Tangkian 

Case #282
People’s Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc.) vs. Secretary G.R. No. 179652    
Facts: A complaint was filed by Jandeleon Juezan against People’s Broadcasting Service, Inc. (Bombo
Radyo Phils., Inc) for illegal deduction, non-payment of service incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium
pay for holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment of wages and non-
coverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth, before the DOLE Regional Office in Cebu City.
On the basis of the complaint, the DOLE conducted a plant level inspection. The Labor Inspector and
noted that Bombo denies employer-employee relationship with the complainant. Bombo claims that
complainant is a drama talent hired on a per drama ”participation basis” hence no employer-employees
relationship existed between them. As proof of this, management presented photocopies of cash
vouchers, billing statement, employments of specific undertaking (a contract between the talent director &
the complainant), summary of billing of drama production etc. And that they do not control of the talent if
he ventures into another contract w/ other broadcasting industries. The DOLE Regional Director found
that private respondent was an employee of Bomno, and was entitled to his money claims. When the
matter was brought before the CA, it was held that the DOLE Secretary had jurisdiction over the matter.
In the Decision of this Court, the CA Decision was reversed and set aside, and the complaint against
Bombo was dismissed. The Court found that there was no employer-employee relationship between
Bombo and Juezan. An important thing to note that the court also settled in this case that while the DOLE
may make a determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship, this function could not
be co-extensive with the visitorial and enforcement power provided in Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as
amended by RA 7730. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) was held to be the primary
agency in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship. From this Decision, the Public
Attorneys Office (PAO) filed a Motion for Clarification of Decision (with Leave of Court). The PAO sought
to clarify as to when the visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE be not considered as co-extensive
with the power to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. In its Comment, the
DOLE sought clarification as well, as to the extent of its visitorial and enforcement power under the Labor
Code, as amended.
Issue: Whether the DOLE may make a determination of whether an employer-employee relationship
exists, and if so, to what extent?
Ruling: Yes. In the exercise of the DOLE’s visitorial and enforcement power, the Labor Secretary
or the latter’s authorized representative shall have the power to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, to the exclusion of the NLRC.
No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship. No procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only make a
preliminary finding, that the power was primarily held by the NLRC.

March 6, 2012: SC said that no limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE to determine
the existence of an employer-employee relationship. No procedure was laid down where the DOLE would
only make a preliminary finding, and that the power was primarily held by the NLRC. The DOLE, in
determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, can use the elements to determine the
existence of an employment relationship.[1] The use of this test is not solely limited to the NLRC. The
DOLE Secretary, or his or her representatives, can utilize the same test, even in the course of inspection,
making use of the same evidence that would have been presented before the NLRC. Also, there is still a
threshold amount set by the Labor Code when money claims are involved, in that if it is PhP 5,000 and
below, the jurisdiction is with the regional director of the DOLE, and if the amount involved exceeds PhP
5,000, the jurisdiction is with the labor arbiter. However, despite the wording of the Code, this would only
apply in the course of regular inspections undertaken by the DOLE. In conclusion, if a complaint is
brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor standards provisions of the Labor Code or other labor
legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that there is an existing employer-employee relationship,
the DOLE exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-
employee relationship, the jurisdiction is with the NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is
accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is with the Labor Arbiter, under Article 217(3) of
the Labor Code. If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an existing employer-employee
relationship, the jurisdiction is with DOLE.
Villares
286
Jaguar Security v. Sales, April 22, 2008

MAIN POINT: It is well-settled in law and jurisprudence that where no employer-employee relationship
exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor
Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has
jurisdiction.

FACTS: Jaguar Security is a private corporation engaged in the business of providing security services to
its clients, one of whom is Delta Milling Industries. Private respondents were hired as security guards and
were assigned at the premises of Delta. However, they filed a labor case against Jaguar before the Labor
Arbiter for certain money claims. The LA rendered a decision in favor of the security guards and ordered
Jaguar to pay. Jaguar filed a partial appeal questioning the failure of NLRC to resolves its cross-claim
against Delta Milling as the party ultimately liable for the payment of the monetary award to security
guards. The NLRC dismissed the appeal and held that it was not the proper forum to raise the issue since
Jaguar, being the direct employer of the security guards, is the one principally liable to the employees.
Thus, it directed Jaguar to file a separate civil action for recovery of the amount before the regular court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter, for the purpose of proving the liability of Delta.   Jaguar insists
that its cross-claim should have been ruled upon in the labor case since it arose out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the original action. They further argue that as principal, Delta
Milling is liable for the awarded wage increases and that Jaguar should be reimbursed of any payments to
be made to the guard employees.

ISSUE: W/N the labor court has jurisdiction over Jaguar’s cross-claim for reimbursement from Delta
Milling. 

RULING: NO. The jurisdiction of labor courts extends only to cases where an employer-employee
relationship exists. It is well-settled in law and jurisprudence that where no employer-employee
relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to
the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial
Court that has jurisdiction. The action is within the realm of civil law hence jurisdiction over the case
belongs to the regular courts. While the resolution of the issue involves the application of labor laws,
reference to the labor code was only for the determination of the solidary liability of the petitioner to the
respondent where no employer-employee relation exists. In the present case, there exists no employer-
employee relationship between Jaguar and Delta Milling. In its cross-claim, Jaguar is not seeking any
relief under the Labor Code but merely reimbursement of the monetary benefits claims awarded and to be
paid to the guard employees. There is no labor dispute involved in the cross-claim against Delta Milling.
Rather, the cross-claim involves a civil dispute between Jaguar and Delta Milling. Jaguar’s cross-claim
is within the realm of civil law, and jurisdiction over it belongs to the regular courts.

Note: Labor Arbiters have exclusive original jurisdiction only over the following: 
1. Unfair labor practices;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages,
rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee
relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving legality
of strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all
other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or
household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of
whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
In all these cases, an employer-employee relationship is an indispensable jurisdictional requisite; and
there is none in this case.
Lim #294
Dispute Settlement
Comscentre Phils., Inc. v. Rocio, January 22, 2020

FACTS: Comscentre Phils., Inc. and its Country Manager Patrick Boe hired respondent Camille B. Rocio
as a Network Engineer . Rocio informed petitioner of her intention to resign effective September 9, 2011.
The Human Resource Manager informed Rocio that she had to pay an employment bond amounting to
P80,000.00 for resigning within 24 months from the time she got employed with the company as provided
in her employment contract.

Rocio was preventively suspended without pay due to her alleged actions causing chaos, disarray/turmoil
among her co-employees and the whole working environment  and thus jeopardizing and putting the
company operations at high risk and hampering over-all productivity. 

Rocio claimed she neither discussed her resignation with her colleagues during work hours nor disobeyed
any company directive. Too, Manager Glass advised employees to communicate with her directly if they
were not comfortable with the way local management handled their concerns. 

On the other hand, petitioners maintained that respondent was validly placed under preventive
suspension for willful disregard of company directives and loitering on work hours.
Consequently, Rocio sued petitioners for ULP, illegal suspension, illegal deduction, etc. Where the LA
ruled in favor of Rocio. 

The NLRC affirmed LA’s ruling with modifications, NLRC ordered that the deduction of the P80,000.00
employment bond is within the exclusive jurisdiction of regular courts. The CA also ruled that petitioners'
claim for payment of " employment bond" is within the exclusive jurisdiction of regular courts. Hence, this
petition

ISSUE: Did the CA err when it ruled that petitioners' claim for payment of "employment bond" fell within
the jurisdiction of regular courts?

RULING: Yes. Article 224 of the Labor Code clothes the labor tribunals with original and exclusive
jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer employee relationship. The Labor Arbiters
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic
notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: 

1. Unfair labor practices; 

2. Termination disputes; 
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages,
rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; 
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-
employee relations; 

Thus, the Court decreed therein that labor tribunals have jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided
by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code.
Furthermore, it is clear that petitioners' claim for payment is inseparably intertwined with the parties'
employer-employee relationship. For it was Rocio's act of prematurely severing her employment with the
company which gave rise to the latter's cause of action for payment of "employment bond.” The Court
further sustained the NLRC ' s finding that Rocio is liable for payment of "employment bond" pursuant to
her undertaking in the employment contract.

Surely, while petitioners are liable to Rocio for her illegal suspension and unpaid money claims, Rocio,
too, is liable to petitioners for payment of the "employment bond." As such, the NLRC correctly ordered
the offsetting of their respective money claims against each other. To rule otherwise would be "to sanction
split jurisdiction, which is prejudicial to the orderly administration of justice."
Am-Phil Food Concepts v. Padilla, October 1, 2014
FACTS:
●      Respondent PADILA was hired as a Marketing Associate by petitioner Corporation.
PADILLA was informed that the Corporation would undergo a retrenchment program that would
be affecting 3 of its employees which included PADILLA. The retrenchment program was
allegedly on account of serious and adverse business conditions, i.e., lack of demand in the
market, stiffer competition, devaluation of the Philippine peso, and escalating operation costs.
●     PADILLA was then subjected to the retrenchment program and paid his separation pay.
PADILLA then executed a quitclaim and release in favor of Am-Phil.
●      PADILLA then instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Corporation asserts that
Padilla was hired merely as part of an experimental marketing program. It added that in 2003, it
did suffer serious and adverse business losses and that, in the first quarter of 2004, it was
compelled to retrench employees so as to avoid further losses.
●      The LA ruled that PADILLA was illegally dismissed. The LA held that the quitclaim executed
by PADILLA is contrary to law. The Corporation appealed before the NLRC. The body affirmed
the LA decision albeit clarifying that Labor Arbiter Chuanico wrongly used the word "solidarily" in
describing Am-Phil’s liability to Padilla.
●      Hence, the current petition.

On August 15, 2005, Am-Phil filed an appeal21 with the National Labor Relations Commission.  Apart from
asserting its position that Padilla was validly retrenched, Am-Phil claimed that Labor Arbiter Chuanico was
in error in deciding the case despite the pendency of its motion for leave to file supplemental rejoinder. 22 
Through this supplemental rejoinder, Am-Phil supposedly intended to submit its audited financial
statements for the years 2001 to 2004 and, thereby, prove that it had suffered business losses.  Am-Phil
claimed that its right to due process was violated by Labor Arbiter Chuanico’s refusal to consider its 2001
to 2004 audited financial statements.23cralawlawlibrary On February 28, 2007, the National Labor
Relations Commission issued the resolution affirming Labor Arbiter Chuanico’s ruling, albeit clarifying that
Labor Arbiter Chuanico wrongly used the word “solidarily” in describing Am-Phil’s liability to
Padilla.24cralawlawlibrary With respect to Am-Phil’s claim that Labor Arbiter Chuanico erroneously ignored
its 2001 to 2004 audited financial statements, the National Labor Relations Commission noted that a
supplemental rejoinder was not a necessary pleading in proceedings before labor arbiters.  It added that,
with the exception of the 2004 audited financial statements, all of Am-Phil’s relevant audited financial
statements were already available at the time it submitted its position paper, reply, and rejoinder, but that
Am-Phil failed to annex them to these pleadings.  The National Labor Relations Commission added that,
granting that this failure was due to mere oversight, Am-Phil was well in a position to attach them in its
memorandum of appeal but still failed to do so.25  Holding that Labor Arbiter Chuanico could not be
faulted for violating Am-Phil’s right to due process, the National Labor Relations Commission emphasized
[O]mission by a party to rebut that which would have naturally invited an immediate pervasive and stiff
competition creates an adverse inference that either the controverting evidence to be presented will only
prejudice its case or that the uncontroverted evidence speaks the truth. 26 (Citation omitted)
RULING: From the provisions of the 2002 Rules, it is clear that a supplemental rejoinder is not a pleading
which a labor arbiter is duty-bound to accept. Even following changes to the NLRC Rules of Procedure in
2005 and 2011, a rejoinder has not been recognized as a pleading that labor arbiters must necessarily
admit. The 2005 and 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure only go so far as to recognize that a reply “may” be
filed by the parties. Thus, Labor Arbiter Chuanico was under no obligation to grant Am-Phil’s motion for
leave to admit supplemental rejoinder and, hereby, consider the supplemental rejoinder’s averments and
annexes. That Am- Phil had to file a motion seeking permission to file its supplemental rejoinder (i.e.,
motion for leave to file) is proof of its own recognition that the labor arbiter is under no compulsion to
accept any such pleading and that the supplemental rejoinder’s admission rests on the labor arbiter’s
discretion. The requirements of due process in labor cases before a Labor Arbiter is satisfied when the
parties are given the opportunity to submit their position papers to which they are supposed to attach all
the supporting documents or documentary evidence that would prove their respective claims, in the event
that the Labor Arbiter determines that no formal hearing would be conducted or that such hearing was not
necessary.
Villares

 Honda Car Phils vs. Honda cars Technical Specialist & Supervisors Union
GR No. 204142, Nov. 19 2014
Topic: Voluntary Arbitration

Facts: On 2006, petitioner Honda Cars Philippines, Inc., (company) and respondent Honda Cars
Technical Specialists and Supervisory Union, entered into a collective bargaining agreement. 
Prior to April 1, 2005, the union members were receiving a transportation allowance of 3,300.00 a month.
On September 3, 2005, the company and the union entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
converting the transportation allowance into a monthly gasoline allowance.
It was provided, that in the event the amount of gasoline is not fully consumed, the gasoline not used may
be converted into cash, subject to whatever tax may be applicable. Since the cash conversion is paid in
the monthly payroll as an excess gas allowance, the company considers the amount as part of the
managers’ and AVPs’ compensation that is subject to income tax on compensation. The union, on the
other hand, argued that the gasoline allowance for its members is a "negotiated item" under their CBA on
fringe benefits.
The company claimed that the grant of the gasoline allowance is tied up to a similar company policy for
managers and assistant vice-presidents (AVPs), which provides that in the event the amount of gasoline
is not fully consumed, the gasoline not used may be converted into cash, subject to whatever tax may be
applicable. Since the cash conversion is paid in the monthly payroll as an excess gas allowance, the
company considers the amount as part of the managers’ and AVPs’ compensation that is subject to
income tax on compensation. The disagreement between the company and the union on the matter
resulted in a grievance which they referred to the CBA grievance procedure for resolution. As it remained
unsettled there, they submitted the issue to a panel of voluntary arbitrators as required by the CBA. The
Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators declared that the cash conversion of the unused gasoline allowance
enjoyed by the members of the union is a fringe benefit subject to the fringe benefit tax, not to income tax.

Issue: Whether the Voluntary Arbitrator has jurisdiction to settle tax matters.

Ruling: No. The Voluntary Arbitrator has no competence to rule on the taxability of the gas allowance and
on the propriety of the withholding of tax. These issues are clearly tax matters, and do not involve labor
disputes. To be exact, they involve tax issues within a labor relations setting as they pertain to questions
of law on the application of Section 33 (A) of the NIRC. They do not require the application of the Labor
Code or the interpretation of the MOA and/or company personnel policies. Furthermore, the company and
the union cannot agree or compromise on the taxability of the gas allowance. Taxation is the State’s
inherent power; its imposition cannot be subject to the will of the parties. Under paragraph 1, Section 4 of
the NIRC, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall have the exclusive and original jurisdiction to
interpret the provisions of the NIRC and other tax laws, subject to review by the Secretary of Finance.
Consequently, if the company and/or the union desire/s to seek clarification of these issues, it/they should
have requested for a tax ruling from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Any revocation, modification or
reversal of the CIR’s ruling shall not be given retroactive application if the revocation, modification or
reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers, except in the following cases: (a) Where the taxpayer
deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or any document required of him by the BIR;
(b) Where the facts subsequently gathered by the BIR are materially different from the facts on which the
ruling is based; or (c) Where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.18

Notes:

Labor dispute means "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the
terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employer and employee." The issues raised before the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators are:
(1) whether the cash conversion of the gasoline allowance shall be subject to fringe benefit tax or the
graduated income tax rate on compensation; and
(2) whether the company wrongfully withheld income tax on the converted gas allowance.

Abisana 302
Guagua National Colleges vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 188492 August 28, 2018
 
Facts: R.A.6728 states that 70% of the increase in tuition fees shall go to the payment of salaries, wages,
allowances and other benefits of the teaching and non-teaching personnel. Thus, petitioner made a 7%
increase in its tuition fees. In order to save the depleting funds of the petitioner's Retirement Plan, its
Board of Trustees approved the funding of the retirement program out of the 70% net incremental
proceeds arising from the tuition fee increases. Respondent Union contended that the unilateral increase
made by petitioner is in violation of the provision under R.A. 6728.
The parties referred the matter to the Voluntary Arbitrator who rendered a decision on June 16, 2008 in
favor of petitioner. Respondent Unions filed an Urgent Motion for Extension praying that the CA grant
them an extension of 15 days from July 1, 2008, or until July 16, 2008, within which to file their petition for
review. This was granted by the CA on July 2, 2008. However, a Motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner
asserting that the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator has become final and executory pursuant to Article
276 of the Labor Code and in accordance with the ruling in Coca-Cola.
This was denied by the CA; thus, this petition for certiorari.
 
Issue: Did the CA gravely abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner's Motion to Dismiss
despite the finality of the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator pursuant to Article 276 of the Labor
Code?
 
Ruling: No. The 10-day period stated in Article 276 should be understood as the period within
which the party adversely affected by the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of
Arbitrators may file a motion for reconsideration. Only after the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration may the aggrieved party appeal to the CA by filing the petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within 15 days from notice pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 43. The
Court notes that despite the clarification made in Teng v. Pagahac, the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) and the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) have not revised
or amended the Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration
Proceedings insofar as its Section 7 of Rule VII is concerned. This inaction has obviously sown
confusion, particularly in regard to the filing of the motion for reconsideration as a condition
precedent to the filing of the petition for review in the CA. Consequently, we need to direct the
DOLE and the NCMB to cause the revision or amendment of Section 7 of Rule VII of the Revised
Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings in order to allow the
filing of motions for reconsideration in line with Article 276 of the Labor Code.
Lim #309
Dispute Settlement
Zonio v. 1st Quantum Leap Security Agency, Inc., May 5, 2021
FACTS: Zonio alleged that on March 13, 2011, he was hired as a security guard by Quantum Leap
Security Agency owned and managed by Romulo Q. Par. Zonio worked seven days a week from 7:00
a.m. to 7:00 p.m., or from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m., alternately every two weeks, for a monthly wage of
P8,500.00. On April 21, 2014, Zonio, along with some of his colleagues, received a memorandum
suspending them from April 21, 2014 to May 20, 2014, for sleeping while on duty. There was no formal
investigation conducted. Nonetheless, Zonio served the suspension and reported back to work on May
21, 2014. Respondents, however, refused to accept him. Zonio filed a complaint against respondents for
illegal suspension, underpayment of salary and 13 th month pay; overtime and holiday pay; holiday and
rest day premiums pay, and night shift differentials pay; among others. 

The respondent employers justified Zonio's suspension when its inspection team caught Zonio sleeping in
his post and took photographs of him as proof where Zonio was directed to report to the head office, but
Zonio disregarded the directive. 

LA ruled that Zonio was validly suspended for sleeping in his post as proved by photographs, which Zonio
did not dispute. Moreover, Zonio failed to substantiate his claim for payment of overtime and holiday pay;
holiday and rest day premiums pay, and night shift differentials pay. Even so, Zonio is entitled to salary
differentials for a period of three years counted backwards from the date of his suspension on April 21,
2014; as well as to 13 th month pay; the monetization of his service incentive leave, and the refund of the
cash bond and miscellaneous fees that were deducted from his salary.

The NLRC modified the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and ruled that Zonio is entitled to overtime and
holiday pay; holiday and rest day premiums pay; and night shift differentials pay. The CA partly granted
the petition by deleting the award of overtime pay, holiday and rest day premiums pay, and night shift
differentials pay.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in deleting the award of overtime pay, holiday and rest day premiums pay, and
night shift differentials pay?

RULING: Yes. “If the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are conflicting, the reviewing
court may delve into the records and examine for itself the questioned findings.”

In this case, the findings of the NLRC as to Zonio's money claims are in conflict with the Labor Arbiter and
the CA. While the NLRC found that Zonio is entitled to the payment of overtime pay; holiday and rest day
premiums pay, and night shift differential pay, the Labor Arbiter and the CA ruled otherwise. Accordingly,
the conflicting findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA, justify this Court to review the factual
issues raised by Zonio.

Here, Zonio proved his entitlement to monetary claims. Zonio submitted a photocopy of the logbook
entries which showed the dates and shift when he reported for work, as well as the specific tasks he
performed on that particular work shift. However, the logbook does not contain whether Zonio worked on
holidays or during his rest days. Thus, Zonio's claim for holiday and rest day premiums is denied for lack
of factual basis. Admittedly, the logbook is only a personal record of Zonio and other security guards. It is
not verified or countersigned by respondents. Anyway, the fact that the entries are not verified or
countersigned will not militate against Zonio. 

The best evidence for respondents would have been the payrolls, vouchers, payslips, daily time records,
and the like, which are in their custody and absolute control. However, respondents did not present any of
these. This failure gives rise to the presumption that either they do not have them, or if they do, their
presentation is prejudicial to their cause. For these reasons, the petition is Partly Granted. This case is
remanded to the LA for the computation of Zonio's monetary award in accordance with this Court's
ruling. 

Tangkian
Case #312
McBurnie vs. Ganzon
 FACTS:
McBurnie, an Australian national filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims
against Ganzon and EGI Managers. McBurnie claims that he signed a 5-year employment
agreement with EGI as an Executive Vice-President who shall oversee the management of the
company’s hotels and resorts within the Philippines. In Nov. 1999, (6 months after he signed the
agreement), he figured in an accident that compelled him to go back to Australia while
recovering from his injuries. He was then informed by Ganzon that his services were no longer
needed because their intended project would no longer push through. Respondents then
opposed the complaint contending that the agreement with McBurnie was to jointly invest in and
establish a company for the management of hotels.
On appeal before the CA, the CA allowed the respondent’s motion to reduce appeal bond in the
amount of P10M and directed NLRC to give due course to the appeal. McBurnie filed a petition
for review on certiorari on this decision of the CA. The NLRC reversed and set aside the
decision of the LA and entered a new one dismissing McBurnie’s complaint. It explained that
based on records, McBurnie was never an employee of any of the respondents, but a potential
investor in a project that included said respondents, barring a claim of dismissal, much less, an
illegal dismissal. In the decision of the SC, however, it reversed the decision of the CA granting
the motion to reduce bail of the respondents and ordering the NLRC to give due course to the
respondent’s appeal. The Court explained that the respondents’ failure to post a bond
equivalent in amount to the LA’s monetary award was fatal to the appeal. This decision of the
SC became final and executory. Nevertheless, the respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration. The Court en banc accepted the case and issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the implementation of the LA’s decision. McBurnie filed a Motion for Reconsideration
where he invoked the fact that the Court’s decision had become final and executory.

REVIEWER: LA found that there was illegal dismissal. Company filed a notice of appeal with a memorandum
containing a motion to reduce bond averring that it was encountering difficulty in raising the bond and paying for
the partial bond. The NLRC granted the motion holding that there was substantial compliance. The CA reversed and
claimed that the failure to post the required bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary judgment impeded the
perfection of the appeal and rendered the LA decision final and executory. The bond may be reduced upon motion
by the employer, this is subject to the conditions: a) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious
grounds and b) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the filing
of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. The rule that the filing of a
motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal is not absolute. The Court may
relax the rule under exceptional circumstances. If the NLRC does eventually grant the motion for reduction after the
reglementary period has elapsed, the correct relief would be to reduce the cash or surety bond already posted by the
employer within the 10-day period. As the Court remains firm on the importance of appeal bonds in appeals from
monetary awards of LAs, we stress that the NLRC, pursuant to Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure,
shall only accept motions to reduce bond that are coupled with the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount.
Hacienda Valentin-Balabag v. Secretary, February 11, 2008

Workers filed with the DOLE Bacolod a request for payroll inspection of Hacienda Valentin Balabag. DOLE conducted an
inspection and issued a notice of inspection report, finding Yanson liable and directed the owner of the Hacienda to pay. Yanson
filed with the Sec. of Labor a verified appeal and posted a bond. In case said order by the DOLE involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company
duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from. When
Yanson filed her verified appeal and supplement to the verified appeal, the Secretary of Labor rejected the appeal for
insufficiency of the appeal bond. The posting of the proper amount of the appeal bond under Article 128(b) is mandatory (based
on the usage of “only” in relation to requirements) for the perfection of an appeal from a monetary award in labor cases.

VILLARES
316
Hacienda Valentin-Balabag v. Secretary
Facts:
Workers filed with the DOLE Bacolod a request for payroll inspection of Hacienda
Valentin Balabag. DOLE conducted an inspection and issued a notice of inspection report,
finding Yanson liable and directed the owner of the Hacienda to pay. Yanson filed with the Sec.
of Labor a verified appeal and posted an appeal bond of P1,000.00 in money order and
attaching thereto a Motion to be Allowed to Post Minimal Bond with Motion for Reduction of
Bond.

Issue:
 Whether petitioner was able to perfect its appeal? 

Ruling:
 No. When petitioner filed her Verified Appeal and Supplement to the Verified Appeal,
she posted a mere P1,000.00-appeal bond and attached a Motion to be Allowed to Post
Minimal Bond with Motion for Reduction of Bond. Public respondent rejected said
appeal for insufficiency of the appeal bond.
 In case said order by the DOLE involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer
may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor in an amount equivalent to
the monetary award in the order appealed from. When Yanson filed her verified appeal
and supplement to the verified appeal, the Secretary of Labor rejected the appeal for
insufficiency of the appeal bond. The posting of the proper amount of the appeal bond
under Article 128(b) is mandatory (based on the usage of “only” in relation to
requirements) for the perfection of an appeal from a monetary award in labor cases
Abisana 317
Consolidated Distillers of the Far East, Inc. vs. Zaragoza
G.R. No. 229302 June 20, 2018
 
Facts: After the court affirmed the decision of the CA in an illegal dismissal case filed by herein
respondent—which decision affirmed the NLRC and LA’s finding and ordered he be reinstated with
payment of backwages, such decision became final on March 30, 2012. Thus, Zaraosa moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution against Condis for his reinstatement, and the payment of full backwages,
accrued salaries and allowances as of December 3, 2012 less the P454,986.98 that was already released
to him by the LA pending appeal. ondis opposed the motion and argued that its execution of the Asset
Purchase Agreement with Emperador Distillers, Inc. (EDI) was a supervening event that made it
impossible to reinstate Rogel to his former position.9 In a Resolution dated August 3, 2013, the LA ruled
in favor of Rogel and directed Condis to pay P2,135,256.45 representing the backwages/reinstatement
salaries, including allowances, from December 3, 2007, the date of Rogel's illegal dismissal, up to August
3, 2013, the date of the LA resolution.
 
Issue: Is condis only liable for backwages and separation pay until the year 2007?
 
Ruling: No. In Bani, the decision there finding that the employee was illegally dismissed and
directing his reinstatement had also already attained finality. During the execution proceedings,
since the employees manifested that they no longer wanted to be reinstated, the LA directed that
separation pay be given to them in lieu of reinstatement. On appeal, the NLRC’s affirmed the
payment of separation pay but modified the basis of the computation. This also became final and
executory. The LA then recomputed the award and ruled that backwages should only be paid until
the date that the employees manifested that they no longer wanted to be reinstated. The NLRC
and the CA, however, both ruled that the backwages should be counted until the finality of the
NLRC’s decision awarding separation pay. The Supreme Court held therein that when there is a
supervening event that renders reinstatement impossible, backwages is computed from the time
of dismissal until the finality of the decision ordering separation pay, thus:
x x x when separation pay is ordered after the finality of the decision ordering the reinstatement
by reason of a supervening event that makes the award of reinstatement no longer possible (as in
the case), backwages is computed from the time of dismissal until the finality of the decision
ordering separation pay.
The reason for this, as the Court explained in Bani, is that “[w]hen there is an order of separation
pay (in lieu of reinstatement or when the reinstatement aspect is waived or subsequently ordered
in light of a supervening event making the award of reinstatement no longer possible), the
employment relationship is terminated only upon the finality of the decision ordering the
separation pay. The finality of the decision cuts off the employment relationship and represents
the final settlement of the rights and obligations of the parties against each other.”
Here, the award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, which Condis does not question, was
made subsequent to the finality of the Decision in the Illegal Dismissal Case (G.R. No. 196038).
Condis cannot therefore evade its liability to Rogel for backwages and separation pay computed
until the finality of this Decision which affirms the order granting separation pay.
Condis failed to show that in 2007 it had closed its business and that it had complied with all the
statutory requirements for the closure. All it alleged was the execution of the Asset Purchase
Agreement and the termination of the Service Agreement with EDI -but this does not mean, nor
was it argued to mean, that Condis had closed its business. In fact, Condis failed to submit any
document which showed that in 2007, it had notified the DOLE or its employees of the closure of
its business and the reason for its closure. It also failed to show that Rogel was affected by this
purported closure of its business. There is therefore no basis for it to claim that Olympia Housing
is authority for its liability to pay backwages and separation pay to only up to 2007.
Allowances not included
As the Court held in Bani:
As a rule, "a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it. Any attempt on the part of the x x x entities charged
with the execution of a final judgment to insert, change or add matters not clearly contemplated in the dispositive portion violates the rule on immutability of judgments."
xxx
From the Decision of the LA that became final and executory on March 30, 2012 (G.R. No. 196038), the computation of the backwages of Rogel is composed of his basic
pay, 13th month pay, and monetized vacation and sick leaves. Having attained finality, the LA, during execution proceedings, cannot add the hotel and meal allowances
and the monthly incentive to the computation. To be sure, Rogel had an opportunity to present evidence on these during the Illegal Dismissal Case and he should have
presented them there. Having failed to do so, he cannot claim, and the LA or even the Court cannot add, these items, which were not contemplated in the dispositive
portion of the LA's March 3, 2009 Decision. The CA therefore erred in affirming the LA's computation of backwages and separation pay

#319 Briones
EXECUTION; UPDATING OF AWARD: IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGEMENTS
University of Pangasinan v. Fernandez, November 12, 2014
 
Facts: This case arose from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Florentino and Nilda against UPI, its
President Cesar Duque, Executive Vice-President Juan Llamas Amor and Director for Student Affairs
Dominador Reyes. Labor Arbiter Gambito ruled that the respondents were illegally dismissed by the
petitioners. The petitioners interposed an appeal to the NLRC, which affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s
decision. Florentino and Nilda filed a petition before the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside
the NLRC decision and reinstated that by the Labor Arbiter. The petitioners elevated the case to the
Supreme Court but were denied by the tribunal. As a consequence, an Entry of Judgment was issued by
the Supreme Court. Subsequently, Florentino and Nilda moved for a re-computation of their award to
include their backwages and other benefits from the date of the decision of LA Gambito up to the finality
of the decision on July 11, 2005. They likewise moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. During the
pre-execution conference, UPI questioned the re-computation of Florentino and Nilda's backwages and
awards. In view of a stand-off, LA Flores required both parties to submit their respective computations
and justifications. Labor Arbiter held that there was a need to update and upgrade the computation of
money claims and separation pay. UPI filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. The
petitioners interposed an appeal to the NLRC questioning the Order of LA Flores and NLRC granted the
appeal. Respondents filed before the CA primarily anchored on the issue of what the proper basis was for
the computation of backwages and benefits to be paid to an employee. The CA reversed and set aside
the NLRC resolution and reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s Order. The petitioners seek to reverse the CA's
ruling by elevating in to the Supreme Court
 
Issue: Whether CA erred when it affirmed LA Flores' Order which allowed the updating beyond
November 6, 2000 of the computation of backwages and separation pay awarded to the respondents
 
Ruling: No. The CA correctly ruled that the backwages should be computed from May 9, 2000, the date
of illegal dismissal, up to July 11, 2005, the date of the Entry of Judgment, while separation pay should be
reckoned from the respective first days of employment of Florentino and Nilda up to July 11, 2005 as well.
Updating the computation of awards to include as well backwages and separation pay corresponding to
the period after the rendition of LA Gambito's decision on November 6, 2000 up to its finality on July 11,
2005 is not violative of the principle of immutability of a final and executory judgment.
 
Additional
The dispositive portion of the herein assailed CA decision did not explicitly refer to the 13th month pay, its
inclusion in the computation approved by LA Flores is proper pursuant to P.D. 851

The CA properly imposed a legal interest upon the total monetary award reckoned from the Entry of
Judgment on July 11, 2005 until full satisfaction thereof, but the Court modifies the rate indicated in the
assailed decision to conform to the doctrine in Nacar.  (6% not 12%)
The computation of backwages and separation pay due to Florentino and Nilda properly includes the
period from 2002 to 2005. In 2002, both had turned 60 and could opt to retire but it is merely optional but
not the mandatory retirement age.

Lim#324
Montero v. Times Transport, March 16, 2015 (prescription)
FACTS: Times Transportation Co., Inc., (TTCI) is a company engaged in the business of land
transportation for passengers and goods serving the Ilocos Region to Metro Manila route. TTCI
employed the herein 21 petitioners as bus drivers, conductors, mechanics, welders, security
guards and utility personnel. The rank-and-file employees of TTCI formed a union named as
Times Employees Union (TEU) which was later certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
unit within TTCI. The company conducted a retrenchment program due to business loss and
subsequently transferred to respondent Mencorp Transport Systems, Inc., (MENCORP).
Thereafter, several union members received notices that they were being retrenched. For a
second time TEU declared a strike against TTCI, but the latter merely reiterated the earlier
return-to-work order of the Labor Secretary. For disregarding the said return-to-work order,
Santiago issued two notices of terminating 119 for participating in the illegal strike. (nag strike
na sila before di nakalagay ang reason, and Secretary of labor assumed jurisdiction)

Respondent served to the DOLE Regional Office I a notice that TTCI would be closing its
operations due to heavy business losses. Petitioners filed several complaints against TTCI and
MENCORP before the NLRC. However, this case was withdrawn on March 4, 1999 upon
motion by the TEU’s counsel which was given due course on March 22, 1999. Four years later,
several complaints for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal with money claims, damages and
attorney’s fees were filed against respondents, before the LA from June to July 2002.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners’ complaints for illegal dismissal have already prescribed

RULING: Yes. SC held it has prescribed. The pendency of the first case did not toll the
prescriptive period since the complaint was voluntarily withdrawn. In the case at bar, October
26, 1997 and November 24, 1997 appear on record to be the dates when the petitioners’
employment were terminated by TTCI. The antecedent facts that gave rise to the petitioners’
dismissal from employment are not disputed in this case. There is no question about the fact
that the petitioners’ complaints for unfair labor practice and money claims have already
prescribed. The petitioners however argue that their complaints for illegal dismissal were duly
filed within the four-year prescriptive period since the period during which their cases were
pending should be deducted from the period of prescription. On the other hand, the respondents
insist that said complaints have already prescribed. Hence, the pivotal question in resolving the
issues hinges on the resolution of whether the period during which the petitioners’ cases were
pending should be excluded from the period of prescription.
Settled is the rule that when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of
livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of one’s dismissal from employment
constitutes, in essence, an action predicated upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff, as
contemplated under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be brought within four
years.

The petitioners contend that the period when they filed a labor case on May 14, 1998 but
withdrawn on March 22, 1999 should be excluded from the computation of the four-year
prescriptive period for illegal dismissal cases. However, the Court had already ruled that the
prescriptive period continues even after the withdrawal of the case as though no action has
been filed at all. The applicability of Article 1155 of the Civil Code in labor cases was upheld in
the case of Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation v. Panganiban where the Court held that
"although the commencement of a civil action stops the running of the statute of prescription or
limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly the
same position as though no action had been commenced at all.

 #325 NAPII Prescription

Rodriguez v. Park N Ride, Inc., March 20, 2017
 
Facts: On January 30,1984, Lourdes Rodriguez was hired by spouses Vicente & Estelita B. Javier as
Restaurant Supervisor for their restaurant at Vicest Phils. Later, when the restaurant closed, she was
transferred to do office work and became an Administrative and Finance assistant to Estelita Javier.
As the spouses ventured into other businesses, establishing more companies, petitioner’s duties extended
to handling personnel, finance and administrative matters of these companies without additional
compensation. Even substituting as cashier at their Park N Ride business when the Head Cashier would be
on day-off. She was also tasked to take care of the household concerns of the Javier spouses, such as
preparing payrolls for drivers and helpers, shopping for household needs, and looking after the spouses’
house whenever they traveled abroad.
She allegedly worked from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., Mondays to Saturdays; was on call on Sundays; and
worked during Christmas and other holidays. She was deducted an equivalent of two (2) days' wage for
every day of absence and was not paid any service incentive leave pay. Tasked with so much duties and
responsibilities and unable to bear the spouses’ treatment of her, she filed a resignation letter effective April
25, 2009 however the spouses did not accept her resignation and convinced her to stay on. However, her
experience became worse as Estelita allegedly became more unreasonable, hot-headed and would belittle
and embarrass her in the presence of co-workers. On September 29, 2009, when she was late in opening
the Makati office after going on her usual “pamalengke” for the spouses, Estelita called her on the phone
and scolded her for it, once again berating her and telling her that if she did not want to continue work, the
company could manage without her. Thus, On September 29, 2009, she wrote a letter to the spouses
expressing her grievances at them. She intimated that they were always finding fault with her to push her to
resign. On October 6, 2009, the Javier spouses replied to her letter, allegedly accepting her resignation.
On October 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed a Complaint for constructive illegal dismissal, non-payment of service
incentive leave pay and 13th month pay, including claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees against Park N Ride, Nicest Phils., Grand Leisure, and the Javier Spouses.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and deemed her resigned. The NLRC reversed the ruling of the
LA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
 
Issue: Whether petitioner was entitled to full-service incentive leave pay and damages
 
Ruling: Petitioner is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages considering that she was not illegally
dismissed but, with respect to service incentive leave pay, the CA limited the award to 3 years (2006 to
2009) only due to the prescriptive period under Art. 291 of the LC. 
Art. 291. Money claims. All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing
during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of
action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.
It was not shown here that petitioner Rodriguez was enjoying vacation leave with pay of at least five days
while being employed by private respondents Spouses Javier; it was not shown that private respondents
Spouses Javier were merely employing less than 10 employees (on the contrary, private respondent
spouses Javier stated that they were employing less than 15 employees). Hence, the award of service
incentive leave pay to petitioner Rodriguez was proper. ( Art. 95 of LC - SIL
 
However, Auto Bus Transport System, Inc. v. Bautista clarified the correct reckoning of the prescriptive
period:
Applying Art. 291 of the LC in light of this peculiarity of the SIL, we can conclude that the 3-year prescriptive
period commences, Not at the end of the year when the employee becomes entitled to the commutation of
his service incentive leave, but from the time when the employer refuses to pay its monetary equivalent
after demand of commutation or upon termination of the employee's services Thus, the prescriptive period
with respect to petitioner's claim for her entire SIL pay commenced only from the time of her resignation or
separation from employment. Since petitioner had filed her complaint on October 7, 2009, or a few days
after her resignation in September 2009, her claim for SL pay has not prescribed. Accordingly, petitioner
must be awarded service incentive leave pay for her entire 25 years of service-from 1984 to 2009-and not
only 3 years' worth (2006 to 2009) as determined by the Court of Appeals.