The defeat of the Romans by the Parthians at the Battle of Carrhae

Jean Charl du Plessis 14143054

MPhil in Ancient Cultures Module 3: Iranian History, Parthia

Lecturer: Prof Johan Cook

June 2011

INDEX
1. Introduction 2. A short history of Parthia and its rise to power up to the Battle of Carrhae 3. The Armies 3.1 The Cultural Influences on the Army of Parthia 3.2 The Parthian Feudal Army 3.2.1 Horse Archers 3.2.2 Cataphracts 3.3 The Roman Army at Carrhae 3.3.1 The Legions 3.3.2 The auxiliary troops 3.4 Asymmetrical Warfare 4 The Campaign 4.1 Origins of the War: the man who ignited the war between East and West 4.2 The March to Mesopotamia and Crassus Early Successes 4.3 The Road to Destruction 4.3.1 The two embassies 4.3.2 The Arab and the Parthian masterstroke 4.3.3 Orodes and Surenas 5 The Battle Carrhae 5.1 The Clash of East and West 5.1.1 The force march and Crassus Scouts
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5.1.2 Surenas outmanuvers Crassus 5.1.3 Publius desperate charge 5.1.4 Crassus impossible choice 5.2 The Roman Armys Night Escape 5.2.1 The pleas of the wounded and the town of Carrhae 5.2.2 Surenas total victory and the death of Crassus 5.2.3 Crassus last act 6 Experimental Archaeology 7 Conclusion 8 Bibliography

Introduction
During the First Century BC Rome had made itself the master of the Mediterranean world. From Spain to the Euphrates Romes soldiers stood unopposed. Its Legions had broken the mighty phalanxes of the Successor Kingdoms, whipped the Empire of Carthage from history, subdued the wild tribes of Spain and established control over Asia Minor with an iron grip. It seemed that no nation was powerful enough to oppose the growing might of Rome. But far to the East the Parthians had slowly carved out an empire of their own filling the power vacuum left by the disintegrating Seleucid Kingdom. In 53 BC Marcus Crassus crossed the Euphrates with 40 000 men to conquer the East. On the plains of Mesopotamia, Romes Legions met the horsemen of Parthia near the town of Carrhae. What followed was a massacre of the Roman army and less than a quarter of the soldiers escaped with their lives and freedom. It was one of the greatest defeats ever suffered by Rome. But how were these horsemen, outnumbered more than three to one, able to humble the might of Rome and achieve such a resounding victory over the seemingly invincible professional legions? In order to answer this question this research paper will take a look at the cultural aspects of Parthia which influenced its ways of warfare and study its army and the tactics they used, which played an essential role in Parthias defeat of Rome. It will look at the role of the terrain and environment during the battle as well as the roles of the commanders on either side and the concept of asymmetrical warfare between Rome and Parthia.

A short history of Parthia and its rise to power up to the Battle of Carrhae
In order to understand how Parthia was able to match the power of Rome a short study of their rise from humble beginnings to empire must be made. The rise to power of the Parthians is described in ancient sources by Strabo, Justinius and Arrian. The origins of the Arsacid Dynasty are somewhat hazy and obscured in the ancient text and several scholars have made attempts to explain the inconsistencies in the ancient
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sources (Yarshater 2006: 21). For the historical background of Parthias rise to power this paper will focus on the studies made by A. D. H. Bivar of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (Yarshater 2006: 21-99). Justinius (Epitome of the Philippic {trans. Watson 1853:XLI, I}) states the founder of the Arsacid Dynasty, Arsaces I was the leader of the Parni tribe who formed part of the Dahae confederacy of Scythians. The Dahae was formed out of several nomadic people who inhabited Transoxiana on the boarders of the Seleucid Empire (Yarshater 2006: XVIII). They were not new comers to the Iranian world as they feature in the Daeva inscription of Xerxes, in Persepolis (Yarshater 2006: 26). In 239 BC the Satrap of Bactria, Diodotus revolted and declared his independence from the Seleucids (Yarshater 2006: 26) (Bickerman 1943:1). In about 238 BCE the Parni, under their leader Arsaces, perhaps encouraged by the actions of Diodotus, invaded the Satrapy of Parthia and overthrew the governor Andragoras (Yarshater 2006: 31). The Parni established an independent kingdom ruled by the Arsacid dynasty. According to Justinius (Epitome of the Philippic {trans. Watson 1853:XLI, 4}) the Parni Seized the opportunity to invade Parthia once they heard of Seleucus IIs defeat at the Battle of Ancyra in Anatolia during the Seleucid civil war. Chronologically it makes sense since the battle occurred in 239 BCE, the year before the Parni invaded Parthia. The Parni now adopted a new name from their newly conquered homeland and henceforth became known as the Parthians (Grysztar 2009:6) Soon after their conquest of Parthia they added Hyrcania to their kingdom as well (Yarshater 2006: 31). Seleucus II raised an army and headed East in an attempt to restore order to the Eastern Provinces which revolted from his rule. The Parthians in response to the threat formed an alliance with the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom and through their combined efforts gained a decisive victory over the Seleucus. Justinius (Epitome of the Philippic {trans. Watson 1853:XLI,5}) states that according to Parthian tradition the victory won them their liberty and that this was the start of their kingdom. The date of this victory is placed at approximately 231 BCE by Bickerman (1943: 2-3). Upon his death Arsaces was succeeded by his brother Tridates who again was succeeded by his son Artabanus I. Under their new king, Antiochus III, the Seleucids launched a new
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eastern campaign in 209 BCE and managed to subdue both Pathia and Bactria. The Seleucids wars with Egypt and Rome once again weakened their hold over the east and under the leadership of King Phraates I who ruled from 176 BCE, Parthia expanded westwards capturing Charax (Yarshater 2006: 31). Mithradates I, son of Phraates I is considered to be the one who pushed Parthia from kingdom to empire. Justinius (Epitome of the Philippic {trans. Watson 1853:XLI,5}) however states Mithradates as the younger brother of Phraates. Mithradates first expanded eastwards, capturing Traxiana and Tapuria from Bactria, who was embroiled with internal conflict caused by the Seleucid king Antiochus IV Epiphanes (Yarshater 2006: 31) and according to Justinius (Epitome of the Philippic {trans. Watson 1853:XLI,6}) hampered from invasions from India. From 164 the Seleucid Empire suffered internal strife due to succession disputes and Mithradates seized the opportunity by invading Media soon after 148 BCE. In 141 BCE he invaded the Satrapy of Babylonia and captured the city of Seleucia. His victory was followed up by his forces defeating the king of Elymais and capturing the city of Susa (Yarshater 2006: 33-34) (Justinius, Epitome of the Philippic {trans. Watson 1853:XLI,6}). Demetrius II, in an attempt to re-conquer the territories he lost to the Parthians marched into Babylonia with his army in 140 BCE. After some early successes he suffered a decisive defeat the following year and was taken prisoner. This defeat victory was followed up by the capture of Babylon by the Parthians. Upon Mithradates death in 138/7 BCE, the Parthian Empire had reached it greatest extent (Yarshater 2006: 35). With the coronation of the new king of Syria, Antiochus VII, new life was breathed into the disintegrating empire. He assembled a large army in 130 BCE and managed to re-conquer Babylonia from, Phraates II, who succeeded his father Mithradates I as king of Parthia. After his early success, while wintering in Media he suffered a defeat by the Parthians and lost his life in battle (Yarshater 2006: 37). Phraates had to abandon his hopes of invading Syria as word came from the east that Saka had invaded Parthian territory. Justinius (Epitome of the Philippic {trans. Watson 1853:XLII,1}) tells us that the invasion was led by the Saka mercenaries in the Parthian army who were denied pay because they arrived too late to do battle against the Syrians. The
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Phraates met the Saka in battle 128 BCE but when the Greek mercenaries of Phraates went over to the enemy the Parthians were routed from the field and Phraates lost his life (Justinius, Epitome of the Philippic {trans. Watson 1853:XLII,1}). After their victory the Saka returned to their steps and the late Phraates was succeeded by Artabanus II, who too died while campaigning against nomadic tribes, this time the Tochari, which Justinius (Epitome of the Philippic {trans. Watson 1853:XLII,2}) calls the Thogarii (Yarshater 2006: 39). Mithradates II, who succeeded Artabanus, brought the independent kingdom of Hyspaosines under his control as a client kingdom in 122/1 BCE who previously captured Babylon from the Parthian governor Himerus. He consolidated Babylonia as the heart of the Parthian army and managed to restore the eastern frontier by driving back the nomad tribes. After consolidating his empire Mithradates turned his army on Armenia and reduced King Artavasdes I to a client-king of Parthia. These achievements earned him the title The Great (Yarshater 2006: 39-41). Towards the end of Mithradates IIs rule we reach a confusing period in Parthian history. It appears that the Parthian kingdom split into two, with Gotarzes I, a senior Satrap under Mithradates, in the west and Mithradates himself in the East. After the death of Mithradates, Gotarzes rule again overlaps with that of Orodes I. The political instability that Parthia found itself in, allowed for the opportunity of Tigranes of Armenia to establish his independence from Parthia. These overlapping rules appear to be dynastic struggles which lasted until 76 BCE when stability was re-established by the return of Sinatruces from his exile, by now an old man in his eighties (Yarshater 2006: 41-44). Sinatruces was succeeded by his son Phraates III in 71/70 BCE. His reign is marked by the important role the Armenian kingdom plays in the relationship between Rome and Parthia. During his reign Mithradates of Pontus and Tigranes of Armenia were in an alliance together against the Roman Republic. They were hard pressed by the armies of Lucullus and requested Parthian aid against their Roman adversaries. Phraates however decided to remain neutral. While the Roman army was occupied with chasing the remnants of Mithradates of Pontus, Tigranes the younger of Armenia rebelled from his father and fled to Parthia for aid. Phraates married the rebel to one of his daughters and gave him military
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support. Together they besieged the Armenian capital of Artaxata but when Phraates withdrew leaving Tigranes in charge, he was defeated by a well timed sally. The young Tigranes now threw his lot with the Romans and fled to Pompey who was advancing towards the Armenian capital. Upon Pompeys arrival Tigranes the Elder submitted to the Roman general and was allowed to keep his throne. Tigranes the Younger however was put in chains and taken as a prisoner of Rome. Phraates did not take kindly to his son-in-law being taken as prisoner and when his embassy to Pompey was rebuffed Phraates invaded Roman held territory. He was however, either by force or by negotiations turned back (Yarshater 2006: 46-47). According to Greek sources (Dio Cassius, XXXXIX), Phraates III was assassinated by his sons, Mithradates III and Orodes II (Yarshater 2006: 48) 58/7 BCE. Orodes then drove Mithradates from the kingdom, who then fled to Roman Syria. Mithradates persuaded the Roman governor Gabinius to help him overthrow his brother but on their march to east Gabinius abandoned Mithradates and left for Egypt to support the Egyptian king Ptolemy XI and his bid for the throne. Mithradates, without the Roman support he counted on did achieve some success and captured Babylonia. Ordes however sent his brilliant general Surenas who besieged Seleucia where Mithradates resided. Justinius gives a similar version of the events of the struggles between Mithradates III and Orodes II. However it is interesting to note that he completely omits the history between Mithradates II, the Great and Mithradates III. In his version the deeds and achievements of both kings are combined. Mithradates II and Mithradates III according to Justinius is the same Person, but this is chronologically impossible (Epitome of the Philippic {trans. Watson 1853:XLII,2,4}). The city was eventually captured by the forces of Surenas and Mithradates put to death by order of Orodes, leaving him as the sole ruler of Parthia (Yarshater 2006: 49). It was Ordoes II, who was the Parthian ruler during Crassus invasion of Mesopotamia and during his rule, the Battle of Carrahe took place. We can thus see how the Parthians rose from their humble Step origins, using the opportunity of a distracted Seleucid Empire to carve out a kingdom of their own. Over a period of two centuries they chipped away bits and pieces of the weakening Seleucid kingdom and established a world power and empire of their own which rivalled that of

Rome. While Rome was expanding east, Parthia expanded westward. A clash between these two nations was inevitable.

The Armies The Cultural Influences on the Army of Parthia

The area from the north of the Danube across the sea of grass, Eastern Europes Steps, to deep into Chinas hinterland was filled by the many nomadic tribes. The area formed a very complex but continuous cultural zone of different ethicalities. They raised their livestock on the plains continuously moving according to the grazing patterns which sustained their way of life (Grysztar2009: 06). Key to survival on the Steps was the horse. It was needed to keep up with the long journeys across the plains, used to keep the heard of livestock together and hunt wild game. All nomads thus learned to ride from a very young age, spending days on end in the saddle. Another important skill needed for nomadic life was archery. On the vast open plains the terrain did not allow for hunters to stalk and ambush their prey and therefore one needed a weapon with good range and accuracy to hunt successfully. The bow was thus essential to nomadic life and another skill learned from young. Over time a more powerful bow emerged from the Eurasian grassland, the composite bow, which was more powerful that the self-bows of Europe. By combining the use of a bow and the speed of their horses, Eurasian nomads were perfectly adapted to hunt on the plains (Man 2006: 49-50). The nomads abilities of archery and horsemanship quickly became a form of warfare, as competition for grazing grew and raids were conducted on other nomads and sedimentary groups on the fringes of the grasslands. Several tribes formed confederacies to strengthen themselves against their neighbours or strengthen their number to have more success in raids. The Dahae of which the Parni were a part of is an example of one of these confederacies (Yarshater 2006: 26-27). In the very name of Dahae, which is Persian for robber, lies evidence of their confederacy raiding other more settled people (Lendering 2011: 01). Apart from the skills of superb horsemanship and mounted archery, the nomadic cultural mentality had a major impact upon the Parthian war-machine. Grysztar (2009: 07) explains that even though the Parthains had become a sedentary people their mentality of warfare

was still dominated by elements of their nomadic heritage. He explains that sedentary or agricultural nations such as Rome always fought for their homes and cities and that the mentality of warfare of these nations was based on retreat and advance. As long as the army advanced he was driving the enemy out of their territory, away from their cities and vice-versa. Retreating meant the enemy was advancing on your territory and closer to your home. Advance was leading to victory while retreat meant defeat (Grysztar 2009: 07). The nomadic attitude towards warfare differed from that of the agricultural nations. Because nomads were constantly on the move they had no permanent settlements and thus no heart to strike at or permanent settlements to protect. They could thus just retreat before the enemy if needed and lure him into a more favourable position for their cavalry to strike or disappear on the vast steps. The mentality of advance and retreat in war meant little to the nomadic nations. It is this mentality that the Parthians had brought with her from the steps and which dictated her way of conducting war (Grysztar 2009: 07). Even though the Parthians had become a sedimentary nation, the mentality of step warfare remained integrated in their culture. Rome had thus far only encountered enemies who conducted warfare the same way that her legions did; advance and retreat. History is evidence of this, the entire Carthaginian civilization came to an end with the fall of her capital of Carthage (146 BCE). The Macedonian Kingdom was scratched from the map after the decisive Battle of Pydna. Entire wars were won by capturing capital cities or through decisive battles. Even the Celt-Iberians who waged their guerrilla war against Rome ceased their hostilities once their capital, Numantia fell. Parthia was however different, throughout her three centuries of war with Rome, she suffered several defeats and her capital fell more than once (116, 165, 198 AD) to Roman forces but she was never conquered by Rome. Parthia often refused to engage Rome, retreating in the wake of the enemy, even at the cost of losing her cities and territory until a time presented itself for a more favourable engagement. An example of this is during Crassuss campaign where the Parthian army retreated before Crassus, sacrificing parts of Mesopotamia, until the Roman army was cut from their supplies and drawn into an open

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plain which allowed the Parthian cavalry to come into full play (Wilcox 1986:18) (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923:381}). The Battle of Carrhae was thus not merely a battle between two opposing cultures and empires but a battle of opposing cultural elements.

The Parthian Feudal Army

The Parthian state was based on a feudal system headed by seven powerful clans from which the king was chosen. The clans were supported by a petty aristocracy and their retainers who were given land in return for military service. They again ruled over the serfs and peasants of the native Iranians who supplied the labourers for their lands and could be levied to serve in the Parthian army, predominantly in the infantry (Wilcox 1986:6) (Barnett 2009: 13). Unlike Rome, Parthia did not have a standing army and when the need arose for the king to go to war he called upon his chiefs and vassals to levy troops for his campaign. The forces were also bolstered by hiring mercenaries from the nomadic neighbours such as the Saka (Barnett 2009: 13). Hiring mercenaries from the steps has been a practise of Parthia from early on as evident in Phaarates IIs campaign against Antiochus VII (Yarshater 2006: 38). The higher nobility and chieftans along with their retinue supplied the heavy cavalry or Cataphracts while the lesser nobles supplied the lighter and more mobile horse archers. Although the Parthians made use of infantry no mention is made of infantry at Carrhae and thus will not be discussed here. The Parthian army at Carrahe can thus respectively be divided into two main groups; the light horse archers and the heavy Cataphracts.

Horse archers They fight on horseback, either galloping forward or turning their backs. Often, too, they may throw their pursuers off their guard against being wounded by their arrows. (Justinius, Epitome of the Philippic {trans. Watson 1853:XLII,2}) The majority of the Parthian army comprised of horse archers. At the Battle of Carrhae their numbers were about 9 000 while the heavy cavalry were numbered at a 1 000 (Barnett
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2009: 16). They were lightly armoured, dressed in leather, felt or woollen kaftans and loose fitting saravara trousers (Wilcox 1986:12) (Barnett 2009: 14). Their clothing allowed them to operate more swiftly as they relied on speed for defence and was well adapted for the Iranian hot climate. Their primary weapon was the composite recurved bow. Constructed out of wood, horn and sinew, hence the name composite, allowed for a bow with very high penetrating power yet small and nimble enough to wield on horseback and able to pierce Roman armour (Yarshater 2006: 52). Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923:389}) makes mention of the effectiveness of the Parthian bows: ...for these now saw the velocity and force of the arrows, which fractured armour, and tore their way through every covering alike, whether hard or soft. Most scholars agree that the horse archer had an effective range of about 50 m (McDonnellStaff 2009: 21) (Barnett 2009: 15) (Wilcox 1986:13). As a secondary weapon they often carried a sword, lance or axe. Because the horse archers were not armoured for melee and close quarter combat and there specific role on the battlefield, these weapons were more likely for emergencies, extreme measures or chasing down a fleeing enemy. The role of the horse archer was to harass the enemy by firing volley after volley of arrows into their massed ranks and withdraw as soon as the enemy attempted to chase them down. The Parthians were so skilled with horse and bow that they could turn in the saddle and fire backwards at their pursuing enemies: For the Parthians shot as they fled... (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923:390}). This later became known as the Parthian Shot(Wilcox 1986:13). The Parthians would often lure the enemy to chase after them which would break an enemys formation and cohesion or lead them into a trap by drawing them away from the main force as with Crassus son at Carrhae (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923:389}). Their mobility allowed them to ride around the enemy and out flank them. During the battle of Carrhae the Roman forces were completely surrounded by the horse archers and suffered hours on end of arrows fire (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923:389}).
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As mentioned before, the Parthians had inherited their mounted archery from the steps and were well at home on their Step ponies with a reputation for endurance and toughness and very skilled with their bows (Wilcox 1986: 9). Justinius (Epitome of the Philippic {trans. Watson 1853:XLII,2}) made mention of their horsemanship: They ride on horseback on all occasions; on horses they go to war, and to feast; on horses they discharge public and private duties; on horses they go abroad, meet together, traffic and converse. As for their archery skill; it was an art taught from a young age on the Iranian plains over many centuries. According to Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 390}) their bows they wielded were large and mighty and curved so as to discharge their missiles with great force which corresponds with the Yrzi composite bow discovered in a Parthian grave at the Baghouz necropolis. The bow had an unstrung length of 1.47 m (McDonnell-Staff 2009: 20). Archaeological evidence of light horse archers can be found in the graffiti drawings of the Dura Europos find, which depicts several light horse archers (Wilcox 1986:7, 8). The horsemen are dressed in kaftans and saravara and bashlyk caps. All carry the gorytos, a large quiver that could hold a spare bow, arrows and a sword. Other historical depictions of the mounted archers are the terracotta plaques, one found in the British Museum, London and the other in the Staatliche-Museum, Berlin (Wilcox 1986:8, 18). The one found in the Staatliche-Museum has the iconic loose trousers and kaftan but without a cap. Interesting to note is that in his bow hand he grips several arrows while he is firing an already knocked arrow at full gallop (Wilcox 1986:8). In his book Attila the Hun, John Man (2006: 103-133) wrote a whole chapter on Lajos Kassai, the world renown traditional horseback archer who single handily revived the lost art. Kassai uses traditional recurved bows, made very much the same as those used by Parthians and uses the same techniques shooting his bow while mounted. Kassai places several arrows between his fingers of his bow hand (normally about nine), reflecting the terracotta plaque from the Staatliche-Museum of the horse archers gripping the arrows in his bow hand, mentioned above (Man 2006: 116). By drawing the arrows from the hand instead of the quiver allows for a much more rapid fire rate. Kassai after his 15 years of training is able
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to shoot an amazing nine arrows in 18 seconds while at full gallop, firing three arrows at a target in front of him, three to the side and finally three arrows over the rump of the horse, performing the Parthian Shot. All his arrows hit the targets perfectly (Man 2006: 120). It is thus more than reasonable to assume that the Parthian horse archers could equal this skill of Kassai since it was a part of their everyday life from a very young age. The Parthian horse archer was thus a hit and run skirmish cavalry, which was nearly impossible to chase down due to their light equipment and their ranged weapons. Their powerful recurved bow could pierce armour and due to their ability with it they were able to produce a very high rate of fire.

Parthian Horse Archer (Courtesy of Johnny Shumate)

Cataphracts The heavy cavalry of the Parthian army were supplied by the richer nobility and clan lords who could afford the more expensive armour for themselves and their mounts. The heaviest
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of these were the Cataphracts who, mount and rider alike, were fully armoured from head to toe. Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 390}) gives another description of these mail clad warriors: ...blazing in helmets and breastplates, their Margianian steel glittering keen and bright, and their horses clad in plates of bronze and steel. The heavy armour for the mounts seems to have developed on the steps as an answer for defence against arrows (Man 2006: 127) (Wilcox 1986: 9). The fact that Plutarch calls it Margianian armour lends weight to the theory of step origin of the armour, as Margianian is a Saka tribe from the steps north of the Oxus (Yarshater 2006: 38). A popular form of step armour was scale mail. Small overlapping plates constructed from plates of bronze, iron, horn, leather or wood were stitched onto leather or linen under garments (Wilcox 1986: 10). Justinius (Epitome of the Philippic {trans. Watson 1853:XLII,2}) description; Their armour, and that of their horses, is formed of plates, lapping over one another like feathers of a bird, and covers both man and horse entirely clearly describes scale armour. The Dura Europos find, has delivered amazing horse trappers covered in bronze scale armour serving as a good example of Cataphract horse armour (Wilcox 1986: 10). Another form of body armour used by Cataphracts is laminated armour which consisted of segmented strips of metal riveted to inner straps of leather or linen. Often laminated and scale armour were combined to form a truly Iron Horsemen. These were often worn over the arms and legs of the rider because of its segmented qualities, allowing for better movement (Wilcox 1986: 10). The main weapon of the Cataphracts was the four meter lance called a Kontos (Barnett 2009: 15). Kontos literarly means barge pole in ancient Greek and its effects were devastating if we are to believe Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 402}) who says of these lances: ...often had impetus enough to pierce through two men at once. To wield a lance of such length both hands were needed and the horse would probably be steered with the legs. The nobles who used them were thus just as good riders as the fellow

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horse archers on their mounts. As secondary weapons these men carried swords, axes and maces (Wilcox 1986: 10). For archaeological evidence we turn once again to the graffiti from Dura Europos find which depicts a fully clad armoured Cataphract. He wears a conical helmet or Spangenhelm and scale armour with a mid section which appears to be supported with a layer of laminated armour. His arms are covered in segmented laminated hoops called manica which allows for better movement. His legs and feet too are covered in laminated hoops. He carries the long Kontos lance and what appears to be a mace as well. His mount is clad in the scale covered trappers similar to those found in the Dura Europos find (Wilcox 1986: 7). Another example is the terracotta plaque from the British Museum depicting a Cataphract hunting lion. He to carries the Kontos with both hands and wears scale armour but wears a thimble helm (Wilcox 1986: 17). One reason for the development of these heavy cavalry units in Iran is the Nisaen breed of horse. They were perhaps antiquitys largest breed and were able to carry much heavier weight than the European breeds, allowing for both horse and rider to be armoured (Wilcox 1986: 10). These armour and weapons made the Cataphracts heavy assault troops of the Parthian army. As mentioned the light cavalry would lure out the enemy to chase after them and once they were well separated from the main army, the Cataphracts would make their charge upon the small force cut off from their main army. An example of this is the force of Publius who chased after the horse archers and into the trap of waiting Cataphracts (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 392}). Their armour gave them staying power in melee and they could thus out fight almost all cavalry sent against them and break weary infantry formations on charge (Wilcox 1986: 9).

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Parthian Cataphract (Courtesy of Johnny Shumate)

Roman Army at Carrhae

The Legions The Roman army had become very much standardized since the Marius reforms in equipment and tactics. Gaius Marius was chosen consul to lead Rome against her war with Jugurtha of Numidia and the Cimbrii and Teutones who invaded Italy. His answer to these new threats was to reform the entire Republican army of Rome. Romes citizen army was replaced by a professional army and recruitment was opened to all levels of society allowing the poor landless masses of Rome to enlist. The army had now become a career and was a permanent standing force that no longer needed to be disbanded according to harvest and campaigning seasons. Changes also included the standardization and uniformity of equipment and formations (Sampson 2008: 22). These reforms had occurred just the previous generation before that of Crassus and the soldiers that Pompey led in the East and Caesar in Gaul were the same that Crassus took to Mesopotamia. According to Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 376}), Crassus crossed the Euphrates with seven legions, placing his heavy infantry approximately 34 000 legionnaires, assuming his legions were at full strength 4 800 men each. The strength of the Roman army was its heavy infantry of which the backbone was the citizen legionnaire. These were the men on which the Roman Empire was built and expanded. The Legionnaire was armoured in Lorica Hamata, better known today as chain mail. Consisting of several thousand iron rings woven together to form a very flexible iron
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shirt weighing up to nine kilograms. It allowed for better movement by the wearer than most other forms of armour and served as good protection against slashing blows, such as the Celtic long sword but less so from pierce attacks such as spears and arrows (Simkins
2000: 14, 27). This weakness played a key role in the Battle of Carrhae as will be explained

later. The most popular helm used by the legionnaire was Montefortino helm. It was of Celtic origin and its simple design allowed for mass production and thus perfect for the reforms of Marius. Its use did however pre-date the reforms and was a poplar helm already from the Punic Wars onwards. Its construction was either from bronze or iron and allowed for good visibility and hearing (Simkins 2000: 10, 17, 27). To complete the defensive arms of the legionnaire a Scutum shield was carried. The Fayum shield discovered at Kasr El Harit, Egypt, dates from the time of Caesar and would be similar to those used at Carrhae by the Romans. Constructed of two or three layers of plywood, it measured four foot in length and weighed approximately seven to nine kilograms (Simkins
2000: 22, 27).

For offensive weaponry the legionnaire carried two pila (pilum singular) javelins. These were the ranged weaponry of the legionnaire and were thrown before engaging the enemy
(Simkins 2000: 17).

The main weapon of these soldiers was the Gladius, the Roman short sword. Designed to thrust instead of slashing cuts and due to its size, it was the perfect weapon for use in close hand and-to-hand combat (Simkins 2000: 10, 20).

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Re-enactment of a Roman Legionnaire based on the Aemilius Paulus victory monument 2nd century BCE: He carries the Republican Delos Gladius, a typical Montefortino helm and wears a Lorica Hamata chain-mail vest. His shield however is from an early Republic period without the convex curve. Crassus troops carried a scutum which was more convex in shape (Authors Collection)

The auxiliary troops The Legions were supported by auxiliary forces. They were drafted from native population who were non-citizens. Their equipment depended on their area of recruitment and there was no set standard to their composition and numbers (Sampson 2008: 115). Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 376}) mentions that the auxiliary numbered a total of 8 000 troops; 4 000 infantry and 4 000 cavalry. Their equipment is not described other than that the infantry were light troops and that at least 500 of them were bowmen (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 392}). Of the 4 000 cavalry, 1 000 were elite Gallic cavalry sent to Crassus by Caesar, and described by Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 394}) as carrying small and feeble spears and lightly equipped with unprotected bodies. According to Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 376}) the army Crassus took to war against the Parthians, composed thus of 42 000 troops, when he crossed the Euphrates in
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53 BCE, of which approximately 38 000 were infantry assuming his contingents were at full strength.

Asymmetrical Warfare
The two armies that met at Carrhae is a perfect example of asymmetric warfare. Asymmetrical warfare can be described as when two armies meet on the battlefield with each waging war in such completely different ways to the other, that either side can make use of these differences to their advantage (Barnett 2009: 15). As described above, the Roman army was an infantry army which relied on closing with the enemy. Their arms and armour were designed for fighting hand-to-hand at close quarters. Of the 42 000 soldiers in Crassuss army 34 000 were infantry legionnaires, thus three quarters of Crassus men had no means to counter the Parthian horse archers who refused to meet them in melee. Crassus 4 000 cavalry were too few in number to act as any counter or screening role to protect the legionnaires against the horse archers. Even the 1 000 Gallic elite horsemen, although very brave, proved of little use when they met with the Parthian cataphracts whos armour they could not pierce with their light spears. Of the remaining light troops of auxiliary Plutarch makes almost no mention and thus can be assumed they too were found wanting when compared to the Parthian tactics. The Parthians took advantage of the Roman lack of cavalry and their slow moving infantry by using skirmish tactics, shooting volleys of arrows into the enemy formation and then retreated when a sally was made against them, thus not allowing the Roman army to use its strength in infantry by avoiding melee combat. Without being able to join hand-to-hand combat and their heavy javelins unable to compete with the range of the composite bows of the Parthians, the Romans had no answer for the Parthians tactics at Carrhae.

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The Campaign Origins of the War: the man who ignited the war between East and West
The Roman Republic was no longer the virtuous state ruled by the Senate and its People. While the Senate still appeared to be the governing body of the Roman state, reality was far different; it was the Triumvirate, which was first created in 58 BCE, who steered Rome down new paths and creating for it a new future. Behind the reigns stood the three most powerful men in Rome; Pompey, Caesar and Crassus. In 55 BCE Crassus and Pompey were chosen as respective consuls of the year and divided the Empire among the three members of the Triumvirate. Pompey took control of Spain and would remain in Rome to keep control of the Senate and the Triumvirates hegemony in Romes political sphere. Caesar kept his command of Gaul and Crassus received the Province of Syria (Boatwright 2004: 236-239). Pompey had previously made for himself a name as a brilliant general by ridding the Mediterranean of Pirates and breaking the power of several minor Eastern kingdoms who threatened Romes interests in the East (Fry 1988: 35-36). Caesar, since his command in Gaul in 58 BCE, had achieved great success fighting the Gallic tribesmen and expanding the power and prestige of Rome as well as his own and was fast becoming the equal of Pompey as far as generalship was concerned (Fry 1988: 36). Crassus on the other hand did not owe his reputation in Rome for his abilities as a military man but to his vast sums of money. Although he held high military positions under Sulla and was the man who finally crushed Spartacus Revolt in 71 BCE, his achievements never gained him any great popularity as a general. His successes were always overshadowed by those of Sulla, Pompey and Caesar. His seemingly endless sources of money however always assured him a prominent role in politics and his position in the Triumvirate (Fry 1988: 35). His wealth is attested in his war with Spartacus when the Senate could not afford to raise more legions to oppose the rebel gladiator, Crassus paid from his own funds to raise and equip six legions of his own alongside the four provided by the Senate (Boatwright 2004: 207). Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 317}) tells of how he lavished upon the Temple of Heracles, feasted the people of Rome and gave every Roman enough money to sustain them for three months during his consulship of 55 BCE. After all the expenses his private inventory still stood at 7100 talents prior to his campaign in the east.
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Crassus had always been envious of Pompeys popularity as a general and now Caesar was surpassing him in terms of glory on the battlefield as well (Boatwright 2004: 208). When Crassus thus received Syria as his province he saw the opportunity to equal his colleges by invading Parthia (Boatwright 2004: 239). According to Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 362}), Crassus joy over receiving Syria was unrestricted: ... he showed his joy that he regarded no piece of good fortune in his whole life as more radiant than the one which had now come to him. Among strangers and in public he could scarcely hold his peace, while to his intimates he made many empty and youthful boasts which ill became his years and his disposition, for he had been anything but boastful or bombastic before this. He was eager to surpass the campaigns of Lucullus against Armenia and Pompey against Pontus, by marching his army to the Outer Ocean which eluded even Alexander the Great (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 362}). It is clear in Plutarchs description of events that when Crassus received Syria, everybody knew his intentions of invading Parthia. Even Julius Caesar from far away Gaul knew of it and wrote a letter of encouragement to Crassus (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 363}). As the political situation stood at the time, there were no open hostilities between Parthia and Rome and the two were relatively at peace since Pompey had returned to Rome. The two Empires in fact had signed a treaty a few years prior which established the Euphrates as a mutual border between them. Crassus received heavy opposition for his planned campaign against a people who were on peaceful terms with Rome. A certain Tribune of the People, Ateius went as far as to oppose him leaving the city by amassing a great many of his supporters and barring his way. Crassus in fear of his life called upon Pompey for aid, who had to make use of his influence among the people to secure a safe passage for Crassus (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 363}). This goes to show how powerful the Triumvirate had become and that they were the true power behind Rome and not the Senate. It was the ambitions of one man which led to the war between Rome and Parthia. The decision to go to war was not that of the Senate or the people of Rome but that of Marcus Crassus, supported by his colleges in the Triumvirate. In his bid for glory and to rival the military achievements of Caesar and Pompey, Crassus had ignited a war between
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East and West which saw Rome and Parthia engulfed in conflict with each other for nearly three centuries.

The March to Mesopotamia and Crassus Early Successes

Even if Crassus did not have the backing of the senate, the time for his campaign in the east looked ripe. In 54 BCE the civil war between Mithradates III and Orodes II was still in full swing with Mithradates III, who was pro-Roman, holding the most important key cities in Mesopotamia which included Babylon, Seleucia and Ctesiphon. Another important advantage was that Armenia was an ally and client-kingdom of Rome and it would be obligatory to supply troops to their Roman allies (Sampson 2008: 97). Lastly, many of the more Hellenized cities were sympathisers of Rome and had very little loyalty towards their Parthian overlords (Barnett 2009: 13). This is most evident when several cities of Mesopotamia came over to Crassus on their own accord upon his arrival (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923:366}). Crassus left Italy from Brundisium but during his sea voyage suffered the loss of many of his transport vessels and his soldiers during a storm crossing the Adriatic (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 365}). The rest of his journey he crossed overland and in 54 BCE arrived in Syria and made the rest of his preparations for his invasions and in the same year crossed over the Euphrates into Parthian territory. The war with Parthia had now begun and the crossing of the Euphrates was soon followed by military success for Rome when Crassus met Silaces, the Parthian Satrap of Mesopotamia. This victory was followed by the declaration of several cities for Crassus, mentioned before. Crassus on his march through Mesopotamia found resistance from only one city, Zenodotium which was besieged and quickly fell to Crassus forces (Sampson 2008: 101). The defeat of Silaces and the capture of Zenodotium had won northern and western Mesopotamia for Rome (Sampson 2008: 102). The start of the Parthian campaign had proven to be a great success for Crassus. With these successes Crassus retired his army to winter in Syria but not before he plundered the Temple of Jerusalem as well as the Temple to Venus at Hierapolis to help pay for his campaign (Sampson 2008: 103). The decision to retire the army to Syria however was

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criticized by the ancient authors and Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 368}) remarks that This was thought to be the first blunder which Crassus committed. The reasoning for their critique was that he should have followed up his success by advancing upon the cities of Seleucia and Babylon but this delay gave the enemy time to prepare. There might be some merit in their criticism of this decision of Crassus not to continue and relieve Mithradates who was now besieged in Babylon by Orodes general Surenas. As mentioned earlier, Babylon fell to the forces of Surenas and Mithradates was put to death, effectively ending the Parthian civil war. Samson (2008: 102) however defends Crassus action claiming that Crassas, knowing his weakness in lack of cavalry, was waiting on crucial cavalry support from the Armenian allies and the Gallic horse sent from Gaul. He also states that Crassus wanted more time to train his inexperienced recruits before marching upon Parthia. He lastly makes the argument that Mithradates would not serve as a strong ally against Orodes for he had no troops of his own and Roman soldiers would have to be used to garrison his cities bleeding Crassus army of manpower. There are several pitfalls in these arguments however. If Crassus was so concerned over his lack of cavalry he would surely have made more effort in recruiting more horsemen prior to his invasion and would surely not have rejected the Armenian kings offer of aid of 10 000 cataphracts if Crassus would only invade via the Armenian mountains (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 374}). The argument Sampson give of Crassus taking the time to rather train his troops is contradicted by Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 374}) (if the ancient author is to be believed) who states that Crassus made little effort in training his men but was more interested in the booty he sacked from the Temple of Venus: ...his sojourn in Syria was devoted to mercenary rather than military purposes. For he made no estimate of the number of his troops, and instituted no athletic contests for them, but reckoned up revenues of cities, and spent many days weighing exactly the treasures of the goddess in Hierapolis.... As for the argument that Mithradates had no men of his own, it is difficult to accept. As mentioned before, Mithradates was able to capture Babylonia and other key cities from Orodes without the help of Rome (Yarshater 2006: 49). This would have been impossible if

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he did not have a substantial force of his own or if he was as unpopular as Sampson (2008: 103) claims. In hindsight, if Crassus continued on his path to relieve Mithradates, the Parthian army of Surenas could be pinned down between the city of Babylon and the forces of Mithradates and the army of Crassus. As we have seen, a major part of the Parthain armys strength lay in their ability not to be pinned down. The fact that the death of Mithradates ended the civil war would surely have freed up all of Orodes time and resources to be used against Rome and their Armenian allies. Therefore the critique of the contemporary sources is understandable.

The Road to Destruction

The two embassies In the Spring of 53 BCE while the Roman army was still at its winter quarters, Crassus received two embassies in regards to the Parthian campaign. The first was the embassy from Parthia, who according to Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 369}) gave Crassus the opportunity to turn back his armies. The embassy hints to its knowledge that the war was unpopular with Rome and blames the invasion on Crassus old age. Sampson (2008: 106) does not question that the embassy did come to Crassus but claims that it is unlikely that the embassy would have insulted the Roman general with his old age, stating that it was Plutarch taking the liberty to create the details of the event, to support his own down play of Crassus age. Crassus answer, if we are to believe Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 369}), was that he would give his reply in Seleucia, the city now held by Parthia, thus making it clear that the two nations were at war. The second envoy came from Armenia of which a quick mention has already been made but will be described in more detail here. The king Artavasdes himself was at the head of this envoy and offered Crassus military support in the form of 10 000 cataphracts and 30 000 infantry if Crassus would follow his advised route through the Armenian mountains which would not allow the Parthian cavalry to operate to their strengths, giving the Romans safe passage. The king also promised the route would have sufficient supplies for the Roman
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army. Crassus however rejected the offer saying that he would march through Mesopotamia to collect all the garrisons he left the previous year. Receiving Crassus answer the Armenian rode away (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 374}). Crassus invasion had thus two routes from which he had to choose. The first was through the Armenian mountains, which Crassus already decided against. It was a longer route and supplies in mountainous areas were always problematic. The route however was considered to be a safer one due to the rough terrain and as mentioned, making it difficult for cavalry to operate. The second route, chosen by Crassus, was to march through Mesopotamia along the Euphrates. The route could be well supplied due to the well organized water routes and the cities along the banks. Many important Parthian cities lay along the Euphrates banks and were obvious military targets for Rome. This route however predicted the Roman armys movements along the river and the surrounding terrain allowed for the Parthian cavalry to play to all their strengths (Grysztar2009: 8). The route through Mesopotamia would lead to the armys destruction but Crassus cannot be fully blamed for his decision, for at the time it appeared to be a military sound one. His army, as we have seen numbering 40 000, was very large and the logistics to supply such an army took tremendous skill and organization. Even though the Armenian king promised supplies to Crassus, if he marched through the mountains, it would be a risk to rely on his word. The army would have doubled in size and a longer route taken, which meant even more supplies were necessary, making the logistics to supply the forces much more difficult. The Armenians were also not the most reliable allies to date. As mentioned as allies they were obliged to supply military aid to Rome. In 54 BCE Crassus had already defeated a Parthian army and sacked one of their cities before the campaign season ran out and he retired to winter in Syria. All these actions had no Armenian aid and they only arrived the next year when Crassus was ready to embark on invading again. The Armenians were thus slow in their support of Rome and thus their promise to supply him while on route in the mountains could not be fully trusted. As Sun Tzu says: An army marches on its stomach. Without supplies the Roman army could be completely destroyed without even striking a blow. Lastly, there was the matter of collecting the remainder of the garrison troops which were stationed in the cities that came over to Rome in 54 BCE and those in the captured city of Zenodotium. This must have been a substantial force and crucial to the remainder of
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Crassus campaign. At this time Crassus had much faith in his men and did not feel he needed the Armenian reinforcements or the safety of their mountains. He had already defeated one Parthian army and captured of one of their cities with ease. The decision by Crassus to take the route through Mesopotamia, due to supplies and gathering the remainder of his troops, can thus be understood. Crassus crossed the Euphrates once again into Mesopotamia, this time at Zeugma. While following the course of the river some of the scouts he sent out returned with news that the route was completely void of any Parthian troops but there were signs and tracks of many horsemen. Crassus and his soldiers took this as cowardly of the Parthian army who were fleeing from the Roman forces (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 374}). As mentioned before, the Roman mentality of warfare saw retreat before the enemy as losing the war. This is evident in the Second Punic War where the policy of Quintus Fabius, to avoid battle with Hannibal Barca, even though successful, proved very unpopular. It actually led to him being relieved of his command (Weir 2006: 132). For the Roman to flee before an enemy was unthinkable. The Parthians cultural mentality, as described on pg 10, had no problem retreating before the enemy and retreat often formed part of their strategy. This is exactly what was happening along the Euphrates River. While the Romans saw weakness in the Parthian retreat, the Parthians were luring the Romans into a trap, and Crassus took the bait.

The Arab and the Parthian masterstroke The tracks of the Parthian army was leading away from the river and Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 376}) tells us that the young Cassius, one of Crassus senior military staff, urged the general to enter one of the cities friendly to Rome and asses the strength of the enemy before continuing. If not that, keep his course along the river towards Seleucia. Cassius reasoning was that the river would assure them of supplies and also serve as an anchor so that they could not be surrounded. Crassus however took the advice of one of Romes Arabian allied chiefs, who Plutarch names Ariamnes (other sources names his Acbar of Abgar), who urged Crassus to follow a different route. Ariamnes served under

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Pompey during his eastern campaigns and thus it is reasonable to understand that Crassus would have taken the advice of the Arab (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 377}). If we are to believe the account Plutarch gives of the Arab, leading the Romans astray, much credit must be given to the Parthians and the planning before the battle. The Arab was secretly in the employ of the Parthians and convinced Crassus his enemy was in full flight before the Romans. He told Crassus that they collected as much of their treasure they could carry and were heading for the vast steps of Scythia or Hyrcania where they would disappear and that Crassus had to make haste and follow his advice, if he was to catch up with the Parthians (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 378}). It is interesting to note that the Arab played upon Crassus main desires from the campaign; his hopes of gaining glory from his campaign and his obsession with gold. The Arab lays claim that the army might escape and if so Crassus would be deprived of the glory by winning a gear victory. Secondly, that they were escaping with their treasure which Crassus hoped to gain to help pay for the campaign. Ariames, after winning Crassus trust led the army away from the Euphrates and out onto the open plains of Mesopotamia during the hot summer month of June (Yarshater 2006: 53). Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 381}) gives a description of the terrain the Roman had to pass through on the Arabs route: ...troublesome when deep sand succeeded, and plains which had no trees, no water, and no limit anywhere which the eye could reach, so that not only did thirst and the difficulty of the march exhaust the men, but also whatever met their gaze filled them with an obstinate dejection. During the difficult march messengers arrived from the Armenian king who brought news that they were under attack from the Parthians in Armenia and was not able to send military aid to Crassus. Crassus was furious with Artavasdes and replied that if he had more time he would march on Armenia to punish the king for his treachery (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 378}). As mentioned, the end to the Parthian civil war allowed for Orodes to throw all his resources and attention against Rome and her ally. Orodes had

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divided his forces and took the main Parthian army to Armenia and sent the second, under his general, known as Surenas, to meet the Romans. The Parthians, thanks to their Arabian ally, had thus won a brilliant strategic victory over the Romans. Carssus and his men were trapped on the desert plain and cut off from their supply line along the Euphrates. The battle ground was chosen by the Parthians and the open terrain favoured the cavalry troops of the Parthians, with no trees or hills to protect the Romans. The summer heat must have added to the suffering of the army of Crassus, who were more accustomed to moderate climate of the Mediterranean. The Partians, on the other hand, grew up in the harsh climate and would have been much more adapted to the heat. To have lured Crassus onto the open ground of the Mesopotamian desert must have been the plan all along. As we have seen the logical route lay along the Euphrates and would be the route Crassus would have taken. The army of Surenas however, was waiting along a different route out on the plain for the Romans. If Plutarchs account is correct, the Arab Ariamnes was an integrated and very important part of the Parthian battle plan and strategy. By convincing Crassus to take a different route, he ensured that the Parthians had gained a major advantaged over the Romans, even before the armies have met on the field of battle.

Orodes and Surenas It seems that Orodes aim was to strike at Armenia before they could supply the Romans with sufficient military aid and knock them out of the war as quickly as possible. With Armenia no longer a threat he could then direct all his forces against Crassus without the fear of an Armenia army at his rear. For him to take on the Parthians with a large enough force he would have to slow down the Roman advance however. For this he summoned one of his able clan leaders who would meet Crassus and slowdown his army and do as much damage to the enemy as possible. The man for this job was to be Surenas (Sampson 2006: 112).

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Surenas, was second only to the king himself. The name which Plutarch gives this general is actually a clan title and not the actual name of the man. History has thus far not been able to produce a name for the brilliant general and Surenas is still used until historical evidence finds one (Yarshater 2006: 53). Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 379}) states that Orodes sent Surenas to block the Roman army and asses their strength while he kept himself and his army in reserve. The fact that Orodes was willing to sacrifice Surenas to stall the Romans might have been a political move on the part of the king. As mention, Surenas was the second most powerful man in the kingdom. His ability to raise 10 000 soldiers from his own estates is testament to this. In Plutrachs (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 379}) account, he is the one responsible for restoring Orodes to the throne and the capture of Seleucia and Babylon from Mithradates III. He must have been a very popular man and combined with his military power he surely posed as a political threat to Orodes. Orodes might thus have hoped that he would severely weaken the Romans by sending Surenas against them and at the same time rid himself of a dangerous rival. The fact that Orodes eventually stabbed Surenas to death due to jealousy, not long after the battle, supports the fact that he saw the general as a political threat (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 422}).

The Battle of Carrhae The Clash of East and West

The force march and Crassus Scouts Of the ancient sources, Plutarchs account of the battle seems to be the more detailed and closest to the actual events and accepted by most scholars as so (Sampson 2006: 124). It is his account of the battle that this research paper will follow. The Arab, satisfied that the Roman army was following along the route he determined, now came to Crassus and told the general that he would ride out ahead with his forces and cause disruption among the enemy and rode off, disappearing from the plain with his cavalry troops (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 383}). Crassus was thus heading straight
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into the trap. Still heedful of the Arabs words that the Parthians were in flight Crassus was desperate to catch up with his enemy and Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 383}) accounts that he marched his soldiers at cavalry pace. The description of the legionnaire with his heavy shield, arms and armour, gives an idea of cumbersome weight they carried. He was now forced to march at a faster pace through difficult sandy terrain and the summer heat of Mesopotamia. It must have been a difficult and taxing task for even the toughest of soldiers. While on the march, the scouts Crassus sent out returned with terrifying news; they ran into the Parthian advance guard and suffered many casualties. This must have come as a great shock to Crassus who had up to now still thought that the Parthian army was in flight. Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 386}) tells us that Crassus was so shocked in hearing the news that he was frightened out of his senses and that he drew up his army in haste and no great consistency. This was the first news Crassus received that the enemy was not fleeing before his army, as he expected, but was fully mobilized and ready to do battle. The scouts reported that the enemy was coming up to fight with a large force and great confidence (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 386}). When Crassus finally decided on a formation he arranged his troops in a defensive square, with each side supported by a cavalry contingent and continued the advance until they reached the Balissus stream. The men were delighted to finally reach water in the desolate country. Some of the officers advised Crassus to camp and rest the men but he decided to keep moving. The men were ordered to eat and drink where they stood in the defensive formation and then continued the march to meet the enemy (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 385-386}).

Surenas out-manoeuvers Crassus When the Crassus forces finally came into sight of the Parthians, the enemy did not appear to be as vast or as heavily armed as the scouts had made out. Plutarch gives the reason for this as Surenas using his vanguard as a screening force of the main army. He also ordered his cataphracts to cover their armour with skins and robes, creating the images that they were
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lightly armoured (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 387}). Surenas had thus created false confidence among the Romans that the Parthian army he now faced were fewer in number and were lacking in heavy cavalry support. Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 387}) tells us that Surenas planned to charge the Romans with his cataphracts and break their formations and throw their front ranks into confusion but when Surenas saw the depth of the infantry he decided against a headlong charge. In the authors opinion, this is just Plutarchs lack of understanding of Pathian tactics. Surenas would surely have known the number of the Roman soldiers and could surely not have hoped that a mere 1 000 cataphracts could break their front ranks. The answer lies in Surenas creating the impression that he had much fewer troops than he really did. The conventional tactic of the time, when an opposing army had a large cavalry force, was to extend ones own line and keep them from out flanking your troops. This tactic is evident when Cassius advised Crassus to extend the line by thinning out the troops, and thus keep the Roman army from being surrounded (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 385}). The Romans under the false understanding that the Pathians were fewer in number would have shortened the frontline and deepened their formation to easier punch through the enemy force. Plutarch hints to this when he mentions the extreme depth of the Roman army (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 389}). Surenas had shown his brilliance as a general; by creating the false impression of a smaller force, he tricked Crassus to shorten his line, so that the Parthian horse archers could easier surround the Romans. Surenas gave the order and the Parthians gave a terrible war cry, beating on drums and ringing bells. The sound of 10 000 men roaring all at once along with the drums and bells must have been terrifying to the Romans. Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 388}) gives the following description of the effects of this psychological warfare: They (the Parthians) had rightly judged that, of all the senses, hearing is the one most apt to confound the soul, soonest rouses its emotions, and most effectively unseats the judgement. At the same time the cataphracts threw off the blankets and skins, exposing their glittering armour. In the moment of shock the Romans experienced during the noise of the drums and bells and the sudden realisation that the army was larger than they had thought, the light
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horse archers suddenly broke ranks and outflanked them and before Crassus forces could react, the Parthians had completely surrounded them. Crassus, realising his army was being outflanked, sent his light troops to counter the enemy action, but these were met with a hail of arrows and driven back to the safety of the main force (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 389}). With their enemy completely surrounded, the Parthians rained down volley after volley of arrows upon them. The arrows were causing great casualties among the Roman while the stood in their ranks and Plutarch notes that the Parthians did not even have to take aim, but shot arrows at random into the ranks, because of the number of the soldiers it was hard to miss. The legionnaires who attempted to close with the enemy achieved nothing, for as soon as they broke ranks and made a charge towards the enemy, the horse archers turned and rode away, but still firing arrows over the rumps of their horses, using their famous Parthian Shot. Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 390}) gives the following account of these events: ...for if they kept their ranks, they were wounded in great numbers, and if they tried to come to close quarters with the enemy, they were just as far from effecting anything and suffered just as much. For the Parthians shot as they fled... it is a very cleaver thing to seek safety while still fighting and to take away the shame of flight. We know that the horse archers numbered 9 000 and that the Roman army was approximately 40 000 men. Therefore the horse archers were a quarter of their strength and as soon as the battle was engaged they rode around the flanks and surrounded the Romans. Because of their fewer numbers, to have surrounded the enemy meant their ranks were thinly spread which gave them ample of room to use their bows and also meant that all 9 000 could shoot at once. To base their archery skill on that of Lajos Kassai, it would be reasonable to assume that each archer could shoot nine arrows in 18 seconds. There would be even less skill needed because unlike Kassai, the Parthians did not need to take aim because of the mass of Roman soldiers and they were mostly stationary unless there was an attempt to charge them. This meant that the Romans could face up to 81 000 arrows in 18 seconds. Even if we double the time and half the amount of arrows due to unforeseen events during the battle, it meant that the Romans had to endure 40 500 arrows in just over
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30 seconds. Examples of Scythian quivers, such as the Urumqui held up to 60 arrows, meaning that 9 000 horse archers could carried 540 000 arrows (Man 2006: 129). Even if this number is halved to 30 arrows per archer (which is a low number for a warrior whos main arm was the bow), it meant that the Romans were bombarded by 270 000 arrows before their quivers were empty. The Roman could not come to grips with the highly mobile force and thus were pinned down until the Parthians had emptied their quivers. Here again, Surenas proved himself to be a remarkable general. Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 390}) tells of how the Parthians were constantly resupplied with arrows from a baggage train of camels, carrying spare ammunition. The horse archers could thus just ride a short distance and refill their quiver and rejoin their comrades and keep the Romans under a constant barrage of arrows.

Publius desperate charge Crassus must at this point have realised the desperate situation and ordered his son Publius, to lead a charge against the Parthians in the hopes of creating a respite for the army. Publius took with him 1 300 horse, of whom 1 000 were the elite Gallic troops sent by Caesar, eight cohorts of legionnaires (roughly 4 000 men) and 500 archers (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 391}). The legionnaire as we have seen could not come to grips with the horse archers and Publius must have attempted to chase down the light horsemen, force an engagement and hold them long enough for the legionnaires to arrive to join the battle. As we have seen the Parthian horse archers tactics was to avoid close quarters combat and turned and fled when the enemy came too close, which is exactly what happened. As soon as Publius force broke from the main army, the horse archers retreated and lured Publius and his men further away from the relative safety of their main force. The Romans, having mistaken the Parthians to be in route, set after to press home their victory. As soon as they were out of reach from the main army, the horse archers, now joined by the cataphracts, suddenly swung around and encircled the small force of Publius. Publius now hard pressed by the enemy sent for aid from his father, but Crassus and his army were under too much pressure from the Parthians and could not send aid. They shot volley after volley into the Roman ranks, still refusing to engage them hand to hand. Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans.
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Perrin 1923: 393}) remarks on the suffering of those of Publius troops, struck by the Parthian arrows: ... (the Romans) were shot, and died no easy nor even speedy death. For, in the agonies of convulsive pain, and writhing about the arrows, they would break them off in the wounds, and then in trying to pull out by force the barbed heads which had pierced their veins and sinews, they tore and disfigured themselves the more. Publius seeing the difficulty his men were in, tried to encourage his troops to charge the enemy cataphracts, but many showed him their wounds, their shields riveted to their arms and their feet nailed to the ground, making them unable to continue fighting or able to flee from their foes. Publius then gathered his cavalry and led a desperate charge against the enemy and clashed with the cataphracts and a vicious cavalry battle ensued (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 392-394}). The Romans were outclassed, even the best of Publius cavalry, the Gauls were found wanting against the iron clad horsemen. According to Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 395}) their light spears could not penetrate the armour of the cataphracts but they still fought bravely, leaping from their horses and rolled under the enemies mounts and stabbed at the unprotected bellies of the horses, who then threw their riders to the ground. Others grabbed the lances of the enemy with both hands and wrestled them to the ground. During the battle Publius was wounded but Plutarch fails to mention how. Despite their gallant acts, exhausted and suffering from the heat and thirst, the Roman cavalry were forced to withdraw and fall back on their infantry. The survivors, too far from the main army, now fell back to a hill close by for their last stand. Publius, noble to the end, refused to abandon his men, asked his shield bearer to help him end his life. Most of the officers followed his example. The men who remained fought on to the end, until a cataphract charge broke the last of the defenders. Of the army of 5 000 men, no more than 500 were taken prisoner, the rest all perished, run through by lances or felled by arrows. Publius head was cut from his body, impaled upon a pike and accompanied the Parthians back to their main force, where they had Crassus surrounded (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 396-397}).

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Horse Archer performing the Parthian Shot (Courtesy of Johnny Shumate)

Crassus impossible choice Of these events Crassus had no knowledge as of yet. The cavalry battle occurred beyond the sight of the main army. Crassus in fact thought that the charge by Publius was successful. His own army was under less pressure from the Parthians who were either being chased by Publius or riding after him, including the cataphracts to support their own troops. Crassus now used his opportunity of this small respite to march his army to a small hill close by, awaiting his sons return. Before Publius perished, he sent for aid from his father. This was the first news Crassus received concerning the danger Publius was in. Crassus was now left with the difficult choice; risk the entire army and send aid to his son, or abandon him to his fate. Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 398}) states that the decision he had to make weighed heavily upon him and after lost his calm and could not make any sound judgment. At last he decided to take the army, abandon the safety of the hill and marched to aid Publius. The Parthian army that annihilated the troops of Publius, now returned, raising triumphant war cries. Travelling before the army, impaled upon a pike, was the severed head of young Publius. The Romans were demoralized when they saw the ghastly trophy the Parthians
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paraded up and down the Roman line. They had lost the best of the cavalry and many brave officers and men on who they relied on to drive off the Parthians. The hope to still snatch victory from this dire of situations must now have completely disappeared (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 399}). Crassus tried to encourage his men with a speech and beseeched them to raise a battle cry but he discovered that they were far from eager to do battle and that their battle cry could not match that of the Parthians who they still outnumbered (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 399}). The hours of arrow hail, the heat of the Mesopotamian desert and the terrible fate of Publius and his men, had driven their morale to its limits. The Roman army had suffered a terrible defeat. The Parthian horse archers now rode around the flanks and behind the Romans raining arrows down on them while any who broke from the formation and attempted to charge the enemy where driven back by the cataphracts, suffering heavy casualties. The killing did not stop until nightfall, when the Parthians finally withdrew. They gave Crassus the night to mourn his son and offered peace if he would surrender to their king Orodes (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 402}).

The Roman Armys Night Escape

The pleas of the wounded and the town of Carrhae Nightfall gave the Romans no respite from the horrors of war, for when the Parthians withdrew, the sounds of battle were replaced by the cries of the many wounded and dying. Crassus, at the loss of his son and the impending doom of his army was in such a state that he was no longer fit to command. When Cassius and Octavius, two of the legates, tried to encourage him to take lead of his army on what action to take, they failed. They then called all the officers together to deliberate what to do next. From this council it was decided to abandon the wounded and by cover of night escape from their foes. When the wounded however came to realise the plan, they pleaded with their comrades not to leave them and gave loud cries and which surely alerted the enemy of what was happening. The night march was difficult and the army often lost its way and had to find their way back to their
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original route. Others were detached from the main force and never found their way back. The darkness and the wounded who could accompany them slowed them down. Three hundred horse under the command of a certain Ignatius, made it to the town of Carrhae and announced that there had been a great battle between the forces of Crassus and the Parthians. Without saying anymore they rode off to Zeugma, thus escaping with their lives. The commander of Carrhae then rode out in search of the Roman army and when he reached them, escorted them back to the Roman held town (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 403-405}). The following morning the Parthians rode out to where the Roman army left their wounded and slaughtered those still alive. Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 406}) gave the number killed at 4 000. The four cohorts who lost their way during the night, too, were hunted down and slain. Only twenty of them escaped with their lives. These fought so bravely that the Parthians, admiring their courage, gave them safe passage to Carrhae.

The Roman Attempt to Escape to Syria

The army divided and the desperate flight west When Surenas learned that Crassus was occupying Carrhae with what remained of his army, he sent word that he wanted to arrange a truce. The Romans, not trusting the words of Surenas decided on yet another night march, hoping to escape to Syria. What remained of the Roman army was divided into groups. How many is uncertain but at least three is known; that lead by Crassus, another by Cassius and lastly the group led by Octavius. Splitting up the army and each taking a different route to Syria, would distract the Parthians and seemed the most logical solution (Sampson 2006: 139). According to Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 409}), when the armies set out from Carrhae, Crassus and the group he headed, was guided by yet another Parthian informer by the name of Andromachs. The guide led Crassus into marshes and many began suspecting him of treachery. Crassus too lost faith in his guide and rerouted back to Carrhae, but left soon after his arrival. It seems he followed the same or a similar route as the army of Octavius, for when Crassus finally came in sight of the safety of the mountains of Sinnaca,
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Octavius had already taken up position there. Octavius from his vantage point in the higher ground could see that the Parthians were in hot pursuit behind Crassus. He now led his 5 000 men down the mountains against the Parthian to save Crassus from his pursuers. They managed to drive the Parthians off and took their position around Crassus (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 410-411}).

Surenas total victory and the death of Crassus Surenas had defeated the Roman army but to crown his victory he needed to take Crassus dead or alive. If Crassus made it into the hills of Sinnaca, Surenas army, consisting of only cavalry, would not be able to operate in the rough terrain and Crassus would be able to escape. His forces had already been repulsed once by the Romans and Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 410-411}) states that the Parthians were already less impetuous in their attacks. The previous days fighting must have tired them out as well. Surenas thus needed to act fast. He sent out an embassy to Crassus, offering peace on condition that Rome was to withdraw from Mesopotamia and abandon all claim east of the Euphrates. Surenas has demonstrated his skill on the battlefield but now demonstrated his skill in deceit. He returned to Crassus some of the Roman soldiers he had taken prisoner, but not before he had them overhear his soldiers speak of how King Orodes had no wish to continue the war with Rome, but wanted peace between the two nations. This false information they took to Crassus on their return. The reason for this was for Crassus to have more faith in Surenas proposal (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 412}). Crassus had little faith in what the Parthians proposed but his men urged him to accept. Crassus replied in turn that if they could hold their position until nightfall, they could escape into the mountain and from there to safety. His men, tired of their suffering and in their eagerness to save their lives now got angry with their general and with threats of mutiny and violence, they forced him to accept a meeting with Surenas. The meeting was thus arranged for the two generals to meet face to face but before Crassus left, Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 413}) tells us what he told his fellow officers about the actions of his soldiers:

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...but tell the world, if ye get safely home, that Crassus perished because he was deceived by his enemies, and not because he was delivered up to them by his countrymen If what Plutarch says is true, Crassuss final wish was not granted for the account was taken down by the ancient historian. Cassus, accompanied by Octavius and Pretonius along with some other officers, went down on foot, according to Roman custom to meet Surenas. The Pathian general however was mounted, according to Parthian custom. Surenas said that there would now be peace between the two nations but that a formal treaty had to be signed and this had to take place at the Euphrates. He brought a horse for Crassus but as soon as he was mounted, the grooms who accompanied the horse attempted to rush him away to the Parthian lines. Octavius seized the reins and a scuffle ensued in which Crassus and his party were slain. Thus ended the life of Marcus Licinius Crassus and with him, the dream of conquering the east (Plutarch, Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 416-417}). Crassus last act Surenas victory was complete. The Roman army was destroyed except for a handful of soldiers who escaped through the mountains. He had won a resounding victory over Rome and at his feet, lay the very man who sought to conquer his homeland. The Roman Imperator was decapitated and his head sent to King Orodes who was residing in Armenia, after he reduced the Armenia back to a vassal state of Parthia. The severed head arrived while Orodes was watching the performance of a play of the Bacchae. Plutarch (Life of Crassus {trans. Perrin 1923: 422}) claims that the head was cast onto the stage and picked up by the actor reciting his lines from the play: We bring from the mountain A tendril of fresh-cut to the palace, A wonderful prey Crassus had lost his war with Parthia and with it his life and the lives of thousands of his men. The richest man in Rome and a member of the Triumvirate ended up as a mere prop in

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a play. His invasion and arrogance, along with his hopes of glory, had led to one of the worst disasters ever suffered by Rome in the field.

Experimental Archaeology Roman Armour vs the Parthian Arrow

As we have seen, the main fighter of the Parthians, was the horse archer. During the battle the cataphracts played a rather small role and it can thus be concluded that the lions share of casualties were inflicted by these mobile bowmen. Beside the shield, the Roman Legionnaire relied primarily upon his Lorica Hamata or chainmail armour for defence. As mentioned before, chain-mail or hamata gives brilliant defence against sword strokes. The hamata is flexible and absorbs the blow of a cutting instrument by spreading the impact across the interlinked rings which pull together and reinforce each other upon impact. The author has first-hand experience of this due to his participation in the 2007 and 2008 national European Martial Arts tournaments, where live steel swords were used and the author clad in chain-mail armour. Other than suffering bruises, the cuts delivered never broke through the armour. It is therefore understandable that the legions of Caesar were so successful against the Gallic tribes, whose main weapon was the slashing long sword; their armour was perfectly suited to deal with the cuts delivered from these wild warriors.

Left: Shoulder doublings to re-enforce protection of the upper region of the soldier from downward strokes. Right: Reconstruction of Roman Lorca Hamata vest (Authors collection)

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The author turned to experimental archaeology to test how the hamata would fare against arrows shot from a recurve bow. The author reconstructed mail of a four-in-one weave pattern popular throughout European history and the same pattern used by the Romans
(Simkins 2000: 21). Roman period hamata finds are very rare and the few versions that have

been found, have suffered the test of time and are little more than corroded metal lumps. This makes it hard to establish the exact construction of the hamata. Most finds cannot be determined if it is butted or riveted mail. The authors reconstruction is butted mail, meaning the ends of the rings were not flattened and then riveted. Riveted mail is difficult to construct and requires specialized tools and this is the reason for the use of butted mail in this experiment. It appears that most Roman period mail was riveted but some examples are butted. This includes the Roman shirt found at Maiden Castle, Dorset (Counts 2011: 01). Other butted mail examples are primarily of Celtic origins such as the Tiefenau shirt from Switzerland (Counts 2011: 01). It should be noted that riveted mail is stronger than butted versions and would probably have been worn by Crassus troops. Because of the use of butted mail, it must not be seen as a fully accurate analysis. The experiment is more to help demonstrate the weakness in mail armour against arrow fire and why the Romans found their type of armour wanting when they faced the Parthians at Carrhae. For a bow the author used a Kassai Buzzard recurve horse bow, made by Lajos Kassai himself and is similar to that used by the Parthians. Modern reproductions of the Yrzi bow suggest that it had a draw weight (the joules of energy produced by the bow) of 30 kg / 66 pounds (Mc Donnell-Stall 2009: 20). Because of the deteriorated condition of the bow, the exact draw weight cannot be established. The author had thus decided to lower the draw weight of the bow used in the test to 25 kg, for his experiment to have a safer conclusion.

Kassai Buzzard Recurve (Authors collection)

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A piece of chainmail was draped over an arrow-butt, making sure it hangs loosely and not pinned down, allowing for the mail to retain its flexibility. Arrows were shot at the target at several distances from 10 30 m. The results were rewarding; time and time again the arrows pierced the piece of mail with the greatest of ease. At 30 m the arrow punched through the mail and still penetrated through 8 cm of compacted cardboard boxes. From the experiment it is reasonable to assume that the Parthian bows used at Carrhae could thus just as easily punch through Roman hamata even if riveted.

Left: The piece of hamata draped over the arrow-but Right: hamata pierced by arrow

Mail rings broken by of arrow penetration

Even though the hamata served well against sword strokes its weakness was clearly pierce attacks such as arrows. The surface area of the arrow point is very small unlike that of a sword blade. All the kinetic energy stored in the arrow when released from the bow is thus focused in the small surface area of the arrow head once it hits its target. This impact is not spread across the surface of the hamata but is focused on a very small area, exploiting the weakness of individual rings. The individual rings of the mail are not strong enough to withstand this force and breaks, allowing the arrow to pierce through the armour and into the flesh of the wearer.
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It is thus clear that the bow and arrow played an important part in the defeat of Rome at Carrhae. Before Parthia, none of Romes enemies used the bow as a main arm during war. Even when bows were used previously, they were far lacking in power compared to those used by Parthia at Carrhae. It is however important to note that experimental archaeology is not an exact science and should never be treated as such. It is but a hypothesis of how it could have been. There is unfortunately too much that we lack in knowledge and information and too much of past events which is unaccounted for, for it to ever be an exact science. It is meant to give a glimpse of the past, never the full story.

Conclusion:
From the study made of the Battle of Carrhae, the arms and tactics used on both sides, the cultural elements and the events leading up to the war, it becomes clear that the Romans were not simply defeated due to one or two factors but that there were many factors that played different parts in Romes defeat. When these factors were combined they led to the annihilation of the Roman army at Carrhae. In Crassus, Rome had an over confident commander who severely underestimated the enemy. Unlike his partners Pompey and Caesar, Crassus did not have a military reputation. From what we read in Plutarch, the military decisions he made were often hesitant, flawed and were constantly advised against by his younger military staff. He also refused the advice and aid of the Armenian king who knew the Parthian tactics and strength. It is clear that Crassus had little knowledge of his enemy. His forces were completely unprepared to face the forces of Parthia. Their cavalry were far too few in number to effectively serve as a counter to the Parthian horse and too few missile troops to help ward off the enemy light cavalry. Crassuss intelligence was untrustworthy and his army was led into a trap through deceit. Surenas on the other hand was a brilliant general. It was under his leadership that the western territories, taken by Mithradates III were recaptured. He used intelligence and counter intelligence to keep track of the Roman armys movement. He used his spies and agents to lure the Romans onto a desert plain, away from their supply lines and onto open ground where the Romans were at a severe disadvantage against the Parthian cavalry. He
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understood the weakness of Roman infantry against his horse archers and exploited this with brilliance, such as the camel train of extra supply arrows and the hit and run tactics, never allowing the Romans to close with their enemy. We have also seen how asymmetrical warfare and the arms and equipments of the opposing forces played a role in Romes defeat. Where the Roman Legion was superior to any other infantry or close combat troops, they had no answer to the tactics and weapons which the Parthian horse archer brought to the field of battle. Roman legionnaires swords were deadly in the clash between two enemy lines but it was of little use against an enemy who fought from 30 m away. Their throwing spears could not match the range of the composite recurve bow and the Romans could not fight what they could not catch. As the author demonstrated, the Roman hamata armour had a clear weakness against arrows. The Roman arms, armour and tactics was not suited for the Battle of Carrhae. We also looked at the cultural elements which played a role in the battle. While Rome followed a policy of always advancing upon the enemy, seeing retreat as a form of defeat, Parthia on the other hand was able to retreat in the wake of the enemy as a military tactic. We have seen how the Pathians used this tactic, abandoning Mesopotamia to the Romans and retreating until the moment served them best to strike at the enemy. It allowed them to lure the enemy away from their supply line, the safety of the river and onto a desolate plain which favoured the Parthian cavalry. When all these elements are combine it becomes clear why the invincible armies of Rome suffered such a major defeat at Carrhae. In Parthia, Rome found a new worthy enemy whose ways of waging war and cultural influence were so vastly different, that neither could obtain the upper hand. For three centuries Parthia was Romes nemesis. Rome had met for the first time in her history an enemy it could not conquer. In Parthia, a second Iranian Empire emerged on the world stage and the Arsacid dynasty can be seen as the heirs of the Achaemenid Empire. They adopted many cultural practices and political systems from the Ancient Persians. This included the title of King of Kings and the Zoroastrianism as their new religion (Yarshater 2006: 684, 867). The Parthian Empire eventually crumbled from within during the third century AD and was replaced by the Sassanid Empire who continued the fight against Rome and the seemingly endless struggle between East and West. The
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Battle of Carrhae had destroyed the myth of an invincible Rome and it confirmed Parthia as a super-power of the Ancient World.

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Wilcox, P. 1986. Romes Enemies: Partians & Sassanid Persians. Men-At-Arms Series; 175. New York; Osprey Publishing. Yarshater, E. (ed) 2006. Cambridge history of Iran: The Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanian periods. Volume 3. 4th edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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