STATUTORY RIGHTS

Human rights in the Philippines are protected by the Constitution of the Philippines, to
make sure that persons in the Philippines are able to live peacefully and with dignity, safe from
the abuse of any individuals or institutions, including the state. Aside from the laws provided in
the Constitution, there are several enacted laws by the legislative body that protects human
rights. Discussed below are some statutory rights related to the protection of human rights.
Rights of Accused
Everyone is given a fair trial as the law stipulates. Statutory itself is the permission or
granting. In other words, Statutory Rights are the enactment of rights provided by the State or
Government. An accused in a criminal proceeding has an entitled right to defend himself in the
court. It is the right of every person, citizens of the Philippines to be informed of these Statutory
Rights and what are these rights. Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
for the statutory rights of an accused.

Rights of Accused (Rule 115, Rules on Criminal Procedure)

The rights of the accused are normally treated in Constitutional Law specifically under
the topic on the Bill of Rights. The discussion in this treatise shall be confined to selected rights
of an accused. Sec. 1 of Rule 115 enumerates the rights of the accused "at the trial."

Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
entitled to the following rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from
arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at
the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically
ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable
cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present
thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to
be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the
accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that
he can properly protect his right without the assistance of counsel.

(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered
by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.

(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.

(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize
as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot with due
diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another
case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the
adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him.

(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of
other evidence in his behalf.

(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.

(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and, in the manner, prescribed by law. (1a)

Presumption of innocence
The presumption of innocence under the Rules is of a constitutional origin and a mere
substantial reiteration of Sec. 14(2) of Art. Ill of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which
provides:
"Sec. 14 (2). In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved."

An accused in criminal prosecutions is to be presumed innocent until his guilt is proven

beyond reasonable doubt. This constitutional guarantee cannot be overthrown unless the
prosecution has established by such quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome this
presumption of innocence and prove that a crime was committed and that the accused is guilty
thereof. Under our Constitution, an accused enjoys the presumption of innocence. And this
presumption prevails over the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
(People v. Sy, G.R. No. 185284, June 22, 2009; People v. Frondozo, G.R. No. 177164, June 30,
2009; See People v. Alivio, G.R. No. 177771, May 30,2011 for related reading).

Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty should not by itself prevail
over the presumption of innocence (People v. Ong, 432 SCRA 470; People v. Paloma, G.R. No.
178544, February 23, 2011). Sec. 3(m) of Rule 131, establishes the disputable presumption that
"official duty has been regularly performed". Hence, as a general rule, the testimony of the police
officers who apprehended the accused is usually accorded full faith and credit because of the
presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. However, when the performance of
their duties is tainted with irregularities, such presumption is effectively destroyed. While the
law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this
presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent
and it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of
regularity is merely just that—a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when
challenged by evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth (People v. Cantalejo, G.R. No.
182790, April 24, 2009; See People v. Alejandro, G.R. No. 176350, August 10,2011).
Proof beyond reasonable doubt
The presumption of innocence is not meant to be forever. It ends when it is overcome in a
final conviction. There is only one type of quantum of evidence which overcomes the
presumption — proof beyond reasonable doubt. Without such quantum of evidence, the accused
is entitled to an acquittal (Sec. 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court). Proof beyond reasonable doubt is
indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence (People v. Montenegro,
436 SCRA 33; People v. Labagala, G.R. No. 184603, August 2,2010).

Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree
of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind" (Sec. 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court).
The Court in Mupas v. People, G.R. No. 172834, February 6, 2008, describes reasonable doubt
as "that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such
investigation to let the mind rest each upon the certainty of guilt."

The presumption of innocence requires that before the accused is convicted, his guilt
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Sec. 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court does not
provide that for proof to be deemed beyond reasonable doubt, absolute certainty of his guilt is
required. The rule merely requires moral certainty. In criminal cases, the prosecution is not
required to show the guilt of the accused with absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is
demanded, or that degree of proof which, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction. With
that, the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of the accused with moral
certainty (People v. Malate, G.R. No. 185724, June 5,2009). The burden lies on the prosecution
to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In
so doing, the prosecution must rest on the strength of its own evidence and must not rely on the
weakness of the defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet its burden of proof, the defense
may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In such cases the presumption
prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted (People v. Angus, G.R. No. 178778,
August 3,2010).

Right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation

In order to inform the accused of the nature and cause of accusation against him, it is
necessary for the complaint or information to contain those matters required by the statute or by
the Rules of Court, to wit:

(a) To state the name and surname of the accused or any appellation or nickname by
which he has been or is known and if his name cannot be ascertained, to describe him
under a fictitious name (Sec. 7, Rule 110, Rules of Court).
(b) To state the name and surname of the offended party or any appellation or nickname
by which such person has been or is known and if there is no other way of
identifying him, to describe him under a fictitious name (Sec. 12, Rule 110, Rules of
Court); if the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name, or
 any name or designation by which it is known or by which it may be identified (Sec.
12[c], Rule 110, Rules of Court).
(c) To state with sufficient clarity and in an ordinary and concise language, the acts or
omissions constituting the offense to enable the accused to know the offense he is
being charged with (Sec. 9, Rule 110, Rules of Court); to state the designation of the
offense given by statute unless there is no such designation in which case it is
sufficient to make reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing the
offense (Sec. 8, Rule 110, Rules of Court).
(d) To state also in ordinary and concise language, the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances attending the acts imputed to the accused (Sees. 8, 9, Rule 110, Rules
of Court);
(e) To sufficiently allege that the crime was committed or its essential ingredients
occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court (Sec. 10, Rule 110, Rules
of Court);
(f) To allege the date of the commission of the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, which date may be one as near as possible to the actual date of the
commission of the offense, except when the precise date is a material ingredient of
the offense (Sec. 11, Rule 110, Rules of Court);
(g) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the
property must be described with such particularity to properly identify the offense
charged (Sec. 12[a], Rule 110, Rules of Court).

It is a basic constitutional right of the accused persons to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against them. It would be a denial of accused-appellant's basic right to due
process if he is charged with simple rape and consequently convicted with certain qualifying
circumstances which were not alleged in the information (People v. Lagarde, G.R. No. 182549,
January 20,2009).

Right to counsel of the accused

The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of counsel to an accused (Sec. 14[2]), Article III,
1987 Constitution of the Philippines). Under Sec. 1(c) of Rule 115, the accused has the right to
"defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of judgment".
111 "In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is
immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the judgment
had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the
opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel" (Hilario v. People, G.R. No. 161070, April
14,2008).

One need not however, be an accused to avail of the right to counsel and the right to
counsel does not commence only during the trial. Every person under custody of the law enjoys
the right. Republic Act No. 7438 (Sec. 2) provides that "Any person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel."
The right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him
The right to confront the witnesses against him and cross-examine them are basic
constitutional rights embodied in Sec. 14 (2) of Art. Ill of the Philippine Constitution.

The cross-examination of a witness is essential to test his or her accuracy, expose

falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may
successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which create
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the constitutional right
of the accused to confront the witnesses against him (People v. Ortillas, 428 SCRA 659).

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial

litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with
quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. It is, however, equally
true that the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct
amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the
opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the
right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be
received or allowed to remain in the record (Equitable PCI Banking Corporation v. RCBC
Capital Corporation, G.R. No. 182248, December 18, 2008; People v. Abatayo, 433 SCRA 562).
The waiver to cross- examine may take various forms but jurisprudence suggests that a waiver
may occur when the party fails to cross-examine the witnesses against him despite opportunity to
do so.

Thus, it was held that where a party has had the opportunity to cross examine a witness
but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the
testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the
record (Vertudes v. Buenaflor, 478 SCRA 210) because the right to cross examination requires
not really an actual cross-examination but merely an opportunity to exercise the right to cross
examine if desired (People v. Escote, Jr., 400 SCRA 603).

Under the present Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right of confrontation does not apply
in a preliminary investigation. The investigating officer during preliminary investigation may set
a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or witness. However, while the
parties are allowed to be present at the hearing, they are "without the right to examine or cross-
examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked
to the party or witness concerned" (Sec. 3[e], Rule 112, Rules of Court).

Where the adverse party is deprived of the right to cross-examine the persons who
executed the affidavits, said affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay (Estrella v.
Robles, Jr., 538 SCRA 60). In the absence of a cross-examination, the direct examination of the
witness should be expunged from the records. If the witness is the lone witness, the trial court
would not have a basis to deny a demurrer to evidence (People v. Ortillas, 428 SCRA 659).
Competent and independent counsel
The meaning of "competent counsel" and its standards were explained in People v.
Deniega, 251 SCRA 626 as follows:
"The lawyer called to be present during such investigations should be as far as
reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer
were one furnished in the accused's behalf, it is important that he should be competent
and independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused, as distinguished from one who would be merely giving a routine, peremptory
and meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights. In People v. Basay, the
Court stressed that an accused's right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to
counsel "contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle."

Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the
latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter's relative
or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the
accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition." Lawyers engaged by the
police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are
generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement
authorities can be symbiotic.
The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning
to end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn
of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the
accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview CPeople
v. Rapeza, G.R. No. 169431, April 3,2007).

Right to compulsory process

This right may be invoked by the accused to secure the attendance of witnesses and the

production of witnesses in his behalf. This is a constitutional right embodied in Sec. 14(2), Art.
Ill of the Bill of Rights.

In connection with this right, the accused may move the court for the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum or a subpoena duces tecum pursuant to the provisions of Rule 21 of
the Rules of Court.

In case of the unjustified failure of the witness to comply, the court or judge issuing the
subpoena, upon proof of the service of such subpoena and proof of his failure to attend, may
issue a warrant for his arrest (Sec. 8, Rule 21, Rules of Court).
Right to speedy trial; speedy disposition of cases
 The right to a speedy trial is explicitly guaranteed by Section 14(2) of Article III of the
Constitution. Thus " In criminal cases, the accused shall “enjoy the right” to have a “speedy,
impartial and public trial" (See People v. Anonas, G.R. No. 156847, January 21,2007).

The same right is echoed and reinforced in Sec. 1(h) of Rule 115 of the Rules of Court
declaring that one of the rights of an accused at trial is "To have a speedy, impartial and public
trial." Nowhere is the guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases more significant and
meaningful than in criminal cases where not only the fortune, but the life and liberty of the
accused as well, are at stake (Cabarles v. Maceda, 516 SCRA 303).

On the other hand, the right to a speedy disposition of cases is provided for under Section
16, Article III, of the Constitution which provides that, "all persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."
115
This right to a speedy trial has consistently been defined by the Court substantially "as
one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its purpose being to assure that an
innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of
having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation
and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose."

It bears stressing that although the Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy
disposition of cases, it is a flexible concept. Due regard must be given to the facts and
circumstances surrounding each case. The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured,
or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without
the party having his case tried. Just like the constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial," "speedy
disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the
circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays
which render rights nugatory (Ombudsman v. Jurado, G.R. No. 154155, August 6,2008;
Lumanog, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 182555, September 7,2010).

The right does not preclude justifiable postponements and delay when warranted by the
situation. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right, particular regard must
also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case (Domondon v. Sandiganbayan,
476 SCRA 496). Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a speedy
trial, it should be borne in mind that speed is not the chief objective of a trial.

Right to appeal
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appeal in the manner
prescribed by law (Hilario v. People, 551 SCRA 191; Sec. l[i], Rule 115, Rules of Court). An
appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review and the appellate court may correct
even unassigned errors. The above rule is in contrast to the rule in a civil case.
 In a civil case, as a rule, an unassigned error will not be considered by the appellate court
unless such error affects the jurisdiction of the court, affects the validity of the judgment
appealed from, or the error is closely related to or dependent upon the assigned error properly
argued in the brief, or when the error is simply plain or clerical (Sec. 8, Rule 51, Rules of Court).

Rights of a Person under Custodial Investigation and Deprivation of Liberty

Custodial investigation is the stage "where the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody

by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating
statements" (People v. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624). (Bar 2006)

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers

after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the
police carries out a process of interrogations that lend itself to eliciting incriminating statements,
that the rule begins to operate (Aquino v. Paiste, G.R. No. 147782, June 25,2008).

Republic Act No. 7438 has however, redefined the concept of 'custodial investigation'
and has extended this constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has not been
formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for questioning. Specifically, Sec. 2 of R.A.
7438 provides that "custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a
person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed,
without prejudice to the liability of the 'inviting' officer for any violation of law (Sec. 2[ff, R.A.
7438).

Republic Act No. 7438.

Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of
Public Officers.
(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be
assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place,
who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense
shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his
rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably
of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the
person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot
afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and
independent counsel by the investigating officer.
 (c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating
officer, provided that before such report is signed, or thumb marked if the person
arrested or detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and
adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided
by the investigating officer in the language or dialect known to such arrested or
detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of
no effect whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the
presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the
municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or
minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession
shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing
and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise, the waiver
shall be null and void and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed
visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical
doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his
immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national non-governmental
organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights of by any
international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the
President. The person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fiancé
or fiancée, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or
aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an
"invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.

The importance of the right to counsel is so vital that under existing law, "In the absence
of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspected person can only
be detained by the investigating officer in accordance with the provisions of Art. 125 of the
Revised Penal Code" (Sec. 3[c]), RA. 7438). Republic Act No. 7438 also clearly mandates that a
counsel "shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation" (Sec. 2[b], RA. 7438). The purpose of providing counsel to a
person under custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting a confession
(People v. Duefias, Jr., 426 SCRA 666).

The right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation
on the part of the police investigator to explain and contemplates an effective communication
that results in an understanding of what is conveyed (People v. Guillermo, 420 SCRA 326).
Failure to inform the suspect of her right to counsel during custodial investigation attains
significance only if the person under investigation makes a confession in writing without aid of
counsel and which is then sought to be admitted against the accused during the trial. In such
case, the tainted confession obtained in violation is inadmissible in evidence against the accused
(Eugenio v. People 549 SCRA 433).

The suspect must also be advised that he has the option to reject the counsel provided for
him by the police authorities, which fact must similarly appear in the extrajudicial confession.
Where the participation of a lawyer in the proceedings was confined to the notarization of the
suspect's confession, the same is not considered, in legal contemplation, the kind of legal
assistance that should be accorded to the suspect (People v. Rapeza, 520 SCRA 596).

Aside from the rule that the counsel must be competent and independent and preferably
the choice of the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, the assisting counsel
provided by the investigating officer is "any lawyer, except those directly affected by the case,
those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those charged with the prosecution of
crimes" (Sec. 3, RA. 7438).

A police line-up is not part of the custodial inquest since the accused at that stage is not
yet being investigated. In the line-up, the right to counsel does not yet attach (People v.
Tolentino, 423 SCRA 448).

It has also been held that a barangay chairman is not deemed a law enforcement officer
for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Art. Ill of the Philippine Constitution. Thus, a
suspect's uncounseled statement before the barangay chairman is admissible (People v. Ulit, 423
SCRA 374).

The right to counsel applies in certain pre-trial proceedings that can be deemed "critical
stages" in the criminal process like in a preliminary investigation. This investigation can be no
different from the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a
preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less than the State's processes, oftentimes
intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal prosecution
(People v. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624).

Women and Children Rights

List of laws protecting women in PH
1. RA 7381
105-Day Expanded Maternity Leave Law
I. Signed into law on February 2019 by President Rodrigo Duterte, Republic Act
11210 or the Expanded Maternity Leave Law extends the previous 60-day (78
days for caesarian section delivery for women workers in the private sector)
paid maternity leave to 105 days.
 II. The law also entails an option to extend for an additional 30 days of unpaid
leave. Additional 15 days paid maternity leave shall also be granted to female
solo parents.
III. Non-Discrimination. – No employer whether in the public or private sector
shall discriminate against the employment of women in order to avoid the
benefits provided for in this Act.
IV. Periodic Review. – The Civil Service Commission (CSC), the DOLE, the
SSS, and the Gender Ombud of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), in
consultation with trade unions, labor organizations, and employers’
representatives shall within one (1) month after the effectivity of this Act
conduct a review of the maternity leave benefits of female workers in the
government service and the private sector, respectively. Thereafter, they shall
include maternity leave benefits in their valuation report conducted every four
(4) years for the SSS and the DOLE and every three (3) years for the CSC, or
more frequently as may be necessary, with the end in view of meeting the
needs of pregnant women and newly-born infants, and improving their
welfare.
V. Penalties. – Whoever fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of this Act
shall be punished by a fine of not less than Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) nor more than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), and
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day nor mere than
twelve (12) years or both. If the act or omission penalized by this Act shall be
committed by an association, partnership, corporation, or any other institution,
its managing head, directors, or partners shall be liable to the penalties
provided in this Act for the offense.
VI. Failure on the part of any association, partnership, corporation, or private
enterprise to comply with the provisions of this Act shall be a ground for non-
renewal of business permits..

2. RA 6725 -Prohibition on Discrimination Against Women

I. RA 6725 prohibits discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of
employment solely on the basis of sex.
II. Under this law, any employer favoring a male employee over a female in
terms of promotion, training opportunities, and other benefits solely on
account of sex is considered discrimination.

III. “The following are acts of discrimination:

(a) Payment of a lesser compensation, including wage, salary or other form of

remuneration and fringe benefits, to a female employee as against a male
employee, for work of equal value; and

(b) Favoring a male employee over a female employee with respect to

promotion, training opportunities, study and scholarship grants solely on
account of their sexes.
 Criminal liability for the willful commission of any unlawful act as provided
in this article or any violation of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to
Section 2 hereof shall be penalized as provided in Articles 288 and 289 of this
Code: Provided, That the institution of any criminal action under this
provision shall not bar the aggrieved employee from filing an entirely separate
and distinct action for money claims, which may include claims for damages
and other affirmative reliefs. The actions hereby authorized shall proceed
independently of each other.”

3. RA 9262 -Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004

I. RA 9262, or An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor
and for Other Purposes, recognizes the need to protect the family and its
members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.
II. Under this law, the state also recognizes the need to protect the family and its
members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.

III. The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through
any of the following acts:

(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;

(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in

conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist
from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or
attempting to restrict or restricting the woman’s or her child’s freedom of
movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or
threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or
child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with
the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman’s or her child’s
movement or conduct:

(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of

custody to her/his family;
 (2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial
support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman’s
children insufficient financial support;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;

(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession,

occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim’s own mon4ey or
properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;

(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose
of controlling her actions or decisions;

(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any
sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force,
physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her
child or her/his immediate family;

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or

through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the
following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or
her child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or

her child against her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to

animals or pets of the woman or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the

woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children
of access to the woman’s child/children.

4. RA 7877 - Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995

I. RA 7877 addresses the issue of sexual harassment committed in employment,
education or training environment. It was signed into law on February 14,
1995, under former President Fidel Ramos' administration.
 II. Sexual favors made as a condition in the employment or granting promotions
or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate,
deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect is
punishable by law.
III. Work-related Sexual Harassment is committed when:

A. The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment,

re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting
said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or
refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the
employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee.
The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under
existing labor laws; or

The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive

environment for the employee.

IV. Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment is committed:

A. Against one who is under the care, custody or supervision of the offender;

B. Against one whose education, training, apprenticeship, or tutorship is

entrusted to the offender;

C. When the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a passing

grade, or granting of honors and scholarships, or the payment of a stipend,
allowance or other benefits, privileges, or considerations; or

D. When the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive

environment for the student, trainee or apprentice.

5. RA 8353 - The Anti-Rape Law of 1997

I. RA 8353 states that any person having carnal knowledge of a woman through
force, threat, or intimidation or by means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority will be punished.
II. Depending on the severity of the case, the offense may be punishable
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.

5. RA 8505 - Rape Victim Assistance and Protection Act of 1998

I. RA 8505 declares the policy of the State to provide necessary assistance and
protection for rape victims.
 II. The government shall coordinate its various agencies and non-government
organizations to work hand in hand for the establishment and operation of a
rape crisis center in every province and city that shall assist and protect rape
victims in the litigation of their cases and their recovery.

6. RA 9710 - Magna Carta of Women

I. RA 9710 is a comprehensive women's human rights law that seeks to
eliminate discrimination through the recognition, protection, fulfillment, and
promotion of the rights of Filipino women, especially those belonging in the
marginalized sectors of the society.
II. It conveys a framework of rights for women based directly on international
law.
III. Pursuant to this law is Executive Order 273 that states the approval and
adoption of Philippine Plan for Gender-Responsive Development, 1995-2025.