Forensic DNA Databasing A European Persp

Forensic DNA
Databasing:
A European
Perspective
Interim Report • June 2005
research funded by The Wellcome Trust, UK
Robin Williams & Paul Johnson

University of Durham, UK
Please contact us at:
School of Applied Social Sciences

University of Durham
32 Old Elvet
Durham
DH1 3HN
England
+44 (0)191 334 6842/3
[email protected] / [email protected]
www.dur.ac.uk/p.j.johnson
Contents
Introduction 1
Section 1
Background 6
Section 2
Forensic uses of DNA in Member States 22
Section 3
Emerging Patterns in EU Forensic
DNA Profiling and Databasing 76
Section 4
Internationalization 100
Section 5
Innovations in DNA
Profiling Technology 120
Notes 131
Bibliography 133
ii
Introduction
This is an interim report of an ongoing study of the development of forensic
DNA profiling and databasing across the European Union. The research, funded
by the Wellcome Trust [GR 073520], began in June 2004 and will finish in May
2007. Its aims are to: explore the scientific, technical, legislative and social
contexts of the current growth of forensic DNA databasing in support of
criminal investigation in the states of the European Union; consider the nature
and implications of increased transnational DNA data sharing and genetic
information exchange in support of criminal investigations across the EU;
investigate emerging trends in current forensic DNA databasing practice;
identify emerging genetic technologies for the identification of physical
characteristics from the analysis of biological material recovered from crime
scenes; and consider the main legal, social and ethical issues arising from these
developments.
The completed study will gather the views of a range of government, criminal
justice, police and human rights professionals concerning DNA profile transfer
and sharing across criminal jurisdictions. It will explore current police
expectations of the genetic analysis of crime scene samples for the prediction
of ‘commonplace characteristics’ of unidentified offenders and assess the
potential for the introduction of this technology into routine crime investigation.
It will compare the UK response to ethical considerations surrounding forensic
DNA databases, such as ‘privacy’, ‘consent’, and ‘confidentiality’, with
responses in other EU countries and evaluate legislative provision for the
protection of individual rights in relation to forensic uses of genetic data. And it
will examine variations in the role and composition of expert advisory
committees in the governance of forensic DNA databases across the EU and
consider the vulnerabilities of differing patterns of governance to emerging
trends in transnational policing.
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Forensic DNA Databasing: A European Perspective Interim Report
For the last year we have been collecting information about recent
developments in forensic DNA profiling and databasing across the EU from a
range of documentary sources and from individuals in many of the relevant
European jurisdictions. We make this information available in this interim report.
The accounts we provide of current profiling and databasing practices in each
of the 25 EU States contain varying levels of detail, levels which reflect our
abilities to collect relevant data at a distance. The next stage of our research
will involve visiting a sample of Member States in order to collect more detailed
information from key stakeholders. However, we are also disseminating the
report that follows in order to encourage suggestions, amendments, comments
and criticisms from anyone with an interest in its content. We expect to use
these responses to develop our own studies and to write a further report in
2007.
This interim account does not try to tell any simple ‘EU story’ with regard to the
police uses of forensic DNA profiles, the establishment of national DNA
databases or the implementation of arrangements for DNA profile exchange
between criminal jurisdictions. As Section 2 of this report shows, and as Section
3 goes on to consider, there remain important differences between member
states in terms of the development and implementation of this technology.
Whilst there is enthusiasm amongst policing authorities in all EU countries for
the use of DNA profiling in support of criminal investigations, legal, financial,
operational and political considerations have meant that the proportion of the
population whose DNA profiles are currently held on criminal intelligence
databases differs greatly from state to state. Fereday (2004) reported data
provided by the ENFSI DNA Working Group on databases held in 16 countries
(including some outside the EU). These returns showed that in April 2004 the
UK held DNA profiles from the largest proportion of its population on criminal
intelligence databases (3.7%) with other countries varying from between
0.002% (Spain) and 0.8% (Austria). The total holdings shown for these countries
comprised 2.9 Million profiles taken from individuals and a further 320,000
unmatched crime scene profiles. 85% of this total was contributed by the
NDNAD of England & Wales. However, recent legislative developments in the
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UK have meant that the difference between England & Wales and all other EU
Member States has been made even greater. It is easily possible that these
changes (to authorize the retention of profiles obtained from all those arrested
on suspicion of involvement in a recordable offence) will mean that the UK
NDNAD will grow to hold more than 20% of the adult population of England &
Wales.
Outline of the report

Section One provides a brief background to recent developments in the use of
forensic DNA profiling and databasing in support of criminal investigations and
identifies the key debates and issues that surround the establishment,
expansion, and uses of national forensic DNA databases. It goes on to outline
the typical set of policy questions that have be addressed by those who wish to
implement forensic DNA databases and summarizes the variety of legislative,
financial and operational considerations that are relevant to their success.
Following a discussion of the inter-relationship between DNA profiling and
databasing at national and international levels, the section ends with a brief
summary of current research literature in this area in order to contextualize our
own, on-going research.
Section Two contains the legislative, scientific and operational information

currently available to us about forensic DNA databasing practices in each of the
25 Member States of the EU. There are many gaps in the current data set, but
these gaps will be filled over the next two years. Whilst the section contains
separate entries for each State, these data are also available as a read-only
Microsoft Office Excel file at the following web address:
http://www.dur.ac.uk/p.j.johnson/European_Database.xls
Readers are encouraged to open this file in order more easily to compare the
varying ways in which different jurisdictions have dealt with common issues.
In Section Three we consider some of the recurrent considerations that are

taken into account when a variety of actors and agencies across the EU and
beyond deliberate on the introduction and expansion of DNA profiling and
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databasing in support of criminal investigations. We note the persistence of a

number of common themes in discussions amongst legislators and other
stakeholders when they consider the ways in which DNA profiling and
databasing should be introduced and regulated within differing legal systems
across the EU. These include: the operationalization of policy commitments
aimed at ‘controlling’ and ‘managing’ crime; concerns about the preservation of
‘due legal process’ in the processing of criminal suspects where biological
evidence is relevant to individual cases; the need to achieve a degree of
consensus on the balance between ‘public security’ and ‘individual liberty’ in
the use of a range of genetic investigatory techniques; and the necessity to
observe relevant legislation governing the storage and handling of personal
information.
Section Four describes recent progress in establishing arrangements to

facilitate DNA profile exchange and DNA database searching across criminal
jurisdictions within the EU and beyond. It begins by noting that this is an
especially complex field of transnational and international activity and
acknowledges the need for more information in order to better understand the
possibilities and limitations of this developing area of investigative,
prosecutorial and scientific cooperation. It considers the various police and
judicial arrangements for the sharing of intelligence in general and forensic
genetic information in particular across national jurisdictions before describing
the mechanisms through which scientific harmonization is being pursued. It then
discusses some of the challenges to the development of more routine profile
exchange as well as the establishment and use of integrated databasing and
searching systems. It concludes by considering some likely futures for these
particular aspects of international police intelligence exchange.
The final section provides a preliminary sketch of some of the important and
recent scientific and technological innovations that support attempts to identify
the physical characteristics of offenders from the genetic and genomic analysis
of crime scene samples. These emerging forms of ‘genetic intelligence’ do not
aim to provide forensic evidence for use in judicial hearings but, rather, are
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expected to provide law enforcers with actionable information for the purposes
of criminal investigation (albeit information of varying degrees of exactitude).
Because of the additional resources currently required to deploy some of these
genetic interrogations many of them, even in jurisdictions that allow their use,
will not be incorporated into routine police inquiries in the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, the final section of the report suggests that the analysis of such
characteristics along with inferences concerning the genetic ancestry or familial
relationships of the individuals who’s DNA has been genotyped raise new
operational, policy, and ethical issues for those involved and interested in the
use of genetic information for crime investigation.
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Section 1
Background
1.1 Introduction
In this section we provide a brief background to recent developments in the use
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of forensic DNA profiling and databasing in support of criminal investigations .
We also consider the introduction of these scientific and technological
innovations in the various Member States of the EU – all of which differ in their
approach to forensic DNA profiling and databasing – and identify the key
debates and issues that surround the establishment, expansion, and uses of
national forensic DNA databases. We go on to outline the typical set of policy
questions that have be addressed by those who wish to implement forensic
DNA databases and summarize the variety of legislative, financial and
operational considerations that are relevant to their success. We discuss the
inter-relationship between DNA profiling and databasing at national and
international levels. And finally we provide a summary of current research
literature in this area in order to contextualize our own, on-going research.
1.2 A brief background to police uses of forensic DNA profiling and databasing
Current methods of forensic DNA profiling (known also as DNA fingerprinting
and DNA typing), based on Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) amplifications of a
varying number of Short Tandem Repeat (STR) loci found at different locations
on the human genome, are regularly described as constituting the ‘gold
standard for identification’ in contemporary society (Lazer & Meyer, 2004: 357;
Lynch, 2003). At a time when criminal justice systems across Europe and beyond
increasingly seek the epistemic authority of a variety of sciences to support the
detection and prosecution of suspects and offenders, genetic science and
recombinant DNA technology are often singled out for particular
commendation. Indeed, the development and application of DNA profiling has
been widely described as the ‘greatest breakthrough in forensic science since
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fingerprinting’ (e.g. Townley & Ede, 2004: 8; Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of

Constabulary, 2000: 12).
Prior to the implementation of PCR methods in the 1990’s, the initial uses of
DNA fingerprinting (based on Multiple and Single Locus Probes) were largely
confined to reactive forensic casework. In this modality of use, laboratories
directly compared DNA profiles obtained from biological material left at crime
scenes with those taken from individuals already in police custody who were
suspected of involvement in the specific criminal offence under investigation.
However, the subsequent ability to construct digital representations of profiles
and store them in continuously searchable computerized databases, together
with widening police powers to take and retain biological samples from
individuals, has made possible a vastly expanded role for DNA profiling. In
particular, police investigators are now able to apply this technology inceptively
rather than reactively. In other words, they can use it to shape an inquiry by
identifying potential suspects from the start rather than using it later to lend
authoritative support to the incrimination or exoneration of otherwise
nominated suspects. A continuous and successive series of laboratory
improvements, to enable the reliable extraction of genetic material from a
wider range of samples in varying conditions, has meant that forensic
laboratories can more easily generate usable DNA profiles. Sometimes (as in
cold case reviews) such DNA profiling may succeed when other forms of
forensic or witness evidence has proved insufficient or unreliable in helping
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bring offenders to justice for crimes committed some years earlier .
Where forensic uses of DNA have been incorporated into routine criminal
investigations this has often both facilitated and reflected important changes in
the organizational practices of policing. Some have gone so far to claim that
this technology has not merely enhanced existing police capacity, but has even
begun to replace 'the slow, tedious and expensive traditional investigative
methods of police interviews' (Watson, 1999: 325). Whilst this may be an
exaggerated claim, and whilst it must be tempered by reference to the many
different methods of policing across the EU, it is often acknowledged that the
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introduction of DNA profiling has provided an especially powerful forensic

resource for the enhancement of a specific model of policing - ‘intelligence-led’
policing. This model, critical of a previous ‘re-active’ model in which police
simply respond to individual reported cases and collect evidence relevant only
to those cases, emphasizes the importance of the collection and interpretation
of a wide range of information, including forensic information, about individuals
and about patterns of crime and criminality. Police agencies then make strategic
use of such collections (available only to those with limited authorized access) to
select, shape and inform more effective law enforcement and criminality
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disruption measures. From this perspective, DNA profiling and databasing can
be understood as one of a series of closely related practices that together
comprise a technologically facilitated infrastructure of intelligence gathering
aimed at crime detection, reduction and the risk management of a 'suspect
population'.
However, whilst scientific rationality and technological instrumentality

undoubtedly function as increasingly important aspects of policing in general it
is not always easy to assess the significance of the contribution of individual
innovations to changing police investigations. There are those who argue that
the majority of criminal investigations have always been shaped by an
attentiveness to the actions of individuals already known to the police. In other
words, that most investigations have always proceeded through the re-selection
of already known suspects and the subsequent effort to construct cases against
one or several such individuals by drawing on a variety of informational forms
including physical evidence, witness statements, observation and police
interviews (see, for example: Packer, 1968; Matza, 1969; McConville et.al, 1991;
Sanders & Young, 2002). Such working practices of 'policing by suspicion' are
said to engender amongst the police a strong and persistent interest in the
ongoing collection, storage and retrieval of information about individuals who
have come to their attention (or who have been made the object of their
attention) in a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons (Manning, 1977).
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If investigative practices are understood this way, then developments in forensic

DNA profiling and data-basing may be important, not because they contribute
to any transformation in investigative practices, but because they provide a
technological gloss on qualitatively variable knowledge of suspect populations
already constructed through highly localized, informal and often unreliable
information. For some commentators (for example, see: Amey et. al, 1996;
Barton and Evans, 1999; Gill, 2000; Heaton, 2000; John and Maguire, 2003;
Maguire and John, 1995), investment in increasingly complex information
handling systems simply mean that '…in the process of targeting these
individuals the organization is more likely to generate further intelligence on
them, thus justifying their selection as targets both retrospectively and
prospectively’ (Innes, 2003: 74).
Such observations raise important questions about the extent to which the
incorporation of DNA databasing across the EU has impacted upon the
mundane processes of criminal investigation. The majority of police users of
DNA profiling and databasing across the world have endorsed its operational
usefulness. However, this endorsement has usually been accompanied by a
recognition that the expanded use of genetic and information technologies for
crime control incurs significant financial costs. Furthermore, the UK experience
shows that the use of DNA databasing in the investigation of certain types of
crime produces different success rates – DNA detections in serious crime
investigation are dramatically lower than in the investigation of volume-crime
such as auto theft and house burglary. Whilst 20 of the 25 Member States of
the EU now operate DNA databases the majority of them consist of small
collections of individuals convicted (and incarcerated) of serious offences. Under
these circumstances a DNA database will not be routinely deployed in the daily
work of volume crime investigation and, as a result, will make no significant
contribution to ‘intelligence-led’ or other variant forms of ‘pro-active’ policing.
1.3 Commentaries and Interpretations

Alongside these debates about the investigative usefulness of DNA profiling
and databasing, the increased visibility of these technologies has engendered a
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range of critical commentaries on their social and ethical significance and

consequences. These commentaries will be examined in more detail as our
research proceeds, but we note their main outlines here.
1.3.1 Surveillance and control

For some observers, the establishment and growth of DNA databases is best
understood as the instantiation of wider and far reaching changes in the modes
of social control that exist in many contemporary European and North American
societies. From this standpoint, these scientific and technological developments
are seen as part of the ‘new culture of crime control’ which has both been
informed by the political and cultural values of late modern society and has in
turn come to shape the ways in which this society has installed ‘…more
intensive regimes of regulation, inspection and control [whilst] our civic culture
becomes increasingly less tolerant and inclusive, increasingly less capable of
trust’ (Garland, 2001: 194-5).
Understood this way, databased DNA profiles are seen as contributions to a

rapidly growing collection of knowledge about citizens, which is part of a ‘bio-
surveillance’ apparatus to be used to detect past, present and potentially future
criminal conduct. DNA databases can be seen as one of a series of ‘centres of
calculation’ (Latour, 1987) whose existence demonstrates the extensive and
intense bureaucratic surveillance of individual subjects. In other words, they are
just one example of a multiplicity of ways in which modern forms of government
seek and use knowledge about their citizens (see for example Lyon, 1991 &
2001; Lyon and Zuriek, 1996; Marx, 2002; Norris and Armstrong, 1999; Norris,
Moran and Armstrong. 1996). It is for this reason that some critics of DNA
databases argue that the extension of police powers to take, retain, and
speculatively search a large and expanding collection of DNA profiles is
disproportionate despite the legitimate public interest in the investigation of
crime.
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1.3.2 Civil liberties and human rights

A second set of comments focus attention on a cluster of issues concerning the
effect of DNA profiling and databasing on civil liberties, the autonomous
actions of human subjects, and the relationship between selves, bodies and
truth. For example it has been argued that DNA profiling represents a new
‘borderless body technology’ (Gibson 2001:73) in which conventional
understandings of the body resting on interior/exterior and part/whole
distinctions are increasingly challenged ‘in the name of control, regulation and
predictability’ (Ball, 2005:100). And, at a community level, Duster (2003, 2004,
2005) and others have noted the ways in which criminal justice DNA databases
re-inscribe prior differences in the treatment of minority groups by the police
and, in doing so, pose new threats to the already excluded. (see also Sankar,
1997,2001 and Lazer [ed], 2004)
Whilst such commentaries differ from place to place and are dependent upon
both the social and legal histories of nation states there are several substantive
topics which recur. The first is the claim that, as relevant technologies develop,
the analysis of genetic samples held by the police may not remain restricted to
currently designated 'noncoding' areas of the human genome, but will expand
to consider various other forms of information that may be derivable from these
samples. Included amongst such possibilities are: genetic risk factors,
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phenotypical information, and 'genetic ancestry' . Secondly, there is a concern
that the lawful authority of the police to take samples under a variety of
conditions (including both consensual and non-consensual ones) should not be
used to coerce or deceive individuals. As O'Neill (2002: 107) puts it: 'If consent
procedures are inadequate, or if public authority is exercised for purposes that
are not essential or in ways that do not command trust, obtaining genetic
profiles will be ethically suspect'. Thirdly, it is contended that however
'uninformative' current genetic profiles are, it is vital to public confidence in the
applications of this technology that such genetic information is held securely
and confidentially and is made available only to other agencies authorized to
share it under clearly specified arrangements. Finally, it is argued that both
routine uses of this technology, and research which seeks to further develop its
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capacity and application, must be subject to adequate independent scrutiny,

especially though the establishment of mechanisms of governance which
provide for expert and external oversight.
1.3.3 The impact of ‘scientification’

A third response has celebrated the increasing ability of genetic technology to
resolve uncertainty by reducing the reliance of investigators and prosecutors on
more subjective or more easily contestable forms of evidence to put before
judges and juries in criminal cases. Ericson and Shearing (1986) have
characterized the investigative contribution of this as an instance of the
'scientification of police work' in which DNA profiling is one of the mechanisms
through which formal scientific reasoning, combined with technological
inventiveness, becomes a ‘means by which the police effect closure and express
authoritative certainty about what they know and the decisions they have taken’
(Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 358). Studies of the uses of DNA profiling in
support of criminal prosecutions have told a similar story, although they have
often stressed the complex trajectory of judicial confidence necessary for the
routinization of such uses (see, for example: Redmayne, 2001). Understood this
way, DNA profiling is one instance of the widespread use of science and
technology to lend specific authority to preferred versions of contested
accounts of 'who did what to whom, when and why' in both operational and
deliberative contexts. Of course, the corollary of this ability has also been the
introduction of the same technology to generate uncertainty in cases where
earlier criminal convictions were based on problematic inferences from available
biological evidence and where DNA analysis can now be used to re-interrogate
such evidence (such is the basis for the ‘Innocence Project’ in the USA which
provides support to incarcerated individuals seeking re-trial on the basis of new
DNA evidence).
1.3.4 Evidential effects

A final set of observations has acknowledged the effect of DNA on uncertainty
reduction in judicial proceedings as described above, but depicts this more
negatively in arguments that the growing use of DNA within the criminal justice
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process endangers or appropriates the justice process in favour of the

exaggerated objectivity attributed to forensic scientific practice (Gerlach 2004,
McCartney, 2003). In an early critique of the expanding uses of DNA in rape
trials, Holmes (1994) argued that DNA profiling had become such a ‘seductive’
technology that its objectivity was taken for granted and concerns about
reliability and validity were being overlooked. Certainly, in the United States
questions about reliability and validity received significant challenge whilst such
issues remained more muted in Europe. Nevertheless, the issues of evidential
reliability and scientific objectivity remain pertinent for both those who would
critique DNA profiling and those forensic scientists who provide statistical
evaluations in court.
1.3.5 Public support

Whilst these different commentaries are easily discernable in a number of
professional, academic, political and mass media interpretations of forensic
DNA profiling and databasing, it is less easy to know what the various publics in
each EU state make of such claims (and of those who make them). An earlier
report by the UK Human Genetics Commission (2001) suggests high level of
public approval in England & Wales for the collection of DNA from a range of
offenders and its retention for use in subsequent investigations. However, we
know little about public perceptions of the more recent legislative changes in
England & Wales that extend police powers of retention to include all those
once arrested regardless of the outcome of any subsequent police actions. It
may be that the dissemination of positive images of police uses of DNA do
indeed ‘provide reassurance to a public, who are perhaps losing their faith and
confidence in the ability of the criminal justice system to live up to the purpose
of protection’ (Kellie 2001). However, it also seems likely that other members of
the public perceive such extensions of police powers as representing erosions
of previously taken-for-granted human rights and civil liberties.
1.4 Finding a balance: key policy considerations for EU member states

In light of the varying responses provoked by the development of police DNA
profiling and databasing it is not surprising that these practices remain the
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subject of intense debate. Policy makers responsible for the introduction of

DNA databases have been required to consider the social, ethical and legal
viability of introducing this novel resource into established criminal justice
systems. In seeking the balanced and proportionate use of DNA by the police,
governments across the EU have considered a number of claims both for and
against this technology. This has usually involved contrasting two distinct sets of
claims.
On the one hand, there are those who argue DNA databases enhance the
public good because they: have the potential to make speedy and robust
suspected offender identifications through automated profile comparisons in
centralized criminal justice databases; provide the ability to confidently
eliminate innocent suspects from investigations; increase the likelihood of
generating reliable and persuasive evidence for use in court; reduce the cost of
many investigations; provide a likely deterrent effect for potential criminal
offenders; and possibly increase public confidence in policing and in the wider
judicial process.
On the other hand, there are those who argue that police DNA databasing:
threatens the bodily integrity of citizens who are subject to the forced and non-
consensual sampling of their genetic material; denigrates privacy rights by
allowing the storage and use of tissue samples; creates the potential for the
future misuse of such samples held in state and privately owned laboratories;
engenders the prospect of long term bio-surveillance; and fosters the possibility
for the deceptive use of DNA forensic evidence in police investigations and
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criminal prosecutions .
When deliberating the establishment and permissible uses of DNA databases in

their own jurisdiction policy makers have been required to provide a balanced
and proportionate response to the two opposing sets of assertions and
concerns outlined above. To reach such a conclusion has usually involved a
consideration of a number of normative questions, which include:
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• under what circumstances should the police be able to obtain, without consent
and with force if necessary, DNA samples from ‘suspects’;
• what range of circumstances and offences should license this sampling;
• what agencies should be permitted to carry out the analysis of the samples;
• what should be the criteria for the inclusion of DNA profiles on databases;
• what are the legitimate uses of samples and profiles held by the police;
• from which individuals should samples and profiles be retained following the
completion of investigations and for how long should they be held;
• who should own, manage, and govern the use of databases accessed by the
police;
• should access to samples and profiles be permitted to any other organizations;
• what systems should be in place for the quality assurance and oversight of the
varying scientific and bureaucratic practices that make up sample analysis,
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profile construction, storage and comparison?
1.5 Commonality and difference

In answering the above questions the governments of EU nations have
deliberated and enacted a range of different legislative arrangements to afford
the police the power to take, store and speculatively search DNA profiles from
both individuals and crime scenes. The range of such legislative powers across
the EU remains considerable – from Member States which continue to restrict
the collection and searching of DNA (e.g. Ireland, Luxembourg and Malta), to
those which limit the collection and storage to cases of serious crime (e.g.
Austria, Finland and The Netherlands), to the extensive collection in the UK
(England & Wales) of all individuals arrested by the police. In the sections of the
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report that follow we explore these key differences: Section 2 provides an

overview of each Member State and Section 3 provides a commentary on these
differences by reference to specific activities of collection, profiling, database
retention and searching.
Yet despite many differences in individual legal, political and cultural histories, it
is possible to discern a common trajectory across the EU in the approach to the
installation and development of forensic DNA profiling and databasing. Whilst
legislators in particular jurisdictions have made varying choices as they have
sought to arbitrate the opposing claims of investigative effectiveness and
personal intrusiveness, there seems a widespread consensus that, at least, the
establishment of DNA registers is a worth-while and positive addition to
criminal justice systems. Moreover there also seems to be a trend for each
country which possesses a database to gradually expand the categories of
individuals from whom DNA samples can be taken and retained for subsequent
searching. Certainly no country has yet ever reduced its established forensic
DNA collection or sought to curtail its uses once it has been embedded
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successfully into its criminal justice system .
1.6 The national and the international

Whilst this report concentrates on the establishment and use of DNA databases
in each member state of the EU it is also concerned with the international uses
of forensic DNA. Across the EU there is increasing interest in supranational
databasing both in the form of specific databases already operated by trans-
national policing organizations (such as Europol) and the, as yet, more
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speculative idea of a pan-EU archive . Rare but high-profile international
criminal investigations have occasionally been used by proponents of national
databasing to lobby for the establishment of such widespread international
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databases . Furthermore, as Governments increasingly debate ways of applying
various biometric technologies (e.g. fingerprinting, iris measurement, facial
geometry) in the effort to register and subsequently authorize those who have a
legitimate claim to citizenship and its various rights, DNA profiling is seen as an
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attractive future possibility . Universal identity registers of the kind soon to be
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11
established in the United Kingdom provide the infrastructural support for the
addition of DNA profiles to currently planned fingerprint and iris biometrics
(and the potential commercial rewards to companies who can provide fast,
robust portable processing facilities are more than sufficient to encourage
research and development by several bio-tech companies in this area).
Section 4 of this report considers the important issue of internationalization in

the development of DNA profiling. It is important to consider how such
internationalization has been responsible for propelling the development of
DNA databases in particular ways. The real outcome of the increased inter-
relationship between Member States in the EU has not been the creation of a
pan-EU DNA archive or a vast increase in data sharing across Europe. On the
contrary, such developments have remained limited. Rather, it is the
establishment of national DNA databases, comprising discrete national
collections, which has been the principle outcome of trans-European forensic
co-operation. Such co-operation can be seen to have promoted DNA databases
in a number of ways:
• the development of a common scientific infrastructure, encouraged through the

partnership of forensic scientists across Europe, has promoted an
internationalization of practices, competencies and procedures;
• the formal legal and policing infrastructures of the EU have encouraged close
co-operation between Member States in their approach to the forensic use of
DNA;
• the growth and success of both public and private forensic enterprises in
specific nation states (such as the Forensic Science Service in the UK and private
companies such as Applied Biosystems) have been the foundation for the
promotion of this technology elsewhere.
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1.7 Current research on EU forensic DNA databasing

Whilst the development of national DNA databases and the creation of supra-
national DNA exchange has proceeded at a significant pace, available
information about these developments is scare. There is no significant body of
research which seeks to provide an overview of the current arrangements for
databasing in these areas. What currently exist is a range of documentary
sources which when combined give a partial perspective about the activities of
both member state and their practice of data-sharing with other EU nations. In
the following paragraphs we detail the existing heterogeneous literature that
can currently be accessed.
As far as we are aware no individual government in the EU has commissioned a

comprehensive comparative study of forensic databasing. Documentary sources
produced by nation states tend to focus exclusively on national databasing
practices and do not consider these in relation to the wider European context.
What do exist, however, are instances in which deliberations in Member States
regarding database arrangements have produced partial cross-national
comparisons. For instance, in exploring a number of social, ethical and legal
issues pertinent to the establishment of a national DNA database in the
Republic of Ireland, the Law Reform Commission situated its own consideration
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within the context of the practices of the UK (England & Wales) and Germany .
These two countries have enacted considerably different legislation in relation
to DNA profiling and databasing and, as such, provide a spectrum in which to
consider questions of proportionality.
Despite legislation enacted by the European Parliament regarding forensic

DNA databasing and profile exchange there has been no published research on
the current arrangements for such practices in the EU. As we argue in section 4
of this report, whilst the legislative bodies of the EU have issued
recommendations and guidelines on forensic uses of DNA they have not
provided any systematic consideration of its uses. Nor has Europol issued any
detailed information on the current use of DNA profiles in its archives.
18
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Research on the scientific and technical issues surrounding EU databasing is

disseminated by a range of organizations that are currently involved in
developing and promoting DNA profiling and databasing. For example, the
European DNA Profiling Group (EDNAP), which has existed since 1988 with the
aim of establishing systematic procedures for data-sharing across the European
community, has published a series of papers on scientific and technological
13
harmonization . Similarly, the Standardization of DNA Profiling in the European
Union (STADNAP) group, which exists to promote co-operation across the EU in
14
order to facilitate ‘technology transfer’, has made findings available . The
European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) is perhaps the most
significant organization to consider issues of DNA profiling and databasing in
the EU. The DNA Working Group at ENSFI have made data available regarding
15
the current size of databases across the EU as well as conducting research on
random match probabilities across 24 European countries using STR population
16
databases .
One of the most significant pieces of research to collate the current uses of
DNA profiling and databasing across a range of countries has been undertaken
17
by Interpol. The ‘Global DNA Database Inquiry’ reports the uses of DNA in all
of the nation states which are members of Interpol, paying attention to its
European Region (which consists of 46 countries and is therefore much larger
than the current grouping of the 25 Member States of the EU under
consideration in this report). The report provides basic information on the
countries that have constructed, or are intending to implement, a national DNA
database as well as what categories of individuals are included on it. The inquiry
also considers the question of independent accreditation for laboratory work,
reporting that 78% of European countries do possess some form of
accreditation.
Academic interest in cross-border EU forensic databasing has remained slight

and there is no significant body of research on the subject. In July 1997 a
special issue of the journal Forensic Science International collected a number of
articles from academics and practitioners across Europe with the intention of
19
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providing a perspective on current EU activities. To date, it is the most

comprehensive collection of literature on the subject. The collection contains
contributions from commentators in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Finland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and The Netherlands. Each contribution gives an overview of
national police databasing and, in some cases, current plans for database
expansion. The journal concludes with a transcript of a discussion between
forensic practitioners and academics from across the EU in which a number of
issues – about DNA sampling, profiling, storage and evidence – are considered.
Since the appearance of this special issue, evidence of further academic interest
has been scarce. Two articles published in 2001 considered the formation of
forensic DNA databases in Europe (Martin, Schmitter & Schneider, 2001) and
their different stages of development (Schneider & Martin, 2001). The latter is a
useful resource since it formulates a number of operational distinctions across
eleven EU states in terms of database inclusion, profile removal criteria, and
protocols for anonymization. The authors also pay attention to the emerging
framework for international exchange of DNA profiles, noting the then
embryonic Interpol database.
This literature has necessarily focused on the scientific and technological issues
that are raised by considerations of EU databasing, such as laboratory and IT
procedures as well as STR harmonization. However, it has also begun the work
of defining the various social, ethical and legal issues that arise in relation to
forensic databasing at both a national and international level. Schneider and
Martin (2001), for instance, compared the legislative frameworks of 15
European nations in order to discern key differences in state legislation
One of the most up-to-date sources for information regarding the current state
of DNA databasing across the world is a web based publication
www.dnaresource.com This publication, although largely focused on North
America, issues regularly bulletins about developments in forensic DNA
casework and databasing. It is published by the law firm Smith Alling Lane who
20
Williams & Johnson
provide specialist legal advice and representation on forensic matters to a

range of governmental and scientific organizations. For instance, Smith Alling
Lane has been responsible for compiling a report for the European Network of
Forensic Science Institutes (ENSFI) which details a number of key legislative
18
distinctions between EU nation states .
21
Section 2
Forensic uses of DNA in
Member States
2.1 Introduction
In this section of the report we provide an account of uses of DNA profiling and
databasing by criminal investigators in each Member State of the EU. This
account is partial and much information is missing from it – information which
we will gather during the next stage of our research. In addition to the
individual entries provided here, all relevant information is also available as a
read-only Microsoft Office Excel file at:
http://www.dur.ac.uk/p.j.johnson/European_Database.xls
Legislative, operational and numerical details shown are the latest available to
us. A later report will be based on a common date so that comparisons will be
more exact. We very much welcome the provision of additional information, or
corrections of existing information, from readers of this report working in
relevant fields. Information can be submitted to us using the contact details at
the front of this report and will greatly assist us in providing as comprehensive
assessment as possible.
The format of this section is as follows:
Each Member State is considered in terms of a number of key criteria that are
essential for the successful use of DNA profiling and databasing by
investigators:
• the scope for the collection of DNA samples from crime scenes and individuals
• the use of such samples and derived profiles for comparison with previously
held records
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Williams & Johnson
• the retention of samples and derived profiles in databases
Where a national DNA database is in existence we provide details of:
• the year of establishment

• the relevant legislation which supports it
• the current size of the database
• the match reports which have been issued from it
We also provide details of other features that are pertinent to the use of DNA
profiling and databasing by the police in Member States:
• the relevant arrangements for custodianship of a database

• the existence of governance provisions
• the applicable data protection legislation
• the provisions for quality control and assessment
23
Austria DATE May 2005
National DNA Database YES Date Established 1st October 1997
Size of database: individual reference profiles crime scene profiles
Relevant national legislation

Sicherheitspolizeigesetz (Security Police Act) 1999
Matches: scene to scene scene to suspect

scenes with nominations individuals nominated
Police personnel have the authority to take DNA SAMPLES from:
CRIME SCENES YES when when no suspect is available / on order of a court

SUSPECTS YES when from suspects of 'severe crimes'
consent is required NO
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES when from those convicted of 'severe crimes'

VOLUNTEERS Y/N when

VICTIMS Y/N when
MISSING PERSONS Y/N when
The minimum age of a person who can be sampled is Subject sampling method Buccal swab
DNA PROFILES can be added, for speculative searching, to the national DNA database
when legally obtained from:
CRIME SCENES YES SUSPECTS YES CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES
VOLUNTEERS Y/N VICTIMS Y/N MISSING PERSONS Y/N
DNA PROFILES can be retained, for speculative searching, on the national DNA database
CRIME SCENES Y/N until

SUSPECTS NO until
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES until
VOLUNTEERS Y/N until
VICTIMS Y/N until
MISSING PERSONS Y/N until
DNA SAMPLES can be stored by the police, or laboratories acting on their behalf, when
legally obtained from:

SUSPECTS NO until
VICTIMS Y/N until
The database custodian is Department of The Interior
Governance is provided by
Match reports are issued by Austrian Central DNA Laboratory to Department of The Interior
Samples are owned by
Profiles are owned by
Samples are stored by
What data protection legislation applies to the use of DNA and the DNA database by the police
What provisions are in place to ensure adequate record keeping and what sanctions if they are not
What legislation applies to the misuse of samples and records and what sanctions are enforced
International exchange of DNA profile information is undertaken YES
with: INTERPOL YES EUROPOL Y/N and
The main laboratory providers of DNA profiling are Central DNA Lab / Institute of Legal Medicine
They are accredited by
Quality control assurance is provided by
The main statistical interpreters are
Autosomal STR loci
Belgium DATE May 2005
National DNA Database YES Date Established 1999

CRIME SCENES Y/N when

SUSPECTS Y/N when
consent is required Y/N
CONVICTED OFFENDERS Y/N when

VOLUNTEERS Y/N when

VICTIMS Y/N when
The minimum age of a person who can be sampled is Subject sampling method
VOLUNTEERS YES VICTIMS NO MISSING PERSONS NO

SUSPECTS NO until
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES until ten years after the death of the individual

VICTIMS Y/N until

SUSPECTS NO until
CONVICTED OFFENDERS NO until
VICTIMS Y/N until
The database custodian is National Institute for Criminalistics and Criminology
Match reports are issued by to
with: INTERPOL Y/N EUROPOL Y/N and
The main laboratory providers of DNA profiling are

Autosomal STR loci
Cyprus DATE May 2005


SUSPECTS Y/N when

VOLUNTEERS Y/N when

VICTIMS Y/N when
CRIME SCENES YES SUSPECTS Y/N CONVICTED OFFENDERS Y/N
VOLUNTEERS Y/N VICTIMS Y/N MISSING PERSONS YES

SUSPECTS Y/N until
CONVICTED OFFENDERS Y/N until
VICTIMS Y/N until

SUSPECTS Y/N until
VICTIMS Y/N until
The database custodian is

International exchange of DNA profile information is undertaken Y/N

Autosomal STR loci
Czech Republic DATE May 2005
Size of database: individual reference profiles 7327 (March03) crime scene profiles 2552 (March03)

Police President Binding Instruction No.88 of 29th May 2002

CRIME SCENES YES when

SUSPECTS YES when

VOLUNTEERS NO when
VICTIMS YES when
MISSING PERSONS YES when
VOLUNTEERS NO VICTIMS YES MISSING PERSONS YES
CRIME SCENES YES until match is made
SUSPECTS NO until
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES until 80 years
VOLUNTEERS NO until
VICTIMS YES until
MISSING PERSONS YES until
SUSPECTS NO until
VOLUNTEERS NO until
VICTIMS YES until
The database custodian is Czech Republic Police Institute of Criminalistics (Prague)
Governance is provided by Data Protection Bureau

Match reports are issued by Institute of Criminalistics to
Samples are owned by The institute which performs the analysis
Profiles are owned by The institute which performs the analysis
Samples are stored by The institute which performs the analysis
Data Protection Act No 525/2004
with: INTERPOL YES EUROPOL YES and
The main laboratory providers of DNA profiling are Czech Republic Police Institute of Criminalistics
Autosomal STR loci
Denmark DATE May 2005


SUSPECTS Y/N when

VOLUNTEERS Y/N when

VICTIMS Y/N when
VOLUNTEERS NO VICTIMS Y/N MISSING PERSONS Y/N

SUSPECTS Y/N until
VICTIMS Y/N until

SUSPECTS Y/N until
VICTIMS Y/N until


Autosomal STR loci
Estonia DATE May 2005
Size of database: individual reference profiles 5100 (Dec2004) crime scene profiles 2200 (Dec2004)

Government of the Republic Act/Databases Act/Police Act/Decree of National Police Comm.


SUSPECTS YES when
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES when

VOLUNTEERS YES when

VICTIMS Y/N when
VOLUNTEERS Y/N VICTIMS NO MISSING PERSONS Y/N
SUSPECTS YES until 30 years
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES until indefinately
VOLUNTEERS NO until (profiles can be retained, but in a seperate database)
VICTIMS Y/N until

MISSING PERSONS YES until identification

SUSPECTS Y/N until
VICTIMS Y/N until

The main laboratory providers of DNA profiling are Forensic Service Centre
Autosomal STR loci
Finland DATE May 2005
National DNA Database YES Date Established 1st September 1999
Size of database: individual reference profiles 17500 Dec2004 crime scene profiles 6050 Dec2004

Coercive Measures Act 1997. From 1st January 2004 amended to extend powers.


SUSPECTS YES when crime carries a term of imprisonment longer than 6 months
CONVICTED OFFENDERS NO when

VOLUNTEERS YES when crime under investigation carries 4 years imprisonment

VICTIMS YES when
VOLUNTEERS NO VICTIMS NO MISSING PERSONS NO
SUSPECTS NO until
VOLUNTEERS NO until
VICTIMS NO until
MISSING PERSONS NO until
SUSPECTS NO until
VOLUNTEERS NO until
VICTIMS NO until
The database custodian is National Bureau of Investigation

Autosomal STR loci SGM+
France DATE May 2005

Legislation: 1998, 2001, 2003


SUSPECTS YES when
consent is required YES
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES when convicted of specified offences

VOLUNTEERS Y/N when

VICTIMS Y/N when
VOLUNTEERS Y/N VICTIMS NO MISSING PERSONS Y/N
CRIME SCENES YES until

SUSPECTS NO until
VOLUNTEERS NO until
VICTIMS NO until

SUSPECTS NO until
VOLUNTEERS NO until
VICTIMS NO until
The database custodian is National Police Force

Autosomal STR loci
Germany DATE May 2005

Legislation: 1998


SUSPECTS Y/N when

VOLUNTEERS Y/N when

VICTIMS Y/N when
VOLUNTEERS Y/N VICTIMS NO MISSING PERSONS YES

SUSPECTS YES until 10 years (adults) 5 years (juveniles). Prolonged retention possible.
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES until 10 years (adults) 5 years (juveniles). Prolonged retention possible.

VICTIMS Y/N until

SUSPECTS NO until
VICTIMS Y/N until
The database custodian is Bundeskriminalamt

Autosomal STR loci
Greece DATE May 2005

Legislation: 2001


SUSPECTS Y/N when

VOLUNTEERS Y/N when

VICTIMS Y/N when
CRIME SCENES Y/N SUSPECTS Y/N CONVICTED OFFENDERS Y/N
VOLUNTEERS Y/N VICTIMS NO MISSING PERSONS YES

SUSPECTS Y/N until
VICTIMS Y/N until

SUSPECTS YES until ten days after speculative search on database

VICTIMS Y/N until
The database custodian is Hellenic Police Headquaters, DNA Laboratory

Autosomal STR loci
Hungary DATE May 2005

Legislation: 2000


SUSPECTS Y/N when

VOLUNTEERS Y/N when

VICTIMS Y/N when
VOLUNTEERS Y/N VICTIMS NO MISSING PERSONS NO

SUSPECTS NO until
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES until twenty years after expiry of sentence

VICTIMS Y/N until

SUSPECTS NO until
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES until twenty years after expiry of sentence

VICTIMS Y/N until
The database custodian is Institute for Forensic Sciences

Autosomal STR loci
Ireland DATE May 2005
National DNA Database NO Date Established


SUSPECTS Y/N when

VOLUNTEERS Y/N when

VICTIMS Y/N when
CRIME SCENES NO SUSPECTS NO CONVICTED OFFENDERS NO
CRIME SCENES NO until

SUSPECTS NO until
VOLUNTEERS NO until
VICTIMS NO until

SUSPECTS NO until
VOLUNTEERS NO until
VICTIMS NO until


Autosomal STR loci
Italy DATE May 2005


SUSPECTS Y/N when

VOLUNTEERS Y/N when

VICTIMS Y/N when

SUSPECTS Y/N until
VICTIMS Y/N until

SUSPECTS Y/N until
VICTIMS Y/N until


Autosomal STR loci
Latvia DATE May 2005
National DNA Database YES Date Established

National DNA Database Law 2003


SUSPECTS YES when

VOLUNTEERS YES when

VICTIMS YES when
VOLUNTEERS YES VICTIMS YES MISSING PERSONS YES
CRIME SCENES YES until 75 years
VOLUNTEERS YES until 75 years
VICTIMS NO until
MISSING PERSONS YES until 75 years
SUSPECTS NO until
VICTIMS YES until for five years
MISSING PERSONS YES until for five years
The database custodian is State Police Forensic Service Department
Governance is provided by State Police Forensic Service Department

Match reports are issued by Forensic Service Department to Police, Courts, Prosecutors
Samples are owned by State Police Forensic Service Department
Profiles are owned by State Police Forensic Service Department
Samples are stored by State Centre for Forensic Medical Examination; Police; Court of Law
The main laboratory providers of DNA profiling are Laboratory of Biology, Police Forensic Dept.
Quality control assurance is provided by ISO 17025
Lithuania DATE May 2005

Legislation: 2002


SUSPECTS Y/N when

VOLUNTEERS Y/N when

VICTIMS Y/N when

SUSPECTS Y/N until
VICTIMS Y/N until

SUSPECTS Y/N until
VICTIMS Y/N until


Autosomal STR loci
Luxembourg DATE May 2005

CRIME SCENES YES when judicial authority is obtained

SUSPECTS YES when judicial authority is obtained

VOLUNTEERS YES when

VICTIMS YES when

SUSPECTS NO until
VOLUNTEERS NO until
VICTIMS NO until

SUSPECTS NO until
VOLUNTEERS NO until
VICTIMS NO until


Autosomal STR loci
Malta DATE May 2005


SUSPECTS YES when non-consensual sampling only on order of magistrate
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES when non-consensual sampling only on order of magistrate

VOLUNTEERS YES when

VICTIMS YES when

SUSPECTS NO until
VOLUNTEERS NO until
VICTIMS NO until

SUSPECTS NO until
VOLUNTEERS NO until
VICTIMS NO until


Autosomal STR loci
Poland DATE May 2005

Legislation: 2001

CRIME SCENES YES when authorized during penal proceedings

SUSPECTS YES when authorized during penal proceedings
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES when authorized during penal proceedings

VOLUNTEERS Y/N when

VICTIMS YES when authorized during penal proceedings
MISSING PERSONS YES when authorized during penal proceedings
CRIME SCENES YES SUSPECTS YES CONVICTED OFFENDERS NO
VOLUNTEERS NO VICTIMS YES MISSING PERSONS YES

VOLUNTEERS NO until
VICTIMS Y/N until
MISSING PERSONS YES until identity is determined

SUSPECTS YES until
VICTIMS YES until
The database custodian is Central Forensic Laboratory of the Polish Police
Governance is provided by Chief Commander of the Polish Police

Samples are owned by Polish Police
Profiles are owned by Polish Police
Samples are stored by Polish Police
Regulation of the Chief Commander of the Polish Police
The main laboratory providers of DNA profiling are Central Forensic Laboratory of the Polish Police
They are accredited by Polish Centre for Accreditation
Quality control assurance is provided by Quality Manager, Central Forensic Laboratory of Polish Police
Portugal DATE May 2005


SUSPECTS Y/N when

VOLUNTEERS Y/N when

VICTIMS Y/N when
CRIME SCENES YES SUSPECTS Y/N CONVICTED OFFENDERS Y/N
VOLUNTEERS Y/N VICTIMS NO MISSING PERSONS NO

SUSPECTS Y/N until
VICTIMS Y/N until

SUSPECTS Y/N until
VICTIMS Y/N until
The database custodian is Policia Judiciaria

Autosomal STR loci
Slovakia DATE May 2005
National DNA Database YES Date Established May 2004
Size of database: individual reference profiles 1000 crime scene profiles

Using DNA analysis for identification of persons (number 417/2002)


SUSPECTS YES when

VOLUNTEERS YES when

VICTIMS Y/N when
VOLUNTEERS YES VICTIMS Y/N MISSING PERSONS YES

SUSPECTS NO until
VICTIMS Y/N until

SUSPECTS NO until
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES until ten years

VICTIMS Y/N until
The database custodian is Institute of Criminalistics, Bratislava

Slovenia DATE May 2005
National DNA Database YES Date Established 1st July 1998
Size of database: individual reference profiles 5500 crime scene profiles 2700

Police Act 1998, Criminal Procedure Act


SUSPECTS YES when suspect of all crimes which can be prosecuted 'ex officio'

VOLUNTEERS YES when

VICTIMS Y/N when
VOLUNTEERS NO VICTIMS Y/N MISSING PERSONS Y/N
CRIME SCENES YES until 'absolute limitation period' (variable)
SUSPECTS NO until
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES until variable according to crime

VICTIMS Y/N until
MISSING PERSONS YES until unllimited retention

SUSPECTS Y/N until
VICTIMS Y/N until

The main laboratory providers of DNA profiling are Police Forensic Science Laboratory
Spain DATE May 2005

Legislation: 1999


SUSPECTS Y/N when

VOLUNTEERS Y/N when

VICTIMS Y/N when
CRIME SCENES YES SUSPECTS YES CONVICTED OFFENDERS Y/N
VOLUNTEERS Y/N VICTIMS YES MISSING PERSONS YES

SUSPECTS Y/N until
VICTIMS Y/N until

SUSPECTS Y/N until
VICTIMS Y/N until


Autosomal STR loci Profiler/Profiler+
Sweden DATE May 2005
Size of database: individual reference profiles 2687 (2003) crime scene profiles 8800 (2003)

Police Data Act 1998 (622)


SUSPECTS YES when deemed suitable to undergo medical examination

VOLUNTEERS YES when

VICTIMS YES when
The minimum age of a person who can be sampled is Subject sampling method blood sample
CRIME SCENES YES SUSPECTS NO CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES
SUSPECTS NO until
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES until ten years after the completion of sentence
VOLUNTEERS NO until
VICTIMS NO until

SUSPECTS NO until
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES until two years / if individual is deceased saved for 25 years

VICTIMS Y/N until
The database custodian is National Laboratory of Sweden
Governance is provided by The National Police Board


Autosomal STR loci
The Netherlands DATE May 2005

DNA legislation: 1994, 2001, 2003, 2004


SUSPECTS YES when crime carries pre-trail detention / ordered by prosecutor
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES when crime carries pre-trial detention / ordered by prosecutor
VOLUNTEERS YES when

VICTIMS YES when
CRIME SCENES YES until Retained for 18 years (or duration of the conviction if matched)
SUSPECTS NO until
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES until 20 / 30 years depending on sentence
VOLUNTEERS NO until
VICTIMS YES until deceased victims only for 18 years

CRIME SCENES YES until Retained for 18 years (or duration of the conviction if matched)
SUSPECTS NO until
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES until 20 / 30 years depending on sentence
VOLUNTEERS NO until
VICTIMS YES until deceased victims only for 18 years
The database custodian is Netherland Forensic Institute
National Dutch Privacy Law
The main laboratory providers of DNA profiling are Netherlands Forensic Institute
UK (England & Wales) DATE May 2005
National DNA Database YES Date Established April 1995
Size of database: individual reference profiles 2.5 million 2004 crime scene profiles 227,000 2004

Legislation: 1994; 2001; 2003


SUSPECTS YES when arrested for recordable offence
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES when convicted of recordable offence

VOLUNTEERS YES when

VICTIMS YES when
The minimum age of a person who can be sampled is 10 Subject sampling method Buccal swab
SUSPECTS YES until death of suspect
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES until death of individual
VOLUNTEERS YES until death of individual
VICTIMS NO until

SUSPECTS YES until death of suspect
VOLUNTEERS YES until death of individual
VICTIMS NO until
The database custodian is Forensic Science Service
Governance is provided by NDNAD Board

Match reports are issued by Forensic Science Service to Police Forces
Samples are owned by ACPO
Profiles are owned by ACPO
Samples are stored by Laboratory to which sample was submitted
Data Protection Act
The main laboratory providers of DNA profiling are FSS, LGC, Cellmark
They are accredited by UKAS
Quality control assurance is provided by ISO 9001, ISO/IEC 17025, ISO/IEC Guide 43
The main statistical interpreters are Scientists in the laboratories to which sample was submitted
UK (Scotland) DATE May 2005
Size of database: individual reference profiles 146,753 (2004) crime scene profiles

Legislation: 1995, 2003


SUSPECTS YES when arrested for offence
CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES when convicted of offence

VOLUNTEERS YES when

VICTIMS YES when
The minimum age of a person who can be sampled is 10 Subject sampling method Buccal swab
SUSPECTS NO until
VOLUNTEERS NO until
VICTIMS NO until

SUSPECTS NO until
VOLUNTEERS NO until
VICTIMS NO until
The database custodian is Police Forensic Science Laboratory, Tayside Police
Governance is provided by ACPOS

Match reports are issued by Tayside Police to Police Forces
Samples are owned by ACPOS
Profiles are owned by ACPOS
Samples are stored by Laboratory to which sample was submitted
Data Protection Act
with: INTERPOL YES EUROPOL YES and all profiles are exported to the NDNAD England & Wales
The main laboratory providers of DNA profiling are Tayside Police Dundee, Strathclyde
They are accredited by UKAS
Quality control assurance is provided by ISO 9001, ISO/IEC 17025, ISO/IEC Guide 43
The main statistical interpreters are Laboratory to which sample was submitted
Section 3
Emerging Patterns in EU
Forensic DNA Profiling
and Databasing
3.1 Introduction
In the previous section we provided individual accounts of the current forensic
uses of DNA profiling and databasing in each EU Member State. Such accounts
show significant differences in the ways in which police forces across the EU
utilize and deploy DNA profiling and databasing in support of criminal
investigations. Whilst DNA profiling is currently used by the police in all EU
states, and many have established and operate forensic DNA databases, there
are wide variations in the range and scope for sampling, profiling and
databasing DNA. Such variations are determined by the legislative and
statutory regulations that govern the ways in which the police in each Member
State may obtain and use genetic samples. These legislative provisions are one
aspect of a wider system of criminal justice in each state which defines powers
and procedures for the police and the courts.
When analyzing the differences which exist in forensic uses of DNA across the
EU it is important, therefore, to consider the significant variations in criminal
justice approaches. For instance, there is the important difference between
common law and civil law traditions in the EU, but there is no singular or simple
structure to the court systems in jurisdictions which operate either a common
law or civil law system. Therefore, it is often difficult to compare the roles and
powers of the courts in one state with those of its neighbours (Mitsilegas,
Monar and Rees, 2003: 13-14) since the various structures and processes have
‘grown and prospered independently of each other’ (Weigend, 1980: 386). Such
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differences both structure and reflect the varying normative and interpretive
frameworks within which criminal acts are categorized and responded to across
the EU (Zedner, 1995: 19).
In addition to such differences there exist several diverse models of policing

that operate in Member States (Hebenton & Thomas, 1995; Delmas-Marty &
Spencer, 2002; Joubert and Bevers, 1996). One fundamental aspect of this
diversity is the degree to which policing is centralized: some countries, for
instance, operate centralized forces whose activities are overseen by relevant
government ministries, such as Austria, Denmark, Greece, Ireland and Portugal;
others, however, operate more decentralized police forces, like those in
Germany and Spain. In some Member States policing is differentiated by
reference to spheres of operational activity, such as the distinction between the
Police nationale and the Gendarmarie nationale in France, and the distinction
between the Carabinieri and the Polizia di Stato in Italy. These, and other
policing arrangements, affect the ways in which forensic science support in
general, and genetic profiling and databasing in particular, are available to
criminal investigators.
Yet despite these, and other significant differences, forensic DNA profiling and
databasing has been incorporated into the criminal justice processes of many
EU States through new, or amended, legislation. Such legislation authorizes
relevant policing and judicial agencies to collect, use, and retain human tissue
samples taken from individuals and collected from scenes of crimes for both
investigative and evidential purposes. In sanctioning these agencies to utilize
novel genetic and information technologies a range of ‘stakeholders’ in each
Member State – including the executive and members of parliament, the
judiciary, advisory bodies, independent commentators, and the police
themselves – have participated in a variety of deliberations over how genetic
19
information should be used in the criminal justice process . These deliberations
and their practical outcomes are informed by, and further instantiate, varying
political, social and ethical concerns and commitments in each country. These
include policy commitments aimed at ‘controlling crime’, concerns about ‘due
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legal process’ in the processing of criminal suspects, the need to achieve a

degree of consensus on the balance between ‘public security’ and ‘individual
liberty’ in the use of a range of investigatory techniques, and the necessity to
observe relevant legislation governing the storage and handling of personal
information. Although there are variations in the interpretation of, and priority
given to, each of these commitments in Member States – variations often
glossed as ‘cultural differences’ – there also exist important similarities.
In this section of the report we offer a provisional account of these similarities –

a partial account which we hope that readers will seek to challenge and critique
– which we will amend and extend, following more detailed conversations with
key stakeholders in EU Member States, during the next stage of this research.
As a way of situating such an analysis we first provide an account of significant
European developments in crime management practices and their impact upon
criminal justice due process.
3.2 DNA and contemporary crime management practice

Several commentators have argued that a new culture of crime control
developed in many western societies at the end of the twentieth century
(Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Braithwaite, 2000; Garland, 1996 & 2001; Rose,
2000). Whilst there are important matters of detail that distinguish different
variants of this argument, Garland neatly sums up:
The most significant development in the crime control field is not the
transformation of criminal justice institutions but rather the
development, alongside these institutions, of a quite different way of
regulating crime and criminals (2001: 170).
Central to this contemporary ‘regulation’ or control of crime has been the

formulation and introduction, across myriad sites and in many differing forms, of
systems designed to more efficiently repress criminal conduct. Crime control,
also incorporated into descriptions of ‘the new surveillance’ (Lyon, 2003), refers
to a collection of governmental, police and private security practices designed
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to maximize actuarial techniques of crime management. DNA databases are

one element in this array of technologies which also include CCTV and other
applications various biometrics (including fingerprints, palm prints, iris
configuration and facial geometry). What makes such practices distinct is that
their uses are not exhaustively determined by their integration into a system of
due legal process. Instead they are more generally available as generic
instruments of social control and social order employing methods, modalities,
or technologies to enhance the repertoire of information available for various
forms of policing. Their use in criminal investigations may not necessarily
require the establishment of reasonable cause for individualized suspicion, or
be relevant to the circumstances of a particular case under investigation.
Furthermore, such methods, which include police databases holding
information on individuals who have previously ‘come to the attention’ of
investigators, are often used to ‘pre-detect’ (Gerlach, 2004: 25) suspects.
Neither the existence of such a record or ‘intelligence’, nor the initial trajectory
of the detection, will normally be revealed to lay triers of fact in order to avoid
prejudicial judgments of the moral character of the accused.
An early attempt to distinguish the central features of ‘crime control’ practices

was made by Herbert Packer (1968) who, in contrasting them with ‘due process’
concerns, sought to outline the ways in which crime control initiatives inform
decision making about and within the criminal justice process and police
practice. Packer’s distinction between crime control and due process drew
attention to the relative priorities given by individuals and agencies to the
achievement of different criminal justice aims. Prioritising ‘crime control’ he
argued led to an emphasis on speedy police investigations, as well as high
detection and conviction rates, fostered a dependency on police judgments
and favoured processes which afforded ‘minimal opportunities for challenge’.
This, he argued, contrasted to those due process concerns which emphasize the
protection of suspects through explicit recognition of relevant rights and
reliance on formal and accountable public forms of adjudication. Whilst the
former priority emphases the ‘zweckrational’ managerial principles of ‘value-for-
money’ and the efficiently targeted use of scarce human and material resources
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(Duff, 1998), the latter emphasizes the ‘wertrational’ values of impartiality,

equity, transparency and integrity (Martin, 2003; Raine and Willson, 1997).
As Packer argued of the tension between these two aspects of the criminal
process:
The two models merely afford a convenient way to talk about the
operation of a process whose day-to-day functioning involves a constant
series of minute adjustments between the competing demands of two
value systems and whose normative future likewise involves a series of
resolutions of the tensions between competing claims (1968).
It is widely asserted that Packer’s (1968) original account of the difference

between crime control and due process priorities is problematic when used to
analyze the practical accomplishment of criminal investigations and the
trajectory of criminal prosecutions (see for example Ashworth, 1998; Damaska,
1973; King, 1981; and a series of exchanges between McConville, Sanders &
Leng and their critics in Noaks, Levi & Maguire [eds], 1995). Nevertheless, his
articulation of the ‘complex of values’ which demands ‘operational efficiency’
and endorses an ‘administrative, almost a managerial model’ (1968: 159) of
policing activities has become increasingly relevant since its original formulation
more than 30 years ago. Characterized by others as an ‘efficiency model’ of
criminal justice (Duff, 1998: 611) and informed by an attentiveness to
instrumental values ‘imported from the technological, scientific and corporate
domains (Gerlach, 2005: 191) this is an especially visible element in the
contemporary police discourses regarding crime management as well as
informing the architecture for the organization of policing. Moreover, in
understanding the role of forensic uses of DNA within the changing landscape
of policing it is helpful to retain Packer’s notion that the criminal justice system
can be characterized as ‘a constant series of minute adjustments’ between such
crime management practices and the concern with due process. This is
essentially because, in developing and implementing DNA profiling and
databasing across the EU, it has often been asserted that the usefulness of
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these technologies is their efficiency and effectiveness in enabling the

identification of previously unknown criminal suspects by the police and,
furthermore, of the adjudication of innocence or guilt in court.
Gerlach (2005) has argued that the introduction of DNA profiling and
databasing into criminal justice systems has produced a profound effect on
crime management practices:
DNA evidence and the DNA sampling of convicted offenders are having
an instrumentalizing effect on crime management; there is a trend
toward applying instrumental rationality over value rationality, and as a
result, forensic DNA techniques are trumping legal protections for the
accused. This instrumental rationality manifests itself not only in judicial
decisions but also in police tactics for acquiring DNA evidence, in
government policies, and in the increasing privatization of the DNA
testing industry’ (Gerlach, 2005: 177).
Gerlach suggests that DNA profiling, rather than being a neutral or passive
instrument of crime management practices, actually impels and fashions the
application of such practices and their associated values. As a result, he
suggests, new forms of instrumental rationality come to replace the types of
rationality which are the traditional foundations of due legal process. Such
instrumental rationality is, he contends, already visible across the criminal justice
system: in court rooms where DNA, along with other forms of scientific
evidence, reconfigure the objective of a trial so that the production of ‘fairness’
is replaced by the production of ‘truth’; in the growth in new police tactics of
surveillance where DNA profiling allows investigators to carry out mass screens
of large numbers of innocent individuals – something which Gans (2001) has
referred to as ‘request surveillance’ – and which erodes their civic rights; and
through the importation of values from the private sector – efficiency,
profitability, productivity, and entrepreneurialism – which become the main
ends of the criminal justice process. For Gerlach, these changes amount to a
fundamental re-emphasis in the criminal justice system towards a type of crime
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management, drawing upon intelligence-led policing, where the due process

concern with ‘justice’ are overshadowed by the principles of management;
management both of socially problematic individuals and their fiscal cost to the
state. This, he argues, represents ‘a shift in legal regimes away from an ideal
type based on political value about the relationship between the individual and
the state toward one based on values imported from the technological,
scientific, and corporate domains’ (Gerlach, 2005: 91).
This is certainly prevalent in the context of the UK where particular agencies,

including the Home Office, ACPO and the Forensic Science Service, have taken
a leading role in efforts to evaluate the effectiveness (and cost effectiveness) of
the contribution of DNA databasing to the detection of offenders. We have
described these developments in detail elsewhere (see: Williams, Johnson &
Martin, 2004) but it is worth noting here that there has been a widespread
dissemination of these ideas from the UK through a range of government,
professional and commercial channels; indeed the ‘success’ of the UK
experience, as a ‘world leader’ in forensic DNA databasing’, is often cited by
those seeking the establishment or expansion of forensic DNA databases
elsewhere in the EU. The most recent example of this was in April 2005 when
the Garda (Republic of Ireland Police) Commissioner, Noel Conroy, made a
speech calling for the introduction of a national DNA database and cited the
experience in the UK where, he claimed, the database had resulted in a 5%
20
reduction in crime and a 50% increase in detections . Such statistics are highly
problematic (see: Williams, Johnson & Martin, 2004) but are regularly deployed
to argue for the significant gains for crime management which DNA databasing
is capable of delivering.
For Derek Beyleveld (1997), who has argued that views about forensic DNA can
be divided up into ‘camp enthusiastic’ and ‘camp hostile’, those who are most
enthusiastic about the use of DNA profiling and databasing are those who are
interested in utilizing forensic DNA to achieve effective and efficient policing.
As a result, Beyleveld argues, those who form ‘camp enthusiastic’ usually
express a number of opinions regarding how forensic DNA should be used,
including: that the police should have maximum access to DNA profiles from all
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individuals; consent should not be required to collect samples; the police

should be able to retain all samples and profiles; all obtained profiles should be
available for speculative searching on a database; current methods of DNA
profiling are adequate; no special regulation of forensic laboratories is
necessary since the evidence they produce is evaluated at trial stage; statistical
certainties offered by forensic databases is adequate; DNA evidence is
sufficient to secure conviction; there is no reason to believe that DNA leads to
miscarriages of justice; it is unrealistic, and expensive, to use post-conviction
DNA testing in cases where convictions were secured without DNA evidence
(Beyleveld, 1997: 5-8).
Variations of these arguments are made on a continual basis across the EU by

those who seek an increase and extension in the reach of forensic DNA within
criminal justice systems. Whilst the views listed above are ideal types – for
instance, it would be rare to find even the most enthusiastic proponent of DNA
arguing that the police should be able to take samples from anyone under any
circumstances (i.e. with no grounds for suspicion of involvement in any illegal
activity) – they are the basis for a number of adapted arguments made by a
range of stakeholders. Importantly, they are representative of the central
concern with using this scientific and technological resource to enhance and
extend methods of crime management.
3.3 Due process and the uses of forensic DNA

It would be misleading to suggest that those who foreground issues of due
process in debates about the uses of forensic DNA in support of criminal
investigations are necessary hostile to rigorous efforts to detect, prosecute and
convict offenders. On the contrary, they often share similar views to those who
emphasize crime management matters regarding the importance of detecting
crime and punishing perpetrators. Most interested parties involved in the
criminal justice system recognize that an effective processing of offenders which
contributes to a reduction in crime is a desirable objective. However, what does
differ for those who prioritize due process issues in discussions about DNA
profiling and databasing are fundamental ideas about how, when and why these
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technologies may be used by the police. As Packer (1968) argues, the concern
for due process is deeply rooted within formal structures of law and not with
crime management per se. If crime management values stress the importance
of the early effective application of DNA profiling and databasing by
investigators, due process values can be seen to stress the importance of
controlling the operational uses of the technology with appropriate levels of
administrative or even judicial supervision. Furthermore, those concerned with
due process emphasize that the importance of the technology lies in its
evidential contribution to a system in which adjudication is made regarding the
innocence or guilt of suspects – that is, in court and not by the police.
At the heart of due process is the ideal of the ‘presumption of innocence’ and
this ideal underwrites a number of arguments about how individuals should be
treated throughout the criminal process. Beyleveld (1997) aligns these values
with the agenda of ‘camp hostile’ and typifies its view of forensic DNA in the
following ways: the power of the police to obtain DNA profiles from individuals
should be limited as far as possible; consent to DNA profiling should be
regarded as foundational; samples and profiles from those exculpated from
investigations should be destroyed; speculative searching of profiles on
databases should be limited; current methods of DNA profiling should be
regarded as inadequate and changed to increase their reliability; the
independent regulation of laboratories is essential since courts and jurors are
often unable to evaluate the weight of forensic evidence; match probabilities
are often confusing and can result in an illegitimate importance being attached
to DNA evidence; it is unacceptable to convict an individual using DNA
evidence alone; DNA testing must be made available to those currently
convicted on non-DNA evidence (Beyleveld, 1997: 5-7).
Central to a due process focus is the ideal that the criminal justice system acts
not to convict offenders – although that may be one of its outcomes – but to
discern and adjudicate the truth. From this perspective it is the courts rather
than the police who hold definitive authority for the disposition of those
suspected of or charged with criminal offences. It therefore follows that whilst
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the police should be afforded relevant and legitimate powers to investigate

possible offences and detect suspects those powers must be ‘balanced’ with
the rights of individuals guaranteed by civil society. Since the police are not the
agents who determine the innocence or guilt of individuals their authority to
impose upon or restrict civil liberties must be proportionate. The European
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) provides the basis for such liberties and
each EU nation state is required to oversee its implementation.
The ECHR provides a useful framework in which to situate due process concerns
about the increasing power of investigators to collect, use and retain DNA
samples and profiles. In the UK, the ECHR has been the basis for a number of
assertions that powers afforded to the police are disproportionate and have a
negative impact on civil liberties – particularly the right to private life enshrined
by Article 8(1) of the ECHR. Whilst such concerns are often subsumed under the
umbrella term ‘ethical issues’, which suggests they are conceptual or
philosophical problems, they actually relate to practical issues in operational
policing. For instance, as we discuss below in more detail, the creation of
‘suspect databases’ by the police – comprising DNA profiles of those not
convicted of a criminal offence – has become a key issue in tensions between
proponents of crime control and due process.
In an earlier comparative review of forensic DNA profiling and databasing,

Schneider, Rittner & Martin (1997: 1) noted that the ‘general European view’ is
that only those convicted of serious crimes should have their DNA profiles
permanently retained on a national DNA database. The authors contrasted this
view with the strong logic of social control in the more inclusive retention
regime of UK which, at the time of the study, allowed the databasing of DNA
taken from individuals convicted of any ‘recordable’ offence. Eight year later,
UK inclusion practices are more widely accepted across Europe and what was
novel in 1997 for the UK is now more common elsewhere. In the UK the
database inclusion regime has changed significantly since 1997. It can be seen,
as we discuss below, as the ‘purest’ example of the application of a crime
management priority, and still remains distinct from the rest of the EU: no
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country other than the UK (England & Wales) permits the permanent retention
of DNA from all criminal suspects regardless of their disposition following their
arrest by the police. What do exist across the EU are different legislative
provisions for the categories of individuals who are included within these
searchable police databases. The extent of this inclusion largely reflects
deliberations informed by concerns to adequately balance the need for crime
management with the protections afforded by due criminal process.
3.4 Comparison and evaluation

The usefulness of thinking about these two distinct criminal justice imperatives
is that it allows us to comprehend how attention to each of them has framed
and shaped deliberations about the permissible uses of forensic DNA profiling
and databasing within EU member states. The negotiation and implementation
of a range of policies, influenced by both crime management and due process
objectives, are central in shaping the operational activities which make the use
of DNA by the police a viable forensic practice. In the UK, for instance, the vast
bulk of the debate about DNA profiling and databasing is focused on efforts to
develop effective crime management and crime reduction strategies, especially
in cases of ‘volume crime’ such as domestic burglaries and vehicle crime.
Legislation exists which permits the police to utilize these technologies without
the need to obtain specific judicial authority or approval in individual cases. In
many EU states, on the other hand, debate continues to centre on due process
issues like the need for individualized suspicion to justify the intrusiveness of
taking DNA samples from criminal suspects as well as the need for conviction to
justify the retention of DNA profiles beyond the end of an investigation. This is
just one, general, example of the many ways in which attention to crime
management and due process concerns structures uses of DNA profiling and
databasing by the police and in the following parts of this section we explore in
more detail key procedures and practices in investigative and scientific DNA
work across the EU.
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3.4.1 Crime scene collection

The collection of forensic evidence from crime scenes is common practice in
every member state of the EU. Attending examiners at scenes of crime routinely
collect a range of forensic materials for later analysis in laboratories. The
collection of DNA is a steadily increasing aspect of crime scene examination
and is now used at scenes of both serious (including violent) crime as well as so-
called ‘volume’ crime (burglary, car theft etc). The process of collecting DNA
from a range of available samples at a crime scene is inevitably an aspect of
police work and is carried out under police authority. However, common to
most EU jurisdictions is recognition that examination of crime scenes may take
place within dwellings and properties regarded in law as private. For this
reason, in most jurisdictions crime scene examination (which may involve the
removal of items from the scene) requires the agreement of the owner or
proprietor of the property involved. This is distinct from the types of searches
carried out by the police during investigations where they can exercise their
own powers, or those granted by the court, to search without consent the
property or premises of suspects.
Given that crime scene examination is a fundamental aspect of police

investigation, and that such investigations are orientated towards the search for
forensic material deposited by an offender, then it is not surprising that the
police, in many jurisdictions, hold the authority to conduct searches. In addition
to this, crime scene examination is most often conducted at the initial stages of
criminal investigation and given its focus is understandably organized and
administered by the police. There has been little objection to the police
collecting DNA in this way. Yet, in some jurisdictions, the police are limited in
their powers to collect. Whilst the collection of potentially important forensic
evidence may be regarded as fundamental to the criminal process – and
therefore that the police should be afforded the power to undertake such
collection – there are aspects of crime scene police work that require more
consideration.
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For instance, in cases of property crime it is possible that samples taken during
crime scene examinations may include the DNA of the victims of the crime in
question. The collection of DNA at the scene of a burglary or car theft will
involve a number of swabs taken from a range of surfaces in order to capture
human tissue for later profiling. The result of this practice is that profiles of
victims of crime may well be collected, and in some jurisdictions, loaded onto
databases. In order to effectively deal with this problem the police may
undertake the collection of elimination samples from victims. These samples
would be used to construct DNA profiles in order to eliminate the victim from
those DNA profiles derived from scene samples. However, there have been
verbal reports from some jurisdictions that victim DNA sample profiles taken for
elimination purposes have been loaded onto their databases.
There is another aspect of crime scene examination which is important but

often overlooked. Crime scene examiners, medical personnel, and police
officers regularly have to collect suspect DNA from human bodies, deposited in
the course of an attack, where a victim is either alive or dead. In the case of a
surviving victim of violence a non-intimate examination may be carried out by
police investigators and intimate examinations by medical personnel. Under
these circumstances the issue of consent is apparent and the police must be
obtained from the victim for bodily examination to be undertaken.
The powers of the police to search for evidence during the investigation of a
crime may therefore demand negotiation, often with a victim, to obtain
consent. In many jurisdictions this negotiation is carried out exclusively by the
police. For instance, in the UK the police are at liberty to collect DNA at their
discretion from crime scenes provided that, where this requires access to
private property, consent is obtained. Whilst this arrangement is common
across the EU in some jurisdictions the power of the police to obtain DNA from
crime scenes must be authorized by judicial process. In Luxembourg, for
example, the police are required to obtain judicial authority for all DNA crime
scene collection. In Austria DNA can only be collected from crime scenes under
police authority during investigations where no suspect has been identified; if a
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suspect is know to the police and they wish to examine a crime scene for DNA
then they are required to obtain authority from the courts.
Such arrangements demonstrate that even though DNA scene collection may
be regarded as a central element in investigatory policing it is situated within a
wider criminal justice process.
3.4.2 Suspect sampling

Taking DNA from suspects is now a central aspect of policing in the majority of
EU states. In those countries which have established a DNA database the vast
majority of profiles entered onto it are obtained from suspects during the
investigation of crime. Yet even in those countries which do not possess a
database, DNA is regularly taken from suspects, in order to compare it with
DNA recovered from crime scenes. All such genetic sampling of individual
suspects by the police – especially those taken without consent – involves
consideration of a number of legal, operational and ethical issues, as reflected
in the comment of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers of February
th
10 1992 that such sampling must:
Take full account of and not contravene such fundamental principles as

the inherent dignity of the individual and the respect for the human
body, the rights of the defence and the principle of proportionality in
the carrying out of criminal justice.
For those who are eager to promote and extend the powers of the police to
sample suspects there is often great emphasis placed on the immediacy of DNA
profiling to exonerate individuals from, as well as implicate individuals in,
criminal suspicion. The point is often made that enabling the police to obtain
DNA samples from suspects introduces a reliable and objective method of
evaluating their presence at a scene of crime. Yet, in order to obtain such a
sample the suspect must undergo a procedure to extract bodily matter – most
commonly cheek cells, or plucked hair, and sometimes blood. This procedure
(classified in many contexts as ‘medical’) raises a number of questions about
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when, under what circumstances, and by whom, individuals be subject to having

their DNA taken for the purposes of investigating a criminal offence.
Whilst there are a number of differences across European Member States in

relation to how the police may take DNA from individuals the issue of ‘the
body’ is prevalent in the laws of all nation states. The body figures in legislation
not simply in relation to DNA sampling but with regard to a whole set of crimes
(for instance, rape) and police procedures (for instance, intimate searching). It is
therefore important to recognize that each nation state possesses two sets of
legal arrangements relating to aspects of the body: first, a definition of when,
and under what circumstances, a breach of the body is considered a criminal
offence; and, second, arrangements for the police to legally ‘interfere’ with
bodily integrity.
Affording the police the authority to take DNA samples without consent
involves making a number of legislative decisions. The first involves deciding at
what stage in criminal procedure an individual should be subject to compulsory
DNA sampling. A second, and related, issue is whether the police themselves
should possess the authority to administer the collection or if they should be
required to obtain judicial approval. A third issue is what types of offences
should allow the compulsory sampling of suspects. And, following that, a fourth
issue is whether such sampling should be relevant to the specific offence in
question.
A number of different arrangements across the EU. A number of states have

‘minimized’ the significance of these issues to maximize the possible sampling
of suspects. On the other hand, a number of states have minimized sampling on
the basis of recognition of these issues. The obvious example in the former
category is the UK (England & Wales) which permits compulsory DNA sampling
at the earliest point of investigation (upon arrest of a suspect) by the police for
any ‘recordable’ offence regardless of whether such a sample is relevant to the
investigation. An example of a country in the latter category is France where
non-consensual sampling of suspects is completely prohibited. These two
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examples form the extremes of a continuum which now exists across the EU,
with the majority of states falling somewhere between them.
In the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Malta police are able to take compulsory
DNA samples from individual suspects but such sampling requires judicial
authority. Requiring the police to obtain this authority is a significant element in
the distribution of powers across the criminal justice system. It prohibits the
automatic sampling of criminal suspects by the police and transfers authority
elsewhere. For some, this transference of power is vital in maintaining a proper
balance between individual rights and police powers. Judicial administration
functions in these arrangements, some would argue, as an important way to
safeguard due process since it situates police sampling within judicial process
rather than as an activity prior to it. Yet for this reason such arrangements have
been criticized because of the limitations they place on the investigative
usefulness of DNA. It is in light of this that most countries which allow DNA to
be taken without consent from suspects do not require the police to apply to an
external source for authority.
It is common across the EU for the police to take DNA during the investigation
of certain types of offences. Most often, these are serious offences which
involve violence against persons. Sometimes the targeting of DNA collection
reflects decisions taken by the police themselves to direct resources to specific
kinds of investigations. However, some countries possess legislation which
delimits the collection of DNA from suspects in relation to specific offences. For
instance, legislation in Austria, Finland and The Netherlands means that the
police can only collect DNA from certain suspects. In Austria, this means that
only suspects in cases of ‘severe crime’ can be sampled. In Finland and The
Netherlands sampling is delimited to crimes which attract specific terms of
imprisonment as a punishment (in Finland 6 months, in The Netherlands 4
years). As a result of such arrangements it is usual that sampling will be
undertaken only in relation to the specific offence in questions. This limits the
scope of sampling since it prohibits the automatic sampling by the police for
the purpose of speculative searching on a database.
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3.4.3 ‘Suspect’ databasing

The issue of retaining, archiving and speculatively searching DNA profiles
obtained from individuals who have not been convicted is central to ongoing
deliberations regarding the legitimate forensic uses of DNA. The UK is the only
EU jurisdiction to practice universal databasing of all profiles derived from
suspects regardless of their subsequent disposition. Any person in England &
Wales who is arrested for any recordable offence can be subject to compulsory
DNA sampling and that sample, and the derived profile, can be retained and
used by the police for the remainder of the individual’s life. This makes the UK
National DNA Database distinct across the EU and accounts for both its rapid
expansion and considerable size. England & Wales remains distinct from
Scotland where only the profiles of the convicted are retained.
The practice of suspect databasing provides a focal point for debate regarding
the legitimate, proportionate and balanced uses of DNA profiling in the criminal
justice system. For some, the concept and practice of ‘suspect databasing’ is
alien to due criminal process since individuals remain ‘suspects’ only until they
have been either exculpated by police investigation or are subject to criminal
prosecution in the courts. Following trial individuals are either cleared of
suspicion or are convicted on the grounds for which they were suspected. This
clear differentiation between the ‘innocent population’, ‘criminal suspects’, and
‘convicted population’ is axiomatic to the organization of forensic DNA
databases across the EU. The temporal aspect of suspicion usually denotes a
timeframe in which it is legitimate to collect, analyze, and speculatively search
the DNA of individuals – that is, the time that they are involved in the due
process of the law.
Most countries who have established DNA databases require their custodians
to destroy DNA profiles and samples taken from those individuals who have
been discharged either prior to prosecution or by the courts. In Austria,
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and The
Netherlands (countries which do operate databases of convicted individuals)
there is no retention or use of DNA from those not convicted of an offence. In
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these countries any retention or subsequent use of DNA profiles following

acquittal is illegal. In three other countries – Estonia, Finland and Germany –
more subtle arrangements cover the use of DNA profiles following acquittal.
Finland, for instance, which requires the destruction of suspect profiles within
one year of criminal acquittal, permits the retention of suspect profiles for ten
years if the suspect is deceased. Germany allows the retention of some suspect
profiles by the police in cases where an individual is suspected of a serious
crime (particularly sexual or homicide) or where they have a previous criminal
record for serious crime. Estonia is the only EU country, other than the UK,
which sanctions a wide regime of suspect retention by permitting police to
retain all legitimately collected DNA profiles from suspects – such retention is
time limited by 30 years.
Those in favour of suspect databasing assert a number of arguments and claims

regarding its contribution to the management of crime. The most central
argument has been made in relation to ideas about recidivism. To understand
this it is first important to recognize that the same arguments underpin the
retention of DNA profiles from those convicted of serious offences. As
Schneider, Rittner & Martin (1997) note, the logic of databasing those convicted
of offences has been predicated on assertions about the typical offending
trajectories of serious offenders – in particular the view that most serious
offenders have convictions for prior minor offences. The standard justification is
therefore: ‘…a potential serial rapist can be denied his ambition as he can be
apprehended after his first rape provided that his profile is already on the
database’ (1997: 1). Whilst this can most certainly be thought of in terms of
‘crime management’ it is also situated within due process concerns. A convicted
offender is databased following due consideration by the courts of relevant
evidence. The retention of DNA here is deemed a ‘balanced’ measure given
that the individual concerned has been convicted. Whilst differences exist
across the EU regarding what types of convictions (and what types of crimes)
should afford the police the power to database DNA it is general practice that
the police will retain the DNA profiles of some (if not all) convicted offenders.
This is not so straight forward in the case of suspect databasing.
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In order to retain the DNA profiles of those whose guilt has not been judicially
established, then other justifications must be offered. In England & Wales these
justification have proved extremely difficult. For some time the UK Government
consistently refused to state that the databasing of suspect profiles is based on
any form of suspicion or concept of recidivism; on the contrary, it was clearly
stated that the retention of DNA profiles from the unconvicted did not
constitute a form of suspicion. For this reason, the Home Office and the
Forensic Science Service of England & Wales were at pains to avoid a
description of the National DNA Database as a ‘suspect database’. However,
since the database now contains individuals who have only been subject to
arrest, finding a suitable phrase to describe the collection has proved difficult.
In a recent statement to Parliament in November 2004, Caroline Flint, Under
Secretary of State at the UK Home Office instantiated a new term to represent
this category when she described the NDNAD as holding the profiles of ‘all
known active suspect offenders’. This problem of nomenclature is not mere
semantics but shows how the process of databasing the DNA profiles of the
unconvicted on a police database raises a number of sensitive issues regarding
the relation of such databasing to due criminal process.
3.4.4 Intelligence or evidence

The operational issues surrounding the collection and use of DNA by the police
are themselves based on a fundamental premise about the role of DNA
databasing within the criminal justice system. Many states allow the police to
utilize DNA databases for ‘intelligence’ purposes. That is, investigative purposes
which aim to provide the police with information about suspects. In those
jurisdictions which allow this such uses are often underpinned by an ethos of
crime management. This bears very little relationship to the process of criminal
administration associated with the courts. For instance, a database which is
used as a ‘weapon’ in the ‘fight against crime’ is therefore not a resource which
is employed during the evidential stages of criminal procedure. In the UK, for
instance, information derived from the National DNA Database is never
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presented in court and remains solely for the purpose of the ‘prevention and
detection of crime’.
The use of a DNA database for intelligence purposes emphasizes its role in the
production of suspects rather than the confirmation of suspicion. Its use is
determined by its objective: to provide the police with the name of a suspect
during the investigation of a crime. Used this way, the database does not form a
mechanism for adjudicating innocence of guilt but forms the basis for
inculpating or exculpating individuals from suspicion. As such, therefore, this
role for DNA databases is very much driven by an ‘intelligence agenda’ that is
focused on the control of crime by the police.
The weight accorded to DNA intelligence databasing in each state of the EU is

demonstrated by the types of collections of DNA profiles held by the police.
For instance, delimiting databases to hold only the profiles of those convicted
of criminal offences demonstrates a relationship between the recognized
importance of police record keeping and the protection of innocent individual
rights. The destruction and removal of DNA profiles taken from an individual
who is no longer a police suspect and who is not a convicted criminal is
undertaken in recognition of the fact that such an individual, subject to due
legal process, is returned to the ‘innocent’ population. For those concerned
with upholding due process values this arrangement, which characterizes most
of the EU, expresses a proportionate and balanced use of DNA databasing.
Whilst different opinions are often expressed about what types of crime should
trigger inclusion on a database the principle that inclusion should follow
conviction is central.
However, for those concerned with intelligence policing the outcome of an

investigation or court hearing may not be the best method with which to assess
the importance or significance of information. It is often argued that those who
are arrested by the police for suspicion of a crime can subsequently evade
prosecution or conviction when they are guilty. Such an argument is recognized
as extremely problematic in terms of due process since the police should not be
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able to make judgments about guilt. It is for this reason that the inclusion on a
DNA database of individuals who are not convicted of an offence is argued to
interfere to their right to innocence in law. However, the inclusion of a one-time
suspect on a database for intelligence purposes can also be recognized as a
vital element in policing. Whilst such individuals remain, along with the rest of
the unconvicted population, innocent in the eyes of the law, they remain
differentiated in the eyes of the police.
3.4.5 The custody, governance, and management of DNA profiling and

databasing
As Schneider, Rittner & Martin argued of the arrangements across the EU for
DNA databasing: ‘Whilst there are significant levels of agreement that DNA
profiling can be carried out, there remains diversity in determining which
experts can carry them out and the levels of supervision and oversight
appropriate to their work’ (1997: 100). Who is responsible for the operation of
police DNA databases is crucial to questions about the status of such databases
within the criminal justice system. Issues about governance, which relate to
questions about database custody, bring into focus a range of concerns about
which personnel have access to databases and who oversees their
management. In some jurisdictions DNA databases are operated and governed
by the police themselves. The Czech Republic, France, Greece, Latvia and
Scotland all operate DNA databases from police laboratories. In other states,
such as England & Wales, The Netherlands and Sweden, DNA databases
custodianship is assigned to independent laboratories. Such laboratories are
state owned and operated but do not employ police personal.
This distinction in custodianship is important in relation to issues of database

governance. The question of independent management by an authority other
than the police has become pivotal in debates. There are two central points
that are often made in relation to this. First, it has been asserted that
independent management of DNA databases is essential to ensure the legality
of databasing and, secondly, that independent custody of databases should be
subject to external scrutiny from a regulatory body or watchdog. Both of these
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elements are argued to be essential to protecting due process values by

ensuring that sensitive data held about citizens is used within the parameters of
the law.
There is also recognition in some states that transparency and accountability of

DNA databases is essential in relation to maintaining public confidence in them.
In The Netherlands, for example, the custodian of the database makes detailed
statistics about the size of the database, the match reports issued, and a range
of other information available via its website (http://www.dnasporen.nl). In the
UK (England & Wales) a National DNA Database Annual Report has been
published twice. These resources are designed to ensure awareness of police
uses of DNA and to demonstrate its effective utilization in investigation. They
are also designed to allay fears regarding the collection and storage of genetic
samples and profiles.
3.4.6 The Role of Expert and Advisory Bodies

In some countries, the work of expert advisory bodies has heavily influenced the
introduction of forensic DNA profiling into the criminal justice system and the
establishment and scope of DNA databases for police use. For example, USA
jurisdictions benefited from the work of the National Research Council
Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science and the National Institute
of Justice Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence (see Jasanoff 2004). The
UK forensic DNA trajectory had no such external guidance. The NDNAD was
established following recommendations of Royal Commission on Criminal
Justice in 1993, a Commission that was heavily lobbied by ACPO and the FSS in
support of such a development. Indeed the UK forensic community remained
relatively exempt from the influence of external bodies until the Human
Genetics Commission (a Government advisory body) began to take an interest
in forensic DNA databasing in the late 1990’s. One member of this body now
sits on the NDNAD Board, although a recent report of the House of Commons
Select Committee on Science and Technology (2005) has suggested the
necessity for wider external expert and lay participation on this board. We have
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yet to determine the existence and influence of similar such expert and advisory
bodies in other EU countries that have national DNA databases.
3.4.7 Data Protection and DNA Databasing

A significant issue in relation to these governance arrangements is the need to
ensure that data protection standards are met by relevant data controllers. Data
protection standards across the EU have significantly harmonized in relation to
the processing, storage and use of personal information and each Member
State is now required to implement measures outlined in Directive 95/46/EC.
This Directive is designed to ensure that personal data is obtained from
individuals in a manner compatible to their right to privacy outlined in Article
8(I) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Directive deals with the
storage of personal information on databases and recognizes their significant
threat to privacy. A further, and comprehensive, piece of EU data-protection
legislation, Regulation (EC) 45/2001, seeks to ensure data-protection standards
within EU community institutions. The Regulation established a European Data
Protection Supervisor to oversee the implementation and conformity to a strict
set of data processing rules and establishes a number of citizen rights in relation
to access to such data. However, Article 20 allows for Community institutions
and bodies to restrict application of the Regulation where such restriction
constitutes a necessary measure in ‘the prevention, investigation, detection and
prosecution of criminal offences’.
The exemption in the Regulation means that ‘data controllers’ of forensic DNA
material are not subject to a wide range of directives on data processing. It
further means that the Data Protection Supervisor has no authority to insist on
adherence to such directives. The exemptions are wide and allow law
enforcement authorities to suspend: Article 4 concerning data quality (which
specifies that data must be ‘processed fairly and lawfully’, ‘collected for
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes’, ‘adequate, relevant’ and ‘accurate’);
Article 11 on the information about data controllers which must be given to
data subjects (such as ‘the identity of the controller’ and ‘the purposes of the
processing operation for which the data are intended’); Articles 13-17 which
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cover rights of access, rectification, blocking, erasure, and notification to third

parties; and Article 37 on traffic and billing data.
We remain unclear about the nature and history of the working relationships
between Data Protection authorities, the custodians of DNA databases and
police users of genetic data in the different States of the EU. Recent prominent
criminal investigations in the UK have occasioned discussions and negotiations
between ACPO and the Information Commissioner and some of these have
resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding which seeks to specify a series of
safeguards for the police uses of particular forms of genetic searches. However,
the Information Commissioner plays no direct role in the governance of the
NDNAD.
3.5 Conclusion
In this section of the report we have made some preliminary remarks about the
common issues faced by legislators and other stakeholders when they consider
the ways in which DNA profiling and databasing should be introduced and
regulated within differing legal systems across the EU. At this stage of the
research we have not yet fixed on a schema for comparison which recognizes
the many detailed differences but which also renders visible the overall shape of
the most significant of these. We expect a fuller immersion in the discussions
with key stakeholders that will take place in the next stage of the research to
provide the resources to construct this schema. In the meantime, we invite
comments on what we have written here in the hope that the challenges they
present will help us to develop our work further. We will acknowledge all such
comments in a later amended account.
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Section 4
Internationalization
4.1 Introduction
In previous sections of this report we have described the various forensic DNA
databases that exist (or are being planned) in the 25 Member States of the EU.
In this section we describe recent progress in establishing arrangements to
facilitate DNA profile exchange and DNA database searching across criminal
jurisdictions within the EU and beyond. We note that this is an especially
complex field of transnational and international activity and we acknowledge
that more information is needed to better understand the possibilities and
limitations of this developing area of investigative, prosecutorial and scientific
cooperation. We begin by considering the various police and judicial
arrangements for the sharing of intelligence in general and forensic genetic
information in particular across national jurisdictions. We then go on to describe
the mechanisms through which scientific harmonization is being pursued. We
discuss some of the challenges to the development of more routine profile
exchange as well as the establishment and use of integrated databasing and
searching systems. Finally we conclude by considering some likely futures for
these particular aspects of international police intelligence exchange.
4.2 Framework for analysis: three ‘levels’ of cooperation and two types of
exchange
Recent accounts of the growth of international cooperation in criminal
investigations as an element of crime control policies and practice (Newburn
and Sparks, 2004; Mitsilegas et.a. 2003; Hebenton & Thomas, 1995) have
recognized the significance of several distinct modes of aggregations of actors
and agencies that operate in this criminal justice arena. Three of these have
already been identified: ‘informal professional networks’, ‘formal
intergovernmental cooperation’ and ‘emergent supranational institutions’ (see
Loader, 2004). The influence of each is important for understanding the
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growing enthusiasm for the establishment of national forensic DNA databases

and the development of international arrangements for forensic DNA
datasharing across the EU. Whilst these forms of professional aggregation are
not isolated from one another – in the sense that their work is imbricated
through various networks – it is helpful to consider them as comprising distinct
sets of working practices and objectives.
In the following parts of this section we will describe how these organizations
and institutions have encouraged the development of effective transnational
uses of forensic DNA in two important ways. First, through the
intergovernmental exchange of DNA profiles and, second, through the creation
of supranational DNA databases. Again, it is important to recognize these two
modes of data-sharing as distinct even when, as is often the case, they involve
the same agencies and networks.
4.3 Policing co-operation and intelligence exchange in the EU

The legal basis upon which police forces in criminal jurisdictions across the EU
exchange intelligence data has been developed through both the Maastricht
Treaty (1992) and subsequently through the Treaty of Amsterdam (in force,
1999). Title VI of Maastricht created the Third Pillar of the EU, ‘Justice and
Home Affairs’, which allowed for a number of cross-border operational activities
between police forces for the purpose of preventing and detecting crimes
(these are outlined in articles 29-42, ‘Provisions on Police and Judicial
Cooperation in Criminal Matters’). It was through this treaty that the European
Police Office (Europol) was established (although it did not become fully
operational until 1999). Maastricht must therefore be seen as instrumental in
formalizing important matters of policing cooperation at both an
intergovernmental and supranational level. However, because Title VI was
modeled on pre-existing intergovernmental modes of cooperation (which were
themselves the remnants of previous European agreements) it faced a number
of criticisms, most notably that it enabled non-harmonized, over-complicated
and non-transparent cooperation whilst affording EU institutions no effective
way of exercising control over Member States' decisions (see Apap, 2002). The
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Treaty of Amsterdam, which reformulated the Third Pillar and brought into
being the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, was a response to this.
Since the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force the EU has grown considerably,
expanding both its external borders and its internal land mass and population.
With the development and implementation of the Schengen acquis, coupled
with the renewed emphasis on the threat of terrorism, the EU has developed a
new ‘security discourse’ (Walker, 2002) focusing on both its frontiers and its
internal territory. A central part of this continually developing culture of EU
securitization is the emphasis on increasing and making more efficient
intelligence exchange between the police forces of 25 EU States as well as
strengthening the role of transnational policing. Both of these aims combine in
the ideal of Europol both as a mechanism for the exchange of intelligence
between nation states and as an autonomous organization capable of providing
member states with relevant intelligence.
As such, Europol’s ‘dual’ intelligence function stems from its situation within an
EU context in which there is no enthusiasm for the creation of an independent,
EU wide police service whilst there is commitment to union-wide internal and
external security. Under Maastricht and Amsterdam the ‘Third Pillar’ of the EU
confers, unlike other aspects of the political architecture which tends towards
the centralization of legislative powers, the responsibility of policing and law-
making to Member States (Walker, 2000). Even following Amsterdam’s attempt
to widen the role for trans-national policing the emphasis remains fixed on
intergovernmental co-operation rather than on supranational policing.
Such co-operation has been encouraged through the Schengen Information

System (SIS) which was developed as an instrument for exchanging information
between nation states that now permitted greater flows of movement of
persons across their borders. The SIS comprises a computerised network which
allows all police stations and consular agents from Schengen group Member
States to access data on specific individuals, vehicles and property. Member
States provide information through national networks which are connected to a
central system. The SIS is the cornerstone of "Schengen-land" (which does not
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currently comprise all members of the EU) and operates within the parameters
of the broader legal structures of the EU. An important development in the SIS
is the advent of, and soon to be implemented, SIRENE system which will give
those Member States who operate within it full access from their national police
computers to the SIS. In the UK, for instance, the SIRENE system is scheduled
to go live in 2006 and will allow police to interrogate the SIS via the Police
National Computer.
The SIS is an example of a formal mechanism designed to facilitate the

exchange of intelligence between Member States. Yet a recent draft framework
published by the Multidisciplinary Group on Organized Crime at the Council of
the European Union recognizes that the systems for exchanging information
(necessary both for pre-investigative intelligence work and mutual assistance in
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criminal investigations between Member States) must be overhauled . The
framework argues that ‘effective and expeditious exchange of information and
intelligence between law enforcement authorities is seriously hampered by
formal procedures, administrative structures and legal obstacles laid down by
Member States’ legislation’ and that, whilst the framework does not ‘purport to
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change these systems’, this is a ‘deficiency that will have to be remedied’ . The
framework proposes to remedy the current systems for intelligence exchange
by creating a common set of conditions through which Member States can
request intelligence from any national EU law enforcement agency.
The framework recommends a series of procedures to simplify the exchange of

intelligence between Member States in relation to the gathering of information
regarding criminal activities attracting a custodial sentence of at least 12
months. It suggests that the exchange of intelligence should be processed
through the widest possible set of channels and that whist SIS, SIRENE and
Europol should be utilized, exchange should also involve direct contact
between national law enforcement agencies. Some such contacts already take
place but the framework stresses that, whereas current data-sharing is
constrained by the legal differences of member states, a ‘horizontal’ approach
should be adopted.
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4.4 Development of the EU legislative arrangements for DNA data-sharing

The development of a framework for cooperation on forensic DNA issues and
the exchange of forensic DNA profiles within the EU is situated within this
broader canvas of criminal justice policy. Yet it is important to note that the first
specific statement on EU DNA profiling and databasing was made in 1992 by
the Council of Europe (Committee of Ministers), rather than by any EU
institution (No. R 92/1). The Council of Europe, responding to the development
and use of DNA profiling in Member States, asserted that DNA was so
potentially effective in the investigation of criminal offences that all states
should adopt the procedure and that ‘recourse to DNA analysis should be
permissible in all appropriate cases, independent of the degree of seriousness
of the offence’. At the time of this recommendation no State had yet
established a national DNA database (it was three years prior to the National
DNA Database in the UK) but DNA profiling was being widely employed in
forensic case work. As well as making a number of recommendations about
when samples and profiles should be taken from individuals by the police, for
what purposes they should be used, and how they should be stored (they
argued for the destruction of samples after profiling has taken place – a
measure not subsequently adopted in England & Wales), they also emphasized
the importance of the ‘transborder exchange of information’. The Council of
Europe asserted that, providing countries conformed to a minimum standard of
laboratory procedures, DNA analysis results should be shared between nation
states for the purpose of criminal investigations.
The first formal recommendation on the exchange of DNA intelligence in the

EU was a Council of the European Union Resolution in June 1997 (97/C193/02).
Made in relation to the EU ‘STOP’ initiative, designed to combat the
international criminal trade in human beings and sexual exploitation of children,
the resolution made a number of recommendations which urged Member
States to establish their own national DNA databases and to standardize their
scientific technology in order to aid the sharing of information across policing
jurisdictions. To encourage the development of DNA exchange The Council
made four specific recommendations. First, they urged further exploration of
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possible systems for exchanging information which, whilst offering sufficient

safeguards for the security and protection of personal data, would allow the
‘creation of a network of compatible national DNA databases’. Second, they
stressed that such data exchange should be restricted to the purposes of
confirming the presence an individual’s on a police database or comparing a
profile with a previously collected crime scene sample. Third, they stated that
an appropriate role for Europol should be considered in relation to these
activities. And finally they argued that the establishment of a European DNA
database should be considered as a ‘second step’ following the realization of
appropriate conditions for the exchange of the DNA analysis results. This
‘second step’ recommendation is important and we consider it in 4.4.1 below.
In 1998 a Council Act (1999/C 26/01) formally outlined standard rules for the
collection, storage and use of personal data by Europol. One type of data
distinguished under the category ‘identification means’ was ‘DNA evaluation
results’. Europol deemed such data appropriate for use ‘to the extent necessary
for identification purposes and without information characterizing personality’.
The Council Act makes an important distinction between what may generally be
thought of as the use of DNA profiles and the more information-rich genetic
samples from which such profiles are derived. However, this distinction was not
explicitly formulated until the 2001 Council Resolution (2001/C 187/01) on the
exchange of DNA analysis results. This resolution made a number of important
assertions regarding the sharing of DNA intelligence between police forces in
different jurisdictions. The most important of these was the recommendation
that, when exchanging DNA analysis results, Member States should limit the
DNA analysis results to chromosome zones containing no ‘genetic expression’,
such as those that provides information about ‘specific hereditary
characteristics’. As well as asserting the importance of using non-coding regions
to produce DNA profiles which could be classified as ‘non-sensitive’
information, Council also urged that, because of the potential for scientific
developments to enable such markers to reveal personal information in the
future, member states should be prepared to delete DNA-analysis results if they
should subsequently prove to contain information on hereditary characteristics
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(we deal with this issue and the implications of such a scientific development in
the Section 5).
The Resolution makes two important practical recommendations regarding how

data should be transmitted between Member States. First, it argues that
Member States should adopt a standard form of data recording procedure
designed specifically for the transmission of information between states and
that a single national contact point should be established for incoming and
outgoing communication. Second, it suggests that electronic forms of
communication are used to aid the speed of information transmission. These
recommendations (particularly the first) point to long standing concerns
regarding the need to harmonize both the scientific basis of the data
exchanged between nation states and the procedures for handling it. Since
Member States have not always used a standard repertoire of STR markers for
DNA profiling the Resolution points to the need to formulate systematic data-
sharing rules to accommodate, if not negate, such differences between
countries.
4.5 ‘Second step’ – a European database

Whilst the points raised in the above recommendations by Council are
important it is clear that the development of an EU infrastructure capable of
supporting the creation of a European DNA database has remained limited.
This reflects the fact that although Maastricht (and subsequently Amsterdam)
provides a broad schema for policing co-operation in the EU the majority of
legislative arrangements and operational activities for policing remain nationally
based. Despite Council’s resolution that a European database be considered as
a second step following the implementation of national databases there is no
significant movement in the EU towards such a cross-national archive. Sporadic
high profile criminal investigations often occasion calls for a European or global
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DNA database . Yet whilst references to the ‘Europeanization’ of DNA
databases are a regular feature of EU political discourse on security there is no
significant programme for the creation of one single EU collection. Nor is there
any real movement towards making the national collections of Member States
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interoperable or inter-connected (in the way that state databases in the US are
linked via CODIS).
This lack of progress in furthering the ‘second step’ of Europeanization reflects

a number of important factors which hinder such a development: particularly, as
we discussed above, the way in which policing remains focused at a national,
rather than EU, level. Yet this focus is maintained, especially in relation to the
forensic use of DNA, not simply because of a lack of EU legislative or political
development but because of its effectiveness. Whilst DNA profiling and
databasing become increasingly important as investigative tools across the EU it
is important to emphasize the small role that it plays in cross-border
investigations between Member States. One explanation for this is that, as the
UK experience has shown, the most easily measurable benefits to policing
offered by DNA profiling and databasing have not been in the detection of
mobile international offenders (for which extended geographical coverage
across the EU is regarded as useful) but rather in the investigation of localized
‘volume’ crimes, especially domestic burglaries and vehicle crime. Whilst the UK
government – and the UK mass media – frequently emphasize the importance
of DNA profiling for the investigation of serious and high profile crimes, the
NDNAD is an instrument designed and largely funded for use in support of
volume crime investigation, especially where no suspect has been identified by
other means. It is the potential to use this archive to enable automated
comparison with the hundreds of biological samples collected at volume crime
scenes which has encouraged successive UK governments to commit substantial
resources to the employment of relevant staff and the development of
necessary technological infrastructure.
It is perhaps for this reason that the interest in establishing a comprehensive

European-wide DNA register has remained lackluster. A recent G5
recommendation on EU security, for example, did not encourage the
establishment of such an instrument but instead actively sought to promote the
development and expansion of national DNA databases as well as emphasizing
the more ‘traditional’ EU concern for the need to increase intelligence
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24
exchange between them . This creates an important distinction between, on
the one hand, the type of databasing undertaken by Member States (which
emphasizes, in respect to local legislation, the routine input and speculative
searching of a collection of DNA profiles) and the international exchange of
DNA profiles between Member States (undertaken on a case-by-case basis). At
the moment, it is the latter which remains the dominant model of exchange in
the EU. However, this type of exchange is often facilitated through the network
of inter-governmental policing organizations which themselves operate
supranational databases.
4.6 Supranational DNA databasing – Interpol, Europol and Trans-national

Policing
Whilst intergovernmental DNA exchange remains the dominant model for EU-
wide use of forensic DNA, supranational DNA collections do exist. These
collections are distinct because, whilst comprising profiles submitted by
Member States, they are databases administered outside of national territories.
The two important DNA databases that currently cover the EU are operated by
Interpol and by Europol.
The Interpol database was set up at the General Secretariat in July 2003 and
aims to provide a resource for DNA exchange and comparison between
Interpol’s 181 member countries. At present the database remains small
despite Interpol’s attempts to encourage its member states to submit profiles
for the investigation of particular crimes or individuals. The Interpol database
contains significant contributions from only two countries, Croatia and the UK,
who have provided a number of unmatched crime scene profiles. This low
submission rate to the database highlights, amongst a range of other factors, a
general recognition that there are limited intelligence benefits to be gained in
most crime investigation by exporting large numbers of DNA profiles for
international searching. Although the Interpol database acts as a hub for the
exchange of intelligence information between police forces it has so far only
recorded one ‘hit’ – between a newly entered profile from Slovenia and a
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previously entered profile from Croatia (nation states which themselves share a
border and common policing history).
Although Interpol is a ‘data hub’ and has no executive power to act on the
information it receives or generates, we have already noted the existence of a
European policing agency with considerable cross-border powers. Europol is a
‘supranational institution’ (Loader 2004) with its own investigative powers. As a
European law enforcement organization its aim is to improve the effectiveness
and co-operation between member states in order to prevent and combat
terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international
organized crime. Whilst Europol has no executive powers (and does not
constitute what is often described as a European FBI) its remit is extensive.
Since it became fully operational in 1999 its activity has grown considerably and
it receives generous funding. A key aspect of its activity is its large intelligence
database comprising data accumulated across the EU and beyond. The
database consists of a collection of computerized Analysis Work Files (AWFs)
which are organized according to known or potential suspects. Europol, under
the terms of its convention, is allowed to collect and store 53 specific types of
data relating to an individual suspect, including information about ‘racial origin,
religious or other beliefs, sexual life, political opinions or membership of
movements or organizations that are not prohibited by law’. Other categories
include: ‘personal details’ (fourteen types of data), ‘physical appearance’ (two
types), ‘identification means’ (five types, including DNA and fingerprints),
occupation and related qualifications (five types), ‘economic and financial
information’ (eight types) and ‘behavioural data’ (eight types).
Whilst Europol incorporates DNA into its database, its archive of DNA profiles is
not organized in a manner comparable to those used by the national forensic
DNA databases of Member States. The Europol database of AWFs is not used
for routine or continuous speculative searching and nor does it receive mass
daily inputs of profiles for automated comparison. Rather, DNA profiles are one
element in the repertoire of ‘identification means’ which objectively
differentiate individuals from one another and assure self-sameness over time –
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necessary features of any intelligence database made up of case files on

particular individuals.
4.7 Europol databasing and speculative searching

The arrangements for supranational databasing described above reflect the
investigative purposes which underwrite Europol’s (and Interpol’s) use of DNA
but it also shows a qualitative difference between the types of uses to which
DNA profiling, and databases, can be put. Whilst it is possible for Europol
investigators to compare their reference profiles with newly available crime
scene profiles this comparison follows rather than leads the development of
other types of intelligence. It does not, therefore, carry out the continuous
speculative (or suspicion-less) searching of profiles central to the public (and
political) imagination of the routine uses of national forensic DNA databases.
This is a crucial distinction because it is essentially the power to speculatively
search DNA databases in order to produce ‘cold hits’ which has made them an
attractive investigative, as well as governmental, resource.
Without the routine loading stream of crime scene profiles onto a database for
comparison with an already existing collection of profiles, the database cannot
function as an instrument capable of producing suspect identities. This makes
the Europol database distinct from the type of pan-EU database which is often
imagined or described by politicians, police, and social commentators. Such a
database is often described in one of two ways: either as a large collection
comprising every DNA profile obtained in every member state of the EU or,
alternatively, as a network of interoperable databases situated in each nation
state.
4.8 Scientific Collaboration, Coordination and Harmonization

Since the late 1980s debates about EU ‘harmonization’ with regard to the
forensic use of DNA have predominately focused on scientific and technical
issues. The 2001 Council of Europe Resolution was influenced by the long-
standing work of those stakeholders who now form the DNA Working Group
(DNAWG) of the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI).
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ENSFI have carried out extensive research on the current scientific platforms
used in different nation states and proposed methods to accommodate
differences between them. The DNAWG is comprised of members from
government, police and academia whose primary interest is in extending the
use of DNA for criminal investigations at both a national and supranational
level. The group’s primary principle is to ‘establish core DNA markers for
national and international criminal or intelligence DNA profile databases in
Europe’ which has also been a long standing interest of the ‘European DNA
Profiling Group’ (EDNAP). EDNAP, formed in 1988 by a small group of
European forensic scientists as a ‘small assembly of laboratory representatives’
(Schneider, Rittner & Martin 1997: 2) and, since 1991, associated with the
International Society for Forensic Genetics, were responsible for the selection of
the ‘European standard set of loci’ now used by Interpol and ENFSI.
Subsequent work by the ‘Standardization of DNA Profiling Techniques in the
European Union’ group (STADNAP) has been focused on the necessity to foster
greater scientific harmonization between nation states.
A variety of additional networks and meetings exist which bring together the
work of a large number of scientists and other stakeholders with an interest in
the uses of forensic DNA profiling. These include the Triennial International
Forensic Science Symposia supported by Interpol and attended by scientists
working in forensic laboratories and forensic services from Interpol states
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throughout the world , a series of ad hoc conferences sponsored by Interpol
(e.g. International DNA Users’ Conferences for Investigating Officers held in
2001, 2002 and 2003, and the INTERPOL DNA Monitoring Expert Group.
Whilst issues of scientific standardization continue to receive attention and

remain an important aspect of data-exchange there is now sufficient
commonality in scientific procedures to facilitate DNA profile transfer between
EU Member States. Where differences exist to produce significant problems for
such exchange is not in the scientific and technological sphere but in divergent
legal and policing traditions, located within the distinct ‘cultural’ and ethical
traditions, which characterize member states. It is these numerous differences
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between how police forces obtain, process, analyze, use and store genetic
information which render the harmonization of DNA databasing problematic.
Such differences also produce a range of problems in relation to the
governance and oversight of the methods of exchange. We turn to discuss
these problems in the next part of this section.
4.9 Governing international DNA profile exchange

A central issue facing the increased exchange of DNA profiles between the
Member States of the EU, along with their inclusion on supranational databases,
is the formation and implementation of data exchange regulation and database
governance. Whilst significant data-transfer does take place between and
across the EU, and whilst each Member State possesses its own arrangements
for the collection and use of DNA profiles, it is the absence of a supranational
authority to govern such forensic activity which is problematic. The current
situation for the governance of the international transfer of forensic DNA
profiles is problematic in two distinct respects: first, nation states do not
converge in their legal provisions for DNA profiling; secondly, relevant state
authorities differ in the positions they take on the many social and ethical and
legal issues that arise in relation to potential supranational practices.
In relation to the first, the distinct criminal justice legislative frameworks of the
EU states dictate the procedures police forces must follow to obtain and use
DNA profiles in support of criminal investigations. These procedures include:
the necessary grounds for the initial collection of DNA samples from certain
individuals under particular conditions; the manner in which such samples can
be taken; the uses to which such samples and any derived profiles can be put;
and the databasing and continuing storage of genetic data. Whilst in England &
Wales the police can obtain and indefinitely retain non-consensual DNA
samples and profiles from any person arrested on suspicion of involvement in a
recordable offence, this is anomalous in comparison to the rest of the EU. As
can be seen in the previous sections of this report, many Member States have a
much more limited repertoire of offences that attract compulsory sampling and
most also limit the time-span for retention. For example, in France the police
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have no powers to obtain non-consensual DNA samples from individual

suspects or to retain the profiles of those not convicted of an offence (non-
consensual samples can be taken from certain categories of individuals already
convicted and incarcerated). Consequently, the Fichier National Automatisé des
Empreintes Génétiques (the French national DNA database) contains only a
small number of profiles from convicted individuals and there is no suspect
database.
A central concern raised by these differences between Member States is that

DNA profiles transmitted to organizations such as Europol may be used and
stored in ways that would be deemed illegal in the jurisdiction where they were
taken: first, some states (for example France) limit the collection of DNA from
narrowly defined categories of offenders and do not operate ‘suspect
databases’ (i.e. databases comprised of those not convicted of offences);
second, some states (for example Germany) make individualized judicial
calibrations of the ‘danger of re-offending’ to determine the retention of
profiles taken from individuals who have been investigated but not convicted of
particular offences; finally, some states (for example Sweden) expunge all
profiles from the database ten years after the completion of an offender’s
sentence. These – and other – legislative differences are significantly multiplied
across the EU. The complexity of this set of legislative arrangements, as we
argued in Section 1, is exemplified by the fact that no authoritative account of
them is currently available to either law enforcement officials or to members of
the public.
Because of these legislative differences a number of public policy issues arise in

relation to the exchange of DNA profile information between Member States
that are in addition to those raised by the use of DNA within separate criminal
jurisdictions. One set of such questions are raised by the submission of DNA
profiles to databases outside of national jurisdictions. Another range of
questions are raised when national DNA collections are utilized by foreign
investigators. These questions are distinct since the first relates to issues that
are raised when DNA profiles and samples leave the jurisdiction in which they
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were obtained (for example, when they are sent for inclusion on a ‘third party’
database) whereas the second relates to issues raised by a jurisdiction allowing
access to its own collection (for example, in the case of allowing foreign
investigators to speculatively search a national database).
4.9.1 Third-party exportation and data protection

When DNA profiles are ‘exported’, then questions arise concerning the ways in
which such information is treated outside of the national jurisdiction in which it
was obtained in terms of the provisions in place to ensure the confidentiality of
the information and to protect the privacy rights of the individuals from which
such information was taken. The 2001 Council Resolution recognizes the
importance of these questions regarding privacy and confidentiality. However,
it gives no indication as to the measures which should be adopted to ensure
that adequate safeguards are in place to prevent the misuse of ‘personal’ data.
Such safeguards are deemed the responsibility of the nation states that
produced the data for exchange.
As noted above, the requirement given to Member States to ensure data

integrity is rendered problematic once profile information leaves a jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, recognizing the concerns about the potential misuse of such
information, Interpol have stressed that their database does not record
identifying details of individuals. They receive and retain only the standardized
numeric profile that is generated from a DNA sample. Interpol use numerical
codes to match profiles submitted by national police forces and where matches
are made these are reported to the force holding the identifying information.
As noted above, the Interpol DNA Database has had few operational successes
and it is therefore difficult to assess the adequacy of the systems in place to
ensure confidentiality. Furthermore, whilst the distinction between a numerical
representation of identity and ‘personal information’ is important, it fails to
acknowledge that unless such distinct data fields can routinely be brought
together any database is rendered operationally worthless. It is also important
to acknowledge that Interpol’s ‘hub’ for the exchange of ‘numerical code’
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should still be subject to whatever governance arrangements exist for the

national DNA databases of member states.
The problematic relationship between national data protection legislation and

supranational intelligence exchange is exemplified by Interpol’s own difficult
history in France which led to the creation of the Commission for the Control of
Interpol’s Files. This commission, previously The Supervisory Board for the
Control of Interpol’s archives, was created by the ‘Headquarters Agreement’
(appended with the ‘Exchange of Letters’) between Interpol and the French
Government. Its genesis is rooted in the claim by the French government that
their law of 6 January 1978 concerning information technology, files and
freedoms was applicable to the nominal data stored in Interpol's premises at
Saint-Cloud, France and that access should be granted through the Commission
Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (French Commission on EDP and
Freedom) which was set up in application of the above-mentioned law and
given powers to control computerized files in France. Interpol argued that this
French national law was not applicable to the police information processed by
the General Secretariat for the following two reasons: first, information
submitted by member countries does not belong to Interpol, which merely acts
as a depository, and applying a national law to such information would give that
law an extraterritorial status; second, applying the Law of 1978 to Interpol's files
in France could hamper international police co-operation, since certain
countries would prefer not to communicate police information which could be
disclosed to French bodies.
The Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files is a direct result of the
consensus reached between Interpol and the French government which was
made official on 3 November 1982 with the signing of a new Headquarters
Agreement. The Commission operates within the framework laid down by the
basic rules governing the Organization, which state that Interpol's aim is ‘'to
ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal
police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries
and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' (Article 2(a) of
the Constitution). The Commission has a supervisory role and is responsible for
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ensuring that the information stored by the General Secretariat is obtained,

processed and stored in accordance with Interpol's rules and regulations and
the purposes stated therein. The Commission’s independence is secured within
Article 19 of the Rules on International Police Co-operation.
The Commission forms the point of contact between Interpol (the General
Secretariat) and external individuals or agencies. It mediates ‘indirect’ access to
files and does not disclose information to individuals without the expressed
consent of the member state which originally transmitted it. In the absence of
such authorization from the member concerned, the Commission informs
parties that it is not empowered to divulge if personal information is held about
them in the General Secretariat's archives, or to allow them access to any
information which might exist. It simply informs the requesting party that the
checks have been carried out. What these arrangements show is that the
arrangements and responsibility for data protection and freedom of information
are located with the ‘owners’ of the data, who remain the nation states that
submitted it to Interpol.
We noted in Section 3 that EU data protection legislation, both at the national

and supra-national levels, have exemptions covering the use of data in criminal
investigations. The implication of this is that supranational organizations, such
as Europol, are not significantly accountable to either the data-protection
legislation of the member states which it represents or to international
regulations. Europol has its own convention which outlines how personal data
may be used and a Joint Supervisory Body was created to monitor its
adherence to its own data protection rules. This Body is comprised of
representatives from data protection supervisory authorities in the member
states and has access to all data held by Europol. However, it has no powers to
enforce any changes in Europol’s records or act to intervene in Europol’s
handling of data (Statewatch, 2002). Furthermore, there is no regulatory
authority with powers to oversee the transfer of data from Europol to ‘third
countries’ (nations outside the EU). Whilst third countries are assessed by
Europol in terms of their standards for meeting data protection criteria there is
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no independent body designated with the capacity to independently scrutinize

such transactions.
4.9.2 Inter-governmental cooperation and data protection

A second set of issues, regarding the exchange of information between national
police forces, relates to the sharing of information which does not involve third
party organizations. Specifically it involves allowing foreign investigators access
to stored information on the national DNA databases of EU countries. For
example, in February 2003, France enacted its new Internal Security Law which
provides for external access to national police databases by police forces
outside of its jurisdiction. What is contentious about such practices is how
information is handled, stored and used once it leaves the jurisdiction in which it
was obtained. A recent case which required police involvement across France,
the UK and the USA showed that DNA profile information was exchanged
across national borders and between investigating police forces. There is no
formal, global provision to safeguard the confidentiality of DNA profiles under
these circumstances. Furthermore there is no way of ascertaining the extent of
the storage and use of profiles from one jurisdiction in other multiple
jurisdictions. The UK Parliamentary Joint Committee of Human Rights has
expressed concern about foreign investigators using the NDNAD for ‘fishing
expeditions’ and the data-protection issued which this raises.
4.10 Conclusion and future trends

The desire to foster and expand pan-European forensic DNA sharing is a
longstanding feature of both EU politics and policing. This is one element in an
increasingly sophisticated network of intelligence gathering across the EU which
is has been described as driven by a ‘transnational police elite’ who have ‘come
to form part of an opaque, thinly accountable policy network increasingly
organized around an ideology of European security’ (Loader, 2004: 57 emphasis
in original). It is the recurrent political concern with EU security which underpins
the justification for collecting and maintaining large archives of data that are
independent of national policing authorities. Yet, ‘security’ is a contestable term
in relation to the collection and use of certain forms of biometric information
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utilized for ‘tracking’ individuals. There has been no significant or systematic

consideration by the Council, Commission or Parliament of the EU of the
usefulness of using DNA in relation to either security or law enforcement. What
exist are rather piecemeal recommendations within the EU regarding the legal
basis for the exchange of DNA profile data between member states.
This means that the current status of such data-sharing remains problematic for
a number of reasons. Harmonization is hampered by the range of differing
social and legislative contexts in which DNA is obtained and data-based by
police forces – from states (such as The Republic of Ireland) which do not
possess a database to countries (such as England & Wales) with very wide
authority to retain the DNA of both the convicted and the unconvicted. Whilst
there is scope for countries that do not possess the relevant authority to collect
DNA from suspects to submit crime scene profiles (and profiles obtained
covertly from individuals) to supranational organizations such as Europol there
are minimum advantage to be gained. Without a pre-existing national archive
capable of providing profiles obtained from individuals with whom such crime
scene profiles can be compared forensic DNA will deliver limited results. It is
the power of a DNA database containing a large number of profiles obtained
from known individuals which delivers the maximum benefits from forensic DNA
profiling and it is precisely such a database that is missing at an EU level.
Yet the continued exchange of DNA profiles between the member states of the
EU raises a number of important issues that will form the basis for future
debate. First, the continued international exchange of DNA profiles in a context
which is characterized by the absence of any formal EU governance raises a
number of questions about data protection and security. Second, the vast
differences in member states’ legislative and procedural provision for obtaining
and storing DNA is in marked contrast to the current lack of a formal
mechanism for governing and monitoring the scope of supranational
databasing by Europol and Interpol. Third, the political emphasis and
commitment to constructing national DNA databases in each member state
remains varied and, in some countries, unrealized.
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One future trend currently being speculated upon is the possibility of

incorporating a DNA biometric into passports and awaiting the development of
technology which will make profile comparison an instantaneous practice. This
would create procedural continuity across all twenty-five Member States and
produce an archive of roughly 450 million DNA profiles. It is perhaps for this
reason that some politicians have introduced DNA into the discussions of
passport controls. But there are a number of social, ethical and legal issues that
would arise from this practice. In particular, any large scale database comprising
all EU citizens would need to be subject to comprehensive transnational
governance arrangements in order to ensure data integrity and protection.
Furthermore, the suggestion that genetic databases established for identity
verification could also be used to facilitate identity attribution by criminal
investigators remains an unexplored and untested possibility. Whilst such a
development may seem a highly cost-effective approach to the generation and
deployment of ‘forensic intelligence’, it would also raise serious questions
concerning the balance between measures aimed at securing public safety and
the civil liberties of EU subjects. Even at a time when the discourse of security
has assumed such a highly dramatized form, it seems unlikely that proposals for
the establishment of such an extensive internationalized collection of genetic
material would receive widespread national support.
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Section 5
Innovations in DNA
Profiling Technology
5.1 Introduction
In light of new forms of genetic knowledge, technological improvements in
processing, and the perceived rewards of investigative ingenuity, there are
constant innovations in methods for interrogating the informational content of
biological samples obtained from scenes of crime which, following STR
profiling, have failed to match any individual already held on a searchable
database. The capacity to analyze unidentified genetic samples for content that
can yield identifying information has continued to grow over the last decade. At
present analysis can be undertaken to gain information about phenotypical
attributes, ‘bio-geographic ancestry’ and ‘familial relationships’. Some
interrogations involve the direct examination of coding regions of the human
genome – genes themselves – while others rely on new ways of using
information from the non-coding areas already examined by conventional
forensic genotyping.
Successful applications of such innovations to specific criminal cases – especially

‘hard-to-solve’ cases – often become the subject of widespread media
attention, but the trajectories of their implementation are usually more complex
and uncertain than may appear from newspaper and broadcast accounts. The
research base for these developments has typically been in specialist forensic
laboratories or in private biotech companies, although in some cases – at least
in the UK – independent academic research, carried out by particular individuals
or small research groups and supported by research councils or charities, has
also provided significant scientific and technological resources. In many of these
latter cases, novel techniques or approaches have been commended for their
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potential to resolve a variety of specific investigative uncertainties. These

emerging forms of ‘genetic intelligence’ are not aimed at providing forensic
evidence for use in judicial hearings but, rather, are expected to provide law
enforcers with actionable information for the purposes of criminal investigation
(albeit information of varying degrees of exactitude). Because of the additional
resources currently required to deploy some of these genetic interrogations
many of them, even in jurisdictions that allow their use, will not be incorporated
into routine police inquiries in the foreseeable future.
In this final section of our interim report we provide a brief overview of these
areas of scientific and operational innovation. All of them raise new practical,
policy, and ethical issues for those involved and interested in the use of genetic
information for crime investigation. It is our intention (described in the original
project outline for this study) to examine them in more detail in Spring 2006.
5.2 ‘Genetic Ancestry’, ‘Population Groups’ and Forensic Investigations

One particularly complex area of genetic information of interest to criminal
investigators has been that of patterned human genetic diversity. Knowledge of
the differential variability of genotypes according to population groups has
been relevant to the calculation of random match probabilities since the early
days of DNA profiling. Whilst the details of population genetics are largely of
interest to the specialized forensic community, the ability to infer the population
origin of an otherwise unidentified crime scene stain is of significant interest to
investigators: specifically, the possibility of relating this genetic knowledge to
lay characterizations, of the ‘racial origins’, ‘ethnic origin’ ‘ethnic affiliation’ or
even ‘ethnic appearance’ of individuals. Reliable inferences of this kind can be
used to focus subsequent inquiries, to determine an interview strategy, to
compare with witness statements, or to design an intelligence-led mass DNA
screen.
There are of course many conceptual and operational uncertainties surrounding

the ‘ethnic estimation’ of individuals whose biological material has been
recovered from scenes of crime. Moreover, there is a danger, well articulated
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by Duster (2003, 2004 & 2005), Cho & Sankar (2004 and 2005), and others that
‘race’ will be reified in the attempt to define distinctive human population
groups and subgroups. These critics also point to the ways in which questions
of genetic ‘ancestral attribution’ for these limited and pragmatic purposes can
easily become confused with more ambitious theoretical assertions concerning
the biology of ‘race’ as well as ‘some old and dangerously regressive ideas
about how to explain criminal conduct’ (Duster, 2003: 151)
Despite these problems, a number of forensic laboratories and agencies have

added to their analysis of autosomal DNA STRs and SNPs, Y-chromosome STR
and Y-chromosome SNP multiplexes for the analysis of loci whose polymorphic
26
range is already databased by a variety of international consortia . The Y-
chromosome is an especially suitable site for such investigations because of the
low rate of recombination on this chromosome. This means that particular male-
specific haplotypes are preserved across generations and vary systematically
across different population groups (see Jobling et.al. 1995, 1997 and Jobling
2001 for accounts of this). Thus there are several ways in which these systematic
variations have been examined in forensic contexts. We describe them below.
5.2.1 Autosomal STRs and ‘ethnic inference’

Lowe et.al. (2001) have described the methodology used by the UK Forensic
Science Service for inferring the ‘ethnic origin’ of DNA samples profiled using
®
the second generation multiplex test SGM which comprises analysis of six loci
and amelogenin. Based on previous work using RFLP analysis carried out by
®
Evett et.al (1992), as well as on SGM by Evett et.al. (1997), the method
estimates the proportion of any profiled genotype found amongst five
ethnically differentiated British sub-populations (‘Caucasian’, ‘Afro-Caribbean’,
27
‘Indian sub-continental’, ‘Southeast Asian’ and ‘Middle Easterners’) . These are
the ethnic designations used by the police and recorded together with genetic
profiles obtained from individuals whose DNA was sampled on arrest. Their
results showed that analysis of the six autosomal STR loci provided designations
of population of origin that were correct in only 56% of those described as
‘Caucasians’, 67% of those described as ‘Afro-Caribbeans’ and 43% of ‘South
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Asians. The authors are careful to note that dependence on such designations
affects the validity of potential inferences and that the method is a probabilistic
rather than a categorical one. However, it is not clear that they fully recognize
the problems that surround the theoretical underpinning of such an approach.
This can be seen in their claim that ‘the composition of the databases cannot be
regarded as ethnically pure’ (Lowe et.al. 2001: 21). Such a comment is
problematic because of its confusing use of ‘ethnicity’ in relation to ‘purity’.
Even if another term was substituted for ‘ethnicity’ it would remain analogous
to modern societies in which there are few ‘geographically localized,
reproductively isolated groups(s)’ (Duster, 2005: 1051) representing any simple
ethnic ‘purity’.
5.2.2 Y-chromosome STRs

Recent years have seen a substantial expansion in the use of Y chromosome
STR markers for the analysis of crime scene samples. Whilst one use of such Y
STR markers has been for the interpretation of mixed male/female biological
samples (e.g. those collected during the investigation of rapes and other sexual
assaults) they can also be interrogated to infer the ‘specific population group’
28
to which genetic material is affiliated . Such inferences are based on the use of
existing evidence of both distinctive and shared paternal lineage amongst
specific population groups. Amongst the research and reference databases that
provide such evidence are the Y-STR haplotype reference database
(www.yhrd.org), the US population database (www.ystr.org/usa), and a
European population database (www.ysrt.charite.de). Whilst studies that have
used Y-chromosome haplotypes to infer the ‘racial origin’ of samples have
produced better results than the studies reported in the previous sub-section,
there are still shortcomings in the accuracy of their designations. For example
Syndercombe-Court et. al. (2003) correctly identified 80%, 72% and 89% of
individuals who had defined themselves and both parents as ‘White’, ‘Black’ or
‘South Asian’.
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5.2.3 Autosomal Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs)

There are believed to be 10 million SNPs in the human genome. According to
Sobrino et. al. (2005: 1) ‘more than 5 million SNPs have been collected and
around 4 million SNPs have been validated, this it to say they have been
confirmed to be polymorphic in one or various major population groups.’ There
have been several surveys of SNP polymorphisms, many of which are collected
together in a global haplotype map known as the ‘HapMap’ (www.hapmap.org).
SNPs have a much more limited polymorphic range than STRs, so that about
four times as many SNPs are needed to produce profiles, capable of
discriminating individuality, as those used by STR typing (Sobrino et.al 2005; Gill
2001; Chakraborty et.al. 2001).
There are a number of different SNP typing technologies. However, many of

them have limited multiplexing capability and, because of this, are unlikely to
be technologies of choice for the routine analysis of crime scene samples.
Whilst rapid developments in this field may alter this possibility (Sobrino et. al
2005) the current expert view is that SNPs are unlikely to replace STRs for large
scale forensic databasing in the foreseeable future (Gill et.al 2004).
Nevertheless, the establishment and expansion of SNP forensic databases
alongside current STR collections is not out of the question.
Despite problems with SNPs their analytical scope means that they can serve
valuable forensic identification functions, especially in situations where samples
are too degraded to make STR typing possible. Frudakis et. al. (2003) have
suggested that recent research on more than 200 autosomal SNPs shows that
56 of them differed between ‘three major race groups’ and can therefore be
used to infer ‘racial origins’. Indeed, this research has been used to add
credibility to the commercial genotyping service provided by Genomics Inc. of
Sarasota, Florida and there have been a small number of high-profile criminal
inquiries in the United States to which this company has contributed.
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5.2.4 Y-chromosome SNPs

The Y Chromosome Consortium (2002) has provided a ‘phylogenetic tree’
which describes the history of 18 major lineages of diverse SNP haplotypes
across human populations. Jobling (2001), Vallone & Butler (2004), Wetton et.al.
(2005) and others have recently discussed the development and use of Y-SNP
multiplexes to support inferences of population origin. In the study by Wetton
et.al (2005) samples obtained from the UK NDNAD and from volunteer donors
were SNP typed on 43 loci to assign each individual to one of the 18 lineages.
These assignations were subsequently compared to the visual classifications
made of 627 donors using the full repertoire of six ‘ethnic appearance’
categories used by the police (pale-skinned Caucasian, dark skinned Caucasian,
African/Afro-Caribbean, Indian Sub-continent, East Asian and North
African/Middle Eastern). When a comparison was made between the
assignment of each individual to one of these groups on the basis of visual
appearance and the assignment on the basis of Y-SNP inference, there was high
but variable concordance. The spread ranged from a low of 74% of concordant
assignments to the Indian Sub-continent ethnic appearance category to a high
of 88% of concordant assignments to the pale-skinned Caucasian ethnic
appearance category. Once again, the researchers note the contribution to
admixtures to failures to concordant assignment, recommend the use of such Y-
Chromosome SNP haplotyping in combination with other tests of biogenetic
ancestry (e.g. mitochondrial sequence data, autosomal STRs), and conclude that
useful rather than definitive intelligence can be derived for use by investigators.
We are not yet in a position to adequately evaluate the significance of these

various efforts to provide information about genetic ancestry. A clear
preference for SNPs markers over STRs seems to have emerged over the last
few years and large numbers of SNPs are now combined to form ‘ancestry-
informative markers’, some of which have been used in forensic casework
(Shriver, Fudakis & Budowle 2005). However, until recently, there have been
problems in standardizing such markers and in the standardization of haplotype
nomenclature (Tyler-Smith 1999). It is also reported that the increase in
populations of mixed origin is a feature of complex urban societies so that
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‘indirect deductions about individuals are often unreliable’ (Jobling 2001: 161).
Even when the pattern of differential SNP distributions is used to ‘improve’ the
accuracy of such inferences, as in the case with ‘proportional ancestry’ studies,
there remain conspicuous uncertainties.
5.3 Inferring Specific Phenotypical Features – the ‘Genetic Photofit’

In addition to efforts at identifying the genetic ancestry of unmatched crime
scene stains, forensic scientists and police investigators remain interested in
whether interrogations of such stains may yield information about a wide
repertoire of visible characteristics of their donors. For the purposes of police
investigations, the ability directly to determine individuals’ physical
characteristics may be more appealing than inferring those characteristics from
assumptions of biogeographic ancestry. The most frequently used method of
direct interrogation – of the amelogenin locus – determines the biological sex
of the DNA source and is already incorporated into the majority of multiplex
systems. Aside from this test, however, the research literature reveals limited
success in attributing phenotype from genotype in ways that are practically
useful to investigators. The UK Police Science and Technology Strategy 2003 to
2008 makes a commitment to support the development of research which will
‘predict physical characteristics’ from DNA, but an initial review of forensic work
in this field suggests that positive results remain scare. Whilst analysis of the
human melanocortin 1 receptor gene can be used to indicate ‘red hair’ in the
relevant subject (Grimes et.al. 2001), hair loss and hair colouring can make this
test problematic when applied in investigatory contexts.
Both STR and SNP profiling are of interest to forensic scientists keen to develop
predictive tests for a range of other observable physical characteristics including
eye colour, skin type, and height. It seems likely that SNP analysis may prove
more successful than STR markers as the basis for such tests. This is not simply
because most genomic mutations are single base changes but also because
there is considerable research being carried out beyond the forensic community
to identify SNP polymorphisms and their effects on a variety of human
attributes. For example DNAPrint Genomics offers ‘RETINOME’ to forensic
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investigators in which it is possible to infer eye colour – in part from a ‘human

pigmentation’ gene SNP along with other ancestral marker SNPs. There may
be other such tests available but we know little of their reliability or their
practical applicability to criminal investigations.
5.4. Familial Searching

The term familial searching, as used by forensic scientists and police officers in
the UK, refers to a form of database searching based on knowledge about the
probability of matches between the STR markers of two members of the same
family (as opposed to the probability of matches between these markers when
the individuals compared are unrelated). This practice makes use of
understandings of inheritance that prefigured the discovery of the structure of
DNA and which had been largely applied to understanding variation in human,
animal and plant phenotypical characteristics (see: Bieber, 2004 for a summary
account of these assumptions as applied to the forensic context). The work of
Alec Jeffreys and his colleagues in the 1980’s represented an effort to
operationalize and test these understandings at the genetic level rather than at
the phenotypic level (see Jeffreys, Wilson and Thein, 1985). Conceptually
Jeffreys sought both to reliably differentiate individuals from one another and
also to establish patterns of variations between those who were genetically
related. Jeffreys’ research programme had been focused on the development
of robust methods for establishing and representing genetic heredity and the
first human application of his technique, then termed ‘DNA fingerprinting’,
using multi-locus probes was to assess claims of family connectedness in a UK
immigration case.
The UK FSS have considered the utility of database searches based on this
29
knowledge since 1996 and their Forensic Intelligence Bureau now offers police
forces in England & Wales a search of the NDNAD to identify possible relatives
of criminal suspects. The procedure has been applied when a full DNA profile
obtained from a crime scene has not matched an existing full profile on the
database. Familial searching utilizes the increased likelihood of similarity
between the DNA profiles of those who have a direct genetic relationship in
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order to identify a parent, child or sibling of an individual whose profile is not

currently on the database. Familial searching therefore refers not to the social
arrangement of families but the genetic relationships between individuals – a
distinction which is important for investigative as well as ethical reasons.
Despite several well publicized instances, applications of familial searching in

the UK remain numerically limited. In 2004, the FSS reported that
approximately 20 familial searches had been undertaken and that a quarter of
these had yielded ‘useful intelligence information’. The reasons for this limited
application include a recognition of the novelty of the process and also the
volume of partial matches it may provide. Because familial searching relies on
identifying a pool of possible genetic relatives of a suspect, who are then
subject to more direct investigation (typically by being interviewed by the
police), ACPO has also acknowledged that a number of ethical issues need to
be addressed when this strategy is being considered. The National DNA
Database Annual Report 2002-03 stated that the ‘Database Board has recently
sought advice from the Information Commissioner on the ethics and data
protection issues of using this new approach more widely and will be issuing
guidelines in the near future’ (Forensic Science Service 2003: 25).
The perceived necessity for such guidelines reflects the recognition of several
fundamental problems that surround the use of this search procedure to direct
investigations. Issues arise in both the searching of profiles on the NDNAD and
in the subsequent investigative trajectories that follow the provision of a list of
individuals derived from such a search. A genetic link between individuals might
be previously unknown by one or both parties and police investigations may
make such information known to them for the first time. Equally an investigation
may reveal (to investigators – if not to informants) the absence of genetic links
which participants assumed to have existed. There is also the question of
whether this kind of use of an individual’s databased DNA violates promises of
privacy and confidentiality made when their genetic material was originally
30
donated voluntarily . Furthermore, assertions about criminality, geography and
familial relatedness that are central to the use of this forensic methodology are
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especially problematic (even if they do accord with the rhetorical endoxa of

many detectives). For instance, the Custodian of the NDNAD said in a public
meeting of the UK Human Genetics Commission held in February 2004 that
‘[Familial searching] is based on some very important assumptions that
criminality can run in families, that a relative could be on the database, the
families tend to live in the same area, and that offenders tend to offend close to
their homes or in areas that they frequently visit’. The same assertions are made
in the most recent National DNA Database Annual Report (Forensic Science
Service, 2004). Yet they reveal pervasive problems associated with the
confusion between ‘genetic’ and ‘social’ relatedness (‘families’ are not only
constituted through genetic lines but through clusters of non-genetically related
individuals) as well as the implicit assumption that criminality is fostered
because of such relatedness (either because of genetic or social reasons). It is
likely that these issues will be widely discussed in the near future whenever it is
more widely exploited by the police and more members of the public become
involved in sample requests.
Aside from the UK, we currently have no information about the use of this
technique by other Member States. It may be that legislative and statutory
regulations prohibit such searching of databases profiles in many states. It may
also be the case that familial searching is impractical in databases which do not
contain large collections of profiles – small archives will obviously provide less
scope for making partial matches because of their limited coverage of the
population. Nevertheless, familial searching is a forensic practice that is certain
to be developed in Member States in the future.
5.5 Conclusion
We have already suggested that our work on the aspects of forensic genetics,
briefly covered in this final section of this report, is at an early stage. Although
we have undertaken some initial scoping of some of the areas we will cover in
more detail in the early months of 2006 a good deal or work remains to be
done. Furthermore we have not considered the extent of interest – if any –
amongst forensic geneticists or criminal investigators in the capacity to infer
129
Williams & Johnson
medical conditions from the interrogation of crime scene samples, nor the
willingness of custodians of medical genetic databases to countenance requests
for searches of such databases in support of criminal investigations. All of these
matters – especially the last – are fraught with ethical difficulty and are likely to
be treated differently in different Member States. In our future research we
expect to be able to discern the ways in which issues of liberty and public
security are deliberated alongside qualitative distinctions about types of genetic
information, assumptions about bodily properties, and understandings of the
relationship between genetic and social relationships.
130
Williams & Johnson
Notes
1
We have already written more detailed historical accounts in Johnson, Martin & Williams (2003),
Johnson & Williams (2004) and Williams, Johnson & Martin (2004).
2
There are many accounts of these matters in the literature, but for a recent short review, see Jobling & Gill
(2004). Lazer (2004) provides am authoritative account of this trajectory – especially in the US. See also
Lynch & Jansaoff ( 1998)
3
Differing accounts of this model of policing can be found in NCIS (2000), Tilley (2003) and Innes et.al.
(2005)
4
Such concerns draw upon debates about the essential ‘nature’ of DNA and frequently reiterate claims
about the exceptional informational richness of genetic material. We have discussed this in more detail in:
Williams & Johnson, 2004.
5
The literature on these matters is extensive. Essential sources include Billings (1992), Lazer (2004),
Human Genetics Commission (2002), Laurie (2002), O’Neill (2001), and Rothstein (1997)
6
The first considerations given to a number of these issues in the UK can be found in the Scottish Law
Commission ‘Report on Evidence: Blood Group Tests, DNA Tests and Related Matters’ (1989, Edinburgh,
HMSO) and the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (1993, Cm 2263, London, HMSO). There has been a
continuous return to these issues over the ten years since the establishment of the National DNA Database of
England and Wales (NDNAD) in 1995.
7
It is worth noting that the response of the UK Government to the discovery that Police Forces had
illegally retained up to 50,000 DNA samples and profiles in the late 1990’s (see HMIC 2000) was to
retrospectively legalise this practice in the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001.
8
Most recently this was given explicit attention by a meeting of the European G5 nations who focused on
the future possibilities for ‘interoperable’ databasing across the EU (see: UK Home Office, Press Release
221/2004).
9
For example, following the detection of a child murderer in the UK who had also attacked women in other
European nations and the United States, the chief of the Police Superintendent’s Association (in England &
Wales), Rick Naylor, argued for the introduction of more widespread international DNA databases (see:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3809575.stm). Interpol, who operate such a database, also regularly
promote the benefits of international DNA profile exchange.
10
In addition to legislative constraints, the use of DNA for identity authorisation and verification awaits the
development of sufficiently speedy analytic technology. The UK Forensic Science Service are about to
offer a ‘lab-in-a-van’ facility which will provide profiles at crime scenes in six hours. Whilst ‘lab-on-a-
chip’ seems currently available for some SNP arrays, it is still unclear when such a technology will be
available for the analysis of forensic STRs.
11
At the time of writing the Identity Cards Bill 2004 is being considered by the UK Parliament. If enacted
in its current form it will provide legislative provision for the formation of the National Identity Register
and, in tandem with the issuing of identity cards to all UK citizens, the establishment of an infrastructure
capable of storing and comparing a range of personal data. It seems that the police will be able to request a
search of the fingerprints held on the Register where crime scene fingermarks have failed to match anyone
whose fingerprints are held in the existing Police fingerprint database.
12
Consultation Paper on the Establishment of a DNA Database (LRC CP 29 - 2004)
13
See: http://www.isfg.org/ednap/ednap.htm
14
http://www.stadnap.uni-mainz.de/
15
http://www.enfsi.org/ewg/dnawg
16
http://www.enfsi.org/ewg/dnawg/
17
http://www.interpol.int/Public/Forensic/dna/Inquiry/InquiryPublic2002.pdf
18
See: http://www.enfsi.org/ewg/dnawg/db/exfile.2004-09-
20.5914860034/attach/ENFSI%20Legislation%20Final%20Report.pdf
19
These vary in form and content, but recent examples include the Irish Law Commission Report on the
establishment of a National DNA database in Eire and other parliamentary commissions in Italy and Spain
20
See: http://www.rte.ie/news/2005/0426/gardai.html
21
Council of the European Union ‘Draft Framework Decision on simplifying the exchange of information
and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the member States of the
European Union, in particular as regards serious offences including terrorist acts’. 13869/04
131
Williams & Johnson
22
Council of the European Union ‘Draft Framework Decision on simplifying the exchange of information
and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the member States of the
European Union, in particular as regards serious offences including terrorist acts’. 13869/04
23
The detection of Francisco Arce Montes, a Spanish national, for the murder of Caroline Dickinson, an
English girl, and the subsequent linking of Montes to violent crimes across Europe and the US, promoted
the chief of the UK Police Superintendents’ Association, Rick Naylor, to argue for the benefits of a trans-
national DNA archive. See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3809575.stm
24
http://www.gnn.gov.uk/content/detail.asp?ReleaseID=122208
25
These meetings exist to disseminate knowledge of ‘advances made in scientific methods over the
previous three (3) years’, to discuss common scientific and technical problems and their potential solutions;
and to consider future developments and collaborations in forensic science (NicDaeid [ed] 2004: 3)
26
For example, the Y-Chromosome Consortium (2002) suggest that there are 18 major haplotype
population groups.
27
Parallel studies have of course been carried out elsewhere. Shriver (1997) is an example of US research.
We continue to look for similar studies in other EU states.
28
The International Y STR use group has recommended 9 loci that comprise a ‘minimal haplotype’ – see
Roewer, Krawczak et.al. (2001)
29
Some of this work arose from previous efforts to deal with ‘close-relative defences’ in prosecutions
involving DNA identification (see for example Evett 1992). Subsequent published studies of the same topic
by others include Belin (1997) and Sjerps & Kloosterman (1999).
30
The CJPA 2001 also authorised the indefinite retention and continuous speculative searching of DNA
samples taken during mass screens – subject to the ‘irrevocable consent’ of the individual from whom such
a sample was requested. It seems unlikely that familial searching would have been envisaged by anyone
who consented to give their DNA under these circumstances.
132
Williams & Johnson
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Forensic DNA

research funded by The Wellcome Trust, UK

Robin Williams & Paul Johnson

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Outline of the report

Section Two contains the legislative, scientific and operational information

In Section Three we consider some of the recurrent considerations that are

databasing in support of criminal investigations. We note the persistence of a

Section Four describes recent progress in establishing arrangements to

fingerprinting’ (e.g. Townley & Ede, 2004: 8; Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of

introduction of DNA profiling has provided an especially powerful forensic

However, whilst scientific rationality and technological instrumentality

If investigative practices are understood this way, then developments in forensic

1.3 Commentaries and Interpretations

range of critical commentaries on their social and ethical significance and

1.3.1 Surveillance and control

Understood this way, databased DNA profiles are seen as contributions to a

1.3.2 Civil liberties and human rights

capacity and application, must be subject to adequate independent scrutiny,

1.3.3 The impact of ‘scientification’

1.3.4 Evidential effects

process endangers or appropriates the justice process in favour of the

1.3.5 Public support

1.4 Finding a balance: key policy considerations for EU member states

subject of intense debate. Policy makers responsible for the introduction of

When deliberating the establishment and permissible uses of DNA databases in

• what range of circumstances and offences should license this sampling;

• should access to samples and profiles be permitted to any other organizations;

1.5 Commonality and difference

report that follow we explore these key differences: Section 2 provides an

1.6 The national and the international

Section 4 of this report considers the important issue of internationalization in

• the development of a common scientific infrastructure, encouraged through the

1.7 Current research on EU forensic DNA databasing

As far as we are aware no individual government in the EU has commissioned a

Despite legislation enacted by the European Parliament regarding forensic

Research on the scientific and technical issues surrounding EU databasing is

Academic interest in cross-border EU forensic databasing has remained slight

providing a perspective on current EU activities. To date, it is the most

provide specialist legal advice and representation on forensic matters to a

The format of this section is as follows:

• the retention of samples and derived profiles in databases

Where a national DNA database is in existence we provide details of:

• the year of establishment

• the relevant arrangements for custodianship of a database

National DNA Database YES Date Established 1st October 1997

Size of database: individual reference profiles crime scene profiles

Relevant national legislation

Matches: scene to scene scene to suspect

Police personnel have the authority to take DNA SAMPLES from:

CRIME SCENES YES when when no suspect is available / on order of a court

CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES when from those convicted of 'severe crimes'

VOLUNTEERS Y/N when

CRIME SCENES YES SUSPECTS YES CONVICTED OFFENDERS YES

VOLUNTEERS Y/N VICTIMS Y/N MISSING PERSONS Y/N

CRIME SCENES Y/N until

CRIME SCENES Y/N until