Soft Determinism and Compatibilism – Jack Holliday

Since such great minds as Copernicus, Galileo and earlier still, we have looked at the stars tracking their
celestial orbits, determined by velocity, gravity and other physical constructs and then reflected on the
possibilities such physical laws applying to human beings. As the principle of causation evolved – every
event having a cause, each cause determined by natural laws, each law understandable and knowable –
it was hypothesised that with enough knowledge, accurate predictions could be made of anything.

This determinist stance believes that human beings, and their associated actions, are just as predictable
as anything else in the universe; that water will boil at 100° Celsius, and that it will freeze at 0° Celsius.
And furthermore it’s only lack of knowledge of the laws of behavioural actions and social sciences which
hinder us from being able to accurately and correctly foresee outcomes.

As soon as we begin to reflect upon this notion there are a number of specific criticisms of determinism,
and it is largely based upon these that the polar group, libertarianism, holds its position. Libertarians
claim that determinism offers too narrow a spectrum to allow for consequences of human actions: If it
was already predetermined that the thug would steal the handbag, upon what basis is it right to punish
him for an unavoidable action? If all actions are a mere effect of previous causal events, what, if any,
scope is there for Free Will?

The third position, and the position I will attempt to argue in favour of, is soft determinism. This term,
coined by the American philosopher William James, is alien to these first two theories in that it is a
compatibilist theory; Free Will and determinism are not mutually exclusive, as the hard determinists and
the libertarians claim. 2 acts both have the same effect; not eating for a week. However, causally, they
may differ, and this differentiation is the key. Ghandi fasted for a week to free India, and a man didn’t
eat for a week because he was stranded in a desert. It is clear that here; free will played a part in
Ghandi’s decisions. Although the conditions under which each found themselves may well have been
causally determined, it clearly shows that actions caused can still be free acts.

Determinist’s state that it is morally incomprehensible to punish people for acts which, arguably, they
could not avoid committing, however, this alleviation of moral accountability also alleviates the notion
of Free Will, a potentially crippling notion for determinism; as the principle behind punishment is to
instil the subject with motivation to not commit the atrocity again, or to use the subject as an example
to others as to why not to follow suit. However, if people aren’t culpable for their actions, punishing
them would be like punishing a horse for the actions of its rider. Another thing to note is how
cataclysmic it would be for all but the most nihilistic of ethical systems if determinism was deemed true;
actions, expressions, even your thoughts being nothing but a product of receding actions and events.

Determinists claim that we do make choices, but these are rigorously controlled by preceding actions;
men are free to choose, but what parameters cause him to choose? Chiefly, through common sense, we
can see that a person’s actions are controlled by “Heredity and Environment” (Blatchford, Robert; Not
Guilty). So, we do posses a will to choose, but this is by no means free, detached from all impression.
When it comes to choose, a person will weigh decisions based on his temperament (heredity), or his
training (environment). Ultimately, it is determined what the result is, as one or the other of the decisive
factors will be in majority. The important thing to notice here is that the causal process of determinism
is not impotent, just that the outcome is predetermined. The action of choosing and carrying out the
decision is necessary for causing further events in the world.

Critically, the issue that arises with determinism is that it makes the concept of freedom almost
redundant, D’Holbach wrote; “Man, when running over, frequently without his own knowledge,
frequently in spite of himself, the route which nature has marked out for him, resembles a swimmer
who is obliged to follow the current that carries him along; he believes himself a free agent because he
sometimes consents, sometimes does not consent, to glide with the stream, which, notwithstanding,
always hurries him forward.” Although by many contemporaries, including Hume, this was analysed and
debunked; as mentioned above, the act of choosing, though predetermined, is necessary. The
impression one receives is the same; we are merely an agent of the future, our actions were determined
long ago, through environment, through parental love, through education.

Possibly the most banal, and most penetrating of criticisms is simply how counter intuitive it is; every
person believes, to one extent or another, that they are free to act, that freedom of choice is
uninhibited, that they are truly free agents.

Libertarianism is possibly the widest, most immediate, most powerful common sense intuition shared
between the majority of people outside of the discipline of philosophy. Unhindered, they go about their
business, believing they chose the low fat hot chocolate instead of the bitter espresso, walked instead of
catching the bus, and so on. This linguistic example also opposes determinism quite strongly on the face
of it, the plural possibilities of actions before you make a decision refuting deterministic ideals.
However, the ontological argument is quite ineffective here, as we saw earlier, choosing is still
fundamental, even from a deterministic standpoint.

Quite strongly, Corliss Lamont states that: “Unless there is free choice, the function of human thought in
solving problems becomes superfluous and a mask of make believe” (Religious Humanism, 1969). This is
one issue with determinism, how ‘Free Will’ becomes merely a supervening illusion, an element of
thought which ultimately doesn’t affect the outcome of a decision, and so, is logically unnecessary.

Deterministically, the past creates limitations and potentialities, however, a libertarian will counter that
the past, whilst yes, holding power over the present, does not determine it; merely condition it. This is a
difficult concept to comprehend, as above, determinism counters libertarianism with a parallel and very
closely related argument. A determinist would watch a skier weave and plummet down a hill, watch his
technique and propose that those actions will help to better understand his future actions. A libertarian
will conversely look merely at the current actions, the skier’s free will and knowledge of his own skill
accumulating with the aggregate of inanimate matter, conditioning the actions he takes to traverse the
terrain.

The stark difference between determinism and libertarianism is the effectiveness of moral responsibility
and its consequences. For determinists, there is no moral accountability for yourself, as your being is the
product of past causations. For the libertarian, you, and only you, are wholly responsible for any actions,
and the situation which one may find themselves in due to such moral accountability will be there, as
reinforced above, due to those past actions conditioning, for example, your night in prison for being
drunk and disorderly.

An issue prevalent among many scholars with libertarianism is its apparent disregard for the past. The
past conditions current actions sounding like a loose shroud for saying some elements of choice are
actually determined by past experiences. For example; I have determined that I will not stick my hand in
a fire, because last time I was burnt; the pain conditioning my choice sounds almost like a colloquial
term for, “I learnt from my environment that fire is painful”.

Another criticism levelled at libertarianism is quite recent, and if there is a monumental epistemological
paradigm shift, could well see libertarianism denied in favour of compatibilism altogether. This is the
investigation of subatomic particles and quantum mechanics. Libertarianism, as stated by Lucretius, a
Roman poet and philosopher, is made possible, and free will arises from, entropy, the free chaotic
movement of atoms. However, as more and more is discovered about physical laws, it is being proven
that atomic movements are not purely chaotic, and do obey deterministic laws. For libertarianism to be
maintained then, the only escape is to then claim that Free Will is an esoteric, supernatural property of
humans, as maintained by dualist notions of consciousness and many religious sects. A choice I leave up
to you, but which then raises issues of compatibility and interconnectivity: How does a purely non
physical, esoteric property interact with a purely physical brain and body?

Are determinism and free will mutually exclusive? If a person could track their actions back indefinitely,
each cause determined by a previous one, it’s assumed that these actions cannot be free. However, as
I’ll show, and as soft determinism, or compatibilism proposes to explain, is how they are not
inconsistent. It is through persistent misrepresentation and incorrect defining that these two positions
cannot cohere. If an alien of supreme intelligence were to come to earth, with the preconceived notion
that man was any mammal with five legs, he would quickly establish there is no such creature as ‘man’.
This, as we know instinctively, is absurd. The same applies to the definition of Free Will. It is hard to pin
down because of its incorrect definition. I’ll give two examples of how Free Will is commonly used
outside of philosophy symposiums, and then further define it:

Smith: “Did you work out of your own free will?”

The same, with a different inflection:

Smith: “Did you work out of your own free will?”

Morality is concerned with what people ought and ought not to do, but if what is done is done under
compulsion, it cannot be said to be freely undertook, and how can someone be justly punished for doing
something they could not help doing? It would be under the same logic as punishing people for
breathing, or for their heart beating. What then, is the difference between those acts freely done, and
those done under compulsion? Which characteristic is present in the first example, but not in the
second? The causes, in both examples, are of a different kind, in the first example, Brown worked due to
an internal, mental, psychological motive. However, in the coerced, unfree act, the second example
cited, the motives are most definitely physical, and third personal, from Brown’s point of view. The
threat of a dumbbell is an outside influence, whereas the internal willpower to work is first personal,
and infallible.

Using this as a framework, it’s easy to see that free will does certainly exist; determinist’s insistence of
the opposite is seen as little more than nonsense, as now it’s easy to define any undertaking of an
individual, where the causes are distinctly first personal mental states are an exercise of free will.
Furthermore, such activities could be quite predictable: If Smith knew that Brown was determined to get
the best grades at university; he could accurately predict that Brown would revise. This seems
somewhat of an issue initially for compatibilists; if an action can be accurately determined, where is the
exercising of free will? Well, it’s perfectly true to say that Brown could have refrained from revising, if
the situation were different. As the situation stands, the actions taken were determined due to Brown’s
desires and motives. Predictability and free will are by no means incompatible, and this is obvious, if you
were around somebody a lot, you could begin to predict their actions, and when predicted right, nobody
stares aghast and states that it shows a lack of Free Will, more they state you spend an unhealthy
amount of time together.

As soft determinism encompasses an existence of free will, it also means the theory offers a sufficient
basis for moral responsibility. It is right to laud someone for murder, and to praise them for rescuing a
baby from a river, but should it be so even if their actions are predictable due to predetermination? If
people’s actions are determined, and correctly predicted, as they are acting without compulsion,
exercising free will, should they be called on it? Saying because actions are known with certainty before
they are committed, predictable, excuses them of moral responsibility is ridiculous. If you knew with
absolute certainty Ireland were to win the Six Nations Cup, should they be deprived of it? Because we’re
certain Josef Fritzl will trap people in his cellar should he be allowed, should he be excused of due
punishment? Of course not, doing so would be quite deluded.

Punishment, in short, should be seen as an ulterior motive for acting morally; if a child gets into the
habit of telling lies, a parent will shout or threaten them; the usual motives for truth telling are obviously
corrupt, and it is hoped that an injection of a synthetic motive; fear or punishment, will help cause
someone who might otherwise do evil to do well. The necessity is to supply a cause to allow the subject
to remedy its actions and work as it should; a seemingly noble aspiration of the British Judicial System.

A last example is of an area of dispute within compatibilism, where people’s motives have the potential
to be either first or third personal. A thug puts a pistol to your head and demands your wallet, and, for
the sake of example, you do. Applying the definition of free will here; it looks as though you acted freely,
as fear, as we saw above, is nothing but a synthetic motive, allowing your first personal impulses to work
to a greater standard. The motive, fear of death, is purely psychological, and so counts as a free action.
Although obviously there is repudiation here; as in no way is the action freely undertook, it’s argued that
the use of force as a mental motivator can be manifested as a third personal compulsion. Does this
mean that the definition is wrong? Not really, it’s true, the gun to your head may approximate to actual
force, or it may well be a border case: Aristotle, who wrote extensively on the subject, admitted to
“mixed” or borderline cases where it’s difficult to see whether the acts were free or compelled.

From these examples, I hope to have shown that not only can moral responsibility and determinism
cohere, in many cases they may be seen as requiring one another. If actions were not free, there would
be no justification for punishing murder, lying, stealing, no justification in rewarding honour, valour, and
bravery. Moral responsibility would atrophy and disintegrate. Similarly, if we could not predict and
determine actions, everything would be entropic and unpredictable; we would see people as
irresponsible and overly impulsive. Can free will surely, reading this, be defined as being undetermined
by causes?