REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.5817 OF 2012

Agnigundala Venkata Ranga

Rao ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Indukuru Ramachandra Reddy

(Dead) by LRs. & Ors. .…Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1) This appeal by certificate is filed by the

plaintiff against the final judgment and order dated

28.10.2011 of the High Court of Judicature, Andhra

Pradesh at Hyderabad in Appeal Suit No.4141 of

2003 whereby the High Court allowed the appeal

preferred by the defendants(respondents herein)

and reversed the final judgment and decree dated

22.09.2003 of the Additional Senior Civil Judge,

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Narasaraopet in Original Suit No. 98 of 1998.

2) In order to appreciate the issue involved in the

appeal, which lies in a narrow compass, it is

necessary to state few relevant facts taken from the

appeal paper books.

3) The appellant is the plaintiff whereas the

respondents are the defendants in the civil suit out

of which this appeal arises.

4) The subject matter of this appeal is an

agriculture land measuring Ac.13.38 cents in

Survey No. 436 and Ac. 9.38 cents in Survey No.

826 (total land-22 acres 76 cents) situated in

-Agnigundala Village of Ipur Mandal, District

Guntur Andhra Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as

the "suit land”).

5) The appellant owned several acres of

agriculture lands, which also included the suit land.

The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on

Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (for short, “the

Act”) was enacted on 01.01.1973. It came into force

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on 01.01.1975. The appellant being a "person" as

defined under Section 3(o) of the Act and was

holding the land in excess of the limits prescribed

under the Act filed a declaration in respect of his

holding before the Tribunal as required under

Section 7 of the Act. During the pendency of his

case before the Tribunal, the appellant sold the suit

land vide sale deed dated 16.07.1975 to the

respondents. The sale deed, inter alia, recited that

the appellant has also delivered possession of the

suit land to the respondents. Respondent No. 1 then

mortgaged the suit land along with his other lands

to the State Bank of India and obtained loan

wherein the appellant had stood as the guarantor.

6) The Tribunal, on 21.08.1976, passed an order

in CC No.2311/VKD/75 under Section 7 of the Act

and held inter alia that the appellant was holding

the land in excess of the limits prescribed in the

Act. It was further held that so far as the transfer of

the suit land made by the appellant in favour of the

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respondents vide sale deed dated 16.07.1975 is

concerned, the same was void because it was

effected by the appellant after the Act had come into

force which was prohibited under Section 7(2) read

with Section 17 of the Act. The appellant was,

therefore, directed to surrender the excess land held

by him in favour of the State as provided in the Act.

7) In 1995-1998, i.e., almost after 2 decades from

the date of the order of the Tribunal (21.08.1976),

another litigation began between the appellant and

the respondents in relation to the suit land. This

was under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh

Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971

(for short, "the Act of 1971 ") wherein the issue was

whose name - the appellant or the respondents be

entered in the Pass Book in relation to the suit land

as Pattadar. This litigation ended in appellant's

favour by the orders of the revisionary Court.

8) On 29.10.1998, i.e., almost after 22 years from

the date of the Tribunal’s order (21.08.1976) the

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appellant filed a civil suit (O.S.No. 98/1998) against

the respondents before the Additional Senior Civil

Judge, Narsaraopet out of which this appeal arises.

The suit was for permanent injunction in relation to

the suit land against the respondents. It was

essentially founded on the allegations that the

appellant is the owner of the suit land to the

exclusion of all persons including the respondents,

who have no right to interfere in the appellant's

possession over the suit land. It was averred that

the appellant has been and continues to remain in

possession of the suit land and since the

respondents are threatening the appellant to

dispossess him from the suit land, hence he was

constrained to file the civil suit seeking permanent

injunction against the respondents restraining them

from interfering in appellant’s peaceful possession

over the suit land.

9) The respondents filed written statement. They

denied the appellant's claim and set up a title in

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themselves over the suit land. It was contended

that the respondents purchased the suit land from

the appellant vide sale deed dated 16.07.1975 and

since then they have been in its possession. It was

contended that the respondents on purchase of the

suit land obtained the loan from S.B.I and

mortgaged it with the Bank by way of security for

the loan taken. It was also contended that the

appellant is estopped from raising any contention

once he sold the suit land to the respondents and

stake any claim over the suit land.

10) The Trial Court, on the basis of pleadings,

framed two issues viz., (1) whether the plaintiff

(appellant) is in lawful possession of the suit land;

and (2) whether the plaintiff (appellant) is entitled

for injunction as prayed for?

11) The Trial Court vide judgment/decree dated

22.09.2003 decreed the plaintiff's suit. It was held

that the sale made by the appellant to the

respondent of the suit land vide sale deed dated

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16.07.1975 (Ex-B-1) is null and void being in

contravention of Section 17 of the Act. It was held

that such sale, even if made, did not convey any

right, title and interest in respondents’ favour. It

was further held that the plaintiff is in lawful

possession of the suit land as he was able to prove

his actual possession on the basis of evidence

adduced by him and hence was entitled to seek

permanent injunction against the respondents

restraining the respondents not to dispossess the

appellant from the suit land.

12) Felt aggrieved, the defendants (respondents)

filed first appeal before the High Court. By

impugned judgment and order, the Single Judge of

the High Court allowed the appeal and while setting

aside the judgment/decree of the Trial Court

dismissed the suit. The plaintiff (respondent before

the High Court) then orally prayed to the Single

Judge to grant leave to file appeal to this Court

(Supreme Court) as provided under Article 134-A(b)

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of the Constitution. The Single Judge granted

"leave" to the plaintiff as prayed. This is how this

appeal is brought before this Court on the strength

of the certificate granted by the High Court.

13) Heard Mr. V.V.S.Rao, learned senior counsel

for the appellant and Mr. B. Adinarayana Rao,

learned senior counsel for the respondents. We also

perused the written submissions filed by the

parties.

14) Learned senior counsel for the appellant

(plaintiff), while assailing the legality and

correctness of the impugned judgment, contended

that the High Court (Single Judge) erred in reversing

the judgment/decree passed by the Trial Court. The

submission of the learned counsel, in substance,

was that the judgment of the Trial Court, which had

rightly decreed the appellant’s suit, should be

restored. It is this submission, which learned

counsel elaborated by pointing out various

provisions of the two Acts and the exhibits and

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findings of the two courts below.

15) In reply, learned senior counsel for the

respondents supported the impugned judgment and

contended that no case is made out to interfere in

the impugned order and hence appeal deserves to

be dismissed.

16) Before we consider the merits of the case, it is

apposite to deal with one question which though

arises, was not argued by pointing out the relevant

provisions governing the question.

17) As mentioned above, this appeal is filed on a

certificate granted by the High Court (Single Judge)

on the oral application made by the appellant

immediately after the pronouncement of the

impugned judgment as provided under Article

134-A of the Constitution. The order granting

certificate is a part of the impugned judgment in its

concluding Para which reads thus:

“Learned counsel for the respondent seeks

leave of this Court to prefer an appeal against
this judgment.

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 Accordingly, leave is granted.”

18) What is the true interpretation of Articles 133

and 134-A of the Constitution and who can grant

the certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme

Court remains no more res integra. It is settled by

the decision of this Court in State Bank of India &

Anr. Vs. S.B.I. Employees’ Union & Anr., 1987 (4)

SCC 370.

19) The facts of this case and the one involved in

the SBI case (supra) are somewhat similar wherein

Their Lordships examined the issue as to whether

the certificate granted by the High Court (Single

Judge) satisfied the requirements contained in

Articles 133 and 134-A. Justice Venkataramiah (as

His Lordship then was and later became CJI)

speaking for the Bench held thus:

2. The certificate contemplated under Article

134-A of the Constitution can only be a
certificate which is referred to in clause (1) of
Article 132 or in clause (1) of Article 133 or
in sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of Article 134 of
the Constitution. This is quite obvious from
the language of Article 134-A of the

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Constitution. This case does not fall either
under Article 132(1) or under sub-clause (c) of
Article 134(1) as it neither involves a
substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the Constitution nor it is a
criminal proceeding. It can only fall, if at all,
under Article 133(1) of the Constitution.
Article 133 of the Constitution reads thus:
“133. (1) An appeal shall lie to the
Supreme Court from any
judgment, decree or final order in
a civil proceeding of a High Court
in the territory of India if the
High Court certifies under Article
134-A—
(a) that the case involves a
substantial question of law of
general importance; and
(b) that in the opinion of the High
Court the said question needs to
be decided by the Supreme Court.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in
Article 132, any party appealing
to the Supreme Court under
clause (1) may urge as one of the
grounds in such appeal that a
substantial question of law as to
the interpretation of this
Constitution has been wrongly
decided.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in
this article, no appeal shall,
unless Parliament by law
otherwise provides, lie to the
Supreme Court from the
judgment, decree or final order of
one judge of a High Court.”
3. Clause (3) of Article 133 says that
notwithstanding anything in that article no
appeal shall, unless Parliament by law
otherwise provides, lie to the Supreme Court
from the judgment, decree or final order of
one judge of the High Court. Before the
introduction of Article 134-A of the

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Constitution by the Forty-fourth Amendment
of the Constitution there was no express
provision in Articles 132, 133 and 134 of the
Constitution regarding the time and manner
in which an application for a certificate
under any of those articles could be made
before the High Court. There was also a doubt
as to the power of the High Court to issue a
certificate suo motu under any of those
articles. Article 134-A was enacted to make
good the said deficiencies. Article 134-A does
not constitute an independent provision
under which a certificate can be issued. It is
ancillary to Article 132(1), Article 133(1) and
Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. That is
the reason for the use of words “if the High
Court certifies under Article 134-A” in Article
132(1) and Article 133(1) and for the use of
the words certifies under Article 134-A in
Article 134(1)(c). The High Court can issue a
certificate only when it is satisfied that the
conditions in Article 132 or Article 133 or
Article 134 of the Constitution as the case
may be are satisfied. In the instant case such
a certificate could not have been issued by
reason of clause (3) of Article 133 of the
Constitution by the learned Single Judge.

4. The fact that in a similar case a certificate

had been issued by a Division Bench of the
High Court consisting of two judges in a case
decided by the Division Bench did not
empower the Single Judge to issue the
certificate under Article 133(1) of the
Constitution in a case decided by him. The
restriction placed by clause (3) of Article 133
of the Constitution could not be got over by
relying upon the order of the Division Bench.

5. We, therefore, revoke the certificate. This

petition of appeal may, however, be treated
as a special leave petition under Article 136
of the Constitution and posted for
preliminary hearing.”

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20) In our considered opinion, the law laid down in

S.B.I case (supra) would squarely apply to the case

at hand because in the instant case also, the

impugned judgment and the certificate of fitness to

file an appeal was passed by the Single Judge of

the High Court.

21) As held in S.B.I. case, such certificate/leave

could not have been issued/granted by the Single

Judge by reason of clause (3) of Article 133 of the

Constitution. In other words, the Single Judge of

the High Court had no jurisdiction to grant

certificate in the light of restrictions contained in

clause (3) of Article 133 of the Constitution.

22) We, therefore, revoke the certificate granted by

the Single Judge of the High Court. However, this

appeal is treated as a special leave petition under

Article 136 of the Constitution as was done by this

Court in S.B.I case (supra). Leave is accordingly

granted.

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23) Coming now to the merits of the case, the

short question, which arises for consideration in

this appeal and which was also debated before the

two Courts below, is who was in possession of the

suit land- the appellant or the respondents on the

date of filing of the suit and whether the appellant

(plaintiff) was entitled to claim permanent

injunction against the respondents(defendants) in

relation to the suit land.

24) The Trial Court held the appellant (plaintiff) to

be in possession of the suit land and accordingly

granted permanent injunction restraining the

respondents (defendants) from interfering in the

appellant's possession over the suit land whereas

the High Court in an appeal filed by the

respondents reversed the finding of the Trial Court

and dismissed the suit giving rise to filing of this

appeal by the plaintiff on certificate.

25) One cannot dispute the legal proposition being

well settled that the question as to who is in

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possession of the suit property is essentially a

question of fact. Such question is required to be

decided on appreciation of evidence adduced by the

parties in support of their respective contentions.

Once the Trial Court renders a finding either way

and the same is then appreciated by the first

appellate Court in exercise of its appellate

jurisdiction, such finding is usually held binding on

the second appellate Court and this Court.

26) It is only when such finding of fact is found to

be against the pleading or evidence or any provision

of law or when it is found to be so perverse or/and

arbitrary to the extent that no judicial person of an

average capacity can ever record, the same would

not be binding on the higher Courts and may in

appropriate case call for interference.

27) Coming to the facts of the case, we are of the

considered opinion, that the appellant (plaintiff)

simply abused the process of law in filing the suit

for permanent injunction in relation to the suit land

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against the respondents. The suit, in our opinion,

was misconceived and deserved dismissal on facts

and in law on the grounds, which are indeed

apparent on the face of the record of the case as

mentioned below.

28) Firstly, the legal effect of the coming into force

of the Act was that on and after 01.01.1975 (notified

date), the appellant being the holder of agriculture

lands had no right to sell or/and transfer the suit

land whether for consideration or otherwise. In

other words, the sale/transfer of agriculture land by

the holder of the land was prohibited on and after

-01.01.1975 by virtue of the provisions of the Act. In

this view of the matter, the sale made by the

appellant vide sale deed dated 16.07.1975 in favour

of the respondents in relation to the suit land was

null and void.

29) Secondly, the Tribunal having rightly held in

the order dated 21.08.1976 that the sale deed dated

16.07.1975 executed by the appellant in favour of

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the respondents was null and void because it was

made in contravention of the provisions of the Act

and secondly, having held that the appellant's total

holding was in excess of the ceiling limits prescribed

in the Act, the suit land was not available to the

appellant for its disposal. Indeed its disposal could

be done only in accordance with the provisions of

the Act with the intervention of the State.

30) That apart, one of the legal effects that ensued

consequent upon passing of the order by the

Tribunal dated 21.08.1976 was that the character of

the suit land had changed. It was then in the nature

of "surrendered" or "deemed surrendered" land in

favour of the State as prescribed under Sections 10

and 11 and other related provisions of the Act.

31) Thirdly, the litigation, which had ensued

during 1995-98 between the appellant and the

respondents under "The Act of 1971" in relation to

the entries of their names in the revenue record

(Pass Book) pertaining to the suit land was neither

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of any consequence and nor was of any significance

and nor had any impact on the present litigation. It

was for the reason that Section 28 of the Act that

gives overriding effect to the provisions of the Act on

all those laws, which are inconsistent with the

provisions of the Act, had applied to this case. The

Act of 1971 is one such law and, therefore, any

order passed under the Act of 1971 in relation to

the suit land was of no avail to any party and nor it

could have been made basis for determining the

issue of possession of any party over the suit land

while considering the grant of injunction.

32) In other words, no benefit of the order(s), even

if passed, under the Act 1971 could be taken by the

parties either way against each other in these

proceedings by virtue of Section 28 of the Act.

Moreover, in our considered view, no proceedings

under the Act 1971 could either be initiated or be

pursued by the appellant/respondents in relation to

the suit land after the Act had come into force

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(01.01.1975). Even the proceedings under the Act of

1971 were subject to the final outcome of the

proceedings under the Act.

33) Fourthly, the appellant did not come to the

Civil Court with clean hands inasmuch as he

suppressed the material fact that he had already

sold the suit land much prior to filing of the Suit to

the respondents and, therefore, had no subsisting

interest in the suit land. Indeed filing of the civil

suit by the appellant (29.10.1998) almost after 22

years from the date of passing of the order by the

Tribunal (21.08.1976) was totally uncalled for. In

fact, it was a collusive suit filed to frustrate the

rights of the State which had accrued in State’s

favour in the suit land by virtue of the order dated

21.08.1976 read with the provisions of the Act.

Such frivolous suit, in our considered opinion,

deserved rejection at its threshold.

34) Fifthly, the Trial Court and the High Court

having held on the strength of Tribunal's finding

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recorded in the order 21.08.1976 which has

attained finality that the appellant was not the

owner of the suit land, the respondents too did not

acquire any right, title and interest in the suit land

through sale deed dated 16.07.1975. It being a

settled principle of law that a person can transfer

only those rights, which he has in the property and

cannot transfer any rights, which he does not have

would apply to this case.

35) In other words, when the appellant was

prohibited to transfer any of his rights, title and

interest in the suit land by virtue of the provisions

of the Act to any person - a fortiori, the respondents

too could not acquire any rights, title and interest in

the suit land through sale deed dated 16.07.1975

from the appellant and he too was, therefore, in the

same position like that of the appellant.

36) Seventhly, once the appellant's rights in the

suit land stood determined by the Tribunal vide its

order dated 21.08.1976 under the Act, there did not

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arise any occasion to hold the appellant to be in

“lawful possession" of the suit land on the date of

filing of the suit (29.10.98) for considering grant of

injunction over the suit land against the

respondents.

37) It is a settled principle of law that in order to

claim prohibitory (temporary or permanent)

injunction, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prima

facie prove apart from establishing other two

ingredients, namely, irreparable loss and injury that

his possession over the suit land is "legal". In this

case, it was not so and nor it could be for the simple

reason that as far back on 21.08.1976, the Tribunal

had already declared the land held by the plaintiff to

be in excess of the ceiling limits prescribed under

the Act. In these circumstances, the plaintiff was

neither holding the land nor could he be held to be

in its lawful possession so as to enable him to

exercise any ownership rights against any other

private party over the suit land. The appellant had

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then very limited rights left to exercise under the

Act in relation to the suit land and such rights were

available to him only against the State. Such is not

the case here.

38) Lastly, this being a simple suit for grant of

permanent injunction between the two private

parties in relation to the land which was subject

matter of the State Ceiling Laws, was liable to be

dismissed on the short ground apart from many

others as detailed above that any order that may be

passed by the Civil Court would adversely affect and

interfere in the rights of the State under the Act,

which had not been impleaded as party defendant.

39) Learned counsel for the appellant took us to

the various documents including orders of the

Revenue authorities to show that it was the plaintiff

who was in possession of the suit land on the date

of filing of the suit as was rightly held by the Trial

Court and, therefore, this Court should restore the

finding of the Trial Court.

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40) We are afraid we cannot re-appreciate the

documentary or/and oral evidence again in our

appellate jurisdiction. Firstly, it is not permissible

for want of any case made out to that effect and

secondly, it is not considered necessary in the light

of what we have held above.

41) Learned counsel for the appellant placed

reliance on several decisions in support of his

submission such as Nagubai Ammal & Ors. vs. B.

Shama Rao & Ors., AIR 1956 SC 593, Bhagwati

Prasad vs. Shri Chandramaul, AIR 1966 SC 735,

Pinninti Kishtamma & Ors. vs. Duvvada

Parasuram Chowdary & Ors. 2010 (2) SCC 452,

State of Tamil Nadu vs. Ramalinga Samigal

Madam, 1985 (4) SCC 10, Annamreddi Bodayya &

Anr. vs. Lokanarapu Ramaswamy(Dead) by L.Rs.

1984 Suppl SCC 391, Anathula Sudhakar vs. P.

Buchi Reddy(D) by L.Rs., 2008 (4) SCC 594,

Rajendra Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors.,

(1998) 7 SCC 654 and Karnail Singh vs. State of

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Haryana & Anr., (1995) Suppl(3) SCC 376. We have

perused these decisions and find no quarrel with

the general proposition of law laid down therein. In

our view, all the decisions cited are distinguishable

on facts and hence have no application to the facts

of this case.

42) It is pertinent to mention that in order to limit

filing of such frivolous suits by the private parties in

relation to agricultural land which are subjected to

the State ceiling laws, the State of M.P. amended

the Code of Civil Procedure by Act No. 29 of 1984

w.e.f. 14.8.84. By this State amendment, Rule 3-B

was added in Order 1 Rule 10 making it obligatory

upon the plaintiff to implead the State as party

defendant along with private party defendant in

every such suit. The amendment further provides

that so long as the plaintiff does not implead the

State as party defendant in the suit, the Court will

not proceed with the trial of the Suit. The object

behind introducing such amendment was to give

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notice to the State of filing of such suit by the

holder of the agricultural land which would enable

the State to defend their rights, which had accrued

in State's favour in the land under the Act.

43) In the absence of any such rule in operation in

the State of A.P., the State remained unnoticed of

the suit proceedings, which continued in Courts for

last more than two decades.

44) In view of foregoing discussion, we uphold the

conclusion arrived at by the High Court on our

reasoning given supra. As a consequence, the

appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.

45) Before parting, we consider it apposite to state

that the appellant and the respondents made frantic

efforts to somehow retain the suit land to them and

keep the land away from the clutches of The Act.

With this aim in view, they got the suit land

involved in this litigation since 1976. All this was

done without notice to the State Authorities.

46) We, therefore, direct the Tribunal to take up

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the case of the appellant on its Board and pass

appropriate consequential order, if necessary under

the Act keeping in view the order dated 21.08.1976

of the Tribunal passed in CC No. 2311/VKD/75

and take all remedial steps as are necessary in

relation to the land held by the appellant including

the suit land.

47) Registry is directed to send a copy of this order

to the concerned Tribunal.

…...
……..................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

………...................................J.
[NAVIN SINHA]
New Delhi;
April 13, 2017

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