648714

research-article2016
SREXXX10.1177/2332649216648714Sociology of Race and EthnicityArmenta

The Racial State and Policing in the United States

Sociology of Race and Ethnicity

Racializing Crimmigration:
2017, Vol. 3(1) 82­–95
© American Sociological Association 2016
DOI: 10.1177/2332649216648714

Structural Racism, sre.sagepub.com

Colorblindness, and the

Institutional Production of
Immigrant Criminality

Amada Armenta1

Abstract
Deporting “criminal aliens” has become the highest priority in American immigration enforcement.
Today, most deportations are achieved through the “crimmigration” system, a term that describes the
convergence of the criminal justice and immigration enforcement systems. Emerging research argues
that U.S. immigration enforcement is a “racial project” that subordinates and racializes Latino residents
in the United States. This article examines the role of local law enforcement agencies in the racialization
process by focusing on the techniques and logics that drive law enforcement practices across two
agencies, I argue that local law enforcement agents racialize Latinos by punishing illegality through their
daily, and sometimes mundane, practices. Investigatory traffic stops put Latinos at disproportionate risk
of arrest and citation, and processing at the local jail subjects unauthorized immigrants to deportation.
Although a variety of local actors sustain the deportation system, most do not see themselves as
active participants in immigrant removal and they explain their behavior through a colorblind ideology.
This colorblind ideology obscures and naturalizes how organizational practices and laws converge to
systematically criminalize and punish Latinos in the United States.

Keywords
crimmigration, immigration enforcement, racism, Latinos, police, criminal justice

A defining feature of contemporary immigration contemporary United States, policies that prioritize
enforcement around the world is its complexity, deporting “criminal aliens” justify an immigration
encompassing multiple levels of government, public enforcement system that extends into jails and across
and private institutions, and individual actors in any local law enforcement agencies.
given country. Immigration enforcement is no longer Latinos overwhelmingly bear the burden of these
limited to apprehending prospective migrants along immigration control efforts.1 Nearly 80 percent of
physical borders; instead, new technologies and penal unauthorized immigrants in the United States are
interventions manage noncitizens within national ter-
1
ritories (Aas and Bosworth 2013). The most salient University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
new development in immigration enforcement has
Corresponding Author:
been the emergence of the so-called crimmigration Amada Armenta, University of Pennsylvania, 113 McNeil
system, in which the immigration enforcement sys- Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104,
tem is integrated with the day-to-day operations of the USA.
criminal justice system (Stumpf 2006). In the Email: [email protected]
Armenta 83

Mexican or Central American, and the majority of promote racial hierarchies around citizenship and
Mexican and Central American immigrants residing belonging. However, despite the racist origins of U.S.
in the United States are undocumented (Massey and immigration policy and the overrepresentation of
Pren 2012). Recognizing that immigration enforce- Latinos in deportation statistics, much research on
ment has become increasingly punitive, emerging immigration enforcement fails to incorporate theoret-
research argues that restrictive immigration policies ical perspectives on race and racialization (Garner
are the primary mechanism through which Latinos 2015; Sáenz and Douglas 2015; Sanchez and Romero
are excluded and racialized in the United States 2010; Treitler 2015). In quantitative research, for
(Aranda and Vaquera 2015; Golash-Boza and example, it is not uncommon for scholars to argue
Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013; Massey and Pren 2012; that race effects are actually citizenship effects, driven
Massey 2014a, 2014b; Provine and Doty 2011; by punitiveness toward noncitizens (Light 2014;
Romero 2006).2 Much of this research emphasizes Light, Massoglia, and King 2014). This is also largely
the central role of U.S. immigration policy in mak- true of European scholarship, which tends to tie
ing Latinos “illegal,” criminalizing “illegality,” and immigration enforcement and exclusion to a lack of
marking Latinos as a racialized group near the bot- formal citizenship rather than racism (Aas and
tom of the American stratification system (De Bosworth 2013). In these formulations, the burdens of
Genova 2004; Massey and Pren 2012; Massey immigration enforcement are linked to immigrants’
2014a, 2014b; Provine and Doty 2011). legal status, with only implicit acknowledgement that
This article extends the literature on the racializa- “access to citizenship, enjoying full rights, and being
tion of Latinos by examining the role of local law considered an unproblematic part of the imagined
enforcement agencies in the production and punish- nation” are highly racialized (Garner 2015:201).
ment of “illegality.” My goal is to move beyond a This article answers recent calls by scholars to
description of broad general trends in immigration racialize studies of immigration and immigration
law to consider the on-the-ground processes that enforcement by prioritizing race and racism as core
criminalize Latinos and channel them into the immi- concerns (Douglas, Sáenz, and Murga 2015;
gration enforcement system. I examine immigration Garner 2015; Sáenz and Douglas 2015). To do this,
control “from the bottom up,” arguing that the power I situate my study in the theoretical formulations of
of the state emerges through the daily practices of a variety of critical race scholars who emphasize
institutional actors that form part of the crimmigration structural and systemic theories of racism (Bonilla-
system (Gravelle, Ellermann, and Dauvergne 2012). Silva 1997, 2015; Feagin 2013; Goldberg 2002;
I draw on two years of qualitative fieldwork in Omi and Winant 2014). This work rejects lay con-
Nashville, Tennessee, to argue that local law ceptions of racism as a problem rooted only in indi-
enforcement agents racialize Latinos and punish vidual racial prejudice, instead arguing that racism
illegality through their daily practices. I focus on is embedded in the political, economic, social, and
the techniques and logics that drive law enforce- legal structures of society (Bonilla-Silva 1997;
ment practices across two agencies and show that, Omi and Winant 2014). Racial inequalities are
acting according to the priorities of their respective institutionalized and systemic, a result of laws and
institutions, street-level officers punish Latinos and organizational practices that often appear to be
reinforce their construction as “criminal aliens.” race-neutral (Bonilla-Silva 1997, 2015; Feagin
This meso-level institutional approach makes clear 2014; Goldberg 2002). Ultimately, these laws, poli-
that Latinos’ vulnerability to deportation does not cies, and institutional practices generate and reify
stem from federal immigration policy alone; rather, ideas about racial difference, contributing to pro-
a system of state laws and local law enforcement cesses of racialization (Bonilla-Silva 1997, 2015;
practices converge to reinforce Latinos’ subordinate Feagin 2013; Omi and Winant 2014).
status in the racial hierarchy. A key feature of this “new” racism is that it often
appears to be nonracial and is passively sustained
by individuals who may lack conscious discrimina-
Racism, Immigration tory intent (Bonilla-Silva 2010). Thus, individuals
deploy colorblind arguments to produce, maintain,
Enforcement, and the and rationalize racial inequality (Bonilla-Silva
Criminal Justice System 2010). According to Bonilla-Silva (2010), people
According to Goldberg (2002), all modern nation- use four frames of colorblind ideology to explain
states are “racial states” that use immigration controls, racial inequality: abstract liberalism, naturalization,
laws, bureaucracy, and government technologies to cultural racism, and minimization. In this paper, I
84 Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 3(1)

focus on the colorblind frame of naturalization, in and the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office (DCSO),
which people explain racial inequality as the “natu- because both institutions play crucial roles in
ral” result of the way things are. Nashville’s crimmigration system. Nashville is an
My study is not the first to link immigration appropriate site for this study given the dramatic
enforcement to structural and systemic racism. For growth of its Latino immigrant population and its
example, both Provine and Doty (2011) and Aranda early adoption of the 287(g) program, a federal initia-
and Vaquera (2015) describe immigration enforce- tive to devolve immigration enforcement authority to
ment as a “racial project,” a set of state practices nonfederal police. Although Davidson County’s
and structures that create ideas about racial differ- 287(g) program has since been replaced by new fed-
ence, thereby sustaining racialized practices (see eral initiatives, federal immigration enforcement
Omi and Winant 2014). Golash-Boza and strategies continue to prioritize local jails as sites of
Hondagneu-Sotelo (2013) call the modern immi- immigration control.
gration enforcement regime a gendered racial Between January 2009 and September 2010, I
removal program, arguing that changes in federal lived in Nashville to conduct fieldwork. I con-
immigration law and administrative enforcement ducted ethnographic observations at Latino com-
priorities target working-class Latino men. Massey munity events sponsored by or attended by law
and Pren (2012) link the immigration enforcement enforcement. This included events hosted by the
regime to the creation of a new Latino underclass. Mexican consulate, community health fairs, com-
Although each of these studies identifies local munity policing fairs, cultural festivals, and com-
law enforcement agencies as important actors in the munity policing meetings. I also conducted more
immigration enforcement system, their analyses do than 120 hours of police ride-alongs with officers
not center around understanding law enforcement in Nashville’s South Precinct, where the majority
practices. For that reason, the mechanisms through of Latino residents in Nashville have settled. Ride-
which local agencies encounter and punish Latinos alongs began in the precinct roll call room, where a
is not clear. For example, Aranda and Vaquera lieutenant (whoever was on duty) would assign me
(2015) rely on reports from immigrant young adults to a police officer and instruct officers about how to
who describe how family members’ contact with direct their enforcement priorities. Ride-alongs
the police resulted in their family members’ depor- ended when officers returned their cars at the end
tations to argue that the police racially profile of the shift. I rode with one officer at a time but
Latinos. Although this assertion suggests that immi- interacted with numerous officers during each shift
gration enforcement is sustained through deliber- through participation in roll call, answering calls
ately racist officers who choose to stop and arrest for service, and taking meal breaks. I used these
Latinos to trigger their deportation, I argue instead opportunities to conduct field interviews with offi-
that these practices are a result of institutionalized cers about their experiences. After each ride-along,
policies (see Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider- which spanned between 6 and 11 hours, I recorded
Markel 2014). This perspective is critical, because my observations as field notes.
uncovering the “behaviors, styles, cultural affecta- It would be naïve to suggest that I ever achieved
tions, traditions, and organizational procedures” insider status or that my presence did not affect offi-
that reproduce racial domination is key to under- cer behavior. The overwhelming majority of patrol
standing racism (Bonilla-Silva 2015:75). officers in the South Precinct are white men in their
twenties, and I am a Mexican-American woman,
also in my twenties at the time that this research was
Methods conducted. Rather than consider officer reactivity
This study goes “inside the state” by documenting an obstacle, however, I draw from Herbert (2010),
how local law enforcement agencies contribute to the who argues that officers’ responses to fieldworkers
practice of immigration enforcement. Anthropologist should be treated as data. Most patrol officers
Laura Nader (1972) argued that ethnographers assumed I was studying to work in the 911 call cen-
should “study up” to understand how bureaucracies ter. Twice I was confused for a Hispanic detective
and organizations function. One method of studying who works in another precinct. Occasionally offi-
up is institutional ethnography, which provides cers thought I was married to one of the three Latino
insight into the processes and rationales by which officers who worked in the South Precinct. I told
institutional actors exercise power (Smith 1987). I officers that I was a graduate student interested in
draw from these approaches to examine the understanding how they did their jobs in a diverse
Metropolitan Nashville Police Department (MNPD) area like the South Precinct. This garnered
Armenta 85

sympathy, and some officers volunteered to answer immigration in Nashville. These additional data
questions and promised to “get into things” so that I sources allowed me to triangulate data from my eth-
would have more to write about. When officers nographic observations and interviews and provided
realized I spoke Spanish, they responded enthusias- additional local context.
tically about the possibility of using me to translate.
Although a few officers were guarded in my pres-
ence, others felt comfortable enough to voice their Formal Law and Policy:
political beliefs, insult their superiors, use deroga-
tory and scatological humor, and insult civilians
Organizing Immigrant
who called them for help. Thus, while I cannot iden- Illegalities in Nashville
tify exactly how my presence might have affected In the late 1990s, Latino immigration to the southern
officers’ behaviors, like Monahan and Fisher (2010) United States exploded, as immigrants arrived to cit-
I believe that informants’ performances, however ies and towns across the region (Marrow 2011;
affected, offer crucial insights into how they see Massey 2008; Winders 2013; Zúñiga and Hernández-
themselves and how they want to be seen. Therefore, Leon 2005). At first, this migration was largely
I consider these observations alongside other data to domestic, consisting of Mexican men already resid-
make sense of urban policing in Nashville. ing in the United States who were pulled to the
This paper also draws from 21 in-depth inter- South by promises of employment in growing con-
views with law enforcement personnel, including struction, manufacturing, and service industries
those with police administrators (n = 6) and employ- (Johnson-Webb 2003; Smith and Winders 2008;
ees of the DCSO (n = 15). Interviews with police Zúñiga and Hernández-Leon 2005). These domestic
administrators addressed the department’s policing arrivals were quickly joined by an international flow
strategies, bureaucratic priorities, and policies and consisting of men, women, and children from
practices with respect to driver’s license violations. Mexico and, later, Central America (Winders 2006).
Interviews with sheriff’s deputies addressed 287(g) Between 1990 and 2000, Nashville’s Latino popu-
processing and asked deputies to reflect on their lation grew by 446 percent, with Mexicans compris-
experiences participating in the program. All inter- ing the majority of the growth (U.S. Census Bureau
views, which ranged in length between 45 minutes 2011). In 2000, about 27,000 (5 percent) of Nashville’s
and 2½ hours, were audio-recorded and subsequently 570,000 residents were Latino (U.S. Census Bureau
transcribed. In what follows, quotation marks indi- 2001). White residents comprised 67 percent of the
cate when subjects’ words are quoted verbatim; oth- population, and black residents made up about 26 per-
erwise, data are paraphrased. All names in this paper cent of the population (U.S. Census Bureau 2001). By
are pseudonyms. 2010, the city had grown to 601,000 residents, of
My ethnographic field notes and interview tran- whom 10 percent were Latino, 62 percent were white,
scripts yielded hundreds of pages of data, which I and 28 percent were black (U.S. Census Bureau
manually coded for analytic themes. Drawing from 2011). Mexicans and Central Americans comprise
techniques in the grounded theory tradition, I con- almost 80 percent of the city’s Latino population,
ducted open coding, grouped data according to ana- while Puerto Ricans and Cubans comprise 5 percent
lytic themes, and wrote and rewrote memos to sort and 3 percent, respectively. More specifically, 60 per-
and clarify the conceptual categories I identified cent of Nashville’s Latino population is Mexican and
(Glaser and Strauss 1999). Recurrent themes in the 18 percent is Central American (among Central
policing data included proactive policing, investiga- Americans, 28 percent are Guatemalan, 27 percent
tive vehicle stops, “good stats,” driver’s licenses are Honduran, and 37 percent are Salvadoran) (U.S.
and identification documents, misdemeanor state Census Bureau 2011). Thus, in Nashville, the term
citations, and an insistence that police do not par- Hispanic or Latino conjures images of Mexican and
ticipate in immigration enforcement. Themes in the Central American immigrants. As in the rest of the
sheriff’s data included the 287(g) program, the United States, local preoccupation with immigration
police, the classification of risk, and deputies’ views focuses predominantly on these groups.
of themselves as objective and compassionate As numerous scholars have pointed out, a
implementers of immigration law. patchwork of federal, state, and county laws com-
I supplemented qualitative data with public bine to produce locally contingent forms of immi-
records such as state and county documents detailing grant enforcement (Coleman 2012; Varsanyi et al.
policy changes, as well as newspaper articles about 2012). Rather than review the many changes in
policing, the 287(g) program, and unauthorized federal immigration law and administration that
86 Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 3(1)

created the current system of mass deportation, I order-maintenance policing strategy. This approach
focus instead on the state laws and institutional to policing, which originated in New York City,
policies that produce everyday illegalities in stems from the theory that cracking down on minor
Nashville.3 By “everyday illegalities,” I refer spe- forms of disorder deters more serious crimes (Wilson
cifically to the routine ways that laws and institu- and Kelling 1982). This logic propelled the New
tional policies make it impossible for unauthorized York City Police Department to increase its contact
immigrants to act within the law. In the paragraphs with civilians through the pervasive use of “stop-
that follow, I review the formal changes to law and and-frisk” tactics, in which officers stop, question,
policy that comprise the crimmigration system in and search pedestrians to check them for warrants,
Nashville. Although none of these laws and poli- weapons, and drug possession (Gelman, Fagan, and
cies explicitly mention race, they are an example of Kiss 2007). In sprawling, car-based areas like
a racist crimmigration system because they work Nashville, however, police-citizen contact occurs
together to criminalize unauthorized Latino immi- through the deployment of investigative vehicle
grants and produce their deportation. stops, where police identify minor violations in
order to stop cars on the chance that a motorist may
be doing something wrong (Epp et al. 2014).
State Driver’s License Laws As a result of these new bureaucratic priorities,
When Latino immigrants began arriving in Tennessee the number of traffic stops in Nashville dramati-
in the 1990s, all state residents were eligible for state cally increased beginning in 2004, rising steadily
driver’s licenses and identification cards (IDs). This through the mid-2000s. Table 1 illustrates the num-
changed between 1997 and 2001, when eligibility for ber of MNPD traffic stops between 2003 and 2009.
driver’s licenses and IDs became contingent on pro- The data show that traffic stops doubled between
viding one’s social security number.4 As a result, 2003 and 2005, from 126,083 stops in 2003 to
many noncitizens (including unauthorized immi- 269,813 in 2005. To put this rapid escalation in per-
grants, foreign students, and nonimmigrant aliens) spective, in 2007, police averaged about 5,000 traffic
became ineligible for state identity documents and stops a week, more than twice the average number of
driving privileges. In 2001, lawmakers loosened eli- stops in similar-size cities (Howard 2008). As I show
gibility standards by specifying that only applicants in the next section, Latinos are particularly vulnera-
who had social security numbers were required to ble to traffic enforcement. In 2007, about 8 percent of
supply them. In the first two months of expanded eli- all traffic stops resulted in arrests; however, stops
gibility, the Tennessee Department of Safety issued made on Latino drivers led to arrests 29 percent of
nearly 30,000 licenses to noncitizens, the vast major- the time (Howard 2008).
ity of whom were unauthorized Latino residents
(Pulle 2004). In 2004, the Tennessee state legislature
passed Public Chapter 778, which required driver’s Adopting the 287(g) Program in the
license and ID applicants to verify their legal pres- County Jail
ence. Unauthorized immigrants who had obtained Unlike the MNPD, the DCSO does not patrol,
driver’s licenses between 2001 and 2004 could keep answer calls, conduct traffic stops, or make arrests.
them until the documents expired (five years), but The agency’s primary responsibility is the security
they would not be able to renew them. Without driv- and administration of the county jail. In 2007, after
er’s licenses, unauthorized immigrants lost their driv- a notorious drunk driving case involving an unau-
ing privileges as well as legally sanctioned proof of thorized Latino immigrant assailant, the sheriff
their identities. announced that the DCSO would seek authoriza-
tion to participate in an immigration enforcement
program called 287(g). The program allows jail
Police Department Policy employees to screen immigrant arrestees for immi-
The Metropolitan Nashville Police Department is gration violations and process them for deporta-
the primary law enforcement agency in Nashville, tion. Between 2007 and 2011, the DCSO identified
with jurisdiction throughout the county’s 567 square 8,400 immigrants for removal. Almost 80 percent
miles. As state legislators battled over driver’s of those identified for removal were arrested for
license eligibility in the mid-2000s, changes were misdemeanors, and 60 percent were arrested for
also underfoot in the MNPD. In 2004, the traffic violations (Capps et al. 2011). Although the
newly installed MNPD police chief changed the Sheriff’s Office emphasized that deportable immi-
department’s policing priorities by implementing an grants hailed from 61 different countries of origin,
Armenta 87

Table 1.  Metropolitan Nashville Police Department (MNPD) Traffic Stops per Year.

Year Traffic Stops

2003 126,083
2004 218,029
2005 269,813
2006 273,560
2007 260,989
2008 298,989
2009 283,581

Note: Data provided by the MNPD.

more than 98 percent were from Mexico and be “proactive,” a buzzword synonymous with a vari-
Central American countries (DCSO 2009). More ety of order-maintenance policing tactics through
specifically, 71 percent were Mexican, 11.6 percent which they are expected to produce contact with
were Guatemalan, 10 percent were Honduran, and civilians. This is what Lieutenant Lewis reminds
5 percent were Salvadoran (DCSO 2009). officers as he strides into the precinct roll call room,
speaking from the podium. In a stern voice, the lieu-
tenant announces that the group needs to “get their
Immigration Control stats up” because their vehicle stop numbers are
from the Bottom down. “Stats matter,” he tells them. These kinds of
admonitions are constant. According to Officer
In the previous section, I highlighted the local laws
Williams, a white patrol officer in his early twenties,
and policies that are crucial for understanding how
“To the lieutenants there’s no such thing as too many
Latino immigrants are identified for deportation in
stops. The stats make them look good because they
Nashville. In this section, I move from a description
can say, ‘Look at all the work my guys are doing.’”
of the law “on the books” to consider the law “in
Under pressure to meet the department’s expec-
action” (Pound 1910). I focus specifically on how
tations, officers are always on the lookout to make
local law enforcement agents—both on the street
vehicle stops. Some violations, such as speeding or
and in the jail—participate in the local crimmigra-
erratically changing lanes, clearly represent safety
tion system. On the street, Latinos risk getting
issues. For example, when Officer Jones, a white
stopped by local police who have been instructed to
officer in his early twenties, pulled over a sedan
aggressively enforce minor violations. Once in jail,
after the car swerved unexpectedly into an adjacent
Latinos are “criminal aliens” who are punished par-
lane, he did so because he thought the driver might
ticularly harshly. In both examples, local law
be impaired, not because he was looking to make a
enforcement agents contribute to immigrants’ pre-
stop. In contrast, when Officer Phillips pulled over
carious status, enhancing the state’s power to detain
a car for cutting through a parking lot to make a
and punish Latinos. The actors who engage in these
right turn, we had been idling nearby, waiting to
racializing practices, however, insist that they are
stop the first motorist who did something wrong.
colorblind. They describe their behavior as the natu-
These stops are investigative, and officers make
ral result of laws and policies that they must
them because the tactic is supposed to help the offi-
implement.
cers identify guns, weapons, and “criminals.”
In practice, however, officers report that the
most common violations they encounter are driv-
Criminalizing Latinos on the Street:
er’s license violations. For example, after pulling
The Metropolitan Nashville Police over a car for cutting through a parking lot instead
Department of waiting at the intersection to make a right turn,
To understand what motivates police activity in Officer Phillips, a white officer in his early twen-
Nashville, one must understand the pressures that ties, asked the driver for his license. The driver, a
patrol officers experience. Officers must do more young Latino in his early twenties, handed Phillips
than answer calls, take reports, clear accidents, tes- a Mexican driver’s license. “Passport?” Phillips
tify in court, and fill out paperwork. They must also asked. The man shook his head, saying in accented
88 Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 3(1)

English that he did not have one. Phillips asked the where he was born. In fact, Officer Williams was so
driver how long he had lived in Nashville (two convinced he knew the answer (Mexico) that he
years) and returned to the squad car. In the car, began to write it down automatically.
Phillips inspected the Mexican driver’s license, “I was born in Orange County, sir,” said Mr.
twirling it between his fingers and holding it up in Sanchez, having understood the question as a request
the sunlight. “It’s real, isn’t it? It has holograms,” for his county of birth, rather than his country of
said Phillips, handing me the card. He wondered if birth. Williams quickly scratched out what he had
he should give the young man a warning, but tech- written and asked for the name of the city. “Santa
nically, his Mexican driver’s license was not suffi- Ana, California,” said Mr. Sanchez. Officer Williams
cient. Foreign driver’s licenses are supposed to be wrote this down and handed Mr. Sanchez the state
accompanied by a valid passport, which the driver citation, saying, “Make sure you go to court. If you
could not produce. Moreover, since the motorist get your license and insurance before the court date,
was a state resident and not a tourist, he needed a it’ll probably get dismissed.” “Oh yes, sir,”
license from Tennessee. Phillips pulled out a thick responded Mr. Sanchez, “I don’t want no problems.
pad of unissued state citations and began to fill one I just want to work and provide for my family.”
out for the young man. As we drove away, Phillips Officially, police officers do not consider race
wondered again whether he should have issued a or immigration when they do their jobs. In practice,
warning. He shrugged off the idea quickly. The however, it is impossible for officers not to see that
citation was good for his stats. the majority of unlicensed drivers they encounter
After three hours of answering calls, Officer have brown bodies and Latino surnames and speak
Williams, a white officer in his mid-twenties, Spanish. As this example demonstrates, Officer
lamented the fact that he had not made any stops. Williams assumed that Mr. Sanchez was foreign-
Noticing that the navy truck in front of us had an born because he did not have a driver’s license.
inoperable left brake light, Williams decided this Indeed, any diversity within the Latino population
was a perfect opportunity for a quick stop. “License, is largely invisible to police officers, who come to
registration, proof of insurance,” said Williams, after associate not having a license with being Latino
approaching the driver. “Good afternoon, sir,” and foreign-born (Donato and Rodriguez 2014).
responded the driver, as he leafed through his wallet. As Latino motorists await their fate, they sit idly
The man, who had dark brown hair, dark brown on the side of the road, on display for all passing
eyes, and an olive complexion, handed Officer motorists to see. These stops are a spectacle, a visual
Williams the car’s registration and an ID card, issued representation of Latinos’ social marginality in the
in Indiana. His ID card indicated his last name was city. At community meetings in South Nashville,
Sanchez. He spoke English with the ease of a native attendees mentioned the overzealous enforcement of
speaker, although I detected an almost imperceptible traffic laws as a problem in their neighborhoods. For
accent that suggested to me he had learned Spanish example, one evening, at a meeting for Hispanic
before he learned English. He did not have a license business owners, the precinct commander invited
or insurance, and he explained he had just moved to attendees to speak. A petite Asian woman raised her
Nashville and bought the truck. “Ok, but you need to hand and stood:
be insured since day one,” Officer Williams told
him. “Yes, sir,” responded Mr. Sanchez, explaining The reason why I’m here is because I have a store,
that he could not get insurance without a driver’s a Latino grocery store on Murfreesboro Road and
license, but that he could not get a driver’s license everyday there’s police on the streets stopping
until his wife mailed him his birth certificate. cars. It’s too much. Too many police officers. Too
Officer Williams told him to “sit tight” and we many. It hurts our business. Everybody’s walking
returned to the patrol car, where Williams quickly now because they’re afraid. Then, lots of times
began filling out a misdemeanor state citation. He they (police) park in our parking lot and block the
left two items on the citation blank, returning to the entrance. When the police are stopped outside,
truck to ask Mr. Sanchez his address and his place everyone freezes. And I think, what’s going on?
of birth. “In what country were you born?” No one’s going in or out. And it’s not just one. It’s
Williams asked, absentmindedly starting to write more than one. It’s like a party.
down the answer before Mr. Sanchez responded. I
watched as he scrawled: M-E-X. I had noticed Later, at the same meeting, a business owner
immediately that Officer Williams asked Mr. named Ricardo announced that he was going to tell
Sanchez in what country he was born, rather than us about Adela’s run-in with the police, because she
Armenta 89

was too shy to speak about it herself. According to have your seatbelt on.” Then I asked, “Where’s
Ricardo, a police officer began following Adela’s your driver’s license? Your ID? Your passport?”
car when she left work late one night and eventually Nothing. [He holds up his hands in exasperation.]
pulled her over, claiming that she had not used her And that’s why we take people downtown! I
turn signal. “But how could that be? If the police don’t know who this person is! He could be
were following her, how could she make that mis- whoever. He could have committed a crime in
take?” Ricardo asked incredulously. Adela, who California and come over here. I don’t know who
was standing next to Ricardo gazing at the floor, he is, so I have to take him downtown. I go to the
nodded. Ricardo continued. Within minutes of pull- consulate and I always tell people to have their
ing her over, multiple police cars arrived. Officers ID, so that officers can know exactly who you
searched Adela’s car and her purse, commenting on are. Show your matrícula. Show your passport.
the large sum of cash she had in her wallet. Ricardo Show whatever documents. Show this one and
seemed particularly disgusted by this intrusion, stat- that one and that one, and that’s how an officer
ing that he had $400 in his pocket at this very will know. They’ll just give you a fine, but you
moment and asking, rhetorically, whether that made have to go and pay it. What happened to you? [He
him a criminal. Ricardo wanted answers: Why did looked at Adela pointedly.] They gave you a fine
the police officer tail Adela? Why would they ask to and you left, right? Did immigration take you?
search her car, and why did so many officers appear No? Ok. What happened? You paid a fine! You
on the scene of a simple traffic stop? paid a fine and immigration wasn’t there!
The commander responded, saying that he could
not comment about the traffic stop without more spe- Officer’s Moreno account makes clear that while
cific details but promising that the department would Latino residents interpret police behavior as racial
vigorously investigate allegations of wrongdoing. I profiling, police interpret their practices through col-
knew from my time with patrol officers, however, orblind lenses. A Latino officer himself, Officer
that this would be considered a “good stop.” Having Moreno insists he is not “looking” to punish Latinos
identified an alleged violation, the officer was free to but that he stops them because they happen to com-
pull Adela over and ask to search her car. The com- mit violations. He goes on to explain that sometimes
mander explained that he instructed officers to patrol he “has to” arrest Latinos (take them downtown)
crime-ridden areas. For example, just that weekend, because they do not have sufficient identification.
one street had seen four personal robberies, and offi- Officer Moreno also pointed out forcefully that
cers would direct additional enforcement to that area. immigration agents had not been part of Adela’s traf-
Ricardo shook his head. “I understand, but there’s a fic stop. He suggested that the stop had amounted to
difference between what you’re saying, Commander, no more than a minor inconvenience because Adela
and what the officer was doing following this woman had not been arrested and had been able to pay a fine
. . . make them understand that they’ve got to stop and leave. I always found it odd when police officers
profiling.” talked about state citations and paying fines posi-
At this, Officer Moreno, a Dominican officer tively, as if the officers should be recognized for
who jokingly referred to himself as “el negro,” their compassion (see Armenta 2016). True, arrests
defended the department’s tactics. He started by are more punitive (particularly because arrests lead
describing a number of minor violations that war- more directly to deportation), but a citation is no
ranted traffic stops, explaining that any punishment favor. A citation requires misdemeanants to miss a
Latinos received as a result of these stops was not day of work, travel to the downtown county court-
the officer’s fault: house, wait to be processed (in English), and pay
steep fines. Citations can result in misdemeanor con-
Tennessee state law says that when a person victions, which can have adverse effects on immi-
drives and their taillight is broken, that’s a traffic grants’ ability to regularize their immigration status
stop. If they don’t have their seatbelt on, it’s a in the future and can make immigrants priorities for
traffic stop. If your headlights aren’t on and it’s deportation because the conviction makes them
raining and you’re running your (windshield) “criminals.” If misdemeanants do not go to court, a
wipers, that’s a traffic stop. One day I stopped six judge will issue a warrant for their arrest. At that
Latinos, and I’m Latino! I’m not looking for these point, the fact that the first violation was a minor
people; I’ll stop anyone! But that day they were infraction becomes irrelevant; once the criminal jus-
all Latino. I asked the first guy I stopped, “Why tice system has decreed that the misdemeanant
did I stop you?” He said, “I don’t know, because belongs in criminal custody, the misdemeanant turns
I’m Latino?” And I said, “No! Look, you didn’t into someone who is “wanted.”
90 Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 3(1)

The precarity that Latinos experience as a result the low-wage workforce. Many exit, however, as
of local policing is institutionally created. Institutional immigrant detainees or “criminal aliens,” identified
policies empower officers to aggressively address for removal even before they have been convicted of
trivial infractions through traffic enforcement. Faced any criminal offense. Implementing immigration
with this mandate, officers make large numbers of screenings upon arrest rather than conviction is a
stops for minor technical infractions and regard unli- policy decision and political choice. It means that
censed drivers with suspicion because establishing a even those who are arrested without cause are subject
person’s identity is integral to order-maintenance to deportation. Thus, when a young Latino man pre-
policing. In fact, the “inability to establish identity” is sented himself at the jail after an arrest warrant was
officers’ principal justification for choosing to arrest erroneously served at his house, he was processed for
unlicensed motorists rather than cite them. Ultimately, removal through 287(g) even though the charges
however, officers’ inability to establish identity is were dismissed.
also institutionally created. State laws dictate that Astoundingly, just like the police officers who
unauthorized immigrants cannot get Tennessee driv- believe they are doing immigrants a favor by citing
er’s licenses and IDs. Department policy dictates that them, some DCSO deputies allow themselves to
satisfactory identification is required to avoid a phys- believe that immigrants enjoy getting processed for
ical arrest. For Latino immigrants, the identification removal. They imagine that the immigration inter-
cards they cannot get are the only ones that will pro- view, which lasts between 30 and 45 minutes and
tect them from arrest. Officers may choose to accept occurs in a small room, is a respite from the rest of
passports, consular identification cards, or foreign the booking process. Chad, a deputy with 12 years
driver’s licenses as “satisfactory” identification, but in the Sheriff’s Office, explains:
department policy does not require them to do so.
Unlicensed Latino drivers have no protection from Most of the time they’re in the office with me
punishment. Aggressive enforcement of driving they’re laughing. . . . They’re already in an
offenses creates a pipeline to deportation (Stuesse uncomfortable situation if they’re facing
and Coleman 2014). Still, because local police deportation and if they’ve got family here, so I
explain their behavior as “just” doing their jobs, the try to break the ice. I try to make them feel
systemic racism embedded in these institutional poli- comfortable and let them know what their
cies appears to be the natural result of colorblind options are. . . . And I think they feel more
policies. comfortable when they come to us than they are
out there. When they come to us, I make it a
habit to go a little further with them just because
Criminalizing Latinos in the Jail: The I understand what they’re facing. Out there it’s
Davidson County Sheriff’s Office pretty much an assembly line, whereas with us
In the previous section, I highlighted how institu- they get one-on-one.
tional policing practices contribute to immigrants’
precarity and criminalization. In this section, I Indeed, most sheriff’s deputies emphasized that
examine a similar phenomenon in the Davidson they strove to implement a deportation process that
County Jail. I show that the jail’s institutional poli- was “humane” or “compassionate.” They wanted to
cies and practices produce disproportionately harsh “change the face” of deportation processing. They
punishment for Latino arrestees, and I argue that insisted that they were not the bad guys, pointing
inserting immigration enforcement into criminal out that they had no control over who police arrested
justice procedures enhances the state’s power to and delivered to their custody.
detain and punish Latinos. Between 2007 and 2012, In their analysis of criminal justice processing in
the DCSO implemented an immigration enforce- Seattle, Beckett and Evans (2015) point out that the
ment program called 287(g). As part of the pro- criminal justice system processes unauthorized immi-
gram, sheriff’s deputies, who are trained to enforce grants differently than other arrestees. This is also the
immigration laws, interview foreign-born arrestees case in Nashville, where the 287(g) program trans-
to determine their immigration status (see Armenta formed criminal justice processing, with citizens and
2012). The overwhelming majority of immigrants noncitizens experiencing differential access to justice.
interviewed and identified for removal are Latino. For example, arrestees on immigration detainers were
Thus, Latino immigrants enter the jail as categorically denied the opportunity to bond out or
Nashville residents whose presence is formally unau- secure pretrial release. If they were given a local bond
thorized by law but tacitly accepted as necessary to and decided to pay, it triggered an immediate transfer
Armenta 91

from local to federal custody, rather than release. As a of jail. At the very least, she would have been
result, bail bond agents refused to post bail for arrest- treated as a low-risk offender and not shackled dur-
ees on immigration detainers. Ineligible for pretrial ing childbirth.
release, most Latino arrestees were incarcerated until As this section shows, institutional policies and
their criminal court date. practices converge to produce particularly punitive
In addition to not being able to bond out of local treatment for Latinos from the moment they arrive
custody, inmates on immigration detainers were in custody. After booking, officials interview and
often denied access to alternative and diversionary screen foreign-born arrestees for legal status, sub-
sentencing programs. Since a release from jail trig- jecting many Latinos, even those with legal status,
gered a transfer to federal custody, unauthorized to additional scrutiny. Once marked with an immi-
immigrants could not comply with any sentence that gration detainer, immigrants move through the
did not involve physical custody. Immigrants could criminal justice system differently than the native-
not comply with the terms of alternatives to incar- born, with differential access to bail, longer dura-
ceration, for instance, probation. A DCSO employee tions in jail, elevated risk classifications, and the
explained: looming threat of deportation. These processes are
also happening in Norway, where penal policies
A lot of them are being assigned probation but distinguish between Norwegians, EU nationals,
they can’t complete it because they’re inside. . . . and non–EU nationals (Ugelvick 2013).
For example, this guy here, Mr. Ramos. He’s on Although Latinos comprised the majority of
probation. He’s got no more charges, but he’s in immigrant removals from Davidson County, offi-
ICE custody, so nobody knows how to handle it. cials insisted that immigrant removals were “color-
You can’t do community service! You can’t go blind.” Indeed, officials touted the “diversity” of
to the DUI school! immigrant removals, pointing out that they screened
everyone who was foreign-born and that deportees
In addition to having longer overall stays in jail, were from many countries of origin. For example,
inmates on immigration detainers experienced one official said, “I’ve sent individuals from Canada,
harsher procedures once in custody. For example, England, Germany, and Russia through immigration
DCSO officials classified all noncitizen arrestees on court. People like to use the phrase Mexicans, but
immigration detainers as medium-security inmates, not everyone is from Mexico.” Another official
even when their arrest offenses corresponded with the made a similar statement:
lowest-risk classifications. This bureaucratic decision
restricted Latino arrestees’ access to spaces, activities, The basic misconception—and that’s even if
and programs to which other inmates had access. One you look in the newspaper at the news articles
DCSO employee recognized this practice as an injus- and stuff, the misconception is that we are just
tice, comparing Latinos’ experiences to those of other deporting everybody Mexican. If you Mexican,
racial and ethnic groups: “Ok. So what you’re telling they gonna deport you, and that’s not true. I
me is this African American and this one guy and this mean, nine times out of ten, majority of the
oriental who is in here can go down the hall 15 steps cases that we do are Mexican—Mexican
but Latinos, because they’re not legal, are more of a descent. But, we got Honduras, El Salvador,
safety risk? Where are they going to go?” and all this and that.
The following well-publicized and controver-
sial case demonstrates how the jail’s decision to What is telling about both of these statements is
transform low-level misdemeanor arrestees into that even as officials are making assertions about
medium-risk offenders creates extraordinary puni- the diversity of immigrant removals, they are doing
tive procedures for Latino arrestees. In July 2008, a so by referencing Mexicans. To both officials,
Mexican woman who was nine months pregnant Mexicans have emerged as the “master category”
was arrested for driving without a license. When for “illegality,” a term synonymous with remov-
she went into labor while in custody, jail employ- ability. This is consistent with earlier work which
ees treated her as if she were a serious offender. For argues that illegality is a racialized social condition
the majority of her labor and recovery, she was that has become a defining feature of “Mexican”-
shackled to the hospital bed, a deputy guarding her ness (De Genova 2004).
door. She returned to jail two days later, at which The 287(g) program empowered DCSO officials
point her infant was released to her family. Had this to detain arrestees on suspected immigration viola-
woman been U.S.-born, she would have been eli- tions, allowing officials to use accent, phenotype, or
gible for pretrial release and could have bonded out last name as markers for illegality. For example, in
92 Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 3(1)

2010, Davidson County officials placed an immigra- inequality, even as those who perform them believe
tion detainer on a U.S. citizen of Mexican descent. they are colorblind.
Born in Portland, Oregon, the man should never For example, I argue that the MNPD’s order-main-
have been subjected to a 287(g) interview, but he tenance approach to policing, with its emphasis on
was after the arresting officer wrongly listed Mexico investigatory vehicle stops, drives the contact between
as the man’s place of birth. Although the man could Latinos and the police. Although not a response to
name the Portland hospital where he was born, sup- immigration, and technically a race-­ neutral policy,
plied a Tennessee ID that required proof of citizen- investigatory police stops are a powerful race-making
ship to obtain, and recited a valid social security practice, both reflecting American racial stratification
number, sheriff’s deputies were unconvinced that and actively maintaining it (Epp et al. 2014). Patrol
the man, who spoke limited English, was in fact a officers make stops for technical violations because it
citizen. Ineligible for pretrial release because of the is a bureaucratic priority. Although their tactics may
immigration detainer, the man remained in custody put officers into contact with all residents, these prac-
until the local charges against him were dismissed tices subject only some residents to increased levels of
for lack of probable cause. Rather than release him, scrutiny. Through their implementation of the
however, DCSO officials held him for nine addi- MNPD’s policing priorities, officers subject Latino
tional hours until his relatives arrived with his birth residents to lengthier inspections, sanctions, and
certificate and passport. He had been in jail for more sometimes arrest. These interactions signal Latinos’
than 10 days. Officials insisted that they were just place in the racial hierarchy, marking Latinos as less
doing their jobs. than full citizens in the polity.
During its tenure, Davidson County’s 287(g) It is critical to point out that Nashville police do
program was one of the most active immigration not see what they do as policing immigration. That
enforcement programs in the country. Between 2007 is, unlike police officers in Netherlands (van der
and 2011, Sheriff’s Office employees identified Leun 2003) or London (Parmar 2011), local police
approximately 8,400 removable immigrants in the are not empowered to stop-and-search in the name
Davidson County jail. The overwhelming majority of national security, counterterrorism, or immigra-
of those identified for removal by sheriff’s deputies tion enforcement. However, given that criminal laws
were Latinos arrested by local police for minor and immigration laws map onto one another (so that
offenses. Although officials would argue that these a violation of immigration law guarantees a viola-
removals are solely about immigration status, I sub- tion of state criminal law), local police cite and
mit that they are fundamentally about race. arrest Latinos because Latinos are outside the law by
design. By framing their practices as merely doing
their jobs, law enforcement bureaucrats can explain
Discussion: Racializing away the racial disparities that their practices pro-
Crimmigration duce as the natural results of (nonracial) laws and
This article extends the literature on the racializa- policies. Ultimately, these aggressive police prac-
tion of Latinos via the immigration enforcement tices undermine the relationship between Latinos
system by examining the role of local law enforce- and law enforcement, because minorities experience
ment agencies in the production and punishment of involuntary police encounters as racial profiling
illegality. Examining immigration enforcement (Epp et al. 2014; Solis, Portillos, and Brunson 2009).
from the bottom up makes clear that Latino crimi- Like other researchers examining how immigra-
nalization is institutionally created through penal tion status affects criminal justice processing
policies that criminal justice institutions take for (Beckett and Evans 2015; Light 2014), I argue that
granted. The criminal justice system is not color- both alienage and legal status affect how Latinos
blind but rather is a system of structural racism that move through the criminal justice system. For exam-
creates racial inequality and reinforces ideas about ple, because unauthorized immigrants are issued an
racial difference (Murakawa and Beckett 2010; immigration detainer, they cannot access pretrial
Van Cleve and Mayes 2015). From what behaviors release and diversionary programs. However, unlike
are “legal” and “illegal,” to how laws are enforced extant research on the social control and punishment
by local police, to how individuals are processed of noncitizens, I do not imply that this citizenship
after arrest, Latinos experience particularly harsh penalty means that racial inequality is insignificant.
punishment and increased scrutiny from legal Rather, I argue that policies that punish noncitizens
authorities, both on the street and in jail. This are examples of a colorblind institutional racism that
occurs through subtle, institutional, and ostensibly is structural and systemic. Thus, even though the
race-neutral laws and policies that produce racial overwhelming majority of Latino immigrants
Armenta 93

identified for removal are arrested for misdemeanor deputies, who screen immigrants to verify their sta-
driving offenses, their contact with criminal justice tus, identify removable immigrants but decide nei-
institutions essentially transforms them into “crimi- ther who is arrested nor who is ultimately removed.
nal aliens” who are so “dangerous” they are categor- And although the majority of arrestees end up in jail
ically classified as medium-risk offenders. for very minor violations, because they appear in
In addition to pointing out how many of the dis- deportation statistics as “criminal aliens,” their
parate outcomes that Latinos experience in criminal removal is seen to serve the interest of national
justice processing are institutionalized and embed- security.
ded in law and policy, I also show how frontline Race is central to understanding the crimmigra-
workers amplify racialized outcomes through their tion system’s devastating effects on Latino commu-
interactions. For example, I saw an officer wrongly nities. This article highlights the mechanisms—the
assume that an American motorist of Latino descent laws, policies, and practices—that undergird sys-
was foreign-born when filling out a state citation. temic and institutionalized racism, reproducing racial
Had the officer made the same mistake on an arrest domination and reinforcing white supremacy.
report, the motorist would have been subjected to an Policies and practices that punish noncitizens, and
immigration screening. This is exactly what hap- more particularly unauthorized residents, are racist.
pened when the Sheriff’s Office illegally detained Although their effects may not always be intentional,
the young Latino man born in Oregon. Armed with they stem from a long tradition of preserving the
an arrest report that (erroneously) indicated the American racial hierarchy. As scholars, it is critically
man’s place of birth was Mexico, DCSO officials important that we do not erase race from our analy-
disregarded the man’s assertions that he was born in ses. Although it is easy to identify policies and prac-
Portland. In each of these cases, frontline workers, tices as racist when they overtly target Latinos or
armed with the authority to categorize people as other racial groups, it is even more important that we
native- or foreign-born, or legally or illegally pres- identify and critique those policies and practices that
ent, acted on their assumptions and implicit biases, are not overtly racist but are no less devastating in
assuming that Latino status, Mexican-ness, and ille- their consequences.
gality were one and the same. Their decisions
clearly illustrate that policies that punish people Notes
based on citizenship have spillover effects that
harm all Latinos, regardless of legal status or nativ- 1. The term Latino is a pan-ethnic label that describes
culturally and geographically heterogeneous groups
ity (Aranda, Menjívar, and Donato 2014; Massey
of Latin American ancestry. Although Latinos can
2014a; Massey and Pren 2012). be of any race and nativity, popular representations
of Latinos in the United States emphasize an olive
or brown skin tone, dark hair, lower-class origins,
Conclusion and the use of the Spanish language. For those
Although this article analyzes the process of Latino who fit this image, physical appearance serves as
punishment and removal in one metropolitan area, an embodied marker of exclusion and “illegality”
the themes that I identify are relevant throughout the (Romero 2006). Thus, when I use the term Latino
United States. The current U.S. system of mass throughout this paper, I am referring specifically to
deportation depends on the penal punishment and individuals of Mexican, Central American, or South
American origin who conform to popular represen-
marginality produced through the criminal justice
tations of “Mexicanness” and/or “illegality.”
system. Frontline bureaucratic actors in the crimmi- 2. The term racialization refers to the process by
gration system play a crucial role in Latino immi- which ideas about race are constructed, perceived
grant removal. For example, police, correctional as meaningful, and acted upon. Race is a social
officers, lawyers, and judges perform discrete and construct used to classify people according to ideas
specialized tasks that contribute to deportation, but about phenotype, culture, ancestry, country of
few recognize themselves as forming part of the origin, and ethnicity (see Omi and Winant 2014).
immigration enforcement machinery. Their work, as Although Hispanic and Latino are officially eth-
well as Latinos’ vulnerability to it, is so taken for nic labels, they function in the same ways as racial
granted as the natural order of things that their role in labels.
3. For a thorough review of changes to federal immi-
punishing Latinos is largely invisible. So police
gration law, see Coleman (2007), Golash-Boza and
make arrests that ultimately subject immigrants to Hondagneu-Sotelo (2013), and Stumpf (2006).
immigration screenings, but the police officers them- 4. These requirements emerged from a 1996 federal
selves do not enforce immigration law. Sheriff’s welfare reform law that targeted “deadbeat parents”
94 Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 3(1)

by creating new child support enforcement tools, De Genova, Nicholas. 2004. “The Legal Production
allowing states to track, identify, and potentially of Mexican/Migrant ‘Illegality.’” Latino Studies
deny or revoke licenses to parents who did not ful- 2(2):160–85.
fill child support obligations. Donato, Katharine M. and Leslie Rodriguez. 2014.
“Police Arrests in a Time of Uncertainty: The Impact
of 287(g) on Arrests in a New Immigrant Gateway.”
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