, a biochemist, testified before the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) regarding her NIH-confirmed vaccine injuries. His testimony
was covered by several members of the mainstream media, and Ms. Dressen’s experience quickly
went viral. Initially, the story trended on Google with over 87 news stories featuring his testimony.
394. When Ms. Dressen ran a search of the identical terms on Google four hours later,
she discovered that only five stories appeared in the search results. Although the stories remained
on the news sites where they were published, Google prevented the story from trending by
removing them from visibility on the Google search engine.
395. In December 2021, a support group on Facebook on which Ms. Dressen served as
an administrator, with over 12,000 members, including vaccine-injured individuals and supporting
friends and family, was shut down after a group member posted a link to a news story featuring
Ms. Dressen’s experience after taking the vaccine, as well as a link to the government of
Australia’s website discussing adverse vaccine reactions. According to Facebook, the post
violated its “Community Standards on misinformation about vaccines.”
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396. In November 2021, Ms. Dressen co-founded a non-profit organization called
React19 to support the vaccine-injured community. She, along with React19’s other board
members, serve as group page administrators on multiple social media platforms and have each
experienced censorship similar to that which is described above. This censorship has not only
limited group members’ access to medical information and support, but it has also dramatically
limited React19’s ability as a non-profit organization to fundraise.
397. In January 2022, in her role as co-founder of React19, Ms. Dressen helped produce
and circulate on multiple social media platforms a vaccine injury awareness video called “Silence,”
documenting only the personal experiences of those who experienced medical injuries after taking
the vaccine. The video was removed from both Vimeo and YouTube.
398. YouTube notified Ms. Dressen that the video was removed for violating YouTube’s
“medical misinformation policy.”
399. Vimeo notified Ms. Dressen that the video violated its Guidelines because it made
“false or misleading claims about (1) vaccination safety, or (2) health-related information that has
a serious potential to cause public harm.” Ms. Dressen appealed the removal. Vimeo responded
by permanently deleting React19’s account from the platform. Vimeo provided the explanation
that the “claims of injury are not substantiated by the US Centers for Disease Control.”
400. In June 2022, React19 launched a new awareness campaign called “Can we talk
about it?” which requested that participants post on social media a photo of their arm and share
what symptoms they had experienced after taking the vaccine.
401. After posting about the awareness campaign on Instagram, Ms. Dressen was
notified that her post had been removed for “harmful false information.” Ms. Dressen’s post stated
the following: “It’s time to break the silence about v-injuries and deaths. Mark your calendars
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and join us on June 14th at 2 p.m. EST for the launch of the #CanWeTalkAboutIt worldwide
campaign, which aims to: Create a safe space for C19 v-injured to share their stories. Create
awareness among the general public that C19 v-injuries are real. Raise funds to support global
organizations and initiatives working on projects related to research, health solutions, and lawful
processes leading to compensations.”
402. After Ms. Dressen posted about the awareness campaign on Facebook, her account
received a warning for posting “misinformation that could cause physical harm.” Facebook also
claimed that the post “may show graphic content” and that her account might be restricted if she
were to violate again. Ms. Dressen’s post stated the following: “Join us in solidarity Tuesday
June 14th! Take a photo with your sleeve rolled up if inj. or take a photo of your hand over your
heart.” The post also included an infographic with event details and a link to the campaign website.
403. In September 2022, React19 posted a story on Twitter focused on hope and the
healing process of a vaccine-injured member of the non-profit organization. The post discussed
her symptoms and progress toward recovery and was tagged #WednesdayWins. Twitter removed
the post and locked React19’s account. Twitter notified React19 that the account could only be
unlocked if the account administrator clicked a checkbox admitting that the post was harmful and
in violation of Twitter’s rules. Once Ms. Dressen clicked the checkbox, the account was restored.
She appealed the post’s removal but, to date, has received no response.
404. In March 2023, React19 posted a link to an article on Facebook regarding a
scientist’s findings on Covid vaccine injuries. In addition to the article link, the post stated:
“Science has been slow to study vaccine injuries, but one British Columbia researcher has led the
charge to determine the incidence of Guillain-Barré syndrome, VITT, TTS, and
myocarditis/pericarditis strongly associated with COVID-19 vaccination.” Facebook removed the
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post, describing it as “misinformation that could cause physical harm.” Facebook then froze
React19’s account for 24 hours and suspended for one month the private Facebook account of
React19’s social media manager who is also vaccine-injured. His private account had not been
used for months but was nevertheless suspended for content posted by React19’s official account.
405. On May 4, 2023, YouTube notified Ms. Dressen that React19’s account has been
suspended for posting inappropriate video content.
406. Due to the ongoing threat of censorship and penalties for posting on social media,
Ms. Dressen and her fellow support group members often hesitate to share their personal stories
on social media platforms or reach out for support from those with common experiences. Ms.
Dressen has been limited in her ability to communicate and connect with those whom she perceives
to be most in need of connection and support.
407. In her role as social media group administrator for React19, as well as for three
private support groups on Facebook, she has been compelled to dedicate more time determining
how group members can communicate with one another without being censored than supporting
the group members through the trauma of their injuries, which has always been her primary
objective.
408. Ms. Dressen currently serves in her personal capacity as administrator of three
private Facebook groups with a combined membership of approximately 19,400 people.
409. In her capacity as administrator for React19, she manages its accounts on Facebook,
Twitter, YouTube, Odysee, and Instagram, with a combined following of over 48,000 people.
410. Ms. Dressen is also a member and contributor of other support groups on social
media platforms that, in total, include approximately 22,500 members of the vaccine-injured
community.
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b. Shaun Barcavage
411. On December 29, 2020, Mr. Barcavage received his first dose of the Pfizer vaccine.
Before that time, he had been in good health with no medical concerns, spending his free time
traveling the world and walking in the park with his partner and two dogs.
412. Within hours of receiving the vaccine, he developed paresthesia (numbness,
tingling, warm and cold sensations) along his injected right arm, which radiated into his upper
back and armpit area.
413. Mr. Barcavage’s symptoms progressively worsened over the following days to
include tingling on the right side of his face, stinging in his right eye, and a burning sensation on
one ear.
414. On January 4, 2021, he attended a primary care visit, after which his physician
referred him to the neurology department.
415. On January 11, 2021, Mr. Barcavage met with a neurologist at Weill Cornell
Medicine who conducted an electromyography (EMG) test on his right arm and ran some general
blood work tests. He recommended that Mr. Barcavage proceed with the second dose of the Pfizer
vaccine. Despite his misgivings, and under pressure from impending vaccine mandates, Mr.
Barcavage proceeded with the second dose of the Pfizer vaccine on January 19, 2021.
416. During the first three days, Mr. Barcavage experienced pain where he had been
injected that radiated to his left neck and back. By the fourth day, he awoke with ringing in the
right ear (tinnitus), and the paresthesia in his right side had returned. He also developed a prickling
sensation in his throat. Over the course of the next few days, the paresthesia in his right side
escalated with more intensity. He consulted his neurologist about these symptoms and was
instructed to simply “wait it out.”
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417. By January 30, 2021, Mr. Barcavage developed inappropriate sinus tachycardia,
wildly fluctuating blood pressure, a severe headache on the right side, acute abdominal pain,
worsening tinnitus, stinging sensations, muscle fasciculations and internal vibrations in his legs.
418. On January 30, 2021, he sought emergency care in Pennsylvania where he received
a CT scan, which showed that he had an inflamed mesentery. The attending physician dismissed
the possibility that Mr. Barcavage’s symptoms were vaccine-related and sent him home with
ibuprofen.
419. As a medical professional, Mr. Barcavage felt certain that something was seriously
wrong and consulted numerous doctors for help and answers. However, none knew how to help,
and some admitted to him that “this was all new” and that what was happening with the vaccine
during the pandemic was still poorly understood.
420. By March 2021, Mr. Barcavage’s symptoms had worsened, with the onset of
autonomic dysfunction (positional tachycardia and severe insomnia), cardiac arrhythmias, and
generalized, whole-body neuropathies that involved the mouth, throat, and eyes.
421. Since the adverse reaction to the vaccine, Mr. Barcavage has also been diagnosed
with positional tachycardia, and a skin biopsy has indicated small fiber neuropathy. His symptoms
have continued to worsen and, most recently, he has developed chronic pain in both ears,
worsening tinnitus, and sudden fluctuations in hearing.
422. After receiving no answers about his symptoms from his doctors, Mr. Barcavage
turned to the internet to search for others who might be experiencing similar reactions to the
vaccine.
423. In March 2021, Mr. Barcavage began posting on his Instagram account to share his
experience with the vaccine and to raise awareness of the issue. Instagram labeled the majority of
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his posts with a message directing viewers to the CDC website “to obtain factual information about
Covid.” To Mr. Barcavage, this labeling suggested that his injuries qualified as misinformation,
adding to his sense of alienation as he struggled to find support and connect with others who might
be struggling with similar conditions.
424. In March 2021, Mr. Barcavage established one of the first online support groups on
Facebook for those suffering tinnitus post-vaccination. Only individuals who had been injured by
the Covid vaccine were permitted to join, and a vetting process was conducted before any member
was admitted. Within months of creating the group, the group had over 3,500 members.
425. His private support group was frequently the target of censorship by Facebook. The
group often received warning messages for posts that Facebook claimed violated its “Community
Standards.” Group member posts were also often labeled as “misinformation” or with a message
that redirected viewers to “more accurate information” on the CDC website.
426. As an administrator of the support group, Mr. Barcavage struggled to find ways to
enable members to communicate without the group being shut down. He had to develop code
words with the other members, such as “vee” for vaccines, to prevent posts, including links to
news articles and medical journals, from being flagged as misinformation or removed entirely.
427. In November 2021, Mr. Barcavage shared testimony about his vaccine injuries
before the U.S. Senate. When his family and fellow vaccine-injured individuals attempted to share
his testimony on Facebook, the posts were removed as “misinformation.”
428. On December 15, 2021, Facebook disabled Mr. Barcavage’s support group,
claiming that the group had “content that goes against Facebook’s Community Standards.” Mr.
Barcavage appealed Facebook’s decision, and, without any further communication from
Facebook, the group was restored on January 4, 2022.
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429. Mr. Barcavage must still self-censor or speak in code when posting on social media
platforms to avoid warnings, removals, or account suspensions, and both he and members of his
support groups have been limited in their ability to share their experiences, read about others’
experiences and symptoms, seek advice, find answers, and support one another.
430. Mr. Barcavage has been conducting research into the adverse effects of the Covid
vaccine with the hope of spreading awareness and providing the vaccine-injured with further
support and knowledge about their injuries. His efforts to communicate freely, however, have
been largely undercut by the suppression of his posts on social media platforms, as well as the
negative, “anti-vaxxer” stigma that has accompanied the labels of “misinformation” on his posts.
c. Kristi Dobbs
431. On January 18, 2021, Ms. Dobbs received her first dose of the Pfizer vaccine at her
local hospital’s vaccine clinic.
432. Within five minutes of receiving the injection, as she waited in line to schedule her
appointment for the second dose, Ms. Dobbs felt a strange tingling sensation, like freezing cold
water, running down her left arm, which had just received the injection. A few moments later, she
experienced a pre-syncopal episode, during which she experienced heart palpitations, lightness of
breath, increased pulse, and an abnormally high blood pressure reading that was worthy of stroke.
433. She was monitored at the clinic for 45 minutes and then released. The nurse at the
clinic told her that she was either having a panic attack or a hot flash, and no further medical
assistance was offered. Ms. Dobbs was also told to file a “V-safe report,” an informal mechanism
to report to the CDC how one felt after taking the Covid vaccine.
434. Three days later, Ms. Dobbs suddenly felt a stabbing pain in her left upper back,
followed by tingling and numbness in her arms and involuntary tremors in both hands.
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435. Over the course of the next few weeks, she suffered additional symptoms, including
the following: extreme fatigue, autonomic dysfunction, heart palpitations, blood pressure
fluctuations, gastrointestinal problems, painful paresthesia and neuropathy, internal tremors, brain
fog, muscle pain and weakness, inability to feel pin pricks on her legs, dizziness, stiff neck,
intermittent tinnitus, headaches, temperature regulation issues, skin rashes, over-dilated eyes,
sound sensitivity, heavy-thick clotted menstrual cycles, as well as nocturnal convulsions, or
pseudo-seizures.
436. Ms. Dobbs’s symptoms became so severe that she spent weeks during which she
could barely get out of bed, and she could only manage to get to the living room couch to help her
kids with their schoolwork. It was impossible for her to make it as far as the kitchen to cook dinner
for her four young children.
437. In March 2021, Ms. Dobbs was invited to participate in NIH’s “investigation of
persistent neurological symptoms following SARS-CoV2 vaccine.”
438. She was seen by NIH neuroimmunologist Farinaz Safavi, who requested a blood
sample from Ms. Dobbs to test for autoantibodies post-Covid vaccination. Ms. Dobbs regularly
corresponded with Dr. Safavi throughout the month of March.
439. In May 2021, without explanation, Dr. Safavi requested to speak with Ms. Dobbs’
neurologist and informed Ms. Dobbs that NIH would no longer see her as a patient.
440. Without explanation, Ms. Dobbs’s neurologist also informed her that he would no
longer treat her. Ms. Dobbs was referred to a new neurologist who acknowledged that Ms. Dobbs
had “developed multiple symptoms after covid vaccination,” but was unable to treat her symptoms.
441. During the initial days following the vaccine, Ms. Dobbs felt extremely alone and
depressed. She often contemplated suicide.
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442. Ms. Dobbs turned to the internet for answers and possibly to find others who were
experiencing similar aftereffects of the Covid vaccine.
443. In February 2021, she came across an article in Neurology Today with a comment
at the bottom of the article from Dr. Danice Hertz, a retired gastroenterologist who had been injured
by the vaccine. Ms. Dobbs contacted Dr. Hertz by email, and they soon created an email thread,
including others who had been injured by the vaccine.
444. By March 2021, the email group had grown so large that Ms. Dobbs and a few
others decided to create a support group for the vaccine-injured on Facebook.
445. After about a week, Ms. Dobbs and the other group administrators decided to make
the group private, so that members could be vetted before being allowed to join. All applicants
were required to submit details regarding their symptoms, as well as the date of the vaccine
administration, brand of vaccine, treatment(s) attempted, and a description of their health status
prior to vaccination.
446. Ms. Dobbs is also a member of other vaccine-injured support groups, each of which
is strictly nonpartisan and fully focused on allowing vaccine-injured individuals to share their
experiences and discuss possible medical treatments.
447. On June 28, 2021, Ms. Dobbs participated in a press conference held by Senator
Ron Johnson, along with other vaccine-injured individuals, where they shared their experiences.
448. Within twenty-four hours of the press conference, one of Ms. Dobbs’s support
groups on Facebook was shut down and member lists were eliminated entirely under the claim that
the group had been spreading “misinformation.”
449. A few days after the press conference, another Facebook support group of which
Ms. Dobbs was a member was shut down for posting a link to the press conference and an
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infographic displaying certain symptoms that people had experienced post-Covid vaccine. As a
result of Facebook’s shutdown of the group, Ms. Dobbs lost contact with nearly two thousand
other vaccine-injured individuals who had been members of the group.
450. Around this time, Ms. Dobbs realized that she and other advocates for those injured
by the vaccine were being shadow banned on Facebook. This meant that her posts were no longer
visible to other users and that she could no longer see and read posts from several members of her
support groups.
451. In hopes of reconnecting with the lost group members, Ms. Dobbs joined a few new
vaccine-injured support groups. In all the groups, Ms. Dobbs and the other members had to use
code words to describe their experiences, symptoms, and medications because words such as
“vaccine,” “side effect,” “symptoms,” “Pfizer,” and “Moderna” would result in a post being
labeled as misinformation or removed.
452. Despite Ms. Dobbs’ efforts, many of her posts continue to be removed or flagged
as false, misleading, or potentially false information. The posts that are not removed are also often
labeled with a warning box directing viewers to visit CDC’s website for “reliable, up-to-date
information.” On multiple occasions, after removing her posts, Facebook has notified Ms. Dobbs
that the posts are “misinformation when public health authorities conclude that the information is
false and likely to contribute to imminent violence or physical harm.”
453. In February 2022, Ms. Dobbs joined React19 and continues to serve as its secretary,
a voluntary and unpaid position which she works from home. Ms. Dobbs is also a part of React19’s
advocacy team.
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454. In June 2022, React19 launched a new awareness campaign called “Can we talk
about it?” discussed above, which requested that participants post on social media a photo of their
arm and share what symptoms they had experienced after taking the vaccine.
455. Ms. Dobbs made a post about the awareness campaign in one of the vaccine-injured
support groups on Facebook. As a result, Facebook froze her account for three days and removed
the post for “violence and incitement.”
456. Ms. Dobbs now hesitates to post about her personal experience, whether on her
personal Facebook page or in one of her private support groups. She frequently feels she must
self-censor out of concern that her account will be frozen or the support groups will be shut down.
Her ability to speak freely, even in a private group context, with other members of the vaccine-
injured community about their symptoms, success stories, and possible medical treatments has
been severely limited.
457. Ms. Dobbs currently serves as the administrator of two Facebook support groups
for those injured by the vaccine and is a member of eight others.
d. Nikki Holland
458. On February 12, 2021, Ms. Holland received her second dose of the Moderna Covid
vaccine, having had no symptoms following the first dose.
459. Within 36 hours of receiving the injection, she began to experience nausea,
vomiting, and extreme gastrointestinal discomfort.
460. The next day, she began to experience shortness of breath, fatigue, and weakness.
461. Five days after receiving the vaccine, her shortness of breath worsened to the point
that she had to leave work to go to the emergency room where she was treated for respiratory
failure. She had to be placed on a ventilator three times for breathing assistance. The third time,
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due to the urgent need for more advanced medical care, she had to be flown, or “life-flighted,” to
a larger hospital.
462. Ms. Holland soon also began to experience fluctuations of blood pressure and heart
rate, leg pain, fatigue, paresthesia, and her gastrointestinal problems worsened.
463. During the course of 2021, following Ms. Holland’s second dose of the vaccine,
she was hospitalized five times, life-flighted to a larger hospital five times, spent nearly 100 days
in the hospital, and spent one month in an inpatient rehabilitation center to gain enough strength
to return home.
464. Since taking the second dose of the vaccine, Ms. Holland has been diagnosed with
post-vaccination injury syndrome, chronic respiratory failure with hypoxia, laryngospasms, status
post tracheostomy, vocal cord dysfunction, systemic inflammatory response syndrome, food
intolerance, gastroparesis, abdominal distension, gastroesophageal reflux disease, dysphagia,
neurogenic bladder, critical illness myopathy, deep vein thrombosis, hemoptysis, sepsis, anxiety,
major depressive disorder, acute pain, lower extremity weakness, drop foot, gait abnormality,
muscle spasms, ataxia and neurological disorder. She became dependent on supplemental oxygen
and required a tracheostomy, a suprapubic catheter implant and bladder InterStim implant to assist
with urination, as well as a feeding tube for nutritional tolerance and support. She must also rely
on a wheelchair as an assistive device for mobility, along with multiple medications.
465. Ms. Holland sought assistance from multiple doctors and specialists but has seen
little improvement, and she continues to suffer on a daily basis. Formerly an active single mother
who worked full time and ran regularly, Ms. Holland now must rely on her three children for
assistance with basic tasks and often can barely get out of bed.
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466. As her symptoms worsened in 2021, she began to search Google for medical help
and social support. However, most searches turned up only CDC reports about the vaccine and a
sparse list of its known or acknowledged side effects.
467. Unable to find support or treatment, Ms. Holland became depressed and, at multiple
points, contemplated suicide.
468. In the summer of 2021, however, she discovered support groups on social media
platforms—primarily on Facebook—consisting of individuals around the world who had similar
post-vaccine experiences and symptoms. Ms. Holland’s mental state subsequently began to
improve, and her feelings of depression and alienation diminished.
469. On Facebook, Ms. Holland noticed that her own and others’ posts that contained
Covid-related words, such as “Covid vaccine” would be flagged with a box stating that the Covid
vaccine had been thoroughly tested “for safety and effectiveness” and providing a link to CDC’s
website, giving the impression that the posts were false or misleading.
470. Ms. Holland also noticed that the vaccine-injured support groups did not appear in
Facebook or Google searches. She could only locate the groups by typing out the full group page
address or by searching through her previous group connections.
471. Ms. Holland and other members of the vaccine-injured support groups began using
code words as substitutes for words including “vaccine,” “side effect,” “symptoms,” “Pfizer,” and
“Moderna” in an effort to prevent the posts from being removed or the groups being shut down.
472. Ms. Holland posted about her post-vaccine experience on Facebook, TikTok, and
YouTube, and she received warnings on each of the three platforms that her posts were misleading,
constituted misinformation, or violated the social media platforms’ rules and standards. At various
points, her accounts on these platforms were restricted from posting or sharing content.
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473. On November 14, 2021, YouTube removed Ms. Holland’s video in which she was
giving a speech about her post-vaccine experience at an event in Los Angeles. YouTube warned
her that, if she violated YouTube’s Community Guidelines again, her account would receive a
strike, and she would be unable to post, upload, or livestream for one week.
474. On February 24, 2022, YouTube removed a video in which Dr. Heather Melton
interviewed Ms. Holland and other vaccine-injured individuals about their post-vaccine
experiences.
475. On March 19, 2022, Facebook removed a post that Ms. Holland made discussing
data from HHS’s Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), which showed that the
Moderna vaccine appeared to have produced 90% of recorded adverse Covid vaccine reactions.
Ms. Holland appealed the removal, and eventually Facebook allowed the post back up on her
personal page.
476. On December 13, 2022, YouTube removed a documentary film called
“Anecdotals,” in which Ms. Holland shared her post-vaccine experience. YouTube claimed that
the film contained misinformation and violated Community Guidelines.
477. On several occasions, including on February 26, 2022, August 1, 2022, October 21,
2022, and April 5, 2023, TikTok removed Ms. Holland’s video posts about her vaccine injuries
and recovery process, including personal speeches about her post-vaccine experience. TikTok
notified her that the videos violated “Community Guidelines.” According to TikTok, one of Ms.
Holland’s videos was removed for “Violent and graphic content.” Other videos were removed for
“integrity and authenticity” concerns.
478. Ms. Holland continues to believe that it is a risk to post on social media platforms
about what happened to her after taking the vaccine and feels limited in her ability to seek advice,
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support, and medical information from those who have had similar experiences. Each time she
posts about this subject matter, she fears that her post might be removed, her account frozen, or
her support group shut down.
e. Suzanna Newell
479. On April 13, 2021, Ms. Newell received her second dose of the Pfizer vaccine.
480. Prior to taking the vaccine, she was very active, regularly biking and competing in
triathlons. She had no underlying health conditions.
481. One day after receiving her second dose of the vaccine, Ms. Newell experienced
extreme fatigue, brain fog, a swollen lymph node in the neck, a forehead rash, and joint pain.
482. Over the next few weeks, her symptoms worsened, but she only spoke of her
condition to her closest friends out of concern that she would scare others out of getting the
vaccine.
483. On May 21, 2021, Ms. Newell’s condition had deteriorated to the point that she
could no longer walk unassisted.
484. On May 24, 2021, she went to the emergency room to seek treatment for her
symptoms. The doctor sent her home with a referral for an echocardiogram stress test.
485. Two days later, her symptoms exponentially worsened to the point that she feared
her body was shutting down and that she would die.
486. She was hospitalized for three days. Despite the numerous tests conducted, she left
the hospital with no answer as to the cause of her symptoms.
487. Ms. Newell continues to regularly see multiple neurologists, a rheumatologist,
cardiologist, allergist, neuro occupational therapist, physical therapist, among other medical
professionals.
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488. Ms. Newell has been diagnosed with small fiber neuropathy, Sjogren’s syndrome,
cryoglobulinemia vasculitis, super ventricular tachycardia, mild cardiovagal and adrenergic
dysfunction.
489. After two years, many of her symptoms have worsened, and she still frequently
struggles to perform simple tasks.
490. Ms. Newell’s primary doctor has attributed her symptoms to the Covid vaccine.
491. On September 30, 2022, Ms. Newell posted a video entitled “Kindness” on
YouTube in which she and a vaccine-injured friend discussed their difficult experiences and how
“Team Humanity” and the kindness of others had allowed them to maintain hope. They did not
make any claims about the Covid vaccine. YouTube removed the video for “misinformation” and
for violating its Community Guidelines.
492. In January 2023, Ms. Newell was interviewed about her post-vaccine experience
by Children’s Health Defense in Washington, D.C. After her husband shared the video of the
interview on Facebook, the post was labeled with a warning that it could cause “physical harm.”
Facebook notified him that another violation could result in his account being restricted.
493. Eventually, Ms. Newell turned to Facebook as a means of connecting with others
who had been injured after taking the vaccine, and as a way to spread hope and awareness. She
created a support group called Team Humanity, which focused on growing a supportive
community of the vaccine-injured and their friends and family.
494. To prevent the Team Humanity group from being shut down or its posts removed,
Ms. Newell and the other group members had to communicate in code and avoid using any words
related to Covid or the vaccine.
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495. After she created the support group, Ms. Newell became aware that she and other
members were being shadow banned on Facebook. This meant that her posts were no longer visible
to other users and that she could no longer see posts from several members of her support groups.
496. Currently, Ms. Newell rarely uses social media due to the ongoing threat of
censorship and the difficulties in constantly having to communicate in code to avoid posts being
labeled as “misinformation” or removed entirely.
497. Ms. Newell is currently a Board Member of React19 where she advocates for
vaccine-injured individuals and tries to spread understanding of those who have experienced
lasting effects of the Covid vaccine. Due to the censorship and related difficulties that she and
other members of React19 have faced, efforts to collaborate and spread awareness and support
have been, and continue to be, limited.
e. Ernest Ramirez
498. Mr. Ramirez’s son Ernest Ramirez, Jr., was born on November 11, 2004. As a
teenager, he was very active and a talented baseball player for his high school team. He had never
had any health problems.
499. Early in 2021, Mr. Ramirez received both doses of the Moderna vaccine.
500. In April 2021, the Pfizer vaccine had been recommended by CDC as safe for
teenagers, so Ernest, Jr., received his first dose on April 19, 2021.
501. Five days later, on April 24, 2021, Ernest, Jr., collapsed while he was running in
the park. A police officer attempted to perform CPR on him, and he was taken by ambulance to
the hospital.
502. By the time Mr. Ramirez arrived at the hospital, he was informed that his sixteen-
year-old son was dead.
108
503. According to the autopsy report, Ernest, Jr., had died of an enlarged heart,
myocarditis, and terminal cardiac arrhythmia. Acute inflammatory cells were detected in his heart
and liver.
504. After losing his son, Mr. Ramirez reached the darkest point of his life and no longer
wanted to go on living.
505. In the summer of 2021, however, Mr. Ramirez found new purpose and a means of
honoring his son’s memory when he began traveling and speaking about what had happened to
Ernest, Jr.
506. At first, Mr. Ramirez only spoke locally in Texas to raise awareness and share his
son’s story.
507. However, in August 2021, he launched a GoFundMe page to help fundraise enough
money for a trip to Washington, D.C. to share his son’s story in the nation’s capital.
508. Approximately one week later, GoFundMe notified Mr. Ramirez that his
GoFundMe account had been removed for violating the platform’s terms of service for “Prohibited
Conduct.” As a result, all the funds (approximately $2,000) that Mr. Ramirez had raised were
forfeited.
509. Subsequently, Mr. Ramirez created a fundraising page on LifeFunder to raise funds
for Washington, D.C., and he was ultimately able to raise enough to make the trip.
510. Mr. Ramirez also turned to social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube, and Instagram to share his son’s story and to connect with others who had been impacted
by vaccine injuries.
109
511. In November 2021, Mr. Ramirez discovered vaccine-injured support groups on
social media. Through the support groups, he was able to share his son’s story, spread awareness,
and connect with others who had experienced similar hardships.
512. Frequently, Mr. Ramirez’s posts on social media have been removed or labeled as
misleading or false.
513. On November 11, 2021, Mr. Ramirez posted a photo of himself beside his son’s
casket at his funeral on Facebook and Twitter. The caption of the photo read: “My good byes to
my Baby Boy.”
514. Facebook flagged the post with a warning box viewable to other users labeling it
as “partly false information” and stating: “The same information was checked in another post by
independent fact-checkers.”
515. Twitter removed the photo altogether and warned Mr. Ramirez: “Make sure you’re
sharing reliable information. Visit the COVID-19 Information Center for reliable vaccine info and
resources.”
516. On August 21, 2021, Facebook removed Mr. Ramirez’s post in which he wrote:
“Getting ready to speak on behalf of my Baby Boy!” and restricted Mr. Ramirez’s account.
517. Facebook similarly removed Mr. Ramirez’s post of a quote by Plato: “No one is
more hated than he who speaks the truth.”
518. On October 1, 2022, Facebook labeled Mr. Ramirez’s post with a warning box as
“Partly false information. Checked by independent fact-checkers.”
519. On November 21, 2022, Twitter labeled Mr. Ramirez’s post with a warning box
stating that “it might have sensitive content.”
520. Mr. Ramirez has been suspended from Twitter and Facebook on multiple occasions.
110
521. On November 29, 2021, YouTube labeled Mr. Ramirez’s video post in which Dr.
Peter McCullough discussed the death of Mr. Ramirez’s son as “Missing context.” The warning
label explained: “Independent fact-checkers say this information could mislead people.”
522. On February 15, 2023, YouTube removed Mr. Ramirez’s video post in which he
participated in a roundtable discussion held by Senator Ron Johnson on November 3, 2021, to
share his son’s story. YouTube informed him that the content “violates our medical
misinformation policy,” stating that “it’s important to us that YouTube is a safe place for all.”
523. On April 4, 2023, YouTube notified Mr. Ramirez that it had removed two videos
he had posted and that Mr. Ramirez’s account had received “2 strikes” for posting content that
violated YouTube’s Community Guidelines. The two videos that YouTube removed were (1) an
interview in which Mr. Ramirez discussed his son’s death; and (2) a video of Mr. Ramirez driving
his son’s truck down the street.
524. Shortly after, YouTube restricted Mr. Ramirez’s ability to post a video that he had
received from a group of vaccine-injured individuals sharing their condolences on the anniversary
of his son’s death.
525. On May 15, 2023, Facebook flagged as “partly false” a video that Mr. Ramirez
posted earlier that day. Facebook warned Mr. Ramirez that posts of “[p]eople who repeatedly
share false information” are less likely to be visible to other users (i.e., shadow banned). The video
that Mr. Ramirez posted was a clip from an episode of the American television series “Conspiracy
Theory with Jesse Ventura.”
526. Currently, Mr. Ramirez’s YouTube account is suspended, and he is unable to make
any posts. YouTube has notified him that, if he receives a third strike, his account will be deleted
permanently.
111
527. Currently, Instagram prevents Mr. Ramirez from being tagged in any posts,
including the posts of other users. When a user attempts to tag Mr. Ramirez, Instagram notifies
the user that Mr. Ramirez cannot be tagged because he “repeatedly posted content that goes against
our Community Guidelines on false content about COVID-19 or vaccines.”
528. Mr. Ramirez’s ability to share his son’s story, spread awareness of his personal
tragedy, and connect with others has been his primary lifeline since Ernest, Jr.’s death. However,
his ability to do so has been greatly limited by the ongoing censorship that Mr. Ramirez has faced.
529. Each time that he communicates about his son’s death on social media or any
related experience, Mr. Ramirez fears that his speech will be removed or labeled as
misinformation—or that his account will be frozen or removed entirely.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT ONE – VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Against the Government Defendants
530. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the preceding material as though fully set
forth herein.
531. Private action that violates constitutional rights may constitute state action that can
be attributed to the government in multiple ways.
532. As alleged herein, the Government Defendants have coerced, threatened, and
pressured social-media platforms to censor disfavored speakers and viewpoints by using threats of
adverse government action, including threats of increased regulation, antitrust enforcement or
legislation, and repeal or amendment of Section 230 CDA immunity, among others.
533. As alleged further herein, as a result of threats, pressure, and inducements, the
Government Defendants have colluded and worked in concert with social media platforms to
censor disfavored speakers and viewpoints, including by pressuring them to censor certain content
112
and speakers, and “flagging” disfavored content and speakers for censorship. In doing so, the
Government Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights under the First
Amendment: namely, the freedom to both speak and receive speech, and the freedom of expressive
association.
534. Moreover, even absent threats, pressure, and inducements, the Defendants have
abridged Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by enabling the social media companies to coordinate
and systematize Defendants’ censorship program in relative uniformity across all of the platforms.
Unless each of the social media platforms restricts more-or-less the same types of speech, they
cannot effectively carry out Defendants’ mass censorship scheme. However, the social media
companies cannot coordinate among one another without violating antitrust laws, so they thus
depend upon government to supply the necessary coordination—to coordinate speech restrictions
across the dominant social media platforms. By supplying this coordination, Defendants have
reduced and thus abridged the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.
535. The Government Defendants’ conduct readily qualifies as state action for several
independently sufficient reasons: (1) through the heavy and regular imposition of threats, pressure,
and encouragement, the federal government fostered, encouraged, and empowered the creation of
a small number of massive and dominant social media companies with disproportionate ability to
censor and suppress speech on the basis of speaker, content, and viewpoint; (2) federal officials—
including, most notably, the Government Defendants herein—have repeatedly and aggressively
threatened to remove legal benefits (i.e., Section 230 and the absence of antitrust enforcement) and
impose other adverse consequences on social media platforms if they do not increase censorship
and suppression of disfavored speakers, content, and viewpoints; and (3) the Government
Defendants herein, conspiring and colluding both with each other and social media firms, have
113
directly coordinated with social media platforms to identify disfavored speakers, viewpoints, and
content and have procured the actual censorship and suppression of them on social media. These
actions have drastically impacted Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights of free speech and freedom
of expressive association.
536. Defendants’ actions have injured and continue to injure Plaintiffs by suppressing
and chilling their exercise of free speech on social media platforms. Further, Defendants’
censorship has violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to read and receive speech
communicated by other users on social media platforms, thus depriving Plaintiffs of information,
opinion, and companionship that could greatly benefit them in their adversity, that was and is
essential for their personal well-being and their participation in public life, and that matters in all
aspects of their lives. This injures not only Plaintiffs, but all social media users by reducing the
availability of free speech in what is meant to be a free marketplace of ideas.
537. The Government Defendants’ conduct inflicts imminent, ongoing, and continuing
irreparable injury on Plaintiffs, as further alleged herein.
538. To the extent that Plaintiffs are still able to use social media and other tech
platforms, they fear losing accounts and various other forms of reprisal, causing them to curtail
expression accordingly. Penny Saver Publications, Inc. v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 905 F.2d 150, 154
(7th Cir. 1990) (“Constitutional violations may arise from the chilling effect of governmental
regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights.”).
539. In sum, the Government Defendants’ censorship activities, targeting both content
and viewpoints that threaten—or even question—the federal government’s preferred narrative
have violated, and continue to violate, Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights to free speech (including
the freedom both to speak and to receive information), and free expressive association.
114
COUNT TWO—VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Against the De Facto Government Defendants
forth herein.
541. As alleged herein, the De Facto Government Defendants engaged with the
government in its massive government/private joint censorship enterprise through SIO’s “Virality
Project,” to target and suppress speech on the basis of content and viewpoint.
542. Through the Virality Project, the De Facto Government Defendants built strong ties
with several federal government agencies, most notably the Office of the Surgeon General and the
CDC, and engaged in continuous, ongoing communication with government officials (which, on
information and belief, continues to this day) to execute the government’s censorship scheme.
543. The De Facto Government Defendants’ actions, in conjunction with the
Government Defendants, have injured and continue to injure Plaintiffs by suppressing and
chilling their exercise of free speech on social media platforms. As a result, Plaintiffs have been
deprived of their First Amendment rights to freely associate in private social media groups, and
to communicate and receive information, including from each other.
544. Through their joint participation and powerful nexus with the government in its
unconstitutional censorship enterprise, the De Facto Government Defendants plainly qualify as
state actors under Supreme Court precedent and must be held accountable as de facto
government actors.
COUNT THREE—ULTRA VIRES ACTION BEYOND STATUTORY AUTHORITY

forth herein.
115
546. “An agency’s power is no greater than that delegated to it by Congress.” Lyng v.
Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986). Agency actions that exceed the agency’s statutory authority are
ultra vires and must be invalidated.
547. No federal statute authorizes any of the Government Defendants to engage in the
course of conduct concerning the censorship and suppression of speech on social media, as alleged
herein.
548. No federal statute authorizes the Government Defendants to determine what
constitutes “misinformation,” “disinformation,” and/or “malinformation” in public discourse on
social media platforms; to direct, pressure, coerce, and encourage social media companies to
censor and suppress such speech; and/or to demand that private companies turn over information
about speech and speakers on their platforms in the interest of investigating “misinformation,”
“disinformation,” and/or “malinformation.”
549. The interpretation of any statute to purport to authorize such actions would
constitute a plain violation of the non-delegation doctrine and the major questions doctrine.
550. The Government Defendants and the federal officials acting in concert with them,
by adopting the censorship policies and conduct identified herein, have acted, and continue to
act, without any lawful authority whatsoever. No federal statute, regulation, constitutional
provision, or other legal authority authorizes their social media censorship program, and it is
wholly ultra vires.
551. The Government Defendants’ ultra vires actions inflict ongoing irreparable harm
on Plaintiffs, as alleged herein.
116
COUNT FOUR—ULTRA VIRES ACTION BEYOND CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDS

forth herein.
553. Congress is prohibited from conferring upon a federal agency power or authority
that is contrary to the Constitution. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (“the
fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution”) (cite omitted).
554. Further, “[a]n agency’s power is no greater than that delegated to it by Congress.”
Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986).
555. Congress’s authority is “limited to those powers enumerated in the Constitution,”
as the Constitution withholds from Congress “a plenary police power that would authorize
enactment of every type of legislation.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also
Const. Art. I, § 8. Although Congress enjoys authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate
the channels and instrumentalities of commerce among the states, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,
91 (1824), including electronic channels and instrumentalities, it may not regulate noneconomic
matters, such as speech, that were never within the scope of the Commerce Clause and that only
indirectly have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See James Wilson, State House Yard
Speech (Oct. 6, 1787), see https://csac.history.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/281/2017/07/
James_Wilson.pdf (“a power similar to that which has been granted for the regulation of
commerce” was not “granted to regulate literary publications,” and thus “the proposed system
possesses no influence whatever upon the press”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557; United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.
117
556. Moreover, the text of the Constitution is explicit that: “Congress shall make no
law… abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. Amend I. Any law or policy that “abridges”
or reduces the sphere of constitutionally protected speech thus violates the First Amendment.
557. Therefore, even if (contrary to what is alleged above) the Government Defendants’
censorship enterprise were within the bounds of the statutory authority delegated by Congress (it
is not), the Government Defendants’ conduct would, and does, remain ultra vires in violation of
any conceivable constitutional authority. Congress is not constitutionally authorized to confer
upon federal agencies any power, purpose, or authority beyond the Constitution’s enumerated
powers or in violation of the First Amendment.
558. In sum, no constitutional authority permits the Government Defendants’ censorship
activities, as alleged herein, which have violated and are continuing to violate Plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights to free speech and free expressive association, so they are wholly ultra vires.
COUNT FIVE – VIOLATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

Against the HHS Defendants
forth herein.
560. Defendants HHS, CDC, Murthy, Becerra, Crawford, and Waldo are referred to
collectively herein as the “HHS Defendants.”
561. As set forth herein, the HHS Defendants’ conduct is unlawful, arbitrary and
capricious, an in excess of statutory authority under the Administrative Procedure Act.
562. The APA authorizes courts to hold unlawful and set aside final agency actions that
are found to be: “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) without observance
118
of procedure required by law….” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D). The HHS Defendants’ conduct
violates all these prohibitions.
563. In the Fifth Circuit, the “final agency action” requirement is a jurisdictional
threshold, not a merits inquiry, and is guided by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the APA's
finality requirement as ‘flexible’ and ‘pragmatic.’” Texas v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n,
933 F.3d 433, 440–41 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)).
Even agency advisory opinions can be deemed to have “consummated the Department’s
decisionmaking process.” Data Mktg. P’ship, LP v. United States Dep’t of Lab., 45 F.4th 846, 853
(5th Cir. 2022). “The mere possibility that an agency might reconsider” its advisory “in light of
‘informal discussion’ and invited contentions of inaccuracy does not suffice to make an otherwise
final agency action nonfinal.” Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 127 (2012).
564. The HHS Defendants’ conduct alleged herein constitutes “final agency action”
because it “marks the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process.” Bennett v. Spear,
520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quotation marks omitted). Further, it is action by which “rights or
obligations have been determined,” and “from which legal consequences will flow.” Id.
Defendants’ campaign of pressuring, threatening, and colluding with social media platforms to
suppress disfavored speakers, content, and speech are final agency actions of this sort. The actions
of Defendants alleged herein, on information and belief, reflect and result from a specific, discrete,
and identifiable decision of Defendants to adopt an unlawful social media censorship program.
565. Under the APA, a reviewing court shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be … arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
119
566. The HHS Defendants’ actions are arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion
because they are being executed to favor the government’s viewpoint while suppressing dissent
therefrom.
567. Further, the HHS Defendants’ conduct is “contrary to constitutional right, power,
privilege, or immunity” because it violates the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs. 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(B).
568. The HHS Defendants’ conduct was “without observance of procedure required by
law” because it is a substantive policy or series of policies that affect legal rights that require notice
and comment, and yet they never engaged in any notice-and-comment process, or other process to
obtain input from the public, before engaging in these unlawful agency policies. 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(D).
569. The HHS Defendants’ conduct is in excess of any statutory authority and thus
unlawful under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(B), (C).
COUNT SIX—VIOLATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

Against the DHS Defendants
forth herein.
571. Defendants DHS, CISA, Mayorkas, and Easterly are referred to collectively herein
as the “DHS Defendants.”
572. As set forth herein, the DHS Defendants’ conduct is unlawful, arbitrary and
capricious, an in excess of statutory authority under the Administrative Procedure Act.
573. The APA authorizes courts to hold unlawful and set aside final agency actions that
are found to be: “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of
120
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) without observance
of procedure required by law….” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D). The DHS Defendants’ conduct
violates all these prohibitions.
574. The DHS Defendants’ conduct alleged herein constitutes “final agency action”
because it “marks the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process.” Bennett v. Spear,
520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quotation marks omitted). Further, it is action from by which “rights
or obligations have been determined,” and “from which legal consequences will flow.” Id.
Defendants’ campaign of pressuring, threatening, and colluding with social media platforms to
suppress disfavored speakers, content, and speech are final agency actions of this sort. The actions
of Defendants alleged herein, on information and belief, reflect and result from a specific, discrete,
and identifiable decision of Defendants to adopt an unlawful social media censorship program.
575. Under the APA, a reviewing court shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be … arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A).
576. The DHS Defendants’ actions are arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion
because they are being executed to favor the government’s viewpoint while suppressing dissent
therefrom.
577. Further, the DHS Defendants’ conduct is “contrary to constitutional right, power,
privilege, or immunity” because it violates the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs. 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(B).
578. The DHS Defendants’ conduct was “without observance of procedure required by
law” because it is a substantive policy or series of policies that affect legal rights that require notice
and comment, and yet they never engaged in any notice-and-comment process, or other process to
121
obtain input from the public, before engaging in these unlawful agency policies. 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(D).
579. The DHS Defendants’ conduct is in excess of any statutory authority and thus
unlawful under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(B), (C).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court enter judgment in their favor and grant the
following relief:
A. A declaration that Defendants’ conduct violates the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution, including the rights to free speech (both to express and
receive speech) and free expressive association;
B. A declaration that Defendants’ conduct constitutes ultra vires action lacking
statutory and constitutional authority, and that Defendants’ interpretation of its
statutory authority in such a way as to authorize their conduct runs afoul of the
nondelegation and major questions doctrines;
C. A declaration that Defendants’ conduct violates the Administrative
Procedure Act and therefore is unlawful and invalid;
D. Injunctive relief restraining and enjoining all Defendants, excluding Biden,
as well as their officers, officials, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all
persons acting in concert or participation with them (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)),
from continuing to engage in unlawful conduct as alleged herein;
E. Injunctive relief restraining and enjoining all Defendants, excluding Biden,
as well as their officers, officials, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all
persons acting in concert or participation with them from engaging in any act to
122
demand, urge, pressure, or otherwise induce any social media platform to censor,
suppress, de-platform, suspend, shadow ban, de-boost, restrict access to content, or
take any other adverse action against any speaker, content, or viewpoint expressed
on social media;
F. A declaration that Twitter and other social media companies are under no
obligation to censor content (especially content deemed COVID-19
misinformation) and will not be penalized if they do not engage in viewpoint-based
censorship;
G. Any equitable or remedial relief to which Plaintiffs are entitled, including
but not limited to repayment of the funds that Mr. Ramirez raised on his GoFundMe
account prior to his account being deleted, as alleged herein;
H. Nominal damages of $1 each;
I. Attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and
J. Any other relief that the Court may deem just and proper.
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs herein demand a trial by jury of any triable issues in the present matter.
May 22, 2023
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Casey Norman

Casey Norman*
Litigation Counsel
New York Bar # 5772199
[email protected]
Motion to Be Admitted as Attorney-in-
Charge Forthcoming
123
/s/ Margaret A. Little

Margaret A. Little
Senior Litigation Counsel
Connecticut Bar # 303494
[email protected]
Pro Hac Vice Admission Forthcoming
NEW CIVIL LIBERTIES ALLIANCE

1225 19th Street NW, Suite 450
Washington, DC 20036
Telephone: (202) 869-5210
Facsimile: (202) 869-5238
* Admitted only in New York and Ohio. DC

practice limited to matters and proceedings
before United States courts and agencies.
Practicing under members of the District of
Columbia Bar.
/s/ S. Michael McColloch

S. MICHAEL MCCOLLOCH, PLLC
S. Michael McColloch
Texas Bar # 13431950
Telephone: (214) 643-6055
[email protected]
KAREN COOK, PLLC
Karen L. Cook
Texas Bar # 12696860
Telephone: (214) 643-6054
[email protected]
6060 N. Central Expressway, Suite 500
Dallas, Texas 75206
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Case 3:23-cv-00155 Document 1 Filed on 05/22/23 in TXSD Page 1 of 124

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

BRIANNE DRESSEN, ERNEST

the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security

to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.” Norwood v. Harrison, 413

transpired—and continues to occur—here.

“misinformation” speech that conflicts with the government’s preferred narrative—including

speech that the government explicitly acknowledges to be true.

Plaintiffs’ speech has repeatedly been flagged as misinformation or removed entirely,

misinformation that could cause physical harm.”

group as “misinformation” or with a message redirecting viewers to “more accurate information”

and medical journals, from being flagged as misinformation or removed entirely.

violating its Community Guidelines.

or even question—its vaccination agenda.

amounts to government-induced censorship. Through threats, pressure, inducement, and coercion,

deems “disinformation,” “misinformation,” and “malinformation”—a feat that the government

enterprise.” It turns out that this statement is quite literally true.

to the Covid vaccine and its—sometimes devastating—side effects.

“often-true content” that “can be framed as sensation, alarmist, or shocking.”1

which describes itself as “a cross-disciplinary program of research, teaching and policy

“misinformation” when “shared absent context.”3 Similarly, VP categorized as misinformation

in false or misleading content.”5

major anti-vaccine activist and by conservative politicians engaged in prior anti-vaccine

This fact is not featured in VP’s report.

continuous, ongoing communication and close collaboration with VP to effect a “whole-of-

is thus sued as a de facto government agent.

caused by Covid vaccines.

chilled constitutionally protected speech on social media platforms—modern society’s public

constitutional authority. Defendants’ censorship operation continues unrepentant and unabated to

Plaintiffs, but of all Americans.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28

2. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because Plaintiff

Ernest Ramirez resides in this District.

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202.

4. Plaintiff Brianne Dressen was formerly a preschool teacher in Saratoga Springs,

Salt Lake City, Utah.

5. Plaintiff Shaun R. Barcavage was formerly a research nurse practitioner at Weill

resides in Henry, Tennessee.

vaccine. Mr. Ramirez resides in Edinburg, Texas.

Strategy at the White House. He is sued in his official capacity.

his official capacity.

Strategic Communications and Engagement. She is sued in her official capacity.

Response Team. She is sued in her official capacity.

15. Defendant Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is a cabinet-level

executive agency within the government of the United States.

in his official capacity.

is sued in his official capacity.

21. Defendant Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a cabinet-level executive

agency within the Government of the United States.

22. Defendant Alejandro Mayorkas is Secretary of DHS. He is sued in his official

23. Defendant Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is an agency

the “Government Defendants.”

26. Defendant Stanford Internet Observatory (SIO) is “[a] program of [Stanford

Center, at https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io. SIO describes itself as “a cross-disciplinary program